What Lies Ahead?
The Iraq War and International Politics
Lowy Institute
Studies in International Policy
August 2007
WHAT LIES AHEAD? THE IRAQ WAR AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS Much of the current debate surrounding the war in Iraq has, unsurprisingly, centred on the immediate future of the US military presence in the country. That is, the focus has been on the particular policy choices with respect to Iraq. Yet as most commentators have acknowledged, the war is also likely to have significant consequences beyond Iraq’s borders. This collection is an effort to consider what some of the broader implications of the Iraq war will be for international politics. Of course, it is a little invidious to begin considering the wider impacts of the war before it is yet over. The general, though by no means undisputed, view that the war has been a failure might yet be reversed by a dramatic improvement in the security situation in Iraq or by a deal between rival political and sectarian forces in the country. And even if the war continues heading along its largely negative trajectory, it is difficult to believe that the US forces will exit the country in the short to medium term, given the strategic interests that are at stake in Iraq and the broader Middle East. Nevertheless, there are strong grounds for considering now what the longer term consequences of the war will be. More importantly, it is imperative that policymakers start thinking now about what kind of international environment they are likely to face in the aftermath of the Iraq episode. This is not just because they will have to deal with these consequences of the war, but also because an appreciation of the war’s broader impact should also inform decisions on the future course of American policy in the still unfinished conflict in Iraq. The collection of transcripts and essays we present here is intended to help spur a broader consideration of the war’s likely aftermath. What lies ahead? The Iraq war and international politics reflects and draw upon presentations and discussion of at the Lowy Institute conference of the same name held on 29 June 2007. The collection covers the waterfront of possible consequences, including the impact of the war on the future conduct of the United States as a world power, the future stability of the Middle East, the war on terror and Australia’s alliance relationship with the United States. The collection is organised into three parts. In Part I, in an edited transcript of their comments to the Lowy Institute’s 29 June conference, distinguished US commentators William Kristol and Gideon Rose debate the consequences of the war for US international policy. In Part II, essays by Ezzedine Chourki­Fishere and Anthony Bubalo consider the implications for the Middle East. And finally in part III Hugh White and Dan Flitton consider the implications for Australia. Lowy Institute for International Policy 30 August 2007
About the contributors William Kristol, Editor and Founder of The Weekly Standard Before starting The Weekly Standard in 1995, William Kristol led the Project for the Republican Future, where he helped shape the strategy that produced the 1994 Republican congressional victory. Prior to that, he served as chief of staff to Vice President Dan Quayle during the Bush administration and to Secretary of Education William Bennett under President Reagan. Gideon Rose, Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs Gideon Rose has been Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs since December 2000. He has served as Associate Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council and has taught American foreign policy at Princeton and Columbia universities. Dr Ezzedine Choukri­Fishere, Counselor, Cabinet of the Egyptian Foreign Minister Previously Ezzedine Choukri­Fishere served as Special Advisor to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), Khartoum, Senior Political Advisor to the UN Fact­Finding Mission Regarding the Assassination of Former PM Hariri, and Senior Political Advisor to the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO). He also served as head of the political section in the Egyptian Embassy in Israel from 1999 to 2001. Anthony Bubalo, Program Director, West Asia, Lowy Institute for International Policy Prior to joining the Lowy Institute in 2004, Anthony Bubalo was an officer in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) for 13 years. He served in Australian missions in Saudi Arabia and Israel and was Middle East Analyst with the Office of National Assessments from 1996 to 1998. From 2002­2003 he was Director of the Policy and Coordination Unit in the Australian government's Iraq Task Force. Immediately prior to joining the Lowy Institute he was DFAT’s Senior Speechwriter. Prof. Hugh White, Head Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University Hugh White is a Visiting Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy. From 2001 to 2004 he was the first Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). Before that he had served as an intelligence analyst with the Office of National Assessments, as a journalist with the Sydney Morning Herald, as a senior adviser on the staffs of Defence Minister Kim Beazley and Prime Minister Bob Hawke, and as a senior official in the Department of Defence, where from 1995 to 2000 he was Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence. Dan Flitton, Diplomatic Editor, The Age Daniel Flitton was appointed diplomatic editor at The Age newspaper in June 2007. Most recently he has worked as an analyst for the Office of National Assessments. He has also held positions as a researcher at the Australian National University and as an associate lecturer at Deakin University. He has been a Fulbright Scholar at Georgetown University and has written analysis and articles for a range of publications.
2 I. The Iraq war and the United States The following is an edited transcript of comments made by William Kristol and Gideon Rose to the Lowy Institute conference ‘What lies ahead? The Iraq war and international politics’ held on 29 June, 2007. William Kristol The implications of Iraq are hard to separate from the outcome in Iraq which I believe is uncertain. I do not believe we’ve lost in Iraq; in fact I’m much more optimistic than I was six months ago or a year ago. I actually think that the new strategy is succeeding on the ground and can succeed. By no means is it guaranteed to succeed but I actually now think the odds are slightly better than 50/50 which I would not have predicted three months ago. However, domestic support here is obviously tenuous and it is a huge question what happens in summer – can we make progress on the ground fast enough to stop people here from snatching certain defeat out of the jaws of at least possible victory or at least possible moderate success. There are a lot of things between victory and defeat and a lot of those middle grounds between victory and defeat are a lot more desirable than the flat­out defeat of withdrawal and the consequences that I think would follow from that. Obviously a lot depends on what happens. For a good update on this I would actually recommend someone from Australia as it happens, who just posted a terrific update on the Small Wars website and that’s David Kilcullen, General Petraeus’ advisor on counter­ insurgency operations. We’re finally fighting a real counter­insurgency and we’re doing pretty well actually. Whether it’s too late is obviously a question, though even if it’s quote, ‘too late’, a lot depends on the ways in which we achieve a less than fully satisfactory outcome over the next year or two. So it’s an obvious point but one we should stipulate, and I do want to just say for the record that I’m by no means convinced that this is lost. We’ve had a quite successful outcome actually and I’m not convinced that domestically we can’t sustain the war as well, though this is a low point, I would say, in support. Having said that, two points I’d make. I would say generally, for most of the last four years, or the last six years, what is most striking is we’ve been engaged in this extremely intensive foreign policy effort in the Middle East, part of which is the war in Iraq, but obviously there’s been a huge focus on what to do about jihadist Islam, how to contain Iran if we can and obviously a big debate about Iraq, and huge concerns about Al Qaeda and whether it’s getting stronger or weaker or some combination of the two. What’s striking when you, however, look at the rest of the world is American foreign policy hasn’t changed that much to the rest of the world and we seem to be neither much better off nor much worse off in the rest of the world. I defer to people in Australia about our situation in East Asia, but basically if you really step back and look at it, it’s not very different, it seems to me, from what it was when Bush took over: probably stronger, actually, is the relationship with Japan and India; the same mix of engagement and containment with China; we have a strong relationship obviously with Australia; Indonesia, there are problems, but there are many worse cases that could have happened than what’s been happening there, etc.
3 So in general I think Asian policy is surprisingly stable and the situation strikes me incidentally as reasonably stable. I would say the same about Latin America and the same about Europe. Chavez has been a setback in Latin America, and not particularly related to Iraq, I don’t think. On the other hand there’s the two biggest countries in Latin America – Brazil and Mexico – that are in much better shape than what we were predicting 10 or 15 years ago. Europe; is a complicated situation in terms of what its future is, ultimately, as a major partner in preserving what we can preserve of a decent liberal world order and advancing that order. Some of us would like a much stronger and more conservative Europe, however, I don’t think that’s going to happen. On the other hand, for all the talk and the public opinion polls about how unpopular the US is in Europe, we now have the voters of France and Germany replacing Chirac and Schroeder with Sarkozy and Merkel, which isn’t exactly a sign that being somewhat pro­American is the kiss of death. In Europe other elections in Spain and in Italy have gone the other way; Brown and Blair doesn’t strike me as a big change. I would say that if you had gone to sleep with the Clinton administration in power and woke up now, the world has changed some – Europe is much more aware of their problem with radical Islam – but basically the fundamental US­European relationship is quite similar. NATO’s actions have probably been a little better in Afghanistan than a lot of us might have predicted five or ten years ago, though one wishes there were more European capacity, frankly, and help with some of these important missions. I still think the Middle East is central, obviously, because the threats coming from the Middle East are so central. Having said that, it is somewhat surprising, I suppose, that the rest of the world seems to have chugged along in the usual mixed way the world chugs along, and I would say from the US point of view, not unsatisfactorily. There are a lot worse outcomes in major parts of the world that could have happened over the last five years, or for that matter over the last 10 or 15 years, than have. So one might, therefore, say that success in Iraq or failure in Iraq may affect US Asia policy or US standing in Asia, US­European relations and US standing in Europe, NATO, or in Latin America, much less than one might think. In that respect for all the centrality of the Middle East, it’s still only the Middle East and I think that’s a point worth making. Obviously people in Australia would have a better sense, in an Asian context, of how much spill­over there’s been for better or worse. But I think if one steps back one is more struck by continuity in most of US foreign policy over the last five or ten years than by discontinuities – except in the Middle East. So we come to the Middle East, which is awfully important, and there I think it’s very much of a mixed bag. The Bush administration has made a lot of mistakes. Some people would say we never could have achieved what we set out to – I think we could have. Positive effects seemed to be happening in 2003, 2004 with some liberal ferment in the Arab world like the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon. Even with the Israeli pull­out at Gaza, there possibly could have been a non­terror state, a Palestinian state. Well a lot of those hopes obviously haven’t been fulfilled and that obviously is bad from the US point of view, and I would say bad from the world’s point of view. On the other hand the most dire predictions that the US would be involved in a lengthy ground war in the heart of the Middle East fighting Muslims – or fighting self­proclaimed
4 defenders of Islam – and that this would just spark unparalleled rage in the Middle East and the Arab world, and that every pro­American government would fall – that certainly hasn’t happened either. What’s again stunning is that is if one looks outside Iraq, it’s quite similar really to the way it was five, ten years ago; which is to say it’s a mess and it’s not what we would hope to make it or to help them make themselves, but nor did most of the worst things happen. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, even Iran, is pretty much on a course – those nations strike me as having the same mixtures of dangers and opportunities, threats and good relationships, in some cases, that they had before. Having said that, I do think what happens in Iraq is very important for the Middle East. If we are driven out of Iraq by a combination of Al Qaeda and Iran that will be very bad. It would be victory for Al Qaeda, it will certainly energise Al Qaeda throughout the region. It will also strengthen Iran and that will be very bad. It’s going to reinforce the radicalism, both Shia and Sunni. It will cause our allies to rethink our commitment to the region. It could easily lead to a nuclear arms race in response to the Iranian nuclear program. So if we win, if we stay the course, if we have a decent government in Iraq, not dominated by Iran, where Al Qaeda is not able to set up shop, that’s a positive outcome and then I think we could turn our attention to a million other problems in the Middle East; not in a military way particularly, but turn our attention diplomatically to strengthening the positive forces in that region and beating back the various forms of extremism and the various forms of support for terror. Winning is better than losing. I do think a Middle East in which Al Qaeda and Iran are energised and strengthened is obviously dangerous beyond the borders of the Middle East and that’s why some of us think it’s so important to fight on in Iraq and to fight to win in Iraq. I think that while so much of the debate in the United States has been so childish and so irresponsible, the idea that because we made mistakes, even very bad mistakes, the idea that we would therefore just throw up our hands is really just appalling in terms of this short­ sightedness. But, and frankly, even muddling through at the level we are at right now is much better than a very bad outcome. But American domestic politics, like the domestic politics of any democracy, moves in emotional ways and people will understandably react to past failures and want to punish the administration for past failures, even if it would be detrimental I think to our national interests. That has happened a little bit already and it may happen over the next year and a half as we move toward November 2008. Speaking of 2008 and the question, is the Bush Doctrine dead? And who knows exactly what the Bush Doctrine was, but how much would change if it really was? But I believe that if we were to get together three years from now and a Democratic administration would have been in power for a year and a half, we would all be struck by how similar US foreign policy would be, not how dissimilar. We might have gotten out of Iraq – I doubt if we will be fully out of Iraq – but we will be committed to many of the same goals in the Middle East and elsewhere, the fundamental alliance structure of countries will be similar, this country will be similar, the challenges and threats will be similar. The question of what to do about the Iranian nuclear program – if it hasn’t already become a functioning one – will be front and centre. The tough trade­off between working with autocratic governments that has undesirable effects in terms of public opinion in these countries and the ability of groups like Al Qaeda to recruit and, on the other hand, the dangers of promoting democratisation too radically will still be there – there may be a slightly different balance struck up, though I’m not sure even how. So I actually I don’t think, whatever the judgement on Bush, whatever the judgement on Iraq, I think basically American foreign policy around the world – and even in
5 the Middle East – will be more similar than dissimilar after Iraq. There may be a short­term aversion to any foreign entanglement or venture, but what struck me about the debate here, is how unlike it is to the debate here in 1970s. No­one is calling to radically tighten the defence budget; no­one’s calling to pull US troops out of Japan or Korea or Europe; no­one is even calling for failing to be interested in the future of the Middle East; no­one is saying you shouldn’t be concerned about the Iranian nuclear program; no­one is saying you should defer to the UN in every instance, where fundamental national interests are at stake. I mean it is striking to me that if you separate Iraq, I think there’s a fair amount of consensus and, therefore, I think there is likely to be a fair amount of continuity in American foreign policy.
6 Gideon Rose Let me start by giving the ultimate view of the last few years. The Bush administration took office, getting a thoroughly decent hand on foreign policy from the Clinton administration. For the first nine months you saw fairly similar policy principles with differences in some of the rhetoric. Then came 9/11. 9/11 was, of course, a dramatic rift in the time and space continuum and so forth; everybody has focused on the fact that it identified a new threat and brought home the significance of the threat of radical Islam and the danger of terrorism. But as significant as I think this new threat was, the impact it had domestically in the United States seemed to be that it essentially unlocked the key to the bank account of American power. The American public responded to 9/11 by giving a blank cheque to its leaders, essentially saying ‘get the bastards who did this and make sure it never happens again. We’re not going to micro­manage you; do what you have to do.’ And this essentially gave the Bush administration complete freedom domestically to do whatever it wanted in foreign policy and particularly with regard to the threat from abroad. The key thing to understand about the Bush years after 9/11 was the lack of constraint on decision­makers who had no external checks and no internal checks because of the domestic reaction. That is a situation where the policymakers had complete freedom of action to do whatever they wanted. The initial invasion of Afghanistan was almost a knee­jerk reaction; any President would have done something essentially the same once it was decided who had been responsible for 9/11 and the Taliban wouldn’t give him up. But the interesting questions for American foreign policy began in the winter or spring of 2002; that was when the initial response to 9/11 had been taken and the question then became what else do you do? Where do you go from here? And because of this lack of constraint, externally and internally, the administration could have done anything it wanted to do essentially. It was like the 800 pound gorilla in the old joke: Where did it sit? Wherever it wanted to. The Administration chose to go into Iraq. It decided to essentially use the capital and the freedom of action it had to go after Iraq. Now we’re still not entirely sure why the Administration did this. There were reasons that were given and there are the official reasons and the unofficial reasons all of which are unsatisfactory because none of them explain what happened as it happened. But be that as it may, the Iraqi venture was embarked on, on the basis that it would be a relatively quick turnaround. That is, when success came it would come quickly and the doubters would be silenced. In 1991 when we first went to war against Iraq it was not especially popular at first but then everybody jumped on the bandwagon when it became clear that it was a success. The problem was, of course, that pretty soon after the war began it became clear that it wasn’t going to be a success. At this point rather than being able to flip the investment, rather than being able to parley the proceeds of a successful bet into other successful bets elsewhere the Administration found all its capital – financial, military, diplomatic or whatever, bureaucratic, mental, and so forth – tied up in Iraq. And what’s happened since then is they’ve been trapped and gradually the grinding process of post­war Iraq and the conflict there has ground down this capital that’s been trapped there and essentially meant that practically nothing else has been done in foreign policy. That’s an exaggeration, some things have been done but by and large we have been in stasis mode for several years. To the question about whether the Bush doctrine was dead or will be dead, the Bush doctrine had died by at least 2004, but probably in 2003: we were bogged down in Iraq; no weapons
7 were found; pre­emption was gone; regime change was also gone because everyone realised that we had little idea of how to make it work; the ‘with us or against us’ frame wouldn’t work because some of the key allies… we’re weren’t able to put them in either category… countries like Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, even Libya. The Libyan deal that was cut was a classic deal of coercive diplomacy in which the very key to the deal was trading off regime change in return for a behavioural change. We said to Gaddafi ‘you can stay as long as you give up your weapons and terrorism’, which is precisely the kind of thing that the Bush doctrine was supposed to be not in favour of. So the Bush doctrine was dead, and the resources of the Administration were tied up in Iraq. Now we have seen this playing out over the last several years. The public didn’t really understand this, which is why the election was so close in 2004. So you’ve got a narrow victory that didn’t change anything and allowed the Bush administration to stand by its run and not change anything in a very foolish way. So what happened was, the Bush administration got itself in a little corner and then didn’t fix any of the problems. The result has been that the second term of Bush has essentially unwritten the supposed foreign policy revolution of the first term. Every major element of the Bush foreign policy right now is in a shambles, lying on the floor, hacked away and we’re back to where we started. 9/11 brought home the dangers of doing nothing. So isolation was not the answer. But Iraq showed that you can move forward and try and blow up the enemy in his home base – try to act on a hunch rather than a proof – and you can get in trouble there too. So, essentially, the American public now doesn’t really know what to do. It knows the Bush answers aren’t valid. There’s widespread revulsion across the board at the President’s foreign policy; and so the one thing America is not going to repeat is the Bush policies, but no one really knows what’s going to happen next. I would say a lot of the things that Bill just said about the state of the world are somewhat true if I took them and spun them rather positively. But to the extent that they are true I think that the world outside the Middle East is not that bad because, essentially, the Bush administration has been forced to adopt a policy of benign neglect. The Bush policy towards Asia was going to be dramatically confrontational towards China. Like when the plane incident occurred, the initial response of the Administration was to demand the plane be returned. They couldn’t get the plane back and midway through the plane incident the Administration shifted course on a dime, Powell was sent out to apologise, the plane comes back and now China’s taught us a lesson. The administration’s basically realised that its confrontational China policy wasn’t going to work and it has remained quiet on the China front by and large ever since. It has drawn positively towards India – which has been one of its great successes – but as to the rest of Asia it hasn’t paid much attention. In Latin America, the Bush administration, if it would have wanted to do something it would have been very belligerent towards Chavez. It couldn’t because of Iraq so it hasn’t done anything. In Europe everybody hates us. Africa; no one really cares about Africa so it’s the same as it was before. With regard to the Middle East they hate us as much as they did when the war first started, so things are not that much worse than they were. So where are we now with what’s going to happen? I think they’re still kidding themselves about the general American position. The world may not be in bad shape, but the American position in the war is in awful shape. Every poll shows that we’re widely hated and abused. And one of the things that the Administration and its neo­conservative supporters never quite realised was that the extent of American power in the world wasn’t just an opportunity to do
8 things, it was something that scared other countries and that one of the things that we had to do was reassure the rest of the world that we would use our power responsibly for collective good. And that essentially what the Bush administration has done by acting so recklessly and incompetently in Iraq and elsewhere has been to make everyone else more scared of us and wanting to see us less powerful than they should because actually we are a force for good but no­one recognises that now. What’s going to happen, I would suggest, is the following: the Bush Doctrine is dead, but the War on Terror will remain. The reason the war on terror will remain, under whatever guise or name, is that the problem of violent radical Islam is spreading. Al Qaeda has been displaced from Afghanistan, but has scattered to the four corners of the region and given a toe­hold in a whole variety of places and has local cells and sympathisers in Europe and elsewhere. The problem of dealing with radical Islamist terrorism will indeed be a generational issue and it’s going to be with us for a long time, whatever policies you want to use against it. American military intervention is, by and large, off the table; the American public will not stomach it. We didn’t have to worry about the use of force against Iran from at least June 2003; I’ve won lots of money betting over the last few years, that there wouldn’t be an American attack on Iran, and I would continue to take that bet. There simply isn’t the resources, the will, the political capital, the confidence and judgement and so forth to carry that out. Basically the American public is making sure that the next Administration will get what in American parenting terms would be called a ‘time out’. This isn’t going to last very long and it’s not going to be very pleasant for us or for others. But at the end of the day, it’s going to be salutary, for two reasons: one, because we’ve realised that we don’t have to do everything all the time and that things are okay a little bit without us; and more importantly, the rest of the world will recognise that they actually do want us to play a role; that hegemonic stability theory is not some academic construct or some neo­imperial adventure, but rather a very practical and serious mode of operation that the strongest power in the world should be the one to provide benevolent collective goods to the system as a whole and when the United States doesn’t play a role, doesn’t seem active then everybody else on our side either will have to do it themselves or suffice to see things not getting done. Basically the next administration, if it is smart, will concentrate on the major issues, great power peace, a global free trade system that produces ever greater economic development, and some kind of attempt at continuing political liberalisation around the world – how exactly that can be done you can debate. But with the focus on those kinds of big picture issues, the American public will be relieved to see competence return to the White House. The rest of the world will be relieved to see responsible adult supervision of American power and the really interesting fact about the current international situation in international relations terms, which is the lack of actual balancing of American power, will continue if the rest of the world sees the United States playing a generally benevolent role in the world. They will continue to de facto trust the United States with its power and generally follow its lead rather than resist that power the way they have with other hegemons over time. But what is required, what is going to be required, and what the Bush administration can’t do no matter what it tries at this point, but what the next Administration will have to do, is reassure the American public and the world at large, that the vast power in American hands
9 can be used responsibly and prudently for the betterment of the world at large. I am just as confident as Bill that this is in fact what American power is meant to do, has done generally throughout history, and can and should do in the future. Unfortunately the number of people who still believe that could probably be contained in the room in which this conference is being held right now. And the challenge for the next President is to convince everybody else that what we think is still true. It can be done. I think it will be done. It will be done by a Democratic President almost certainly and let’s hope that there’s a certain degree of competance after the irresponsibility of the last several years.
10 II. The Iraq war and the Middle East Ezzedine Choukri­Fishere It is now all apparent that the Coalition is unable to restore normalcy to Iraq on at least four main fronts. First, and despite recent improvements, the Coalition remains incapable of ending violence targeting its own forces or those of the Iraqi government. Secondly, the Coalition has been unsuccessful in its rather shy attempts to control the armed militias or to re­establish inter­communal peace. Thirdly, the US­backed political process remains, it seems, in a deadlock: important segments of the Iraqi society choose not to participate in it unless it undergoes substantial changes; meanwhile the Shiite­dominated groups in power oppose most of these changes. Finally, both engagement of, and pressure on, Iraq’s neighbors have failed to garner their support or to curb Iran’s intrusive influence in Iraq. This multiple failure, and the dynamics that produced it, have serious consequences for regional security, especially if the Coalition decides to withdraw or reduce its forces drastically. Lend a hand to your enemy: Iraq as a regional hub for insurgency The collapse of law and order in Iraq and the continued presence of areas where the Coalition forces have little influence, offer safe haven for various armed groups in the region. The proliferation of unknown quantities of weapons and explosives throughout the country adds an attraction for these armed groups to establish themselves in Iraq. Groups with national, regional and global agendas find this environment propitious for regrouping, retraining and launching operations, transforming Iraq into a regional hub for armed groups. Afghanistan played this role in the 1980s and the 1990s, and its consequences for regional security have been painful to many security agencies in the region and to some outside it. In addition to its territory being used by Al Qaida and other armed groups, the ‘returnees from Afghanistan’ became the backbone of almost every group that used violence in the Middle East. Iraq, in the view of many security officials, offers a similar, if not worse, prospects. Combined with the residual security challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the reported Iranian involvement with both types of insurgents, the picture becomes quite gloomy. In addition, the inability of the coalition forces to defeat the insurgents, despite the use of overwhelming force and sophisticated armament, hugely boosts the self­confidence of armed groups and their prestige in the region and constitutes a serious challenge to American deterrence. There is a widely­shared perception that a small group of insurgents, with limited armament and organisational capabilities, has defeated the only superpower, just as the Mujahedeen had defeated the Soviet Union and Hizballah defeated Israel. Regardless of the truth of these perceptions, they create a new disposition in the region to defy US power. Simultaneously, the war in Iraq weakens the standing of those who advocate moderation in the region. In the eyes of the population, the moderate regimes have failed to protect them and to prevent the invasion of an independent Arab State. Moderation is discredited, while extremism is shown to have worked in Iraq. Moderate regimes are also accused of complicity in the invasion of Iraq, which erodes the already shaken legitimacy of these regimes and fuels internal instability. This is not to suggest that any of these regimes will fall because of the war on Iraq, but when the next moderate regime falls to extremists (through elections or force), this war would certainly feature among the main factors leading to its downfall.
11 Iraq’ spill­over: the Shiite/Sunni fault­line The worsening Shiite/Sunni tension inside Iraq adds a serious challenge to regional security. The ‘Shiite takeover’ in Iraq sends alarming signals to countries like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and Lebanon, which count important numbers of Shiites among their populations. It confirms fears among certain segments of the Sunni population that the Shiites’ loyalty lies beyond the border and/or that the Shiite leaders await the opportunity to turn against the Sunni majorities and take over power in these countries (one needs to remember that very few people in the region believe that the Shiites constitute a majority in Iraq itself). The displacement of approximately 4 million Iraqis, many of them wealthy Sunnis, presents other Sunni dominant groups in the region with a graphic picture of the risks inherent in a Shiite takeover. Often, these fears have led to the adoption of more exclusionist policies towards minority Shiite communities – not to more inclusion as some had hoped. On the other hand, many Shiites feel emboldened by the change of fate that Iraqi Shiites have experienced. Combined with the adoption of more exclusionist policies towards them and the incendiary discourse of certain Sunni leaders, Shiites and Sunnis seem to be, in certain parts of the region, on a collision course. The ruling regimes find it difficult to strike the necessary balance between the conflicting pressures by both camps, often adopting inconsistent positions in order to respond to the more pressing needs of the day. In this heavily charged atmosphere, small incidents carry an explosive potential. Preparing for the next conflict in the Gulf The dislocation of the Iraqi State has resulted in its disappearance as a regional counterweight to Iran. The carefully maintained balance of power between the two countries in the Gulf sub­ region has not only been upset, but it has actually replaced by an Iranian hegemony over Iraq itself. Added to the Iranian expansion of influence into Afghanistan – partly thanks to the American war there, the Iranian influence in Syria and Lebanon, and the reported Iranian ties with influential circles in Pakistan, the overall result is a decisive increase in Iran’s power in and around the Gulf sub­region. This unusual surge in influence alarms other countries in the region, especially Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Both countries, in different ways, perceive Iran’s influence in Iraq as threatening in its own right and in so far that it hurts their vital interest in a unified Iraq. Consequently, both countries follow interventionist policies which, at the end of the day, become part of the instability patterns in Iraq. The current inter­communal tension/conflict in Iraq, already a threat to its unity and to its neighbours’ interests, is likely to increase, especially if/when the Coalition forces start to withdraw – probably reaching a breaking point. In this case, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia will intervene even more directly, with the risk that Iraq will become a protracted regional conflict. At the same time, the collapse of the traditional balance of power in the Gulf sub­region reduces the possibility of building a cooperative Gulf security regime. Since such a regime would inevitably reflect Iran’s current level of influence, other Gulf countries have an interest in opposing the emergence of a collective security arrangement at this time – until Iran’s power is checked and/or reduced to its traditional level. Instead, Gulf States will rely further on US protection in order to deal with the perceived Iranian threat. This in turn increases
12 tension and polarisation in the region, especially against the backdrop of Iranian nuclear projects. And increased resentment throughout the Arab World For the vast majority of Arab populations, the US and allies attacked a sovereign Arab State, unprovoked, against the will of all Arab States, against established rules of international law, and despite opposition by major players in the UN Security Council. This is viewed as confirmation of perceived Western hostility towards the Arab/Muslim Worlds. The war in Iraq also confirms the Arabs’ perception that sheer force is all what matters in international relations, and that rules of international law are applied only to the weak. This popular creed has practical consequences; it creates public pressure towards the building of a military power base that can deter the US and its allies in the future. The cases of North Korea and India are often cited as successful examples of countries whose nuclear capabilities deterred the US. The relevance of this public pressure is manifested in the interest Arab States have suddenly developed towards ‘peaceful nuclear technology’. Reversing the tide? These implications are neither inevitable nor irreversible. In fact, because of these rather obvious security threats, many countries in the region are prepared to abandon their traditional caution and to take considerable political risks, if they are confident of the payoff. Consequently, a genuine partnership between the Coalition and regional players could turn the situation in Iraq from a security threat into an opportunity. For this to happen the partnership has to be genuine, i.e. the policy towards Iraq has to be developed jointly by the partners. The Coalition will have to implement a certain number of policy shifts, which will be necessary to restore inter­communal peace and to merge the current political process into a wider and more inclusive process. A change in the nature of the overall framework defining the foreign presence in Iraq will also be necessary if regional players are to take on more serious responsibilities.
13 Anthony Bubalo ‘…we know there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know.’ Many people will be familiar with this quote. It comes, of course, from the former US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld. It proves that, whatever else he was, Rumsfeld was almost certainly a philosopher. In this quote the former Secretary of Defence outlines a useful intellectual framework for considering international politics – one that I will use here. That is, in considering the consequences of the Iraq war for the broader Middle East, there are the things we know, there are things that we are unsure of, and there are also likely to be things that will catch us completely by surprise. These categories also happily coincide with a short, medium and long term prognosis for the region. Generally, however, I think more of what will happen as a result of the war in Iraq will be familiar to us than surprise us. And this brings me to a second quote. ‘…how much longer are valuable lives to be sacrificed in the vain endeavour to impose upon the Arab population an elaborate and expensive administration which they never asked for and do not want?’ It comes from the Times of London. It refers, of course, to Iraq, but not to today’s Iraq. It is from an article that appeared on 7 August 1920 and it was a reference to Britain’s badly faltering efforts to quell local revolt in Mesopotamia (as a large part of Iraq was then known). We might take this quote to mean that the US should have expected what it is currently experiencing in Iraq. For me, however, it simply underlines that what is happening in the region is not necessarily that new. That is, the Iraq war might well be the biggest ever blunder in US foreign policy history, as some have argued, but that does not necessarily mean that we are at an unprecedented point in Middle Eastern history. The history of the Middle East is replete with example of external powers that came, saw, conquered, and left – either booted out by the locals or, usually, by someone else, or left simply because they were exhausted (the Middle East does that to you). But the important point here is they did not always leave right away. As this last quote underlines, British power in the Middle East faced a serious challenge in the 1920s, and not just in Mesopotamia. But it would not be until the Suez Crisis in 1956 that British power in the region would ultimately reach its nadir.
14 What we know One of the things we know – one of the undisputed short­term consequences of the Iraq war – has been America’s loss of influence in the Middle East. This is significant not just for the US but also for the region because is affects regional and local balances of power. This change in regional power relativities has three dimensions. Firstly, judged by the standards of numerous opinion polls, America’s popular standing in the Middle East – or viewed more expansively, using the terminology of Joseph Nye, America’s ‘soft power’ – has been badly damaged. One can question whether this really matters in a region with few democracies. But most regional autocrats do no like to rule by coercion alone; they prefer, where possible, to rule by consensus or at least consent and economise on the use of force. This means that growing popular antipathy towards America makes it more difficult for regional allies to overtly associate or even, in some cases, to openly cooperate with the US in the region. Secondly, and flowing from the growth in popular antipathy toward the US, Washington’s regional allies are being forced to play a more active and independent role in the region themselves and are perhaps keener to see other external powers play a greater a role in the region. The best example of this is Saudi Arabia. It has been forced to become more active diplomatically, particularly with respect to the Israeli­Palestinian issue, because it feels Washington has not been doing enough. It has also strengthened its relations with emerging powers India and China; not as a substitute for its strategic alliance with the US but, I believe, as part of an effort to encourage a more multipolar Middle East that to some degree constrains the excesses of US power. Thirdly, the Iraq war has left Iran more powerful. For the first time in at least a quarter of a century, Iran does not face an openly hostile opponent in Baghdad and has a large measure of influence throughout Iraq. When combined with the removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Iran’s strategic position is looking more favourable than it has for many years. Unquestionably, however, the key factor in Iran’s regional rise has been a perception of American semi­paralysis. Tehran, but also many of Washington’s regional allies, fear that the US is so bogged down in Iraq that it can do little to block Iran’s ambitions, from its pursuit of a nuclear weapon to its meddling in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon. Things that remain unclear We can certainly be confident in these judgements today, but what about tomorrow? How enduring is this shift in regional power relativities going to be? This brings us to the medium­ term prognosis – or those things that remain unclear about the consequences of the Iraq war for the region. And here, let me be the devil’s advocate and argue that maybe in the medium term things won’t be so bad for the United States in the Middle East. Firstly, and counter­intuitively, the worse things get in Iraq the more regional states will want the US to stay in Iraq and the region. Notwithstanding the problems that America’s Iraq
15 intervention has caused, these countries need the US to ensure that Iraq’s problems do not spill over its borders and to contain an emboldened Iran. Of course, the willingness of some regional allies to closely follow the US lead on certain issues may be more permanently affected. I think we will also see a greater demand for US policy to be more State Department­led rather Defence Department­led. Secondly, the Iraq war has boosted Iran’s regional power in the short term, but it is by no means clear that Iran will dominate the region. For one thing, the awareness in the region of Iran’s growing power is producing reactions, from the exploration by the GCC of a nuclear energy program, to Saudi efforts to undermine Iran’s ties to Syria. More particularly, Tehran may also discover the limits of its new­found power in any future confrontation with the United States. I do not think the US is actively planning military action against Iran’s nuclear program. But the possibility remains of a military confrontation resulting from a miscalculation or the exhaustion of diplomatic efforts to end that program. Under these circumstances I think Iran would quickly learn that US military power has not been as dulled by Iraq as it might think. Thirdly, there is the Bush factor. Popular antipathy in the Middle East toward the US existed long before the US invaded Iraq. Nevertheless, we often seem to forget how much current levels of antipathy are directed personally at the President. Any new President is bound to get a bounce in the region – though it may prove to be short­lived. Indeed, this will be the real challenge in the Middle East for the next US President – managing expectations. A new President will face high expectation that he or she will do things or achieve things differently from President Bush – for example, by being more proactive on the Israeli­Palestinian issue – but will have a very limited time, if not ability, to meet those expectations. What might surprise us? I am conscious that much of the focus here has been on the United States. In large part this is because I think the main short and medium strategic and geo­political consequences of the Iraq war will be for the United States in the Middle East. This is not to say that Iraq’s neighbours and the region and of course the people of Iraq more broadly are not suffering the consequences of the war. I have touched on some aspects of this already, if indirectly: the rise of Iran and the concern this has caused amongst many regional states; the possibility that Iraq’s internal conflicts – including sectarian conflict or terrorism – might spill over its borders into neighbouring countries; and the internal pressure on regimes closely allied with the United States. Moreover, when we talk about possible surprise in terms of the consequences of the Iraq war, I think these are likely to relate mostly to internal developments with a number of regional states. Iraq may not prove to have been the catalyst for region­wide democratisation that the Bush Administration apparently hoped for, but it could yet prove to be a cause of political change in entirely unexpected ways. Some of these changes will be positive and some will be negative.
16 Let me provide two examples. First a negative one. The Iraq war is already placing tremendous pressures on Jordan where you have a young, overtly pro­Western monarch of a very traditional and resource­poor country, squeezed between two issues – Iraq and the Israeli­Palestinian conflict – about which his population feel very passionately. Indeed I fear that if we are go to see any nasty surprises as a result of the Iraq war one might be growing instability in Jordan. Related to this is the prospect that we will have flowing out of Iraq groups of well­trained jihadis returning to their home countries to participate in violent unrest, as occurred after the Afghan war against the Soviet Union; to some degree we are seeing it already. Yet there might also be some positives which emerge out of the Iraq war – albeit indirectly. In 1991, the US Administration of Bush senior half­heartedly insisted to the Kuwaiti Royal family that they take some modest steps toward political liberalisation – a response in part to a charge from some quarters that in liberating Kuwait and its monarchy from Iraq the US had in effect been keeping the world safe for feudalism. No one really expected that such exhortations would lead to Kuwaiti democratisation; indeed they were largely seen as window dressing. The irony is that the only people that seem to have taken this seriously were the Kuwaitis themselves. In 15 years we have seen the gradual development of political life in Kuwait, to the point where women now have the vote and the Kuwaiti parliament played a significant role in managing the royal succession when it struck some difficulties last year. No one would suggest Kuwait is a fully­fledged democracy. But with a modicum of political space opened as a result of an external shock and some international encouragement, a process has begun. It is possible that similar, gradual processes might also now take place in other regional states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, partly as a result of forces that have been – even unwittingly – released by the shock to the Middle East system caused by Iraq. Saudi Arabia has had municipal elections, Egypt is going through a process of constitutional reform. Many people do not take these processes very seriously, but the Kuwaiti example should remind us, that once begun these processes can assume lives and dynamics of their own.
17 III. The Iraq war and Australia Hugh White It seems no­one has found quite what they were looking for in Iraq. For both sides of the bitterly contested debate about whether to invade and remove Saddam Hussein, the choice seemed to carry immense significance for all concerned – for Iraqis, for the Middle East, for Al Qaeda, for the US and its place in the international system, for Australia and the future of its alliance, and for the workings of the international order itself. And yet as we confront the failure of the policy, only the Iraqis themselves seem to have been left with a fundamental transformation of their circumstances. For everyone else – the wider Middle East, Al Qaeda, the US – less seems to have changed than one might have thought. What then has it meant for Australia? As one of only three countries committed to overt military participation in the invasion, one might expect that the implications for Australia would be profound. Again at this stage that’s not clear. Reasons to invade To understand this, it helps to recall why we joined the US to invade Iraq in the first place. At the time, Australia’s leaders had no choice but to appropriate for themselves the arguments for invasion advanced by Washington: politically, junior coalition partners never have much scope to set out independent strategic rationales for the adventures they sign up to. But for Australia the primary reason for the Australia to help invade Iraq was to support the US as a good ally should. In thinking this way the Howard government was not reflecting a radical new post 9/11 view of the nature of the alliance and the requirements it placed on Australia. On the contrary, it was reflecting a pattern of alliance management that dated back to the early or mid 1980s. Since that time Australia has frequently sent small contingents to support US­led coalitions in the Middle East, because such deployments have been seen by both Canberra and Washington as an important demonstration of Australia’s commitment to the alliance. Implications for policymaking For Australia, the invasion of Iraq was primarily an exercise in alliance management, and in thinking about the consequences of the invasion the first question should concern its implications for alliance. Strictly speaking, America’s success or failure in Iraq might be irrelevant to Australia’s main objective in supporting the invasion. If we have been seen as good allies by Washington, the fact that the overall operation was a disaster might not matter much to us. There was always an argument to be made that even if invading Iraq was a terrible mistake, Australia would benefit from being seen to support their allies in making it. However it would be too charitable to attribute such clear­eyed Machiavellian cynicism to Australian leaders at the time the decision to invade was debated and taken. Although a lurking suspicion that the post­invasion phase might be messy can be inferred from Howard’s early insistence that Australia would not commit forces to later stabilisation phases, most of the evidence suggests that the Howard government was convinced that invading Iraq was a good idea. Much attention has been paid to the intelligence failures involved, but this was also, and more seriously, a major policy failure. In retrospect of course it is easy to say that
18 the actual costs of the invasion have outweighed the actual benefits, but at the time the decision was taken the potential costs could be seen to outweigh the probable benefits, even if the beliefs about Iraq’s WMD had been true. This was not seen and addressed. The Australian Government did apparently believe the invasion would work, and failed to understand the very real risks that it might not. Perhaps even more seriously, it failed to see that there were other ways to respond to a US request for support than ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Australian policymakers failed to see that the most effective response to American approaches would have been to ask questions which would have probed American thinking and given Australia a better understanding of the costs and risks involved. It may even have helped senior American policymakers to start asking questions of their own. Australia’s initial decisions on Iraq therefore constitute a serious policy failure in alliance management for Australia. The first question, then, in thinking abut the implications of Iraq for Australia is what have we learned about how to avoid such mistakes next time. The answer so far is, I fear, very little, because the fact that such mistakes were made has not been honestly faced – either at the political or the official level. Implications for the Alliance The second key question in assessing the implications of Iraq for Australia is the effect on the alliance itself. Failure in Iraq has certainly killed off the radical new vision of the alliance promoted by Australian advocates of the Bush Doctrine. Back in 2002 and 2003, invading Iraq was seen by many in and around the Howard government as the template for Australia’s role as America’s ally in the world post Cold War, post 9/11 world. The idea was simple – the world would be reshaped by America, using armed force to transform rogue states and unstable regions and bring them into a US­led world order. Australia’s new strategic policy would be to send forces to support America in this bold enterprise. Failure in Iraq has killed that image of a transformed alliance. But what of its impact on the alliance we have? Here the data is mixed. The Howard government and its supporters have argued that Australia’s staunch support for the US in Iraq has strengthened the alliance significantly. It is often claimed that the alliance has changed qualitatively in recent years, reaching new heights of intimacy. These claims seem exaggerated. On the American side, no doubt senior figures in the current administration are grateful to John Howard and his colleagues for their support. But there is no evidence that the alliance is working differently as a result, nor that the benefits to Australia of this gratitude will outlast the Bush Administration itself. And there are risks that Australia’s Iraq policy could count against us. Barak Obama may not be the only American to notice that Australia has talked big about Iraq but done much less. There is a risk that Americans will come to resent the contrast between Australia’s willingness to talk America into the war, and its unwillingness to send more troops, or to allow the troops we have sent to do more dangerous jobs. On the Australian side the outcome is equally ambiguous. Opponents of the war have tended to argue that Iraq has turned Australians against the US alliance. No doubt there is some truth in that. Both the Iraq war and the Bush Administration have been unpopular in Australia, and their unpopularity has no doubt rubbed of on the standing of the alliance itself. But the evidence suggests that Australians remain quite capable of distinguishing the US from the policies of any one administration, and the alliance from the pros and cons of any one
19 operation. Iraq and Bush are indeed unpopular, but the US and the alliance are not. On balance in this confused picture the negatives and the positives probably balance out: Iraq has not changed the alliance much one way or the other. A more sober view of force Failure in Iraq may also influence the development of Australia’s own thinking about the use of armed force. It is not true that the Howard Government’s more interventionist approach to the South Pacific since 2003 has been merely a local version of the Bush Doctrine. But Canberra’s willingness to deploy armed force as the central element in a number of regional interventions did reflect something of the Bush Doctrine’s new interventionism – the confidence that armed force could be used effectively to achieve essentially political objectives in unstable states. One likely consequence of failure in Iraq – and most likely in Afghanistan as well – will be a reassessment of that confidence, and a resurgence of the scepticism about the application of armed force to political problems which flourished after Vietnam. This will have some implications for the way we develop our armed forces, and especially the Army, which had seen its fortunes rise with the new interventionism. Bigger issues The most important implications of Iraq for Australia will flow from the way it affects America’s view of its role in the world, and hence the way America handles demanding policy challenges which will do much to determine Australia’s future security. It is no exaggeration to say that the biggest determinant of Australia’s future security will be the evolution of the international system in Asia to accommodate the growing power of China and India, and the strategic re­emergence of Japan. American policy will be critical to this process, and American policy will be shaped by America’s image of itself, and the ability of America to reconcile its power and its ambitions. Some observers – including at times Australian leaders – have worried that failure in Iraq would fatally damage America’s international prestige, dent American confidence and foster isolationism. So far, again, this has not happened. While the militaristically­tinged hubris of the Bush Doctrine has not survived the test of reality, failure in Iraq does not seem to have dented America’s broader ambitions to establish and maintain clear leadership over the international order. Democrats and Republicans alike both still expect this to be another American Century, shaped even more than the last by American values and American power. What does Iraq mean for that ambition? On the military front, not much. The sobering military lessons of Iraq have corrected overconfident assumptions that American military power is omnipotent, and especially reminded people of the limits to America’s land power. But nothing that has happened in Iraq has eroded America’s armed strength in the air and at sea, where its real advantage has always been. And it was never going to be the case that American global leadership could be based primarily on force. The damage to America’s international standing may be more significant. Much of the appeal of American leadership to the rest of the world depends on confidence in the quality of American decision­making – both in its technical and its moral dimensions. By its decisions on Iraq and other issues since 9/11, the Bush Administration has made it harder for the rest of the world to trust Washington to lead the world wisely and fairly. This may be a more serious blow, because, at least in their own eyes, America’s claim to global leadership rests not on its
20 power but on the quality of its institutions and the essential morality of America. Failure in Iraq will make it harder to persuade others around the world that that is true. But ultimately, America’s claims to global leadership will not depend on its military power or its moral authority, but on its economic strength. If America could retain the lead it has today as the world’s strongest economy, nothing that has happened since 9/11 would prevent it achieving the global leadership which most Americans still take to be their country’s right. But if, as seems likely, America’s relative economic power erodes, especially as the power of China grows, then America’s expectations of global leadership will not be fulfilled. Only Americans believe that their claims to lead the world are based on their moral superiority. For the rest of us, it is a matter of power, and as power shifts, so will leadership. The key question for America, and for the rest of us, is how, if American economic primacy erodes, its leadership aspirations will adjust. Will it fight to retain leadership? Or gracefully accept the need to share authority in the international system, and learn to treat rising powers like China as equals? Here Iraq may be significant. Will failure in Iraq make it harder or easier for Americans to adapt their expectations of leadership to the realties of a new distribution of economic power? On that question I think it is too early to say, because of course Iraq is not over. Most Americans would now like to get out of Iraq, but the next Administration will have no easy way to do that for them. By destroying Iraq as a strategic factor in the Middle East, the Bush Administration has made it impossible for America to withdraw without risking much worse turmoil than we have seen so far. The Administration has been right recently to compare America’s future in Iraq with its long presence in Korea. Decades from now America might still be there. But the Korea metaphor only goes so far, because South Korea has had relatively stable and strong governments. There is no sign of that in Iraq. There is no model for how America retains forces in Iraq, big enough to protect its deeper interests there and in the wider Middle East, while being disengaged from the day­ to­day struggles between Iraqi factions and communities beyond the walls of their bases. If America has to stay in Iraq, it cannot disengage from Iraq’s turmoil. And that might last for decades too. Iraq can still get worse for America, and it can last a lot longer. If it does, the biggest consequence might be a hardening of American attitudes towards the rest of the world, and a more truculent approach to the delicate business of adjusting America’s global ambitions to the new realities of the global balance of power. If so, we may all pay a very high cost for Iraq indeed.
21 Daniel Flitton Today, in the United States, the hardest political question is what to do about Iraq. The presidential election is still almost 18 months away and neither the Republicans nor the Democrats have settled on a candidate – though plenty of hands crowd the air. But anyone who aspires to gain their party's nomination in 2008 must first show their colours on the war in Iraq. With over 3,500 US military personnel killed and thousands more wounded, America's political debates are sharp, full of rancour and recrimination. Australia's political debate on Iraq is subdued by contrast. Earlier this year, on the fourth anniversary of the US­led invasion, the prime minister set out to defend his government's commitment to the occupation force. ‘A hallmark of our free society is the ability to debate issues forcefully and to resolve inevitable differences peacefully’, John Howard declared. ‘Our enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan see this as a sign of weakness. We know it is our greatest strength.’ But on the future policy for Australia in Iraq, ‘our greatest strength’ gets only an occasional public workout. Both the prime minister and the opposition leader are spared the kind of relentless questions about the conduct and direction of the war being fired daily at political leaders in America. Iraq is unlikely to be the dominant issue that will decide the 2007 election (although the recounting of the conflict will sit alongside references to past failures in Vietnam in the Australian political lexicon). Where the Iraq issue does intrude, the Australian debate is fought on narrow policy ground. Both parties want to achieve the same objective, to find a way out of Iraq. Howard maintains Iraqis need ‘time, not a timetable’ – training Iraqi troops and police to take control of their broken country. Kevin Rudd argues for a staged withdrawal of Australian combat forces, putting the onus on Iraq's politicians to take more responsibility for reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. So, put another way, a policy of asking Iraqis to do more. But even Australia's limited political debate points to one of the most enduring consequences of the Iraq war – the reinforcement of violent Islamist propaganda. In turn, this feeds judgements the violent Islamist threat will last at least a generation. Last year, a US intelligence assessment on the future trends of global terrorism leaked to the media. The warnings from this assessment showed just how difficult finding a way out of the Iraq war has become. ‘Perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere,’ said the report from the National Intelligence Council, the peak body drawing together the collective wisdom of America's intelligence community. Al Qaeda has built a cadre of fighters well schooled in insurgency tactics, which carries the risk of ‘bleed­out’, where the skills and training picked up by insurgents in Iraq would be taken and applied in other conflicts around the world. The veterans of al­Qaeda's fight in Iraq are only one part of the threat identified by the US intelligence assessment. The key element of this judgement is the ‘perception’ of success. Osama bin Laden and his ilk claim to have driven the Soviet superpower out of Afghanistan in the 1980s. If they can credibly claim to have driven the American superpower out of Iraq, the movement will grow in strength and determination. Hence, in the context of Australian debates, Howard's deliberate reference to the dangers of a ‘perceived’ American defeat in
22 Iraq. ‘The consequences of Western failure and defeat in Iraq are too serious to allow our policy to be dictated by weariness, frustration or political convenience,’ he warns. Yet equally, the ongoing conflict in Iraq and the presence of foreign troops have worked to greatly invigorate extremist propaganda. The US intelligence assessment noted ‘the Iraq conflict has become the cause célèbre for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.’ Hence, again in the Australian context, Rudd's deliberate reference to Iraq as ‘a magnet, inspiration and training ground for international jihadists.’ The chief of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation recently told a conference, ‘What makes al­Qaeda such a dangerous creature is its ability to marry ideological intensity with organisational resilience and adaptability.’ Al­Qaeda's resilience and adaptability are clearly demonstrated. Despite the introduction of additional security barriers since 2001, and the billions of dollars spent worldwide in the campaign against Islamist violence, terrorists remain patient and determined to carry out further attacks. But it is Al­Qaeda's story – the ideological intensity of the movement – that benefits most from Iraq. Al­Qaeda has woven together an array of supposed examples of Western oppression of the Muslim world to justify its campaign. The power of this violent Islamist narrative is demonstrated by the frequent statements of al­Qaeda's principal ideologue, bin Laden's deputy Dr Ayman al­Zawahiri. He has established his own running commentary on international affairs, releasing a flurry of statements already this year. As prose, they are turgid and dense, full of conspiracy and bile. But Zawahiri keeps generating more within whatever limits govern his physical security because he also knows this propaganda has wide appeal. Zawahiri, and the thousands of mini­ideologues that swirl around on the internet who echo and reinforce his views, have crafted their own powerful story. Just a selection from the past few months shows the important place of the Iraq conflict in this extremist rhetoric. ‘Bless the lions of Iraq who broke America's back and spoiled its plans,’ he boasted earlier this year. In May, he chided the United States administration who fell into a ‘historic trap’ set by the ‘brothers’ in Iraq, asking the Americans only be released ‘after losing two or three hundred thousand killed’. Then, in a claim that links back to the warnings from the US intelligence estimate, he argued, ‘You shall – God willing – be defeated in Afghanistan and Iraq in the near future, which will alert the Mujahid Muslim forces to escalate their confrontation of you.’ All this serves to integrate Iraq into the potent narrative that sustains and enlarges the violent Islamist threat. The Afghanistan campaign in the 1980s against the Soviets serves as a central trunk of the Islamist propaganda – the defeat of a world superpower. Iraq will add further impetus to this movement. Rudd takes the argument further, warning ‘the uncomfortable fact for Australia is that we have become a greater terrorist target than would otherwise have been the case because of our participation in that war.’ Judging Australia's ranking on a terrorist hit­list is no simple matter, but it is obvious the Howard government's strong, and sometimes lonely support for US policy in Iraq has brought
23 unwelcome attention. Australia's problem is of a different character and scale than the threat confronting the UK for instance. The terrorist threat in the UK is made worse by a confluence of factors. First is the appeal of violent Islamist ideology to a disaffected minority in the UK’s Muslim community. This does not amount to many people, but it is enough to give succour to those willing to carry out attacks. But this alone does not explain the scale of the threat in the UK. It connects, second, with the strong personal connections British Muslims maintain in South Asia. Each year, thousands of young Britons visit relatives or attend schools in Pakistan, India or Bangladesh. This provides al­Qaeda a potential conduit to tap into Muslim malcontent. While the UK experience is a warning to Australia, the opportunities exploited by al­Qaeda are not present to the same level. But common elements are evident in both countries. Most obvious are the means extremists use to extend their network of sympathisers. The internet propagates and promulgates violent Islamist ideology but it has also become a powerful tool for the grooming and recruitment of extremists. This has helped facilitate the use of operatives who fall outside the profile expected by security agencies. Most striking is the participation in attack plots by young Muslim men who have spent most of their lives living in the West – the so­called home­grown terrorist threat. Mohammed Sidique Khan, the cell leader of the 2005 London attacks, made explicit reference to the war in Iraq as part of his recorded justification for the bombings. For those Australians arrested in and after November 2005 on terrorism charges, their trials may provide an insight into what extent the conflict in Iraq played a role in their alleged conspiracy. Again reinforcing the importance of perception in Iraq, the US national intelligence assessment stated, ‘Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight.’ But as events in Iraq have unfolded and the momentum of the political debate shifts towards a withdrawal, it appears the perception of violent Islamist success is going to be very hard to dispel. A shorter version of this article first appeared in The Age newspaper.
24 The Lowy Institute is an independent, non-partisan, international policy think tank based in Sydney. Its objective is to deepen
the debate in Australia about international policy and to generate new ideas and dialogue on international developments.
http://www.lowyinstitute.org