The Danish and Norwegian Experiences during the Holocaust
Kimberly Elizabeth Bloor
Masters of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies
Fall 2008
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degree of Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies.
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II Abstract:
The preamble to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948, notes genocides
have occurred throughout history.
The Convention recognizes
genocides as criminal acts that should be prevented, or if not
prevented, then punished.
While it would be wonderful to put
an end to all genocides by adopting a Convention, that has
proven not to be the case.
Genocides continue, as illustrated
by the events in Rwanda and other places that have occurred
after the Convention was adopted.
Genocides and genocidal rescue operations are complex and
need to be studied.
This paper will study one aspect of the
complexity ― rescue operations.
This will begin by comparing
two occupied states, Denmark and Norway, during the Holocaust of
World War II and the rescue operations that occurred within
them.
By understanding what has worked in the past, one may
hope to devise a better understanding of what may succeed in
stopping, or at least significantly abating the effects of,
future genocides.
Denmark and Norway on the surface are similar in culture,
history, politics, geography and general attitudes.
Yet, during
World War II their Jewish citizens experienced markedly
III different outcomes, mostly due to breadth and success of rescue
operations conducted by the citizens of each country.
While
rescue operations were mounted in both countries, the rescue
operations conducted by the Danes were far more successful.
How and why Denmark succeeded, when the rest of Western
civilization, including Norway, failed is a complex and multifaceted problem. What made Denmark or perhaps the Danes
different from the rest of Europe? Was it just random
coincidence, or can something be learned from the Danish
example? By comparing the various political, economic, social,
religious and geographic differences between Denmark and Norway,
this paper hopes to glean a list of factors that are influential
in genocidal rescue operations and that can be applied to other
genocidal rescue operations.
In conclusion, while no genocide is the same and the
circumstances in Denmark were unique and highly unlikely to be
replicated in the future, there are universal traits that can be
found in the Holocaust and in subsequent genocides during which
people have tried to rescue their fellow citizens. By
recognizing and understanding these universal traits more can be
learned about the causes, and perhaps, the preventions of
genocides.
IV Table of Contents Part One ..................................................................................................................................... 7 Chapter One: History of Genocide and the Holocaust................................................................ 8 1.1 Genocides in History......................................................................................................... 8 1.2 The History of the Word Genocide ................................................................................. 13 1.3 The History of the Word Holocaust ................................................................................ 18 1.4 The Context of the Holocaust ― World War II ............................................................. 20 1.5 Hitler’s Racial Policies ................................................................................................... 25 1.6 Stories of Rescue............................................................................................................. 28 Chapter Two: Historiography on Denmark .............................................................................. 32 Chapter Three: Historiography on Norway .............................................................................. 47 Part Two Denmark and Norway ................................................................................................... 56 Chapter Four: In Denmark it Could Not Happen...................................................................... 57 4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 57 4.2 Assimilation: A Short History of Jews in Denmark ....................................................... 58 4.3 Denmark in World War II ............................................................................................... 66 4.4 Resistance Movement ..................................................................................................... 68 4.5 The Rescue of the Jews ................................................................................................... 70 4.7 Those Who Were Not Rescued ....................................................................................... 86 4.8 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 89 Chapter Five: Norway and the Nazis: How It Could Happen .................................................. 92 5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 92 5.2 History of Norway .......................................................................................................... 93 5.3 A Short History of Norway in WWII ............................................................................. 96 5.4 Norwegian Resources ..................................................................................................... 99 5.5 Norwegian Jews ............................................................................................................ 103 5.6 Jews that were rescued .................................................................................................. 105 5.7 Why the Jews were not rescued .................................................................................... 108 5.8 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 112 Chapter Six: Comparing the Two; Why Denmark Was More Successful than Norway? ...... 114 6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 114 6.2 Governments ................................................................................................................. 115 6.3 Anti-Semitic Views ....................................................................................................... 120 6.4 Nazis’ Needs ................................................................................................................. 124 6.5 Luck .............................................................................................................................. 127 6.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 129 Part Three What Can We Learn? ................................................................................................ 131 Chapter Seven: Comparing Denmark and Norway to Today’s Problems .............................. 132 7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 132 7.2 Yugoslavia. ................................................................................................................... 134 7.3 Cambodia ...................................................................................................................... 138 7.4 Darfur. ........................................................................................................................... 141 7.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 147 Chapter Eight: Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 148 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 152 Primary Sources......................................................................................................... 152 V Secondary Sources .............................................................................................................. 154 7 Part One
8 Chapter One: History of Genocide and the Holocaust 1.1 Genocides in History The systematic killing of people, based on an ethnic,
racial, religious, or national distinction, has been going on
since the beginning of time. Even before the term genocide was
coined, the idea, the ability to kill people based on who they
were, what they believed, or how they looked, has long existed.
Even so, the term genocide is relatively new.
It was coined in 1944. There have been many different
definitions offered, but no single definition has gained
worldwide acceptance. Nonetheless, genocide for this discussion
includes the deliberate intent to destroy or disable groups of
people based on a characteristic of that group such as;
religion, ethnicity, nationality or physical characteristics.
9 Genocide can include not only killing of people within an
identifiable group, but also disabling those groups by mental or
physical harm, discrimination to prevent a livelihood, or
preventing their means to continue their culture.
Some of the known genocides occurred during the times of
antiquity. One problem with understanding genocides that
occurred in the distant past is the difficulty in gathering
accurate information. There are instances where evidence shows
that in the distant past entire cities and even entire
civilizations disappeared and that the cause could have been
genocides.
Still, it remains difficult to deduce whether the
disappearance of these people actually represented genocide or
was something else.
Famine, natural disaster, war, or something
else might have forced entire cities to move suddenly.
Throughout human history it has been common that one
group would consider themselves to be fully evolved humans,
while seeing others as something less-something that did
not merit the right, the respect, or the regard that should
be accorded to “humans.”
Historically and anthropologically peoples have
always had a name for themselves. In a great many
cases, that name meant 'the people' to set the
owners of that name off against all other people
who were considered of lesser quality in some
way. If the differences between the people and
10 some other society were particularly large in
terms of religion, language, manners, customs,
and so on, then such others were seen as less
than fully human: pagans, savages, or even
animals. 1
For this reason, it is not always apparent why one
group of people might have disappeared.
genocides are documented.
Even so, some
Some of the earliest genocides
are well known events in history, such as the destruction
of Melos by Athens, and the stories of Amalekites and
Midianites from the Old Testament, the destruction of the
city of Carthage and the rampages of Genghis Khan. It is
true that these events commonly have been considered wars,
not genocides.
Yet, in many respects they are genocides.
People were killed because they belonged to a certain
tribe, ethnicity, or group. These events and the evidence
from these events - whole empires disappeared, extreme
cruelty, the differences in religions of the two groups,
and excavations today revealing entire cities suddenly
depopulated with little explanation ― suggest that genocide
was a common historical occurrence. 2
1
Chalk, Frank, and Kurt Jonassohn. The History and Sociology of
Genocide. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. (28)
2
Chalk, Frank, and Kurt Jonassohn. The History and Sociology of
Genocide. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. (64).
11 Along with the accounts of genocide, throughout
history there are accounts of rescue and rescue operations.
Understanding those events ― how and why rescues were
successful and what motivated them ― becomes important in
breaking the circle of death and destruction. Understanding
how and why rescue operations occurred, and what made them
successful, can be important in, perhaps, slowing or
halting genocides.
Genocides often resulted in the total destruction of
entire tribes, cities or civilizations. However, an event
can be genocide without the total destruction of a tribe,
city, or group. For this reason, it sometime can be
difficult to define precisely what events constitute
genocide.
Genocide sometimes can be identified by the motivation
of the perpetrators.
Is the motive to annihilate an entire
tribe, religion, or ethnic people, or is the motive
something else – such as territorial expansion or
acquisition of resources?
For example, the Holocaust of World War II was
motivated by the desire of the Nazis to exterminate those
12 peoples and groups they deemed undesirable. 3
In contrast,
the numerous wars between England and France in the 17th,
18th, and early 19th centuries were not genocides.
They were
motivated by empire, ambition of the monarchies, and trade
competition. 4
The English were not motivated by a rage to
kill every last Frenchman, and vice versa.
Thus, motive is one element to consider in determining
whether genocide occurred or was attempted, but motive is
not always the clear signal for genocide.
For instance,
questions commonly arise in the case of the Natives in both
North and South America. As Europeans colonized the
Americas, many Native Americans died both of disease and of
fighting the newcomers. Eventually, the total population of
Native Americans was reduced to a fraction of what it was
prior to colonization.
Was the death of these people
simply due to war and unintended consequences, or did the
Europeans act with intent, killing and spreading disease
among Native Americans for who they were?
This question is
often debated, but there is no final, authoritative
conclusion.
3
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. “The Third Reich-Overview”
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10005141
4
Chalk, Frank, and Kurt Jonassohn. The History and Sociology of Genocide. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. (6)
13 These examples illustrate that genocide is not always
easy to recognize or to define.
Without the entire, openly
intentional destruction of a civilization, questions arise
as to whether an event is genocide. Nonetheless, it is
important to recognize it.
To classify an action as
genocide is to brand it as something distinct.
The
majority of the world has reached consensus that genocide
should be condemned. To define some action as genocide is
to classify it as morally wrong, unacceptable by any
standard, something the force of the world should stop.
Recognizing that genocides have occurred throughout history
helps us today to question and define just what constitutes
genocide.
This, in turn, is important today because of the
implications the question and the definition may have for
millions of people. Genocide focuses the thought of the
world.
1.2 The History of the Word Genocide There is ample evidence that throughout history one group
has deemed itself superior to another, and on that basis has
aimed to eradicate the other; but until recently that practice
has not had an acceptable name. The word genocide was coined by
14 Raphael Lemkin in 1944 from the Greek word genos meaning race or
tribe and –cide meaning to kill. 5 By combining the two meanings,
kill and race, the word Genocide evokes ideas of mass murder,
hatred, and wide-spread suffering.
Raphael Lemkin coined the term genocide to describe
atrocities that occurred in his own lifetime, such as the
Holocaust in Europe, and the destruction of six-hundred
Christians in Iraq in 1933 also known as the Simele Massacre and
the Assyrian Genocide. 6 His mission in life was to put a name to
the atrocities. Lemkin believed that international law was the
only way in which to prevent further atrocities from taking
place.
Because of his desire to prevent future genocidal
attacks from going unchecked, and because the
Nuremberg trials did not attempt to assign
individual responsibility for atrocities which
occurred under Hitler before the outbreak of the
war, Dr. Lemkin continued to work for the
establishment of an international treaty
prohibiting crimes against a nation. 7
5
Pacific Lutheran University. “Lemkin, A Brief Bibliography Sketch”
http://www.plu.edu/~history/lemkinbio.doc
6
Martin, Joseph, Jones. The Man who Invented Genoide: The Public Career and Consequences of Ralph
Lemkin. (University of California Press. 1984), 184.
7
Pacific Lutheran University. “Lemkin, A Brief Bibliography Sketch”
http://www.plu.edu/~history/lemkinbio.doc
15 With Lemkin’s continuous work, the world genocide, and actions
it describes, did gain greater recognition and concern.
It was
Dr. Lemkin’s goal that greater recognition would lead to
increased prosecution of the acts that the word represents, the
systematic mass killings of targeted groups it describes.
The definition of the word Genocide, as coined by Lemkin is
readily understood.
However, to define an act or event as
genocide is more problematical, as was discussed in the
preceding section of this paper.
Today, while there are several
different definitions of the events, acts, or circumstances that
constitute genocide, the different definitions encompass many
different acts.
The United Nations defines genocide in Article Two of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide:
as any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such: killing members of the group; causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group; deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life, calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
imposing measures intended to prevent births
16 within the group; [and] forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group. 8
This definition, perhaps, is too broad and paradoxically narrow
at the same time.
The United Nations’ definition includes so many actions and
alternative criteria that too many events might be called
genocide.
Such a result would not be accepted in common
understanding.
Every hostility is not genocide.
Additionally,
a broad definition is contrary to Lemkin’s original purpose.
He
wanted a word to describe actions that the world would condemn.
If the definition is so broad that many or most hostilities can
be defined as genocide, there is the risk that people become
numb to the use of the word.
At the same time the United Nations’ definition might be
too
narrow.
events
that
The
took
definition
place
was
written
specifically
in
during
response
the
to
1940s.
the
Other
events, both prior and subsequent, that the world recognizes as
genocides
have
definition.
not
always
Additionally,
fallen
some
within
events
the
United
cannot
classified under the United Nations’ definition.
be
Nations’
precisely
The events
8
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights.
“Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.”
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm.
17 could be construed to fall within the definition, and at the
same time, could be construed to not fall within the definition.
One example of this would be the Ukrainian Genocide during the
period around 1917. Today there is great debate as to whether
those in charge were targeting a nationality, which in terms of
the definition would be genocide, or whether it was simply a
famine
as
the
Russians
have
suggested
it
was.
The
United
Nations’ definition does not help resolve this debate.
Today, there is no single, universally accepted definition
of genocide, which makes acknowledging and responding to events
of mass killing more difficult. Why the murder of one man is
deplorable, “genocide” is intended to denote actions of such
magnitude malignity that they must be condemned by the entire
world.
In
contrast,
actions
that
expected to compel less attention.
are
not
“genocide”
can
be
For this reason, recognition
of genocide can make a significant difference in how the world
reacts to the event.
That recognition, in turn, could make a
significant difference to those who are involved, either as the
target
or
the
perpetrators.
The
Holocaust
is
the
primary
example where recognition of the actions for what they were was
particularly important to the targeted groups.
18 1.3 The History of the Word Holocaust The Holocaust is an important event in the study of
genocide. In the Holocaust millions of people were victims of
genocide.
Only after the Holocaust was there wide-spread
recognition of genocide coupled with wide-spread will and
determination to understand and prevent genocide.
The word Holocaust means “sacrifice by fire” in Greek. From
the original holòkauston, holò meaning complete and kauston
meaning burned. Its Latin counterpart holocaustum was used to
describe the persecution of Jews as early as the 1190s. It was
not until the 1950s that the term Holocaust was used to describe
the systematic attempts by the Nazis to exterminate Jews and
other “racial undesirables” during the Second World War. 9
Another word commonly used is Shoah, which is a Hebrew
word meaning disaster, while Hashoah commonly refers to the
Holocaust specifically, and was used especially after the end of
Holocaust. The world shoah has been used since the 1940’s in
9
Shoah, Resource Center. "About the Holocaust."
http://www1.yadvashem.org/Odot/prog/index_before_change_table.asp?gate=
0-2 (accessed 07/25/2008).
19 relations to the mass murder of Jewish people during the Second
World War. 10
Today, The Holocaust, as a term, is generally, but not
universally, understood to refer to:
the sum total of all anti-Jewish actions carried
out by the Nazi regime between 1933 and 1945:
from stripping the German Jews of their legal and
economic status in the 1930s`; segregating and
starvation in the various occupied countries; the
murder of close to six million Jews in Europe.
The Holocaust is part of a broader aggregate of
acts of oppression and murder of various ethnic
and political groups in Europe by the Nazis. 11
The religious underpinnings of both words Shoah and Hashoah do
have a significance, but they are Jewish centric. Most scholars
now recognize that other populations were victims of the Nazi’s
practices, and they, too, are widely acknowledged as victims of
the Holocaust. Today, the term Holocaust is used primarily for
the genocide that occurred in Nazi occupied Europe, against Jews
as well as others the Nazi’s classified as racial undesirables.
10
Shoah, Resource Center. "About the Holocaust."
http://www1.yadvashem.org/Odot/prog/index_before_change_table.asp?gate=
0-2 (accessed 07/25/2008).
11
Shoah, Resource Center. "About the Holocaust."
http://www1.yadvashem.org/Odot/prog/index_before_change_table.asp?gate=
0-2 (accessed 07/25/2008).
20 1.4 The Context of the Holocaust ― World War II World War II can be seen as a continuation of World War I.
At the end of the First World War, all Europe was left in a
state of disruption, but the effects were felt especially in
Germany. The economic depression that hit the world in 1929 hit
Germany especially hard.
At the end of World War I, Germany was
forced to pay reparations to other countries. That, alone, was a
strain on Germany’s economy.
The additional impact of a world-
wide economic depression in the 1930s had a devastating effect
on Germany’s economy.
These economic hard times allowed Adolph Hitler and the
National Socialist German Workers Party (Nazis) to rise to
power. They did so by offering hope to the German people.
The
Nazi party under Hitler was nationalist, and ethno-centric.
Germans were a race superior to others.
at the hands of inferior peoples.
They should not suffer
Germans had a right to the
lands lost during World War I, and Germany should increase its
military strength to gain back its lost land.
Hitler told the
Germans that as a nation, as a race, they deserved preeminent
national stature, economic vitality, and land lost at the end of
World War I.
Due particularly to the hard economic times, many
Germans embraced this notion. Hitler’s message was well received
21 by most Germans; however, with the measures that Hitler put in
place, free speech and non-Nazi political parties were banned.
These restrictions made it more difficult for any other person
or party to try to stop the growing power and unilateral
dominance of the Nazi Party and Adolf Hitler. Hitler argued that
Aryans were superior to other peoples.
more.
As such, Aryans deserved
They should not endure the fate handed to them at the end
of World War I. If necessary, they should take what was, by
nature, their rightful, dominate place in the world.
Hitler exercised his power in early 1938.
Germany annexed
Austria, followed shortly afterwards by the invasions of
Czechoslovakia and Poland. A year later, on September 1, 1939
Germany’s invasion of Poland prompted England, the commonwealth
countries, and France to declare war on Germany. These events
are generally regarded as the beginning of World War II.
At the beginning of World War II the Nazi leadership had
not formulated a defined strategy for dealing with Jews and
others they considered racially inferior. There are currently no
known documents that expressly state a plan by the Nazi Party to
exterminate the entire Jewish population or others that they
deemed “inferior.”
There are, nonetheless, documents that do describe the
goals of the Nazi Party in regard to the “Jewish Question,” a
22 term used by the Nazis to imply that there was something
undesirable, unfit with Jews and that some action was needed to
correct it. There also are documents that collect and recite the
reasons that the Nazi party believes the Jewish People to be a
problem.
Because it is necessary, because we no longer
hear the world screaming, and finally because no
power in the world can stop us, we shall
therefore now take the Jewish Question towards
its final solution. The program is clear. It is:
total elimination, complete separation! It means
not only the elimination of the Jews from the
German national economy, a position which they
brought upon themselves following their murderous
attack and their incitement to war and murder.
The Jews must therefore be driven out of our
apartment houses and residential areas and put
into series of streets or blocks of houses where
they will be together and have as little contact
as possible with Germans. 12
This document from 1938 shows the enmity that the Nazi Party had
for Jewish people and enumerates some of the reasons they
believed removal of those deemed “inferior” was essential to
Germany’s future. 13 While the Nazi Party did advocate eliminating
the Jews from Germany, they were careful to not announce
explicitly that they intended to annihilate them all.
12
Yad Vasham , “SS Views on the Solution of the Jewish Question,” Das
Schwarze Korps, No. 47, November 24, 1938.
http://www1.yadvashem.org/about_holocaust/index_about_holocaust.html
13
Inferior people included not only Jewish People, but also Roma, Slavic
peoples, homosexuals, Communists, Socialist, Jehovah Witnesses and
those with physical or mental illnesses.
23 The same thoughts about “inferior” people were advanced and
refined during the Wannssee Conference in January 1942. The
Wannssee Conference is instructive in understanding how the
changing course of World War II influenced the Holocaust. The
reports of the conference show that, at the time, the Nazi party
had plans that included Jews in all of Germany and the occupied
countries as well.
In early 1942 the principal aim of the Nazis
was to deport the Jewish population to Eastern Europe.
However, beginning in late 1942 and continuing with rising
force through 1945, the Soviets pushed back the German lines.
Also during this period, the fighting continued on the West
front, and in 1943 preparations for an Allied attack on Germanoccupied France began. By 1944 Allied forces had enough strength
to compete with German forces. In addition to the allied forces
ready to invade France, on the Eastern Front the Russians had
stopped the Germans at Stalingrad and Kursk. Due to the fighting
on all fronts, the Germans were not able to dominate any longer
and were defeated in many battles during this time. The German
military was weakened, but this is did not stop the German Army
from continuing to fight; the Germans did not fully surrender
until May 1945. However, the weakened military and the inability
to transport “inferior” people to Eastern Europe forced the
Germans to alter plans for dealing with those they deemed
24 undesirable.
feasible.
Exportation to Eastern Europe was no longer
For that reason, most of the Jews under German
control were sent to concentration camps. The concentration
camps were beginning to fill beyond capacity.
This combination
of factors resulted in mass extermination of Jews and other
peoples in those camps.
While the Nazi’s designs for the Jews were evolving during
this period, 1939-1944, World War II was raging. By the year
1940 the Germany Army had invaded and taken extensive control
over Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and
France.
By this time, Europe and soon the United States would
be engaged in the war. The fact of war dominated nearly every
county.
The means of the war ― ground, aerial, and navel
actions ― were to utmost concern.
This fog of war made it
almost impossible for the rest of the world to know what was
happening to the Jewish population in Europe at the time. Other
countries were too preoccupied with their own safety to worry
about how Jews were being treated, especially in countries that
harbored some anti-Semitic views.
Nazi concentration camps (camps were the Jewish population
were “concentrated” and isolated from the German population)
were already in use by 1943, some had been in use before the
war.
The broadening war and the German’s ability to move people
25 within occupied countries without detection allowed for a
greater persecution of the Jewish people.
By the end of the
War, the concentration camps had grown in numbers, size, and
scope unrecognized by the rest of the world.
On April 11, 1945, American troops entered the Buchenwald
concentration camp near Weimar, Germany. About 56,000 prisoners
died there. Even though many of the American soldiers had fought
in the worst battles of WWII, they were unprepared for the
horrors they saw there. Edward R. Murrow was one of the
reporters covering the event, and he was so disturbed that he
couldn't even talk about it for days.
14
These horrors would soon
be made public and the true ramifications of Hitler and the
Nazi’s actions would be known.
1.5 Hitler’s Racial Policies For Hitler, the “Jewish problem” was one of race, not
strictly religion. To this day, there are no known Nazi
documents that explicitly state that Jewish people were a
problem because of their religious beliefs. The problem, in the
Nazi’s view, was with people who were inferior to what Hitler
deemed the “master race.” Hitler believed that inferior people,
14
Edward R. Murrow, Buchenwald report, April, 1945.
26 such as the Jewish people, Gypsies, and those with disabilities
were impeding the “master race” from ruling the rest of the
world.
Hitler believed that, more than other countries, German
was encumbered by the deleterious influences of the “inferior”
peoples.
It was his role, he believed, to defend the German
people from corrupting influences.
“Hence today I believe that I am acting in accordance with
the will of the Almighty Creator: by defending myself against
the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord” 15 Hitler
believed that by exiling the Jewish people he was saving the
world, and he believed that it was the Christian God’s view.
Anti-Semitism was not uncommon at that time in Europe,
though rarely to the intensity Hitler displayed.
There is no
clear evidence where or why Hitler acquired his vehement antiSemitic views.
There is some evidence that Hitler’s initial
hatred of Jewish people festered after being rejected from the
Viennese School of Art and then contracting syphilis from a
Jewish prostitute.
There is no doubt, however, that to the Nazis and Hitler,
survival of the “master race” depended on a solution to the
“Jewish problem.” “’The Jewish problem’ was of cosmic
15
Hitler, A. Mein Kampf. (Houghton Mifflin, New York: Hutchinson Publ.
Ltd., 1969) 60.
27 importance. Human survival itself depended on the fate of the 17
million Jews inhabiting the globe.” 16 Jews were a common enemy
that could be seen.
Germans could point to them.
responsible for the ills that afflicted Germany.
They were
Jews, by their
very existence, were subverting the “master race.”
In essence, Hitler cast the blame on to others for the post
World-War I suffering of Germany.
The German people, the
“master race,” could not be held responsible, for the aftermath
of World War I.
Others were to blame.
Rid the nation of the
inferior people, and the nation would be restored to its
predestined place.
This idea of blaming others was avidly
received by the Germans.
This idea of blaming others spread
within the Nazi party and greatly contributed to the party’s
future actions.
In its formative years, the Nazi party did not fully
express its views on Jewish people.
It was deemed too extreme,
and it might alarm voters. Gradually, the party did more
directly blame many of the problems of Germany on the Jewish
people, and in an environment of anti-Semitism the views of the
Nazi party began to gain ground. Once the party gained control,
laws against those people deemed inferior, specifically the
16
Chalk, Frank, and Kurt Jonassohn. The History and Sociology of
Genocide. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. 339.
28 Jewish people increased, ending with the transporting of those
people off to concentration camps.
1.6 Stories of Rescue The Holocaust was horrific. Nonetheless there are countless
examples of inspiring rescues of people being persecuted by the
Nazis. The lessons of these rescues and rescue operations are
instructive. Rescues describe those instances in which a person
or group, with the aid of others, evaded capture or death by the
Germans. This term applies even if the person or group later was
captured or killed. Rescue operations denote that a plan or
spontaneous means were employed to affect a rescue. Rescue
operations varied from small and impromptu to larger and more
deliberate.
Literally thousands of people were helped by others who
believed it was the right thing to do. Sometimes, the device was
to escape to another, friendly country.
was concealment.
Other times, the device
Some Jews were able to survive the entire
experience in hiding; others were caught while in hiding. But
even delaying capture could be an advantage. Those who were
caught and sent to concentration camps later in the war had a
significantly better chance of survival than those who were
29 caught in the beginning. The rate of death in concentration
camps dropped significantly due to fewer diseases that a person
had to contest with.
One of the best known families that sought refuge are the
Franks, Anne Frank in particular.
Anne Frank, only thirteen
when she started her diaries, produced one of the most famous
pieces of literature from WWII. Ann and her family of eight
survived two years in a “secret annex” before being discovered
and then shipped to a concentration camp where she later died. 17
Anne Frank’s accounts have been read by millions of children
around the world.
Her rescue, even though she did not survive
the War, shows how ordinary people helped those that they found
to be in need.
Even though Ann Frank may be the most famous of those who
were rescued during the Holocaust, thousands more received the
same consideration, sometimes from perfect strangers, who
themselves risked great personal harm and the possibility of
death if captured with those that the Nazi’s wished to
persecute.
Le Chambon-sur-Ligon a town on the French-Spanish border
was able to save 3,000-5,000 Jewish people. Johanna Hirsch was
17
Frank, Anne. Diary of a Young Girl. West Hatfield, MA: Pennyroyal
Press with Jewish Heritage Publishing, 1985
30 one of the children saved by the Children’s Aid Society in Le
Chambon-sur-Ligon. Hirsch remembers
In 1940 we were deported to Gurs, a Vichy
detention camp on the French-Spanish border. I
learned from a social worker there that a pastor
in Le Chambon village wanted to bring children
out of the camp. This social worker, from the
Children's Aid Society, got me out. Being free
was heavenly. 18
Many in Le Chambon could sympathize with the Jewish people.
Most in Le Chambon were Calvinist in a primarily Catholic
country.
Their ancestors had been the subject of religious
persecution for several centuries. They had been provided
shelter and refuge by others. Their geographic location
provided a route to help and many in Le Chambon now felt
that they were able to return the gifts that had earlier
been bestowed upon them. 19
The stories of Anne Frank and Le Chambon are perhaps
some of the best known stories of rescue during the
Holocaust, but every story of rescue has a great
significance. These stories show the ability of people to
care for others. They give hope for future genocide
18
United States Holocaust Museums. “Personal Stories.”
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/idcard.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10006582
19
Rittner, Carol. Sondra Myers ed.
York University Press, 1986), 99.
The Courage to Care. (New York: New
31 prevention. By examining the various factors that
contributed to successful rescues and rescue operations
during the Holocaust, we may learn lessons or clues to
prevent genocides in the future.
32 Chapter Two: Historiography on Denmark Denmark‘s role in the resistance movements of World War II
often remains overlooked. Yet, Field-Marshall Montgomery praised
the Danish resistance as “second to none.” The Danish resistance
movement started small, with only a few people; but the movement
grew.
Eventually, almost the entire population participated in
one way or another. Once the resistance began, the Danish
engaged in it with enthusiasm. The unity of the Danes was one of
the defining characteristics of the Danish resistance. 20
One mark of their distinction was the zest which they
employed under German occupation; one of the most vivid stories
of the Danish resistance includes posting signs, in Danish, on a
Nazi road post that stated, “This Nazi is not wearing any
trousers.” The Germans who understood did not find this amusing.
The Danish resistance also established extensive rescue
operations.
Those rescue operations will be discussed in
greater detail in a section later in this paper. The unity they
enjoyed allowed the Danes to rescue over ninety-eight percent of
their Jewish population, an accomplishment that no other country
20
Goldberger, Leo. The Rescue of the Danish Jews. (New York: New York
University Press, 1987), xiii.
33 in Europe can claim or approach. The Danish example is the
quintessential lesson in the importance of unity.
Because of
their constant resistance, sometimes passive and sometimes
active, the Danish were able to keep their country free from
major German interference.
Many of the stories of the Danish resistance are retold in
The Savage Canary: the Story of Resistance in Denmark by David
Lampe. 21 This book remains one of the most extensive works on the
underground movement in Denmark.
His tome recounts many tales of the resistance.
Just one
such tale is that of Niels Bohr, the famous Danish Jewish
physicist who would eventually work on the Manhattan project in
the United States. And there is the commendable King Christian X
who responded to his birthday telegraph from Hitler, with a
simple, “thanks.” Hitler was furious for the lack of an
effulgent response from King Christian.
These are two notable
figures of the resistance, but their stories are only two of
many.
Individual Danes, individuals not so notable as Bohr or the
King, on their own initiative, would pour sugar in cement mixes
that the Germans used to construct their guns pads, which caused
21
Lampe, David. The Savage Canary: the Story of Resistance in Denmark .
(London: Cassell and Company Ltd, 1957).
34 them to shatter immediately after just one shot. To Lampe, these
small actions undertaken by many, many individuals who did not
seek or expect their names to be remembered, or even want their
names to be known, are the backbone of the Danish resistance.
Lampe’s thesis is that even the smallest and ill-equipped
countries can succeed against an enemy, as long as people come
together with the common cause of overthrowing the enemy. He
writes his book to encourage other small countries to gain the
courage they might need to defeat occupiers. While he writes
with an agenda in mind, he does tell the story of how one
country did achieve success.
Lampe furthers his thesis with
stories retold by those who were personally involved in the
resistance movement. While the stories are anecdotal, they are
typical of many other accounts.
His examples illustrate that the Danes carried themselves
in much the same manner as their King Christian, who actively
defied Hitler more times than fate should have allowed, stating
at the time of the initial occupation “Really, I’m much too old
to take on the added responsibility of ruling Germany, too.” 22 He
made this statement in 1940. It was widely understood to mean
that Denmark would survive the rule of Hitler, but the Nazis
22
Lampe, David. The Savage Canary: the Story of Resistance in Denmark.
(London: Cassell and Company Ltd, 1957.) xiii.
35 would not. It was a direct flaunt to the Nazis’ vision that the
German Reich would survive all challenges.
While King Christian was an active role model for his
people, he by no means was a great instigator of actions. While
many stories of the King are popular in Denmark, Lampe argues
there is little credibility to some of these tales, such as King
Christian wearing the Yellow Star of David, when the Germans
made his Jewish citizens do the same.
Such examples illustrate the unity among the Danish people,
and that unity remains one of the central themes throughout
Lampe’s book.
It was this unity, he argues, that empowered the
Danes to defy the Germans. One example of this unity is the
strike that took place during the summer of 1944, the
Folkestrejken. The strike was in response to the capture and
transportation of the Danish Jews and to restrictions placed on
Copenhagen, especially a curfew.
Lampe writes that the Danes went on strike in reaction to
these attempts to assert dominion over the population. The
strike started out with just one factory but soon grew to
involve the entire island of Sealand. People went without food,
electricity, and transportation.
They set off fireworks even
though the Germans had strictly forbidden them; the Germans were
even going as far as sending out death squads to kill those who
36 were disobeying their rules.
And, they did kill many Danes.
In
spite of the mass killing, the Danes continued to band together.
They would not buckle.
They held bonfires with flames reaching
up hundreds of feet, defying the blackout conditions that were
supposed to be strictly enforced. In this manner, Lampe equates
the strike with resistance to the German occupation.
Lampe emphatically argues that more than simple
nationalistic pride united the Danes. Unity was cultivated by
the hundreds of underground newspapers that were being
published. While many of these had a small readership, a few had
thousands of ardent readers.
Many of these publications were
read openly in front of the Germans.
Even some of the Germans
read them. Lampe recounts twenty-two stories of this type of
occurrence. By these stories, Lampe endeavors to illustrate the
importance of unity as the defining characteristic of Danish
resistance.
Lampe, a British author, notably omits citations. Many of
his histories are retold stories of people he personally
interviewed. No doubt, Lampe’s who views might color his telling
of some stories; however, the general messages of the stories
still ring true. Lampe himself acknowledges that this book is
far from a scholarly work.
Even so, it has significant value
because it retells memories that, otherwise, soon would be
37 forgotten. In this, Lampe has achieved an important
accomplishment.
A different view of the Danish resistance movement is
presented by Robin Reilly. He expounds on one specific event in
the Danish resistance movement, one of the more violent and
significant actions. Reilly, a former military person and a
current military historian, has written several books.
In his
book The Sixth Floor: the Danish Resistance Movement and the RAF
Raid on the Gestapo Headquarters, March 1945, 23
Reilly argues
that the RAF raid on the Gestapo headquarters in Copenhagen was
significant even though it was a small raid and played no
significance role in the Allies' strategy. Even though it lacked
great strategic significance it was one of the most successful
low-level daylight attacks directed and conducted by the RAF. 24
And, it highlights the effectiveness of the Danish resistance.
In the course of describing preparations for the raid,
Reilly does analyze many of the actions undertaken by the
resistance movement. His thesis is that the actions leading up
to the attack on the headquarters are just as important as the
attack itself. The Danish resistance, as well as the RAF, risked
23
Reilly, Robin. The Sixth Floor: the Danish Resistance Movement and the
RAF Raid on the Gestapo Headquarters, March 1945 (London: Cassell and
Company, 2004).
24
Reilly, Robin. The Sixth Floor: the Danish Resistance Movement and the
RAF Raid on the Gestapo Headquarters, March 1945 (London: Cassell and
Company, 2004), 7.
38 so much for this objective, and it is a singular illustration of
the dedication and the cunning of the resistance.
Reilly devotes much of his book to airpower and
communications. The RAF needed Danes to assist with planning the
raid, but Danes could not openly travel to England. To assist
those in England with attack strategies, Danes had to slip
secretly through a German blockade.
One way was by air.
Reilly
recounts that the resistance was so well organized that it
managed, undetected, to construct several serviceable airplanes
from old plane shells that had not been confiscated because the
Germans believed they were either in too poor a condition to be
usable or they were antiques in a museum. Then, with airplanes
at hand, the Danes needed inventive ways of fueling their
resurrected aircraft because only the Germans were allowed
access to petroleum.
Reilly describes how insightful and
cunning the Danes were in supplying the needed fuel.
They did
secure fuel, again, undetected. 25
Communication was another essential element that allowed
the attacks to take place. Resourcefulness, again, was a key.
A
Danish BBC broadcast was used to convey messages from England to
25
Reilly, Robin. The Sixth Floor: the Danish Resistance Movement and the
RAF Raid on the Gestapo Headquarters, March 1945 (London: Cassell and
Company, 2004).
39 Denmark, through codes embedded in the broadcast text. In
addition, messages were sent through Sweden to England.
This book, while lacking citations, does have a good
bibliography. As with the other book, however, much of the
history seems to be colored by the author's rendering.
As the
author himself states, these are his interpretations of the
events.
Both of the aforementioned books focus on the resistance of
the Danes during the German occupation. Both of them show the
link between the Danish resistance and the rescue operations.
While both are poorly cited, they do give a fairly accurate and
rounded description of the resistance. They illustrate that
sometimes resistance was passive and sometimes it was aggressive
depending on the purpose or motivation for the actions being
taken.
These books describe German reactions to the Danish
resistance, both active and passive, as being subdued, tolerant,
and restrained.
The authors do not address the question of why
the Germans did not react more harshly to Danish resistance, as
they did in some other occupied countries.
Why did the Germans
let the Danes retain so much autonomy and initiative? No other
occupied country was allowed to keep its government, police and
laws. The Germans were very lenient.
They allowed the Jews to
40 escape, and they allowed strikes to take place.
Overall, they
countenanced a general ruckus.
One answer is found in Philip Giltner’s book In the
Friendliest Manner: German-Danish Economic Cooperation during
the Nazi Occupation of 1940-1945. 26 Giltner received his PhD in
History from the University of Toronto.
As the title of the
book suggests, Giltner argues that economics were the main
reason that the Germany’s occupation of Denmark appears
comparatively benign.
The Germans depended on the resources,
primarily the agricultural and manufacturing resources that
Denmark had. Hitler, therefore, ordered the Germans to behave
“in the friendliest manner” with the Danish.
Denmark is not mineral rich, and Giltner argues, that
Denmark’s agriculture was of great importance because Germany
was in desperate need of food.
It takes time, care and manpower
to produce corps. The Germans needed the Danes to willingly
produce large crops, and do so without enormous investments of
German power to oversee the efforts. In addition, many of the
Danish factories could easily be converted, without much extra
capital being expended, from their original purposes to
26
Giltners, Philip. In the Friendliest Manner: German-Danish Economic
Cooperation during the Nazi Occupation of 1940-1945 (New York: Peter
Lang Publishing, 1988).
41 manufacture some of the war materials that the Germans
desperately needed.
Also, Giltner argues, Denmark also fit the “racial
Aryan” profile that Hitler found so appealing.
His argument is
that several other occupied countries also fit the
characteristics of Denmark. Many other countries were as “Aryan”
as Denmark. Many were larger and could provide more resources
than Denmark. Why, then, did Denmark experience such an easy
occupation?
Giltner’s thesis is that Denmark was primarily a military
and resource area, but he adds it was also important because of
geography.
He viewed Denmark’s location as the “gatekeeper of
the Baltic.”
In addition Giltner states that the Germans were
not concerned about Denmark’s military prowess.
a military threat to Germany.
Denmark was not
Rather, the Germans believed
that, while the Danes could be willful and unruly at times, like
temperamental children, they did not, and could not, threaten
Germany’s military objectives.
Therefore, a more lenient
occupation was warranted.
Giltner says another cause of the leniency was the absence
of a German plan to fundamentally alter the Danish economy.
While the Germans did change some of the products that factories
manufactured, factories were still producing, and crops were
42 still being grown. Wehrwirtschaftsstab Dänemark, the German
plenipotentiary in Denmark, provided Danish factories with a
continual stream of orders to keep workers employed and plants
operating. In fact, Denmark experienced some economic growth
during the German occupation because of the increased value of
its products, and this allowed some sectors of the Danish
economy to grow in because of the greater production outputs
within certain factories and industries. 27
Also, the Germans
never attempted to fully control the Danish economy, allowing
each segment of the economy to maintain a significant amount of
autonomy.
This allowed each segment to establish its own market
equilibrium.
One interesting fact that Giltner points out is that the
Germans did not fully exploit the Danish economy.
The Germans
could have pushed more from the Danish economy to aid the German
war effort, but they did not push.
According to Glitner the
Germans did not demand more of the Danish because the Germans
were cautious not to over-extend the Danish economy.
They did
not understand how robust it already was. The Germans thought
that cooperation was the only glue holding the Danish economy
intact. Cooperation with the Danes, therefore, remained a
priority of the Germans.
27
Giltners, Philip. In the Friendliest Manner: German-Danish Economic
Cooperation during the Nazi Occupation of 1940-1945 (New York: Peter
Lang Publishing, 1988).
43 Even so Giltner concludes, there was no single reason for
the lenient occupation of Denmark. The Aryan features of the
Danish population may have played a role, but it can be argued
that Norway is just as much part of the “master race” as Denmark
was.
Therefore, part of the explanation why Denmark received
lenient treatment, at least until more evidence comes about,
remains unidentified.
Giltner lists a fifteen page bibliography.
He uses both
German and Danish archives and economic data from the period of
the occupation. The breadth and depth of his sources lend to the
credibility of his thesis.
The Danish resistance was an important element in the
overall resistance to German forces during World War II. But
despite their contributions, the actions of the Danish
resistance are not well known -- something that the above
mentioned authors have tried to correct. While the first two do
so by telling a good story, they are limited in scope. The
third, while more thorough and academic, lacks the narrative
quality of the first two. All contribute to an understanding of
the Danish resistance in World War II. All three authors, no
matter their stance on the most important reason behind
Denmark’s successes during World War II, would agree that
Denmark should be proud of its role in World War II.
However,
44 not everyone views the Danish resistance as a proud
accomplishment.
Some believe that, while there was a Danish resistance, its
significance has become exaggerated with the aid of historical
myth. Niels Aage Skov articulates this in his article "The Use
of Historical Myth." 28 Skov contends that, while many of the
celebrated events of the Danish resistance did take place, their
significance has been embellished.
Historical myth, he argues,
is the method people use to adorn the truth, to tell the story
of what happened in a favorable light; and by doing this, they
have made the events seem more heroic than they actually were.
Skov uses several examples of historical embellishment to
suggest that Demark was trying to soothe its wounds after being
occupied by Germany for the second time in less than a century.
Skov cites the fact that many people did not even know about the
resistance movement until the general strike in 1944. In fact,
and in contrast to the ideal of a national resistance, many
Danes joined Frikorps Danmark, a Danish regiment that served
with the Germans on the Eastern front. Skov argues that because
so many people joined this voluntarily, not everyone could have
thought of the Germans as evil occupiers. Collaboration was more
extensive than the resistance stories of Giltner, Lampe and
28
Skov, Niels Aage, “The Use of Historical Myth,” Scandinavian Studies
72 (2000).
45 Rieley might suggest. In addition, Skov notes, it was difficult,
even in Denmark, to form a resistance group.
population had the fortitude.
Not all the
Many people joined the strike
only because it contributed to their personal contentment.
It
allowed them to enjoy more of the summertime daylight, which the
Danes particularly enjoyed due to their short days in the
winter.
Skov also argues that the Danish resistance movement was
able to gain ground only with the help of the British, who in
1943 started dropping supplies that were essential to the
resistance movement. 29
While Skov does not argue that the Danish resistance was
entirely myth, he simply does not agree that the resistance was
as forceful and consequential as some authors portray.
He
believes that the resistance has been glorified. He says that
individual stories of the resistance and rescues, have been
inflated to represent all Danes and to make the Danes look
better than they actually were. Myth also helped them to come to
terms with the war in general and in particular with many of
their friends and family being sent to concentration camps or
killed by the Germans.
29
Skov, Niels Aage, “The Use of Historical Myth,” Scandinavian Studies
72 (2000).
46 Perhaps today we cannot know the absolute facts about the
Danish Resistance.
Still, there is no doubt that a significant
Danish resistance existed and that, even if it were weak in
other respects, it accomplished the most successful rescues in
all of Europe.
There is no doubt that the Danish Resistance
movement remains a matter of pride for the Danish, even if some
historians do accept the heroic depiction and significance
claimed for its actions. Also, there is no doubt that the
resistance movement still remains an often overlooked piece of
history. So, despite the arguments that Skov makes about the use
of historical myth, the successes of the resistance are
documented, and those successes still retain their imprint on
the history of World War II.
47 Chapter Three: Historiography on Norway There are many similarities between Denmark and Norway.
They have a similar history, language group, mores and
ancestors.
And like Denmark, the history of the resistance in
Norway is not widely known. Yet, while Norway was similar to
Denmark in many respects, the rescue operations and resistance
movements in Norway were profoundly different from those in
Denmark.
Numerous reasons for this fact have been identified by
the authors who write on the subject.
Douglas C. Dildy in his book Denmark and Norway 1940:
Hitler’s Boldest Operation lays out numerous differences between
the events in Denmark and the events in Norway, the reasons for
those differences, and the consequences of the differences,
particularly with regard to the resistance movement and rescue
operations. Dildy provides a comprehensive tome, complete with
maps and pictures to help highlight his thesis that the
quintessential differences between Denmark and Norway resulted
not so much from differing treatment by the Germans but rather
more from the reaction of each to the German forces.
Dildy focuses most of his attention on the battle to
conquer Norway.
As he points out, the battle to conquer Denmark
was over within a few hours of its starting. Norway, Dildy
48 points out, is the only Scandinavian country that mounted
serious military resistance against the German forces and that
at the time it was the only land-air-sea campaign and the only
campaign coordinated and launched by three branches of the
Wehrmacht. 30
Dildy focuses on five main themes within his book: the
military plans of the Germans and of the Norwegians, the orders
of battle of both, and the campaign in itself. Dildy begins by
stating two reasons Hitler so determinedly sought Denmark and
Norway. One reason was minerals and other natural resources,
such as iron ore, that was necessary for machinery that Germany
desperately needed. They were available in Denmark and Norway.
The ports and airfields located in both countries was the second
reason Hitler and the German forces wanted the Nordic lands. The
German military strategy was based on the premise that the
German military must control the sea and air over and around the
northern countries. In the view of German strategists, if
Germany were to have any hope of winning the war, control of the
north would keep Russia weak, interrupt the flow of war
materials, and would prevent Allied action in German occupied
Europe. Without these two countries, Hitler believed, the German
army faced a real threat of Allied action from the west.
30
Dildy, Douglas. Denmark and Norway 1940: Hitler’s Boldest Operation.
(Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2007). 9.
49 To give context to the occupation of Norway, Dildy goes
into great detail about the military of Norway. As Norway was a
new country, less than forty years old at this time, it had no
blue-water navy and had only six army divisions.
These
divisions were formed by an intermittent and sporadic draft
throughout the six military districts in Norway. For these
reasons, the author argues, Norway’s military was weak and
immature. Norway, as a new country, simply did not have the
equipment or the manpower necessary to defeat the Germans even
with what help the Allies gave.
Interestingly, and in parallel, Norway’s resistance to
Germany’s occupation was comparatively weak and ineffective.
Dildy gives that context to the resistance in Norway, but he
does not discuss the resistance efforts in any detail. Dildy’s
book remains important to the overall literature of the
Norwegian Holocaust because it shows how Norway came to be
occupied despite its own military and Allied support.
Dildy does an excellent job of explaining how Norway was
invaded and why the German military was so harsh in controlling
Norway. Yet, he does not address the question that arises from
his narrative: what happened in Norway after it was invaded?
Answers to that question come in Samuel Abrahamsen’s Norway’s
Response to the Holocaust a Historical Perspective.
50 Abrahamsen’s book was the undertaking of “Thanks to
Scandinavia” an organization whose purpose is to publicize the
acts of humanity and bravery that occurred in Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden during World War Two. This tome focuses in
particular on the Norwegian’s ability to rescue only 50% of
their fellow Jewish citizens. The author focuses on the German
effort to produce a Jew-free country in Norway. He posits that
the Germans succeeded in eliminating around 50% of the Jews in
Norway is due to several factors: the history of Jews in Norway,
including pre-war policies; the overall anti-Semitism in Norway;
the Vidkun Quisling’s National Union Party and its racist
ideology, which led to the Norwegian Jews’ removal from Norway;
and the fact that some Norwegians were moved to help to rescue
Norwegian Jews once information about the Holocaust became known
in Norway
One of the author’s most interesting juxtapositions to
Denmark is that Norway, on the whole, was very anti-Semitic
prior to and in the early part of the German occupation.
He
cites numerous instances in which Norwegians tried to persecute
and remove their Jewish citizens. Quisling’s party and the
national police went to great lengths to remove Norwegian Jews
from their country, and with the deportation of over 750 Jews
during one raid, they greatly succeeded at this. However, when
51 knowledge of the Holocaust spread, some Norwegians tried to stop
the violence against Jews. By 1943, the attitudes of at least
some Norwegians had changed. 31
The author argues that this shift in attitudes of many
Norwegians demonstrates how sympathy for other human beings can
sometimes override xenophobic attitudes. By arguing that, while
Norway was anti-Semitic and had generally been trying to get rid
of its Jewish population for as long as Norway has been a
country, some Norwegians were willing to risk their own lives to
help Norwegian Jews.
This is one example of how the Norwegians’ attitudes toward
Jews were conflicted in the latter part of World War II.
Early
in its history, Norway itself persecuted Jews, but after 1943
many helped rescue Norwegian Jews from Nazi persecution.
From
1943 to the end of the war the government-in-exile, residing in
London, attempted on several occasions to arrange trades of
German prisoners of war held by their allies for their own
Jewish citizens. The attempt was totally unsuccessful because
the Nazis would not release transported Jews.
Even so, the
author cites this action as an attempt, on some level, to atone
for the wrongs Norway itself committed against the Jews.
Abrahamsen says it also illustrates the confusion in the
31
Abrahamsen, Samuel. Norway’s Response to the Holocaust a Historical
Perspective. (New York, Holocaust Library1991).
52 attitudes and actions toward Jews of the Norwegian people and
its official laws.
The author’s extensive use of Norwegian and German records
provides this book with a historical provenance that is
unrivaled in regards to historical works on Norway and the
Holocaust. Research in Great Britain, the United States, Israel,
Germany, and Norway produced a book that is a comprehensive,
clear, and historically accurate piece. 32
While Abrahamsen discusses at length the rescue actions of
both the government and the general population of Norway, some
authors put less emphasis on the actions of the government. Two
such authors are Olav Riste and Berit Nokleby. These writers
believe that the people of Norway, not the government, deserve
all the credit for efforts and actions to resist the Nazis and
the German occupation. Their book, Norway 1940-45 the Resistance
Movement, argues this thesis. 33
By focusing more on the resistance movement, this short
book shows how the people of occupied Norway worked
independently of any government, after being defeated by the
Nazis in 1940, to build a large resistance network that enabled
32
33
Abrahamsen, Samuel. Norway’s Response to the Holocaust a Historical
Perspective. (New York, Holocaust Library1991).
Riste, Olav, and Berit Nokleby. Norway 1940-45 The Resistance
Movement. 3rd ed. 2nd, (Oslo: Nor-Media A/S, 1970.)
53 them to strike back at their occupiers. This book focuses on the
common citizens. The thesis is that these common Norwegian
people, without aid or direction from an organized government,
on their own did much that was monumental. The resistance
movement managed to gather arms, train a shadow army, and
counter the propaganda disseminated by the Nazi-occupied
Norwegian government. The Norwegian resistance scored several
military successes, but it also was instrumental in rescue
operations. 34
The previously mentioned authors accept the idea that the
government of Norway, until about 1943, sanctioned the
persecution of the Jews. A different view is presented by
Wolfgang Seibel in “The Strength of Perpetrators-The Holocaust
in Western Europe, 1940-1944.” Seibel asks the question: did
different governments as in the case of Norway and Denmark lead
to the different results in rescues and general persecution. 35
He argues that there is no research that links the success of
rescue operations to different governments’ policies and
attitudes during the German occupation. This author argues that,
in the instances of Norway and Denmark in WWII, formal
government policies did not have any affect on the fate of the
34
35
Riste, Olav, and Berit Nokleby. Norway 1940-45 The Resistance
Movement. 3rd ed. 2nd, (Oslo: Nor-Media A/S, 1970.)
Seibel, Wolfgang. “The Strength of Perpetrators-The Holocaust in
Western Europe, 1940-1944” Governance: An International Journal of
Policy, Administration and Institutions. 15.
54 Jews in that country during the war. He argues that the
attitudes and actions of the common citizens had more effect on
the outcome than did the formal policies of the governments.
Seibel admits that since research projects that compare
different occupied countries are fairly rare, it is difficult to
reach any definite conclusions. In addition, the Germans did not
administer occupied countries uniformly.
This makes any
comparisons unreliable.
Seibel states three types of administrations were present
in occupied territories. The first were annexed areas. These
were occupied territories into which the Reich military
administration was extended. The second category were
territories with German civilian administrations.
These
included Denmark and Norway. The last was German military
administration. This was the equivalent of martial law under the
German army.
Seibel argues that interference from Hitler or conflict
within the SS could not account for the different outcomes in
various countries. He posits that the common people will act the
same, regardless of the social structures imposed by a
government. It is important to remember, he says, that people
murder, not governmental polices, not policies, not structures.
So, even though the structure might encourage persecution of the
55 Jews, it could not force the people of a country to murder or
turn in Jews. 36
Seibel’s argument in this article runs counter to the
authors’ theses previously mentioned. The previous authors imply
that Norway’s government, both pre-war and during the
occupation, inhibited rescue operations ― that government policy
constrained the citizens’ humanitarian instincts to rescues
those in peril. Seibel rejects that as an excuse. Seibel argues
that people act and react on innate human values that are not
altered as easily or as frequently as government manifestos are
changed.
A common theme of much of the Norwegian literature is that
the German administration imposed by the Nazi occupation
influenced the behavior of the Norwegian people. In contrast,
Seibel argues that the primary reason behind the Norwegians’
actions was their own human feelings of resentment towards the
occupation and of compassion to Jewish people in general. This
argument makes sense. The Norwegians who chose to help the Jews
of Norway did so because they felt that was the ethical thing to
do.
36
Seibel, Wolfgang. “The Strength of Perpetrators-The Holocaust in
Western Europe, 1940-1944” Governance: An International Journal of
Policy, Administration and Institutions. 15.
56 Part Two Denmark and Norway 57 Chapter Four: In Denmark it Could Not Happen 4.1 Introduction When thinking of Denmark, many might believe that Legos
have been the country’s greatest achievement. Denmark, however,
should be acclaimed for saving over ninety-eight percent of its
Jewish citizens from extermination during the Holocaust in
Europe. No other country achieved a similar record of rescues.
This chapter will discuss how and why the rescue of Danish Jews
was so successful.
In broad terms, the Danes were so successful because they
had both the motivation and the means to carry out the extensive
rescue operations.
Several different factors contributed to the
Danes’ accomplishment in saving so many of their fellow
countrymen: the overall Danish resistance to the Germans;
Sweden’s open-door policy in regards to accepting Danish Jews;
geography, the country’s geographic proximity to Sweden; and
German dependence on Danish goods. None of these factors is
independent of the others.
While those factors were important and significant in the
rescue of the Danish Jews, probably the most crucial factor is
58 that the Danish Jews had been assimilated into the Danish
culture.
Assimilation provided the motivation for the extensive
rescue operations.
4.2 Assimilation: A Short History of Jews in Denmark Jews first arrived in Denmark in the seventeenth century,
allowing a prolonged time to assimilate into Danish culture
before World War II. 37 When the Jews first came, the Danes were
interested only in the wealth and international connections the
Jews possessed; 38 but their acceptance and assimilation into the
Danish community grew relatively quickly.
At the end of the 17th century the right of two
such Ashkenazi 39 to settle in Copenhagen was
officially recognized. They were the goldsmith
Israel David and his partner, Meir Goldschmidt
(also known as Stadthagen), who came from
Hamburg,
Germany.
They
were
even
granted
40
permission to hold prayer in their homes.
37
38
Leni Yahil, The Rescue of the Danish Jewry, (Philadelphia: Jewish
Society of America, 1969), 3.
Ibid.
39
Ashkenazi refers to Jews of European origin rather then Mediterranean
or “Oriental” Jews. Oriental in this context is an antiquated term. The
modern term would be Middle-Eastern or Asian Jews.
40
Leni Yahil, The Rescue of the Danish Jewry,(Philadelphia: Jewish
Society of America, 1969)4.
59 Permission to hold private prayer in their homes was
significant.
It demonstrates a trait that was instrumental in
the future acceptance of Jews into the Danish community. It
illustrates an early acceptance by the Danes of Judaism on the
whole. The Danish acceptance of the Jewish religion carried over
to a general acceptance of the Jews into Danish society as
well. 41
The long history between the Danes and their Jewish
citizens is the single most important reason behind the success
of the Danish rescue operations. “The larger society regarded
them as ‘Danes like any other Danes,’ not as members of some
stigmatized out-group.” 42 The Danes did not consider Danish Jews
part of the “problem” that Hitler wanted to exterminate. For the
Danes, killing a Danish Jew was as offensive as killing any
other Dane.
During World War II, over ninety-eight percent of
the Danish Jews reached safety in Sweden.
Long acquaintances
and assimilation were the keys that motivated the Danish rescue
operations.
The Danish Jews, over time, had become integrated into
Danish society.
Among European countries, such acceptance was,
41
Leni Yahil, The Rescue of the Danish Jewry, (Philadelphia: Jewish
Society of America, 1969) 12-13.
42
Andrew Buckser, “Rescue and Cultural Context During the Holocaust:
Grundtvigian Nationalism and the Rescue of the Danish Jews,” Shofar 19,
no. 2 (2001), 6.
60 of course, not the norm. Denmark was an exception, and several
circumstances combined to encourage that acceptance.
Danes have always been recognized as a tolerant, accepting
people, a characteristic which became especially evident in
post-World War II legal actions.
Denmark was among the first
countries in the world to allow same-sex marriages, legalize
pornography, and legalize some “recreational” drugs. While these
events happened after the end of World War II, they demonstrate
the accepting nature of Danish culture, a characteristic that
was extant well before World War II. These national
characteristics contributed to the acceptance of their Jewish
citizens.
Jews have been in Denmark since the 1600s, and
they had enjoyed full civil rights since 1814. As
a result, it is argued, they identified strongly
with the larger Danish culture. They spoke
Danish, they dressed like other Danes, and they
participated actively in the social and cultural
life of the nation. 43
Well before World War II, Danish Jews had fully assimilated into
Danish life. They were Jewish but thought of themselves as
43
Andrew Buckser, “Rescue and Cultural Context During the Holocaust:
Grundtvigian Nationalism and the Rescue of the Danish Jews,” Shofar 19,
no. 2 (2001), 5.
61 Danes. 44 They had thought of themselves as such for several
hundred years by the time of the occupation of Denmark by the
Germans. They had no reason to fear being characterized as an
affliction on the Danish culture.
When an identifiable foreign group immigrates, integration
into the society of the new country, or lack of integration, can
be influenced by a variety of factors.
In the case of Denmark,
integration of the Jews was facilitated by two circumstances.
The assimilation of the Jews into the Danish nation was the
product, first of time.
A long history, over four-hundred years worth, led to
nearly universal acceptance of the Jews into Danish culture.
That long history created a deep connection between Danish Jews
and indigenous Danes. Assimilation allowed Danish Jews to see
themselves as Danes and the Danes to view the Jews as their
equals. The Danes also saw the Danish Jews as nothing more than
Danes who happened to believe differently than they did. Because
of this assimilation, most Danish people did not believe that
Hitler’s ideas about the extermination of inferior races
pertained to the Jewish citizens of Denmark. That belief, in
turn, inspired the rescue to take place.
44
Andrew Buckser, “Group Identities and the Construction of the 1943
Rescue of the Danish Jews,” Ethnology 37, no. 3 (1998), 215.
62 The second factor that aided assimilation of the Jews into
the Danish nation was Grundtvigian nationalism, which helped to
unite the country in the previous century. This political
philosophy has been a large part of Danish political and social
thought since its inception.
It was an important force because
it furthered the assimilation between the Danes and the Danish
Jews, and that was an important factor in the Danish rescue of
the Jews.
Assimilation of the Jews in Denmark, and in general
the tolerance of Danish society, was encouraged and strengthened
by Grundtvigian nationalism.
Grundtvig was a Dane who helped to unify the Danes after a
war with Germany in the mid 1860s. During that war, Denmark lost
some of its territories to German forces. Grundtvig helped to
restore national pride, purpose, and unity in the aftermath. He
became a leader in Danish society, his view permeated through
Danish culture, politics, and religion.
His cultural-religious opinions excluded any
notion of racism or anti-Semitism. …Grundtvig
was convinced that the Danish people were chosen
by God as a ‘divine experiment,’ and he spoke of
Denmark as ‘the Palestine of history.’ 45
45
Leni Yahil. “National Pride and Defeat: A Comparison of Danish and
German Nationalism.” Journal of Contemporary History 26, no. ¾ (1991),
462.
63 Grundtvig started a folk school in Denmark.
The school
welcomed all Danes to attend. At his school there were no
assignments, and people came to class whenever they wanted. This
school taught people to become rational thinkers. 46 He taught
openness towards different races and religions.
his teachings.
People loved
Grundtvig’s first school was replicated
throughout Denmark.
He preached his ideas at these schools.
Over the decades the ideas sunk in, particularly the ideas of
openness to others, and this helped the Danish Jews assimilate.
Grundtvig, who died in 1872, had great influence over
Danish culture. His ideas played a huge part in the Danish
resistance and assimilation process. “The Danes, on the other
hand — officialdom, society and individuals – acted from the
beginning as though by pre-established agreement, and when the
danger for Jews became acute, united with remarkable ease in a
national act of deliverance.” 47 In World War II, the Jews were
experiencing something that in the 1800s, the Danes had
experienced and fought against. Both experienced losing their
land, their culture, and in the more extreme instances, their
46
47
Leni Yahil. “National Pride and Defeat: A Comparison of Danish and
German Nationalism.” Journal of Contemporary History 26, no. ¾ (1991),
465.
Ibid. At 453.
64 lives. 48 The Danes were simply living up to what they had been
taught ― that the Danish Jews, while a different religion, were
in no way any more different from any other Dane.
Since the Danish Jews assimilated well into the culture,
the Danes saw them first as Danes, not as Jews. They “…therefore
regarded the Jews first of all as Danish citizens, equal in all
respects to Christians. To round them up was as great an outrage
as to round up any other Dane, and the popular reaction was
inevitable.” 49 The outrage was patent.
In part, the success of
the Danish rescue of Jews lay in the ability of Danish political
leaders to demonstrate that Danish Jews as fully equal Danish
citizens.
King Christian X, King of Denmark and Iceland (1912-1947)
was such a leader. He defied the Germans in ways calculated to
promote unity between the Danes and the Danish Jews. There is a
national myth in Denmark that when the Germans ordered the
Danish Jews to wear the Yellow Star of David, King Christian X
said that if any of his citizens had to wear the star he would
wear the star as well. In reality, Germany never forced the Star
48
Andrew Buckser, “Rescue and Cultural Context During the Holocaust:
Grundtvigian Nationalism and the Rescue of the Danish Jews,” Shofar 19,
no. 2 (2001), 9.
49
Andrew Buckser, “Group Identities and the Construction of the 1943
Rescue of the Danish Jews,” Ethnology 37, no. 3 (1998), 25.
65 of David requirement on the Danish Jews, 50 nor did King Christian
X ever wear a star.
Nevertheless, the myth illustrates national
unity. It helped to show the Danes that, with unity, they could
pull through anything. Due to such myths and other acts of
Danish leaders, solidarity with the Danish Jews, fellow Danish
citizens, remained strong, even when the Danes were aware of the
dangers that could potentially threaten their lives.
Not only did King Christian X help promote unity of the
Danish people, which was an essential part of the Danish rescue,
but also he helped to build a defiant attitude towards the
Germans. One method he used to accomplish this was angering the
Germans. As an example, when Hitler telegraphed King Christian
on his seventy-second birthday, 51 King Christian replied with
nothing more than a casual “my best thanks.” From that moment on
Hitler despised Denmark.
The attitude demonstrated by King
Christian X (1912-1947) gave the Danes a role model.
They saw
the King actively defying the Germans. They could do the same.
That attitude strengthened the resolution of the Danes to rescue
their fellow citizens.
50
51
Emmy E. Werner, A Conspiracy of Decency, (Boulder: Perseus Books
Group, 2002), 15.
Th. Thaulow. Denmark During the German Occupation. (Copenhagen: The
Scandinavian Publishing Company, 1946), 139.
66 4.3 Denmark in World War II Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany with the Nazi party.
As the Nazi Party’s power increased, Hitler began to articulate
his “solution” to the Jewish “problem.”
His goal was to create
a perfect race, 52 and the Jews were a major part of the “problem”
that impeded achievement of that goal.
It later would be his
idea to take over Europe and exterminate what he saw as a
“problem,” the Jewish people and other races categorized as
“inferior”. Danish Jews, even if they did see themselves as
thoroughly Danish, were included in what Hitler deemed the
“problem.”
This was one motivation for Germany’s occupation of
Denmark, but there other motives as well.
Germany regarded
Denmark as occupying a strategic position, and Germany needed
goods and supplies from Denmark.
For all of these reasons,
Germany invaded Denmark in April 1940.
The invasion itself was surprisingly complaisant, almost a
bureaucratic transaction.
“There he 53 learned that German troops
52
“For a racially pure people which is conscious of its blood can never
be enslaved by the Jew. In this world he will forever be master over
bastards and bastards alone.” Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. ___. For more
information of the Final Solution, refer to the mentioned text.
53
He here refers to a Danish General stationed at the Danish-German
border. This is where Germany first invaded Denmark due to the shared
border.
67 and planes had crossed the Danish frontier, that the German
Ambassador had handed a note to the Danish Foreign Minister to
the effect that German forces were taking over the protection of
Denmark…” 54
There was no military resistance, and Germany began
occupation of Denmark almost immediately.
In the occupation, Germany was comparatively tolerant
towards Denmark. “The moderate attitude of the Germans toward
the Danes is usually explained by the economic benefits that
could be reaped from Denmark – and only from a tranquil Denmark
whose internal affairs operated without disturbance.” 55 The Danes
had some weapon factories, but most importantly, Denmark had
farms. The food that Denmark provided became essential to
Germany at a time when many German farms were not optimally
productive (too many German males in military service rather
than working on farms), and Germany needed the extra food needed
for the war.
To preserve Danish productivity, the Germans allowed the
Danes, unlike other occupied countries in Europe, to retain
their current government, their police, and their other local
services vital to the running of the country.
Even so, most
54
Harold, Flender, Rescue in Denmark, (Washington D.C.: Holocaust
Library, 1963), 20.
55
Leni Yahil, The Rescue of the Danish Jewry, (Philadelphia: Jewish
Society of America, 1969), 117.
68 Danes ― who remembered a German occupation following the
forceful takeover of Danish lands during the Schleswig-Holstein 56
war (1864) in the previous century ― were furious at Germany. 57
Although there had been no military resistance to the invasion,
most Danes did not willingly accept the occupation.
4.4 Resistance Movement In hopes that the Germans would leave Denmark and stop
taking Danish supplies, the Danes did whatever they could to
frustrate the German military. Some acts were small jabs at the
Germans.
Another story that made the rounds described a
traffic post the Germans had set up at a main
intersection in the capital. Inside a waist-high
circle of sandbags stood a lone soldier,
directing traffic. One morning, as the streets
filled with people…traffic halted. …A black
uniformed officer got out of the car and tore
down a sign that someone had tacked to the
traffic post. It read (in Danish): ‘Attention!
This soldier is not wearing any trousers.’ 58
56
Leni Yahil. “National Pride and Defeat: A Comparison of Danish and
German Nationalism.” Journal of Contemporary History 26, no. ¾ (1991)
454
57
Ibid. At 458.
58
Emmy E. Werner, A Conspiracy of Decency, (Boulder: Perseus Books Group,
2002), 12-13.
69 But as the occupation wore on, the Danes employed more assertive
resistance tactics.
Many were intended to demoralize and
discourage the Germans. Danish resistance escalated as the
occupation continued and as subsequent raids on the Danish Jews
occurred. 59 The resistance and the tactics employed demonstrated
national unity against the German occupiers.
The tactics
solidified the will of the Danes at the beginning of the
occupation and later would prove essential in rescuing the
Danish Jews.
One such method was communication.
Early in the
occupation, the Danes developed methods of communication
developed to coordinate passive resistance.
These same methods
would later be important in the rescue operations.
Underground
newspapers were the most wide-spread and pervasive method of
communication.
Underground newspapers helped to coordinate passive
resistance and later violent resistance against the German
occupying forces in Denmark.
Underground newspapers helped to
coordinate both local and nation-wide events.
The newspapers
allowed the Danes to coordinate the details ― when, where, and
59
Emmy E. Werner, A Conspiracy of Decency, (Boulder: Perseus Books Group,
2002), 126.
70 how ― they would hold certain events. Alsang 60 is one example of
the influence of underground newspapers.
The paper Alsang,
early in the war, helped to coordinate the first rescue
operations. This means of communication not only helped to
sustain Danish resistance during the occupation but also
facilitated the rescue operations.
4.5 The Rescue of the Jews The cohesiveness of Danish society and the ability of the
Danes to communicate were important factors, but not the only
factors, that contributed to the rescue of Danish Jews.
Geography, Sweden’s open-door policy and the assimilation of the
Jews into Danish society were other important factors.
Intriguingly, the Germans themselves also became a factor in the
rescue.
60
“Alsang, where Danes gathered and sang patriotic community songs to
manifest national solidarity against the German occupation forces, had
created a Danish nationalism which, after the Liberation and the
Judicial Purge of Nazi collaborators in 1945, was to show its viability
in peacetime as the unifying ideology. This nationalism also colored
the development of Danish music at the end of the 1940s and in the
1950s.” Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Danish Contemporary
Music. (Copenhagen: Danish MIC, 2000), 3.
71 The key Nazi in Denmark was Dr. Best. 61
Danish society.
He understood
He understood the Danes felt outrage from the
occupation, and he understood that the Danes would not quietly
acquiesce to large scale raids by the Germans against Danish
Jews.
It was Dr. Best who first advised Hitler that the raids
against the Danish Jews should be carried out while Denmark was
under the state of emergency enforced by the Germans at the
beginning of the occupation.
62
In a telegram to Hitler, Dr. Best
expressed his views on Denmark and the occupation:
Before a government is set up and the state of
emergency terminated, adequate German police
forces must be set up in Denmark. Just as that
policy begun in 1942, namely, to direct Denmark
with the help of the country’s own political
factors has hitherto been consistently carried
out… The resistance movement must not in the
future be fought with the aid of the Danish
forces. 63
61
Dr. Best was a Gestapo officer in the Reich main office. He was in charge
of Jewish affairs policy in the Gestapo. In 1942 Dr. Best was appointed as
Reich Plenipotentiary to occupied Denmark. He held this position until 1945,
the end of the war in Europe. He was later sentenced to the death penalty in
Danish courts. In 1951 he was pardoned and released. He was later charged
70,000 Deutsch Marks (around $16,000) for his actions.
62
Leni Yahil, The Rescue of the Danish Jewry, (Philadelphia: Jewish Society of
America, 1969), 153.
63
Best, Doctor. Telegraph 1001, The Rescue of the Danish Jewry. edited by
Leni Yahil. Translated by Morris Gradel. 174-175. United States: Jewish
Publication Society of America, 1969. From Beretning til Folketinget. Afgivet
af den af Tinget Under 19. Dec. 1945 Nedsatte Kommission i Henhold til
Grundlovens §45, Bd. I-Bd. XV, J.H Schultz A/S, Universitets-Bogtrykkerri,
Kobenhaven, 1945-1958.
72 Dr. Best succeeded in making the German government aware of the
situation in Denmark by this telegram and several others similar
in nature. However, Dr. Best may have had ambivalent motives.
Some suggest that Dr. Best simply wanted a promotion within
the Nazi Government. 64 Dr. Best knew that if the Germans tried to
capture the Danish Jews without the protection of the state of
emergency, they would excite significant resistance among the
Danes.
So, perhaps, Dr. Best warned the German government about
this to demonstrate his thoughtful insight into the situation in
Denmark. 65
By this means, he hoped to gain recognition and
promotion.
In contrast to that line of thought, others suggest that
Dr. Best secretly may have intended to aid the Danish Jews. One
fact that supports this idea is that on September 11, 1943, Dr.
Best informed G.F Duckwitz, who worked for the Germans as a
shipping agent, of the upcoming raids on the Danish Jews.
Duckwitz did not support the Nazi Party.
He never made a secret
of the fact that he was sympathetic to the Danes.
Dr. Best had regular contact with Duckwitz, and it can be
inferred that Dr. Best knew of Duckwitz’s sympathies. If so, why
64
Leni Yahil, The Rescue of the Danish Jewry, (Philadelphia: Jewish Society of
America, 1969), 136.
65
Leni Yahil, The Rescue of the Danish Jewry, (Philadelphia: Jewish Society
of America, 1969), 136.
73 would Dr. Best give information on upcoming raids? One
conclusion is that Dr. Best intended that the Danes know of the
planned raids so that they could evade them. This conclusion is
bolstered by the fact that, even after news of the raids was
well known among the Danish population, the Nazis did not alter
their plans or take added precautions to assure the success of
the raids.
Even so, many historians believe it unlikely that Dr. Best
was motivated to save the Danish Jews.
They point out that
there is some controversy as to whether Dr. Best even knew
Duckwitz’s sympathies. 66
More significantly, Dr. Best was
committed and loyal to the Nazi party.
A third possibility, and perhaps more plausible, is that
Dr. Best tried to appease both sides. Dr. Best tried to impress
the Nazi leaders with his insight and advice on the situation in
Denmark. 67 He also tried to appease the Danes by giving
information that would aid their rescue operations.
The
intriguing possibility is that Dr. Best may have calculated that
appeasing the Danes was the most certain way for the Germans to
66
Harold Flender, Rescue in Denmark, “Duckwitz told Best that he would be
ashamed of being a member of the German Embassy Staff if Best participated in
Jewish Persecution. Best replied that he was personally unsympathetic to the
Nazis’ treatment of the Jews, but claimed that it was necessary to obey
orders.” 47. This view is not stated in other sources.
67
Leni Yahil, The Rescue of the Danish Jewry, (Philadelphia: Jewish Society
of America, 1969), 139.
74 obtain their most important goals in Denmark.
What the Germans
wanted most from Denmark was production ― food and manufactured
goods.
Dr. Best knew that massive, successful raids against the
Danish Jews would arose significant, wide-spread antagonism
against the Germans and likely would result in reduced
production.
Perhaps Dr. Best took actions calculated to avoid
such wide-spread reductions in production.
In the end, there is no conclusive evidence to demonstrate
the private motives of Dr. Best. Nonetheless, there is the
object evidence of the raids and the results of them.
The raids
took place exactly as planned, exactly as the Danes knew they
would, and exactly as the Nazis knew the Danes would know.
The
results were that almost all Jews escaped.
Duckwitz was instrumental in that mass escape.
Immediately
after meeting with Dr. Best, Duckwitz used his connections and
contacts as a shipping agent to arrange a meeting with the
Swedish and Danish governments. “A meeting with the Swedish
Prime Minister, Albin Hasson, was arranged.” 68
This meeting
eventually led to the Swedish open door policy, a policy that
would be essential to the Danish Jews’ safety.
68
Emmy E. Werner, A Conspiracy of Decency, (Boulder: Perseus Books Group,
2002), 34.
75 A few days before the planned raids, Sweden announced its
policy to the world through different newspaper articles and
radio announcements.
A New York Times article tells the story:
In a sweeping humanitarian gesture Sweden offered
asylum today to some 7,000 Jews arrested by the
Gestapo
in
Denmark
Sept.
30
during
the
[traditional Jewish New Year – Rosh Hashanah] New
Year festivities. Stockholm political circles
entertained no illusion that the Swedish remarks
in Berlin would receive a favorable answer if
they receive any at all. 69
The Swedish open-door policy allowed Danes, Jew and nonJews alike, to seek asylum in Sweden no matter the reason behind
the need for refuge.
Without this commitment from Sweden,
conveying Jews to safety would have been more problematic and
risky. Without Sweden, there were few good options. Sea passages
to Great Britain were a much longer and, more perilous, journey.
Thus, geography was an additional factor that helped the Danish
Jews escape to Sweden.
Denmark and Sweden are separated only by a narrow strand of
ocean.
Boat transportation between Sweden and Denmark is
relatively quick and simple because of the short distance, in
some places no more then a few miles separate the two
69
George Axelsson. “Sweden Offers Aid to Denmark’s Jews.” The New York Times
(New York: New York: October 3, 1943), 29.
76 countries. 70
Also, a majority of the Danish Jews lived in
Copenhagen, an island close to Malmo, Sweden. This made for an
even shorter journey.
Once hidden from Germans patrolling the
country, the Danish Jews lived in safe houses until they could
leave the country. Then they would finally take a boat to
Sweden.
For many refugees transported between Sweden and Denmark
the journey was easy. In the area there were many fisheries and
fishing boats. German forces (for the most part) did not check
the fishing boats traveling the Sound. 71
Navy is provided below.)
(More on the German
An unmolested escape and return could
be made in a single night.
Sweden had opened its border at a critical time.
Danish
Jews and Danes alike took advantage of Sweden’s open-door
policy. About one-half of the Danes who took advantage of the
policy were non-Jews.
“Of the 17,020 Danish refugees in Sweden,
9,114 belonged to the non-Jewish group.” 72 They were Danes who
felt they needed protection because they had enraged the Germans
70
At their closest points Denmark and Sweden are only 4.5 KM apart. This is
from Elsinore (Hamlet’s Castle) at Helsingør, Denmark to Helsingborg, in
Sweden. http://www.encyclopedia-online.info/Oresund
71
Some boats were caught ferrying Danish Jews to Sweden and those people
either drowned trying to escape or they were arrested.
72
Harold Flender, Rescue in Denmark, (Washington D.C.: Holocaust
Library, 196), 241.
77 with their actions against the occupation.
They took refuge in
Sweden for fear that they, too, would be shipped off to
concentration camps.
Although Sweden’s open-door policy was announced to the
world, the German government did not comment or respond, and the
Germans did not alter their plans or conduct in Denmark. It was
as if they did not hear, or chose to ignore, the message. They
did not mount a campaign to interrupt the Swedish open door
policy.
This action, or lack of action, corroborates the theory
that the Germans’ highest priority in Denmark was the
cooperation of the Danes and the continued consistent production
of Danish food and materials. The Germans did not want to make
any public statement or engage in overt action that would
indicate any Dane had anything to fear from the Germans.
Their
main focus remained on Danish resources and not Danish Jews:
The reason did not lie in German affection for
the Danes but in their awareness that ‘surplus
production in so decentralized a system as Danish
agriculture, with its large number of independent
farms, would evaporate completely” if there did
not exist what the Germans called
Lieferungsfreude (willingness to supply). 73
73
Leni Yahil, The Rescue of the Danish Jewry, (Philadelphia: Jewish
Society of America, 1969), 117.
78 The Germans knew, or at least they believed, that if they
captured the Danish Jews, the Danes would be even more enraged
and uncooperative.
The arrest of you Jews has caused quite a
commotion in Copenhagen. The students have gone
out on strike, the University has closed down all
week and protests are pouring in from the church
and businessmen’s organizations. I know of no
other country where this has happened. 74
The Commandant from Horserod Concentration Camp in Denmark spoke
this to the Danish Jews on their arrival.
There are numerous instances when the German military
seemed to disregard or ignore Danish efforts to rescue the
Danish Jews.
The Germans, in many, many instances, seemed to
abet, rather than hinder, the Danes’ efforts.
The first example
of this is the fact that, due to Dr. Best and Duckwitz, almost
everyone knew about the Nazi’s planned raids against the Danish
Jews.
After he learned of the Nazi’s planned raids, Duckwitz
informed Rabbi Melchior, Rabbi of Copenhagen’s main Synagogue at
the time. Rabbi Melchior later informed the Jewish community in
Copenhagen of the upcoming raids during a worship service.
74
Harold Flender, Rescue in Denmark, (Washington D.C.: Holocaust
Library, 1963), 210.
79 There will be no service this morning, said Rabbi
Melchior. Instead, I have very important news to
tell you. Last night I received word that
tomorrow the Germans plan to raid Jewish homes
throughout Copenhagen to arrest all of the Danish
Jews for shipment to concentration camps. …So
that two or three hours from now everyone will
know what is happening. By nightfall tonight we
must be in hiding. 75
The warning issued by Rabbi Melchior was the first credible
alarm given for Danish Jews in Copenhagen. Because of Rabbi
Melchior’s actions the Danish Jews knew they needed to escape.
Because of the possible consequences to himself, Rabbi
Melchior’s actions are seen as an act of bravery.
Thus, information about the planned raids was widely known.
Yet, the Nazis did not alter those plans or take any extra
measures to capture the Danish Jews.
Another example of the Nazi’s lax attitude is found in
their tolerance toward Danish civil officials. Duckwitz also
informed a leading Dane in the Social Democratic party, 76 Hans
Hedtoft. While the government itself played only a small role in
ferrying of people to Sweden, the government did assist rescue
75
76
Harold Flender, Rescue in Denmark, (Washington D.C.: Holocaust
Library, 1963), 15.
One of the parties in governmental power.
80 operations by collecting and forwarding information. This
allowed better coordination of the rescue operations. Each piece
of aid allowed more people to escape.
Others civil authorities, too, played roles that
contributed to the rescue operations.
Danish police, for
example, who had Jews in police custody often ignored German
orders to surrender Danish Jews to the Germans. “In Denmark the
Germans found the Danish police to be almost totally
uncooperative. The Danish police played a large role in the
rescue of the Jews and, later, in the sabotage actions against
the Germans.” 77 On more than one occasion the police would simply
release the Danish Jews from custody. 78
Danish civilians also, all occupations and classes, at some
level, contributed.
Doctors and nurses helped to hide people by
faking deaths, funerals, and surgeries.
Although Germans
patrolled the area, Bisperbjerg Hospital in Copenhagen was a
spot from which many of the Danish Jews escaped to Sweden.
Not once did the Germans penetrate the hospitals,
even though one evening Bisperbjerg was
surrounded by soldiers. On that night, 200 Jews
were hidden in the hospital… …Promptly at nine oclock in the morning a funeral procession rolled
77
Harold Flender, Rescue in Denmark, (Washington D.C.: Holocaust
Library, 1963), 237.
78
David Lampe, The Savage Canary, (London: Cassell and Company Ltd.,
1957), 214-215.
81 out of the chapel. In the rented cars, which the
Germans did not check, were two hundred Jews on
their way to Sweden. 79
This account is just one example of behavior that occurred
repeatedly during the occupation of Denmark: often Germans
seemed by inaction to allow, or by assumed ignorance to ignore,
Jews slipping away to safety.
In the action recounted above, the Jews escaped in a rather
elementary and obvious manner.
Yet, they were not challenged.
Why did the Germans not check those cars? In previous situations
the Germans had been vigilant in checking cars. Did the Germans
believe that a funeral was taking place and that checking the
cars would have been an inappropriate action?
Or had the
Germans been ordered to let the Danish Jews go because they knew
that their situation would be worse if they caught the Danish
Jews?
Just as the German army often was lax, as in the
Bisperbjerg Hospital example, so too the German navy, at
critical times took actions that, viewed objectively, seemed to
smooth, rather than hinder, the passage of Jews to safety in
Sweden.
79
Emmy E. Werner, A Conspiracy of Decency, (Boulder: Perseus Books
Group, 2002), 49.
82 For example, Hanne Seckel was one of the Danish Jews
rescued. She traveled to Sweden by boat.
intercepted.
The boat was
She wrote in her diary “The German soldiers with
their bayonets, they were walking on the top of the boat…To this
day, I think the German must have known…that we were there.” 80
But, they did not look below.
There are similar accounts:
In October 1943, the Jews of Denmark were being
hidden in order to keep them from being sent to
concentration camps by the occupying German
forces, my neighbor organized and ran a fishing
boat service which took groups of Jews across the
sea… He was caught in the searchlight of a German
Navy patrol boat which ordered him to stop and
kept him covered. The German captain shouted:
‘what are you carrying?’ And Ole shouted back,
‘fish.” The captain jumped onto the deck, leaving
his crew to cover him, and demanded that the
hatches to the fish-hold be removed. He stared a
long time at several dozen frightened people
looking up at him. Finally, he turned and said to
Ole, in a loud voice that could be heard by his
own crew as well: ‘ah, fish!’ Then he returned to
his boat and sailed into the night. 81
Often they (the Germans) would simply take the Captain’s
word that no one else was on board. Even when the Germans did
board the boats, they rarely checked in the holds under the
80
81
Emmy E. Werner, A Conspiracy of Decency, (Boulder: Perseus Books
Group, 2002) 80.
Ibid. at 82.
83 decks, which under normal circumstances would be the most
logical place for hiding people because the holds are out of the
normal line of sight.
In short the German navy gave the handling of
naval tasks priority over police surveillance.
The use of German patrolling vessels was
terminated on October 1, when the crews were
transferred to mine sweeping duties. The German
navy did not take any part in the surveillance of
the civilian traffic on the Sound before November
8, 1943. 82
Since the Germans knew that the Danes knew about the
upcoming raids, it would have been advantageous for the Germans
to intensely patrol the waters during the time before the raids.
They did the opposite. The Germans put several of their naval
vessels in dry dock for repairs or ordering the boats into mine
sweeping missions. 83
This action, at the time, was seen as
evidence that the Germans did not care if they caught the Danish
Jews.
There is no documentary evidence that establishes the
Germans in Denmark adopting a formal plan allowing Jews to
82
Michael Morgensen. “October 1943-The Rescue of the Danish Jews.” In
Denmark and the Holocaust, edited by Mette Bastholm Jensen and Steven
L.B. Jensen. (Copenhagen: Institute for International Studies
Department for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 2003), 54.
83
Emmy E. Werner, A Conspiracy of Decency, (Boulder: Perseus Books
Group, 2002), 37-38.
84 escape.
This is not to say the Germans never took action.
However, most action taken was on a small scale.
For example,
Rabbi Melchior faced prosecution if caught by the Germans. 84
Also, many individual Danish police officers who had released
Jews in defiance of German orders themselves became targets of
the Nazis.
To be a target was a serious thing.
Such Danish
police officers, and other activists, all non-Jews, made up
approximately one half of those who escaped to Sweden to avoid
German prosecution.
Nonetheless, the evidence of the events mentioned
above, and many more of similar effect, suggest to an
impartial observer that the Germans did not want to
interfere, on a large scale, with the rescue of Danish
Jews.
The Germans did not exercise the terrifying
efficiency that they could have employed to capture the
Danish Jews and quash the rescues.
This suggests the
Germans did believed the Danes’ willingness to cooperate ―
to produce food and materials for Germany ― would suffer if
Germans made large scale raid and transported Danish Jews.
The Germans’ larger war effort could not afford disruption
of the Danish contributions of food and materials.
84
If Rabbi Melchior would have been caught, he would have been treated
as any other person who was caught helping Jews. He would have been
sentenced to a concentration camp, even though that would have been his
fate anyway because he was Jewish.
85 In summary, a number of factors combined to help the rescue
of the Danish Jews.
First, the Danes had the means: the Danish
resistance to the Germans, the Swedish open-door policy
regarding Danes, and geography.
Second, the Germans depended on Danish goods that were
critical to German war effort. 85
The situation in Denmark, in
addition to the announcement by Sweden that it had an open-door
policy in regard to Danes, might have led to a harsh and
aggressive German reaction. This proved to not be the case.
The
Germans’ reaction seemed calculated. The Germans knew of the
Danish Jews assimilation into Danish culture, and therefore, the
Germans concluded that aggressively capturing the Danish Jews en
masse would have caused more resistance, and loss of
productivity, from the Danes.
Finally, the Danes had the motivation to rescue Danish
Jews.
Assimilation was the key factor.
Without it, none of the
other factors would have mattered. If the Danes did not see the
Danish Jews as their own, they would not have wanted to help
them to safety.
Without all these factors, the rescue of the Danish Jews
could not have taken place on the scale that it did.
85
Emmy E. Werner, A Conspiracy of Decency, (Boulder: Perseus Books Group,
2002) 82.
86 4.7 Those Who Were Not Rescued Despite the combination of these factors, the rescue
operation did not achieve the perfection the Danes desired.
Of
the Jews living in Denmark at the time, around 8,000, some 480
were captured during October 1943. 86
The Germans sent those
Danish Jews to Theresiensdtadt. 87 This is consistent with the
German purpose to make Denmark free of Jews, but the Germans did
not act with determination to exterminate Danish Jews.
For many
Jews that camp simply remained a stopover before being shipped
to Auschwitz, but not for Danish Jews. Due to an unwritten, but
nonetheless acknowledged, arrangement between the Danish
government and the German government, the Danish Jews escaped
being taken to Auschwitz. 88
Almost all Danish Jews survived the captivity in
Theresienstadt, thanks, in part to the attempts
made by the Danish authorities to protect them.
86
Harold Flender, Rescue in Denmark, (Washington D.C.: Holocaust
Library, 1963), 209.
87
Theresiendtadt was a concentration camp in the former Czechoslovakia.
The Nazis hoped to hide the extermination of the Jews in Europe by
making this camp, a model one. Agencies were allowed to only visit this
camp in which there were fake schools, libraries and cafes. There was
even a propaganda video that detailed life in Theresiendtadt as ideal
for every Jew. Theresiendtadt was later handed over to the
International Red Cross near the end of the war.
http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%205875.pdf
88
Herbert Pundik, In Denmark it Could not Happen (Hewlett, New York:
Gefen Publishing House, 1998), 85.
87 They were given preferential treatment by the
Germans, and the Danish Red Cross sent packages
with food and medicine. 89
The Danish Red Cross, helped in saving the Danish Jews held
captive in Theresienstadt by sending them food packages.
“Thanks also to this vigilance; Danish prisoners were allowed to
receive some Red Cross parcels from home which provided a
precious supplement to their meager diets.” 90 While not enough
food to keep the Danish Jews hearty, the food kept them alive.
Many packages sent by other international relief agencies to
concentration camps never reached people in those camps. The
Danish packages escaped confiscation by the Nazis because of
their agreement with the Danish Government. 91
The Danish Government, through its relationship with the
Nazis, got the Danish Jews out of the concentration camps
earlier ― on Friday, April 13, 1945 ― than those whose
liberation came at the hands of the Allied forces. 92 In exchange
for this unwritten agreement, the Danish government agreed not
89
Herbert Pundik, In Denmark it Could not Happen (Hewlett, New York:
Gefen Publishing House, 1998), 85.
90
Knud Dyby, Boats in the Night, as told by Martha Loeffler, (Blair,
Nebraska: Lur Publications, 2000), 61.
91
Leni Yahil, The Rescue of the Danish Jewry, (Philadelphia: Jewish
Society of America, 1969), 298.
92
Harold Flender, Rescue in Denmark, (Washington D.C.: Holocaust
Library, 1963), 249.
88 to incite mass strikes or production declines. Himmler bartered
an early release for the Danish Jews in a vain attempt to impose
preconditions for surrender in the west. Once released, the
Danish Jews took ships to Sweden where they lived until the end
of the war.
93
Of the Danes taken to concentration camps, only
about fifty of them died (this number varies depending of the
sources).
94
These actions are further evidence that the Danes
possessed strength through their unity. They were able to afford
some protection even to the Jews who had been captured and
transported by the Germans. An affront to one Dane was an
affront to all, and the Germans knew that if the entire country
became openly defiant, production of food and war materials in
Denmark would decline. In addition, it would be necessary to
deploy more soldiers to Denmark to support the occupation. Those
outcomes would hinder Germany’s ability to wage the on-going
war.
93
Leni Yahil, The Rescue of the Danish Jewry, (Philadelphia: Jewish
Society of America, 1969), 291.
94
“It is difficult to determine the exact number of Jews sent to
Theresienstadt. The numbers quoted vary from 470 to 475. Most sources,
however, confirm that there were in fact 464 Danish Jews in the camp.”
Leni Yahil, The Rescue of the Danish Jewry, (Philadelphia: Jewish
Society of America, 1969), 291.
89 4.8 Conclusion Germany needed and obtained food, war materials, and
resources from many countries.
So the question remains, why did
the Danish Jews and Danes receive better treatment from the
Germans than other occupied countries? The most likely answer is
that materials that the Danes provided to the Germans were, in
the eyes of the Germans, more essential to their efforts, than
the “final solution.” Denmark provided several different war
materials to Germany, including guns, artillery, and similar
military supplies essential to the business of war.
Equally
important, the Danes had farmland and food. The Germans, who
during the war were required to import more food than usual,
needed a reliable, close source of food. The Danes, through
passive, and later active, resistance efforts made it clear to
the Germans, that if they harmed significant numbers of fellow
Danish citizens, that there would be a huge price to pay.
Danes
considered Danish Jews as their fellow citizens.
Finally, the Danes shared with the Germans many of the
racial features and characteristics. Danes were commonly
considered to be Aryan of Nordic stock.
Thus, Danes were high
90 in the Nazi’s racial hierarchy. They were a favored group in
Hitler’s racial politics.
As a result, the Germans may have
been less inclined to be harsh in all aspects of their dealings
with the Danes. There is no lack of evidence to show the Nazis
could be harsh in occupied countries, but the reasons mentioned
above all combine to explain why the Nazis were comparatively
tolerant in dealing with the Danes.
The Danish Jews escaped the hands of Nazi Germany because
of the Danish resistance; Sweden’s open-door policy; geography;
German dependence on Danish goods; and the recognition by the
Germans that, if they wanted the Danes to reliably produce guns
and food for the German war effort, the Germans needed to
placate the Danes.
While all of these measures were essential to the Danish
rescue, none of this would have mattered if the Danes had not
viewed the Danish Jews as their own. If the Danes would have
seen the Danish Jews as outsiders, they might not have put as
much effort into the rescue operations.
While Denmark did a great humanitarian deed, the Danes
were by no means saints. At the beginning of the war many Danes
were pro-Nazi. After the atrocities that the Nazis committed
came to light that sentiment quickly faded. The Danes unified.
While not saints, they followed the teaching of Grundtvig who
91 “was convinced that the Danish people were chosen by God as a
‘divine experiment,’ and he spoke of Denmark as ‘the Palestine
of history.’” 95 They set out to prove this by doing what no other
nation in Europe did.
They stopped the Germans. In Denmark
there was no Holocaust. 95
Leni Yahil. “National Pride and Defeat: A Comparison of Danish and
German Nationalism.” Journal of Contemporary History, 26, no. ¾ (1991),
462.
92 Chapter Five: Norway and the Nazis: How It Could Happen 5.1 Introduction On a map or globe, Norway and Denmark are near to each
other.
The people of both countries, in general, fit the
category of Scandinavian.
Nazis during World War II.
populations.
Both countries were occupied by the
Both had recognized Jewish
The majority of histories written about World War
II give little attention to Norway, just as most give little
attention to Denmark.
An average American today probably knows
little about the history of Norway, and might have difficulty
identifying Norway on the map.
Notwithstanding these similarities, Denmark and Norway have
significant differences that were important during World War II.
In general, the population of Norway, unlike Denmark, was antiSemitic.
And, of course, the geography is different.
Looking
at a map, one would know that Denmark, located nearer to Great
Britain than Norway, would be strategically significant to
Germany during World War II.
Due to its geographic features and
location, Norway might appear to have been of little use to the
Nazi war effort.
However, Norway was important in the Nazis’
strategic planning.
Norway’s geographic location, available
93 resources, and potential contribution to a nuclear weapons
program, all combined with a government and people who were
generally anti-Semitic, made Norway an important feature in the
Nazis’ strategic plans.
These same factors caused the greater
loss of Norwegian Jewish people than Denmark experienced.
5.2 History of Norway Norway has a long and varied history prior to World War II.
This history helps to shape how Norwegians reacted to the events
of World War II. In 1450, Norway, like the rest of Europe was
suffering from the results of the plague.
The economy suffered
a downturn due to loss of population in great parts of Norway.
Due to this economic downturn, the Norwegian nobility declined
and lost importance in Europe.
A treaty with Denmark allowed
Norway to continue to be an equal with the Kingdom of Denmark,
but in 1536 Norway ceased to be an independent state.
The results of this union with Denmark were especially hard
for the Norwegian people. Not only were they pulled into wars
which they did not initiate, but also they lost land when those
wars were not won. While their land was being lost by the King
of Denmark, the Norwegian state leaders were able to persuade
94 the Danish King to retain a few benefits for the Norwegian
people, such as keep the tidings from the grain sales. 96
By the mid 18th century the Danish King sought a monopoly on
the grain and iron ore produced within Norway. The economic
restraints put on by the Danish King would not allow Norway to
regain its statehood.
About this time, the Norwegian people were beginning to
realize their potential both for financial independence and
autonomy. They started to pursue ventures that the Danish King
found disturbingly in favor of independence, such as a Norwegian
National Bank and a National University. The Danish King, of
course, stopped all of these endeavors.
During the Napoleonic Wars of 1807-1814 Denmark/Norway was
allied with the French; however, a blockade isolated Norway from
Denmark and did not allow Copenhagen to govern and at the same
time it blocked Norway from markets. The resulting loss of
shipping and exports of timber caused a widespread famine.
The Battle of Leipzig in 1813 proved to be an instrumental
battle in the Napoleonic War for Denmark and Norway. Sweden, one
of the opponents of Napoleon, after losing Finland to the east,
wanted Norway as a buffer zone. Denmark and King Fredrik IV
96
Norwegian Embassy in the United States of America. “Norway after
1814.” http://www.norway.org/history/after1814/
95 wanted nothing of this, but after losing territory to a military
attack on Holstein conceded. Thus in 1814, the Danish King
surrendered Norway to Sweden, cut ties with Napoleon; and thus
ended the 434 year union between Denmark and Norway, a tie that
even though strained would allow some of the same values of the
two to remain. 97
Norway, through an agreement between Denmark and its
opponents, was allowed to return to independent status. Then,
Norway began to coalesce.
From 1814-1905 Norway began to
improve economically and politically: telegraph and railroad
lines were laid, political parties were formed and elections
were held. With the implementation of a free democracy the
people of Norway was able to eventually dissolve the ties with
Sweden in 1903. From this time onward, Norway would be a
neutral, independent state. 98
Norway would continue growing its economy and its democracy
until WWI and WWII.
Norway declared neutrality in both wars.
Yet Norway, while practicing democracy, was experiencing
suffering instability as a result of extremist political
parties, ones that were generally anti-Semitic.
97
Norwegian Embassy in the United States of America. “Norway after
1814.”
http://www.norway.org/history/after1814/
98
Norwegian Embassy in the United States of America. “Norway after
1814.” http://www.norway.org/history/after1814/
96 5.3 A Short History of Norway in WWII When German forces invaded, Norway and its people had to
face its past and its prospects for the future. After 125 years
of being on the periphery of Europe, Norway now had to come
face-to-face with direct involvement in a potentially dark
future. Part of the dark future came from its own political
system. Norway, like other countries in Scandinavia at the time,
did not have strong and evolved political parties. In 1933
Vidkum Quisling’s Nasjonal Samling (National Unity Party) began
to gain political strength with a campaign philosophy that can
be described as fascist. 99 The Norwegian Labor party described
Quisling as “Herr Hitler’s Norwegian department.” 100
Initially,
this was nothing more than political bantering, a ploy to keep
the party from being elected.
Prior to the invasion of Norway, only one party,
Quisling’s, National Unity Party, was sympathetic to Hitler’s
99
Vidkum Quisling is commonly known as one of World War II most infamous
traitors. Quisling, after the war was charged with treason and shot
before a firing squad. Quisling visited Hitler the year before Norway
was invaded. During this time, Quisling and Hitler became close
political friends and when Norway was invaded, Quisling was appointed
the head of government by Hitler himself. After only a week, Joseph
Terboven, a former Nazi, took over as the head of government only to be
usurped in 1943 by Quisling again. Jewish Virtual Library [MORE
DETAILS]
100
Dahl, Hans. “Behind the Fronts: Norway.” Journal of Contemporary
History. 1970. 37-49.
97 cause. However, as the war evolved the Party gained a
significant following, and Quisling became an important player
in the Norwegian entrance into the war. Under his influence, it
seemed inevitable that Norway would be swept up in the war.
While neither Quisling nor his party aided in the invasion
of Norway, they did very little to stop it. Quisling wanted
Norway on the German side, and wanted Norway in the war with
little impact on the Norwegian homeland.
Quisling, sought
contact with the Nazi party during several meetings held in
December 1939 with Hitler.
The meeting ended with Quisling
believing that the Nazis had agreed to a peaceful takeover of
Norway and that Hitler would install him as prime minister.
In the initially stages of Germany’s war in Europe, Norway
was ambivalent toward the Nazis.
(Norway did have a declaration
of neutrality, but it was nothing more than paper.)
April 1940, Norway was invaded by German forces.
Then, in
On June 10th,
Norway surrendered to German forces, losing approximately 5,000
soldiers in the process. This is in contrast to the bloodless
takeover of Denmark; but like Denmark, the Royal Family, the
Government, and many Ministry heads left for Great Britain
following the surrender of Norway to Germany. 101
101
Norwegian Embassy in the United States of America. “Norway after
1814.” http://www.norway.org/history/after1814/
98 After the invasion, Quisling assumed power and remained
there as an unpopular ruler for a very short time before Hitler
himself asked Quisling to step down. After that, Joseph
Terboven, a former Nazi, led the occupying government. Later, in
February 1942, Quisling would be appointed by Hitler President
of Norway for a second time.
After the invasion was complete, Hitler declared that the
Norwegian economy would be exploited by the Nazi party for the
war effort because Norway was deemed an enemy county, even
though Quisling had thought that his previous meetings with the
Nazis would have prevented this characterization. This is a
subtle, but important, difference when compared to Denmark.
From Denmark, Hitler wanted production of food and materials.
Demark was an occupied country, but Norway was an enemy country.
Despite these circumstances, it is estimated that over
200,000 Norwegian workers helped the Nazi war effort by
volunteering to work at a variety of different occupations such
as roads, submarines, barracks, and many other war
necessities. 102
For the reminder of the war, the Norwegian government in
exile worked from Great Britain until it returned to Oslo at the
102
Abrahamsen, Samuel. Norway's Response to the Holocaust. (New York: The
Holocaust Library, 1991), 24
99 end of the war. During this time as well, Norwegian military
forces loyal to the exiled government were re-trained in Great
Britain.
Later, near the end of the war, these forces would
fight against the Germans in concert with the allies to help
regain their Norwegian homeland.
But, that was later.
During the height of the war, the Nazi forces in Norway,
primarily the German 6th SS Mountain Division, strategically
supported the larger war effort.
The 6th SS Mountain Division
was mainly charged with supporting the Nazi fight against the
Soviet front at Salla and were used to fight the Lapland war
against the Finnish. In regard to those campaigns, Norway was in
a strategic position to help the Germans with their war effort,
just as Denmark occupied a strategic position on the North Sea.
As the Nazi war effort grew and resources were needed in other
places the 6th SS Mountain Division was moved to other areas.
This left the occupying force in Norway weak.
Nonetheless,
Norway would remain occupied until the end of the war, when
Germany surrendered to Allied forces.
5.4 Norwegian Resources Norway, like Denmark, was vital to the German war effort in
many ways. Just as in Denmark, in Norway land and air resources
100 were the most important element in the German war effort. Also
important were the Norwegian people willing to work toward
manufacturing a variety of materials, both experimental and
immediately deployable, that were needed to further the war
effort. One of the most potentially significant and
controversial, of these materials is the production of rare
components that could have been used to make a nuclear weapon.
These were of great interest to the Germans at that time. 103
While nuclear or atomic weapons had not been fully
developed and tested, scientists knew of the great destructive
powers that these weapons potentially could produce.
The
Germans, therefore, were very interested, and in view of the
progress of the war almost desperate, to acquire these weapons.
Norway was import to that effort. Well before World War II,
a Norwegian facility, Norke Hydro, began producing heavy water
in 1934. Heavy water was important in the early development of
an atomic bomb.
After the German invasion and occupation of
Norway, the Germans closely monitored and protected the
facility.
Soon they began shipping the heavy water back to
Germany to experiment with nuclear fission. Due to the fact that
the technology was still in its infancy, Norke Hydro was not
103
Norke Hydro. “1943: The Heroes of Telemark.”
http://www.hydro.com/en/About-Hydro/Our-history/1929---1945/1943-TheHeroes-of-Telemark/
101 producing enough heavy water to satisfy the German’s needs.
Therefore, the Germans insisted on increasing output to over 100
kilos of heavy water per month.
Due to the importance of the operation, the Germans
insisted that these operations remain a secret, and those who
did not comply were sent to concentration camps. However,
information about the intentions of the Germans soon found its
way to the Norwegian government in exile and then to London and
Washington.
The Allied governments were greatly worried about the
possibilities of nuclear power in the hands of Hitler. The
Allies contrived several plans to thwart the Germans’ nuclear
ambitions.
The first attempt, in 1941, at sabotage failed. The
second, a modest attempt to disable the heavy water plant,
succeeded.
It was a remarkable story.
Twelve men lived off of
raw reindeer while doing the primary scouting of the heavy water
plant and area. They detonated explosives.
Escaping by skis,
the twelve men made it out alive and successfully completed the
mission of disabling the heavy water plant. The Nazis would
later rebuild the plant, but in 1943, the Allied forces sent
airplanes to bomb the plant again.
Yet, the Nazis salvaged and
102 transported to Germany those pieces that had not been
destroyed. 104
This story of the heavy water shows the importance that
Norwegian resources occupied in the German war effort. Hitler
and his top men knew that with an atomic weapon their chances of
winning the war, or at least ending the war with an outcome
acceptable to them, would have increased ten-fold.
While nuclear power would have been a great advantage to
the German war effort, it was seen as a long-range goal in the
overall war effort for the Germans. Short-term goals mattered
most day-to-day.
The first thing that the Germans needed to
accomplish was make sure that Allied forces did not have easy
access to the continent.
Even without heavy water, that
strategic goal makes the occupation of Norway a high priority
for the Germans.
Norway was ideally situated to control air and
sea routes to the continent.
In this perspective, Norway was
regarded much as Denmark ― its geographic position gave it
importance in the battle to control Europe.
In the war plans of the Germans, access to water ways into
the Baltic remained high on the list of priorities. Germany saw
Norway as occupying a strategic position for access to the
104
Norke Hydro. “1943: The Heroes of Telemark.”
http://www.hydro.com/en/About-Hydro/Our-history/1929---1945/1943-TheHeroes-of-Telemark/
103 continent.
From Norway the Germans could best keep out enemy
submarines, and Norway could also serve as a U-Boat base. The
many fjords and existing naval bases provided hiding places and
infrastructure that the Nazis could use.
build them.
They did not have to
With the war depleting supplies, this was an
essential consideration.
5.5 Norwegian Jews As far back as the year 1000 the Norwegian King Olav den
Hellige forbad anyone who was not Christian from living in
Norway. However, it was not until the 16th century that people of
the Jewish faith specifically were forbidden from living in
Norway. The Jews referred to in the 16th century decrees were
those driven out of Spain and Portugal in 1492. All of those
Jews who arrived in Norway around that time had to be given
special permission by the King to enter Norway. Over time, many
of these Jews let themselves be baptized in order to further
integrate themselves within the Norwegian community.
By 1630
King Christian IV allowed Jews freedom of religion and travel
around both Denmark and Norway. But later, under restrictions
King Fredrick III put in place, and Jews were not allowed to
stay in the country without a visa. King Fredrick III’s
104 successor, King Christian V, reinstated the prohibition against
Jews entering the country. 105
One hundred fifty years later attitudes towards Jewish
people were tempered, and “Portuguese Jews” were allowed to
enter freely.
However, countering that, Norway in 1815 gained
its constitution. Paragraph two of the constitution stated that
the official religion of Norway was Lutheranism and that Judaism
and Jesuits were strictly forbidden from the Kingdom of Norway.
The Norwegian poet Henrik Wergeland lobbied to overturn this
Constitutional provision, and in 1851 it was repealed.
By the late 1800s a Jewish community had been established
within Oslo. With only a few hundred people, many of the members
of the community decided that it would be best not to practice
Hasidic or ultra-orthodox Jewish traditions, so to better fit in
within the larger Norwegian community. By the beginning of WWII
there were around 2,000 Jewish people within Norway, many of
whom lived in the greater Oslo area. By the beginning of WWII,
the community was well established and growing.
It had
established its own Jewish schools, tutors and choirs. Being
well established was no protection for the Jews in Norway.
Unlike the situation in Denmark, and for all their history in
Norway, Jews were not assimilated into Norwegian society.
At
105
Abrahamsen, Samuel. Norway's Response to the Holocaust. (New York: The
Holocaust Library, 1991)
105 the beginning of WWII, Jews still were viewed as outsiders to
native Norwegians.
By 1942, 750 Norwegian Jewish people were deported to Nazi
Concentration Camps.
population in Norway.
That was nearly 40% of the Jewish
Of those, only 25 survived. Most of the
remaining Jewish population survived either by escaping to
Sweden or hiding within Norway for the remainder of the war.
5.6 Jews that were rescued Norwegians did rescue a number of their Jewish citizens,
and those Norwegians who risked their lives to rescue them
should be thought of as heroes. They did so at extreme peril to
themselves.
Unlike the conditions in Denmark, in Norway the
occupying Germans were not ambivalent toward rescue efforts.
Many of those who participated in the rescue operations were
caught by the Germans and had to either flee Gestapo persecution
or commit suicide to prevent themselves from going to
concentration camps.
One of the most heroic stories of the rescue operations
from Norway is that of fourteen orphans who were living in an
orphanage in Oslo. These orphans had been rescued from Austria
106 and sent to Norway. The Germans in Norway somehow learned of the
orphans and sought out their benefactors.
Luckily for the
orphans, someone tipped off the people who were hiding then, and
the children were smuggled out just a few hours before a raid
occurred. The children lived in various apartments in Oslo for a
week, and then were walked to Sweden.
Another story of rescue involved Norwegian Rabbi Elchanan
Samuel. Samuel and many others were rescued during December 4-5,
1942. They were rescued in a very unique way. A farmer invited
them to help him pick potatoes and haul them away. They
consented.
The “potatoes” turned into a truck full of Jewish
people; and the truck, along with Rabbi Elchanan Samuel, was
sent to Sweden where they escaped persecution.
Many of those who were able to escape Norway did so by a
combination of vehicles and walking. Another route, but more
dangerous, was by boat.
Most of those who escaped by boat
arrived in Scotland or the Shetland Islands. One of those Jews
who escaped by boat was Jo Benkow, who would later become the
President of the Norwegian Parliament. Jo and his uncle were
secreted to Bergen.
There they were given a row boat.
They had
to row themselves to safety in Sweden. Within a few weeks all of
their male relatives had arrived. None of his female relatives
ever arrived; all of the females died in Auschwitz.
107 These tales tell a small part of the rescue operations. The
center from which the rescue operations began to materialize was
Oslo, Norway.
From there many anonymous people risked their
lives to save Jewish people they did not know.
In many cases
they did so simply because they felt that it was the right thing
to do.
Even so, a smaller percentage of Jews were rescued from
Norway than in other countries.
As was true in Denmark, in Norway acts of resistance,
particularly later in the war, joined with the efforts to rescue
the Jews.
Both the rescue efforts and the resistance by the
Norwegians were aimed at asserting control over their own
county, ridding their county of the occupying force. The
National Church of Norway, the Lutheran Church, actively
preached against the Nazi occupying forces. The Lutheran Church
helped to disseminate information about the fates of Norwegian
Jewish citizens and about the occupation in general.
The Catholic Church offered to baptize Jewish people into
the Catholic faith, which they hoped would protect Jews from
Quisling’s anti-Jewish Laws. 106 While this did not succeed, it
shows that even those who did not actively rescue Jewish people
did try to protect the Jews through various means they thought
106
Abrahamsen, Samuel. Norway's Response to the Holocaust. (New York: The
Holocaust Library, 1991), 143
108 would thwart the Nazis.
However, prayer and offers of good
works did not stop the deportation of Jewish people.
5.7 Why the Jews were not rescued Anti-Semitism was rampant in Norway even before the
pressures of the Nazi Party. On May 14, 1814, with a vote of 94
in favor and 7 against the constitutional provision banning
Jewish people from entering the country, article two of the
constitution was passed ― banning Jews from entering Norway.
These actions were taken not so much because Jews themselves
were feared, but because of an imagined visage of the Jews: “it
is not the Jew who is hated, but an imaginary picture of the Jew
which is confounded with reality.” 107
By the time of the Second World War, Quisling’s influences
played a large role in the attitudes of most of the populace in
Norway. In Norway, under Quisling, Jews were disliked for many
reasons that were common among Europeans of that time; mostly,
fear drove the masses to feel this way. While Quisling and his
party did not gain control through a democratic process, his
ideas were inculcated into the populace. Theodore Hamerow argues
that the combination of the already existing attitudes of the
107
Abrahamsen, Samuel. Norway's Response to the Holocaust. (New York: The
Holocaust Library, 1991), 126
109 Norwegian people combined with the influences of Quisling’s
rhetoric brought about the factor greatest in importance to the
Norwegian Jews not being rescued: apathy.
Professor Leo
Eltinger, a Norwegian psychiatrist and an Auschwitz survivor who
testified at Quisling’s trial, stated that, without a doubt, the
actions of Quisling facilitated the deportation of Norwegian
Jews to concentration camps. 108
A Supreme Court Justice from Denmark, Karsten Meyer,
stated: “What happened in Norway must be attributed to the
initiatives of Quisling.” 109
For Example, in Norway, the
populace deemed Jewish women who married Aryans to be racially
inferior.
As such, they could be arrested.
Such arrests were
uncommon among countries occupied by the Germans.
Such arrests
made easy the work of occupying forces, and therefore made the
occupation and the removal of Jewish people even easier than in
other occupied countries.
Hamerow argues that “the annihilation of European Jewry
could not have taken place without the active participation of
the population.” 110 Without the apathy, and sometimes direct
108
Abrahamsen, Samuel. Norway's Response to the Holocaust. (New York: The
Holocaust Library, 1991), 126
109
Abrahamsen, Samuel. Norway's Response to the Holocaust. (New York: The
Holocaust Library, 1991), 126
110
Theodore S. Hamerow. “The Hidden Holocaust.” Commentary 79, 3, 1985.
pg. 34
110 hostility, of the Norwegian people to their Jewish citizens the
processes to remove people from their homes could not have taken
place. In Norway, for example, Hamerow argues that the Jews
could not have been rounded up without the help of the Norwegian
police. This is a notable contrast to the police in Denmark, who
often released Jewish arrestees.
As an example, beginning in
May 1940, the Norwegian police systematically confiscated radios
belonging to Jewish families.
This was followed by house
arrests, sale of Jewish property, and finally deportation.
While some of these actions were common in Nazi occupied
countries, many of the actions specific to Norway were due
simply to fear and apathy of the populace. Many people were
simply too afraid of what would happen to them if they helped
the Jews. Also, many just did not care.
The Norwegians, in
contrast to the Danes, did not see the Jewish citizens as their
fellow citizens.
The Norwegian police were neither a Nazi-led group nor
where they Nazi supporters outright. However, the propagandainspired fear about Jewish people, as well as fear of
persecution by the Nazis for not following orders, promoted a
general attitude that inhibited rescue efforts.
Even the Norwegian government in exile did not attempt to
align the moral compass of the country. Tore Gjelsvik, the head
111 of the civil resistance movement, did nothing to aid the Jews in
Norway. The Norwegian occupation government’s actions differed
from those in Denmark.
The effect was to quell rescue efforts.
The Norwegian government in exile did nothing to aid the Jews in
Norway. In December 1942 Norwegian Foreign Minister Trygve Lie
wrote the World Jewish Congress that he never expected to have
to tell his citizens to act against the Nazis, that they were
capable of making these decisions for themselves.
It has never been found necessary for the
Norwegian Government to appeal to the people of
Norway to assist and to protect other individuals
or classes in Norway who have been selected for
persecution by German aggressors, and I feel
convicted that such an appeal is not needed in
order to urge the population to fulfill their
human duty towards the Jews of Norway. 111
Without the support of the Norwegian government in exile,
the efforts of those common Norwegian citizens who might
have helped their Jewish countrymen were dampened. If the
government in exile did not appear to care about the Jews,
Norwegian citizens, who might risk their lives in rescue
efforts, questioned whether they should care.
This was
unlike the situation in Denmark, where all Danes felt that
an offense to one Dane was an offense to all.
111
Abrahamsen, Samuel. Norway's Response to the Holocaust. (New York: The
Holocaust Library, 1991), 11
112 5.8 Conclusion The common people of Norway viewed Jews with general
apathy, if not the outright dislike.
This being the common
attitude, it becomes more clear why more Jewish people of
Norway were not rescued. There were a few brave people who
risked their lives to save their Jewish citizens, but more
risked their lives to defy the Nazis in general resistance
to the occupation. The overall effort was uncoordinated and
ill equipped.
The effort failed to have a substantial
impact on the Nazi’s efforts within Norway.
The resistance
in Norway did not have the same effects or consequences as
that in Denmark.
Some argue that Denmark was given more control over
their Jews because of the food that Denmark could provide
to Germany:
The moderate attitude of the Germans toward the
Danes is usually explained by the economic
benefits that could be reaped from Denmark – and
only from a tranquil Denmark whose internal
affairs operated without disturbance. 112
112
Leni Yahil, The Rescue of the Danish Jewry, (Philadelphia: Jewish
Society of America, 1969), 117.
113 In September 1941, Norway went on strike, over the
children’s milk supply as a form of resistance against the
Nazis, but it was an ineffective effort.
arose from it.
No unified front
In all, the Danes were more successful
because they were more cohesive.
Norway reacted to the
Nazi invasion as a multitude of individuals.
Many
resisted, but the resistance was ill-organized.
Denmark
reacted to the Nazi invasion as a single nation repelling,
sometimes passively and sometimes aggressively, an invader.
The Danes acted with a cohesion that the Norwegians could
not marshal.
114 Chapter Six: Comparing the Two; Why Denmark Was More Successful than Norway? 6.1 Introduction Comparing Denmark and Norway, the possibilities for
both comparisons and contrasts are considerable. There are
many similarities and many differences.
The similarities
cannot account for the significantly different outcomes of
the rescue efforts in the two countries.
Those different
outcomes must be explained by the contrasts between the
countries; and those differences, those that seem to have
had the most impact on the success of rescue efforts, can
be identified.
The great differences in the outcomes of
the rescue operations can be attributed to four factors:
the governments, anti-Semitic views, the Nazis’ designs for
each country, and finally luck.
To discern why these
factors produced results that differed so greatly between
the two countries, each of these factors will be examined.
115 6.2 Governments At the beginning of World War II, Norway had been
independent from Denmark for about one hundred twenty
years, not long enough to developed marked distinctions.
The countries still had much in common. With a common
shared history ― in terms of government, language, and
culture ― it would seem logical to assume that the rescue
efforts and the outcomes should be similar. Nevertheless,
the composition of the two governments, and their reactions
to Nazi occupation, was one factor that contributed to the
two very different outcomes.
Key players in both governments were the police. While
the police might not be thought of as motivated by
political ends, they are law enforcement agents of the
government.
They are, therefore, a reflection of the will
of the government. In Denmark, the police often acted
informally, and sometimes overtly, to stop the impact of
the Nazis, and they unofficially assisted in rescuing the
Jews. For instance, they would arrest Jews and then take
them to safe houses or give the Nazis wrong directions to a
Jewish person’s house.
116 In Denmark, there is evidence that the police often
knew in advance of planned raids for the purpose of
capturing Jews.
The police in Norway, in contrast, seemed
not to have equivalent motivation to aid the Jews or to
ferret out the exact time and place of Nazi raids against
the Jews.
Rather than help the Jews, the police in Norway,
generally, did more to aid the Nazis.
They would, for
example, confiscate the radios of Jewish families, and
often would bring Jews in for crimes that would have gone
unnoticed if committed by gentiles. These actions, and the
general predisposition of the police forces in Norway,
helped the Nazis to round up Jews in Norway.
It cannot be said that either the Danish or the
Norwegian police force was uniformly or consistently for or
against the rescue operations.
Yet, the predominate
actions of the Danish police forces aided the rescue
operations, and the actions of the Norwegian police forces
aided the Nazis.
The actions of the police forces set an example for
the populace.
By their example, they influenced the
actions of the people. Likewise, other governmental
117 authorities in each country, by their examples, influenced
and guided the behavior and attitudes of the people.
Of the two governments, the Danish government was the
more active in cultivating in its people a sense that the
Nazis’ actions were ethically wrong. The Norwegian
government, as exemplified by its police, seemed to believe
that such an active role was not necessary.
Norwegian
authorities adopted more of a laissez-faire approach.
This
is illustrated by a statement of a Norwegian Jurist and
supporter of the resistance movement who said:
It has never been found necessary for the
Norwegian Government to appeal to the people of
Norway to assist and to protect other
individuals or classes in Norway who have been
selected for persecution by German aggressors,
and I feel convicted that such an appeal is not
needed in order to urge the population to
fulfill their human duty towards the Jews of
Norway. 113
The Norwegian officials simply did not feel that they
needed to coach the Norwegian people to help those being
persecuted. In contrast, the government of Denmark adopted
a different principle. The government in Denmark acted on
113
Abrahamsen, Samuel. Norway's Response to the Holocaust. (New York: The
Holocaust Library, 1991), 11
118 the premise that people, especially in stressful situations
such as being in an occupied country, needed guidance.
A psychological experiment that is commonly discussed
in Introduction to Psychology classes is the Milgram
experiment. During this experiment the examiner directs a
teacher to “teach” the learner sets of words. Whenever the
learner answers a question incorrectly a continuously
higher electrical shock was given to the learner by the
teacher. The teacher was told that the highest electric
shock could kill the student.
Nonetheless, around 70% of
the teachers ended up giving the final, and they thought
lethal, electric shock of 450 volts.
This experiment was
designed to test the degree of obedience in normal
people. 114 The Milgram experiment was first published just
years after the end of World War II, and some wondered if
those who helped to commit the crimes of World War II were
simply following the examiners wishes ― just as the
teachers in the Milgram experiment were directed to “teach”
and then could not turn back.
Another common psychological phenomenon is the
bystander effect. The foremost example of this is the Kathy
Genovese murder of 1964. Genovese was murdered on a street
114
Milgram, S. “The Behavioral Study of Obedience.” Journal of Abnormal
Social Psychology, 67 (1963) 371.
119 in New York.
At least 38 witnesses observed, yet no one
did anything to help. Every person believed that they did
not need to do anything.
Each believed that someone else
would be rushing to the rescue or calling the police.
No
one wanted to tangle up the phone lines. This example, like
the Milgram experiment, demonstrates that people are not
inherently self-motivated when they face horrific
circumstances.
People, generally, prefer to wait, let
someone else rush in to stop a situation and help. The more
people present, the longer it takes for one person to
intervene. 115
Numerous other studies demonstrate that the inaction
of most citizens of Norway, and most of Europe, was within
the normal boundaries of human reaction to a stressful and
unfamiliar situation, particularly when their governments
did nothing to point them toward different behavior. What
distinguished Denmark compared to Norway is that more
people in power, such as the King and the police, openly
opposed the Nazis.
In comparison, the King of Norway fled.
The studies described above do suggest that the
actions of the police and others in charge in Denmark
115
Darley, J. M., & Latane, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in
emergencies: diffusion of responsibility. J Pers Soc Psychol, 8(4),
377-83.
120 probably did help to demonstrate to their fellow Danes the
correct actions under the difficult circumstances.
clear example, most Danes followed.
With a
Whether this was a
psychological effect or was ethically based, the result was
the same.
The Danish Jews fared better.
6.3 Anti­Semitic Views Across Europe, anti-Semitic views were not new or
unknown at the beginning of World War II.
have existed since there were Jews.
Such prejudices
During World War II,
many traditional white European cultures still felt that
Jewish people were a threat to their ways. By the mid 1930s
those feelings were moderating.
In most countries such
feelings were not as manifest and pointed as expressed by
Hitler, but under the surface, the feelings were
acknowledged.
So, when Hitler said that he would take care
of the “problem,” most Europeans immediately knew what the
“problem” was.
Many Europeans, like the Norwegians, but
unlike the Danes, did not resist Hitler’s solution to the
“problem” because they shared a dislike of the Jewish
people.
Others had no active dislike of the Jews, but
they were intimidated by the Nazis.
The fear was enough to
121 suppress any thoughts they may have had to aid the Jews.
Either way, it was due to these feelings that the Holocaust
was allowed to occur and succeed in murdering a great
percentage of the Jewish population of Europe.
Both Denmark and Norway had varied populations, as was
true in most European countries.
In each, some were anti-
Semitic, and in each, there were those who sympathized with
the plight of the Jews.
The difference is that in Denmark
those who had compassion for the Jewish people did
something about it in greater numbers than those in Norway.
Any person who risked his life to save a person from
persecution by the Nazis is a great and honorable person,
but Norway seemed to have fewer people willing to do the
honorable thing.
In addition to the attitude of the Norwegian
government, another reason can be inferred from the history
of Jewish people within the two respective countries. Both
countries, at one point in their history, had banned Jewish
people from entering, and both had rules against practicing
Judaism in public and in private well into the mid-19th
century. The difference is that Norway never did assimilate
Jews, as did Denmark.
In Norway, Jews were not admitted
into the Norwegian society, or chose not to join.
They
122 kept apart; and Norwegians, in general, were content to
leave them isolated. In Norway, Jews tended to live in
Jewish communities and did not participate in the culture
or activities of the Norwegians.
Jews in the same manner.
Most Norwegians treated
Jews were Jews, and Jews were not
Norwegians. Neither group seemed to want or need much
interaction with the other.
In Norway, both sides are to blame for this lack of
assimilation. Norwegian Jews mostly stayed within their own
communities. Norwegians did everything within their power
to keep the Jews from intermingling in their normal, daily
lives. For a while, Jews even were forbidden even by
express language in the Norwegian Constitution.
These
mutually accepted deportments effectively inhibited any
significant assimilation. Neither side wished to help the
other because neither felt they had any communal connection
to the other.
In Norway, the Jews dressed differently, spoke
differently, kept different traditions, and did not
participate in Norwegian social and cultural life.
The
Danes, on the hand, did assimilate their Jews people into
national culture and society.
123 Jews have been in Denmark since the 1600s, and
they had enjoyed full civil rights since 1814.
As a result, it is argued, they identified
strongly with the larger Danish culture. They
spoke Danish, they dressed like other Danes, and
they participated actively in the social and
cultural life of the nation. 116
Denmark was less anti-Semitic because of its history;
it, over time, came not to fear Jewish people. The Danes
embraced the Jews within Danish culture. In turn, Jewish
people thought of themselves as Danes first and Jews
second. The Jews observed their Sabbath on a day different
than Christian Danes, but that was commonly viewed as an
insignificant matter. Assimilation both caused and allowed
the Danes to view what was happening to the Jewish people
in a different light than the Norwegians viewed the same
events.
In Norway, the Jews were just a foreign people.
In Denmark the Jews were Danish, just like them, their
neighbors.
The differing anti-Semitic views of the two countries
remain one of the key reasons more Danish Jews were
rescued.
Danes felt they were rescuing their neighbors,
116
Andrew Buckser, “Rescue and Cultural Context During the Holocaust:
Grundtvigian Nationalism and the Rescue of the Danish Jews,” Shofar 19,
no. 2 (2001), 5.
124 while the Norwegians did not have similar feelings for the
Jews.
6.4 Nazis’ Needs Nazis had different plans for the two countries. Each
provided the Nazis with different resources.
Because the
Nazis wanted different resources from each country, they
deployed forces differently in Norway than in Denmark
according to the resources the Nazis thought to be
valuable.
This dictated the number of Nazis stationed
within each country and where the troops were concentrated.
When a greater number of Nazis were stationed in one area
in particular, a predictable effect was to cause people to
grow more cautious and less likely to help Jewish people to
escape.
So, the Nazis’ designs for each country was a
factor that had some influence on the rescue of Jews.
Each country provided different types of resources.
Norway provided naval resources, manufacturing
capabilities, and possible atomic weapon resources. Denmark
provided foodstuffs, farmland, and some manufacturing
capabilities. Denmark was more important to the immediate
survival of the German forces.
It provided food and guns
125 that were immediately useful. The reliable, steady
production the Nazis wanted required a stable, cooperative
population.
Therefore, the occupation in Denmark was
relatively unassertive.
Norway was thought to be more important in the
overall, long-term, strategic war effort.
location prevented a mainland invasion.
Norway’s
Also, Norway
provided materials that, the Nazis’ hoped, held nuclear
weapon capabilities, and with that capability the ability
to ultimately end the war decisively. In Norway, the Nazis
could take the geographic strong points and the mineral
resources.
And so in Norway, the occupation, generally,
was more forceful.
The resources provided by each country could not be
easily replaced by the other.
Therefore, it seems each
would have been equally, but differently, important to the
Germans. Yet, in fact, the Germans seemed to be more
complaisant in their occupation of Denmark.
Whether by
design or by accident, the Germans allowed more of the
Danish Jews to escape, and did so without harsh reprisals
to the country.
Does this signify that the Nazis counted
the cooperation of the Danes to be of greater significance
than that of the Norwegians?
126 At least in terms of the documented history, the
answer is, no.
There is no direct evidence that the
resources of either country, in the view of the Nazis,
dictated that greater liberty should be given to the Danes
than to the Norwegians.
From the records of the time, it
appears that Norwegian resources were just as important to
the Nazi war effort, just in a different way.
So, in the
end, the different resources of the two countries probably
did not play a large of role in the different events.
Nonetheless, the methods employed to gain those
resources do seem to play a role in the different outcomes
of rescue operations.
In Denmark, the Nazis relied
predominately on cooperation.
More of the population in
Denmark engaged in rescue efforts.
In Norway, they used
more force, and the occupation has harsher.
in Norway engaged in rescue efforts.
Fewer people
That, together with
other factors ― anti-Semitic views, the role of government,
and luck ― did play an important role in the outcome of the
rescue efforts.
127 6.5 Luck Luck is something that cannot be quantified. However,
it would seem as though the Danish Jews had a generous
share of it going in their favor. In World War II, the Jews
in Denmark benefited from of confluence of favorable
factors.
While this confluence might be deemed just
coincidences, it seems as though luck had a part to play.
A rationalist would argue that there is no such thing
as luck, that believing so would be committing the “post
hoc, ergo procter hoc” fallacy. 117
Notwithstanding the
rules of formal logic, it is undeniable that many Danish
rescue operations were successful due to odd, seemingly
inexplicable events.
For example, the story of Ulrik
Plesner who escaped by boat to Sweden in October 1943. This
journey included 23 other people and several crew. During
this time the Germans boarded the boat and asked to look in
the fishing holds where the Jews were being held. The
German Captain insisted on looking in the fish holds.
Even
when he saw a hold full of people, he declared it to be
fish to his crew, and they sailed away. It would seem as
117 A logical fallacy. Post hoc ergo propter hoc means “after which hence by
which.” The most common version of this fallacy, mistakes temporal sequence
for causal connection—as when a misfortune is attributed to a “malign
event,”... "post hoc ergo propter hoc." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2009.
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 08 Jul. 2009
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/472047/post-hoc-ergo-
128 though luck played some part in the German Captain not
telling that there were Jewish people in the boat hold.
118
Another story is that of Elsebeth Kiler and her
brothers Jorgen and Flemming. All were medical students and
part of the underground movement. One night they decided to
go to a gala event held at a local estate and they asked
people for money to help transport the Jews across the
sound. By exposing their plans to hundreds of people they
did risk their lives, but no one exposed them.
In the end
they raised over one million kroner, enough for about 1,000
rescues to take place. 119
Not every failure of a Norwegian rescue attempt can be
attributed to the logic and efficiency of the Nazi troops;
not every success of a Danish rescue can be attributed to
luck.
Even so, the sheer number of successful Danish
rescue operations that turned on some propitious turn of
events or unexpected act cannot be ignored.
worked diligently at rescue operations.
The Danes
Several factors
favored the Danes’ efforts ― support of the Danish
government, a comparatively relaxed occupation by the
Nazis, support from Sweden, geography, and assimilation of
118
Werner, Emmy. A Conspiracy of Decency.
Press, 2002). 82.
119
Ibid., at 62
(Boulder, Colorado.: Westview
129 the Jews.
Even so, many things had to go right for the
Danish Jews to be rescued in such large numbers.
The
stories of the rescues reveal that objective, quantifiable
factors alone do not account for the overwhelming success
of the Danish rescue efforts.
In addition to the objective
and quantifiable, something must have gone right; perhaps
even a little bit of luck can be the reason.
6.6 Conclusion Why did Denmark succeed in rescuing so many Jews, and
Norway did not? There is no single, overall reason. Many
disparate factors fell into place for the Danish Jews to be
rescued. The Danish government, the assimilation of the
Jews within Denmark, the Nazis’ comparatively benign
occupation of Denmark, and a little luck allowed the Danes
to succeed.
These factors, coming together as they did,
allowed Denmark to accomplish rescue operations that were
unequaled.
Norway did not fail entirely. It saved around 50% of
the Jewish population from Concentration camps. Norway
accomplished that while facing obstacles not present in
Denmark.
The Norwegian government was not as concerned or
130 compassionate toward the Jews.
anti-Semitic.
The population was largely
The Norwegian rescue operations did not have
the frequent turns of luck that seemed to favor the Danish
rescue operations.
These were obstacles that impeded the
well-intended rescue operations that originated in Norway.
Due to these obstacles, fewer people were saved.
Would the outcome have been different if one of the
obstacles had been switched? Would the outcome have been
different, for example, if Denmark had a more stringent
police system and Norway had a more sympathetic one?
Perhaps the outcome would have been different, but only a
novelist can argue now.
131 Part Three What Can We Learn? 132 Chapter Seven: Comparing Denmark and Norway to Today’s Problems 7.1 Introduction The Holocaust of World War II is today the best known
and worst genocide, but it was not the first or last
genocide.
Notable genocides have occurred within recent
history.
The events in Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and Darfur
are just a few.
A reasonable person should presume that
others will occur in the future.
In World War II several factors combined to allow
Denmark to succeed in rescuing so many Jews.
Norway did
not rescue as many. There was no single reason for this
division.
Several causes contributed.
The government of
Denmark was more disposed to assist in rescue operation.
Sweden offered express aid to the Danish Jews.
The
assimilation of the Jewish people within Denmark gave the
Danes greater compassion and concern for the Jews, whom
they considered to be equal citizens.
The perpetrators of
the genocide, the Germans, for their own reasons were more
lenient with Denmark than with Norway.
An incalculable
factor, luck, allowed the Danes to succeed in some rescues
that could have been exposed and interdicted.
These
133 factors, coming together as they did, allowed Denmark to
accomplish rescue operations that were unequaled.
Norway's rescue operations must not be dismissed as a
complete failure.
Norway did save around 50% of its Jewish
population, while facing obstacles not present in Denmark.
The Norwegian government was not as concerned or
compassionate toward the Jews.
And, no other government
offered express assistance to the Norwegian Jews, as Sweden
offered express assistance to Denmark.
population was largely anti-Semitic.
The Norwegian
The German occupation
forces in Norway were more oppressive than those in
Denmark.
The Norwegian rescue operations did not benefit
from the frequent “luck” that seemed to favor the Danish
rescue operations.
These were obstacles that impeded the
well-intended rescue operations that originated in Norway.
It is worthwhile to contemplate the characteristics
that aided Denmark in rescuing its citizens – the attitude
of the government, international aid, the degree to which
the oppressors were determined, resolute, and unyielding,
assimilation, and luck.
These still are important today
because genocides continue, and these factors can affect
the outcome.
Genocides are occurring in situations and
134 places that are remote from the events in Europe, but the
acts and consequences are the same.
The last chapter compared Denmark and Norway during
World War II.
The rescue operations that occurred in those
countries took place in circumstances and a context that,
most probably, will not be replicated in future genocides.
Nevertheless, the examples of Denmark and Norway do provide
lessons that might show the world, facing future genocides,
what elements contribute to strengthen and invigorate
rescue operations.
To examine this suggestion, we will
consider recent genocides.
Of these, three prominent
examples are Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and Darfur.
7.2 Yugoslavia. In World War II, Germany occupied many countries and
forced its Nazi racial policies on the occupied populace.
The occupied countries, left alone, probably would not have
joined in the Holocaust.
That certainly was true of
Denmark.
In contrast, following World War II, it has frequently
been the case that genocides are not the result of an
occupying force.
Rather, in recent history, genocides
135 frequently are motivated by those all ready in charge of a
particular state or area.
In these instances, those in
authority prompt the genocide because they believe the
genocide will advance some purpose of their own; and they
rely on the military, or sometimes the police, to implement
the deadly policies.
Those are the organizations with the
weapons and the brute force to execute the will of the
rulers, and the rulers demand and depend upon the
wholehearted commitment of those forces.
They are an
essential, ingredient of the genocide.
These circumstances present an immediate contrast to
the circumstances in Denmark.
There, the national
government was sympathetic to the victims, and the police
forces did not cooperate with those carrying out the
genocide.
Rather, in Denmark, the police often were part
of the solution. Therefore, a military/police force that is
not aligned with the aggressor, and that has the power to
make a difference in the outcome, could be an important
part in preventing genocides and enabling rescues in the
future. As an example of this, consider the genocide in
Yugoslavia.
The genocide in Yugoslavia involved three different
groups: Serbs, Croats and Muslims, all residing in the same
136 country. From 1992-1995 approximately 200,000 people were
killed in what most consider to be a genocide.
As
Yugoslavia began to break up, Bosnia, which has a majority
Muslim population, was attacked by Serbia, which has a
majority Orthodox Christian population. In this genocide,
the military was unquestionably aligned with the Serbs and
was used to carry out mass killings of Bosnia’s Muslims.
Unlike Denmark in World War II, the international
community responded with only ineffectually measures.
No
other nation would help the Bosnians in a way similar to
the specific and directed aid that Sweden offered to the
Jews in Denmark. News reports that Bosnians were subject to
mass shootings and concentration camps were widely
circulated, and yet, no other state offered the kind of
bold aid that Sweden did.
In Denmark, compared to Norway, one of the keys to
rescue was having a military/police that wanted to help the
Jews and had the ability to help. In Bosnia, the local
military/police, in fact, did have compassion for the
Bosnians, as they were themselves Bosnians, but they did
not have the ability to prevent mass murders. They were
strictly and effectively under the minute rule of their
leaders.
So, even though a majority of the military and
137 police in Yugoslavia had compassion for the Bosnians, they
did not have the ability to aid the Bosnians.
In part,
that inability was due to the lack of international
support.
There was no demonstrable action, internal or
from the international community, in support of the
Bosnians or of the military and police who might have
helped the Bosnians.
The genocide resulting from the breakup of Yugoslavia
provides a negative example of the role of the
international community in the genocides. The plight of the
Bosnians was well known as it was happening, and the
international community perceived the events in Yugoslavia
as wrong.
Direct and meaningful action, such as offered by
Sweden to Danes, could have made a difference.
The
evidence suggests that international aid could have tipped
the favor for the military/police forces to have the
institutional will necessary to stop the murders.
International action could have prevented people from
losing their lives, yet there was no international
intervention.
Considering all these factors, one principle that can
be derived from the comparison of Yugoslavia to Denmark is
the following: large-scale, successful rescue operations
138 are enabled by a combination of two conditions, first a
military/police force with the means, either direct or
indirect, and the compassion to assist in rescues; and
second, direct assistance from the international community
in support of rescue operations.
The study of Denmark and
Norway, and the comparison with Yugoslavia, show that the
combination of these factors could have the effect of
deterring or lessening a genocide.
And, if these factors
combine strongly, similar outcomes as those in Denmark
might be achieved.
7.3 Cambodia One predominant reason supporting the Danish rescues
during the Holocaust was that the Danish people saw the
Danish Jews countrymen as Danes first and foremost. One of
the key differences between Denmark and Norway was the
degree of assimilation that was felt between Jewish people
and their fellow countrymen.
Identifying with people has always been part of
helping them. Identity solidifies individuals within a
group, such as race, ethnicity, nationality, religion and
139 other constructs. Within Denmark, nationality was the
primarily identifier.
Within societies people broadly identify themselves in
four ways. First, they identify categories of people – a
soccer fan, a basketball player, a devout follower of a
religion, and similar categories.
Second, they identify
themselves with a particular category – for instance I am a
soccer player. Third, they distinguish – I am a soccer
player and soccer players are different than basketball
players. Finally, they make comparisons – soccer players
are superior to basketball players.
Denmark and its people identified themselves as Danes
within the first category. Danes were Danes, and Jewish
Danes were Danes.
Therefore, other classifications did not
matter as much. Assimilation allows people to see
themselves all as soccer players. All soccer players are
good and are better than non-soccer-players.
This had good
effect in Denmark, but assimilation is not always proof
against genocide,
A genocide in which all the people were “soccer
players” to begin with occurred in Cambodia.
all the victims were countrymen.
In Cambodia
Yet, Pol Pot was able to
murder over 25% of the people of Cambodia. The identifying
140 factor in Cambodia was not nationality, but rather
ideology.
Pol Pot wished to form a communist utopia and did so
through the infamous killing fields. Pol Pot did not kill
people based on their ethnicity, although he did expel all
foreigners and target ethnic minorities. Pol Pot killed
people who were against his ideas.
It was simple.
Everyone against Pol Pot were targets – they could have
been intellectuals, ex-military, or anyone whom Pol Pot
thought was would contaminate his utopian society.
In Cambodia there was no tangible identifying factor
that distinguished those who were killed from those that
were not. All in Cambodia were assimilated – all were
Cambodians.
Yet, some were killed because of what they
were thought to believe or support.
This was strikingly
much unlike the situation in Denmark.
There, the Jewish
Danes openly supported a religion different than the
majority.
Yet, they were not persecuted, at least by their
fellow Danes.
If people in Cambodia, who were essentially all the
same, could not help each other, is the Danish example
situation still valid?
yes.
On reflection, the answer must be
There are contrasts between the two situations. While
141 it is important for people within the community to be
assimilated, as the people in Cambodia were, that alone is
not enough.
occur.
Other elements must be in place for rescues to
One of those other elements that is important is
the support or pressure of the international community.
In
Denmark, there was direct and effective assistance from
Sweden.
There was no equivalent in Cambodia.
7.4 Darfur. When a genocide is occurring within a country or a region,
the administration of that country or region can have a
tremendous affect on the success or failure of rescue
operations.
Both Denmark and Norway were occupied by Germany,
but the Germans allowed much of the national administration of
each country to remain in place.
This was particularly true in
Denmark, but even in Norway, the Germans did not attempt to
supplant all governmental functions.
The fact that local,
sympathetic administrations were still in place did assist the
rescue operations.
The administration or government within a region where
genocide is occurring has the ability to assist rescue
operations, or condone then, or actively resist them.
The
142 administration within a region can influence whether rescue
operations can be organized internally and whether outside,
international efforts will be allowed or banned.
Thus, in the
future, it will be essential to rescue operations that the
administration of a region allows international operations to
assist and for rescue operations to occur. No place can
demonstrate this as much as Darfur.
Recently, the Genocide in Darfur was a favorite cause of
the celebrity world.
Hundreds of celebrities and other
influential people asked the rest of the world to help.
mass killings are real.
There can be no doubt.
The
Celebrities
have done much to raise awareness to a part of the world that
was little known to most modernized peoples.
But solutions,
still, are not simple.
The problems with Sudan are numerous.
In contrast to
Denmark, Norway, Yugoslavia, and Cambodia, most elements of a
modern state are absent in Darfur.
There is no effective police
force, and no credible administration.
In Darfur, the status
has degenerated to a primitive contest of one tribe against the
other:
“when the state is too weak or unwilling to constrain
preemptive action by one group, the other group becomes fearful,
loses confidence in institutional arrangements, deepens the
perception of the hostility of its ethnic rival and prepares for
143 violence.” 120 This is exactly what has happened in the Darfur,
Sudan.
One group routinely perpetrated violence against another
group. The state could, or would, do nothing to halt the
violence; and therefore the cycle of violence continued to
perpetuate itself indefinitely. Yet, the responses of the
international community were muddled and muted. In western
countries, the first response was to avoid entanglement in an
inscrutable affair.
The West cannot hope to change an
ingrained, foreign character where tribal groups have been
fighting each other for many years. 121 Closer to the killings,
the African Union has tried to help, but it is weak.
Without
money and mandate, the Union can do little more than watch.
Darfur’s problems are not exclusive to Sudan.
To some
extent, Africa as a whole suffers from the same conditions.
They are a result of European rule followed by years of neglect.
In terms of governance, the situation is unlike Denmark and
Norway as any that could be imagined.
No other country is stepping up to try to end the conflict.
Military action by an outside force on the ground in Darfur is
120
Stein, Janice Gross. “Image, Identity and the Resolution of Violence
Conflict” Turbulent Peace. 193
121
Peace.
Luttwak, Edward. “The Curse of Inconclusive Intervention.” Turbulent
266.
144 nearly impossible.
Sanctions and other diplomatic measures
might be applied on the anemic government in Khartoum, but the
reaction to such sanctions is not assured. Since Khartoum is
relatively weak, it is questionable whether any pressure applied
to Khartoum could influence events in Darfur.
contrast to the situation in Denmark.
This is a marked
Even during the Nazi
occupation, Demark had a vital and influential government.
This type of indecision by the international community
remains a part of the modern African experience; many other
countries in Africa experience the same indecisiveness.
It
could be explained by a realist perspective adopted by outside
nations.
Since many local wars in Africa do not harm central
western interests, unlike conflict in the Balkans, the need to
intervene is not as high. Of course, without intervention, the
lives of thousands are lost while other states stand silently
and watch, doing nothing.
There have been numerous efforts to bring United Nations
peace-keepers into Sudan.
Khartoum, however, has resisted.
Unlike the African Union troops, the UN entry, Khartoum
claims, would constitute a violation of its sovereignty.
Khartoum only wants other Africans to solve the problem.
Therefore, only African nations can be part of the
145 peacekeeping force. In deference to Khartoum, the United
Nations does not intervene.
The United Nations debates ― when does a country
lose its right to sovereignty if its people are being killed
by the thousands and nothing is being done?
Nations intervene?
Will the United
At least in the case of the Sudan, the
answer is that that the United Nations has not taken
decisive action.
The United Nations, under the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement 122 has United Nations peacekeepers in Southern Sudan. 123 The United Nations mandate,
however, is even less than that of the African Union.
The
UN forces can only watch the African Union troops, who can
only watch as well. Beyond that, and a few Security Council
and General Assembly resolutions – words on paper-- little
has been done to try to stop the atrocities in Darfur.
Compared to the rescue operations in Denmark, the lack
of action, at all levels, in Darfur is striking.
In World
War II, Denmark’s government stated that the Danes should
help the Jewish people. Without that first acknowledgment,
122
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is a series of agreements, some of
which include a permanent cease-fire, a constitution and an national
oil commission. Embassy of Sudan. “The Comprehensive Peace Agreement.”
12-31-2006.
http://www.sudanembassy.org/default.asp?page=viewstory&id=484
123
Feinstein, Lee. Darfur and Beyond: What is Needed to Prevent Mass
Atrocities. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2007). 38.
146 intervention will not happen.
international assistance.
The citizens of Denmark took
action to rescue Danish Jews.
respect.
There was direct and positive
Darfur is different in every
Khartoum is weak and has no influence.
One tribe
sees no reason to stop the violence against another tribe.
The international community, it seems, looks only for
convenient excuses not to become involved.
To combat the problems in the Sudan, the United States,
the European Union, and the United Nations will have to
revisit the lessons of World War II.
They must step up
diplomatic, military, and humanitarian presence in the area.
They can be the international agencies to support an end to
the mass killings.
Some believe that only then can peace be
achieved. Yet currently, the United States and the European
Union have done little more than acknowledge the genocide in
Darfur. 124 As shown in Denmark, this is one important step in
taking action, it cannot be the only step.
If in the future genocides can be prevented or the scale
lessened, lessons from Denmark need to be learned and
applied.
Governments and the international community need
to intervene.
124
Feinstein, Lee. Darfur and Beyond: What is Needed to Prevent Mass
Atrocities. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2007). 42.
147 7.5 Conclusion It will never be possible to stop people from killing
each other. Perhaps though, mass killings can be stopped or
mitigated. The lessons from Denmark – a government disposed
to assist, international aid, assimilation, a compassionate
police force, and a bit of luck – are important.
What cannot be changed is the way people view each
other. Over time, acceptance and tolerance can be taught.
Denmark shows us that if rescue operations are to be
successful, some degree of assimilation must have taken
place before the genocide starts. In addition, other
genocides show us that the military/police must have some
compassion and must be flexible enough to work with the
people being persecuted on some level. Lastly, the
international community must intervene or aid the people
being persecuted in some useful way, unlike what happened
in Bosnia and Darfur.
148 Chapter Eight: Conclusion The essential nature of genocides have not really
changed since the first occurred thousands of years ago.
What has changed is the way of thinking about genocides,
what they mean for our collective future and ways to
prevent them from occurring or ways to stop them once they
have started.
However, understanding alone is not prevention, just
as understanding that germs cause a cold does not prevent
you from catching one. In order to prevent genocide the
world must invent antibiotics for genocides and armed
conflict which often lead to genocides. The example of
Denmark is a good beginning in this investigation.
It
shows that genocides can be thwarted, and it is an example
of the basic ingredients needed to create a genocide
antibiotic.
Denmark, and to some extent Norway, show us successful
rescue operations during genocide. The lessons learned,
particularly from Denmark, are that several elements can
combine to produce successful rescue operations.
These
include a government that is active and is disposed to
assist, international aid, assimilation, a compassionate
149 police force, and a bit of luck. Not all of these elements
must exist, but the lack of some of them makes efforts to
thwart the genocide or to rescue victims less effective.
In Norway, the Jews were not fully assimilated, as
they were in Denmark.
Also, the government was not
demonstrative in supporting rescue efforts. That dampened
rescue efforts in Norway, as compared to Denmark.
In Denmark the police were sympathetic to the Jews,
and they frequently took affirmative actions to assist
rescue efforts.
And, in Denmark, Sweden offered a safe
refuge alike to Jews and to those who aided the Jews. In
Yugoslavia the military/police forces were sympathetic to
the Bosnians, but they did not aid them.
No international
support was offered to the Bosnians or to anyone who might
aid them.
In Denmark the Jews were fully assimilated into Danish
society.
In Norway, the Jews were not assimilated, and
that fact did decrease the success of rescue efforts in
Norway.
However, in Cambodia almost all victims of the
genocide were Cambodians.
They were fully assimilated, yet
they were victims of genocide.
This illustrates that a
single factor cannot explain a genocide.
Although the
victims in Cambodia were assimilated, there was not
150 international aid, there was no sympathetic police, and the
government itself encouraged, rather than resisted, the
genocide.
In Darfur, there is no influential government at all.
There is no international influence or aid.
rather than assimilation prevails.
Tribalism,
There is no common
police or military force to preserve the peace, let alone
attempt to aid the victims.
A final element was mentioned in connection with the
Danish rescue operations that was not mentioned in
connection to any of the other examples.
That is luck.
As
commonly understood, luck cannot be invoked or summoned on
command.
It comes and goes according to its own will.
It
is included in this discussion, particularly, in regard to
Denmark, to remind that even people with the best
intentions do not have perfect control over all events.
It
is inevitable that some element of random chance will
affect all these activities.
So it was that, even with the
most favorable set of conditions, not all Danish rescue
efforts were successful.
And so it has been that, even
with dismal circumstances, some rescues from Cambodia and
from Darfur have been successful.
It is important to
remember that “luck” does play some role, and we do not
151 control it.
So, the lesion is those things we can control
―- the attitude of the government, assimilation, or at
least tolerance and acceptance, international concern and
aid, and sympathy of one citizen for another ― must be
focused to present genocide.
While identifying differences and applying them to
genocides cannot actually prevent them, learning about them
can possibly prevent future genocides.
The ability to
protect citizens from those persecuting them is one of the
greatest lessons that can be learned by studying the
genocides and rescue efforts that have occurred at
different times and places.
We must further explore
genocides that have happened so that we can learn if there
are possible warning signs of potential problems.
Denmark shows us that a successful rescue can happen.
The question is: can it happen again? The exact context and
circumstances cannot be replicated, but perhaps work can be
done to make sure that some of the conditions can be met so
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