Emergence and evil
E:CO Issue Vol. 8 No. 2 2006 pp. 102-115
Forum
Emergence and evil
David A. Bella
Oregon State University, USA
The production of biological weapons occurred
in the Soviet Union on a vast scale of deadly effectiveness that is chilling and horrific. How could
they do this? We are forced to take seriously the
notion of evil. But, if we fail to address a central
claim of emergence – that the character of a whole
cannot be reduced to its parts – we will seriously
misperceive evil with grave consequences. Drawing upon an account of this program by its chief
research scientist, this paper exposes the character
of emergent patterns within which people, much
like ourselves, devoted their time and effort to
preparations for mass murder. The patterns are
disturbingly familiar. This paper demonstrates
that emergence, as a disciplined way of thinking, can expand our understanding of evil and
responsibility in ways that are relevant and critically important.
Introduction
“Understanding the factors that can and do lead
people of faith and goodwill – wittingly or unwittingly
– into destructive and evil patterns of behavior must
be a high priority on the world’s agenda” (Kimball,
2002: 7)
T
he word ‘evil’ means portending great harm,
threat, or danger. It implies something sinister, seductive, or hidden and yet potentially
powerful. Essayist Lance Morrow (2003: 7) tells
us, “evil is the most powerful word in the language,
and the most elusive.” The purpose of this paper is
to apply a central concept from complexity theory,
emergence, to the study of evil[1]. But, first, I will
explain why an ‘alternative perspective’ (Hiett, 2001)
is taken.
Emergence in human affairs:
An alternative perspective
“An important property of emergent wholes is that
they cannot be reduced to their parts ... wholes are
qualitatively different from their parts ... they require
a different language to discuss them” (Richardson,
2004: 76-77).
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Such notions of emergence are central to the exciting and expanding field of complexity science
(Goldstein, 2000; Waldrop, 1992). The concept
of emergence challenges traditional management
theory and common understandings of organizations in human affairs (Lissack, 1999). However,
my own experience as a practitioner – assessing the
consequences of technological actions – leads me to
agree with Hiett (2001) that “complexity theory has
the air of something not quite right” and an “alternative perspective” is called for.
On the one hand, experience leads me to
conclude that emergence is indeed a concept of fundamental importance. Failure to address emergent
phenomena in human affairs portends dangers so
grave that the word ‘evil’ is justified! On the other
hand, the study of emergence has not sufficiently
drawn upon the experiences of practitioners – engineers, applied scientists, managers, etc. – and the
radical implications of emergence have not been
incorporated into their education, thinking, and
notions of responsibility. Instead, ‘emergence’ seems
to be appropriated by academic fields with their own
internal jargon and citations that serve to mark off
territories convincing practitioners to “leave such
esoteric concerns to other experts.” As the danger
of catastrophic emergent outcomes grows, the study
of emergence itself may become an intellectual
black hole, shedding little light on the world that is
being radically transformed through the organized
applications of science and technology. To counter
such a troubling condition, the study of emergence
must draw upon the experiences of practitioners and
provide explanations (models, sketches, etc.) that
practitioners can readily grasp and critically review
from the basis of their own experience. This paper
constitutes this kind of study.
Practitioners are problem solvers. For emergence, Goldstein (2000: 5) describes the problem
well.
“Although emergence may be an intriguing, even
revolutionary, notion, the more one tries to get a
clear grasp on the concept, the more it can prove to
be elusive and murky.”
E:CO Vol. 8 No. 2 2006 pp. 102-115
For practitioners, when something is thought to
be important (e.g., ‘emergence’) but is “elusive and
murky,” one seeks clarity from a compelling example
that is honest to experience and clearly described.
And, particularly for engineers, clarifying descriptions come in the form of sketches that allow one
to see past all sorts of distractions to uncover what
is fundamental to a problem. Too often, wordy dissertations, sophisticated definitions, and impressive
citations serve to confuse rather than clarify. “Draw
a sketch” is a common practitioner response to a matter that is “elusive and murky.” And, practitioners
know, from education and experience, that drawing
a sketch that is both simple and meaningful is an art
that requires practice, reviews, and revisions.
What needs to be sketched? We do know
that emergence has something to do with the character of wholes that cannot be reduced to the character
parts. Thus, this paper will sketch the character of
whole patterns of human behaviors that cannot be
reduced to the character of the individuals involved.
Through such sketches, this paper will demonstrate
– but only if you work through the sketches – the
nature and significance of emergence in the study
of evil. Why evil?
To merely blame individuals – presuming
that evil outcomes arise from evil people – is to
avoid (preclude, presume away) the essential claim
of emergence: that the character of wholes should
not be reduced to the character of parts. If we believe that this central claim of emergence is valid,
then we cannot avoid a disturbing possibility: evil
(distorting, threatening, harmful) outcomes can
emerge through the efforts of normal, competent,
and well adjusted people much like ourselves. This
paper seeks to expose this possibility as terribly real.
We begin with an episode from recent history.
The episode: Rebirth Island, Aral Sea,
1982
I
t was a desolate place, an island in the Aral
Sea that divided Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
“Languishing fifty miles off the Kazakh shoreline
in waters so polluted by the runoff of agricultural
fertilizers that nothing could possibly live in them
any more, it was the antithesis of its name.” But now,
Rebirth Island was the place where Biopreparat – an
upstart organization in the Soviet Union – could
prove its worth.
Biopreparat was formed in 1973 to recruit
Bella
the “nation’s best biologist, epidemiologist, and biologchemist.” In 1979, General Yury Tikhonovich
Kalinin took over Biopreparat. Kalinin had remarkable abilities. He was able to break Biopreparat
free from the rigid army hierarchy, while securing
enormous funds to support extensive laboratories
across the country staffed by sixty thousand personnel including some of the best young researchers in
the country. Now, on the desolate Rebirth Island,
Biopreparat would test its first biological weapon,
tularemia.
“Tularemia is a debilitating disease.” Biopreparat “had obtained, from a leading international research institute in Europe, a strain capable
of overcoming immunity in vaccinated monkeys.”
As far as they knew, “There had never been an attempt anywhere in the world to weaponize a vaccine-resistant strain of tularemia.” The test provided
an opportunity to prove what Biopreparat could do.
It’s director, Kalinin, saw it as a key to the success of
the program.
The “best” biological weapons, agents, “were
those for which there was no known cure.” Thus,
biological research was in a continuing race to stay
ahead of cures, antibiotics, and vaccines. Biopreparat
was about to demonstrate that it could meet the
demands of this race. “Five hundred monkeys were
ordered from Africa for tularemia tests on Rebirth
Island.” “All of the monkeys had to be immunized
before they were exposed.” After all, they “were
testing a vaccine-resistant weapon.”
As test results filtered back from Rebirth
Island, “the news was better than anyone had expected.” Upon hearing the results, the head of Biopreparat, Kalinin, called Kanatjan Alibekov, chief of
technological development, and enthusiastically told
him, “You’re a Great Man!” “Other congratulatory
calls followed from colleagues in Moscow who had
heard about the results.” Alibekov received a special
military medal.
But a mistake in the test procedure had
been discovered. The credibility of Biopreparat was
challenged by critics. But, Kanatjan Alibekov turned
this potentially damaging result around. In his own
words:
“The next year we conducted new tests with an even
more efficient dry variant of tularemia, following all
the procedures meticulously, and the new version of
weaponized tularemia entered the Soviet arsenal. The
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achievement launched Biopreparat as a significant
force in the nation’s weapons establishment.”
During this tularemia effort, a meeting took
place. Alibekov was told by Kalinin, “I’m going to
nominate you as deputy director of Omutninsk,” a
major research facility. Alibekov had a hard time believing this. He was six years out of graduate school,
a thirty-one-year-old captain with a lot of energy
and only a few achievements for it. He gained the
attention of those in higher position because of a
technique he had recently developed for improving
biological weapons production.
Alibekov was called to Kalinin’s office. When
he arrived, he heard shouting behind closed doors.
A red faced man barreled out of the meeting room,
stopped and looked over Alibekov. He was furious. “I
don’t know what you think you’re up to!” he barked.
“You’re nothing but a puppy.” He stormed back into
the office. Clearly there were those who resented the
advancement of younger people, regardless of their
qualifications. Clearly, the head of Biopreparat, Kalinin, thought otherwise. A short time later Kalinin
came out of his office looking “mildly apologetic.”
He told Alibekov to return to his hotel. He would
call.
Kalinin called Alibekov later in the afternoon to congratulate him. Alibekov had been
promoted to the new deputy director at Omutninsk.
How did Kalinin convince the “armchair generals”
that this “puppy” should be promoted? Kalinin replied that he convinced them that despite his young
age he would “do all right.”
Fearfully, Alibekov ventured, “How?”
“You’ll turn our tularemia project around,”
Kalinin answered. In Alibekov’s words:
“It was an assignment no scientist of my age and
experience could have expected to get so early in his
career... I knew the project was fraught with risk, but
I was caught up in the challenge.”
Alibekov did indeed turn the tularemia
project around and he advanced to higher positions
within Biopreparat.
Two Prayers
This episode is based upon the actual accounts of
Kanatjan Alibekov, the first deputy chief of Biopre-
104
parat. In 1992, he defected to the United States and
changed his name to Ken Alibek. The quotes in the
episode above come from Alibek’s book (Alibek,
1999). In the prolog to this book Alibek tells more
about Rebirth Island.
“On a bleak island in the Aral Sea, one hundred monkeys are tethered to posts set in parallel rows stretching
out toward the horizon. A muffled thud breaks the
stillness. Far in the distance, a small metal sphere lifts
into the sky then hurtles downward, rotating, until it
shatters in a second explosion.
Some seventy-five feet above the ground, a cloud the
color of dark mustard begins to unfurl, gently dissolving as it glides down toward the monkeys. They pull at
their chains and begin to cry. Some bury their heads
between their legs. A few cover their mouths or noses,
but it is too late: they have already begun to die.
At the other end of the island, a handful of men in
biological protective suits observe the scene from
binoculars, taking notes. In a few hours, they will
retrieve the still-breathing monkeys and return them
to cages where the animals will be under continuous
examination for the next several days until, one by
one, they die of anthrax or tularemia, Q fever, brucellosis, glanders, or plague.
These are the tests I supervised throughout the 1980s
and early 1990s. They formed the foundation of the
Soviet Union’s spectacular breakthroughs in biological
warfare” (Alibek, 1999: ix).
At the end of his book he writes:
“As a young boy in Kazakhstan I once came across a
book about a doctor who risked his life and health to
heal his patients. He was the physician I dreamed of
becoming. I cannot unmake the weapons I manufactured or undo the research I authorized as scientific
chief of the Soviet Union’s biological weapons program;
but every day I do what I can to mitigate their effects...
This is my way of honoring the medical oath I betrayed
for so many years” (Alibek, 1999: 292).
We can respond to Alibek’s confessional
account from two radically different perspectives.
The first is expressed in the prayer, “thank God
we’re not like him.” The expression comes almost
E:CO Vol. 8 No. 2 2006 pp. 102-115
Figure 1 Behavioral interactions found at the end of the Rebirth Island episode.
When reading, say “therefore” if you move forward on an arrow, “because” if you move backward.
automatically when we are confronted by the terrible
program described in Alibek’s account. The second
prayer is “lead us not into temptation but deliver
us from evil”[2]. This expression, from an ancient
prayer, is troubling and paradoxical. Evil repulses us
but temptation attracts us. Moreover, the word “us”
– employed twice – is inclusive. It includes Alibekov
and myself! How could this be? I’ve never worked
in a biological weapons program and I’m horrified,
not tempted, by Alibekov’s ‘achievements’. The first
prayer, “thank God I’m not like him,” comes so easily.
It allows me to set aside these disturbing and terrible
matters. I can’t imagine myself doing such terrible
things. Despite such strong reactions, it is the second more challenging prayer that we will follow. It
is an expression, not of belief, but of commitment
to consider troubling matters in a deeper way. It
involves confessional discipline, a demanding effort
to look past the particular individuals and events to
uncover something that is familiar, tempting, and
crucial to the outcomes that emerged.
Uncovering the context
Look back on this episode, Rebirth Island, 1982.
Amid the tularemia testing, there is a meeting. It
seems incidental, easy to overlook. And, yet, in such
seemingly incidental events we find evidence of a
powerful force lurking in the background, hidden by
the terrible outcomes it produces. This is the force
of context. To grasp such power, we will explain
human behaviors in a way that is radically different
from the ways we explain mere objects.
The behaviors of objects are explained
Bella
through deterministic laws – rule-like causes – as
done in Newtonian mechanics (note: I taught engineering mechanics for many years). Unlike, mere
objects, we humans can act out a virtually infinite set
of possible behaviors. The question is: why, within
a given context, do we act out only a tiny fraction
of these possibilities? And, how do we know what
this tiny fraction should be? This paper answers: we
humans are context sensitive beings. We know that
to act out of context (e.g., yelling and cheering in a
library) invites a social reproach that we are strongly
motivated to avoid. It is, of course, physically possible to act out of context – law like causality is not
involved – but, within a context, we sense reasons
to not do so. Context is thus a powerful force in
human affairs but, for the most part, it is hidden
and taken for granted in our normal (e.g., context
accommodating) behaviors (Bella, et al., 2003).
Contexts do not precisely define our behaviors. Instead, they produce the background from
which we shift attentions, initiatives, and actions
in some ways rather than others. In organizational
systems, such as Biopreparat, contexts provided
coherence to the diverse and changing activities of
many individuals with different personalities, skills,
and beliefs.
To expose the character of a context requires
a method that forces us to see past all sorts of busyness and distracting details to uncover background
patterns that have persistent and pervasive influence
upon behaviors. The method employed herein does
this by drawing upon the narratives arising from
the lived experience of those involved, knowledge
105
Figure 2 The pattern resulting from the rearrangement of continuing behaviors (Figure 1).
Note that each behavior (boxed statement) now has at least one incoming arrow (reason) and one outgoing
arrow (consequence).
in the Biblical sense[3]. To apply this method, notice general behaviors seen or inferred at the end
of the episode. These are sketched in Figure 1. To
read, begin with any statement. Move forward or
backward along an arrow. Say “therefore” if you
move forward, “because” if you move backward.
Read the next statement and continue, forward or
backward.
These behaviors point to the competence
of Alibekov and Kalinin. Kalinin comes across as
an exceptional manager. He promotes Alibekov, a
young non-Russian, on merit, even when he has to
take on powerful opponents to do so. Alibekov, in
turn, accepts the responsibilities given to him. These
behaviors are expressions of a continuing pattern in
Alibekov’s career in Biopreparat. This pattern can
be uncovered by employing two common sense
guidelines.
1. Behaviors continue because they have continuing reasons that make sense from the perspective of those acting out the behaviors;
2. Continuing behaviors have consequences that
continue.
In Figure 2, the behaviors sketched in Figure
1 are rearranged. The first guideline is met because
each behavior (boxed statement) now has at least one
incoming arrow, a reason. The second guideline is
met because each behavior has at least one outgoing
arrow, a consequence. The pattern that results from
these guidelines appears in the form of mutually
106
reinforcing loops. Read through the entire pattern
through many routes; read forward (say “therefore”)
and backward (say “because”) until you get the whole
picture.
We can imagine others in Biopreparat, the
“nation’s best biologists, epidemiologists and biochemists,” experiencing the same pattern. Figure
3 restates the pattern to include the voices of other
competent people. Alibekov advanced in the system
because he was competent; that is, he was able to
excel within the context of competency sketched in
Figure 3. Had he failed, Kalinin would have selected
someone else.
Contexts emerge as behaviors settle into
such patterns. Applying a phrase from Kauffman
(1995), contexts are “collectively autocatalytic”
patterns of order in human affairs. And, because
such patterns provide multiple and self-reinforcing
reasons (shown by incoming arrows), they exert a
powerful influence upon the behaviors of people
within them. This pattern (Figure 3) looks quite
good, even idealistic. Indeed, as organizational
systems adaptively shift toward more effective and
self-sustaining arrangements, we should expect such
patterns to emerge at multiple levels. A colleague
told me, “I wish I worked in such a system.” It is
here that the paradoxical prayer – “lead us not into
temptation but deliver us from evil” – provokes us.
Temptations don’t repulse us, they attract us and
the word “us” includes Alibekov, my colleague, and
myself.
E:CO Vol. 8 No. 2 2006 pp. 102-115
Figure 3 A general context of competence
Figure 4 A competence context that becomes demonic. Three behaviors (dotted lines) are added to Figure 3.
The demonic
Competence can be seen as being fit, well adjusted,
and well adapted to the context sketched in Figure
3. Kalinin and Alibekov were competent in this way
(Figure 2). The production of effective biological
weapons on such massive scales required the competent actions of many people. While these people
differed in skills, personalities, and fields of competence, their actions were acted out within contexts
of the character sketched in Figure 3. Our attention
should be drawn, not to the character of the individuals, but to the character of the context. But, now
consider a troubling matter. In Alibek’s words,
Bella
“The government I served perceived no contradiction
between the oath every doctor takes to preserve life
and our preparations for mass murder. For a long
time, neither did I” (p. x)
How could he not perceive this contradiction?
To answer, we need to understand what has
been trivialized in our modern age, the ‘demonic’.
Drawing upon a leading theologian of the twentieth
century (Tillich, 1963), the demonic is always associated with the good. The demonic emerges when
a vehicle to Goodness becomes overextended until
it becomes a substitute for Goodness itself. As an
107
example, tests can be vehicles (means) to student
learning, but when passing tests becomes overextended until it becomes a substitute for learning
itself – US students call this “plug and chug; cram
and flush” – then passing tests becomes demonic;
it becomes the substitute for learning (Bella, et al.,
2003).
Let us now show how competence becomes
demonic. Start with Figure 3. Add only three behavior statements and arrows consistent with our common sense guidelines. The result is shown in Figure
4. Notice how the avoidance of troubling matters
and negative implications actually strengthen the
pattern. Referring to Figure 4, this strengthening
is shown by an additional incoming arrow to the
statements “Our work contributes to the success of
the program” and “We gain a positive self-identity
from our work.”
Yes, competence can serve to “preserve life,”
but it can also serve “preparations for mass murder”
(quotes from Alibek). When the pursuit of competence – the drive to excel, be affirmed by peers, and
accomplish things never done before – becomes a
driving force in itself, then competence can become
demonic.
When Alibekov and his young colleagues
first entered Biopreparat, they agonized over the
moral implications of their work. “Kan, we’re doctors!” a troubled friend exclaimed. “How can we
do this?” But, as they gained competence, as they
proved themselves, as they became “caught up in
the challenge,” such troubling concerns receded. In
Alibek’s words,
“I was developing a reputation for getting results.
Uncertainties about the direction of my life, and the
morality of what I was doing, had long since receded”
(p 82).
A transformation of Alibekov occurred as
his identity was given over to the system.
“The idealistic young doctor from Tomsk who had
agonized over the difference between saving lives and
taking them was gone. The worst possible fate for me
had become banishment from Biopreparat, and from
the privileges that came with it... [T]he secret culture
of our labs had changed my outlook. My parents
would not have recognized the man I had become”
(pp. 101-102).
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The drive to excel within the context became
a powerful hunger, a calling, that so consumed Alibekov and his colleagues that they overlooked the
terrible outcomes of their work. Alibek tells us,
“The hunger to be on the newest frontier of biology was
so powerful that scientists who answered the call to
participate in the new program were willing to overlook its connection with weapons-making” (p. 157).
But, to satisfy this “powerful hunger” one
had to excel within the context of competence.
Then, having tasted accomplishment, recognition
from peers, affirmation from superiors, respect from
subordinates, and a positive self-identity, the hunger
gained power. And in the busyness of work – with its
demands, challenges, and risks – it became “normal”
to “overlook its connection to weapons-making.”
Here the word ‘normal’ means well adjusted, fit, and
competent within the context. In Alibek’s confessional account, we are confronted with the power
of contexts, emergent patterns that shape behaviors
of normal people in ways so subtle and strong that
an idealistic young healer was transformed into a
producer of “mass murder.” The context was crucial!
If we fail to grasp the nature and power of contexts,
if we overlook the ways contexts shape our own
behaviors, we will have overlooked a powerful force
in human affairs; this could be a very dangerous
failure.
A
Contexts as attractors
libek describes a 1988 meeting in which
plans were made to arm intercontinental
missiles, SS-18s, with a potent form of
anthrax.
“New York, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Chicago were
some of the targets to come up in subsequent meetings,
but they were abstract concepts to me at the time. All
I cared about was ensuring that our weapons would
do the job they were designed for... I don’t remember
giving a moment’s thought to the fact that we had just
sketched out a plan to kill millions of people” (p. 7).
With this form of anthrax, Alibek writes, “a
single SS-18 could wipe out the population of a city
as large as New York.” The meeting went on to go
over the available menu of “toxic choices.”
E:CO Vol. 8 No. 2 2006 pp. 102-115
“Plague could be prepared on a similar schedule. The
plague weapon we had created in our laboratories was
more virulent than the bubonic plague, which killed
one quarter of the population of Europe in the Middle
Ages. Smallpox was stockpiled in underground bunkers at our military plants, and we were developing
a weapon prototype based on a rare filovirus called
Marburg, a cousin of Ebola... Our meeting ended
after an hour or so of additional calculations. We
shook hands, packed our papers, and congratulated
one another on a productive session” (p. 7-8).
How can we explain such behaviors? Some
might answer, “Those people were dedicated communists,” “They were only following orders,” or
“They had no choice.” Alibek’s account exposes
such answers as superficial at best and even absurd.
We might point to the environment of the Cold
War and the threats they perceived from the United
States. Alibek’s account provides some support for
this kind of answer, but only partially. What his
honest account does reveal as powerful, pervasive,
and essential is the drive to be highly competent.
Such competence required initiative, not mere following of orders. It demanded dedication, not to
communism, but to competence itself. It called for
devotion and sacrifice, not to the state, but to work,
science and research. And through such dedication,
devotion, and sacrifice, Alibekov and many others
did indeed become highly competent in what they
did. And then, driven to be highly competent, to be
“on the newest frontier of biology,” they were able
to “overlook its connection with weapons-making.” The model presented herein, Figure 4, seeks
to explain this, not by describing the character of
individuals, but rather the character of the context
within which they excelled.
Consider an analogy. Imagine a square table
with a top that is flat and white. We place a number
of coins on the table and shake it. A video camera
looks down on the table top and records the coins
as they shift back and forth. Assume the table has a
reflective edge to prevent the shifting coins from falling off. If we initially placed the coins in a cluster and
then shook the table, the video, taken from above,
would show a tendency for the coins to spread across
the table. But, now imagine that in one corner of
the table (say the lower left as viewed from the video
camera above), I pressed the table surface downward
to form a basin, a bowl or depression. Then, after
Bella
distributing the coins across the surface, I again
shook the table. What would you see recorded on
the video taken from above? You would, of course,
see coins shifting about. But, amid this shifting, you
would see a tendency among all the coins to gravitate
toward the base of the basin in the lower left region
of the table (viewed from above).
Now consider the table surface to be a map
of behavior space as shown in Figure 5. Imagine
that the position of a particular coin represents the
behavior of an individual within Biopreparat. As we
shake the table, we notice that the positions of coins
shift, indicating shifting behaviors among individuals. The precise shift of a particular person (coin) at
a specific time is unpredictable. But, as before, the
general shift will be toward the basin of attraction
as shown on our map.
Figure 5 A map of behavior space with a basin of
attraction. The character of the basin is sketched in
Figure 4.
To explain this general shift, it would make
no sense to pick up each coin and carefully examine
it. This is analogous to our study of Biopreparat.
As with the coins, examining the character of individuals tells us little. It is the base of the basin that
demands our attention. Following Kauffman, “we
can roughly think of an attractor as a lake, and the
basin of attraction as the water drainage flowing into
the lake” (Kauffman, 1995: 78). In human affairs,
contexts act as attractors, drawing behaviors into
their regions of behavior space as sketched in Figure
5. Thus, the character of a context (attractor, base of
109
a basin, emergent pattern) is crucial; this character
can be sketched. And following our analogy, if one of
the coins had our name on it, it too would be drawn
to the attractor.
I
The common context: Radical implications
n the Soviet Union, Alibekov and his colleagues
“could not take the risk of making close friends
outside of the program.” “In our isolation,”
he tells us, “we found relationships among ourselves”[4]. While their particular skills, personalities, assignments, and fields of specialty were diverse,
they held in common the context sketched in Figure
4. Of course, there were other factors shaping their
behaviors. But, when explaining how so many
people could do such things, the character of the
common context within which they devoted their
time, energy, and abilities must be seen as crucial.
Now, let us consider, not the horrors of Biopreparat but rather the underlying context sketched
in Figure 4. To sense the character of this context,
conduct a simple experiment. Do not try to “figure
out” Figure 4. Instead, simply read through it, forward (“therefore”) and backward (“because”), until
you grasp the character of the pattern as a whole.
Then, imagine that you discover some “troubling
matter” that has been avoided by competent people
(i.e., people acting within the pattern). Imagine
that you have the opportunity to ask them questions. Your questions and their answers are given
in Table 1. One of the most telling and disturbing
insights from this exercise is how familiar these
responses sound, how ordinary. Troubling matters
are overlooked by ordinary people who say, “I’m too
busy,” “It’s not my job,” or “There is nothing I can
do.” Within the context sketched in Figure 4, such
responses (Table 1) make sense.
Our inquiry challenges us – practitioners
who have proven our competence – to face up to
three things. First, the answers given in Table 1 are
familiar and reasonable because they arise within a
common context. Second, through our own competent (e.g., in context) behaviors, we too gain position,
recognition, and a positive identity (Figure 4); here
are temptations. Indeed, Figure 4 provides a good
description of the context within which university
professors, myself included, prove our competence
and gain our identity. Third, evil can emerge from
such competent behaviors on scales greater than
any individual or group could pull off; Alibek’s
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book testifies to this. The prayer “lead us not into
temptation but deliver us from evil” thus addresses
a reality common to our own lives and capable of
great harm. If, in contrast, we can only see evil in
the horrible acts of others, acts that repulse rather
than tempt (attract) us, then perhaps we are unable
or unwilling to understand the nature of evil.
I
Taking emergence seriously
n Biopreparat, we make two observations. First,
we see order in human affairs on vast scales.
Second, we see outcomes that portend dangers
so disturbing that the word evil is justified. In both
cases – order and evil in human affairs – common
explanations fail to grasp the radical implications
of emergence: that wholes cannot be reduced to
parts (Richardson, 2004). In the case of order, it
is commonly assumed that “Somebody must be in
charge!” Similarly for evil, it is commonly assumed
that “Evil people did this!” Emergence challenges
such views.
Self-organization occurs in both human and
nonhuman systems (Kauffman, 1991, 1995). No one
need be in charge. Order often emerges on scales of
complexity far greater than the capacity of individuals (ants, termites, people) to design. Moreover, the
character of emergent wholes cannot be reduced to
the character of the parts. Funny jokes cannot be
reduced to funny words. Likewise, evil outcomes
that emerge from human systems cannot be reduced
to the evil character of the individuals. None of this
denies that there are powerful people who are good
organizers or evil people who do bad things. Instead,
this paper claims that when considering order and
evil, emergence must be taken seriously. That is, evil
can emerge as problems of “organized complexity”
in human affairs and such problems, by their very
nature, cannot be addressed through established
analytical methods (Weaver, 1948).
The implications for the study of emergence
are radical. This paper is in agreement with fundamental claims of emergence (Holland, 1998; Tasaka,
1999; Wheatley, 1999). I agree that emergence
provides coherence in human affairs far beyond the
ability of intentional design. I agree that it allows
people to become part of something greater than
themselves, giving them identity, purpose, and
meaning. Capabilities that emerge in human affairs
do exceed the sum of individual capabilities.
But, despite such valid insights, the emerE:CO Vol. 8 No. 2 2006 pp. 102-115
Person
Addressed
Any Participant
Participant in
Lower Position
Participant in
Higher Position
Any Participant
Question Asked
Answer
Do you consider yourself a
responsible person?
Of course I do! I accept responsibility for the work I do and I
do it well; ask my peers.
But, aren’t there some troubling matters that are not
being addressed?
Well, I suppose there are. But, it’s not my job to deal with
them; I’m busy enough.
So who should address such
matters?
I really don’t know, but it’s not my job. The people I’ve known
through work are, for the most part, competent, responsible,
and hard working. If they aren’t, we should get rid of them.
You mean get rid of people
who don’t go along?
I wouldn’t put it that way. We should help people who have
problems. But, if they can’t or won’t accept responsibilities
like the rest of us, then we can’t continue to support them.
Are these troubling matters
being addressed?
I can’t say. I assume that they are. But you’ll need to speak
to those in higher positions. They are the ones with broader
responsibilities.
Have these troubling matters
been addressed?
I can assure you that the people working in our program are
highly competent. They take their responsibilities seriously. I
have utmost confidence in their ability to do what is needed.
Do you selectively support
some work and not other
work?
Of course I do! That’s my job! If the work is done well and
supports the program, I do whatever I can to provide the
resources the work needs.
But shouldn’t these matters
be addressed?
Perhaps, but, it’s not my job! Even if I tried to address such
matters, I couldn’t change anything so I stick to my own
work and do it well.
And you get a sense of accomplishment from that
work?
Yes, I do! And quite frankly, I’d rather not be troubled by
your concerns. There is nothing I could do about them except maybe depress myself.
So you stay focused on your
work?
Yes. It’s challenging work and I don’t have the luxury of wasting time on other matters that won’t make a bit of difference
any way.
Table 1 Responses of participants within the competence context (Figure 4)
gence of evil – outcomes that portent great harm
– has not been sufficiently addressed in the study
of emergence. Emergence in organizations has
been more commonly described in positive terms.
To be blunt, much of the literature on emergence
in human affairs has been too nice, more positive
and affirming than the evidence justifies. That is,
“the tendency to emphasize the beneficial nature of
emergence seems to be a taken-for-granted attitude
in complexity science,” (Goldstein, 2000: 18). While
the positive possibilities of emergence should not be
denied, we must also face its darker side. And, in
doing so, we challenge practices that have arisen in
recent times.
In recent decades, the word evil has been
Bella
used as an accusation to define the character of one’s
enemies. The exclamation, “Thank God we’re not
like them!” follows such use. Thus, the Soviet Union
was defined by President Ronald Reagan as an “evil
empire,” an accusation not unnoticed in the Soviet
Union. Alibek writes:
“We didn’t need hawkish intelligence briefings to persuade us of the danger. Our newspapers chafed over
Reagan’s description of our country as an evil empire,
and the angry rhetoric of our leaders undermined the
sense of security most of us had grown up with during
the détente of the 1970s. Although we joked amongst
ourselves about the senile old men in the Kremlin, it
was easy to believe that the West would seize upon
111
our moment of weakness to destroy us. It was even
conceivable that our army strategists would call for a
preemptive strike, perhaps with biological weapons”
(p. 89-90).
This paper has looked into this “evil empire,”
examining a program that would indeed fit definitions of evil. But, instead of mere accusation of
“them,” this study followed the paradoxical prayer,
“lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil.”
The paradox involved emergence. Ordinary people
(we) were drawn into self-reinforcing patterns, contexts, that gave them (us) identity, support, purpose,
and meaning (“temptation”). Within such contexts,
they devoted their time and abilities to their competent work to such an extent that they overlooked
troubling matters arising from this work, even when
such matters led to great threat on vast scales (“evil”).
And we discovered that the pattern through which
this occurred is familiar! We too have been caught
up in such a pattern. The prayer “thank God we’re
not like them” is wrong!
The emergence of evil – arising from whole
systems and not reducible to the character of individuals – may sound like a radical notion. However,
it is an ancient view expressed in the prophetic
tradition. Biblical scholar Markus Borg (1997: 141)
writes:
“The passion for social justice that we see in the prophets is a protest against systemic evil... [S]ystemic evil
is a major source (perhaps the single greatest cause)
of human suffering.
Importantly, the issue is not the goodness or wickedness of the elite individuals. Elites can be good people:
devout, responsible, courageous; kind, gentle, charming, intelligent; committed to family, loyal to friends,
and so forth. Moreover, systemic evil is not necessarily
intended even by some who benefit from it. So the issue is not character flaws among the elites” (p. 141).
Clearly, this prophetic view challenges the
modern motion that evil outcomes can be reduced
to the evil character of individuals, people quite
different, of course, from ourselves. The study of
emergence and evil in our own age, I claim, supports this prophetic challenge, not by claiming the
‘factuality’ of particular events in ancient tales, but
rather by discovering that their insights on matters
112
of great importance are relevant to our own age.
T
Conclusion
he evidence is clear that in the Soviet Union,
people, resources, and expertise were drawn
together on a vast scale for “preparations for
mass murder” (Alibek’s words). But, the evidence
does not support the explanation that such evil was
the direct outcome of calculated plans, deliberate
designs, and specific orders from the command
and control center in the Kremlin. Nor was this the
result of deranged minds. The evidence points to
something more chilling, something too dangerous
to overlook, the emergence of systemic evil.
In the absence of independent checks and
the presence of insulating secrecy, mutually reinforcing patterns of competent behaviors emerged at
multiple levels to form the coherent whole known as
Biopreparat. Its emergent competence and collective
claim on resources became mutually reinforcing.
And from this emerged the ability to mobilize the
latest scientific knowledge to produce the means for
mass slaughter of a horrible kind. The essential and
pervasive motivation was the drive to demonstrate
one’s competence within the contexts of the emergent system[5].
At the end of her widely acclaimed book
(revised edition, 1999), Margaret Wheatley wrote:
“I have found that nature and people provide more
hopeful examples of self-organization than I can possibly comprehend” (Wheatley, 1999: 168).
With respect to emergence in human affairs, my own
conclusion rephrases this statement:
I have found that people provide more hopeful, paradoxical, demonic, and evil examples of self-organization than I can possibly comprehend.
By “hopeful” I mean that self-organization can indeed lead to much that is good. By “paradoxical” I
mean that the character of the emergent outcomes
can be quite different than the character of the people
involved. By “demonic” I refer to the emergence of
self-reinforcing patterns that define the good – for
those involved – in ways that sustain the patterns
themselves. By “evil” I refer to emergent patterns
(contexts) that mobilize great power and sustain the
dedication, devotion, and sacrifice of many compeE:CO Vol. 8 No. 2 2006 pp. 102-115
tent people – much like ourselves – leading them (us)
to overlook troubling matters and produce outcomes
that portent great harm, threat, and danger. The
assumption that evil outcomes depend upon the
intentions of evil people (“Thank God we’re not like
them”) is both dangerous and wrong.
But, this troubling conclusion is also an
opening, an opportunity and challenge, to reconsider common notions of responsibility. While
acknowledging the responsibilities of competence
– doing one’s work well – this conclusion provokes
us to acknowledge a very different kind of responsibility, a “response-ability” that transcends, goes
beyond, contexts, including (especially) contexts
of competence. The prophetic name for such transcendent responsibility is faith[6]. In a competence
driven world, however, faith has been transformed
– trivialized – to mean strong beliefs often held in
the face of contrary evidence. Thus, in the name of
“faith,” people justify their actions because they are
“based upon their beliefs.” Wilfred Cantwell Smith,
eminent historian of comparative religion, describes
this notion – faith equals belief – as a “modern heresy” that leads to “monstrous confusion”[7].
The study of emergence and evil can help to
challenge this “monstrous confusion.” It does this
by showing that evil outcomes can and do emerge,
not because the people involved are themselves evil
but rather because ordinary people, much like ourselves, fail to live out responsibilities that transcend
the emergent patterns (contexts) that they (we) work
within. Prophetic faith involves responsibility that
transcends contexts. Such faith calls us “out of bondage” to systems that capture our very identity. The
prophetic traditions involves a calling to open our
eyes, expand our imagination, to see what captures
our devotion of time and energy, our very lives. It
calls for something more than going along and getting ahead. And such responsibility can lead to outof-context acts of faith that disturb and reform evil
systems. The failure to live out such responsibility
– faith in the prophetic sense – can be horrific. And
such responsibility cannot be simply turned over to
those most competent, the experts. On such crucial
matters, this paper and prophetic tradition agree.
Notes
[1] In this paper, “emergence” is understood in a
way consistent with the general statements of Holland (1998). “Recognizable features and patterns
Bella
are pivotal in this study of emergence... The crucial
step is to extract the regularities from incidental and
irrelevant details... This process is called modeling ...
Each model concentrates on describing a selected
aspect of the world, setting aside other aspects as
incidental” (pp. 4-5). “[E]mergence usually involves
patterns of interaction that persist despite a continuing turnover in the constituents of the patterns” (p.
7). “Emergence, in the sense used here, occurs only
when the activities of the parts do not simply sum
to give activity of the whole” (p. 14).
[2] This two thousand year old expression is from the
“Lord’s Prayer” found in the Christian tradition.
[3] The method has been applied to the tobacco
industry (Bella, 1996), educational failures (Bella, et
al., 2003), and distortions of information in organizations (Bella, 1987, 1997; Bella, et al., 2003). In all
cases, bad outcomes could not be simply reduced
to bad people. This method stands in contrast to
computer simulations that see people as rule following agents. Lissack and Richardson (2000) provide a critique of such simulations; their critique is
supported by my own experiences. Since the mid
1960s, my own research and teaching were in the
field of computer simulation of ecosystems. But,
experience – involvement with a wide range of real
world problems – forced me to approach human
systems in a radically different way. This “alternative
perspective” (Heitt, 2001) is a response to such lived
experiences, my own and others.
[4] Largely because of an independent citizenry and
institutional checks, the United States renounced its
program to develop biological weapons in 1969. The
Soviet Union continued its program, in violation of
the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(Miller, et al., 2001).
[5] The academic literatures from many fields (psychology, sociology, theology, etc.) describe many
kinds of human motivations (ideology, beliefs, approval, etc.). This paper adds the following: First,
motivation (compelling force or dive) in human
affairs can and does arise through the emergence
of self-reinforcing behavioral patterns. Second,
through such emergent patterns, the normal (in
context) behaviors of ordinary people, much like
ourselves, can lead to outcomes that fit definitions
of evil. Third, the drive to prove one’s competence
within the context of such patterns can amplify the
scale of such harm. Fourth, the character of such
patterns is often hidden and taken for granted.
113
Fifth, a method is presented to expose the character of such patterns. Sixth, the method draws upon
the experiences of practitioners. Seventh, all of the
above are demonstrated through a compelling real
world example.
[6] The writings of the late Wilfred Cantwell Smith
explore the meaning of faith through the ages.
Drawing upon many traditions, ancient and modern
(including secular, Christian, and Islamic), Smith
makes a profound and convincing case that “faith
has not and is not belief.” In Smith’s words, “Faith is
the human orientation to transcendence” (1977: 84).
But, Smith shows we moderns live in a “non-transcendence-oriented culture (the first such in human
history).” This paper seeks to show that great harm
– yes, even evil – can emerge when a “non-transcendence” notion of responsibility is acted out.
[7] Smith is certainly not alone in his claim that faith
is not belief. Paul Tillich, one of the leading Christian theologians of the twentieth century, wrote, “It
is a disastrous distortion of the meaning of faith to
identify it with the belief in the historical validity of
the Biblical stories” (Tillich, 1957: 87). “Faith is the
state of being ultimately concerned” (Tillich, 1957:
1). Abraham Heschel, a leading Jewish theologian,
wrote, “Faith is not the same as belief, not the same
as the attitude of regarding something as true,” (Heschel, 1978: 154).
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David A. Bella is Professor Emeritus of Civil, Construction and Environmental Engineering at Oregon
State University. He received his B.S. in Civil Engineering from Virginia Military Institute (1961), his
M.S. (1965) and his Ph.D. (1967) in Environmental
Engineering from New York University. Beginning
E:CO Vol. 8 No. 2 2006 pp. 102-115
in the 1960s, his research involved computer simulation of aquatic ecosystems. He has been involved
in a wide range of assessment research including
pollution in lakes, rivers, and estuaries, nuclear
waste disposal, destruction of chemical weapons,
global climate change, space-based weapons, and
the decline of salmon in the U.S. Pacific Northwest.
A theme in his research is that systemic distortion,
negligence, and corruption can emerge and we make
a fundamental mistaken when we merely blame individuals. He has published widely and was coauthor
of “The Dark Side of Organizations and a Method to
Reveal It,” published in Emergence (2003).
Bella
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