Third World Quarterly, Vol 21, No 3, pp 549– 565, 2000
Shadow players: ecotourism
development, corruption and state
politics in Belize
ROSALEEN DUFFY
ABSTRACT This article examines the way that developing societies have been
increasingly incorporated into global networks, and the effect that this has had
on the states themselves. The notion of a shadow state is used here to inform the
ways that the state has been modiŽ ed by the global networks represented by
ecotourism development on the one hand and drug trafŽ cking (and associated
offshore banking sectors) on the other. Belize provides an excellent example of
the way that these North– South linkages, in the form of global networks,
undermine the ability of states to enforce regulations in offshore banking, drug
trafŽ cking and environmental protection that are demanded of the South by the
North.
The incorporation of developing states and societies into global networks has
had a profound effect on these states themselves. Rather than acting as autonomous agencies capable of exercising ‘sovereignty’ over their own territories,
they are better regarded as arenas in which complex and often illicit transactions
are negotiated between locally-base d elites and representatives of the global
economy. Drawing on Reno’s concept of the ‘shadow state’, this article examines the workings of such transactions in the small Central American/Caribbean
state of Belize, linking two important aspects of modern North– South relations,
tourism on the one hand, and the international trade in narcotics on the other. It
concludes that the networks through which these transactions are managed
deeply subvert the possibilit y both of internationa l regulation and of domestic
accountability.
Ecotourism is promoted by governments of the North and South, internationa l
lending institutions and private business as an ideal development strategy that
combines economic growth with environmental conservation. Developing countries have increasingly promoted themselves as potential ecotourism destinations .
However, the optimism surrounding the commitment to ecotourism in the private
sector, governments and non-governmenta l organisation s (NGOs) has masked the
important political challenges facing any attempt to implement environmenta l
legislation in the tourism sector. This article will speciŽ cally address the
clandestine political interest groups that operate in the ecotourism industry. It
investigates the links between ecotourism development and the operation of
Rosaleen Duffy is at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1
4YL, UK.
ISSN 0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/00/030549-17
Ó
2000 Third World Quarterly
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ROSALEEN DUFFY
clandestine links between international capital, local elites and individuals
involved in illegal trading networks of money laundering and drugs, referred to
as the shadow state, with reference to Belize.1 The concept of the shadow state
is borrowed from Reno’s analysis of the links between international capital, and
local political and economic elites in Sierra Leone. An analysis of the potential
for the operation of the shadow state in Belize is important because it directly
affects policy implementation.
There are obvious difŽ culties with drawing comparisons between developing
states in sub-Saharan Africa and those in the Caribbean, but the speciŽ c history
of Belize means that the similarities are sufŽ cient to examine the validity of the
notion of a shadow state. Belize shares with much of sub-Saharan Africa the
British colonial history that bequeathed a highly bureaucratic and British-style
government apparatus. Equally, kinship and familial ties have a central role to
play in Belizean society, politics and economics that scholars have shown to be
similar to patron– client networks in African societies. Finally, while Reno uses
the example of diamond trading, the drugs trade in Central and South America
displays some comparable features. Where Belize differs is in its internationa l
reputation as a holiday destination—Sierra Leone has been riven by civil strife,
while Belize has experienced political stability since independence in 1980 and
in the relative absence of large-scale political violence has allowed Belize to
build up an ecotourism industry.
This article will Ž rst explore the salient features of the shadow state as a
possible model for analysis of the links between licit and illicit business. Second,
it will discuss the expansion of the shadow state in Belize through offshore
banking and the development of ‘warlordism’ in the form of drug dealing and
trafŽ cking. Finally, it will examine the operation of the shadow state in the arena
of ecotourism in Belize, assessing its implications for enforcing environmenta l
legislation aimed at protecting the natural resources on which the ecotourism
industry depends.
The shadow state
In his study of the organisation of informal markets in sub-Saharan Africa, Reno
formulated the concept of the ‘shadow state’. Ultimately it is based on JeanFrançois Bayart’s argument that any scholarly focus on the visible African state
does not provide a basis from which to analyse political authority; instead
Bayart’s analysis examines what he terms the politique du ventre (the politics of
the belly) which is the way that political elites use informal and invisible
networks to exercise political and economic power.2 Reno’s examination of the
growth of informal markets indicated that they sprang up partially in response
to the decay of central state authority, demonstrating attempts by political leaders
and elites to exercise authority in realms outside institutiona l state boundaries,
and that this breakdown of state– society dichotomies appears even in, or
especially in, the weakest formal states. He argues that shadow states are
constituted by high ranking politicians and a few businessmen without state
ofŽ ce (who may be local or foreign business operators) who manage to exercise
signiŽ cant political authority through the private control of resources in informal
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ECOTOURISM DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION AND STATE POLITICS IN BELIZE
and illicit markets. Such clandestine circuits sustain powerful political and
economic networks, and can be used to manipulate policies designed to attract
legitimate foreign investors who then serve to underwrite the emergent shadow
state. The informal networks of exchange between these groups cross, and
sometimes shadow, the boundaries of formal state, responsibilitie s and powers.
As a result of the survival and growth of a shadow state, the postcolonia l
institutiona l state is no longer the principal authority in Africa.3
Reno’s shadow state is created in the struggle to deŽ ne and shape political
power that was born with the founding of the colonial state. This shadow state
grows outside the territorial boundaries of the colonial creation as new elites are
added to the alliances between ruling elites, international business and local
social groupings; these new elites include creditor ofŽ cials and foreign investors. 4 Under development can be the product of internal social structures and
class relations in developing societies; in particular local elites may act as
comprador classes by inviting in foreign capital and exploiting other classes in
their own society.5 Part of the shadow state is the rulers’ need for sovereign
control that stands outside and above the political order, thus extralegal powers
are the logical means of preserving a regime in crisis. The ruler struggles to
deŽ ne ‘enemies’ and Ž nd enticements to attract friends, and these enticements,
as well as some of the allies, can be found in the form of internationa l capital.6
Turning to the case of Belize, the growth of a shadow state is important
because it directly impinges on policy implementation. Since Belize markets
itself as an ecotourism destination, the possible links between a shadow state and
policy implementation are especially important in terms of environmenta l and
tourism legislation.
The shadow state in Belize
Elites obtain control over lucrative resources by legal and illegal means, but one
of the important factors, for the purposes of this article, is the corrupt allocation
of beneŽ ts in the tourism industry by public and private sector elites. Corruption
is not necessarily a pathologica l phenomenon, rather it is integrated into a
particular path of political and economic development.7 A useful working
deŽ nition of corruption is behaviour that deviates from the formal rules of
conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority
because of private motives such as wealth, status or power. The primary
economic effect of such corruption is an allocative one if, as a result, the Ž nal
user of the resource is someone other than one who would have had access to
the resource otherwise. Economic models that attempt to explain corruption fail
to take account of the political context, where the economic bargains between
patron and client are determined by the political settlement within a country.
Allocation of beneŽ ts by a patron (the state or the private sector) is driven by
the relative political power of the patron.8 A World Bank policy research bulletin
highlighte d the potential for public sector corruption to act as a barrier to
development. The state’s coercive capabilitie s gives it the power to intervene in
economic activities, including the tourism industry and also provides it with the
power to intervene arbitrarily. This power, coupled with access to information
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ROSALEEN DUFFY
that is not available to the general public, provides public ofŽ cials with
opportunitie s to promote their own interests.9
One area where the shadow state can  ourish is in offshore banking and its
development has caused a signiŽ cant economic and political change for a
number of small developing countries. In the 1980s, encouraged by the deregulation of the international banking system, and by successive British Conservative governments who argued it was a means of economic diversiŽ cation, a few
former British colonies and dependencies began to  ourish as offshore centres.
They provided the critical space for a growth of the offshore sector through
guaranteeing client conŽ dentiality, a favourable regulatory environment and a
political climate of tolerance (unlike former French and Dutch colonies).10
The conditions under which offshore banking  ourishes also provide an ideal
environment for internationa l illicit networks of criminal organisations. Under
these circumstances organised crime often enjoys protection from all levels of
government, because it has invaded the structures of the state and taken
advantage of its power and resources.11 In this way global networks that often
inextricably link legal and illegal businesses manage to incorporate developing
states into the fabric of their organisations . Criminal organisation s are well
placed to take advantage of looser border controls and lower trade barriers, and
as a result these organisation s have been able to create highly effective illegal
Ž nancial and drug smuggling networks that advance their interests in the context
of a world keen to reduce economic barriers.12 The advancement of computer
technology has facilitated electronic transfer systems that allow vast amounts of
money to be transported around the globe in a matter of seconds.13 This means
that key Ž gures have access to the Ž nancial resources to underwrite their
emergent shadow state.
The importance of international investment in Belize is enhanced by its status
as a major offshore banking centre (OFC ). The deregulation of internationa l
banking during the 1980s has been identiŽ ed as one of the key determinants of
the rise in OFCs willing to accept deposits derived from illicit sources, and Belize
is one such OFC.14 The involvement of legitimate and illegitimate sources of
foreign investment in tourism developments has been assisted by a legal
framework that provides for total discretion about the source of the investment
capital and the names of the investors. For example, Maria Vega (of the Belize
Tourism Industry Association and a local tour operator) stated that an increasing
number of hotels, restaurants and bars in the tourist areas are ultimately owned
by absentee foreign investors, but they are leased on long-term contracts of up
to 30 years. In addition, Belize is the site of a number of ‘holding companies’
that are not required to disclose who their investors are or from where the
Ž nance originated.15 This is also mentioned in US government documents
regarding the drugs trade and money laundering activities in the Caribbean. For
example, the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report states that money
laundering remains a potential threat in Belize, even through the 1996 Money
Laundering Prevention Act criminalised money laundering and imposed record
keeping requirements in banks regarding large foreign currency transactions.
The Government of Belize has been building an offshore services sector since
1992 and the Central Bank of Belize has received numerous inquiries about
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ECOTOURISM DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION AND STATE POLITICS IN BELIZE
offshore banking licences. However, patterns and changes in individua l accounts
are not seen by any Central Bank authorities unless speciŽ cally ordered and no
registry is kept on offshore trusts.16 The involvement of external capital derived
from legal and illegal sources is a key feature of Reno’s shadow state. It is clear
that there is extensive foreign investment and ownership in Belize, and that,
rather like the shadow state of Sierra Leone, foreign investors are required either
legally or through necessity to utilise local economic and political links. Equally,
these local elites have found it necessary to attract foreign capital in order to
underwrite their emergent shadow state.
The links between the development of Belize as an OFC, drug trafŽ cking and
foreign elites became the subject of intense international debate in July 1999
with the highly publicised story of Michael Ashcroft. His in uence in developing
Belize as a major OFC was of particular interest to the British press because of
his position as Conservative Party Treasurer. The controversy surrounded his
company, Belize Holdings Incorporated (BHI ), and his role in writing the
offshore legislation that turned Belize into a Ž nancial centre.17 In 1994 a Foreign
OfŽ ce adviser, Rodney Gallagher, was contracted by the Belize government to
write a report on regulating a burgeoning offshore sector. In the report Gallagher
warned against allowing too much freedom to the sector, fearing its use by
criminal organisations , particularly drug trafŽ ckers.18 He also expressed disquiet
at the special status given to BHI, which did not have to disclose information
about its accounts and had a 30-year exemption from tax. In fact, under the 1996
Offshore Banking Act and Money Laundering Prevention Act, BHI was the only
company to retain this special status.19 This was attributed to the immense
political and economic power held by Ashcroft, in his capacity as a Belizean
citizen (but resident in Florida), Treasurer to the British Conservative Party and
major funder of the left wing People’s United Party ( PUP ) in Belize.
It was reported in the local and international press that Michael Ashcroft was
averse to interference by the Central Bank of Belize in the running of Belize
Bank, a section of BHI. As part of his attempts to avoid such interference he
sought permission to set up a separate bank in the Turks and Caicos Islands to
take advantage of its lax regulations in the islands’ offshore sector. It was
reported that Ashcroft had threatened the British Conservative government in
1994 that, if he were not allowed to set up his own bank in the Turks and Caicos
Islands, he would use his links to high-ranking politicians in the Commonwealth
to cause trouble.20 In addition, he paid for four conservative MPs to visit the
Turks and Caicos, Cuba, Panama and Belize, giving rise to speculation that those
MPs then tabled questions in the British Parliament that were favourable to
Ashcroft’s business interests.21
However, the press soon linked the rise of Belize as an offshore centre under
the guidance of Ashcroft, to the transhipment of drugs and money laundering in
the wider Latin American region. The US Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA ) had
already indicated that Belize was attracting money launderers to its secretive
offshore services sector, and that it was a major player in the transhipment of
cocaine. The Times then led with a front page story ‘Drugs Agency has Ashcroft
on its Ž les’, indicating that the DEA had four separate investigation s on Ashcroft
and his companies over possible money laundering and drug smuggling, but was
553
ROSALEEN DUFFY
keen to point out that, so far, no evidence of wrongdoing had come to light.22
Michael Ashcroft then issued a libel writ against The Times for defamation and
damage to his business interests, which was dramatically dropped after direct
negotiations between the paper’s owner, Rupert Murdoch, and Michael Ashcroft;
as part of the deal struck between the two men, each agreed to pay its share of
the £500 000 legal costs and The Times printed a ‘no retraction’ notice that
indicated it had no evidence that Ashcroft was involved in drug running, money
laundering or related crimes.23 The Ashcroft case is an example of the in uence
of foreign elites in developing countries and, according to Reno, these elites are
an essential component that allows the expansion of the shadow state. Certainly,
in the internationa l and local media, the reporting of the case indicated a
perception that powerful foreign elites were able to induce policy changes
favourable to their interests by issuing threats and possibly engaging in illicit
activities.
The sector where the shadow state is at its most pervasive and its most
effective in Central America is in drug trafŽ cking. The organisation s and the
networks involved in trafŽ cking have not only incorporated the state apparatus,
but created a mutant set of state agencies that protect and support their activities.
While Colombian drug cartels of the 1980s and early 1990s were highly visible
and posed a direct threat to the state, the nature of trafŽ cking in the late 1990s
has changed signiŽ cantly, and its focus has turned to Mexico. The new breed of
trafŽ ckers are more discreet and set up smaller-scale organisation s that are
interested in co-opting key personnel within the political and judicial systems.
TrafŽ ckers are also more likely to work through legitimate small businesses and
contract out manufacturing and transport to specialist groups. 24 Drugs may be
only one part of a broader criminal business that includes legitimate business on
the one hand (such as tourism) and bank robberies, car theft, arms trafŽ cking and
kidnapping on the other.25
The US Department of State estimates that at least US$85 billion in drug
proŽ ts can be found within the banking system, 26 and the tourism industry has
proved to be a place where illegitimate business interests can converge with
corrupt public sector managers, because the arrival of tourism is often associated
with an increase in crime, prostitutio n and an expansion in the supply of drugs.27
Tourism development in Belize has been partially dependent on drug culture in
the industrialise d world on two levels: recreational drug taking by tourists, and
funding of tourist developments by capital derived from dealing and smuggling.
The demand and supply routes for drugs, particularly cocaine, have had a
signiŽ cant impact of the direction and rates of development in the tourism
industry in Belize.
The Caribbean and Central America are two regions that have been targeted
as trafŽ cking routes by drug cartels. Within the Central American/Caribbean
region, Belize has not been immune to the development of this illegal international trade in narcotics. The US Department of State identiŽ ed Belize as a
signiŽ cant drug transit country. Since Belize lies between the producing countries of South America and the consumer countries of Europe and North
America, its position marks it out as an ideal route for smugglers. In addition,
the unique geography of the Caribbean, and especially Belize, means that chains
554
ECOTOURISM DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION AND STATE POLITICS IN BELIZE
of hundreds of islands provide points to drop off and pick up consignments of
drugs. Belize’s contiguous borders with Mexico and Guatemala, large tracts of
forested land, unprotected coastline, numerous Cayes and inland waterways,
unpopulated rainforest and coastal areas, and a rudimentary infrastructure for
combating trafŽ cking and abuse present the opportunity for signiŽ cant transhipment of illicit narcotics. 28 In the local press, the increase in trafŽ cking of
so-called hard drugs has been partially blamed on drug cartels utilising the old
trafŽ cking routes for marijuana through Belize to Mexico and ultimately through
to the USA in order to target their markets for cocaine and heroin. 29 In fact it
was reported in the Belizean press that ofŽ cers from the US Counter Narcotics
Cocaine Unit visited customs at the port of Belize and the sniffer dogs were so
overwhelmed by the smell of drugs they suffered sensory overload and were
unable to function.30
Belize has fallen foul of the internationally publicised US war on drugs and
high-proŽ le country certiŽ cation process. The Belizean government was criticised for failing to curb the use of Belize as an entrepot state and this has
affected relations between the two countries. The country certiŽ cation process is
an annual assessment of the 3 2 major drug producing and drug transit countries,
in which the countries are judged according to the steps they have taken to
enforce the goals of the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit TrafŽ c in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. CertiŽ cation is used as a diplomatic tool by
the US government to focus attention on producing and trafŽ cking states rather
than consumer states. There are three categories—full certiŽ cation, decertiŽ cation and a grant of ‘vital national interests’ certiŽ cation. Belize was
decertiŽ ed by the USA for failing to be active in the war on drugs. However, US
government documents indicate that Belize was granted the position of vital
national interests, which meant that US aid was not suspended and that the USA
would not vote against loans to Belize from the multilateral development
banks.31
One of the striking features of the drugs trade is the way that growers,
trafŽ ckers and dealers are increasingly paid in drugs rather than cash, meaning
that transhipment countries will be subject to an expansion in the availability of
drugs and its attendant problems of narcotic abuse and rising crime.32 Belize
certainly provides an example of this because the interrelationshi p between drug
trafŽ cking, money laundering (through offshore banking and construction of
hotels) and the tourism industry could only be sustained by the existence of a
shadow state. The expansion of trafŽ cking in Belize has had an impact on the
tourism industry. For example, it was reported that cocaine trafŽ cking brought
a new spurt of wealth to the local economy in Placencia, where the local press
noted the appearance of new speedboats and the beginnings of a construction
boom.33 Similarly, there was local speculation, from critics of the involvement
of foreign interests and possibly criminal elements, that entire resorts were
bought with millions of dollars in cash, derived from the drug trade.34 In 1999
James Kavanagh, a citizen of Colorado, was expelled from Belize and escorted
out of the country by US Marshals and DEA ofŽ cers. He had been a resort owner
in Cayo District, but had been found to be engaged in money laundering and the
drugs trade, using the resort as a legitimate business front for illegal activities.35
555
ROSALEEN DUFFY
It is clear that the authorities in Belize were, on the one hand, overwhelmed
by the extent of trafŽ cking and, on the other hand, that elements in the formal
state apparatus were complicitous, leading to the state’s incorporation into global
trafŽ cking networks. For example, the US Bureau for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs stated that the ability of the government of Belize to
combat trafŽ cking was severely undermined by deeply entrenched corruption
which reached into senior levels of government. In addition, it indicated that
ministers in the government, as well as police ofŽ cers, were complicitous in the
drug trade in Belize.36 The extent of trafŽ cking in Belize is the direct result of
complicity in the institution s that are intended to prevent smuggling. There is a
perception in Belize that there are elements in the police force and Fisheries
Department who are involved in the drugs trade.37 The USA insists that local
militaries and law enforcement agencies are involved in internal drug enforcement missions, but this increases the potential for corruption and human rights
abuses. A number of interviewees remarked that they perceived elements in the
Fisheries Department, the Belize Defence Force and the police to be engaged in
the drugs trade. One interviewee, who was formerly involved with Fisheries,
explained how it was possible to intercept drug drops, so that the relevant
authorities would not know if a few bales of cocaine were not handed in, but
were sold by the ofŽ cers themselves. The ability to Ž nd and sell bales of cocaine
were washed up on the shores of Belize’s various Cayes was locally referred to
as winning the ‘sea lotto’.38 This conforms to Reno’s argument that a key feature
of the shadow state is the creation of private armies to protect illicit trading
networks from which political and economic elites draw their strength. It also
indicates that the stipulation s regarding law enforcement and control of the drugs
trade that are expected by Northern interests are subverted by the very nature of
these North– South linkages. As a result any possibilit y of controlling the drugs
trade in the manner favoured by US interests in particular, is rendered impossible.
The impact of the shadow state on ecotourism policy
The shadow links that are ultimately responsible for decision making in Belize
indicate evidence of a process that is more formalised than simply a matter of
ad hoc or unco-ordinated corruption. Rather the links between the public and
private sector, local elites and external capital constitute a shadow state, and this
is nowhere more apparent than in the inability of the formal state apparatus to
enforce environmental legislation in the ecotourism industry.
Unlike Sierra Leone, Belize—once dependent on primary commodities—is a
major tourist destination for North America and Europe. Tourism is a relatively
recent development that really began with the expansion of tourist facilities in
the 1980s, but it is now Belize’s single largest foreign exchange earner, and the
Belize Tourist Board (BTB ) estimated that in 1994 tourism earned the country
Bz$150 million (US$75 million).39 According to BTB statistics, the three major
tourist markets for Belize are the USA, Canada and Europe, and the number of
visitors from the USA increased by 55% during the period 1991 to 1995.40 The
expansion of tourism has signiŽ cantly changed the economies of the resort areas
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ECOTOURISM DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION AND STATE POLITICS IN BELIZE
with, for example, two of the principal areas, Caye Caulker and San Pedro,
switching from dependence on Ž shing to a tourism economy. 41
However, the purpose of this article is to examine the similarities and
differences between the Belizean and Sierra Leonean cases. This article will
investigate the possible existence of a shadow state in Belize through an
analysis of the ecotourism industry, its relationship with external capital, local
elites and licit and illicit investment and trading networks. The existence of
shadow links between the private sector, the public sector and criminal elements means that enforcement of environmental legislation is problematic in
Belize. Since the country is promoted as an ecotourism destination, enforcement of regulations to ensure that tourism developments do not damage the
environment is important. Belize has an extensive framework of environmenta l
legislation, including the Environmental Protection Act, and it has established a
Department of the Environment whose stated aim is to prevent and control
pollution.
A common complaint among locally based tour guides and the conservation
community was that, while legislation was in place, it was rarely enforced.
Godsman Ellis, President of the Belize Ecotourism Association, stated that
policing was not carried out in the face of the country’s low Ž nancial resources, limited manpower, inadequate technological and administrative resources, and its open borders, and that very few cases of environmenta l
violations had been brought before the courts, despite the legislation that had
been put in place.42 One interviewee, who was involved in marine conservation
in Belize, stated that, although environmenta l impact assessments were legally
required for all new tourism developments, the government ofŽ ce responsible
for monitoring such assessments was completely overwhelmed by requests for
assessments because it was so poorly staffed.43 In addition, when conservation
authorities have tried to press for prosecutions for breaches of environmenta l
legislation, they have faced opposition from powerful sets of interest groups.
One example of this was an Ambergris Caye, when there was a  urry of
debate between the resident ‘gringo’ community, the local community and
conservation ofŽ cers over the fate of resort owners whose catamaran ran
aground in the Hol Chan Marine Reserve, causing extensive damage to the
coral reef. The incident occurred against a background of highly publicised
environmental breaches by ‘live-aboard’ dive ships owned by external investors. The most high proŽ le incidents involved the Fantome and the Rembrandt Van Rijn in the marine protected areas, Glovers Reef and Half Moon
Caye (respectively).44 The companies that owned the vessels were offered
options to compensate for the damage they had caused or risk having their
licences revoked, but the local press reported that there was a perception that
the owners were not sufŽ ciently punished because of their high proŽ le connections in Belize. 45 The catamaran incident also occurred against a history of
local resentment against foreign land and property owners who had settled on
Ambergris Caye. A Department of Environment Report detailed that several
foreign-owned resorts or hotels were not abiding by the legal requirements for
construction and management of piers. This was especially contentious because
several residents had complained that, while the regulations state all piers must
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ROSALEEN DUFFY
be open to the public, any Belizean who went to the pier would immediately be
removed by the owners or managers of the establishment.46
In the case of the catamaran in San Pedro, those involved in the conservation
community, such as Mito Paz, the Director of Green Reef, were highly critical
of the catamaran incident and felt that the owners should be taken to court.47 Those
who opposed high levels of foreign ownership speculated that the catamaran ran
aground because of the carelessness and general disrespect for the environment
they associated with newcomers to the island. 48 In contrast, external investors in
the tourism industry in San Pedro were concerned that the incident was being used
by local opponents to criticise the gringo community as a whole. One member
of the gringo community, who had assisted in pulling the catamaran off the reef,
vigorously argued that it was an accident that could have happened to any boat.49
In fact, the owners of the boat took the step of writing a public apology in the
local San Pedro Sun in an attempt to quell rumours about negligence. In it they
stated that the engine had failed and the winds had died, and so the boat ran on
to the reef before the anchor could be dropped.50
Despite the arguments between different interest groups in the tourist areas of
Belize, it was clear that ultimately there was a perception among both sets of
interest groups that a shadow decision-makin g process was underway and that this
would determine the outcome regardless of the legislation. This indicated a
perception that breaches of environmenta l legislation and wider problems with
criminality among foreign and local elites were either overlooked, tolerated or
actively supported and encouraged by key members of state agencies, because
parts of the state apparatus had been co-opted by these powerful networks of elites.
It is also important to provide the political context in which the shadow state
operates. Within Belize it is essential to acknowledge the deep divide between
supporters of the People’s United Party (PUP ) and those of the United Democratic
Party (UDP ). This division permeates local politics, can be exploited by foreign
elites in the tourism industry and plays a central role in determining the coverage
of certain issues in the Belizean press. In terms of the tourism industry it is
important because key Ž gures in either party are able to offer signiŽ cant levels
of patronage to their supporters. The stakes became higher in 1997 because it was
an election year when the opposition PUP were feted to win (and they achieved
a landslide victory). Political opponents and economic competitors in Belize have
pointed to the role of the current and former Ministers of Tourism and the
Environment as major players in the tourism industry. The former Minister of
Tourism and the Environment, Glenn Godfrey ( PUP ), has been able to utilise
contacts in his own constituency, which covers the two prime tourist areas of Caye
Caulker and Ambergris Caye. In particular, the construction of a new airstrip and
condominiums on Caye Caulker have been credited to Godfrey. Indeed, one
interviewee suggested that conservation organisations in Belize were Ž rm
supporters of the PUP; political opponents of this party were keen to point out that
conservation NGOs might have ‘turned a blind eye’ to his activities because they
were PUP supporters. 51
The shadow state has also affected organisation s that engage in lobbying on
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ECOTOURISM DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION AND STATE POLITICS IN BELIZE
conservation issues, especially when they have fallen foul of the deep political
divide between the PUP and UDP . The Lamanai Room Declaration of 1997, which
detailed major environmental abuses in Belize and was signed by numerous local
conservation agencies, including the Audubon Society and Coastal Zone Management Project, was criticised for political bias by those who supported the then
UDP government. Victoria Collins, Editor of the San Pedro Sun, suggested that
the Lamanai Room Declaration was perceived by UDP supporters as designed to
strengthen the position of the PUP amid public speculation that an election was
to be called. The then Minister of Tourism and the Environment, Henry Young,
accused the parties at Lamanai of trying to topple the UDP government. 52 Over
the course of the UDP government term, Young became a developer in Placencia,
where large areas of ecologically important mangroves were cut to make way for
tourism developments.53 Political opponents of such developments speculated
that local business elites and external investors were able to seek protection from
prosecution for environmental breaches because of their links with politically
prominent Ž gures in Belize and with the ruling UDP. It is clear that, in accordance
with Reno’s model of the shadow state, local elites utilise informal networks to
reward their clients. The ecotourism industry provides one example of the
manner in which those elites can bestow political and economic favouritism
upon their international and local supporters.
In promoting tourism as a development strategy, elites often aim to entice
foreign investors and large international tour operators into the country to
underwrite their own investments and patron– client networks. The involvement
of foreign interests in the Belizean tourism industry has assisted the creation of
a shadow state. The convergence of legal and illegal business interests with
government interests is apparent in the development of coastal tourism. The
dominance of foreign capital in the tourism industry is made possible by the
compliance of and collaboration with local companies and the political and
economic elite. This is especially the case in Belize, where there is a legal
stipulation that international tour operators and investors must have a Belizean
partner. In Belize a few key families own or are major Ž gures in the operation
of a number of tourism- and transport-relate d businesses, and as a result tourists
brought in by overseas operators can be funnelled through a series of businesses
all owned by one family or elite group which is ultimately reliant on international tour operators. Historically, on Ambergris Caye three key families,
Blake, Alamilla and Parham, who were also related through marriage, have been
economically dominant. They held sway over the development of the island
through gun running to the Santa Cruz Maya in Mexico during the middle of the
19th century, and later thanks to ownership of coconut and timber plantations,
and other land.54 Furthermore, Gach Guerrero, Secretary of the conservation
organisation , Green Reef, is also owner of Amigo Travel and manager of Island
Air, a member of the Board of the Ambergris Caye Historical Society, an ofŽ cer
of the Belize Tourism Industry Association, and the 1997 and 1998 chairman of
the International Sea and Air Festival.55 Similarly, the Vega family on Caye
Caulker own the tour operator Belize Odyssey and the Vega Inn, are involved
in environmental and tourism consultancy and a Ž shing business, and members
of the family sit on the BTIA, the Protected Areas National Council and the
559
ROSALEEN DUFFY
Coastal Zone Management Programme.56 However, it is not unusual in a country
with a relatively small population to Ž nd that certain individuals and families
have a major role in the public and private sectors.
An examination of the ways that land for tourism development is sold and
resold in the coastal zone reveals the extent to which external capital is involved
in the expansion of ecotourism in Belize. For example, large parcels of land on
Ambergris Caye are owned by a US-based company, Sunset Coves Ltd. The role
of Sunset Coves on Ambergris Caye was the subject of some debate in the local
press, speciŽ cally the San Pedro Sun. Sunset Coves began as a San Pablo Town
Board project, and the land was paid for by local islanders who were promised
they would be full partners in its development. The scheme had support and
assistance from the local MP (and former Minister of Tourism and the Environment) Glenn Godfrey.57 However, Sunset Coves went into receivership in 1996
because of an unpaid debt of Bz$300 000 ($150 000), and as a result it was sold
to Raymond Yusi of Western Caribbean Properties, based in California.58
This pattern of sale of land to external investors is common in the tourist
dominated islands of Belize. The State of the Coastal Zone Report (1995)
indicated that leased national lands were often sold to external investors or
subdivided in joint ventures and then sold on to the highest bidders, who were
primarily non-residents .59 An examination of the tax and valuation rolls for
Ambergris Caye revealed that there was a small number of US citizens,
including Albert Dugan, Corrie McDermott, Gerry McDermott and Ian Ritchie,
who owned or controlled the sales of large swathes of land on the island.60 Ian
Ritchie was formerly the owner of Southwinds Property, which facilitated the
purchase of properties in Belize by external investors; he is also owner of a
major resort (Captain Sharkey’s) on Ambergris Caye and is beginning land
speculation in Roatan in Honduras.61 A Department of Environment Compliance
Monitoring Site report for San Pedro states that:
Several foreigners who live or own hotels/resorts along the beach prohibit people
from using or passing through the beach reserve … totally disregarding the 66 feet
reserve as required by the National Lands Act … these people do not even own the
beach and yet they lay claim to ownership by not allowing anyone to use the
beach.62
In their election manifesto for 1998– 2003, Set Belize Free, the PUP claimed that
tourism had decline thanks to corrupt practices that allowed ‘unscrupulou s
foreigners to side step Belizeans’ and that the BTB had been ‘plagued by
mismanagement and corruption’.63
Caye Chapel (owned by a former mining millionaire from Kentucky) has
proved to be a controversial tourism development that highlights the links
between foreign investors, support from local political and economic elites and
local perceptions of corrupt business practices. The island was completely
re-landscaped and artiŽ cially expanded to provide an exclusive tourist resort.
The development of the island included building a beach and a golf course, and
dredging for sand to build the beach and to allow larger boats to dock at the
island. In the process, the dredging stirred up the sea bed, disturbed lobster
Ž sheries and destroyed Caye Caulker Ž shing grounds.64 The island has been
560
ECOTOURISM DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION AND STATE POLITICS IN BELIZE
perceived in Belize as an example of an environment being totally remastered in
the pursuit of tourism development.65 The alliances which form the shadow state
in Belize ensured that the island could be overhauled to conform to the image
of Cayes presented to potential visitors. There was a great deal of local
speculation about the way in which the owner of the island appeared to be able
to dredge around it and build a beach without proper permission. Those who
opposed the development of Caye Chapel speculated that the owner was allowed
to undertake such activities because he was protected by the highest political
authorities in the country in return for free trips to the island, and that the owner
had been careful to pay the relevant ofŽ cials in order to avoid environmenta l
regulations. 66 For example, one interviewee stated that Caye Chapel was a
glaring example of what happened to the environment in Belize when a corrupt
politician and a foreign millionaire co-operated, and that it was all about money
and there was no-one willing to stop it.67 Caye Chapel will have its own airstrip
and casino to allow gamblers to  y direct from Miami to the island. Critics of
such tourist developments have complained that while the USA and UK berate
Belize for failing to tackle money laundering, drug trafŽ cking and a possibly
corrupt offshore sector, it is the citizens of these countries that are most likely
to avail themselves of the facilities on offer in Belize.68
Another example of the links between local elites and external property
investors was the highly controversia l plan to build a dolphin park called
Cangrejo Caye. Aspects of the process to create the park indicate that common
forms of public consultation were circumvented in order to push through a major
tourist development despite local opposition . Cangrejo Caye was to be developed by a Mexican company, Dolphin International, and it offered tourists an
opportunity to swim with ‘semi-captive dolphins’, along the lines of the highly
successful and lucrative dolphin park in Xcaret in Mexico. The residents of
Ambergris Caye were Ž rst informed of the plans for the park when an advert
appeared in Destination Belize 1997 that encouraged tourists to visit it before it
was even built. As a result Dolphin International embarked on a public relations
campaign, and local business people who were the promoters of Dolphin
International ensured that donations to local charities received favourable coverage in the local press, including when the company sponsored the San Pedro
football team and it was renamed the Dolphins in honour of its new backers.69
In addition, Dolphin International, which also used the name Cangrejo Caye
Educational Experience Ltd, invited a number of Belizean ‘movers and shakers’
to a free weekend at its dolphin resort at Xcaret in Mexico.70 Cangrejo Caye was
part of a redevelopment programme for Ambergris Caye that included shrimp
farming by Nova Shrimp Ltd, the construction of an airstrip and a new pier, all
of which was to be developed under the auspices of the North Ambergris Caye
Development Corporation (NACDC ).71
The dolphin park was opposed by some local tour guides who viewed it as
unwelcome competition and as contrary to the spirit of ecotourism in Belize.
Tour operators Daniel and Elodia Nunez openly opposed the park because they
disagreed with the idea of keeping wild animals in a captive environment to
satiate tourist desires. They stated that they believed that the dolphins at Xcaret
were slowly dying, partly because dolphins like to swim freely over large
561
ROSALEEN DUFFY
distances in order to feed and so keeping them in pens would be cruel and
detrimental to the environment, since the dolphins would eat out such a small
area.72 According to Daniel and Elodia Nunez, in 1998 the park was forced by
local opposition to accept demands for a full environmenta l impact assessment
before construction was begun.73 This strong pro-conservatio n lobby was
identiŽ ed by Victoria Collins, Editor of the San Pedro Sun, as a major factor in
preventing the construction of Cangrejo Caye.74 Opponents of the development
there were keen to speculate that the owners had failed to pay off the right
ofŽ cials in the opposition People’s United Party (PUP ), which was tipped to win
the next election.75 Indeed, after the PUP had won the general election of 1998,
the Urban Planning OfŽ cer for Ambergris Caye, Al Westby, remarked that the
investors from Dolphin International had been invited back once more to Belize
to discuss the future development of Cangrejo Caye further.76 The case of the
dolphin park can also be viewed as an indicator of the extent of the shadow links
between state agencies and the private sector.
Conclusion
It is clear that Belize displays the broad features of a shadow state, as
conceptualised by Reno. Even without any evidence of a shadow state, the
perception of its existence among those in the tourism and conservation communities means that the relevant interest groups act in such a way as to assume
its existence. Despite the obvious differences between the cases of Sierra Leone
and Belize, the similarities are sufŽ cient for useful comparisons to be drawn.
Reno suggests that there is a set of shadow links between international capital
and local elites that ultimately determines the direction of policy making. In
Belize, despite an extensive framework of environmental legislation, the direction of ecotourism policy is determined by the informal links of the shadow
state. The expansion of corrupt activities through tourism development means
that enforcement of the environmental regulations on which ecotourism is
founded is problematic. Government regulations designed to protect the environment are rendered ineffective when a junior arm of the state is opposed by more
powerful interest groups that lie within and outside the state apparatus. The
expansion of organised crime has resulted in the emergence of state facilitators
and protectors of criminality and an institutiona l presence of massive drug
producing, trafŽ cking and money laundering entities. Consequently, these sets of
interest groups are able to challenge elected governments for control of key state
institutions , thereby ensuring that enforcement of legislation is impossible, and
effectively preventing domestic political accountability .
Notes
The author would like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council and its Global Environmental
Change Programme for sponsoring this research while she was a Research Fellow at Edinburgh University,
1997 – 99, and at Lancaster University, 1999– 2000 (Grant no. R000223013) . The author would also like to
thank Professor Christopher Clapham for his comments on numerous drafts, and Dr Liz Bondi and Dr Stephen
Ellis for their support and very helpful advice on this article.
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ECOTOURISM DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION AND STATE POLITICS IN BELIZE
1
W Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
J F Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, London: Longman, 1993; and Reno, Corruption
and State Politics in Sierra Leone, p 8.
3
Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, p 3.
4
Ibid, pp 23 – 26.
5
M Blomstrom & B Hettne, Development Theory in Transition: The Dependenc y Debate and Beyond: Third
World Responses, London: Zed Books, 1984, pp 81– 91.
6
Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, pp 23 – 26.
7
J Moran, ‘Patterns of corruption and developmen t in East Asia,’ Third World Quarterly, 20 (3), 1999 pp
569– 587.
8
M H Khan, ‘A typology of corrupt transactions in developing countries’, IDS Bulletin, 27(2), 1996, pp
12– 21.
9
World Bank, ‘Reducing corruption’, World Bank Policy and Research Bulletin, 8(3), 1997.
10
M P Hampton & M Levi, ‘Fast spinning into oblivion? Recent development s in money-launderin g policies
and offshore Ž nance centres’, Third World Quarterly, 20(3), 1999, p 651.
11
S D Morris, ‘Corruption and the Mexican political system: continuity and change’, Third World Quarterly,
20 (3), 1999, p 630.
12
R S Gelbard, The Globalisation of the Drug Trade, address at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice,
Dublin, 1996; and R S Gelbard, The Threat of Transnational Organised Crime and Illicit Narcotics,
statement before the UN General Assembly, New York, 1997.
13
W Grove, ‘The drug trade as a national and international security threat’, paper presented at the ‘Security
94’ conference held at the Institute of Strategic Studies and the Security Association of South Africa,
University of Pretoria, 1995 See also Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1997: Canada, Mexico and Central America, Washington,
DC: US Department of State, 1998, pp 1– 2; and Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1997: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes,
Washington DC. US Department of State, 1998.
14
M P Hampton, ‘Where currents meet: the offshore interface between corruption, offshore Ž nance centres and
economic development ’, IDS Bulletin, 27 (2), 1996, pp 78– 87. See also Offshore Times, (Panama City)
Winter 1997 (Belize Issue). The Offshore Times is published by the Offshore Association of Central
America and the Caribbean, based in Panama. Also Belize Offshore Centre Brochure, produced by Cititrust
International.
15
Interview with Maria Vega, Vega Inn and BTIA , 21 January 1998, Caye Caulker. See also Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,
1997: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes; and Hampton, ‘Where currents meet’.
16
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, 1997: Canada, Mexico and Central America, pp 1– 2.
17
‘Shadow over Tory Treasurer’, The Times (UK) 13 July 1999.
18
‘A “mugging” and its consequences ’, The Times, 14 July 1994; and ‘British diplomat tells Tories to launch
Ashcroft enquiry,’ The Times, 16 July 1999.
19
‘A “mugging” and its consequences ’; ‘Clamour grows for full scale enquiry’, The Times, 16 July 1999.
20
‘Some of these rumours about Ashcroft cast a shadow over his reputation’, The Times, 15 July 1999; ‘The
whiff of the casbah lingers’, The Times, 13 July 1999; ‘He is off to Bournemout h and will be lobbying our
politicians; The Times, 13 July 1999; ‘Ashcroft sought aid from ministers to promote business interests
abroad Guardian (UK), 15 July 1999; and ‘Tory anger over Ashcroft leaks’, Guardian, 14 July 1999.
21
‘Caribbean jaunt landed MPs in hot water’, Guardian, 23 July 1999; ‘Fury as MPs’ trip to Belize revealed’,
Guardian, 23 July 1999; and ‘Tory MP defends Ashcroft trip’, Guardian, 24 July 1999.
22
‘Drugs Agency has Ashcroft on its Ž les’, Times, 17 July 1999; and ‘Drip drip of disclosures, Guardian, 22
July 1999.
23
‘100 million wiped off shares,’ Guardian, 27 July 1999; ‘Ashcroft blocks US documents’, Guardian, 5
October 1999; ‘Peace in our Times’, Guardian, 13 December 1999; and ‘Dramatic end of Ashcroft and
Times libel’, Guardian, 9 December 1999.
24
‘A new class of trafŽ cker’ The Economist, 11– 19 September 1999, p 66.
25
Morris, ‘Corruption and the Mexican political system’, Third World Quarterly, p 630.
26
Grove, ‘The drug trade as a national and international security threat’. See also Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1997: Canada,
Mexico and Central America, pp 1– 2; Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1997; Money Laundering and Financial Crimes. In
addition, see S Calvani, E Guia & J L Lemahieu, ‘Drug resistance rating: an innovative approach for
measuring a country’s capacity to resist illegal drugs’, Third World Quarterly, 18(4) pp 659– 672.
27
S C Stonich, J H Sorensen & A Hundt, ‘Ethnicity, class and gender in tourism development : the case of
the Bay Islands, Honduras’, Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 3(1), 1995, pp 21– 24; and The Cost of Tourism
in the Caribbean, London: Cassell, 1996, pp 90 – 101.
2
563
ROSALEEN DUFFY
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, 1997: Canada, Mexico and Central America, p 1; ‘Whose colony is this anyway?’ Guardian, 17
June 1997; ‘US Pressure in drug Ž ght rankles some’, Amandala, 19 January 1997; ‘Colombia and Mexico
sign agreement to cooperate in anti-drug Ž ght’, Amandala, 9 February 1997; and ‘Drug trafŽ c increasing in
the Caribbean’, San Pedro Sun, 12 December 1997. For further discussion of the global nature of the drugs
trade see P B Stares, Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World, Washington, DC. Brookings
Institution, 1996. See also B Nietschmann, ‘Protecting indigenous coral reefs and sea territories, Miskito
Coast, RAAN, Nicaragua’ in S Stevens (ed), Conservation Through Cultural Survival: Indigenous Peoples
and Protected Areas, Washington, DC: Island Press, 1997, pp 193– 224.
‘Belize caught in the middle of a drug war’ Amandala, 3 August 1997; and Nietschmann, ‘Protecting
indigenous coral reefs and sea territories’, pp 193 – 224.
‘Belize by sea: much coast little guard’, Amandala, 26 September 1997; and anonymou s interviewees.
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Country CertiŽ cations, Washington, DC:
US Department of State, 1998, p 1. See also ‘Defendants in Belize’s biggest cocaine bust walk’, Amandala,
28 September 1997; ‘Colombian drug trafŽ cker pays Ž ne, exits prison’, Amandala, 5 October 1997; and
‘Bad baby Belize says US’, Amandala, 9 March 1997.
Calvani, Guia & Lemahieu, ‘Drug resistance rating’, pp 659– 672.
‘Belize by sea: much coast little guard’. This was conŽ rmed by a number of interviewees who shall remain
anonymous.
Anonymou s interviewees. This was a claim regularly made against the new owners of Blackbird Caye
Resort and Manta Resort, which had previously been developed by Ray Lightburn, Ken Leslie and Al
Dugan.
Tory MP reported to ombudsman as Belize affair widens Guardian, 22 July 1999; and ‘Mr Ashcroft’s
patronage’, Guardian, 22 July 1999.
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,
1997: Canada, Mexico and Central America, p 2.
Anonymou s interviewees.
Anonymou s interviewees. See also Andreas, ‘In focus: US drug control policy’, US Foreign Policy in Focus.
M McField, S Wells & J Gibson (eds) State of the Coastal Zone Report, Belize, 1995, Belize City: Coastal
Zone Management Programme/UNDP/GEF, 1996, p 97; BTB , Tourism: A Historical Reference, a Challenge to
the Future, from a BTB Perspective, Belize City: BTB, [1993]? interview with Maria Vega, Vega Inn and BTIA ,
Caye Caulker, 21 January 1998; ‘Ectourism to become the fastest growing segment in world tourism’, San
Pedro Sun, 31 October 1997; and ‘Tourist arrivals increase second quarter’, San Pedro Sun, 8 August 1997.
Belize Tourism Board, Belize Tourism Statistics, Section 1, Belize City: BTB, 1995.
Interview with Dwight Neal, Director, Marine Research Centre, University of Belize (UCB), 24 January
1998, Calabash Caye; interview with Mito Paz, Director, Green Reef, 2 February 1998, San Pedro; interview
with James Azueta, Marine Protected Areas Co-ordinator, Fisheries Department, 9 February 1998, Belize
City; interview with Mike Fairweather, Resort Developer, 13 January 1998, Calabash Caye; and ‘Where
have all the sardines gone?’, San Pedro Sun, 30 May 1997.
G Ellis, ‘Tourism and the environment : some observations on Belize, Proceedings of the Second National
Symposuim on the State of the Belize Environment, Belmopan: DoE, 1995, pp 305– 307.
Anonymou s interviewee.
‘Dive ship damages Belize barrier reef’, Amandala, 13 July 1999; and ‘Rembrandt Van Rijn, Fantome
offered “options”,’ Amandala, 10 August 1997.
‘Windjammer Ltd apologises for reef destruction, Amandala, 10 August 1997; and ‘MTE sanctions reef
crunching vessels’, San Pedro Sun, 8 August 1997.
Department of Environment, Compliance Monitoring Site Visit Report, San Pedro, Belmopan: DoE, 1998.
Interview with Mito Paz, Director, Green Reef, 2 February 1998, San Pedro; interview with Tony Calderon,
Park Ranger, Hol Chan Marine Reserve, 22 December 1997, San Pedro; interview with Alberto Patt,
Biologist, Hol Chan Marine Reserve, 2 February 1998, San Pedro. See also ‘Gypsy Queen goes aground on
the reef’, San Pedro Sun, 14 November 1997.
Anonymou s interviewees. See also ‘Gypsy Queen goes aground on the reef.’
Interview with Malcolm Hitchcock, Fido’s Bar, 5 February 1997, San Pedro.
‘Gypsy Queen goes aground on the reef.’
Anonymou s interviewees.
Interview with Victoria Collins, Editor of the San Pedro Sun, 23 December 1997, San Pedro; and ‘Lamanai
room declaration issued by BTIA , Audubon and others’, San Pedro Sun, 22 August 1997.
Anonymou s interviewees.
G Godfey, Ambergris Caye: Paradise with a Past, Belize: Cubola Productions, 1998, pp 23 – 28.
Green Reef, Contacts, San Pedro, Belize: Green Reef, undated.
Interview with Maria Vega, Vega Inn and BTIA , Caye Caulker, 21 January 1998; and interview with Ellen
McRae, CariSearch Ltd, Siwa-Ban Foundation and BTIA , Caye Caulker, 3 January 1998.
564
ECOTOURISM DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION AND STATE POLITICS IN BELIZE
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
San Pedro Town Valuation Roll 1996– 2001: Town Core and South of Town Core. See also ‘Open forum—a
closer look at Sunset Coves, by UDP San Pedro branch, San Pedro Sun, 28 November 1997.
‘Sunset Coves Ltd sold,’ Amandala, 21 December 1997.
McField, Wells & Gibson, State of the Coastal Zone, pp 88– 93; interview with Janet Gibson, National
Project Advisor, Coastal Zone Management Project, 11 February 1998, Belize City: interview with Tony
Calderon, Park Ranger, Hol Chan Marine Reserve, 22 December 1997, San Pedro; and, ‘First phase of North
Ambergris Caye developmen t to start with Basil Jones airstrip says BIS press release, NACDC chairman,’ San
Pedro Sun, 13 June 1997.
San Pedro Town Valuation Roll 1996– 2001: Town Core and South of Town Core; and San Pedro. Town
Valuation Roll 1996– 2001: North of Town Core. James Blake, a Belizean, was one of the other large land
owners on the island. Also, interview with Chocolate, Chocolate’s Manatee Tours, 19 January 1998, Caye
Caulker.
Anonymou s interviewees.
Department of Environment , Compliance Monitoring Site Visit Report: San Pedro, Belmopan, Belize; 1998;
and Department of Environment, Compliance Monitoring Site Visit Report: Caye Chapel, Belmopan, Belize,
1998.
PUP, Set Belize Free: Manifesto of the PUP, 1998 – 2003, p. 25.
Interview with Ellen McRae, Cari-Search, Ltd, Siwa-Ban Foundation and BTIA , 3 January 1998, Caye
Caulker; interview with Chocolate, Tour Guide, Chocolate’s Manatee Tours, 15 December 1997, Caye
Caulker.
Department of Environment, Compliance Monitoring Site Visit Report: San Pedro: interview with Janet
Gibson, National Project Advisor, Coastal Zone Management Project, 11 February 1998; Belize City.
Anonymou s interviewees. This was mentioned by a number of people who were interviewed, particularly
those on Caye Caulker whose livelihoods had been directly affected by dredging.
Anonymou s interviewee.
‘Mr Ashcroft’s patronage. ’
‘Dolphin International helps football club’, San Pedro Sun, 14 February 1997; ‘Dolphin international
donates paint for beautiŽ cation project, San Pedro Sun, 18 July 1997, ‘Dolphin International donates to the
Reina De La Costa,’ San Pedro Sun, 8 August 1997. For further discussion of the different types of
human – dolphin interaction for tourism, see D Perrine, ‘Divers and dolphins’, Sport Diver Magazine, 6(1),
1998, pp 40 – 47.
San Pedro Sun, 25.7.97, ‘Cangrejo Caye Educational Experience Ltd applies for duty free tax exemption’,
25 July 1997.
‘Dolphin International receives lending commitment … meeting held with First Company’, San Pedro Sun,
27 June 1997 and ‘Letter from William (Mike) Campbell Dolphin International Development Ltd’, San
Pedro Sun, 4 July 1997.
Interview with Daniel and Elodia Nunez, Tour Operators, Tanisha Tours, 30 December 1997, San Pedro;
interview with Victoria Collins, Editor, San Pedro Sun, 22 December 1997, San Pedro; interview with Janet
Gibson, National Project Advisor, Coastal Zone Management Project, 11 February 1998, Belize City. See
also ‘BETA concerned about Cangrejo Caye Project’, San Pedro Sun, 8 August 1997; and ‘Private hearing
on the proposed Dolphin Park’, 27 June 1997.
Interview with Daniel and Elodia Nunez, Tour Operators, Tanisha Tours, 30 December 1997, San Pedro;
interview with Victoria Collins, Editor, San Pedro Sun, 22 December 1997, San Pedro; ‘Lamanai room
declaration issued by BTIA Audubon and others’; and ‘Private hearing on the proposed Dolphin Park.’
Interview with Victoria Collins, Editor, San Pedro Sun, 22 December 1997, San Pedro.
Anonymou s Interviewees.
Interview with Al Westby, Housing and Planning Department, 31 December 1998, San Pedro.
565