Canisius College
Model United Nations
36th Annual Conference
Historic Security Council: June 5, 1989
Political Instability and Regional Security in
Eastern Europe
with special attention to problems of nuclear weapons
and nuclear proliferation
A note from 2014
This September, the United Nations is about to have its first-ever
International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
(http://www.un.org/en/events/nuclearweaponelimination/index.shtml)
The vision of a nuclear weapons-free future is difficult to imagine, especially for those
who lived through the Cold War. This topic guide encourages you to imagine yourself
in a very different world, one in which personal computing was by modern standards
but governments controlled technologically sophisticated military equipment, and some
states – but most especially the superpowers – had enormous arsenals of weapons,
conventional and nuclear. It’s also a world that was on the verge of rapid changes that
were hard to imagine, virtually impossible to predict, and potentially very destabilizing
to security in eastern and central Europe. Please read on, and imagine yourself as a
high-ranking diplomat representing your assigned country as you consider the security
challenges of June 1989 in Eastern Europe.
Twenty-five years ago, in 1989, a vision of a nuclear-free world was truly unthinkable. Right or
wrong, the United States and the Soviet Union had massive arsenals of nuclear weapons, and had
developed three-pronged delivery systems for these weapons – by bomber aircraft, by
submarines with missile capabilities, and by intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that
could be launched from the homeland of one superpower and strike targets in the enemy
superpower’s homeland. The so-called “nuclear triad” gained notoriety as the foundation of
mutual deterrence, or “Mutual Assured Destruction” (MAD), a situation in which it would be
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lunacy—or at least suicidal—for either superpower to launch a nuclear strike against the other.
The focus on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), long-range bombers, and ICBMs
obscures the existence of shorter-range missiles that also served as delivery vehicles for nuclear
weapons, that some considered appropriate even for battlefield use. But even smaller, shorterrange missile systems equipped with nuclear warheads instilled fear and unease in many
individuals and governments around the world. Those fears however did not stop governments of
key states (including Security Council permanent members China, France, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) from maintaining nuclear weapons capabilities.
The Soviet Union, like the United States, both protected and relied upon allies during the Cold
War. The Eastern bloc’s answer to NATO – the Warsaw Pact
(http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/warsaw.asp) – included in 1989 the sovereign states of
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania along with the
superpower around which these “satellites” orbited, so to speak: the Soviet Union. The Soviets
wielded a nuclear arsenal that was, by the 1980s, the largest in the world. The nuclear weapons
that targeted Western countries were thought to help protect the Soviet Union and its allies from
nuclear attack by the United States and its NATO allies, which the Soviet leaders in Moscow
saw as threatening and aggressive. In 1983, a war scare in the Soviet Union appears to have
peaked with some Soviet officials believing that the U.S. and NATO were about to launch a
secret nuclear strike against the Warsaw Pact countries -- and arguing that the Soviets should
launch a nuclear first strike of their own, pre-empting the feared attack from the West and
possibly starting World War III. Some historians and analysts argue that the world was even
closer to nuclear war in 1983 than it was during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 (See video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ciy5R-tLiE). But as “hot” as the Cold War was in late 1983,
by the summer of 1989 the superpowers’ relations had undergone a dramatic change.
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Between 1985 and 1989, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev
and their administration ministers and officials had several constructive meetings about arms
control, and even had reached an agreement to eliminate certain classes of nuclear missiles that
were labeled “intermediate-range.” The
INF Treaty was, according to the
Federation of Atomic Scientists, the
treaty was “the first nuclear arms control
agreement to actually reduce nuclear
arms, rather than establish ceilings that
could not be exceeded,” and included
“the most comprehensive verification
regime ever achieved to that point”
(http://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/). This
agreement both symbolized the reduced
tensions between the superpowers and
contributed to the reduction in tensions—especially because the intermediate-range missiles were
considered to be the most destabilizing of all the nuclear weapons delivery systems. Estimates
that U.S.-made Pershing II missiles could reach targets in the Soviet Union from their launch
sites in Western Europe in just 10 minutes or so had made the Soviets extremely nervous about
the possibility of a “decapitation strike”—a first strike by the West that could knock out the
Soviet leadership in Moscow and leave the Soviet Union without a functioning government and
extraordinarily vulnerable, just as NATO was launching an attack against the Eastern bloc. The
INF Treaty went a long way toward reducing those fears.
However, even despite advances in arms control negotiations, unprecedented cooperation
between the Soviet Union and the United States, and initial steps toward eliminating intermediate
range nuclear weapons in Europe, many nuclear weapons remain intact, and the dangers of
nuclear war – or an accident that could result in radioactive contamination (like the meltdown of
a nuclear reactor at Chernobyl inside the Soviet Union in 1986) continue to exist. The Cold War
is no longer hot, and it even seems that the combination of superpower negotiation with the
domestic reforms inside the Soviet Union (e.g., glasnost and perestroika) mean that the Cold
War might actually come to an end (though not all analysts are convinced of this).
What is apparent, however, is that the Soviet Union may no longer impose its will over the
countries of Eastern Europe, and is reducing its political domination of and military presence in
these countries. In part this was due to weaknesses in the Soviet economy, the drain on Soviet
resources during the Afghanistan intervention (the Soviets’ version of Vietnam, perhaps), and the
surge of protests and resistance to single-party rule by the Communists in the countries of
Eastern Europe. But the Soviet Union’s diminished influence over the politics and governance of
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the Eastern bloc leaves in its wake agitation, disorder, and political instability, along with
questions about military facilities and hardware that may be left behind. In Poland, where years
of demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of protest led Solidarity (a massive workers’
movement) to disrupt and compete with the government that had been dominated by
Communists, and in other Warsaw Pact states that had begun to experience internal changes,
people and groups who had been hostile to Soviet control and Communist influence are
emerging as powerful forces in society and politics.
And now, in the summer of 1989, what is the future of the political contests in these countries?
Could the Soviet Union manage to have its personnel and collaborators safely exit the respective
countries -- or survive under the unstable conditions that arose as the Soviet Union withdraws
and pulls back from Eastern Europe? Who is at risk? Who is vulnerable to acts of violence or
retribution as the Soviet Union de-escalates the Cold War and the Communist bloc crumbles?
Will we see movements of people and/or acts of violence in the partial vacuum that results?
And what about the status of the Soviet nuclear arsenal? The international community is left to
wonder whether all of the nuclear weapons and warheads and other nuclear materials were fully
under Soviet control, or had some of these weapons fallen into the hands of anti-Soviet resisters
and new, unpredictable political groups? What sorts of weapons (nuclear or conventional) might
have been left behind in Eastern European satellite countries and become the property of people
whose motives were unknown, and who might not know how to maintain the weapons or their
constituent parts? Would former Soviet war materiel end up for sale on the black market – or in
the hands of terrorists?
The situation now, on June 5, 1989, remains murky and potentially dangerous. Information about
the secretive Soviet military and its assets is difficult to acquire. The Soviet Union, despite its
various weaknesses, remains intact as a sovereign state and, at least for now, is still a very
powerful country. Mikhail Gorbachev gives the Soviet Union a friendly, likable image on the
world stage, and has overseen attempts to implement political and economic reform, but he still
must answer to other Soviet officials and influential people inside the Soviet Union who are on
the defensive as what was effectively an empire unravels before their very eyes. Top-level
military officers in the Soviet Union who might or might not exercise control over remaining
assets in the Eastern bloc may be inclined to “keep mum” about inventory control problems out
of pride, for fear of making matters worse, or just out of habit because secrecy has been
privileged for so long in Soviet leadership.
What is to be done? What can the international community do to hedge its bets against the
spontaneous outbreak of violence within or among Eastern bloc countries? What can the Security
Council do to anticipate problems associated with lethal acts of revenge and possible refugee
flows in the absence of Warsaw Pact discipline centered in Moscow? Further, what can the
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international community do to help guard against the mismanagement of nuclear and
conventional weapons (or their components) that could result in mishandling, accidents, black
market arms sales, nuclear proliferation, or heavily armed terrorists? What can the Security
Council do to secure any “loose nukes” or poorly controlled conventional military equipment
that is left behind or stolen as the Soviets draw down their military presence?
1989
Since the start of the year, revolutionary
movements have sprung up all over the
world against communism. Eastern
European countries have been making
major policy changes, and appear to have
less control from the Kremlin in Moscow,
specifically in the Warsaw Pact States.
Eastern Europeans have also watched
other events around the world unfold, and
this is sure to play a role in their future.
Surely the most recent of these, and
perhaps the most striking, are the student
protests in Beijing where violence has
erupted between the army and protestors
and a government crackdown on the
demonstrations has led to massive
bloodshed (see Topic Guide on
Tiananmen Square Protests and
Crackdown).
In the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev’s
policies of perestroika and glasnost have
had a major impact on politics, economics, and society. Glasnost has had perhaps the biggest
impact, by reducing restrictions on freedom of speech and eventually allowing for the release of
thousands of political prisoners. Perhaps it has also had unintended consequences within the
Soviet Union:
Gorbachev intended glasnost to strengthen the communist regime, [but] he did not
initiate a crackdown when Soviet citizens went beyond the original intent of glasnost.
Soviet intellectuals began questioning the very tenets of Soviet Communism and attacked
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the Communist Party in newspapers, journals, film, and books. Eastern European thinkers
followed the lead of their Soviet counterparts. Consequently, glasnost had the unintended
effect of spurring nationalist and anti-communist movements in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet republics. Dissidents in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and other Sovietsatellite states staged labor demonstrations. Citizens took to the streets, demanding that
the Communist Party step aside and allow democratic elections. (Source: www.faqs.org)
This passage probably overstates the effect of the glasnost policy and understates the local
sources of protests and dissidence from within Poland and the other Warsaw Pact states.
Gorbachev’s reforms within the Soviet Union did encourage dissidents throughout the Eastern
bloc, though, and in the Eastern European states, Soviet control has been diminished, both by the
rising popularity of movements like Solidarity and by the reduced Soviet commitment to
enforcing centralized political control from Moscow.
Indeed, as indicated in previous pages, the Soviet Union has also had a significant drawdown of
troops in a number of occupied areas. However, this past April saw the Soviet Union’s military
crush peaceful protests in Georgia (a Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), and thus part of the
USSR/Soviet Union) and twenty civilians were killed.
In the Baltic SSRs, things are going differently – take Latvia for example. In the summer of
1987, large demonstrations were held in Riga, the capital of Latvia, at the Freedom Monument,
which is a national symbol of Latvia’s independence (despite the fact that Latvia, like its
neighbors Estonia and Lithuania, had been absorbed into the Soviet Union’s territory during
World War II). Last summer, a national movement was gaining steam in Latvia. Gorbachev and
other officials in Moscow agreed to allow the Latvian SSR and the other Baltic Republics to
have greater autonomy. On October 6, 1988, a new state language law that made Latvian the
official language of the Republic. In Lithuania they followed suit -- in November 1988 a new
state language law was passed that made Lithuanian the official language of the Republic. This
year, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR has considered a draft resolution on the occupation of the
Baltic states that declares the occupation “not in accordance with law,” and not the “will of the
Soviet people.”
The six Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe that had been the Soviet Union’s satellites
between 1945 and 1989 are no longer facing the severe threat of military intervention to keep
them under Soviet influence. All had been occupied by the Soviet Red Army in 1945 and
Moscow had insisted that they all adopt Soviet-style socialist governments. Nominally
independent, in reality these states had very restricted freedom of action in domestic politics and
in diplomatic relations. But this appears to be changing.
Consider Poland, a nominally independent state and a member-state of the United Nations, but
for generations a Communist one-party state effectively controlled by the Soviet Union. It is
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positively astonishing, but a non-Communist trade union named Solidarity has won elections in
the parliament. Solidarity formed in 1980, as the first non-communist trade union since the end
of World War II. By 1981 it had 9.5 million members, and has major financial backing from the
United States. Recently, the organization has begun talks with the Polish Government,
persuading them to recognize them as a legitimate entity, and allowing them to participate in
elections, and to contest 35% of the parliamentary seats.
Also, the Soviet Union has been pulling out troops of various countries throughout the year.
These include Czechoslovakia and Hungary (both of which had been subjected to Soviet
military intervention in the past—in 1968 and 1956, respectively), as well as Afghanistan, the
site of a decade-long Soviet military intervention.
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Proliferation
One pressing global issue in regards to these massive changes is what will become of the
nuclear and conventional weapons systems and materials in these regions. Most important, it
raises the issue of preventing the spread of these nuclear weapons, materials, and technology.
Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear
weapons, fissionable material, and weaponsapplicable nuclear technology and information
to nations not recognized as "Nuclear
Weapons States" by the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT). The five member-states with
permanent seats on the UN Security Council
are all declared nuclear weapons states: the
United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom (though France and
China did not sign the NPT). Several non-nuclear states refused to adhere to the NPT as well,
including Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. In 1974,
India joined the “nuclear club,” and Pakistan tested its first atomic bomb in 1983. (Israel is
suspected of having nuclear weapons but has not acknowledged its nuclear weapons publicly.)
Back in 1968, the Soviet Union and the United States both signed the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty (NPT). Under the guidance of the Soviet Union all of the Eastern European states except
Albania signed the treaty. In theory this means that these states should be held to the same
expectations that the United States and the Soviet Union have held each other to in terms of the
proliferation of any weapons-related nuclear materials to non-Nuclear Weapons States.
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The issue of nuclear proliferation is extremely important at this time, as the fate of the Soviet
Union is so unclear. The Soviet Union’s nuclear capabilities are not restricted to mainland
Russia. For example, a comprehensive UN study of nuclear weapons in the 1980s states,
“Academic sources indicate that the Soviet Union keeps tactical nuclear weapons in the
German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, presumably
involving a ‘double-key’ system of control and Soviet custodianship. As at 1989, over 1,000
Soviet tactical aircraft were forward-based at military facilities in the four countries. According
to the Soviet Union, with the current withdrawal of its troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia,
Soviet nuclear weapons outside its territory will remain only in the German Democratic Republic
and Poland until arrangements on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe make their presence there
unnecessary.”1
The Soviet Union also keeps nuclear weapons in many SSRs, including Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
What will happen with these weapons if the Soviet Union breaks up? The bigger concern for
members of the Soviet Union, who do not have these nuclear capabilities, is where they will find
their foundation for security, without a nuclear-capable Soviet Union, providing protection.
Without the security of one of the two nuclear super powers, Eastern Europe may see scrambles
by their own governments to acquire nuclear materials, as well as political instability. This is a
very alarming development. SSRs Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine all currently have
their own nuclear arsenals, as well as production facilities. If these states acquire sovereignty,
they may have a legitimate claim to these weapons. Russia has been removing their armed
warheads from these regions, but the technology and facilities still exist.
The issue of these states and regions already possessing this technology is worrisome. Perhaps
more worrisome is the threat of their technology, spreading to other parts of the globe. Many
other countries have expressed a desire to acquire Nuclear weapons or materials. A black market
could develop in which these materials and information are not only spread to other states, but to
non-state actors as well. Nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists would create a threat that the
world has not yet seen.
Contrary to the fear of the spread of nuclear materials stands political scientist Kenneth Waltz’s
theory on the spread of nuclear weapons. Waltz argues that the spread of nuclear technology is
inevitable, and there is strong encouragement for states to acquire these weapons. “Deterrence is
achieved not through the ability to defend but through the ability to punish… Purely defensive
forces provide no deterrence. They offer no means of punishment.” This suggests that perhaps
the spread of this technology is inevitable and for good reason. States want to balance the global
1
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, Report of the Secretary-General: Nuclear Weapons: A
Comprehensive Study, citing Robert E. Harkavy, Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence, and the
SIPRI Yearbook: World Armaments and Disarmament. Emphasis added.
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scale by deterring belligerents from attacking, by having a force that is so strong, an attack would
create more negative consequences than gains. This may not be a reason to abandon the idea of
non-proliferation, but does explain and justify states desire to acquire them. If non-proliferation
is the course of action, the legitimate desire for these weapons must be taken into consideration.
*****
This topic guide has raised several important issues for consideration under the heading of global
peace and security, and we mention them again here to encourage discussion and debate among
the voting member-states of the Security Council and the invited member-states who are asked to
add their perspective to the debate even though they do not have voting power. Questions for
delegates to consider as you prepare for debate on this date, June 5, 1989:
•
What can the Security Council do to help the Soviet Union and the other relevant
member-states to protect people in transit as the Soviet Union de-escalates the Cold War
and the Communist bloc crumbles? Will we see movements of people in the partial
vacuum that results? Who may be at risk? Who is vulnerable to acts of violence or
retribution by opponents of Communist rule? Can the Soviet Union manage on its own to
have its personnel and is collaborators safely exit former satellite countries -- and perhaps
newly independent republics -- without them being subjected to acts of retribution and
violence, or should the Security Council offer some form of assistance in this regard?
•
How can the UN Security Council encourage non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and
materials, and discourage proliferation of these things, in the wake of Soviet drawdowns?
What about the prospects of new Nuclear Weapons States? Should independent sovereign
states be left to their own devices, or should the Security Council take action to try to
ensure that the number of Nuclear Weapons States does not grow as the political situation
in Eastern Europe and on the periphery of the Soviet Union undergoes rapid changes?
•
And what about the status of the Soviet nuclear arsenal? What will happen with these
weapons if the Soviet Union breaks up? Even if the Soviet Union remains intact, the
international community is left to wonder whether all of the nuclear weapons and
warheads and other nuclear materials are fully under Soviet control. What if these
weapons were to fall into the hands of anti-Soviet resisters and new, unpredictable
political groups? What sorts of weapons (nuclear or conventional) might have been left
behind in Eastern European satellite countries and become the property of people whose
motives were unknown, and who might not know how to maintain the weapons or their
constituent parts? Would former Soviet war materiel end up for sale on the black market
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– or in the hands of terrorists? What can be done to prevent or manage such
developments?
Resources
Soviet Military Power, 1989: Prospects for Change
Chapter IV—Nuclear, Strategic Defense, and Space Programs.
From the Federation of American Scientists website (an excellent general source for information with
respect to nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation). http://fas.org/irp/dia/product/smp_89.htm
For example, see their timeline of developments related to the NPT:
http://fas.org/nuke/control/npt/chron.htm
The United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) maintains a website of interest for those
investigating arms control, disarmament, and nuclear weapons non-proliferation:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/
See also:
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, Report of the Secretary-General.
Nuclear Weapons: A Comprehensive Study, United Nations, 1991 (ISBN 92-1-142175-6)
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/DisarmamentStudySeries/PDF/SS-21.pdf
On the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) see:
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/tnpt/tnpt.html
and https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/npt
and especially http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml, which includes links to
relevant General Assembly resolutions.
At Cold War’s End (book; use relevant sections on 1989; mostly National Intelligence Estimates from the
United States intelligence community, which might serve as a source of confidential information for
diplomats from member-states allied with the U.S.):
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/at-coldwars-end-us-intelligence-on-the-soviet-union-and-eastern-europe-1989-1991/art-1.html
Kenneth Waltz’s debate with Scott Sagan over the spread of nuclear weapons led to a book on the topic
and continues well into the 21st century. A 2005 video features both scholars as they argue their points
(well after the end of the Cold War, but with many references to and insights into the Cold War era):
http://www.uctv.tv/shows/Scott-Sagan-and-Kenneth-Waltz-The-Spread-of-Nuclear-Weapons-A-Debate-Renewed-9491
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Timeline of Developments: Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, 1989
18 January Estonia adopts law requiring minorities (i.e., Russians) to learn its native language
within four years. [Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine later follow suit.]
3 February Soviet troop withdrawals from Czechoslovakia begin.
6 February Solidarity and Polish Government start roundtable talks.
15 February Last Soviet troops leave Afghanistan.
18 February Polish Government declares USSR, not Nazi Germany, was responsible for 1940
Katyn Forest massacre.
9 March Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks begin.
26 March National elections for CPD; many communist candidates are defeated; Baltic
popular fronts sweep elections; Boris Yeltsin wins 90 percent of vote in Moscow.
7 April Solidarity legalized, signs agreement on elections in which it can contest 35 percent of
seats in Sejm, all in Senat.
9 April Soviet forces attack nationalist demonstrators in Tbilisi, Georgia.
25 April Soviet forces begin leaving Hungary.
2 May Hungarian Government lifts "iron curtain" along border with Austria.
18 May Lithuania and Estonia declare sovereignty; Latvia follows on 29 July.
25 May First session of CPD carried live on television; elects Gorbachev chairman; next day
elects Supreme Soviet (standing parliament) from among members.
4 June Interior Ministry (MVD) troops dispatched to quell clashes between Uzbeks and
Meskhetian Turks in Fergana Oblast, Uzbekistan; Solidarity wins landslide victory, communists
are defeated.
Adapted from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-andmonographs/at-cold-wars-end-us-intelligence-on-the-soviet-union-and-eastern-europe-1989-1991/art-1.html
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