Democratic Performance and
Legitimacy of Parties in Europe
By: Hans Keman
VU University Amsterdam
Published in: in: West European Politics, 37/2: 309-330.
2
Abstract: This paper reports an explorative analysis on the development of
legitimacy across 20 European democracies. I contend that processes representing
democratic performance are conducive to changes in legitimacy. A conceptual and
empirical discussion is presented to establish this relationship. Democratic
performance appears to change due to less trust in parties as representatives and
variations in government efficacy. The empirical analysis shows that both responsive
(relating electorates to parties) and responsible (relating parties to government) party
behaviour are not always performing to expectation. Institutional factors and party
behaviour indicate that parties’ responsiveness is hardly representative and
governmental responsibility is closer to party interests than to public concern. Hence,
there seems to be a democratic deficit across Europe reinforced by voting behaviour,
the emergence of new parties, lower rates of survival and higher rates of innovation
of party government. This affects the efficacy of government, responsive and
responsible party behaviour and in the end political legitimacy. [154 words]
3
1.
Introduction
Legitimacy within European democracies appears to be waning of late. If satisfaction with
democracy is considered as an indication then it appears that - according to the European Social
Survey - around 4 per cent of the population in 20 European nations thought that democracy
worked less well in their country than in 1995. However, the differences across Europe are big:
In Greece the change was more than 50 per cent negative, whereas in Poland 35,5 per cent saw
improvement. The same applies to the efficacy of government: the negative change is –13,8 per
cent. Italy decreased dramatically (-82,2), whereas the Czech Republic went up with almost 40
points according to the World Bank.
Arguably this development in Europe is due to a weakening of the democratic
performance of parties and government in Europe. Peter Mair has expressed this concern
regularly by focussing on the role of parties and party government. In his view many parties tend
to become more self-interested thereby not fulfilling their original functions and thus harming
the quality of party democracy (Katz, 2006). If Mair’s argument is tenable, then it follows that
this degrading party behaviour may well affect the political legitimacy across European
democracy. In this paper I will attempt to elaborate the relationship between democratic
performance and legitimacy (a concept that is as complex as ‘nailing a pudding to the wall’). We
will examine party behaviour as a crucial link between democratic performance and levels and
changes in political legitimacy.
Legitimacy is defined as the popular compliance with and acceptance of political
authority (Beetham, 1994) and will be analysed comparatively as a systemic outcome of
variations in the democratic performance of political parties in parliament and government
within its institutional fabric (Keman, 2002b). Central to democratic performance is the degree
of ‘responsiveness’ as an outcome of parties’ behaviour towards electors based on their trust of
(and delegating power to) political parties, parliament and government and the ‘responsible’
performance of parties’ behaviour (acting as ‘trustees’ of all) in parliament towards government.
The central question of this paper is therefore: to what extent parties, in and out government,
enhance by means of their behaviour the democratic performance by representing the ‘demos’
(electorate) in a responsive manner and by directing governmental actions in a responsible way
in order to gain popular consent and subsequently to maintaining legitimacy?
The paper is structured as follows: First, the concepts of democratic performance and
legitimacy will be elaborated; secondly, measurements of both legitimacy and democratic
performance are developed to observe the changes in democratic performance and legitimacy
across Europe; thirdly, some explanations will be offered and explored by means of a
4
comparative empirically driven analysis1. We conclude by discussing the observations made and
explanations offered.
2.
Legitimacy and democratic performance
Since Max Weber we assume that a legitimate state is considered essential for ‘good
governance’ allowing for the justifiable or satisfactory and rightful (i.e. lawful) exercise of state
power and authority over and within a society. The more responsive parties and governments
perform and also responsibly deliver policies, the kinder and gentler society will be and
legitimacy may be expected to be maintained (see also: Putnam, 1993; Andrain and Smith, 2006;
Lijphart, 2008). Hence, parties and governments are expected to play the democratic ‘game’
according to its normative and legal rules: – i.e. responsive and responsible policy formation
(see: Keman, 2002b; Budge et al., 2012). The more this is the case the stronger the democratic
performance will be and thus the legitimacy of the system.
Political legitimacy is considered to the systemic outcome of variations in democratic
performance produced by political parties within 20 European democracies (see Table 1 for the
cases included). Hence, democratic performance is the independent variable and legitimacy is
the dependent variable (Keman, 2002a). This approach to political legitimacy is hardly examined
and instead legitimacy is considered to be an effect-producing factor shaped by the institutional
design of its democratic polity thereby enhancing the political stability (Schmidt, 2008; Olsen,
2009). Yet, it appears to be a more tenable hypothesis that legitimacy must be ‘earned’ by the
lynchpin of modern democracy: political parties. This is manifested in the popular acceptance
(or: consent) of the political regime. In addition, it is expected that the exercise of public
authority is ‘lawful’ and can be impartially scrutinized (i.e. Rule of Law). Taken in this sense,
legitimacy allows for transforming the need for coercion into compliance with the exercise of
state powers in a peaceful but authoritative manner (Beetham, 1994; Weede, 1996). In short,
legitimate government is allowed and expected to steering the ship of state effectively (with
lower transaction costs) and peacefully (with low levels of protest). Hence, responsive and
responsible part behaviour is the benchmark of ‘good governance’ contributing to public
welfare, popular acceptance and peaceful compliance with political authority (Beetham, 1994;
Foweraker, 2002; Gilley, 2006).
1
The approach is comparative and the method is based on empirical statistical analysis (see: Pennings et
al., 2006). The data in use are electoral results – surveys – party programmes – party system features government data – institutional variation like: European Journal of Political Research - Annual Political
Data issues; Woldendorp et al., 2000 and updates; Budge et al., 2001 and updates; Klingemann et al.,
2006; CPDS: Armingeon et al., 2010; CEED: Müller-Rommel et al., 2008; OECD Statistics;World Value
Studies: Integrated data (19889-2008); Eurobarometer and European Surveys (Norwegian Data Centre).
5
This type of party behaviour and ‘good governance’ appear to have become lacking
across Europe after the 1990s. Parties tend to move from a balanced position as regards its
functional goals to a more one-sided strategy, i.e. from both policy and office seeking behaviour
to a more self-interested office seeking strategy (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002; Mair, 2007;
Ezrow and Xenozakis, 2012). Yes, parties became more ‘responsive’ but rather as ‘marketers’
but at the same time less ’responsible’ in terms of promoting the public cause. Peter Mair has
been one of the earliest and most critical observers of this change in party behaviour. In his view
parties have become less democratic internally and organizationally more dependent on the state
than on, for instance, membership or maintaining a constituency: “Parties have reduced their
presence in the wider society and have become part of the state. They have become agencies that
govern – in the widest sense of the term – rather than that they represent.” (Mair, 2007: 20).
With Mair I suspect that the legitimacy of party democracy is indeed waning due to the fact that
representative government is of late increasingly confronted with rising levels of popular
dissatisfaction, the emergence of new (often populist or protest) parties and strong feelings of
individual concern on issues as the economy, immigration, crime, law and order and EU
integration (Marks and Steenbergen, 2004; Kriesi et al., 2007).
All this seems to point to a reduction in trusting the ‘agents’ – parties and government – by the
population, i.e. the ‘principal’ which may well affect the political stability within Europe. For if
democratic performance is understood as the ‘oil’ of the machinery of a democratic system, it
facilitates and ameliorates the interactions between citizens, society and its government. In this
view people’s satisfaction with how party democracy functions and justifiable or lawful use of
public powers is exercised will reduce the transaction costs of policy-making and enhances
policy performance (Dahl, 1989; Putnam, 1993; Weede, 1996;). This line of thought argues that
political parties not only produce additional public welfare but also reduce social costs for a
society through their lawful and trustworthy behaviour. The drawback of this view is that
behaviour of political actors is analysed in terms of their ‘functionality’. Representative
government is then seen as the outcome of an institutionalised process (Foweraker, 2002; Mair,
2007). However, although party governments come and go and vary in composition and format,
at the end of the day parties run the ‘state of affairs’ using state powers. Exercise of state power
or political authority is, however, inconceivable on the long run without a legitimate
government. Hence, political parties in or out government within systems of institutionalised
representative government ‘make or break’ the democratic performance (Keman, 2002a).
We distinguish two dimensions of democratic performance: One, the extent to which the
democratic process is effectively institutionalised and adhered to in terms of ‘legality’. In other
words ‘lawful’ behaviour is considered to produce ‘justifiable and responsible’ authority within
the limits of the extant system of ‘Rule of Law’ (Gilley, 2006). Two, policy representation, i.e.
6
the degree to which parties – in parliament or government - contribute to policy choices that are
corresponding with the preferences of electorates (Lijphart, 2008; Dahlberg and Holmberg,
2012). In combination both elements provide an indication of effective institutionalisation of
interest representation and citizens’ prospective trust of their agents, i.e. political parties. Hence,
the higher the degrees of responsive and responsible behaviour of parties the stronger, the
democratic institutions are considered to contribute to legitimate government (Foweraker, 2002:
205; Ezrow and Xezonakis, 2011). Hence, the relation between democratic performance and
legitimacy should be seen as the result of the interplay between institutions and party behaviour:
1. The institutional design modifies how the ‘people’s will’2 is expressed by free and fair
elections and is represented by parties – the assumption being that the voters’ choice and
party preferences should be more than less congruent, i.e. manifesting responsive party
behaviour (Bingham Powell, 2007).
2. The institutional design shapes party behaviour and make parties and government
responsible for their policy choices made in their electoral or governmental programs 3
because political parties have delegated powers, as a trustee of the electorate, to govern
society, i.e. responsible party behaviour (Strøm et al., 2008).
3. The stronger the correlates between parties, government and electorate in terms of
responsiveness, responsibility and effective government, the better the democratic
performance is considered to be, i.e. contributing to legitimate government (Pennock and.
Smith, 1965: 302; Andrain and Smith, 2006).
Institutional design appears to matter. In this respect I follow the ideas of for example Schmidt
(2002), Olsen (2009), Lijphart (2008; 2012), Budge et al. (2012) and Rothstein (2011) who all
consider institutions to enhancing the quality of democracy (performance) and thus maintaining
political legitimacy. For example, ‘veto points’ are considered to have an effect on government
efficacy (Schmidt, 2008; Jahn, 2012). Arend Lijphart (2008) stresses the differential impact of
consensus versus majoritarean democracies on decision-making, where the former type of polity
tends to perform better in terms of responsibility. Another example is the median party in
parliament and government representing the electorate in parliament and in government. The
closer the two are the more responsive and responsible behaviour can be expected (see also:
Keman, 2006; McDonald and Budge, 2005; Bingham Powell, 2007). The question is therefore
how these institutions will contribute to reliable party governance by a ‘trustee’ is and will
indeed act as an agent by discretion to directing society by means of legitimate political
authority.
2
We do not assume that there is a unified ‘people’s will’ nor a unilaterally defined ‘demos’. The people’s
will be the Vox Populi as expressed in the media and through the electoral competition.
3
Party programs are public statements of intent. We do not assume citizens to have read it. They are used
by parties and the media to communicate with the public and other parties. Government policy positions
can be seen as a ‘plan for action’: Keman, 2007.
7
Before answering this question we should further elaborate the concept of legitimacy.
What dimensions constitute legitimacy? According to David Beetham (1994; also: Gilley, 2008;
Canache et al., 2012) three conditions allow for the legitimate exercise of power to exercise
public authority effectively:

Power is exercised within a set of institutions, like conventions or a constitution that shape
the polity.

This institutionalised power is open for (impartial forms of) control and correction: Rule of
Law.

Legitimacy is seen to be present through regular signs of consent and support by the
citizens.
Obviously only (liberal) democracies appear to avail of these conditions as they have
institutionalised the means required like constitutionalism and Rechtstaatlichkeit (including
confidence in policing), on the one hand, and civil and political rights of the people (like voting
and protesting), on the other hand (Dahl, 1989). Whereas a more formal conceptualisation of
legitimacy emphasizes formalized procedures to safeguard liberties and constraining public
authority, others tend to stress the need of popular participation and (fair) representation of
interests together with a calibrated system of ‘checks & balances’. Another view is that
legitimacy is a ‘social contract’ derived from the ‘People’s Will’ to preserve of the values and
traditions of the community. Whatever the different emphases are, all views signify that the three
dimensions of legitimacy ought to be present in a satisfying and transparent fashion.
Several of the dimensions underlying democratic performance and legitimacy have been
studied and analysed. In addition, citizens’ attitudes, voters’ turn out, electoral volatility and the
emergence of new parties as well as party behaviour and the life and times of party government
have been considered to examine the relationship between the state and society (Bartolini and
Mair, 1990; Katz and Mair, 1995; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Keman and Müller-Rommel,
2012; Lijphart, 2012). In Section 3 the research plan will be laid out to investigate the
relationships underlying democratic performance and legitimacy, but first we shall discuss and
elaborate the empirical indicators to explore comparatively the relationship between democratic
performance and political legitimacy per se.
3.
Exploring Party behaviour: Democratic Performance - Institutions – Party Behaviour Legitimacy
I entertain the idea that legitimacy concerns the question to what extent the population is more or
less ‘satisfied’ with the democratic performance by their ‘trusted’ agents4, i.e. parties fulfilling
4
Often indicators as ’trust’ and ’satisfaction’ are used interchangeably. We do not concur and argue this
by means of semantics: trust represents a ex-ante variable (putting trust into an agent). The principal
expects integrety and reliable behaviour of the agent who has delegated power to act by discretion (Cf.
8
their interests and preferences, ensuring that the process of policy-making is to be lawful or legal
and is carried out peacefully. Yet, the problem with this type of concepts is that these can at best
be operationalised as a latent variable, that is: a number of empirical indicators must be either
used next to each other or may be combined to develop a ‘proxy’ variable (see: Pennings et al.,
2006). There are two ways to do so: either by means of ‘radial categories’ or by so-called
‘resemblances’ (Pennings et al., 2006: 48-50). This implies that indicators are considered either
to measure families of resemblance or by radial categories legitimacy as a proxy variable
(Gilley, 2006: 522-523; Canache et al., 2012).
As measures of legitimacy we shall use satisfaction with the political system, how the
democratic polity is institutionalised and evaluation of the Rule of Law (including safety from
state coercion) as well as the absence of high levels of political protest. These indicators
constitute indirect measures of levels and change in legitimacy5. ‘Satisfaction’ with the political
system and the absence of ‘Political Protest’ are ‘radial’ categories, whereas the organisation of
the ‘polity’ and ‘Rule of Law’ are ‘resembling’ categories. We contend that they are suitable
indicators of popular consent, acceptance of the democratic institutions and compliance with
public authorities. In Table 1 information is given regarding the five variables that will be used
and Figure 1 shows the distribution across Europe.
Table 1: Indicators of Political Legitimacy
Country
Average
SD
Range
Popular
Satisfactio
n
0,0
0,99
3,68
Change
in
Satisfact
ion
-0, 22
1,06
3,57
Polity
Scale
6,24
0,88
2,96
Rule of
Law
Index
0,0
1,0
2,98
Rule of
Law
Change
0,02
0,22
1,03
Protest
Index
0,0
1,0
3,53
Sources: data are derived from surveys by the European Social Survey, or ESS
(https://www.european+social+survey+2012&gs) and the World Values Studies, or WVS
(http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSIntegratedEVSWVS.jsp?Idioma=I); World Bank; Gilley, 2008.
Explanation: Satisfaction is derived from ESS survey of European states transformed into a combined
measure of Satisfaction with Government and Democracy levels in 1995 and 2010 (Index: PAF method,
R² = 89,6%); unweighed scores on Democratic System -Human Rights – Legality compose Polity Scale.
Rule of Law Index is derived from World Bank re. Policing Society – Security from State – Satisfaction
with Legal System; Protest Index is based on WVS and is an index derived from Factor scores of
‘willingness to participate’ in Demonstrations – Unofficial Strikes – Occupations (PAF method, R² =
59,6%) .
Oxford Dictionnary). Hence, trust is prospective whereas ’satisfaction’ is a retrospective or ex-post
variable representing an evalution of an agent’s actions on behalf of the principal, here the electorate.
5
The Surveys produce valuable information showing the relation between democratic performance and
legitimacy; see for this: Norris, 1999; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; 2011. A caveat is that temporal
information is limited in measuring change.
9
Figure1: Levels of Legitimacy by Indicator
Both Table 1 and Figure 1 demonstrate the strong cross-system variation in levels of proxies
regarding legitimacy. Looking at the Range figures one can see that there are quite some
differences between the countries. It is not surprising to observe that Central European countries
do (momentary) less on Polity and Rule of Law, but Greece is the lowest on the institutions of a
democratic system in Europe. The same is true for Protest, together with France and the
Scandinavian cases. The latter group seems odd, but it is not. The willingness for political action,
including unofficial strikes an occupations and so on is quite high because it is a right and the
long history of a socialist movement may well helped this to preserve. The measures of
Satisfaction show some surprising scores: Denmark and Ireland, whereas Central Europe appears
to be split: Poland and Slovakia are positive but the Czech Republic and Hungary are not. All in
all, both the radial (Satisfaction) and resembling (Polity) measures demonstrate sufficient crosssystem variation in level and change. The satisfaction data are also expressed in change in Table
1 and both measures are highly related (i.e. between r = between .40 to .75) to Polity, Rule of
Law and (negatively) to Political Protest. Hence we shall – next to the Satisfaction variables -
10
use the Polity Scale, the Protest and Rule of Law Index as dependent proxies in the comparative
analysis. Let us turn first to the development of democratic performance as a latent variable that
can “travel”.
Table 2: Indicators of Democratic Performance
Variable
Trust in Institutions Negative
Change
Trust Index Positive–
Negative-Change
Government Efficacy Change
Government Efficacy Index
Age of Full Democracy
Average
1,4
Standard
Deviation
10.17
Range
38,00
0,0
1,0
3,68
-0,11
0,0
64,1
0,27
1,0
30,10
1,01
2,92
77,0
Sources:
European Social Survey,
2012
European Social Survey,
2012
World Bank
World Bank
Keman, 2002a
Explanation: Trust Negative (= do not trust) is measured as Change (1995-2010) and as a cumulative
index based on Europe-wide annual survey. Government Efficacy consists of the ‘conventions and
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised like the capacity of the government to effectively
formulate and implement policies and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern
them’. The scale runs from –2,5 to +2,5. Source: Worldbank dataset on Government indicators:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp]. Age of Full Democracy is years and corrected for
authoritarian interruptions.
As discussed earlier, higher levels of democratic performance are indicated by
responsive and responsible behaviour of political parties and party government within
the core institutions of liberal democracy. The constitutive indicators of Democratic
performance are: Government Efficacy, Trust in political institutions and Age of
Democracy6. This latter variable is meant to indicate how long and uninterrupted
democracy has been in play. The behaviour of parties in Parliament and in Government
is measured by means of party differences and the median party position in terms of
programmatic policy priorities. By correlating these policy priorities to the pressing
issues of the population across Europe (see Table 3) one can calculate the degree of
congruence between parties - electorate as well as between parties in parliament and
government.
In addition to these crucial variables, a number of indicators is used that can be
considered as intermediary, i.e. their effects are considered to shape the relationship
between democratic performance and the eventual levels and change in legitimacy.
These variables concern: New Parties, Electoral Volatility, Policy Concerns (or Issues),
Lijphart’s measure of Dividing versus Joint Powers, party system differences in Left vs.
6
Age of Democracy is defined as having Full Democracy: Full political and civil rights including female
suffrage, a constitution, an adequate Rule of Law and accountable government. As period we calculated
from the first year of uninterrupted full democracy.
11
Right, policy preferences at the party system level and of party government, features of
party government like the Rate of Survival (relative duration as a proportion of the
legislative period), Government Innovation (new partners in government), Executive
Dominance of Government over Parliament and the Fabric of Cabinet Government (i.e.
its organisation and decision-making structure). See for further information Table 3.
Table 3: Variables Intermediating between Democratic Performance and Political
Legitimacy
Variable
Average
Standard
Deviation
Range
Source
Issues important to the public:
Economic Situation
25,7
11,69
37,0 European Social Survey, 2012
Unemployment
48,8
20,80
72,0 European Social Survey, 2012
Immigration
12,4
9,30
30,0 European Social Survey, 2012
Crime – Law and Order
26,7
9,66
37,0 European Social Survey, 2012
Economic Misery
13,5
5,02
18,1 OECD: Economic Outlook
Electoral Features:
Electoral Volatility
13,7
5,34
18,1 Woldendorp et al., 2000
Votes New Parties
15,1
16,1
57,4 Keman and Krouwel, 2007
Party in Government:
Government Innovation
26,9
12,36
47,0 Mair, 2007
Rate of Survival Government
60,7
21,0
79,0 Keman and Müller-Rommel, 2012
Institutional Features:
Divided or Joint Powers
-0,1
0,10
3,71 Lijphart, 2012
Executive Dominance
0,1
0,54
2,0
Woldendorp et al., 2000
Note: that Important Issues are also measured for parties – median parties – party government. These are
derived from party manifestoes. See: McDonald and Budge, 2005 and Klingemann et al., 2006.
Government Innovation signifies a ‘new’ partner in coalition meaning only those parties that have never
been in government before (calculations based on Casals and Mair, 2012).
As elaborated earlier, these intermediary variables are considered to analyse to what
extent parties in or out government are indeed showing responsive and responsible
behaviour and thus perform to expectation thereby shaping democratic performance and
subsequent levels and change in legitimacy. In the data analysis we will systematically
scrutinize the relationship between democratic performance and political legitimacy.
This will be carried out by means of bi-variate and multi-variate (correlation and
regression) analysis based on level and temporal measures. In this way we expect to
unfold how and to what extent party behaviour within the context of the democratic
polity is performing and affecting, positively or negatively, the levels and change in
legitimacy across European democracies. First, the relationship between democratic
performance and legitimacy is inspected. Second, party behaviour will be analysed as
regards responsiveness by inspecting the degree of congruence between parties and the
electorate. Third, we move to party behaviour in government and responsibility. Here we
12
focus not only on degrees of congruence but also on the institutional factors that come in
play with respect to responsible party behaviour and related effects for patterns of
legitimacy. Finally we conclude on the results of the comparative analysis.
4.
Exploring Democratic Performance and Legitimacy in Europe
In this section the patterned relationship between Democratic performance and manifestations of
political legitimacy are examined. Recall that legitimacy is a latent variable and therefore
multiple indicators are utilised. As we contend that legitimacy is a result of how parties perform
in the eye of the public and are expected to playing the democratic game according to its rules,
we focus first on the associations between the indicators of democratic performance and political
Legitimacy.
Table 4: Relationship between indicators of Democratic Performance and Political
Legitimacy
Political Legitimacy >
Democratic
Performance:
Government Efficacy
Index
Government Efficacy
Change
Trust Index
Trust Change
Age of Democracy
Satisfaction
Index
Change
Satisfaction
Rule of
Law
Polity
Scale
Protest
.75**
.27
. 79**
.74**
-.39*
.04
.20
.10
-.11
.27
.33
-.02
-.74**
.86**
.73**
-.03
.15
.27
.76**
.30
-.06
.89**
-.35
.26
-.57*
Note: Trust Index re. Democratic Performance combines Level (1995) and Change (1995-2010). See
further
Tables 1 and 2. Correlations are Pearson Product Moment Coefficients. * = significant at >0,05; ** >0,01.
N = 20.
The strong relationships between change and level of ‘Trust’ and change in ‘Satisfaction’ should
not surprise us (see Footnote 4). On the contrary. Satisfaction as an evaluative indicator of how
people view in retrospect the role of democratic politics and should mirror by and large the
delegated powers to their ‘trustees’ (Strøm et al., 2003). In addition the Government Efficacy
Index, representing the process of governance, is positively and strongly related to feelings of
satisfaction. In fact, this is the ‘good news’, all indicators of Political Legitimacy are positively
related to Government Efficacy (except, as expected: Political Protest). Apart from the trust
indicators, Age of Democracy and Polity design matter: the longer the democracy has been the
‘only game in town’, on the one hand, and the higher the quality of the democratic procedures,
on the other hand, the higher the levels of legitimacy and satisfaction and the lower the level of
political protest. Again, this should not surprise us and, as we can tell from the data on country
13
level, there is however a marked difference between the young East European democracies and
the re-democratised Mediterranean cases and France. Whereas the latter countries show growing
levels of (active) political action, the former appear less prepared to do so (also: Marks and
Steenbergen, 2004). All in all, we conclude that (the lack of) Trust, Government Efficacy and
Age of Democracy are strongly related to our measures of legitimacy. This is not so regarding
change in government efficacy, which is relatively small7 and may also be an example of ‘path
dependent’ developments (Pierson, 2000). In other words: efficient, capable and reliable
governance is a matter of learning best ‘practices’ and developing procedures that are not only
‘rational’ but also following the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Cf. March and Olsen, 1989).
The question remains, however, how this relationship is shaped and in what way parties
and institutions may affect this relationship. Because what we have found so far is that popular
support and the institutional shaping of democracies are relevant for understanding legitimacy.
However, what we need to explore is whether or not these relationships are more or less
consistent and to what extent do the indices of democratic performance indeed influence the
legitimacy? To answer this we have regressed the Satisfaction variables and the indexes of
Political Protest, Rule of Law and Polity Scale with Government Efficacy and change, the Trust
index and Change in Trust as well as Age of Democracy. The reason is that we expect that –
although the Trust variables per se will be strongly affecting measures of Legitimacy – in
combination with the other variables representing democratic performance – it is possible to
show how8 relevant the other indicators are for a better understanding of how the relationship is
shaped. In Table 5 the results are reported and will form the basis of a further exploration of
responsive and responsible party behaviour within the institutional context of representative
government regarding democratic performance (also: Lane and Ersson, 2002).
7
In part this is due to the small amount of change: average =-0,11; max. = 0,41: Italy; min. = 0,60;
Slovakia, which is not systematically related to measures of trust.
8
OLS regression will be applied by means of Stepwise Regression. As levels of siginificance .05
Significance level is lowest for acceptance. The emerging models will be controlled for Multicollinearity
and Hederoskedacity. These problems are likely to occur given the, sometimes, high inter-correlations of
the independent variables. See for an elaboration: Penning et al., 2006: 153-166.
14
Table 5: Regression Analysis of Legitimacy and Indices of Democratic Performance
Dependent [Y] ->
Independent [β]:
Trust Index
Age Democracy
Adjusted R²
Outliers (2*SD)
Trust Change
Government Efficacy
Adjusted R²
Outlier (2*SD)
Satisfaction
Index
Change
0.08
-0.84
0.70
0.27
0.49
0.56
Switzerland 0.23
0.72
0.62
-0.80
0.38
0.65
Polity Scale
Rule of Law
-0.01
0.89
0.77
France - &
Portugal +
0.20
0.71
0.53
-0.07
0.76
0.55
Switzerland 0.09
0.82
0,70
Switzerland -
Political
Protest
0.16
-0.51
0.27
Finland +
& France 0.40
-0.48
0.20
Finland +
Note: This table reports the coefficients of the OLS-regressions. The coefficients are Beta-values and in
bold if significant < 0,05. Government Efficacy and Age of Democracy are not used in the same equation
due to high levels of inter-correlation, the same applies to Change and Index of Trust. See for information
on the data used Tables 1 and 2 and regarding the method Footnote 8. Outliers = scores on Y are + = more
than, and – = less than expected given the independent variables.
The results are mixed in terms of robustness: it appears that indeed the Age of Democracy is
important for maintaining legitimacy and this aspect is further reinforced by the observation that
Trust is less crucial if it comes to the Polity scale and Rule of Law. This is quite logical: in
general the public is rather benign if it comes to an evaluation of democracy as a political
regime. The lack of trust lies mainly with the popular experiences of the working of parliament
and government per se and the role of parties in particular (often reinforced by the media; see
e.g. Norris, 2011). Therefore the degree of Government Efficacy is crucial: this variable
represents the ability of government to actually govern adequately in terms of responsiveness
and responsible party behaviour. To summarize: in ‘old’ (or: established) democracies the
chances are higher that government efficacy is considered as more satisfactory than in ‘younger’
democracies (like in Eastern and Southern Europe). This conclusion is further enhanced by the
fact that the variation in Trust tends to vary across the whole of Europe. Unless parties are able
to convince the public at large that they do indeed serve and represent the electorate in a
responsive manner as well as are capable of a responsible policy performance through party
government it will lead to lower levels of legitimacy. Hence, the results of Table 5 are
supporting our ideas regarding democratic performance is effect producing with respect to
legitimacy. However, we do not yet know the way and extent to which party behaviour is
contributing or not to these outcomes. In the next section we will therefore examine the extent to
which parties are responsive to their principal: the electorate.
5.
Parties and Electorates: Responsiveness
Recall that responsiveness is defined as the extent to which popular preferences (here: major
concerns within the electorate) are reflected or emphasized in the electoral platforms of parties.
15
The more congruence between the two, the stronger party responsiveness is considered to be (see
also: Budge et al., 2002). The same applies to the second linkage between parliament and
government: how congruent are the policy preferences of parties in parliament and parties in
government? Hence, how close are the relations between electorate and parties, on the one hand,
and between parties and government in view of the popular preferences.
The present pressing concerns among the electorate are, contrary to what is often
suggested (e.g. Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), rather material and do not tend to become
immaterial. The rank order is: 1. Unemployment; 2. Economic Situation; 3. Crime; 4.
Immigration (see Table 4 below). The fifth most mentioned one refers to the EU, but is rather
mixed across our universe of discourse. Crime and the economic situation are on average close
to each other and immigration is only a ‘hot’ issue in Denmark, Spain and the UK. Only in
Ireland and the UK unemployment and the economic situation are lower rated as a problem than
crime and immigration. Hence, we can safely put forward that material values are still prominent
throughout the whole of Europe (East and West), also in the early part of the 21st century.
Secondly, these popular concerns are significantly and negatively related to the satisfaction
index (except for Crime): Unemployment r = -.49*, Economy r = -.41*, Crime r = -.26, and
Immigration r = -.56**. This may well mean that – although the fear for unemployment remains
the primary concern – the democratic performance is considered below par if and when crime (r
= .62**) and immigration (r= -.69**) are seen as a big concern among the public. Additionally
the ‘objective’ indicator of economic well-being is used: the Misery Index (as used by OECD).
This measure can demonstrate to what extent parties and governments respond to the economic
situation.
The question begging for an answer is then to what extent parties in parliament and
government are responsive to these concerns. Table 6 below presents the correlates between
people’s salient concerns and misery, on the one hand, with indicators of policy preferences of
parties’ electoral pledges at the party system level (all parties in parliament) and when in
government, on the other hand. The higher correlations, the stronger the congruence between the
principal (electorate) and agents (parties in parliament and government) would be and thus also
the performance in terms of responsiveness. In addition to the parties’ stance toward Europe, or
to ‘de-nationalization’ of the state (see e.g.: Zürn, 2000) we employed measures of the scope of
the public economy and Welfare Statism9.
9
Public Economy involves parties’ ideas on degrees of state intervention, big government and economic
planning; Welfare Statism are the parties’ ideas on the level of provision and desire for extension of
welfare state related expenditures; see: Keman,2002b.
16
Table 6: Degree of Congruence between Electorate’s Concerns & Party Policy
Preferences
Issues and Concerns ->
Party System:
Welfare State
Public Economy
EUropeanism
Party Government:
Welfare State
Public Economy
EUropeanism
The Economy
Unemployment
Crime Rates
Immigration
Misery
.25
.06
-.58*
.01
-.17
-.34
-.05
-.14
-.44*
-.21
-.05
-.45*
-.09
-.06
-.31
-.22
.09
-.28
-.09
-.22
-.22
.13
-.30
-.11
-.34
.27
-.38*
-.26
-.23
Pearson Product Moment Coefficients. See: Table 3 re. Electorate’s concerns & operationalisation of
Policy Preferences. Party System is all parties by country and Party Government is all parties in
Government. High degrees of congruence are in bold.
The statistical results are poor. On the level of party systems (i.e. all parties) only the attitude to
Europe is related to the issues listed above. Parties in government do not show any significant
relationship, but for Welfare State and Misery. Obviously the degree of congruence is almost
absent and thus the responsiveness of parties toward the electorate is insignificant. This points to
an important feature of the level of democratic performance: the linkage between electorate and
parties representing the voter appears to be quite weak indeed and implies a lack of input
legitimacy. Parties apparently do represent the people in a one-way direction: they compete for
votes by means of a program, but do not appear to address the major concerns of the people.
Instead they compete amongst themselves and ask for consent to govern rather than requesting a
mandate on the basis of what the ‘demos’ is concerned with. Of course, this latter situation is not
an easy one and reflects the perennial paradox of the micro-macro dilemma (individual versus
collective concerns in view of the public interest; Dahl, 1989).
Whatever way this problematic issue is judged, the relationships reported in Table 6
present us with quite a gloomy view on the basic idea of representative government in terms of a
principal – agent relation and is probably harming democratic performance (Andrain and Smith,
2006; Bingham Powell, 2007). Yet, a caveat is in place: whereas mandate theory stresses the
‘trustee’ element within the electorate regarding its immediate concerns, responsiveness rather
stresses the extent to which congruence regarding representation is available or not. Here is a
dilemma: apart from considering both roles as a leading principle, it should also be kept in mind
that parties ought to be ‘responsible’. Parties cannot and are not only transmitters of the ‘vox
populi’, but must also take responsibility for the ‘common good’ like Misery, which may involve
sacrificing responsiveness for responsibility.
The preliminary conclusion must be that the Principal/ Agent relationship is less
effective than often is put forward and not performing as it is supposed to as regards the idealtypical representation of the voters within a society (Mair, 2007; Keman, 2011). Hence, the
-.20
17
democratic performance by parties as the main channel of (aggregated) representation of the
population is weak and may therefore lead to lower levels of input legitimacy. It appears to be a
different process altogether: Parties attempt to gain popular consent on the basis of what they
regard to be relevant and important in terms of saliency in order to win elections instead of
behaving responsively. Conjecturing, one could argue that this – at least in part – not only
explains the mistrust in parties as the people’s delegate, but also may well be an important
reason for the emergence of ‘populism’ across Europe as expressed in higher levels of electoral
volatility and government innovation (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002; Mény and Surel, 2002).
This appears to be supported by the fact that the only significant correlations concern the party’s
positions re. European integration and precisely this is significantly interrelated to concerns
about increasing criminality and immigration (see also: Keman and Krouwel, 2007). Obviously,
if this link between voters and parties is not congruent, it may be expected that this not only
drives lower levels of satisfaction and related institutions but also to higher levels of protest. If
true then the relationship between pressing popular issues should be visible in the indicators of
legitimacy. This seems the case and can be seen from the correlations in Table 7 between these
issues and the degree of misery: with the exception of ‘Crime and Law & Order’ and change in
Satisfaction all other indicators of legitimacy are related to these issues and also to misery.
Table 7: People’s Issues and Political Legitimacy
Issues ->
Satisfaction
Satisfaction
Change
Polity
Rule of Law
Protest
Economy
Unemployment
Immigration
Misery
.56**
-.26
Crime and Law
& Order
.26
-.22
-.49*
.26
-.41*
.36
-.47*
.26
.08
-.35
.36
.19
.54**
-.26
-.42*
.24
-.22
-.12
-.66**
-.29
.45*
-.68**
-.30
Note: See Tables 2 and 3 for data description and Table 4 for explanation
In particular the material issues or concerns are negatively related to Satisfaction, the institutions
of the political system and also to Protest. Hence, the more pressing issues are the less
satisfaction and consent there seems to be with government efficacy, and the more political
protest can be expected. An intriguing exception is the concern about crime an law & order
whereas this topic is often a grateful subject – as with Immigration - for populist politicians10 to
show the inadequate policy capacities of established parties if and when in government (Mair,
2007). These conclusions are by and large supported by regression analysis: the economic
situation and the issue of immigration are both relevant for the levels of satisfaction and the
10
There is an inter-relationship between the European issue and Crime and Immigration. It seems tenable
to say that these issues are seen as a responsibility of the trans-national EU rather than of national
governments. See: Keman and Krouwel, 2007.
18
organisation of the polity. Except for Southern Europe political protest are not important. To
some extent this is a remarkable outcome. Apparently the ‘objective’ evaluation of the economic
situation and the fear for foreigners, if not ‘xenophobia’ (see: Hooghe et al., 2004) influence the
level of legitimacy because parties have probably not responded to the societal signs of unrest
regarding these issues.
6.
Parties in Government: Representation and Responsibility
The direct linkage between the electorate and parties in parliament may be weaker than
expected, yet this does not imply that this relationship (and thus congruence) between of parties
and government is weak too. In fact, it may be expected that party government, depending on its
composition, is more or less congruent with parties in parliament. This may be even more the
case if and when the median party is represented in (coalition) government (McDonald and
Budge, 2005; Bingham Powell, 2007; Budge et al., 2012). This would mean that the most
‘centrist’ party or parties of the party system best represent the link between the main concerns
of the population and parties in government. If both contentions are supported, it may be said
that the so-called ‘throughput’ appears to be a crucial linkage with respect to the parties’
responsibility if and when in government. In Table 8 the relations between parties in parliament
and government are reported.
The bi-variate relationships between both the Median Party in Parliament and the
preferences within party systems vis-à-vis parties is government are significant and strong. This
means that parties are indeed responsive insofar as their self declared preferences go. This
relationship is even stronger for the median party in parliament and is to some reassuring: the
voter is foremost, albeit indirectly, represented in terms of responsiveness thru parliament,
particularly so if and when this party is included in government. These observations are
important and signify that the ‘systemic’ linkages of the parliamentary polities in Europe are not
only congruent, but also that this relationship is strong in both the ‘old’ and the ‘newer’
democracies. I conjecture that this is further enhanced by the way the relations between
parliament and governments are organised (Schmidt, 2002; Keman, 2002b).
19
Table 8: Bi-variate relations between Parties in Parliament & Government - Median Party of
Party System
Party System
LeftvsRight
State Intervention
Welfare State
EUrope
Median Party
LeftvsRight
State Intervention
Welfare State
EUrope
LeftvsRight
.73**
.20
-.56**
-.07
.64**
.34
-.57**
.02
Parties in Government
State
Welfare State
Intervention
.45*
-.54*
.29
.76**
.09
-.82**
-.16
-.16
.39*
.77**
.13
-.03
-.49*
-.34
.94**
-.06
EUrope
.44*
-.33
-.17
.68**
.49*
-.21
-.11
.76**
All Pearson Parsons Product Coefficients. Party System concern all parties in Parliament. Median Party is
calculated according to McDonald and Budge, 2005. See further Table 5. High degrees of congruence are
in bold.
Table 8 also reveals that most party differences matter, in particular regarding the welfare state
but not so much with respect to the role of the state per se nor with regard to European
integration. As we have seen in Table 4 this is not the main concern of the public at large.
However, if one assumes that the fear of unemployment indirectly points to the relevance of the
welfare state, then it can be put forward that the present debates on fiscal cuts and retrenchment
throughout the OECD world appear to be located in the nexus between party positions with
regard to the Left and Right distribution within the party systems, on the one hand, and policy
position of parties, especially of the median party, on the other hand (also: Klingemann et al.,
1994; Pierson, 2001; Armingeon and Bonoli, 2007). In addition the role of the state and of
European integration can be mentioned. It appears that the stronger the Leftwing parties in
government are represented the more leeway there is for these factors play in domestic politics.
Overall I conclude that – contrary to the linkage between parties and the electorate - the
within system congruence between parties in parliament and government appears adequate in
terms of democratic performance. This conclusion concurs with Mair’s analysis of the changing
role of parties (Mair, 2008): Parties are more self-interested and less interested in representation.
They tend to become parties of (or within) the state and therefore are less sensitive to electoral
responsiveness or to aim for responsibility in view of their own policy preferences. However, we
do not agree fully with Mair. Rather we put forward the idea that parties do play a different role
than before because a strategic shift in party behaviour has taken place since the 1990s (Katz
and Mair, 1995; Strøm et al., 2008): instead a sequential series of steps departing from voteseeking and office-seeking to policy–seeking behaviour, it appears that two circuits have
developed, one directed towards (parts) of the electorate seeking popular consent, the other
20
soliciting for office, in particular governmental office (Huber and Bingham Powell, 1994). If this
hypothesis is correct it would signify that the electoral preferences have lost weight in the view
of parties and, conversely, office-seeking has gained more weight than interest representation
(also: Keman, 2011).
Party Governance has thus changed in it character. Whereas in most countries
policy-seeking behaviour has been dominant into the 1990s (see: Laver and Budge,
1992; Klingemann et al., 1994; Schmidt, 2002; Lijphart, 2012), at present this appears
less to be the case because, as the associations in Table 8 demonstrate that policy plans
are shared among most parties and certainly the median party. Hence, party differences
regarding policy are is not the big issue any more, but rather with whom do you share
public powers. ‘Responsible’ government is – I conjecture – waning and instead parties
tend to keep thru government the state to themselves. Hence party government is the
place to be, but you must compete with other parties to stay in. Yet, this appears also to
undermine gradually the trust of the people in parties and government in terms of
government efficacy (recall Table 5). It is plausible to suggest that this weakening of the
link between democratic performance and manifestations of legitimacy is more than less
reinforced by intermediary factors such electoral and institutional features of European
democracies. Below in Table 9 the role of these factors is displayed and make clear that
indeed
Table 9:
Correlations between Government Efficacy – Trust – Age Democracy
and Electoral – Governmental – Polity Features
Trust
Trust
Efficacy
Efficacy
Age of
Level
Change
Level
Change
Democracy
-.80***
.58**
-.42*
.24
-.33
-.53**
.3
-.61***
.14
-.51*
-.14
-.06
-.45*
-.05
-.17
Electoral Volatility
Vote New Parties
Innovation of
Government
Executive Dominance
Survival of Government
Joint vs. Divided Powers
-.15
.49*
-.32
-.03
-.05
.36
-.57**
.53**
.28
-.40*
-.04
.28
-.43*
.28
.09
All Pearson Parsons Product Coefficients. See further Tables 2 and 3.
Electoral change in terms of successful new parties and shifting loyalties within the electorate
are clearly pointing to a search for alternative ‘trustees’ for established parties (although ‘older’
democracies tend to have less new parties than ‘younger’ ones). In large part this is reflected in
Government Efficacy. This proxy of democratic performance is defined as the conventions and
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised and indicates the capacity of government
to effectively formulate and implement policies within the institutions that govern them. And
21
precisely this proxy variable – together with trust - is strongly related to both electoral behaviour
as well as to shorter life cycles of government and more innovation of party government. In view
of our argument this would signify that insufficient levels of trust and efficacy hamper indeed
the democratic performance in European democracies. Hence there is a ‘democratic deficit’
through which parties in or out government are not trusted (any more) and the efficacy of party
government is not highly estimated (any more). In other words: if indeed ‘responsiveness’ and
‘responsibility’ of parties is in doubt and government is not considered as effective as expected,
then lower levels of legitimacy may not come as a surprise but is rather a likely outcome of
insufficient democratic performance.
Table 9 shows also that institutions appear to affect trust and efficacy across the
European democracies differently. Recall that we argued (in Section 3) -following Lijphart’s
hypothesis - that a system with ‘joint powers’ (or fused party government) would be conducive
to a lesser tension between responsiveness and responsibility by parties. This idea is supported
by our finding (see Table 8) that the median party is dominant with respect to the degree of
congruence between parties in parliament and in government. Hence, from this follows that
polities characterised by lower levels of Executive Dominance and Joint Powers may well have a
different level of efficacy and thereby influencing legitimacy indirectly (see Table 5). Regressing
these variables against efficacy demonstrates that indeed the relationship between the executive
and legislative powers, embedded in an institutional context of shared powers, is conducive to
effective party governance as exemplified in higher rates of Survival. Figure 2 illustrates this:
22
Figure 2:
Scatter plot of regressing Joint Powers Index – Executive/Legislative Relations
– Government Survival on Government Efficacy
Note: See Tables 2 and 3 for description variables and Table 5 for regression method. The equation used
reads: Government Efficacy = Constant [-1.18**] + Rate of Survival [.44**] + Joint Powers [.36***] –
Executive Dominance [.58*]. R² = .60; F = 10,61***; ViF values = <1.06. Note that the coefficients are
Beta’s
Clearly the ‘younger’ democracies in Southern (including Italy) and Eastern Europe are less
stable in terms of party governance, the art of ‘sharing’ power and finding agreements than in
North West Europe. We already noted in Section 4 that it appears that there is a ‘learning curve’
to develop a trustworthy and effective democratic system of governance. In addition, in some
cases the rules within the polity have changed (as, for example, in France to semipresidentialism, Greece and Italy regarding the electoral system, Belgium turning into a federal
system). Although these changes took place before or around 1990, their impact may well have
affected government efficacy. In combination with lower levels of trust in parties and
government (on average for all cases: -6,6 and –4,5 per cent) this has led to less legitimacy.
23
In sum: from the analysis emerges a two-step process: Government Efficacy together
with levels of Trust11 are crucial variables to understand how legitimacy is affected by party
behaviour in and out government. On the one hand, higher degrees of electoral volatility and
more new parties induce lower levels of government efficacy, on the other hand, if the
institutional design allows for consensus oriented party behaviour (fused or shared powers)
which is reinforced by a balance between executive and legislative then governments tend to last
longer and induce more trust. As mentioned in the previous section, parties appear to focus
almost explicitly on the “inner game” of office-seeking thereby relaxing their representational
role and thus both responsive and responsible behaviour. Assuming this is especially the case
where electoral volatility and new parties are present, it seems plausible to suggest that
legitimacy tends to be lower. In other words: self interested party behaviour and non-responsive
party governance harm legitimacy.
7.
Discussion
To put it short and tall, democratic performance of European polities appears to be in
part a result of the responsiveness of parties toward government rather than to their
principal, the electorate (which is weak or almost absent). Hence the legitimacy in
Europe is negatively influenced and limited due to non-responsive party behaviour in
elections but only responsive in parliament and government. This signifies that
responsible party behaviour becomes an “inner game” where the population is merely
reduced to being spectators (de Beus, XXXX). Only if and when government efficacy
remains adequate and parties are more than less trusted then the development towards a
‘democratic deficit’ of the (national) state can be avoided or at least be reduced. It
appears form the comparative analysis that in North West Europe legitimacy is still
apparent, but certainly not everywhere. Conversely, although the scores are weak,
Central and Eastern European countries are developing into trustworthy polities. This is
less the case in Southern Europe.
A first conclusion can therefore be that ‘age’ matters to make the interplay
between behaviour and institutions work. A second conclusion may be that parties their
role as ‘trustee’ must earn, but they can also easily lose it. Electoral developments show
this by means of electoral volatility and the growth of new parties, in particular after
11
The equations used read: Satisfaction Index = Constant [0,0*] + Trust Index [.23*] + Government
Efficacy [.72**] . R² = .57; F = 13,64***; ViF values = <1.06 and Polity Scale = Constant [-0,62**] +
Trust Index [.20*] + Government Efficacy [.71**] . R² = .53; F = 11,76**; ViF values = <1.06. Note that
the coefficients are Beta’s.
24
1990 (see: Mair, 2008; Casals and Mair, 2012). A third conclusion can be that the
delegated powers of parties seems to have been squandered by low responsiveness and
that responsible behaviour in limited to the interactions between parties in parliament
and government. An illustration is the strong position of the median party, i.e. instead of
party differences derived from popular concerns (or issues) there is a convergent patterns
emerging. The question begging for an answer is whether or not this can be considered
as responsible party behaviour or is in fact ‘cartel’ behaviour (see: Katz and Mair, 1995).
Crucial for understanding the relationship between democratic performance and
comparative patterns of legitimacy are thus government efficacy and the performance of
parties as trustees of the people. These features of party governance play an essential
part in this relationship. Yet, path dependencies and idiosyncrasies of single cases should
also be kept in mind. In other words: historical configurations of party behaviour and
particular polity designs make a difference as well as it concerns an ‘older’ one or
‘younger’ democracies. Old habits can last long and newly designed polities have to be
internalised. Nevertheless these caveats, we conclude that trust in parties and efficacy of
governments are apparently the key factors in producing and maintaining legitimacy in a
modern democracy, at least as far as Europe is concerned.
25
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