Examiners’ commentaries 2016
Examiners’ commentaries 2016
PS1172 Introduction to political science
Important note
This commentary reflects the examination and assessment arrangements
for this course in the academic year 2016–17. The format and structure
of the examination may change in future years, and any such changes
will be publicised on the virtual learning environment (VLE).
Information about the Subject guide and the Essential reading
references
Unless otherwise stated, all cross-references will be to the latest version
of the subject guide (2012). You should always attempt to use the most
recent edition of any Essential reading textbook, even if the commentary
and/or online reading list and/or subject guide refers to an earlier
edition. If different editions of Essential reading are listed, please check
the VLE for reading supplements; if none are available, please use the
contents list and index of the new edition to find the relevant section.
General remarks
Learning outcomes
At the end of this course, and having completed the Essential reading and
activities, you should be able to:
• explain patterns of voting behaviour and party competition in different
countries, and how electoral systems influence voters and parties
• explain how different institutional designs of democracy work
• describe how political science explains policy outcomes
• critically evaluate rational choice and institutional theories in political
science
• explain the pros and cons of quantitative and qualitative methods in
political science.
Planning your time in the examination
You must answer three questions out of a possible 12 over a three-hour
period. Asking you to answer three questions allows the examiners to
ensure that you have a depth of knowledge across a broad range of the
topics covered in this course. This gives you 60 minutes to answer each
question. Each question is worth an equal amount (33 per cent of your
overall grade) so you should ensure that you spend the same amount
of time on each question. A sizeable minority of candidates often fail
to answer three questions equally, with a marked difference in quality
between their first answer and their final answer. This can have a
significant negative impact upon their overall grade.
In the examination you should begin by reading through the examination
paper in its entirety to identify which questions you can answer. You
should stick strictly to 60 minutes for each question. Spend the first
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
five minutes for each question writing a detailed essay plan. This is an
opportunity to ensure that the revision you have prepared is tailored to
the specific question asked in the examination and will give you time to
identify a clear argument and answer to the question asked (not some
other question you have previously prepared!). Aim to make one key
point in each paragraph and ensure that you use the Essential and Further
reading and empirical evidence to support your arguments. Once you have
come up with a detailed plan, writing the essay is a less daunting and
more focused task and can be completed in the remaining 55 minutes.
Given the time limitations you face, the examiners will prioritise the depth
of your answers and the quality of your argumentation rather than the
breadth of what you cover. Of course, answers cannot be too short, but
the examiners certainly do not expect you to cover every aspect of a topic
discussed in the subject guide. This is why an essay plan is important as it
can help you to identify what are the most salient issues for discussion and
ensure that your essay shows the reader critical thinking, strong analysis
and focused argumentation rather than general and broad description.
What are the examiners looking for?
The examination looks for you to demonstrate not only your knowledge of
the subject and the topics it covers, but it also looks for key academic essaywriting skills, such as developing and sustaining a clear argument, critical
appraisal, analytical depth and ideally some original thinking or flair.
You should ensure that your answer displays a good knowledge of the
topic under discussion. A lack of core knowledge around a topic and an
overreliance on general or prior knowledge are often the hallmarks of
unsatisfactory and failing examinations. You need to show the examiners
that you understand the core concepts and theories at stake and you are
able to present these insightfully. You also need to show that you are well
versed in the core information that forms the backbone to the question you
are answering, including key empirical trends and evidence. This entails
showing knowledge of the subject guide but, crucially, it is also vital that
you move beyond the subject guide to make broader reference to the
Essential and Further reading. Finally, you need to demonstrate that you
have thought about the key debates that characterise a topic and you can
offer a well-informed opinion.
In addition to subject-specific knowledge, you need to display academic
essay-writing skills. First and foremost, you need to make sure that you
answer the question asked. One of the most common shortcomings in
examinations is that candidates fail to tailor their prepared revision for
the specific question asked. Failing to answer the question prevents the
examiners from being able to assess your ability to engage with a specific
debate and therefore is always liable to fail or be severely curtailed in
the grade it achieves. To help ensure that your response is focused on the
question asked, you should offer a clear statement of what you will argue
right at the outset of the essay. This should then be sustained throughout
the entire body of the essay. This does not mean that you present a purely
one-sided account of any debates – you need to include the counterview
of any argument you might offer. However, your essay should still have
a clear perspective that it is arguing and you present the counterview in
order to show why your position is preferable.
Good essay writing is about constructing and sustaining a focused
argument throughout the whole essay and not just waiting until the
conclusion or closing sentences before you provide the examiners
with an answer or indication of your reasoned judgement on a debate.
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Examiners’ commentaries 2016
Another common shortcoming in examinations is the tendency by some
candidates to describe debates rather than provide an analytical appraisal
of debates. The examiners are looking for critical evaluation and reasoned
judgements. As such, knowledge alone is rarely sufficient to achieve a 2.1
grade or higher. Critical appraisal refers to your ability to assess theories
and concepts against empirical evidence, to unpick their underlying
assumptions and to appraise their strengths and weaknesses. Making
reasoned judgements refers to offering a cogent and coherent argument
in response to the question – one that displays a strong or thorough
knowledge of the debate, one that indicates that you have reflected upon
and digested this knowledge and which offers a well-supported (with
empirical evidence and reading) argument. Critical evaluation carried out
with flair to build a strong argument and which shows original thinking
are the central qualities that lead to first-class work.
Key steps to improvement
It is worth repeating that the first step in any good examination answer is
that it answers the question asked. It is vital that you ensure the answer
you provide addresses the question asked and not a different question
prepared from a previous examination paper or the subject guide. It is
also important that you do not just include all information you know on
a debate but that you tailor the information you have prepared into an
informed analysis.
The nature of the questions asked in this course means that they are able
to be answered in multiple ways; there is rarely one single ‘right’ answer.
Therefore, think carefully about how you will tackle the question asked.
This is why it is important to spend five minutes at the outset of each
question planning a detailed answer. You need to signal to the examiners
in your essay’s introduction how you are interpreting the question and
state very clearly in one sentence what your answer to the question is or
what you will argue throughout your essay.
In the body of the essay you should ensure that you develop your points in
full. A common mistake in examination essays is that candidates mention
an idea in passing without elaborating its relevance or importance either
for the question asked or for the argument they are making. Another
common mistake is that candidates include multiple points in one
paragraph, failing to elaborate on any of them satisfactorily and giving
the essay a confusing and unclear structure. Each paragraph should cover
one clear point in full and you should always try to relate each paragraph
explicitly back to your central argument. This will help to increase the
coherence and cogency of your essay overall.
A large number of candidates underperformed because they very often
failed to move beyond the subject guide. While the subject guide aims to
provide you with an overview of each topic, this should be seen as the
starting point for your studies and you should avoid relying solely on this
resource. You also need to make reference to the Essential and Further
readings for each topic, demonstrating that you understand the main
claims of each of these readings and how they fit in with your analysis
when answering the examination questions. Related to this, there was
also a general lack of references in the essays – just an author’s name will
suffice. References to established thinkers and their ideas are an important
way of showing the examiners your knowledge and of supporting your
arguments.
Another common shortcoming was a failure to include basic definitions
of key concepts under discussion at the outset of the essays. These are
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
necessary because many concepts in political science are contested, for
example what it means to be a democracy or satisfaction with democracy.
To provide a satisfactory answer to most questions you need to show the
examiners that you are aware of debates around the meaning of these
concepts and how you have deployed them in your essays.
Finally, it is important that you are discriminating in the information
you provide when answering the examination questions. You must select
the most important and relevant information for discussion, especially
as the examiners are generally more interested in the depth of your
analysis rather than the breadth of your knowledge. Many candidates
merely repeated all ideas from a given chapter in the subject guide when
they saw a question on a particular topic. For example, in many cases
candidates in 2015 discussed definitions of democracy and theories
of democratisation even though they may only have been asked about
the meaning of democracy. Similarly, even when candidates were only
asked about federalism and secession, many candidates spoke about
all aspects of federalism rather than focusing specifically on why some
federations break-up and others hold together. It is crucial that you show
the examiners that you have thought about the specific question you have
been asked and that you have drawn only on the relevant information to
support your claims. This is important because otherwise the examiners
will think that you are just repeating everything you know on a topic
without undertaking a careful critical appraisal of the knowledge you have
and how this relates to the topic under discussion.
Examination revision strategy
Many candidates are disappointed to find that their examination
performance is poorer than they expected. This may be due to a number
of reasons. The Examiners’ commentaries suggest ways of addressing
common problems and improving your performance. One particular
failing is ‘question spotting’, that is, confining your examination
preparation to a few questions and/or topics which have come up in
past papers for the course. This can have serious consequences.
We recognise that candidates may not cover all topics in the syllabus in
the same depth, but you need to be aware that examiners are free to
set questions on any aspect of the syllabus. This means that you need
to study enough of the syllabus to enable you to answer the required
number of examination questions.
The syllabus can be found in the Course information sheet in the section
of the VLE dedicated to each course. You should read the syllabus
carefully and ensure that you cover sufficient material in preparation
for the examination. Examiners will vary the topics and questions from
year to year and may well set questions that have not appeared in past
papers. Examination papers may legitimately include questions on any
topic in the syllabus. So, although past papers can be helpful during
your revision, you cannot assume that topics or specific questions that
have come up in past examinations will occur again.
If you rely on a question-spotting strategy, it is likely
you will find yourself in difficulties when you sit the
examination. We strongly advise you not to adopt this
strategy.
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Examiners’ commentaries 2016
Examiners’ commentaries 2016
PS1172 Introduction to political science – Zone A
Important note
This commentary reflects the examination and assessment arrangements
for this course in the academic year 2015–16. The format and structure
of the examination may change in future years, and any such changes
will be publicised on the virtual learning environment (VLE).
Information about the subject guide and the Essential reading
references
Unless otherwise stated, all cross-references will be to the latest version
of the subject guide (2012). You should always attempt to use the most
recent edition of any Essential reading textbook, even if the commentary
and/or online reading list and/or subject guide refer to an earlier
edition. If different editions of Essential reading are listed, please check
the VLE for reading supplements – if none are available, please use the
contents list and index of the new edition to find the relevant section.
Comments on specific questions
Candidates should answer THREE of the following TWELVE questions.
All questions carry equal marks.
General remarks
Overall the exam answers were of better quality this year than in previous
years. The mean and median grade were higher, there were fewer fails
and a greater number of firsts. All of this is really encouraging. The main
reasons for the improvement this year compared to previous years were as
follows:
1. Exam answers engaged a lot more with the core theories and concepts
and used these systematically to explore the answers.
2. Basic definitions of core concepts were deployed more, which gave
answers a solid foundation.
3. There was more systematic use of the literature and more use of
in-text citations to support answers. Combined, these improvements
generally made answers a lot more robust and better developed.
However, there are still some common mistakes occurring which are worth
noting in order to improve future performance. The most common, and
one that was also evident last year, is the failure to answer the question
asked and instead just putting down everything a candidate knows on a
topic. In an exam it is important to show the examiner that you know how
to discriminate in the arguments and information you use and that you
tailor your answer to the specific question asked. If you simply repeat a
prepared answer on a topic blindly without matching it up to the precise
question, this will always limit your grade. For example, with the question
‘Is wealth necessary for democracy?’ a lot of answers just gave the three
sets of theories of democratisation, namely wealth-based explanations,
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
followed by cultural-based explanations, followed by strategic bargainbased explanations. However, it is not clear that either culture or strategic
bargaining needed to be discussed to answer this question. Here,
examiners punished candidates as it appears that they were unable to
adapt their knowledge to the exam context and failed to show application,
judgement and critical appraisal skills.
The other common problem was that candidates prepared a minimum
number of topics and this left them in a tricky position if they could not
answer a question on a prepared topic. This was most common in the
climate change question: ‘When trying to tackle climate change at an
international level, are collective action problems inevitable?’ It was clear
that a large number of candidates did not know what collective action
problems were, but they chose to answer this question anyway. Presumably
they did so because they thought they would answer this better than any
other question or because they could not answer any other questions.
In these instances, where it was clear that candidates failed to define or
engage with the idea of collective action problems, the exam scripts were
heavily punished by the examiners. So students should prepare a sufficient
range of topics to give themselves leeway on the exam day.
Question 1
‘Political agents are never free in their choices as they are always constrained by
some institutional setting.’ Discuss.
Reading for this question
The question requires you to demonstrate knowledge of both rational
choice approaches to social science and institutional approaches. These are
discussed in Chapter 1 of the subject guide. Furthermore, rational choice
approaches are also covered in Chapter 3 of Clark, W.R., M. Golder and
S. Nadenichek Golder Principles of comparative politics. (Washington DC:
CQ Press, 2012) [ISBN 9781608716791], while Green, D.P. and I. Shapiro
Pathologies of rational choice theory. (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1996) new edition [ISBN 9780300066364]. Chapter 2 provides
a strong appraisal of the rational choice approach, and what rational
choice is and is not. The institutional approach is discussed by Hall, P.A.
and R.C.R. Taylor ‘Political science and the three new institutionalisms’,
Political Studies 44(5) 1996, pp.936–57.
Approaching the question
This is a fairly straightforward question that was generally well answered
by candidates who attempted it. The question looked for an understanding
of those approaches that place an actor’s choices at the centre of
explanations and an appraisal of whether individual choices are shaped/
determined by the institutional setting in which these choices are made.
The key to tackling this question well was appraising the assumptions that
underpin each approach, namely where an actor’s preferences come from
according to the rational choice approach, how these influence choices,
and how formal and informal institutions constrain or incentivise these
choices, if at all.
6
• There were very few weak answers to this question, but the main
hallmark of poor answers was that they failed to define basic terms
or tease out the debate at the core of this question. In other words,
they simply did not answer whether social science outcomes are
best explained by an emphasis on an actor’s choices, on institutional
frameworks, or as the question suggests by an interaction of the two.
Without this basic foundation to the answers, these responses tended
to meander and make general speculative insights.
Examiners’ commentaries 2016
• Satisfactory and good answers picked up on the main debate and
elaborated it well. Most responses agreed with the statement in the
question, arguing that some appreciation of the interaction between
the two approaches was necessary. They outlined the behavioural/
rational approach and the institutional approach separately before
showing the need to draw on insights from both. Other good answers
used examples from the course to highlight these debates, such as
voting behaviour as an interaction of preferences and the electoral
system.
• Excellent answers focused on the specific phrasing of ‘never free’. One
impressive answer discussed that rational choice did not claim that
agents were entirely free but only made this assumption to elaborate
the logic of this approach. Other excellent answers also unpacked the
assumptions of the rational choice approach, highlighting that rational
choice and institutional approaches were not incompatible. In other
words, what distinguished these answers was the depth of the answer,
the degree of elaboration and the quality of the appraisal.
Question 2
Is wealth necessary for democracy?
Reading for this question
The main readings about democratisation are covered in Chapter 2 of
the subject guide, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of Clark, Golder, and Nadenichek
Golder Principles of comparative politics. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2013)
(2013) [ISBN 9781608716791], and Chapters 1, 2 and 3 of Acemoglu,
D. and J.A. Robinson Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) [ISBN 9780521855266].
Approaching this question
To answer this question you really needed to focus on debates around
economic determinants of democracy. You also needed to be able to define
the idea of necessity (and possibly sufficiency) in social science (see
Clark et al., 2012, pp.39–42). While there is an overwhelming correlation
between wealth and democracy, it is not strictly necessary as the key case
of India (a poor democracy) proves. Incidentally, giving examples of rich
dictatorships does not disprove the question and candidates were punished
if they thought that it did – again check Clark et al. (2012 pp.30–38 to
see what is a valid and an invalid argument. Many answers brought in
discussions about cultural determinants and strategic bargaining, but it
was not always clear how this was relevant to the question asked and
candidates were sometimes punished for a lack of discrimination in their
answers.
• Weak answers were those that failed to understand the idea of
necessity and usually just gave an overview of the three approaches in
general without ever answering the specific question.
• Satisfactory answers tended to tackle the question of whether wealth
is necessary much more head-on, generally rejecting the idea that
wealth is necessary. Adequate reference to the ideas of Przeworksi,
and Acemoglu and Robinson was made and the causal basis of these
claims was explored. Common missteps in these answers included
raising the case of rich dictatorships and the resource course in a way
that assumed this disproved that wealth was necessary, or discussing
cultural-based explanations but without linking this back to the
question asked.
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
• Excellent answers were those that clearly understood the idea of
necessity and sufficiency, but what really set apart the best of these
answers were those that argued the relationship between wealth
and culture is so difficult to disaggregate that it is impossible to say
whether wealth is necessary or not. Here the discussion of alternative
explanations, such as culture, was done in such a way as to ensure that
responses stayed focused on the question.
Question 3.
Does social class matter for how people vote today?
Reading for this question
This is covered in Chapter 3 of the subject guide and this chapter is
crucial. Two further readings on social class and voting were important
here: Evans, G. and J. Tilley ‘How parties shape class politics: explaining
the decline of the class basis of party support’, British Journal of Political
Science 42(1) 2012, pp.137–161, and Evans, G. ‘The continued significance
of class voting’, Annual Review of Political Science 3 2000, pp.401–17.
Approaching the question
For this question we were looking for a discussion of the degree to which
social class matters for voters and this debate needed to be explored using
key concepts such as expressive versus strategic voting, the cleavage model
of politics and dealignment. There is a lot of empirical data for this debate
which needed to be included and assessed. Sensible answers were those
which argued that class matters a lot less today for how people vote, but
that it still has some salience, especially among older voters.
• Weak answers were those that just gave general discussions of how
a person’s social circumstances might affect their voting behaviour
without making any reference to core concepts and empirical
evidence. Other weak answers that did engage with key concepts left
the debate at too abstract a level, typically arguing that cleavages are
less important today, but never actually talking specifically about social
class as one of those cleavages.
• Satisfactory answers distinguished between expressive voting and
strategic voting, with a particular emphasis on the cleavage model of
politics. This was typically used to discuss how class can be understood
as a cleavage, but that post-de-alignment is less determining of an
individual’s voting behaviour. Good answers engaged well with
empirical evidence, such as using the Alford Index or the data by
Evans et al. The main limitation of some of these answers was a failure
to use the idea of de-alignment or relying on countries that are not
appropriate for this debate (such as Singapore), which only really
applies to advanced liberal democracies that went through a form of
industrialisation.
• Excellent answers were those that developed their ideas the most.
They typically appraised the strengths and limits of the cleavage model
as applied to social class, showing how changes in this are hard to
measure over time (under both the expressive and strategic model you
would still expect to see more lower socio-economic groups voting
for left-wing parties but for different reasons) and noting how there
may be generational lags in the decline of cleavage voting. In this way,
these answers offered something more in terms of development and
critical appraisal over satisfactory answers.
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Examiners’ commentaries 2016
Question 4
Does the choice between a majoritarian and a proportional electoral system
matter?
Reading for this question
Chapter 13 of Clark et al. (2013) provides a strong overview of different
types of electoral systems and their consequences. However, this is
more descriptive than analytical. Therefore it is crucial that you also
read Carey, J.M. and S. Hix ‘The electoral sweet spot: low-magnitude
proportional electoral systems’, American Journal of Political Science
55(2) 2011, pp.383–97. This provides a more considered discussion of
the consequences of electoral systems and offers what they propose to
be a ‘best’ type of electoral system. Although the empirical evidence in
this article is difficult at times, the core ideas are very accessible. Two of
the further readings are also useful for looking at the consequences of
different electoral systems and therefore help you to consider if the choice
in electoral system design matters. Hix, S., R. Johnston and I. McLean
Choosing an electoral system. (London: British Academy, 2010) [ISBN
9780856725883] attempt to answer this in the British context, but their
discussion of each electoral system is on a general level. Abramson et al.
‘Comparing strategic voting under FPTP and PR’, Comparative Political
Studies 43(1) 2010, pp.61–90, compare levels of strategic voting under
different types of electoral systems and their finding challenges the
assumption that majoritarian systems lead to more strategic voting.
Approaching the question
This is one of the questions that reappears regularly on the exam paper.
This question is looking for a discussion of the key trade-offs in electoral
system design and asked you to make a judgement on how much these
matter. You also need to consider the Carey and Hix (2011) view that the
choice between majoritarian and proportional systems may not have to be
as stark as some claim and a sweet spot can be achieved through the use
of modified proportional representation, such as using low magnitude PR
systems or introducing an electoral threshold.
• Weak answers were often mainly descriptive rather than analytical.
They provided an overview of different types of electoral systems and
how they worked, but without providing an analysis of why the choice
mattered. Some weak answers also failed to consider the Carey and
Hix (2011) view.
• Satisfactory answers divided electoral systems into either proportional
or majoritarian ones based on the district magnitude of each system
and then looked at how proportional systems prioritise representation
while majoritarian systems prioritise accountability. This really
helped to ensure that candidates did not just describe each individual
electoral system by instead forcing them to consider the two broad
analytical categories. Good answers then showed how this choice
mattered in terms of the different outcomes that are produced under
each system. Good answers then also discussed the idea of an electoral
sweet spot and how this might be the best choice.
• Excellent answers were those that explained how the choice matters
greatly and therefore we need a clear framework by which to make
the choice between electoral systems. This was usually related to how
diverse or homogenous a country was or the needs of the country at
the time.
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
Question 5
How useful is Downs’s Median Voter Theorem for understanding political party
behaviour?
Reading for this question
Chapter 5 of the subject guide covers the debate over whether political
parties polarise or converge on the median voter in advanced democracies.
Obviously the best place to start is Downs, A. ‘An economic theory of
political action in a democracy’, Journal of Political Economy 65(2) 1957,
pp.135–150. An important critique of Downs is offered by Lipset, S.M. and
S. Rokkan ‘Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments’ in
Mair, P. (ed.) The West European party system. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990) [ISBN 9780198275831].
Approaching the question
This question is asking for an evaluation of one of the most important
theories in political science: the idea that parties will converge on the
median voter. In order to undertake an adequate evaluation you need to
outline the assumptions made by Downs, the challenges these assumptions
face, and then be able to appraise these theoretical claims against the
empirical evidence.
• Weak answers never went into any detail on Downs’s theory,
instead just stating in the most basic terms that parties converge
on the median voter. These suffered from a lack of depth and failed
to convince the reader. Other weak answers never specified the
conditions in which Downs claims his theory to hold true and instead
over-generalised it to all parties in all contexts.
• Satisfactory answers explained Downs’s economic theory of party
behaviour, often using core examples from advanced liberal
democracies to highlight this, notably the British Labour Party and the
German SPD. This was juxtaposed with the cleavage model, notably
using the examples of Belgium and Holland. Good answers went
further by unpacking the assumptions underpinning each model to
interrogate how robust these are, such as Downs’s assumption that
party leaders are driven by a desire for office or Lipset and Rokkan’s
assumption that cleavages freeze. The most insightful answers argued
that parties in advanced democracies do not always converge, but if
it is a two-party system with no cross-cutting cleavages in place and
a majoritarian electoral system, then Downs’s theory is useful for
understanding party behaviour.
• Excellent answers distinguished between types of parties, arguing
that large mainstream parties are more likely to converge than small
niche parties, which may have a stronger commitment to policy and
which prevents convergence. In this way these answers showed the
wider context in which Downs’s theory needs to be rooted in order to
appraise its usefulness.
Question 6
‘Although a pluralist model of interest group relations is highly desirable, it is
simply not possible in reality.’ Discuss.
Reading for this question
This question required you to discuss the debate between Dahl’s notion
of pluralism and Olson’s notion of collective action. This is covered in
Chapter 6 of the subject guide and in the reading by McFarland, A.S.
‘Neopluralism’, Annual Review of Political Science 10, 2007, pp.45–66,
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Examiners’ commentaries 2016
which also discusses whether Dahl’s original vision of interest group
competition can be retained. However, the original readings are always
useful to consult and still relevant, namely Dahl, R. Who governs?
Democracy and power in an American city. (New Haven, Conn: Yale
University Press, 1961) [ISBN 9780300000511], and Olson. M. The logic
of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1971 [1965]) [9780674537514] – this is a very
tough read, so be prepared! When examining the political factors that
influence interest group success, the reading by Thies, C.G. and S. Porche
‘The political economy of agricultural protection’, Journal of Politics 69(1)
2007, pp.116–127, provides some very useful empirical evidence.
Approaching the question
Overall this question was answered very well by the vast majority of
candidates and was probably the strongest set of answers in the whole
exam. Basically this question is looking for you to make a normative
judgement on whether pluralism is desirable and then to the extent that it
is, make a theoretical and empirical judgement on whether it is feasible.
So this means juxtaposing Dahl’s pluralism with Olson’s logic of collective
action, and then also considering McFarland’s paper on neo-pluralism.
• Weak answers (and there weren’t that many) were those that failed
to engage with any of the theoretical viewpoints and concepts within
this debate. These answers might have outlined a bit about pluralism
but then not engaged with Olson or with the idea of neo-pluralism as
a possible way to redeem the ideas of pluralism and overcome Olson’s
critique.
• Satisfactory answers were those that discussed Dahl’s pluralism,
highlighting why it was so appealing to Dahl and why many
commentators were initially very taken by the idea of organising
interest group politics in this way. Next Olson’s work was typically
discussed as the major critique of Dahl (along with other critiques we
raise in the subject guide) to show how Dahl’s vision is not necessarily
realisable. Finally, neo-pluralism was often offered as a way to bring
in the ideals of pluralism while overcoming the limited mobilisation
of public interest groups. Important here was the use of concepts like
public versus private goods, free riding and the different forms that
interest group relations can take (Wilson).
• Excellent answers engaged strongly with the normative dimension of
this debate, exploring why and to what extent pluralism is desirable.
This is often assumed, but excellent answers teased out the value of
such an approach to a state’s politics. They also tended to develop
a critique of the assumptions underpinning Olson’s rational choice
method and the degree to which it is valid. So once again what made
these answers excellent rather than satisfactory was the level of critical
appraisal and assessment of key ideas.
Question 7
Does the choice between a presidential and a parliamentary system matter for
the stability of democracy?
Reading for this question
In addition to Chapter 7 of the subject guide, Clark et al. (2012) Chapter
12 provides some very good definitions and a clear empirical overview
of the consequences of different forms of government. A useful way to
understand the different consequences of policy making in presidential
and parliamentary systems is through the lens of veto players. Tsebelis,
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
G. ‘Decision making in political systems: veto players in presidentialism,
parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism’, British Journal of
Political Science 25(3) 1995, pp.289–325, analyses this well. In addition,
when it comes to examining whether presidential systems are more likely
to collapse as democracies, then two fundamental readings to consult
are: Linz, J.J. ‘The perils of presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy 1(1)
1990, pp.51–69; and Cheibub, J.A. and F. Limongi ‘Democratic institutions
and regime survival: parliamentary and presidential democracies
reconsidered’, Annual Review of Political Science 5(1) 2002, pp.151–79.
These two readings agree that presidential systems do not last as long as
parliamentary ones, but they disagree over whether this is caused by the
presidential form of government or not. Chebub and Limongi (2002), in
particular, provide some excellent empirics for this debate.
Approaching the question
To answer this question you need to address Juan Linz’s well-known but
deeply contested argument that presidential systems are more likely to
lead to the collapse of fragile democracies than parliamentary systems.
This requires a clear knowledge of the distinction between the two regime
types and being able to clearly link these to how they might impact upon
stability. It also requires a strong knowledge of key empirical data and
cases covered by Linz, Horowitz, and Cheibub and Limongi.
• Weak answers failed to define the distinction between presidential
and parliamentary systems, which meant that arguments about why
presidential systems might be less stable were not clearly rooted in
key features such as deadlock and fixed terms. Another common
shortcoming was a lack of engagement with the ideas of Linz and
a lack of any empirical data to tease out arguments. This led to
underdeveloped key points.
• Satisfactory answers offered a clear argument at the outset (arguments
both agreeing with and challenging the statement were acceptable),
before defining the two regime types according to key characteristics
of mutual (in)dependence, party cohesion, fixed terms and so on.
Good arguments were able to appraise Linz’s argument and link his
claims clearly to the idea of mutual independence, seeing the strengths
and limits of his position before offering a clear answer to the
question. They also showed a good use of key empirical cases (Chile,
Argentina, Nigeria).
• Excellent answers were those that drew on the vast array of empirical
data to carefully build their arguments. The strongest answers were
those that used the arguments of Cheibub and Limongi extensively,
drawing on their vast array of empirical evidence to build a strong
challenge to Linz. Excellent answers also knew Horowitz’s response to
Linz and brought in the importance of other institutional features, such
as the type of electoral system and the degree to which institutions
build national unity. These answers reached the highest grade by
creating a careful degree of critical appraisal through this extensive
use of empirics.
Question 8
Is Lijphart correct to claim that consensus government is ‘kinder and gentler’
than majoritarian government?
Reading for this question
It is important in this question to show knowledge of Lijphart’s distinction
between consensus and majoritarian democracies and not simply
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Examiners’ commentaries 2016
conflate this with the difference between coalition and single-party
governments. This topic is covered in Chapter 7 of the subject guide
and it is comprehensively discussed in Chapters 12 and 15 of Clark et
al. (2012). It is also useful to read the first three chapters of Lijphart’s
original work, which is very accessible and a seminal text in political
science. This is Lijphart, A. Patterns of democracy: government forms and
performance in thirty-six countries. (New Haven, MA: Yale University Press,
1999) [ISBN 9780300078930]. Additionally, it is a good idea to show the
reader that you understand how Tsebelis’s notion of veto players relates
to the concepts of majoritarian and consensus democracy, so you should
also read Tsebelis, G. ‘Decision making in political systems: veto players
in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism’,
British Journal of Political Science 25(3) 1995, pp.289–325, which provides
a good overview of his thinking.
Approaching the question
Central to this question is showing why Lijphart argues that consensus
democracies are kinder and gentler than majoritarian ones. Initially it
is important to set out the key distinction between the two models of
democracy but without spending the whole of the essay listing Lijphart’s
different institutional designs. The reasons for Lijphart’s preference
for consensus democracy is that it produces better outcomes, such as
lower crime rates, higher GDP, better rights for minority groups and so
on. However, much of this is contested and, of course, there are tradeoffs between the two models of democracy. Bringing in Tsebelis here is
also important. The question should go about evaluating the outcomes
produced by each model of democracy to explore whether Lijphart’s claim
is correct and, if so, under what conditions.
• Weak answers typically failed to define clearly the distinction between
consensus and majoritarian democracies. In addition they usually
failed to specify Lijphart’s arguments and make clear how they were
appraising whether a system was ‘kinder and gentler’ or not. As such,
they tended to over-generalise and failed to make their reasoning
explicit.
• Satisfactory answers drew on Lijphart to distinguish between the two
models of democracy and clearly appraised the relative merits of each
approach. Good answers set out a clear set of criteria by which to
judge each model and, crucially, then explored the outcomes produced
under the two different models and related these to whether one
model could be kinder and gentler than another.
• Excellent answers did all the above but also noted that it was difficult
to argue definitively one way or another and instead stated that
the social context of a country needed to be taken into account.
These answers noted that a consensus model of democracy is more
essential in diverse societies while majoritarian systems work best in
heterogeneous ones.
Question 9
‘Decentralisation enhances both political and economic efficiency.’ Discuss.
Reading for this question
Given the broad nature of this question, all the Essential and Further
reading listed in Chapter 9 of the subject guide is relevant. It is important
to distinguish between decentralisation and federalism and this is well
covered in Chapter 15 of Clark et al. (2012). In addition, there are
different types of federalism and different motivations for federalism.
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
The reading by Elazar, D.J. ‘Contrasting unitary and federal systems’,
International Political Science Review 18(3) 1997, pp.237–51, examines
different reasons countries become federations. The reading by Erk, J.
and L. Anderson ‘The paradox of federalism: does self-rule accommodate
or exacerbate ethnic divisions?’, Regional and Federal Studies 19(2) 2009,
pp.191–202, gives a strong overview of ethno-national federalism and its
strengths and risks. Meanwhile the best overview of fiscal decentralisation
comes from the reading by Oates, W.E. ‘An essay on fiscal federalism’,
Journal of Economic Literature 37(3) 1999, pp.1120–49, but it is also well
covered in Weingast, B.R. ‘The economic role of political institutions:
market-preserving federalism and economic development’, Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization 11(1) 1995, pp.1–31.
Approaching the question
This is a deliberately broad question. In order to make this evaluation it
is necessary to identify a set of criteria by which to make this evaluation
(in other words, define political and economic efficiency) and draw on
a range of evidence to help you make the assessment. The subject guide
looks at the themes of how decentralisation influences accountability,
helps to manage diversity and the consequences of fiscal federalism, and
these would be sensible criteria to use in this essay. Essentially, you need
to provide an appraisal of the strengths and limitations of decentralisation
to offer a clear answer to the question of whether or not it enhances
efficiency. Of course, it is also important for you to acknowledge that
whether decentralisation is an appropriate vertical design of power
depends upon the needs and social context of that state.
• Weak answers were those that failed to define decentralisation clearly
or those that used federalism and decentralisation interchangeably.
Weak answers also often presented only the positive aspects of
decentralisation without considering any of the key drawbacks,
such as creating overlapping levels of responsibility which reduces
accountability, malapportionment and the potential for a ‘race to
the bottom’. This led to partial arguments which were not wholly
convincing as they never addressed the counterview.
• Satisfactory answers were those that provided a clear definition of
decentralisation (and a way to measure it through the rate of taxation
raised by lower tiers of government). They also discussed the strengths
and limitations of decentralisation and related these back to an
overarching argument. Good answers made an appraisal of what type
of states would benefit most from decentralisation, namely large and/
or diverse states, and how efficiency may be achieved differently in
different (more diverse and large) states.
• Excellent answers distinguished between different types of
decentralisation, arguing that it could either be done to decentralise
power to manage ethnic diversity or could take the form of fiscal
federalism. This was important because these are introduced for very
different reasons and therefore shape whether this is efficient or not.
Excellent answers also often moved beyond a straightforward appraisal
of the pros and cons and instead looked at how decentralisation played
out in specific contexts, such as under what conditions ethnonational
federalism helped to hold countries together and manage diversity
compared to conditions where it may facilitate the break-up of large
states. Excellent answers also often explored the meaning of efficiency
and how this can be contested according to what one hopes to gain
from decentralisation.
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Examiners’ commentaries 2016
Question 10
‘Delegation to unaccountable elites reduces the quality of democracy.’ Discuss.
Reading for this question
Central to any discussion of delegation to non-elected institutions is the
principal-agent framework. Therefore you need to use the reading by
Thatcher, M. and A. Stone Sweet ‘Theory and practice of delegation to
non-majoritarian institutions’, West European Politics 25(1) 2002, pp.1–22,
which provides an excellent overview of this approach. The principalagent framework is also discussed in Chapter 10 of the subject guide. The
question asks you to draw on the case of either courts or central banks
to explore this debate. If you use the example of courts you should draw
on the reading by Gibson, J., G. Caldeira and V. Baird ‘On the legitimacy
of national high courts’, American Political Science Review 92(2) 1998,
pp.343–58, which discusses why the delegation of fundamental law to
courts is useful in a democracy. However, there are also dangers and these
are tackled in Steunenberg, B. ‘Courts, cabinet and coalition parties: the
politics of euthanasia in a parliamentary setting’, British Journal of Political
Science 27(4) 1997, pp.551–71, which discusses how judges can impose
their own policy preferences whenever elected leaders are gridlocked.
Part of Chapter 15 of Clark et al. (2012) also deals with the role of
supreme courts in a democracy. If you choose to look at central banks
then the reading by W.T. Bernhard ‘A political explanation of variations in
central bank independence’, American Political Science Review 92(2) 1998,
pp.311–27, discusses some of the main reasons behind delegation and why
it varies from country to country. Additionally, the reading by Hix, S., B.
Høyland and N. Vivyan ‘From doves to hawks: a spatial analysis of voting
in the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England’, European
Journal of Political Research 49(6) 2010, pp.731–58, shows one way that
politicians may try to retain post-hoc controls after they have delegated to
an agent.
Approaching the question
This question asks you to explore the important debate around the role of
unelected bodies within a democracy and argue either for or against the
statement that such delegation is undemocratic. In order to answer this
question adequately, you need to show an awareness of the principal-agent
framework and the purpose of delegation within a democracy. It is also
important to show awareness that this need not be a debate about either
having accountable politicians or having unelected bodies. Somewhat
of a middle ground is possible if political leaders retain some controls in
place over the agent after they have delegated power (such as an oversight
body or controlling their budget), however, such controls do reduce the
functional gains of delegation. In this answer you would be expected to
discuss the possible gains and possible pitfalls of delegation (all of these
are covered in the course guide and in Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002),
using either Supreme Courts or Central Banks as case studies, and relate
these into a clear discussion of whether this enhances or detracts from the
quality of democracy in a state.
• Weak answers were those that failed to use the principal-agent
framework to structure the essay. Other weak answers failed to
tackle the central thrust of the question around accountability
and delegation, instead giving more generalised discussions.
Again, tackling the specific question asked is crucial to performing
satisfactorily or well in an exam.
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
• Satisfactory answers provided an assessment of the strengths and
limitations to delegation in a democracy, teasing out the functional
benefits while acknowledging it runs the risk of policy drift and
unaccountable elites setting new policy directions. Good answers
framed these debates within the principal-agent framework and
noted that the pitfalls of delegation, including the potential for
unaccountable elites to make policy, were not inevitable and could
be militated against through post-hoc controls. Key examples of
Dutch euthanasia law or the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank
of England were often used. Very few satisfactory or good answers
argued outright against delegation and instead most opted to argue
that delegation with some controls to limit unaccountable elites was
compatible with a democracy or enhanced the quality of democracy.
• Excellent answers acknowledged that the opportunity for unelected
elites to make new policy and impose their own preferences was much
more likely to occur when there is gridlock between different veto
players in a government. They also developed the idea that post hoc
controls are a way of limiting the power of unaccountable elites, but
that this reduced the functional benefits of delegation and therefore
it is about striking a balance in any stable democracy. By developing
these points, such answers showed a high degree of original thinking
and a critical application of important concepts which are central to
top-class work.
Question 11
Does the design of political institutions matter for economic performance?
Reading for this question
This topic is covered in Chapter 11 of the subject guide. The first half of
this chapter goes through the ways we measure economic performance,
variations in these indicators in comparative perspective and explanations
for these variations. The other main reading for this is the reading
by Persson, T. and G. Tabellini ‘Constitutional rules and fiscal policy
outcomes’, American Economic Review 94(1) 2004, pp.25–45.
Approaching the question
This is a fairly straightforward question that was tackled by surprisingly
few candidates. There are two main aspects to arguments that political
institutions matter (and it is not really possible to argue convincingly that
they do not matter). Firstly, candidates needed to discuss the difference
between democracies and non-democracies – some scholars (Przeworski
et al., 2000) here may argue there is no real difference between the
degree of democracy and economic performance, but this is contested.
Secondly, there are discussions over how variations in institutional design
within democracies lead to different outcomes, notably whether a state
is presidential or parliamentary, variations in electoral system design
and whether a state is a liberal market economy or a command market
economy.
• Weak answers argued that institutional design does not matter and
that economic factors are more important. This misses the point
somewhat. So this debate does not claim that economic factors, like
the level of resources or human capital in a state, do not matter.
It argues that once we control for all that, there remains an effect
of political institutions (see Persson and Tabellini, 2004). Even if
we accept Przeworski’s claim that there is no difference between
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Examiners’ commentaries 2016
democracies and dictatorships, there is an abundance of evidence
that the design of institutions within democracies matter – so clearly
political institutions matter for economic performance.
• Satisfactory answers acknowledged the role of institutions and most
typically looked at one or two of these variations. Good answers went
slightly further and acknowledged all the main institutional variations
that impacted economic performance. They also showed awareness of
the empirical evidence and used this to support their arguments.
• Excellent answers did all of the above but went much further in
teasing out the causal reasoning as to why institutions matter. Rather
than just stating that, for example, the electoral system was important,
they explained why this was important. In this way, the level of
reasoning was much stronger and a greater degree of depth was
added.
Question 12
When trying to tackle climate change at an international level, are collective
action problems inevitable?
Reading for this question
Chapter 12 of the subject guide discusses the politics of environmental
policy. For a discussion of collective action problems the key reading
is Ostrom, E., J. Burger, C.B. Field, R.B Norgaard and D. Policansky
‘Revisiting the commons: local lessons, global challenges’, Science
284(5412) 1999, pp.278–82. The original discussion by Hardin on the
tragedy of the commons is also easily available online and worth a read
to understand collective action problems. These are also covered in
Chapter 1 of the subject guide where we discuss the prisoners’ dilemma.
Three other readings show ways in which collective action problems at
the international level have been overcome to improve environmental
protection. These discuss domestic politics and the factors that increase the
level of environmental protection. These are Neumayer, E. ‘Are left-wing
party strength and corporatism good for the environment? Evidence from
panel analysis of air pollution in OECD countries’, Ecological Economics
45(2) 2003, pp.203–20; Neumayer, E. ‘Do democracies exhibit stronger
international environmental commitment? A cross-country analysis’,
Journal of Peace Research 39(2) 2002, pp.139–64); and Scruggs L.
Sustaining abundance: environmental performance in industrial democracies.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) [ISBN 9780521016926].
Approaching the question
The foundation of this question needed to be an explanation of collective
action problems. This is the idea that due to communication failures, two
or more players will pursue the strategy that is best for them in the shortterm even though it produces sub-optimum outcomes at the group level.
In other words, this is the classic prisoner’s dilemma. Answers needed to
discuss whether this is inevitable and unpack some of the assumptions or
possible ways to overcome it (repeated games, increasing communication,
privatising the public good or promoting local management of the
commons).
• Weak answers failed to define or even use the term of collective action
failure. Instead they tended to discuss general knowledge of the failure
to tackle climate change at the international level, but without framing
this in terms of key concepts. This limited the depth of the answers
and meant they were at best partial answers.
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
• Satisfactory answers typically discussed the tragedy of the commons,
although many candidates did not explicitly explain how this was
a form of collective action failure. Good answers were more aware
of how the tragedy of the commons was a sub-optimum collective
outcome and explained it as such. Good answers also showed
examples of how this could be overcome and argued that it was not
inevitable. Most arguments were based around the ideas of Ostrom
et al. (1999), notably devolving local ownership as a way to increase
coordination without having to privatise the asset.
• Excellent answers tended to tackle the idea of collective action
problems much more explicitly. Particularly strong answers set out
ways to overcome the public goods challenges of this collective action
problem, such as repeated interaction (for example China and the USA
engage with each other more in other contexts to build trust), or used
the evidence from Neumayer (2002) to show how domestic politics
can help overcome international challenges.
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Examiners’ commentaries 2016
Examiners’ commentaries 2016
PS1172 Introduction to political science – Zone B
Important note
This commentary reflects the examination and assessment arrangements
for this course in the academic year 2015–16. The format and structure
of the examination may change in future years, and any such changes
will be publicised on the virtual learning environment (VLE).
Information about the subject guide and the Essential reading
references
Unless otherwise stated, all cross-references will be to the latest version
of the subject guide (2012). You should always attempt to use the most
recent edition of any Essential reading textbook, even if the commentary
and/or online reading list and/or subject guide refer to an earlier
edition. If different editions of Essential reading are listed, please check
the VLE for reading supplements – if none are available, please use the
contents list and index of the new edition to find the relevant section.
Comments on specific questions
Candidates should answer THREE of the following TWELVE questions.
All questions carry equal marks.
General remarks
Overall the exam answers were of better quality this year than in previous
years. The mean and median grade were higher, there were fewer fails
and a greater number of firsts. All of this is really encouraging. The main
reasons for the improvement this year compared to previous years were as
follows:
1. Exam answers engaged a lot more with the core theories and concepts
and used these systematically to explore the answers.
2. Basic definitions of core concepts were deployed more, which gave
answers a solid foundation.
3. There was more systematic use of the literature and more use of
in-text citations to support answers. Combined these improvements
generally made answers a lot more robust and better developed.
However, there are still some common mistakes occurring which are worth
noting in order to improve future performance. The most common, and
one that was also evident last year, is the failure to answer the question
asked and instead just putting down everything a candidate knows on
a topic. In an exam it is important to show the examiner that you know
how to discriminate in the arguments and information you use and that
you tailor your answer to the specific question asked. If you just repeat a
prepared answer on a topic blindly without matching it up to the precise
question, this will always limit your grade. For example, with the question
‘Is wealth necessary for democracy?’ a lot of answers just gave the three
sets of theories of democratisation, namely wealth-based explanations,
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
followed by cultural-based explanations, followed by strategic bargainbased explanations. However, it is not clear that either culture or strategic
bargaining needed to be discussed to answer this question. Here, the
examiners punished candidates as it appears that they were unable to
adapt their knowledge to the exam context and they failed to show
application, judgement and critical appraisal skills.
The other common problem was that candidates prepared a minimum
number of topics and this left them in a tricky position if they could not
answer a question on a prepared topic. This was most common in the
climate change question: ‘When trying to tackle climate change at an
international level, are collective action problems inevitable?’ It was quite
clear that a large number of candidates did not know what collective action
problems were, but they chose to answer this question anyway. Presumably
they did so because they thought they would answer this better than any
other question or because they could not answer any other questions.
In these instances where it was clear that candidates failed to define or
engage with the idea of collective action problems, the exam scripts were
heavily punished by the examiners. So students should prepare a sufficient
range of topics to give themselves leeway on the exam day.
Question 1
‘Qualitative research methods are superior to quantitative ones as they allow
social scientists to uncover causal relationships.’ Discuss.
Reading for this question
This question requires you to demonstrate knowledge of the strengths and
limitations of both qualitative and quantitative research and to relate these
to the specific point about causality. This is covered in-depth in Chapter
1 of the subject guide and also in Chapter 1 of Clark, W.R., M. Golder
and S. Nadenichek Golder Principles of comparative politics. (Washington
DC: CQ Press, 2012) [ISBN 9781608716791]. In general these should be
sufficient for this question but if you would like to push your grade as high
as possible then further readings are useful. So in addition the reading
by Gerring, J. ‘What is a case study and what is it good for?’, American
Political Science Review 98(2) 2004, pp.341–54, is an excellent overview of
the case study method and its approach to proving relationships between
variables. When it comes to quantitative approaches, the more important
point to note is the difference between correlation and causation rather
than worrying about the specifics of the statistical methods.
Approaching the question
This question is looking for an appreciation of the two main
methodological approaches used in political science (and the social
sciences more generally). Crucially, you need to link explicitly your
appraisal of the strengths and limits of each method to causation. The
key here is not just to present an overview of each method but to also
show what each method reveals about causal relationships. For example,
quantitative approaches are better at finding large-scale correlations across
time and place. Qualitative approaches on the other hand are better at
tracing causation in a small number of cases. As such, perhaps qualitative
methods are preferable for generating initial causal insights which can
then be tested more extensively using quantitative methods.
• Weak answers were those that failed to engage with the causality
aspect of the question and instead just gave a general discussion of
qualitative and quantitative methods without tailoring this to the
question asked. Another common feature of some weak answers was
20
Examiners’ commentaries 2016
making the argument that quantitative methods were better at proving
causation than qualitative methods, such as process tracing. Failure to
demonstrate a core understanding of the debate like this always risks
failure.
• Satisfactory answers showed a strong understanding of the differences
between qualitative and quantitative methods and related these
to issues of causation. We were looking for an understanding that
quantitative methods such as regression use a large number of cases
to find a correlation between variables, but that this does not prove
causation. In contrast, qualitative methods use a smaller number
of cases and by carefully tracing the outcomes are able to come
closer to identifying causal processes. However, we also expected
an understanding of the limitations of each method, including an
overview of how hard it is to be certain of causal relationships in the
qualitative method due to the small sample size and the potential
idiosyncrasies of the approach.
• What distinguished excellent answers for this question was the way
they framed their approach. The best of these acknowledged that
qualitative approaches were better at identifying causal relationships,
but challenged the idea that this rendered them superior. Instead, an
argument in favour of mixed methods was typically offered, arguing
that causality is not the sole factor that needs to be taken into account
when deciding which methodological approach should be deployed.
Question 2
Does democracy need a pro-democratic political culture to emerge?
Reading for this question
The main readings about democratisation are covered in Chapter 2 of the
subject guide, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of Clark et al. (2012), and Chapters 1,
2 and 3 of Acemoglu D. and J.A. Robinson, Economic origins of dictatorship
and democracy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) [ISBN
9780521855266].
Approaching the question
This question basically asks whether a pro-democratic culture is necessary
for democracy. Crucial to this question was some discussion of what was a
pro-democratic culture. Answers needed to distinguish between arguments
claiming that culture prevents democracy, namely the idea that certain
religions are incompatible with democracy, and arguments that say a high
degree of civic trust is necessary for democracy to emerge and survive.
• Weak answers were those that simply gave an overview of the three
approaches and never tailored them to the specific question. Other
weak answers presented discussions that culture prevents democracy,
but never really discussed the idea that culture is necessary for
democracy to emerge.
• Satisfactory answers used the ideas of Almond and Verba, Putnam, and
Inglehart and Welzel to show how many argue that certain cultural
values are necessary for democracy. The strengths and limits of these
approaches were appraised, with many answers arguing that in order
for a pro-democratic culture to emerge a minimum level of wealth
and economic development was required and therefore this was the
real necessity. Where some of these answers fell short was in not fully
exploring the relationship between culture and wealth or appraising
the limited robustness of the evidence used by those scholars who
argue in favour of the necessity of a pro-democratic culture.
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
• Excellent answers distinguished between the emergence and survival
of democracy, arguing that a pro-democratic culture may not be
necessary for democracy to emerge, but that it was necessary for
democracy to survive. This showed a high degree of original thinking
and reasoning to make the argument.
Question 3
Does social class matter for how people vote today?
Reading for this question
This is covered in Chapter 3 of the subject guide and this chapter is
crucial. Two further readings on social class and voting were important
here: Evans, G. And J. Tilley ‘How parties shape class politics: explaining
the decline of the class basis of party support’, British Journal of Political
Science 42(1) 2012, pp.137–61, and Evans, G. ‘The continued significance
of class voting’, Annual Review of Political Science 3 2000, pp.401–17.
Approaching the question
For this question we were looking for a discussion of the degree to which
social class matters for voters. This debate needed to be explored using
key concepts such as expressive versus strategic voting, the cleavage model
of politics and de-alignment. There is a lot of empirical data for this debate
which needed to be included and assessed as well. Sensible answers were
those that argued that class matters a lot less today for how people vote,
but that it still has some salience, especially among older voters.
• Weak answers were those that just gave general discussions of how
a person’s social circumstances might affect their voting behaviour
without making any reference to core concepts and the empirical
evidence. Other weak answers that did engage with key concepts left
the debate at too abstract a level, typically arguing that cleavages are
less important today, but never actually talking specifically about social
class as one of those cleavages.
• Satisfactory answers distinguished between expressive voting and
strategic voting, with a particular emphasis on the cleavage model of
politics. This was typically used to discuss how class can be understood
as a cleavage but that, post-de-alignment, it is less determining of
an individual’s voting behaviour. Good answers engaged well with
empirical evidence, such as using the Alford Index or the data by
Evans et al. The main limitation of some of these answers was a failure
to use the idea of de-alignment, which was too often overlooked, or
relying on countries that are not appropriate for this debate (such as
Singapore), which only really applies to advanced liberal democracies
that went through a form of industrialisation.
• Excellent answers were those that developed their ideas the most.
They typically appraised the strengths and limits of the cleavage model
as applied to social class, showing how changes in this are hard to
measure over time (under both the expressive and strategic model you
would still expect to see more lower-socio economic groups voting
for left-wing parties but for different reasons) and noting how there
may be generational lags in the decline of cleavage voting. In this way,
these answers offered something more in terms of development and
critical appraisal over satisfactory answers.
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Examiners’ commentaries 2016
Question 4
Does the choice between a majoritarian and a proportional electoral system
matter?
Reading for this question
Chapter 13 of Clark et al. (2012) provides a strong overview of different
types of electoral systems and their consequences. However, this is
more descriptive than analytical. Therefore it is crucial that you also
read Carey, J.M. and S. Hix ‘The electoral sweet spot: low-magnitude
proportional electoral systems’, American Journal of Political Science
55(2) 2011, pp.383–97. This provides a more considered discussion of
the consequences of electoral systems and offers what they propose to
be a ‘best’ type of electoral system. Although the empirical evidence in
this article is difficult at times, the core ideas are very accessible. Two of
the further readings are also useful for looking at the consequences of
different electoral systems and therefore help you to consider if the choice
in electoral system design matters. Hix, S., R. Johnston and I. McLean.
Choosing an electoral system. (London: British Academy, 2010) [ISBN
9780856725883] attempt to answer this in the British context, but their
discussion of each electoral system is on a general level. Abramson et al.
‘Comparing strategic voting under FPTP and PR’, Comparative political
studies 43(1) 2010, pp.61–90, compare levels of strategic voting under
different types of electoral systems and their finding challenges the
assumption that majoritarian systems lead to more strategic voting.
Approaching the question
This is one of the questions that reappears regularly on the exam paper.
This question is looking for a discussion of the key trade-offs in electoral
system design and asked you to make a judgement on how much these
matter. You also need to consider the Carey and Hix (2011) view that the
choice between majoritarian and proportional systems may not have to be
as stark as some claim and a sweet spot can be achieved through the use
of modified proportional representation, such as using low magnitude PR
systems or introducing an electoral threshold.
• Weak answers were often mainly descriptive rather than analytical.
They provided an overview of different types of electoral systems and
how they worked but without providing an analysis of why the choice
mattered. Some weak answers also failed to consider the Carey and
Hix view.
• Satisfactory answers divided electoral systems into either proportional
or majoritarian ones based on the district magnitude of each system
and then looked at how proportional systems prioritise representation
while majoritarian systems prioritise accountability. This really
helped to ensure that candidates did not just describe each individual
electoral system by instead forcing them to consider the two broad
analytical categories. Good answers then showed how this choice
mattered in terms of the different outcomes that are produced under
each system. Good answers then also discussed the idea of an electoral
sweet spot and how this might be the best choice.
• Excellent answers were those that explained how the choice matters
greatly and therefore we need a clear framework by which to make
the choice between electoral systems. This was usually related to how
diverse or homogenous a country was or the needs of the country at
the time.
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
Question 5
How useful is Downs’s Median Voter Theorem for understanding political party
behaviour?
Reading for this question
Chapter 5 of the subject guide covers the debate over whether political
parties polarise or converge on the median voter in advanced democracies.
Obviously the best place to start is Downs, A. ‘An economic theory of
political action in a democracy’, The Journal of Political Economy 65(2)
1957, pp.135–50. An important critique of Downs is offered by Lipset,
S.M. and S. Rokkan ‘Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter
alignments’ in Mair, P. (ed.) The West European party system. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990) [ISBN 9780198275831].
Approaching the question
This question is asking for an evaluation of one of the most important
theories in political science: the idea that parties will converge on the
median voter. In order to undertake an adequate evaluation you need to
outline the assumptions made by Downs, the challenges these assumptions
face, and then be able to appraise these theoretical claims against the
empirical evidence.
• Weak answers never went into any detail on Downs’s theory,
instead just stating in the most basic terms that parties converge
on the median voter. These suffered from a lack of depth and failed
to convince the reader. Other weak answers never specified the
conditions in which Downs claims his theory to hold true and instead
over-generalised it to all parties in all contexts.
• Satisfactory answers explained Downs’s economic theory of party
behaviour, often using core examples from advanced liberal
democracies to highlight this, notably the British Labour Party and the
German SPD. This was juxtaposed with the cleavage model, notably
using the examples of Belgium and Holland. Good answers went
further by unpacking the assumptions underpinning each model to
interrogate how robust these are, such as Downs’s assumption that
party leaders are driven by a desire for office or Lipset and Rokkan’s
assumption that cleavages freeze. The most insightful answers argued
that parties in advanced democracies do not always converge, but if
it is a two-party system with no cross-cutting cleavages in place and
a majoritarian electoral system, then Downs’s theory is useful for
understanding party behaviour.
• Excellent answers distinguished between types of parties, arguing
that large mainstream parties are more likely to converge than small
niche parties, which may have a stronger commitment to policy and
which prevents convergence. In this way these answers showed the
wider context in which Downs’s theory needs to be rooted in order to
appraise its usefulness.
Question 6
Do interest groups enhance the democratic process?
Reading for this question
For this question you need to discuss the debate between Dahl’s notion
of pluralism and Olson’s notion of collective action. This is covered in
Chapter 6 of the subject guide and in the reading by McFarland, A.S.
‘Neopluralism’, Annual Review of Political Science 10, 2007, pp.45–66,
which also discusses whether Dahl’s original vision of interest group
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Examiners’ commentaries 2016
competition can be retained. However, the original readings are always
useful to consult and still relevant, namely Dahl, R. Who governs?
Democracy and power in an American city. (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1961) [ISBN 9780300000511], and Olson. M. The logic of collective
action: public goods and the theory of groups. (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard
University Press, 1974[1965]) [9780674537514] – but this is a tough
read, so be prepared! When examining the political factors that influence
interest group success, the reading by Thies, C.G. and S. Porche ‘The
political economy of agricultural protection’, Journal of Politics 69(1)
2007, pp.116–27, provides some very useful empirical evidence.
Approaching the question
The focus here needs to be on whether interest groups are beneficial
or detrimental to the democratic process. Your answer to this may well
depend on whether you believe that a pluralist model of interest group
relations (which enhances the democratic process by dispersing power
among multiple groups, widens participation and makes for more
efficient and better informed decisions by policy makers) is possible or if
you believe, like Olson, that some interest groups are able to dominate
democratic decision-making at the cost of others.
• Weak answers were those that failed to engage with any of the
theoretical viewpoints and concepts within this debate, instead
offering answers that discussed how interest groups with more
resources were better able to influence the process, often judging them
to be bad for democracy. Although not necessarily incorrect, such
answers failed to root themselves in a clear body of theories, concepts
and evidence which greatly limited their academic analysis and the
depth of argumentation offered.
• Satisfactory answers were those that went through Dahl’s and Olson’s
perspectives and related these very clearly to debates around whether
they enhance or detract from the quality of democracy. Good answers
used clear and accurate case examples to highlight their arguments.
Good answers also looked at what happened with interest groups
after they mobilised. Here the findings from Thies and Porche were
important, showing that whether they are good or bad for democracy
may in part depend on how the political system is designed.
• Excellent answers did all the above, but related this explicitly to a set
of criteria on what is desirable or not in a democracy (justified and
rooted in the literature). The advantage of these approaches was that
they made their reasoning very explicit and developed, thus adding
extra depth to their arguments.
Question 7
Does the choice between a presidential and a parliamentary system matter for
the stability of democracy?
Reading for this question
In addition to Chapter 7 of the subject guide, Clark et al. (2012) Chapter
12 provides some very good definitions and a clear empirical overview
of the consequences of different forms of government. A useful way to
understand the different consequences of policy making in presidential and
parliamentary systems is through the lens of veto players, and: Tsebelis,
G. ‘Decision making in political systems: veto players in presidentialism,
parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism’, British Journal of
Political Science 25(3) 1995, pp.289–325, analyses this well. In addition,
when it comes to examining whether presidential systems are more likely
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
to collapse as democracies, then two fundamental readings to consult
are: Linz, J.J. ‘The perils of presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy 1(1)
1990, pp.51–69; and Cheibub, J.A. and F. Limongi ‘Democratic institutions
and regime survival: parliamentary and presidential democracies
reconsidered’, Annual Review of Political Science 5(1) 2002, pp.151–79.
These two readings agree that presidential systems do not last as long as
parliamentary ones, but they disagree over whether this is caused by the
presidential form of government or not. Chebub and Limongi (2002), in
particular, provide some excellent empirics for this debate.
Approaching the question
To answer this question you need to address Juan Linz’s well-known but
deeply contested argument that presidential systems are more likely to
lead to the collapse of fragile democracies than parliamentary systems.
This requires a clear knowledge of the distinction between the two regime
types and being able to clearly link these to how they might impact upon
stability. It also requires a strong knowledge of key empirical data and
cases covered by Linz, Horowitz, and Cheibub and Limongi.
• Weak answers failed to define the distinction between presidential
and parliamentary systems, which meant that arguments about why
presidential systems might be less stable were not clearly rooted in
key features such as deadlock and fixed terms. Another common
shortcoming was a lack of engagement with the ideas of Linz and
a lack of any empirical data to tease out arguments. This led to
underdeveloped key points.
• Satisfactory answers offered a clear argument at the outset (arguments
both agreeing with and challenging the statement were acceptable),
before defining the two regime types according to key characteristics
of mutual (in)dependence, party cohesion, fixed terms and so on.
Good arguments were able to appraise Linz’s argument and link his
claims clearly to the idea of mutual independence, seeing the strengths
and limits of his position before offering a clear answer to the
question. They also showed a good use of key empirical cases (Chile,
Argentina, Nigeria).
• Excellent answers were those that drew on the vast array of empirical
data to carefully build their arguments. The strongest answers were
those that used the arguments of Cheibub and Limongi extensively,
drawing on their vast array of empirical evidence to build a strong
challenge to Linz. Excellent answers also knew Horowitz’s response to
Linz and brought in the importance of other institutional features, such
as the type of electoral system and the degree to which institutions
build national unity. These answers reached the highest grade by
creating a careful degree of critical appraisal through this extensive
use of empirics.
Question 8
Does the risk of exogenous shocks mean that systems with fewer veto players
are always preferable to those with comparatively more veto players?
Reading for this question
This topic is covered in Chapter 7 of the subject guide and it is
comprehensively discussed in Chapters 12 and 15 of Clark et al. (2012).
Obviously, it is necessary to show the reader that you understand
Tsebelis’s notion of veto players, so you should also read Tsebelis, G.
‘Decision making in political systems: veto players in presidentialism,
parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism’, British Journal of
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Examiners’ commentaries 2016
Political Science 25(3) 1995, pp.289–325. It is also useful to relate Tsebelis
to Lijphart and it is useful to read the first three chapters of Lijphart’s
original work, which is very accessible and a seminal text in political
science. This is Lijphart, A. Patterns of democracy: government forms and
performance in thirty-six countries. (New Haven, MA: Yale University Press,
1999) [ISBN 9780300078930].
Approaching the question
It is important to outline Tsebelis’s notion of veto players, its related
concepts and his two rules (the more veto players and the bigger the
ideological distance, the greater the degree of policy stability). Then you
need to show why fewer veto players is preferable with regard to the
risk of exogenous shock. However, you then need to make an appraisal
of whether this risk means fewer veto players is always preferable and
contextualise this debate somewhat. It is here that you can link this to
Lijphart’s notions of majoritarian and consensus democracy.
• Weak answers typically failed to define veto players or the two key
propositions of Tsebelis. They also often failed to explain why an
exogenous shock means that fewer veto players are preferable. In other
words, they failed to understand the basic premise of the question.
• Satisfactory answers defined veto players and discussed the best
known of Tsebelis’s propositions; that more veto players can delay
policy responses. Good answers also noted that the greater the
ideological distance, the more a policy response is delayed. Good
answers also used case examples, typically the risk of war or an
economic recession. Whether these risks meant that fewer veto players
was preferable was completely up to the candidate as long as the
reasoning was well justified and clear.
• Excellent answers related this debate to Lijphart, showing that an
increase in the number of veto players was associated with the same
trade-offs between a majoritarian and consensus system. This was then
used to justify the argument being made, for example, that more veto
players may well be necessary to deliver consensus in a diverse society,
regardless of the risk of exogenous shock.
Question 9
‘Decentralisation enhances both political and economic efficiency.’ Discuss.
Reading for this question
Given the broad nature of this question, all the Essential and Further
reading listed in Chapter 9 of the subject guide is relevant. It is important
to distinguish between decentralisation and federalism and this is well
covered in Chapter 15 of Clark et al. (2012). In addition, there are
different types of federalism and different motivations for federalism.
The reading by Elazar, D.J. ‘Contrasting unitary and federal systems’,
International political science review 18(3) 1997, pp.237–51, examines
different reasons countries become federations. The reading by Erk, J.
and L. Anderson ‘The paradox of federalism: does self-rule accommodate
or exacerbate ethnic divisions?’, Regional and federal studies 19(2) 2009,
pp.191–202, gives a strong overview of ethno-national federalism and its
strengths and risks. Meanwhile the best overview of fiscal decentralisation
comes from the reading by Oates, W.E. ‘An essay on fiscal federalism’,
Journal of Economic Literature 37(3) 1999, pp.1120–49, but it is also well
covered in Weingast, B.R. ‘The economic role of political institutions:
market-preserving federalism and economic development’, Journal of Law,
Economics and organization 11(1) 1995, pp.1–31.
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
Approaching the question
This is a deliberately broad question. In order to make this evaluation it
is necessary to identify a set of criteria by which to make this evaluation
(in other words, define political and economic efficiency) and draw on
a range of evidence to help you make the assessment. The subject guide
looks at the themes of how decentralisation influences accountability,
helps to manage diversity and the consequences of fiscal federalism, and
these would be sensible criteria to use in this essay. Essentially, you need
to provide an appraisal of the strengths and limitations of decentralisation
to offer a clear answer to the question of whether or not it enhances
efficiency. Of course, it is also important for you to acknowledge that
whether decentralisation is an appropriate vertical design of power
depends upon the needs and social context of that state.
• Weak answers were those that failed to define decentralisation clearly
or those that used federalism and decentralisation interchangeably.
Weak answers also often presented only the positive aspects of
decentralisation without considering any of the key drawbacks,
such as creating overlapping levels of responsibility which reduces
accountability, malapportionment and the potential for a ‘race to
the bottom’. This led to partial arguments which were not wholly
convincing as they never addressed the counterview.
• Satisfactory answers were those that provided a clear definition of
decentralisation (and a way to measure it through the rate of taxation
raised by lower tiers of government). They also discussed the strengths
and limitations of decentralisation and related these back to an
overarching argument. Good answers made an appraisal of what type
of states would benefit most from decentralisation, namely large and/
or diverse states, and how efficiency may be achieved differently in
different (more diverse and large) states.
• Excellent answers distinguished between different types of
decentralisation, arguing that it could either be done to decentralise
power to manage ethnic diversity or could take the form of fiscal
federalism. This was important because these are introduced for very
different reasons and therefore shape whether this is efficient or not.
Excellent answers also often moved beyond a straightforward appraisal
of the pros and cons and instead looked at how decentralisation played
out in specific contexts, such as under what conditions ethnonational
federalism helped to hold countries together and manage diversity
compared to conditions where it may facilitate the break-up of large
states. Excellent answers also often explored the meaning of efficiency
and how this can be contested according to what one hopes to gain
from decentralisation.
Question 10
‘Delegation to unaccountable elites reduces the quality of democracy.’ Discuss.
Reading for this question
Central to any discussion of delegation to non-elected institutions is the
principal-agent framework. Therefore you need to use the reading by
Thatcher, M. and A. Stone Sweet ‘Theory and practice of delegation to
non-majoritarian institutions’, West European Politics 25(1) 2002, pp.1–22,
which provides an excellent overview of this approach. The principalagent framework is also discussed in Chapter 10 of the subject guide. The
question asks you to draw on the case of either courts or central banks
to explore this debate. If you use the example of courts you should draw
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Examiners’ commentaries 2016
on the reading by Gibson, J., G. Caldeira and V. Baird ‘On the legitimacy
of national high courts’, American Political Science Review 92(2) 1998,
pp.343–58, which discusses why the delegation of fundamental law to
courts is useful in a democracy. However, there are also dangers and these
are tackled in Steunenberg, B. ‘Courts, cabinet and coalition parties: the
politics of euthanasia in a parliamentary setting’, British Journal of Political
Science 27(4) 1997, pp.551–71, which discusses how judges can impose
their own policy preferences whenever elected leaders are gridlocked.
Part of Chapter 15 of Clark et al. (2012) also deals with the role of
supreme courts in a democracy. If you choose to look at central banks
then the reading by Bernhard, W.T. ‘A political explanation of variations in
central bank independence’, American Political Science Review 92(2) 1998,
pp.311–27, discusses some of the main reasons behind delegation and why
it varies from country to country. Additionally, the reading by Hix, S., B.
Høyland and N. Vivyan ‘From doves to hawks: a spatial analysis of voting
in the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England’, European
Journal of Political Research 49(6) 2010, pp.731–58, shows one way that
politicians may try to retain post-hoc controls after they have delegated to
an agent.
Approaching the question
This question asks you to explore the important debate around the role of
unelected bodies within a democracy and argue either for or against the
statement that such delegation is undemocratic. In order to answer this
question adequately, you need to show an awareness of the principal-agent
framework and the purpose of delegation within a democracy. It is also
important to show awareness that this need not be a debate about either
having accountable politicians or having unelected bodies. Somewhat
of a middle ground is possible if political leaders retain some controls in
place over the agent after they have delegated power (such as an oversight
body or controlling their budget), however, such controls do reduce the
functional gains of delegation. In this answer you would be expected to
discuss the possible gains and possible pitfalls of delegation (all of these
are covered in the course guide and in Thatcher and Stone Sweet), using
either Supreme Courts or Central Banks as case studies, and relate these
into a clear discussion of whether this enhances or detracts from the
quality of democracy in a state.
• Weak answers were those that failed to use the principal-agent
framework to structure the essay. Other weak answers failed to
tackle the central thrust of the question around accountability
and delegation, instead giving more generalised discussions.
Again, tackling the specific question asked is crucial to performing
satisfactorily or well in an exam.
• Satisfactory answers provided an assessment of the strengths and
limitations to delegation in a democracy, teasing out the functional
benefits while acknowledging it runs the risk of policy drift and
unaccountable elites setting new policy directions. Good answers
framed these debates within the principal-agent framework and
noted that the pitfalls of delegation, including the potential for
unaccountable elites to make policy, were not inevitable and could
be militated against through post-hoc controls. Key examples of
Dutch euthanasia law or the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank
of England were often used. Very few satisfactory or good answers
argued outright against delegation and instead most opted to argue
that delegation with some controls to limit unaccountable elites was
compatible with a democracy or enhanced the quality of democracy.
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
• Excellent answers acknowledged that the opportunity for unelected
elites to make new policy and impose their own preferences was much
more likely to occur when there is gridlock between different veto
players in a government. They also developed the idea that post-hoc
controls are a way of limiting the power of unaccountable elites, but
that this reduced the functional benefits of delegation and therefore
it is about striking a balance in any stable democracy. By developing
these points, such answers showed a high degree of original thinking
and a critical application of important concepts which are central to
top-class work.
Question 11
Why do some countries redistribute more than others?
Reading for this question
Chapter 11 of the subject guide discusses the politics of both economic
performance and redistribution, but this question asks you to focus
specifically on redistribution. Chapters 2, 4 and 6 of Alesina, A. and
E.L. Glaeser Fighting poverty in the US and Europe: a world of difference.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) [9780199286102], provide a
very good discussion of the interaction of institutions and preferences
in explaining different patterns of redistribution in the USA and Europe.
Another important reading is Iverson, T. and D. Soskice ‘Distribution and
redistribution: the shadow of the nineteenth century’, World Politics 61(3)
2009, pp.438–86; however, it is also one of the most difficult readings in
the entire course. This reading argues that while the USA and Europe’s
different rates of welfare spending are related to the different institutions,
we still need to explain why each region has chosen to adopt different
institutions. They do this by looking back to the different experiences
of industrialisation and how this either encouraged or dissuaded
cooperation between different groups in society, which sent each region
down contrasting paths of welfare spending over the next 100 years. Two
other useful readings are Ha, E. ‘Globalization, veto players, and welfare
spending’, Comparative Political Studies 41(6) 2008, pp.783–813, which
looks at the influence of globalisation, and the reading by Blais, A., D.
Blake and S. Dion ‘Do parties make a difference? Parties and the size of
government in liberal democracies’, American Journal of Political Science
37(1) 1993, pp.40–62, which looks at the role of left-wing parties in
influencing levels of welfare spending.
Approaching the question
There are two important sets of explanations for variations in
redistributive spending – those that look at institutional factors (such
as whether a country uses a majoritarian or a proportional system or
whether a country is presidential or parliamentary, and so on) and those
that look at preferences (whether there is a demand for redistributive
spending within the electorate). The challenge of this question is to create
a coherent answer which does more than simply list the different range
of factors and also links these together into an overarching argument.
This may well be done by talking about the interaction of institutions
and preferences. Important empirical evidence for this debate comes by
comparing the USA with mainland European countries.
• Weak answers were those that just listed different sets of explanations
(such as dedicating one paragraph describing the role of electoral
systems, then one paragraph on the role of regime types, then one
paragraph on ethnic diversity, and so on) without ever actually
30
Examiners’ commentaries 2016
exploring how these factors are linked or bringing them all together
into an overarching and well-developed argument. Such ‘list essays’
are often the hallmarks of repeating the subject guide without actually
adding any original thinking or argumentation skills.
• Satisfactory answers strove to bring together institutional and
preference-based explanations into a single overarching argument.
This involved appreciating how actors with preferences for more or
less redistribution may choose their institutions accordingly, such as
how the Senate in the USA was established in order to protect the
interests of the wealthy elite. Thus the preferences for a certain level of
redistribution may well lead to particular institutional designs. These
answers often drew on important case examples, such as contrasting
the USA to Sweden. Answering the specific question in a focused way
was the hallmark of these answers.
• Excellent answers were those that looked to how the different
histories of Europe and the USA prior to industrialisation may have
influenced the different paths taken (Iverson and Soskice), teasing
out how different social patterns led to different preferences and
different institutional designs, which in turn locked these societies into
particular paths when it came to redistributional spending.
Question 12
Is ‘Satisfaction with Democracy’ a useful concept for political scientists?
Reading for this question
Central to a strong answer is a consideration of what the concept of
satisfaction with democracy (SWD) actually measures. The readings
by Linde, J. and J. Ekman ‘Satisfaction with democracy: a note on a
frequently used indicator in comparative politics’, European Journal of
Political Research 42(3) 2003, pp.391–408, and Canache, D., J.J. Mondak
and M.A. Seligson ‘Meaning and measurement in cross-national research
on satisfaction with democracy’, Public Opinion Quarterly 65(4) 2001,
pp.506–28, provide an overview of the meaning of SWD and its usefulness
from two different sides of the debate. In order to be useful SWD must
measure some variation in comparative perspective, then we can seek
to explain these variations. Explanations for variations tend to focus on
either institutional designs or economic performance. Good examples of
those that deal with institutional designs are Aarts, K. and J. Thomassen
‘Satisfaction with democracy: do institutions matter?’, Electoral Studies
27(1) 2008, pp.5–18, and Wagner, A.F., F. Schneider and M. Halla ‘The
quality of institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Western Europe
– a panel analysis’, European Journal of Political Economy 25(1) 2009,
pp.30–41. Other important explanations, including those dealing with
economics or the age of democracy, are covered in Chapter 13 of the
subject guide.
Approaching the question
The question was looking for a critical evaluation of the concept of SWD.
In addition, an appreciation of patterns of SWD around the world and
an appraisal of causal explanations for variations in levels of SWD would
be useful in highlighting the depth or limitations of its usefulness. The
idea behind this debate is whether the concept of SWD is so vague as to
be meaningless and perhaps is simply a measure of other factors, such as
economic performance or institutional design, or whether SWD is a useful
summary indicator that tells us something that other concepts do not.
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PS1172 Introduction to political science
• Weak answers were those that failed to even define the concept of
SWD, which of course is a basic necessity given the way this question
is phrased. Weak answers also often failed to justify why they argued
that SWD was useful or not, and simply assumed that it was useful. In
other words, candidates did not consider criticisms such as the idea
that SWD is merely a measure of economic performance or that SWD
is just a measure of how embedded democracy is in a country.
• Satisfactory answers undertook some basic evaluation of the concept
and often argued that SWD was useful as a summary indicator. Good
answers went further than this and tried to show how it was useful by
showing the different patterns it revealed in comparative perspective
and the insights that this exposed about what causes variation in SWD.
• Excellent answers had a mastery of the whole body of literature on
this debate and used this to disaggregate the concept and appraise it.
Some candidates argued that SWD was not useful given that it meant
different things in different contexts, while others argued that it was
useful, particularly in comparative perspective.
32