CONWAY CABAL
Was there a secret plot to remove
George Washington as commander in
chief in the winter of 1777-1778?
Viewpoint: Yes. Washington's critics sought to replace him with General Horatio Gates in an attempt to restore leadership and salvage some measure of
victory in the American Revolution.
Viewpoint: No. There is no evidence of a cabal against George Washington.
Criticism of Washington's military abilities reflected the discontent common in
an open society during wartime, not part of a plot to overthrow him as commanding general.
Many students are surprised to learn that George Washington was
viewed by some contemporaries as a "weak-willed" and "vacillating" general
whose "talents for the command of an Army . . . were miserable indeed."
These harsh criticisms of Washington, made during America's darkest hour of
the War of Independence (1775-1783), had some merit. After all, he had lost
New York City (1776) and Philadelphia (1777) and had suffered many defeats
on the battlefield. During the winter of 1777-1778 the anemic Continental
Army was wasting away at Valley Forge. Whig officials in both Congress and
the military began to question whether the decision to give Washington command of the Continental Army had been the correct one. Some openly
expressed the conviction that the American cause would be better served if
General Horatio Gates, the hero of Saratoga, were placed in command of the
American troops.
92
Thus, when Washington received word in early November 1777 that
General Thomas Conway, a self-serving and ambitious Frenchman serving in
the Continental Army, had cast aspersions on his generalship in a letter to
Gates and implied that the latter deserved to be in charge of the whole army,
the commander in chief and his staff suspected a cabal. Washington
responded with a curt and acrimonious note to Conway, who wrote back that
there was nothing improper in his conduct and denied making specific criticisms of the commanding general. When Gates learned that Washington was
aware of the contents of Conway's missive, he wrote Washington a letter that
made him even more suspicious. Washington responded with a caustic note.
His angst increased when Congress placed Conway, Gates, and other
anti-Washington officials on a reorganized Board of War and charged them
with monitoring daily military activities. Washington's suspicions were confirmed, at least in his mind, when Congress promoted Conway to a major
generalship over twenty-three more-senior officers and named him inspector
general of the army with the authority to report directly to the Board of War
rather than through the commanding general. However, neither Gates nor
Conway were able to use their new positions against Washington, if that was
their intention. Conway soon resigned from the Army and returned to France,
while Gates apologized to Washington and solemnly declared that "I am of no
faction." By March 1778 the friction between the commander in chief, his
officers, and Congress had died down. The Conway Cabal, if there had ever
been one, quietly fizzled out.
Although Washington was convinced that Gates "was to be exalted on the ruin of my reputation
and influence," historians disagree as to whether any real cabal actually existed. No matter what
position one takes, though, any thorough examination of this dispute must address this question:
when does the normal opposition to any leader reach the state of organization necessary to qualify
as a cabal?
In any event, an investigation of the alleged plot raises some interesting questions involving
Washington and the Continental Congress. For example, what does this alleged plot reveal about
how contemporaries viewed Washington before the American people were, as John Adams put it,
"guilty of idolatry in making a man their God?" What does Washington's reaction to this perceived cabal reveal about his personality? What does the event reveal about the nature of Congressional politics? Finally, what were the important consequences of this plot, real or not, on
Washington and the Congress?
Viewpoint:
Yes. Washington's critics sought to
replace him with General Horatio
Gates in an attempt to restore
leadership and salvage some
measure of victory in the
American Revolution.
In the fall of 1777 General George Washington received word that General Thomas Conway
had made disparaging remarks about him in a letter to the American commander of the Northern
Department, General Horatio Gates. In that missive Conway referred to Washington's performance as the American commander in chief in
negative terms and concluded that, "Heaven has
been determined to save your Country; or a weak
General and bad Counsellors would have ruined
it." Once Washington had learned of this letter,
he confronted Gates and demanded an explanation. Gates quickly apologized for any misunderstanding and indicated that Conway's reference
represented nothing more than private criticism
that, through an unfortunate chain of events,
became public. This exchange between Washington and Gates represented the climax of an
attempt on the part of Gates and his supporters
in the Army and Congress to supplant Washington as the commander in chief of the Continental
Army. This conspiracy was known as the "Conway Cabal."
Historians have reached a consensus that the
plot against Washington was more myth than
reality; that it was merely an incident in which
private criticism was made public. Scholarly literature on the cabal falls into three basic categories.
The first group views the matter as primarily
resulting from the paranoia suffered by Washington after his poor showing on the battlefield during the 1777 campaign. These scholars, however,
seem more concerned with vindicating Gates
than thoroughly investigating the questions at
hand. The second group accepts the cabal as a
real plot against Washington. These scholars
believe that Richard Henry Lee of Virginia; Samuel Adams, John Adams, and James Lovell of
Massachusetts; and Benjamin Rush of Pennsylvania led the Congressional effort to supplant
Washington with Gates. These historians, however, attempt to restore Washington's reputation
and refute any suggestion that the commander in
chief was delusional. As a result, their conclusions
raise as many questions as they answer. A third
group recognizes that dissension within the
ranks of the Continental Army, along with
Gates's ambition, made for a volatile situation.
These scholars acknowledge the scarcity of evidence for the plot but suggest much more was
involved than Washington fighting phantoms created in his mind.
A significant part of the problem in ascertaining the existence of a plot against Washington
rests in the rumors that were circulated through
Congress and the army by his many critics and
British Loyalists. Many of these rumors have
been proven to be specious at best and patently
false at worst. As a result, scholars tend to view
the cabal in a similar vein. Yet, sorting through
the rumors and innuendo allows not only for an
understanding of the Conway Cabal but also for
a clearer delineation of the fissures between various political factions in Congress. By linking the
intrigue of the cabal with dissension in the Continental Congress, the effort to remove Washington as commander in chief of the Continental
Army becomes far more than a mere grab for
power by Gates and his cohorts. It represents an
attempt on the part of some leaders in the Army
and in Congress to capitalize on Washington's
military failures to bring the American Revolution (1775-1783) to a speedy end.
An historical assessment of the Conway
Cabal and its significance has been hampered by
its name, which places Brigadier General Conway
at the center of the scheme when he clearly was
not. Consequently, Revolutionary War scholars
focus on the plot in an exclusively military sphere
and place primary emphasis on the relationship
between Washington and Gates. The important
political dimension has been lost as a result. The
H I S T O R Y IN DISPUTE, V O L U M E 12: THE A M E R I C A N R E V O L U T I O N
93
Continental Army was under civilian controlhence, the delegates to the Continental Congress
played a primary role in handling military affairs;
and there is ample reason to believe that Gates
and his allies would not have been nearly as bold
in their conduct if they did not believe they had
support from key members of Congress. Traditionally, when seeking out the anti-Washington
faction in Congress, scholars have set their sights
on Samuel Adams and Lee, suggesting that on
the political end these two men were at the center
of the plot. Adams and Lee have been cleared of
any such involvement; that being the case, then,
Gates must have been relying on others to lend
him the patronage and support he needed to satisfy his own ambitions. Gates's most trusted
friends in Congress were either part of or in some
way affiliated with the Pennsylvania delegation.
Thomas Mifflin and Richard Peters were among
the closest friends of Gates. The question that
94
remains unanswered, however, concerns how
removing Washington as commander in chief
would serve the Pennsylvanians' interests.
The year 1777 was a difficult one for the
American cause; it was the "year of the hangman,"
as John Adams cogently observed—a comment that
applied especially well after the spring 1777 campaign came to an end. Washington's performance
on the field of battle left much to be desired, and
the British troops under the command of British
general Sir William Howe occupied Philadelphia,
the new nation's capital. According to traditional
rules of warfare, the capture of Philadelphia meant,
at least symbolically, the end of the war. Washington's formal surrender was all that was lacking, but
as long as Washington kept his army in the field,
the war was still on. The British occupation of Philadelphia, and Washington's refusal to surrender,
represented the crucial components of what
became known as the Conway Cabal.
HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE A M E R I C A N R E V O L U T I O N
After two years of the Rebels fighting the British, the merchant community in Philadelphia was
ready to negotiate an end to the war. Unfortunately
for them, as long as the Continental Army
remained active and Washington had loyal advocates in Congress, negotiations would never take
place. Consequently, the most direct solution was
to replace Washington with a general more conducive to ending the war with Great Britain. Typically, scholars suggest the reason Gates's name
surfaced as Washington's logical replacement was
Gates's stunning victory over the British at
Saratoga in October 1777. Many delegates in Congress viewed Gates as a winning general and saw his
leadership as a sharp contrast to Washington's
rather lackluster performance. Such observations
certainly applied to Washington's more outspoken
New England critics; the adulations for Gates
flowed from these men because New England was
the primary target of British general John Burgoyne's Hudson Highland strategy during the fall
1777 campaign. New Englanders were confident
that if they put Gates in command the defeat of the
British would soon be at hand. The Pennsylvanians
had a different idea in mind. In Gates they saw a
commander who would be more willing to negotiate an end to the war. It was no secret that Gates
had little respect for the Continental Army and its
commander; he believed that any serious argument
that the American rabble in arms could actually
defeat the British Army was specious at best.
Gates also had much to gain personally by
assuming command of the Continental Army and
then taking a lead role in a negotiated surrender
with the British. Support for American independence never ran deep, and this observation applies
to members of Congress as well as the general public. John Adams once suggested that one-third supported independence, one- third opposed, and
one-third had no opinion on the matter. Although
Adams's clean division may not bear scrutiny, it is
fair to say that the strongest advocates for independence were always in a tenuous situation. As a
result, if Gates brought about a negotiated peace, a
significant percentage of the population would herald him as a hero.
The British, similarly, were looking for an end
to the war in 1777. As British spies kept Parliament
and the King's ministers apprised of American
progress in hammering out an alliance with France,
Crown officials actively sought to end the war in
America before it expanded. Clearly, Washington
was not interested in such talk; neither were the
general's friends in Congress. As a result, General
Howe reached out to those who were interested,
and his most likely audience were those residing in
Philadelphia during the British occupation.
The Pennsylvanians also had much to gain by
achieving peace. From the outset of the Revolutionary War, they were, at best, reluctant revolu-
tionaries. Pennsylvania's colonial economy thrived
as a result of funneling a variety of British-made
goods through Philadelphia for trade among other
colonists as well as with Native American groups
living along the frontier. Independence threatened
to undermine this activity. By facilitating an end to
the war, Pennsylvanians hoped that transatlantic
commerce could resume. As far as they were concerned, the War for American Independence was a
losing venture.
It is important to note that the Pennsylvanians did not develop this attitude as a result of
Washington's failures as commander in chief of the
Continental Army or simply as a result of the British occupation of Philadelphia; it was prevalent
from the outset of the conflict with Great Britain.
As the First Continental Congress debated the
issue of independence, it was a Pennsylvanian delegate, Joseph Galloway, who emerged as the leader
of a reconciliation attempt; and it was another
Pennsylvanian, John Dickinson, who tried to prevent a prolonged war with his famed "Olive Branch
Petition" in 1775. After 4 July 1776 the question
of independence became a moot issue. Galloway
left America and returned to England; Dickinson
drafted a new plan of government that provided for
a strong central government akin to Parliament.
According to the Pennsylvanians, before the
war could be ended, however, a change in American
leadership, both in Congress and on the field of
battle, had to be achieved. In pursuit of this goal
those who sought peace and reconciliation with
Britain conducted an active campaign to tarnish the
reputations of, and remove from office, Washington's core support in Congress—namely, Lee and
Samuel Adams. By associating Lee and Adams
with a plot to remove Washington as commander
in chief, they hoped to break the hold that their
junto had in Congress. Rumors circulating in the
spring of 1777 were designed to try to force Lee
and Adams to deny publicly their involvement in
the effort against the general and thus alienate
them from their New England base, which
included Washington's most vocal critics. The
attempt failed because Lee and Adams never
addressed the rumors publicly; privately, they discounted them as the ranting of their political opponents. Lee and Washington discussed the rumors
frankly in their correspondence, which undercuts
any serious consideration that Lee sought to
replace Washington.
As convoluted as this scheme may seem, it
does reflect a high degree of brilliance. No matter
how Lee and Adams responded to the rumors,
members of the Pennsylvania delegation would
gain an advantage. If Lee and Adams denounced
the rumors publicly, their influence in Congress
would be weakened because they risked alienating
themselves from those New Englanders who supported replacing Washington; if they ignored the
HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE A M E R I C A N R E V O L U T I O N
95
rumors, Washington's control over the Continental Army was undermined. The actual British occupation of Philadelphia added an important
dimension to the plot. As members of Congress
fled the city to avoid the British, Washington's critics were emboldened to take further steps to
achieve their goal. Following the surrender of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga, Washington's critics
launched an initiative to reorganize the Board of
War and named Gates as president of the group in
November 1777. Gates's appointment technically
elevated him above Washington in respect to the
overall chain of command, and there was a strong
possibility that those responsible for the reorganization hoped that Washington would resign his
command as a result. The steadfastness exhibited
by the general and his loyal supporters in Congress,
however, effectively nullified the reorganization
plan. Consequently, the overall campaign to
remove Washington as commander in chief quickly
unraveled. Conway resigned his commission; Gates
denied any involvement; and the overall push for
gaining independence and securing the French alliance gained renewed vigor.
Historians who dispute the existence of the
Conway Cabal have failed to recognize the plot
because they have used a narrow lens to view a
broad panorama of events. The central elements of
the plot have been overlooked; therefore, these
scholars conclude, the plot never existed outside of
Washington's mind. By incorporating the crucial
political dimension of the cabal, it becomes clear
that Washington's critics, however, were seriously
pursuing an agenda with the intent of removing
him as commander in chief of the Continental
Army in order to salvage at least some measure of
victory in what they increasingly regarded as a lost
cause, the War for American Independence.
-J. KENT MCGAUGHY, HOUSTON
COMMUNITY COLLEGE (NORTHWEST)
Viewpoint:
No. There is no evidence of a cabal
against George Washington.
Criticism of Washington's military
abilities reflected the discontent
common in an open society
during wartime, not part of a
plot to overthrow him as
commanding general.
Prior to the 1777 campaign, American civil
and military leaders hoped for a decisive victory
that would win independence from Great Britain. An American force of Continentals and militia under General Horatio Gates won a decisive
96
victory at Saratoga in October, forcing a British
army of more than five thousand troops to surrender. It was the most impressive American victory of the war to that point. General George
Washington's main American army, however,
lost two battles to Sir William Howe's redcoats.
The British occupied Philadelphia, the largest
North American city, and forced the Continental
Congress to evacuate to cramped and expensive
quarters in York. Washington's army, meanwhile,
made winter camp at Valley Forge, eighteen
miles northwest of Philadelphia. These developments sparked a controversy that winter, as
Washington and his officers, sensitive because of
the contrast between their failure and Gates's
success, suspected that a cabal, or conspiracy, was
afoot. They believed that this cabal, a combination of disaffected officers and disgruntled members of Congress, aimed to remove Washington
and make Gates commander in chief.
To understand this controversy, it is important to consider the significance of honor to gentlemen officers and that jealousy was an
important component of republican ideology.
Continental Army officers considered themselves gentlemen above the common rank and
file. Officers staked everything on their honor or
reputation. Though they imitated their British
and French counterparts, they inevitably fell
short of the mark. British and French officers
came from monarchical and stratified societies
with genuine nobilities. American officers lacked
noble status and relied on their property and
gentility to buttress their position. Their station
thus rested on an unstable foundation, and they
tended to be insecure, sensitive to any slights to
their honor. Washington was more sensitive than
most. Throughout his military career he blamed
others for his mistakes and frequently overreacted to any perceived threat to his reputation.
American soldiers were fighting to establish
a republican form of government. Accepted wisdom told Americans that republics were fragile
entities dependent on the virtue of citizens. Virtuous citizens placed the common good over
their selfish desires. Yet, Americans also knew
that man was inherently selfish and easily
tempted by power. Recognizing that power
always threatened liberty, republican citizens had
to maintain an attitude of jealousy or suspicion.
Gossip and the timing of unrelated events
lay at the bottom of the so-called Conway Cabal.
After the victory at Saratoga, Gates dispatched
his aide, James Wilkinson, to inform Congress.
Usually an aide entrusted with such an honor
rushed to complete his assignment. Wilkinson
behaved differently, however, and tarried at taverns along the way, spreading the story that Gates
had received a letter from General Thomas Con-
HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE A M E R I C A N R E V O L U T I O N
way, an Irish-born French officer, that harshly
criticized Washington's military leadership.
Upon hearing this news, Washington
reacted angrily and sent Conway a curt letter that
quoted the words the Irishman supposedly had
written to Gates: "Heaven has determined to
save your Country; or a weak General and bad
Counsellors would have ruined it." Conway
denied using these exact words but admitted that
he had deprecated Washington's military advisers. In a later letter he pointedly reminded Washington that in European armies it was customary
for officers to criticize their superiors. In a free
society, which was what the Continentals were
supposedly fighting to establish, it was imperative that frank and open discussion be allowed.
Congress, meanwhile, addressed a major
concern—the condition of Washington's army.
Because poor training seemed to be a major factor in the recent losses at Brandywine (11 September 1777) and Germantown (4 October
1777), Congress wanted to designate an officer
to drill the soldiers. Impressed by Conway's military background and his performance since arriving in America, the delegates appointed him
inspector general, which gave him the rank of
major general. Conway's appointment occurred
on 6 November, only two days before Washington learned of the comments the Irishman had
supposedly made. When news of his appointment reached the main army's camp, brigadier
generals raised an immediate protest, although as
a staff officer Conway had no authority over any
line officers he outranked.
At the same time, Congress made other
decisions that proved controversial. On 17 October 1777 the delegates, in response to Washington's plea that his soldiers be better supplied,
had established the Board of War, a committee
of three men devoted to army administration. In
November Congress appointed Gates to chair
the committee. The other two members,
Thomas Mifflin and Timothy Pickering, had
made disparaging comments about the officers
surrounding Washington. Mifflin, a former aide
to Washington, was also suspected of harboring
ill will toward the commander in chief.
Washington; his closest associates, General
Nathanael Greene, General Henry Knox, the
Marquis de Lafayette; and his young aides,
Colonels Alexander Hamilton, John Laurens,
and Tench Tilghman saw in these developments
too many coincidences. Coming on the heels of
the reports about Conway's remarks, they concluded that Congress was moving to supplant
Washington. Not surprisingly, Conway encountered a chilly welcome when he arrived at headquarters in late December to begin instructing
the troops. Washington's adherents spread stories that Conway was guilty of cowardice at the
AMERICA UNDONE
BY HERSELF?
In earty 1778 Virginia governor Patrick Henry received an anonymous letter that called for an immediate Change in American military feademhip;
he forwarded it to George Washington. The handwriting was identified as
belonging to &rf Benjamin Hush, one of the medical directors of the Continental Amy:
A dreary wilderness is still before us, and unless a
Moses or a Joshua are raised up in our behalf, we must
perish before we reach the promised land. We have nothing to fear from our enemies on the way. General Howe, it
is true, has taken Philadelphia; but he has only changed
his prison. His dominions are bounded on all sides by his
outsentries. America can only be undone by herself. She
looks up to her councils and arms for protection, but alas!
What are they? Her representation in Congress dwindled
to only twenty-one members* Her Adams, her Wilson, her
Henry, are no more among them, Her counsels weak,
and partial remedies applied constantly for universal diseases. Her army—what is it? A major general belonging
to it called it a few days ago in my hearing a mob, Discipline unknown, or wholfy neglected. The quartermaster's
and commissaries* departments filled with idleness and
ignorance and peculation. Our hospitals crowded with
6000 sick but half provided with necessaries or accommodations, and more dying in them in one month than
perished in the field during the whole of the last campaign. The money depreciating without any effectual
measures being taken to raise it, The country distracted
with the Don Quixote attempts to regulate the prices of
provision; and a/f0da/famine created by it and a rea/one
dreaded from it. The spirit of the people failing through a
more intimate acquaintance wtth the causes of our misfortunes—many submitting daily to General Howe, and
more wishing to do it only to avoid the calamities which
threaten our country.
But is our case desperate? By no means* We have
wisdom, virtue and strength enough to save us if they
could be called into action. The northern army has
shown us what Americans are capable of doing with a
GENERAL at their head, The spirit of the southern army
is no ways inferior to the spirit of the northern. A Gates, a
Lee, or a Conway would in a few weeks render them an
irresistible body of men* The last of the above officers
has accepted the new office of inspector general of our
army in order to reform abuses. But this remedy is only a
palliative one, fn one of his letters to a friend he says, "A
great and good God hath decreed America to be free, or
the - - - - and weak counselors would have ruined
her long ago.*' You may rest assured of each of the facts
related in this letter. The author of it is one of your Philadelphia friends. A hint of his name, if found out by the
handwriting, must not be mentioned to your most intimate friend. Even the letter must be thrown in the fire*
Source: Benjamin Rush, Letters of Benjamin Rush, volume 1,
edited toy L H. BiMerfield (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
WS1), pp, 1B2-m,
HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE A M E R I C A N R E V O L U T I O N
97
battle of Germantown and had intrigued to win
an unmerited appointment. Washington, in
turn, submitted to Congress copies of his correspondence with Conway. Within a month Congress transferred Conway to the upper Hudson
River in New York to take part in a proposed
invasion of Canada.
Washington also exchanged a series of letters with Gates, who acknowledged corresponding with Conway but denied that the Irishman
had written the statement attributed to him.
Despite these disavowals, Washington believed
that Gates was evasive. Though there is no evidence that Gates was involved in any machinations, he did receive letters critical of
Washington's generalship from Congressman
James Lovell, Benjamin Rush, and possibly Conway as well. It is not surprising that these letters
were sent to the victor at Saratoga, especially considering how his army's triumph contrasted with
the performance of Washington's main army.
Still, Gates could have helped matters by defending the commander in chief. His silence suggested that he tacitly endorsed the criticisms.
Washington's supporters did not remain
inactive. Major John Clark, aide to Greene, suggested that "a duel or two" would silence the
aspersions cast against Washington and his main
advisors. Some officers took direct action. During
a visit to camp, the Board of War's secretary, Richard Peters, encountered an angry Colonel Daniel
Morgan. In an argument that almost turned violent, Morgan accused Peters of involvement in a
conspiracy against Washington. Lafayette worried
that some members of Congress had resolved that
Gates be commander in chief. Lieutenant Colonel
John Laurens wrote to his father, Henry, president of Congress, and complained that Conway
had influence with a faction headed by Mifflin
that aimed to remove Washington. Hoping to persuade his father and other delegates loyal to Washington to act, Laurens wrote, "I hope some
virtuous and patriotic men will form a Countermine to blow up this pernicious Junto."
Members of Congress tried to calm these
concerns. While some delegates had vented their
disappointment at the performance of Washington's army, Congress still backed its commanding
general. In response to Knox's intimation that
Congress had turned against Washington, Massachusetts politician and member of the Continental Congress Elbridge Gerry wrote, "How then
can we account for such groundless rumours at a
time when the character of this worthy officer is
high in congress, and when there appears to be an
intention of the members to support him." Henry
Laurens assured Lafayette that "the friends of our
brave & virtuous General, may rest assured that he
is out of the reach of his Enemies, if he has an
Enemy, a fact of which I am in doubt of." Because
98
HISTORY IN DISPUTE,
Laurens was among the more jealous republicans,
his testimony is especially persuasive.
While these letters might have temporarily
allayed the worries of Washington's officers, their
suspicions were again aroused in late January
when Congress approved the Board of War's
plans for an expedition to Canada. Congress
appointed Lafayette to lead the invasion and
chose Conway as second in command. Because
Lafayette was a French Catholic, the delegates
hoped he would inspire Canadians to separate
from Britain. It made sense to separate Conway
from Washington's headquarters, where he was
not welcome, and place the French officer where
he could be of service. Apparently, most of the
delegates were unaware that Lafayette detested
Conway. Hungry for military fame, Lafayette
wanted the command, but he refused to serve
with Conway. Washington's officers connected
the proposed expedition with the plot they had
uncovered earlier. Already distrustful of the Board
of War, they were upset that the committee had
not consulted Washington on the invasion of
Canada. Some officers believed Congress hoped
to separate Lafayette from Washington and place
the young Frenchman under the malicious influence of Conway.
In reality there were sound military arguments against the invasion. Lack of manpower
and sufficient supplies forced Congress to cancel
the expedition in late March. At that point tempers began to cool. Both Gates and Mifflin
resigned from the Board of War, apparently for
reasons unrelated to the controversy. Gates
returned to his former command of the Northern
Department. Despite the strains in his relationship with Washington, the two men resumed their
military collaboration. As for Conway, he grew
restless after the expedition to Canada was canceled. When Congress did not grant him an independent command, he resigned his commission.
Conway fought a duel with John Cadwalader, a
Pennsylvania militia officer who took offense at
the acerbic Irishman's statements. Though
wounded in the mouth, Conway survived and
returned to France, where he continued his military career with distinction.
Washington thereafter distrusted Gates and
Mifflin, but by May 1778 he no longer suspected
civilian leaders and even said that "no whisper" of
his dismissal from command "was ever heard in
Congress." Despite the atmosphere of suspicion
and recrimination in the winter of 1778, there is
no documented evidence to prove the existence of
an organized effort to remove Washington.
Instead, a combination of factors combined to
produce the appearance of a cabal where none
existed.
VOLUME 12: THE A M E R I C A N REVOLUTION
-GREGORY D. MASSEY,
FREED-HARDEMAN UNIVERSITY
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James Kirby Martin, Benedict Arnold, Revolutionary Hero: An American Warrior Reconsidered
(New York: New York University Press,
1997).
Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable
Army: The Military Origins of the Republic,
Washington, The Writings of George Washington
from the Original Manuscript Sources, 17451799, 39 volumes, edited by John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1931-1944).
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