LONDON INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2017
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization
London International Model United Nations
18th Session | 2017
tsTable of Content
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LONDON INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2017
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
WELCOME TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION .............................................................. 3
INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE .................................................................................................................. 4
TOPIC A: FORMING A NATO STRATEGY IN CYBERSPACE ............................................................................. 5
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................... 5
HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM ............................................................................................................................................. 6
Timeline of notable attacks ....................................................................................................................................... 7
1998 – 2001 “MOONLIGHT MAZE” ....................................................................................................................... 7
2005 – 2011 TITAN RAIN & BYZANTINE HADES .................................................................................................. 8
2007 Estonia DDoS Campaigns ................................................................................................................................ 9
2008 Russia – Georgia War ...................................................................................................................................... 9
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ...................................................................................................................................... 10
December 2015 BlackEnergy3 Malware in Western Ukraine ................................................................................ 10
2016 US Election Hacking Campaigns ................................................................................................................... 11
The Attribution Problem.......................................................................................................................................... 12
Is this Cyber War? .................................................................................................................................................. 12
Defining ‘Critical National Infrastructure’............................................................................................................. 13
Collective Security Assurances ............................................................................................................................... 13
Regulating Attack Toolkits ...................................................................................................................................... 14
Building Readiness .................................................................................................................................................. 14
‘BLOC POSITIONS’ ........................................................................................................................................................ 16
QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION SHOULD ANSWER .............................................................................................................. 16
SOURCES....................................................................................................................................................................... 17
TOPIC B: NATO’S EASTERN DIMENSION: ASSURING ALLIES AND DETERRING RUSSIA .................... 20
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................. 20
HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM ........................................................................................................................................... 21
Enlargement of NATO ............................................................................................................................................. 21
Agreements .............................................................................................................................................................. 23
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ...................................................................................................................................... 24
Eastward expansion ................................................................................................................................................ 24
The Ukraine conflict ................................................................................................................................................ 25
Anti-ballistic missile defence ................................................................................................................................... 26
Rapid response force ............................................................................................................................................... 27
CURRENT SITUATION .................................................................................................................................................... 28
2016 Warsaw summit .............................................................................................................................................. 28
Military exercises .................................................................................................................................................... 29
BLOC POSITIONS ........................................................................................................................................................... 30
QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION SHOULD ANSWER .............................................................................................................. 31
SOURCES....................................................................................................................................................................... 32
CONFERENCE INFORMATION ................................................................................................................................ 34
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Welcome to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
Dear Delegates,
After having completed a War Studies degree at King’s College London, I am currently pursuing a
Masters in Management at the London School of Economics. During my MUN career, I have been
active in the American, European, and world circuits, and held tenure as President & Founder of the
KCL United Nations Association as well as Best Delegate Media Chair of the United Kingdom.
LIMUN always holds a special place for me. It is thus an honor to return for the fourth time with my
partner-in-crime Gabriela Silova. We are excited to deliver the very best chairing to you all.
NATO will be a challenging yet rewarding committee for you all. With consensus voting and
complex current topics, there will be no shortage of material for you to address head-on.
Good luck on your preparation and if you have any questions, please do not hesitate to send us an email!
Your Director, Yuji Develle – [email protected]
Dear Delegates,
My name is Gabriela Silova, and after graduating from King’s College London with BSc in Political
Economy, I joined a graduate scheme with an investment bank in London. Throughout my academic years, I
had the pleasure to attend the highest quality conferences worldwide both as a delegate and a chair.
Having participated in NATO committees in the past myself, I am delighted to be your Assistant Director
alongside Yuji, while we tackle two pressing topics.
Since LIMUN 2017 will also be my fourth time I return to the conference, I have no doubt about the quality
of debate and negotiation from you delegates.
All the best with research!
Your Assistant Director, Gabriela Silova
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Introduction to the committee
Founded as a result of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the world’s largest (and arguably most
powerful) military alliance comprising 28 members from both sides of the
Atlantic in the North American and European continents.
A political & military alliance, system of collective defence, channel for transAtlantic security cooperation, and think tank for strategic doctrine, NATO
pursues its core missions in four major ways. Decisions & Consultations at a
variety of political and military levels made across all 28 states and decided
upon in a consensual manner; Active Operations & Missions in Afghanistan,
Kosovo, Africa (broadly), the Mediterranean, and the Horn of Africa under the
premises of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and/or a UNSC mandate;
Partnerships developed with other countries and organizations to the end of
strengthening its depth and reach; Constant re-evaluation and re-developing of
members states’ policies, capabilities, and structures so as to remain at the
forefront of rapidly evolving new threats. (NATO.int)
In this simulation, you will be representing a member state of the North
Atlantic Council, the ‘principal political decision-making body of NATO’
(NATO.int). Decisions are undertaken on a consensual basis. While the Council
is usually chaired by the Secretary General, LIMUN will remove this position
and have your Director and Assistant Director chair instead.
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Image source: Kaspersky Cybermap (cybermap.kaspersky.com)
Topic A: Forming a NATO Strategy in
Cyberspace
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Introduction
On 9 July 2016, NATO held the historic Warsaw Summit where
Cyberspace was officially recognized as the “Fifth Domain of Warfare”. This
long-awaited decision is sure to define the approach NATO has on an
expansive list of countries and non-state actors throughout its threat landscape
and calls for the formation of a swift, realistic and appropriate NATO strategy
in/for cyberspace.
Over the past 25 years, the pace of technological change has overturned
traditional understandings of military strategy and warfare. NATO is an
organization that was built and designed to defend against nation-states and
coalitions of nation-states in open combat not dissimilar from the Second
World War and earlier examples of ‘Cold War’ foes such as Communist China
or the Stalinist Soviet Union. Understandings of war have since evolved to
become akin to grand strategy with strong game theory undertones. The
concept of “Mutually Assured Destruction” and of military stalemate between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact cemented the idea that war had to be avoided
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This topic guide is an adaptation and update to ‘Develle, Yuji. “Aggression, Sabotage and Espionage in Cyberspace:
Drawing Red Lines”, Develle, Yuji & Mullens, George. OxIMUN 2016 DISEC Study Guide. August 2016’ p. 3-23
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through
the
prevention
of
outcomes/change
rather
than
the
Clausewitzian (or Napoleonic) maximization of force on the battlefield.
Today, military paradigms have once more shifted towards information
warfare and the development of resilience to asymmetric threats. In both
scenarios, cyber-attacks have a major impact. Cyberspace has long been a
blind-spot for NATO, as the organization has until now failed to even
recognize its important role in enhancing existing instruments of war, in
complementing military and propaganda initiatives not unlike a “combined
arms” method, and in adding on to the tools available to NATO’s threat actors
seeking to undermine its members and the effectiveness of the alliance as a
whole.
As Carl von Clausewitz the father of modern warfare, once declared:
‘War is a mere continuation of policy by other means; War… is an act of
violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.’ (Von Clausewitz, On War)
Within this definition (should your state choose to adopt it), cyberspace has
been used as a theatre within which actors have used ‘violence’ to compel
others to submit to their political will.
History of the Problem
Despite the relative ‘newness’ of cyber aggression, the past three decades have
gathered quite an extensive record of diverse cyber-attacks. Throughout the past 25
years, one notices the increasing complexity and boldness of attacks, regardless of
whether those are attributed to states, state-sponsored actors, or independent non-state
actors.
Cyber-attacks involve many different types of actors looking to use attacks in
different ways to achieve different strategic ends. Many of the high-profile acts of
cyber aggression have involved a combination of actors, making exclusive
categorization close to impossible. Given the nature of the topic and the geographic
focus of NATO, the following acts of cyber-aggression are disproportionally state6
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influenced and/or have deep geopolitical ramifications. However, it is
important to keep in mind that cyber-attacks disproportionally affect the private
sector. (Information is Beautiful, 08/08 2016)
Timeline of notable attacks:
 1998 – 2001 MOONLIGHT MAZE
 2005 – 2011 TITAN RAIN & BYZANTINE HADES
 2007 Estonia DDoS Campaigns
 2008 Russia-Georgia War
 2015 BlackEnergy3 Malware in Ukraine
 2016 US Election Hacking Campaign
1998 – 2001 “MOONLIGHT MAZE”
Widely known as the first major state-attributed cyber attack in history (to
Russia), operation MOONLIGHT MAZE led to compromising the US Military’s
non-classified inner network (NIPRNET). In March 1998, the DoD detected a
penetration of the ‘Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network’ (NIPRNET).
The attackers broke into computer networks affecting various non-classified areas of
US government, including ‘NASA, DoE, the DoD, etc. The FBI led an investigation
with the NIPC, while the newly created JTF-CND (Joint Task Force for Computer
Network Defense) was to coordinate a response’. (Healey, 2013) While previous
attacks were often attributed to non-state actors, MOONLIGHT MAZE marks the
beginning of the state-led APT threats scares. According to Technopedia, ‘[a]n
advanced persistent threat (APT) refers to a cyber attack launched by an attacker with
substantial means, organization and motivation to carry out a sustained assault
against a target.’ (APT, Technopedia) As an APT, MOONLIGHT MAZE is still
shrouded in mystery because cyber-attacks grant a much greater ability for states to
conceal their actions (they can pursue attacks via proxy actors, proxy servers,
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rerouting their connections around the world, using attack patterns, or
signatures associated with other adversaries, etc.).
2005 – 2011 TITAN RAIN & BYZANTINE HADES
The first publicly declared attacks were codenamed TITAN RAIN.
(Nakashima, 2010) Over three or four years, hackers with links to the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) compromised hundreds of systems in US industry and
government. They hacked an impressive portfolio of networks including Lockheed
Martin, Northrop Grumman, and BAE Systems. In 2010, Google reported that it was
victim of a “highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure
originating from China… theft of intellectual property.” The attackers took advantage
of Internet Explorer vulnerability affecting hundreds of the largest technology
companies. This culminated in the 2011 attacks on RSA security, a computer and
network security company. The RSA breaches were used as a stepping stone for
breaches on networks associated with the development of the F-35 Fighter Jet. There
have eventually been suggestions that the fuselage of China’s second stealth fighter
jet, the J-31, resembles that of the F-22 and F-35. This entire episode of hacking
campaigns affecting over 750 targets was codenamed by US counterintelligence
officials as BYZANTINE HADES. (Healey, 2010)
Whether this was an act of espionage (because of the theft of key US documents and
technology), deliberate aggression (an intentional attack aimed at degrading key
American industries and infrastructure), or sabotage (a deliberate action aimed at
weakening the influence of Google and other industries in China), is still
undetermined. This string of attacks reveals a dire need for NATO (along with other
partners) to draw cyber red lines in labelling attacks properly and finding a response
to these acts of aggression.
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2007 Estonia DDoS Campaigns
For several days, waves of DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks from Russia
hacked and defaced Estonia’s banks, agencies and governmental websites.
‘Commerce slowed almost to a standstill for several hours as financial institutions
found their servers overwhelmed by requests generated by the botnets behind the
attacks. Five years later, the origin and motivation behind the cyber attacks is yet
unclear.’ (Richards, International Affairs Review) These attacks coincided with a
series of Pro-Estonian/Anti-Russian protests associated with the relocation of a prized
Estonian artefact to the Estonian Military Cemetery. (Richards, International Affairs
Review) While the source of the attack is unknown, whether it may be the Russian
government or Russian patriotic hackers, Sergei Markov of the Russian State Duma
shed light on the issue when he blamed the Nashi Youth Group for the attack. (Miller,
2009) The attack had a minimal effect on the Estonian economy, but it did reveal the
potential for cyber attacks to completely cut a government off from the rest of its
infrastructure for a time. “Striking an enemy’s ability to communicate with the
outside world is a very valuable use of a weapon at the early stages of war,” Jose
Nazario, a security researcher at Arbor Networks, told SC Magazine. These attacks
led to the NATO CCD-COE creating a seminal outline on cyber-warfare, the Tallinn
Manual (for link, see bibliography).
2008 Russia – Georgia War
While ‘the cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007 demonstrated the degree to
which nations might persuade patriotic hackers and cyber professionals to exert
pressure on a hostile nation’ and set the groundwork for a framework for cyber-war
in the future (the Tallinn Manual), the Russian cyber campaign occurring at the same
time as the military campaign against Georgia in 2008 confirmed many existent
thoughts within military circles. (Healey, 2013) Cyberspace was to be an essential
component of C4I (Communications, Control, Command, Computer and Intelligence)
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infrastructure for kinetic operations. At the time when Georgia moved its
troops into South Ossetia, capturing the regional capital and surrounding villages, the
Russian cyber campaign had already been going for over a week before the broken
ceasefire terms triggered a Russian invasion of Georgia. Russian hackers focused on
‘denial and degradation of Georgian communications systems’ as well as targeting
many public-facing Georgian websites. (Healey, 2013: 197) Was the Georgian War a
cyber war? Or was it simply a war, with cyber-support. Or, alternatively, was it a
war, and was the cyber campaign a string of attacks disassociated from the war
entirely? These are questions NATO grapples with when examining cyberaggression.
Statement of the Problem
Two attacks in particular dominate the conversation and will have a great
effect on the policies adopted at LIMUN.
December 2015 BlackEnergy3 Malware in Western Ukraine
The Ukrainian Power Grid attack of December 2015 was a major wake up call
for concerning the potential destructiveness and strategic threat of cyberattacks. Over 230,000 residents in the Ivano-Frankivsk region of Western
Ukraine lost power just before Christmas. F-Secure Labs identified Quedagh (a
Russia-based gang known to target political organisations) as the main user of
the BlackEnergy malware toolkit, which was modified from a DDoS botnet kit
to conduct this latest APT. After entering a SCADA (Supervisory control and
data acquisition) via a phishing email, the hackers took 30 electricity
substations offline, damaged 2 power distribution platforms, and removed 2 or
3 backup power supplies to ensure maximum duration of damage. To cover up
tracks, Drives were wiped permanently with KillDisk, passwords were
changed to prevent operators from accessing control functions. Following a
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manual restoration of power, the power came back after 3 to 6 hours.
(ICS-CERT, 2015)
BlackEnergy was used in patterns attributable to Russia in the past, such as when
Russia conducted a swathe of attacks on Georgia during the 2008 Georgian War.
Typical of Russian underground operations, the greater degree of plausible
deniability proposed by the usage of the BlackEnergy 3 kit (because it’s used by so
many criminals) allows for bolder attacks. Toolkits and botnets are the weaponry of
cyber-conflict; their increasing availability and ease of use make attacks all the
simpler to execute.
2016 US Election Hacking Campaigns
A well-timed data leak is all it takes to completely change the course of a political
campaign, and thus the course of a country’s policy-making. Whether or not of your
state’s opinion on the outcome of the US election, data leaks and a host of other
attacks have significantly impacted the course of events and the media narrative
surrounding the US election campaign. This campaign of hacks included the DNC,
the Clinton Campaign and the White House. In June, an attack widely attributed to
Pro-Russian hacker groups “Cozy Bear” and “Fancy Bear”, stole opposition research
by the Democrats on Donald Trump (Galperina, 2016). A month later, in time for the
Democratic National Convention, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) had
the contents of its 22,000 emails leaked to the world via WikiLeaks. It is highly likely
that this earlier compromise enabled the same hackers (under the alias Guccifer 2.0)
to access the DNC email database (and a week later, the Clinton Campaign database).
There is a growing consensus amongst the cybersecurity and intelligence community
that Russia is behind the hacks (or at least condoning them).
The attacks set a new precedent in how bold Russian actors have become in
intervening in the politics of other states, this time striking across the Atlantic. It is no
wonder however, as this specific electoral campaign is set to deeply affect Russia’s
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economic sanctions and its future influence in the region. The United States
has had a long history of intervening in the electoral process of Eastern European
states. No real condemnation of the chief Russian suspects was made in Washington
nor Moscow. The USA enforced White House Directive #41 which created a scheme
that color-coded various degrees of cyber-attack severity and organized the executive
strategy for cyber-attack response. (Koebler, 2016)
The Attribution Problem
To enforce potential solutions to NATO’s cyber vulnerabilities, a number of concepts
must be grasped, defined and agreed upon by member states. As you may have
noticed in the previous examples, it is incredibly difficult to catch the perpetrator of
cyber attacks. The technical process of properly finding the culprit takes weeks if not
months. By then, the reputational damage of the attacks is tremendous. Politically
speaking, it is necessary for governments to be able to attribute responsibility to
countries, governments, or organizations. This is done via initial forensic findings
and geopolitical estimations. NATO is well-positioned to facilitate such a process,
and to provide advice on crisis-response techniques. Yet this depends on another
concept.
Is this Cyber War?
What is war? If we use Carl von Clausewitz’ definition, then a war must comprehend
several key identifiers: violence, a clear political objective, two or more clearly
identified “combatants” and a clear link between the subject, object, and means of the
employed violence. This raises a number of difficult questions (that your respective
countries have sometimes answered with definitions, please follow this website.)
The following questions will be useful in determining your country’s stance and in
preparing your response to issues surrounding the definition of Cyber War (rather
than directly being in a resolution in this form).
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●
What is violence? Does violence always involve death or destruction of
property? If so, is information property? How much violence is needed to move
into “act of war” territory?
● How do we identify political objectives? As many contemporary wars are
undertaken without a specific declaration of war, how do we know when we are in
a situation of cyber-peace or cyber-war? Are we constantly in a state of war or
peace?
● If the objective is to steal information, does this make it any less damaging than
the objective to weaken or destroy infrastructure?
● With the use of various geographic and instrumental intermediaries, what criteria
is needed to attribute attacks to governments and states? Are the intermediaries to
blame? Should states be compelled to crack-down on malicious third-parties?
Defining ‘Critical National Infrastructure’
One particularly promising avenue for action is linking the idea of enhancing CNI
resilience. The NATO CCDCOE definition for ‘National Critical Infrastructure’ is
“operators of essential services”:
‘as a public or private entity in the following sectors: …. Energy, including subsectors… Transport,
including subsectors… Banking, including credit institutions… Financial market infrastructures…
Health sector, including hospitals and private clinics…. Drinking water supply and distribution,
including suppliers and distributors of water intended for human consumption… Digital
Infrastructure, including Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), Domain Name System service providers
(DNS), and Top Level Domain (TLD) name registries’ –2016 EP NIS Directive
As implied, NATO has successfully persuaded the European Parliament to adopt the
same definition for CNI. This particular alignment, compounded by the NATO-EU
‘Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence Cooperation’ signed in February 2016,
marked a strong desire by the EU to work with NATO in cyber-defence.
Collective Security Assurances
NATO could apply deterrence theory in cyberspace, enabling the creation of “cyber framework
nations”, or case-countries which would serve as examples to the rest of alliance of cyber-defence
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best practice. (The Atlantic Council on Extended Deterrence) Operational partnerships with
the private sector (PPPs) and other international organizations (the EU, UN, or even other states like
Russia) would be in order.
Regulating Attack Toolkits
Malware or virus toolkits and botnet operators have often acted as intermediaries for
malicious attacks in cyberspace. A possible way to disarm cyber-criminals and states
in this space would be to work towards regulating (or cracking down on) these
intermediaries.
Often found on the Darknet, these middlemen are difficult to track but easy to find.
Despite strong encryption like that of the most popular rerouter “The Onion Router”
(Tor), intelligence and law enforcement have caught such actors with “honeypots”
(they lured criminals into revealing their identities).
One example of toolkit regulation is the regulation of dual-use technologies, tech that
could be used for good or for evil. ‘Embarrassed by evidence suggesting surveillance
technologies FinFisher GmbH and Hacking Team have been used by repressive
regimes to target activists and journalists’, the EU ‘is expected to propose tighter
regulations on the export of dual-use goods.’ (Townsend, 2016)
Building Readiness
As expressed in official NATO documentation, ‘the top priority is the protection of
the communications systems owned and operated by the Alliance’. Just like any
networked system, communications are what prevent different elements of the NATO
defense structure connected. Furthermore, as in any domain of war, the alliance is as
weak as its weakest link. However, cyberspace is particularly this way as teams of
hackers have the ability to constantly test and attack NATO’s defenses from every
direction, and only need one vulnerability to be granted entry into a network. Once
inside, it is much more difficult to mitigate damage.
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NATO has a number of existing structures that serve to ameliorate readiness. The
NATO CCDCoE is a center of excellence dedicated to elaborating the findings of the
International Group of Experts, which was the first group of its kind to attempt at
defining the parameters of what a “cyberwar” would look like in the Tallinn Manual.
The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) protects the alliance’s
own networks by providing around the clock support to each defense site.
The following links provide additional information on the actual capabilities and
strategies undertaken or potentially undertaken by NATO (so please take a look!):
 NATO’s capabilities:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49137.htm?selectedLocale=en#
 Protecting NATO’s nervous system:
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/nato-cyber-resiliencesecurity/EN/index.htm
 Jens Stoltenberg on the creation of a NATO ‘Cyber Coalition’:
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/omr/roadtowarsaw/2016/07/08/nat
o-and-cyber-time-raise-our-game/86859198/
 NATO Cyber Defense Fact Sheet Oct.2016:
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_10/20161011_161
0-factsheet-cyber-defence-eng.pdf.pdf
 Rex B. Hughes on NATO Cyber Defense, “Mission Accomplished?”
http://www.csl.army.mil/SLET/mccd/CyberSpacePubs/NATO%20and%20Cyb
er%20Defence%20-%20Mission%20Accomplished.pdf
 NATO works to define rules for Cyber Warfare:
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/13051/cyber-warfare-2/nato-works-todefine-rules-for-cyber-warfare.html
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‘Bloc Positions’
The reason for which inverted commas were used is that every member state in
NATO is interested in improving the alliance’s general cyber resilience and
develop a cyber strategy. However, countries of the alliance have widely
divergent levels of preparedness and have very different views on the use of
cyberspace as a domain of warfare.
It is therefore encouraged that you research the following aspects of your
member state to find out what their position is:
 How likely they are to being targeted by a nation-state APT and/or nonstate malicious actor in strategically critical and/or CNI.
 How ‘ready’ and/or ‘prepared’ their country is to face cyber-threats, be it
in the private sector as well as of course the military.
 How much intelligence activity the state is likely to conduct via cyber
means?
 How active the state is in the domain?
Questions a Resolution Should Answer
The conference will focus on two broad brush-strokes:
1) NATO’s red lines concerning definitions for cyber-war, cyber-attack,
Article 5 triggers, as well as rules and norms of military behavior in the
Fifth Domain.
2) Decisions targeted at specifically enhancing and improving NATO’s
cyber-security readiness, resilience and preparedness.
Therefore:
 What would trigger an Article 5 action in Cyber Space?
 What is the role of NATO in this space, and what is the degree of
burden-sharing amongst states?
 Is there a need to update the notion of CNI? What measures can enhance
CNI resilience?
 What kind of political and strategic arrangements can NATO adopt to
make cyberspace safer for all actors (including external actors)?
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 What measures are to be implemented to ensure NATO’s cyber-attack
readiness and response?
 How can NATO make the Tallinn Manual recommendations a reality?
 What is NATO to do in anonymous areas of the internet such as the
DarkNet?
 Can NATO create an atmosphere of deterrence in Cyberspace? If so,
how?
 What set of criteria or schematics can NATO implement to measure the
gravity of different cyber incidents?
 How can NATO make sure member states become prepared for cyberaggression?
Sources (in order)
NATO – Welcome. Date accessed: 21 November 2016. http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html
Von Clausewitz, On War (Web: Clausewitz.com, consulted 5 August 2016)
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK1ch01.html
Information is Beautiful. ‘World’s Biggest Data Breaches” (Last updated 8 August 2016)
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/
Healey, Jason. A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012 (Print: Washington D.C., 2013)
Advanced Persistent Threat APT’ (Web: Technopedia)
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/28118/advanced-persistent-threat-apt
Nakashima, Ellen. “U.S plans to issue official protest to China over attack on Google” Washington Post: 16
January 2010 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/15/AR2010011503917.html
Miller, Chuck. “Russia Confirms involvement with Estonia DDoS attacks” (Web: SC Magazine, March
2009) http://www.scmagazine.com/russia-confirms-involvement-with-estonia-ddos-attacks/article/128737/
Richards, Jason. “Denail of Service: The Estonian Cyberwar and Its Implications for U.S. National Security”
(Web: International Affairs Review) http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/65
Leyden, John. “Techie on the ground disputes BlackEnergy Ukraine power outage story” The Register: 27
January 2016. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/01/27/ukraine_blackenergy_analysis/?page=2
Peters, Sarah. “Questions remain on how cyberattack caused Ukraine blackout” Web: Dark Reading, 1 May
2016 http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/questions-remain-on-how-cyberattack-caused-ukraineblackout-/d/d-id/1323749
F-Secure Labs, ‘Blackenergy & Quedagh: The Convergence of Crimeware and APT attacks’ (Malware
Analysis Whitepaper, 2015)
Zetter, Kim. “Inside the cunning unprecedented hack of Ukraine’s power grid” Web: WIRED Magazine, 3
March 2016 https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/
ICS CERT. “IR ALERT H-16-056-01” https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01
Galperina, Marina. “Russian Government Hackers Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear” Web: Gawker, 14 June 2016
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http://gawker.com/russian-government-hackers-cozy-bear-and-fancy-bear-1781960847
Rid, Thomas. “All Signs Point to Russia Being Behind the DNC Hack” Web: VICE/Motherboard, 25 July
2016 http://motherboard.vice.com/read/all-signs-point-to-russia-being-behind-the-dnc-hack
Koebler, Jason. “Obama Created a Color-Coded Cyber Threat ‘Schema’ After the DNC Hack” Web:
VICE/Motherboard, 26 July 2016 http://motherboard.vice.com/read/obama-created-a-color-coded-cyberthreat-schema-after-the-dnc-hack
Rid, Thomas. “Cyber War Will Not Take Place” King’s College London, UK: Journal of Strategic Studies, 5
October 2011
Stone, John. “Cyber War Will Take Place” King’s College London, UK: Journal of Strategic Studies, 29
November 2012
Masters, Jonathan (Deputy Editor). “Confronting the Cyber Threat” (Web: Council on Foreign Relations,
May 23 2011) http://www.cfr.org/technology-and-foreign-policy/confronting-cyberthreat/p15577http://www.cfr.org/technology-and-foreign-policy/confronting-cyber-threat/p15577
Sauter, Molly. “When Is a Hack an Act of War?” (Web: VICE/Motherboard, July 28 2016)
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/policy-directive-41-cyberincidentshttp://motherboard.vice.com/read/policy-directive-41-cyber-incidents
Ranger, Steve. “Inside the secret digital arms race: Facing the threat of a global cyberwar” (Web: Tech
Republic/Cover Story) http://www.techrepublic.com/article/inside-the-secret-digital-armsrace/http://www.techrepublic.com/article/inside-the-secret-digital-arms-race/
Ranger, Steve. “Cyberwar: The Smart Person’s guide” (Web: Tech Republic/Security, 19 May 2016)
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/cyberwar-the-smart-personsguide/http://www.techrepublic.com/article/cyberwar-the-smart-persons-guide/
Moteff, John & Parfomak, Paul. “Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets: Definition and Identification”
(CRS Web: Congressional Research Service, 1 October 2004) http://fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32631.pdf
NATO CCDCOE, “EU Adopts Network and Information Security Directive that sets Security Rules on
National Critical Infrastructure” (Web: CCDCOE INCYDER Database, 29 July 2016) https://ccdcoe.org/euadopts-network-and-information-security-directive-sets-security-rules-national-critical.html
Kramer, Franklin D. et al. “Cyber, Extended Deterrence and NATO” Washington D.C: Atlantic Council
Brent Snowcroft Center on International Security, May 2016
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/cyber-extended-deterrence-and-nato
NATO – Capabilities. Last updated: 2 September
2016 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49137.htm?selectedLocale=en#
El Fertasi, Nadja & De Vivo, Diana (Original Sources) “Resilient for how long? Information Technology
Warfare in the 21st century: The Alliance’s invisible threat” NATO Defence College: Vox Collegi, vol 13.
July 2016. P. 8-16 http://www.youblisher.com/p/1479189-Vox-Collegii-Vol-XIII/
Stoltenberg, Jens. “NATO and Cyber: Time to raise our game” Web: Defense News, 8 July
2016 http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/omr/roadtowarsaw/2016/07/08/nato-and-cyber-time-raiseour-game/86859198/
October 2016 NATO Cyber Defense Fact
Sheet: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_10/20161011_1610-factsheet-cyberdefence-eng.pdf
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Hughes, Rex B. “Mission Accomplished?” Web: US Army, April 2009, no. 1/4
http://www.csl.army.mil/SLET/mccd/CyberSpacePubs/NATO%20and%20Cyber%20Defence%20%20Mission%20Accomplished.pdf
Paganini, Pierluigi. “NATO works to define rules for cyber warfare” Web: Security Affairs, 21 March 2013
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/13051/cyber-warfare-2/nato-works-to-define-rules-for-cyber-warfare.html
Libicki, Martin C. “Checklist for a U.S.-Russia Cyberwar” Web: RAND Commentary, 31 October 2016
https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/10/checklist-for-a-us-russiacyberwar.html?adbsc=social_20161102_1085191&adbid=UPDATE-c1656546199629747228602368&adbpl=li&adbpr=165654
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Photo Source: http://www.globalresearch.ca/
Topic B: NATO’s eastern dimension: assuring
allies and deterring Russia
Introduction
Warsaw gave its name to the Warsaw Pact in 1955, and hosted the latest
NATO Summit in 2016, which brought a number of action points looking
eastwards. The tensions between NATO member states and Russia have been
soaring since the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s involvement in the
fighting in eastern Ukraine. For a number of current NATO member states, the
vision of more assertive Russia brings not so distant memories of occupation
and aggression during the USSR-era. Being on the front-line again, Baltic and
eastern European states are seeking confirmation of support from NATO.
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The topic of NATO’s eastern dimension has number of factors
that the alliance has to keep in mind. The continuous talks surrounding
enlargement put into spotlight Georgia and Ukraine, which currently do not
have Membership Action Plans, but have been key in locking in the interests of
the alliance in the most eastward region. The anti-ballistic missile program is
underway in Romania and Poland, and the opposition from Russia in the form
of counter-measures in Kaliningrad leads to questions on how the alliance will
react. In addition, the Wales Summit and now the Warsaw Summit confirmed
the deployment of four battalions in north-east Europe. The action plan is
supposed to be completed in 2017, and seeing the opposition from Kremlin, the
alliance will have to prepare for dealing with potential counter-measures by
Russia.
Member-states have decided upon a number of measures to reassure its
eastern members and allies, but the list is not definite. Delegates will have the
challenging task of drafting plans to execute the current plans, prepare for
contingency plans in case of non-diplomatic counter-responses from Russia
and come up with further action points that will instil the feeling of trust in
NATO in Eastern Europe.
History of the Problem
Enlargement of NATO
The Article 10 of North Atlantic Treaty governs the process of joining
NATO, and allows for ‘any other European States’ to be invited to join the
organization. From the twelve founding members in 1949, NATO slowly
expanded to the current 28 members in the following manner:
 1952: Greece and Turkey
 1955: West Germany
 1982: Spain
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 1990: East Germany becomes part of the Federal Republic of
Germany and the organization
 1999: Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic
 2004: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia
 2009: Albania and Croatia
The accession of reunified Germany into NATO has been agreed in the
Two Plus Four Treaty (Deutschland.de, 2015), where the topic of further
expansion eastwards was raised during negotiations. The accession of former
Warsaw Pact countries was unthinkable at that time (Kramer, 2009) as Russian
officials claimed it would be against the ‘pledge’ made by the United States.
The signal sent to Moscow, according to Jack F. Matlock (the U.S. ambassador
to USSR in 1990), clearly stated that if united Germany remains a member of
the alliance, NATO borders will not move eastwards (Kramer, 2009).
However, all of the expansions since the Clinton-administration approved
expansion in 1999 have been eastwards and the continuous incorporation of
formerly Eastern Bloc countries into NATO has been the cause of ongoing
tensions with Russia. Notably, the admission of the three Baltic States in 2004
led to soaring relations as they were the first countries to join, which used to be
part of the Soviet Union. Russian politicians commonly described those states
as “near abroad”, which implied that ‘ex-Soviet states should not act against
Russia’s strategic interests’ (Peter, 2014).
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Agreements
 CFE Treaty:
The Western and former Warsaw Pact countries signed the CFE treaty2 in
1990, which was supposed to limit the numbers of ‘key military equipment in
designated regions’ for both NATO and USSR, and additionally eliminate the
advantage of USSR in conventional weapons in the region (Kimball, 2012).
The treaty’s importance for contemporary security lies within the transparency
on military holdings. Following the break-up of the Warsaw Pact, an update to
the treaty was proposed in 1999 in order to incorporate the new-coming NATO
members. However, NATO member states refused to ratify the adapted CFE
treaty until Russia fully complies with the requirements outlined in the CFE
Final Act3.
However, Russia suspended its implementation of the treaty in 2007 due
to delays in implementation of the adapted treaty, hence withdrawing from the
crucial inspections and arm build-up limits (Kimball, 2012). In response, after
a series of failed negotiations, the US declared it will not accept inspections of
its military bases by Russia, and will not supply military data under CFE.
 NATO-Russia Founding Act:
The Russian interpretation of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act 4
forbids the alliance to set up permanent bases in Central and Eastern Europe.
However, academics have been arguing that the interpretation is a
misconception due to the phrasing of the clauses (Coffey and Kochis, 2016).
The commitment of Moscow to Euro-Atlantic security changed, hence the
2
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe if available for a full read here:
http://www.osce.org/library/14087
3
The Final Act of the Conference of the State Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe is availale for a full read here: http://www.osce.org/library/14114
4
The Founding Act is available for a full read here:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm
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mentioned ‘current and foreseeable security environment’ from 1999
should not apply nowadays. Delegates should bear in mind this treaty
especially when discussing the deployment of Rapid response forces
(addressed later on in the study guide).
 Article 5:
The Article 5 is the most important Article of the Washington Treaty for
the collective defence principle of NATO. The Article states that ‘an armed
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be
considered an attack against them all’, which will lead to the alliance
exercising their right of self-defence recognized by the Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations (NATO, 2016). The article has been invoked
only once after the 9/11 attacks to show solidarity and assist the United States.
On other occasions, including the illegal military intervention in Ukraine by
Russia, NATO has enhanced collective defence measures guided by the
Article. The military exercises and deployment of military ships and planes is
to test the readiness of NATO troops in the case that Article 5 has to be
invoked (NATO, 2016) in order to defend the member of the alliance.
Statement of the Problem
Eastward expansion
In 2011, NATO identified there were four aspirant members. Three of
them adopted Membership Action Plan: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia
and Montenegro; while Georgia, is part of the Intensified Dialogue program.
Even though Georgia has been seeking closer ties with NATO since Rose
Revolution in 2003, Russia strongly opposes closer ties. Russian forces remain
present in the Georgian territory following the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia,
and ex-President Dmitry Medvedev publicly stated that their deployment
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prevented the enlargement of NATO into the former USSR territory
(Dyomkin, 2011). Due to the loss of control of two provinces, Georgia
expressed its will to join the alliance in a non-binding referendum.
Prior to Georgia, Ukraine already established ties with the alliance in
2002, and in 2005, it became the first CIS country to join the Partnership for
Peace initiative and Intensified Dialogue program (NATO, 2016). After the
2008 Bucharest summit, NATO Secretary General stated, after clear opposition
from Russia, that Ukraine would someday become a member, but will start its
Membership Action Plan. The turn-around in policy came with President
Yanukovych, who aimed to keep Ukraine non-aligned and develop a strategic
partnership with Russia at the same time (Kyiv Post, 2010).
The
administration passed a bill that scrapped the goal of ‘integration into EuroAtlantic security and NATO membership’ from the security strategy of the
country (Pop, 2010). Despite the change in policy, Ukraine continued to
cooperate with NATO for example through participating at Summits and
joining the military exercises.
Following Euromaidan street protests, the Yatsenyuk government
initially wanted to maintain the non-aligned status of Ukraine towards NATO.
However, following the initial concerns of Russian military operating within
Ukrainian borders and the consequent annexation of Crimean Peninsula, Prime
Minister Yatsenyuk resumed Ukraine’s bid for closer NATO integration (BBC,
2016) and made joining NATO a priority by repealing the previous bill.
The Ukraine conflict
Conflict in Ukraine pushed the relations of the alliance with Russia into
deep freeze. NATO’s underlying principle of ‘collective defence’ under Article
5 was however not directly applicable in this situation as Ukraine is not a
member. NATO condemned the annexation of Crimea as illegal and
illegitimate, together with the atrocities caused in eastern Ukraine. Along with
members of the alliance, NATO officially condemned Russia’s decision to
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send a truck convoy into Luhansk, describing it as ‘a blatant breach of
Russia’s international commitments’ (LoGiurato, 2014). In April 2014, the
alliance suspended ‘all practical civilian and military cooperation between
NATO and Russia’ over the Ukrainian crisis (RT, 2014).
In order to address the issue, NATO-Ukraine Commission was created and
used for issuance of a statement following the 2014 Wales Summit5. NATO
has consistently underlined the responsibilities of all signatories to the Minsk
Agreements, mainly the necessity to stop ‘deliberate destabilisation of eastern
Ukraine through political, military and financial support for militants’ (NATO,
2016). The statement is based in the support for Ukraine as NATO has alleged
Russia is arming the forces in destabilized regions. The first NATO-Russian
council meeting since the dispute confirmed differing views, as Russia keeps
describing the conflict in Ukraine as ‘internal Ukrainian dispute’ without the
involvement of Russian soldiers on duty (Sharkov, 2016).
NATO currently gives priority to a reform in the security and defence
sector, and the capacity building in Ukraine (NATO, 2016). The Ukrainian
government itself requested assistance from the alliance in 2014, in order to
bolster its military and National Guard (Deutsche, 2014). The Wales Summit
communiqué pledged new programs to Ukraine, including Trust Funds, which
will allow member states to directly provide financial support (NATO, 2016).
The Warsaw Summit added to the cooperation through endorsement to
Comprehensive Assistance Package; however, its execution is yet to be seen.
Anti-ballistic missile defence
The anti-ballistic missile defence system led by the United States lies in
the heart of this topic. The plan is to build a missile shield from Greenland to
the Azores by 2018. Russia wanted to be an equal partner in developing the
anti-ballistic missile defence system, however that option was scrapped – and
5
Summary of the statement and key areas of NATO-Ukraine cooperation can be accessed here:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm?
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NATO is independently pursuing the deployment of interceptors and
radars in Poland and Romania. The ballistic missile shield in Romania was
switched on in 2016, and works began on a shield in northern Poland (Walker,
2016). Consequently, Russia argues that the main goal of shields is to weaken
its nuclear and military programs.
NATO argues that the missile interceptor is to be only purely defensive,
in case of an attack by a rogue state, posing no direct threat to Russia (Peter,
2014). US State Department pointed out that NATO’s shield program is only
supporting the aim of NATO, which is to be ‘defensive alliance’ (RT, 2016).
With the development of ballistic missiles in Iran and North Korea, the US
aims to protect the Eastern front allies with the shield. On the other hand, a
number of NATO member states (mainly the Baltic) are concerned about the
security threat from Russia with the use of ‘hybrid warfare’, following the
annexation of Crimea. The alliance officials however remain vague on whether
the shield’s system can be reconfigured to defend member states against Russia
instead of Middle East in case of a conflict.
As a countermeasure, Russia deployed Iskander missiles, anti-aircraft
and anti-ship missiles tactically in Kaliningrad to ‘secure the necessary level of
security’ (Walker, 2016) ‘amid NATO’s expansion toward its borders’ (RT,
2016). The presence of Kaliningrad’s shield could limit NATO’s ability to
move around due to its extensive reach, as the area is right between Poland and
Lithuania.
Rapid response force
At the 2014 Wales summit, NATO announced the deployment of rapid
response force in Eastern Europe, which can be mobilized within 48 hours and
is composed of member states’ troops on a rotational basis. The decision came
as a result of member states voicing concerns over Russia’s regional
manoeuvres, especially in Ukraine (BBC, 2014). The ‘hybrid warfare’ pursued
by Russia in Ukraine sparked up concerns in Baltic countries, where
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governments fear Russia will try to undermine their rule. The potential
unrest of Russian-speaking minorities in these countries can lead to violence,
and a similar scenario like Ukraine.
The Readiness Action Plan has two pillars (NATO, 2015):
 Assurance measures – increasing presence of rotational continuous NATO
forces (air, land, maritime presence) within the territory of eastern member
states
 Adaptation measures – changes to NATO’s current military capabilities
and posture
The Action Plan is to make NATO ‘fitter, faster and more flexible to
adjust to all kinds of security challenges’ (Rasmussen, 2014) in Eastern
Europe. The Plan has been welcomed by the member states, as it provides the
necessary reassurance and demonstration of commitment. The main issue
behind not-deploying the force is that these Baltic States are incapable of
defending themselves against any rapidly-mobilised attack, leaving them
vulnerable.
Current Situation
2016 Warsaw summit
Already mentioned, an action point from the final communiqué was to
strengthen relations with Georgia, potentially deter Russia and provide the
necessary security guarantees to Georgia, following the democratic elections.
The NATO-Georgia Exercise 2016 marked the second exercise in partnership
with Georgian Armed Forces (NATO, 2016), which was agreed at the Warsaw
Summit. However, the extension of membership offer to Georgia presents a
number of caveats. The military risks stemming from the integration lie in the
problematic of ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus and Georgia’s inability to
exercise full jurisdiction over its territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where
Russia still has permanent military staff).
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In accordance with previous agreements, the Warsaw summit
announced a number of steps to bolster deterrence and reassure its member
states in Eastern Europe as part of the Readiness Action Plan. The alliance
committed itself to stationing four multinational battalions (called Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force) of 1,000 troops each in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and Poland (Economist, 2016) for the ‘Adaptation measures’ program. The
alliance will further increase air and sea patrols in north-eastern Europe. The
purpose of battalions is not to act against Russian forces alone in the case of an
attack, but to act as initial triggers for a full military response by the rest of
NATO member’s forces. The move by NATO is to reiterate the principle, that
an attack on one member constitutes an attack on the alliance.
Despite the deployment of battalions and military exercises, NATO
Secretary General stated, that they continue to seek ‘a constructive dialogue
with Russia’ (ABC News, 2016). The focus of the alliance has shifted from
out-of-Europe operations, back to ensuring that its members are wellpositioned in the program of collective defence.
Military exercises
Military exercises are a crucial part of the way NATO tests its abilities,
tactics and systems, which is especially important due to the trans-national
nature of NATO forces. In crisis situations, NATO forces have to be ready to
react cohesively in the case of an attack, and military exercises allow the forces
to decide upon best practices6. In 1994, the alliance decided that Euro-Atlantic
area countries that are part of the Partnership for Peace can take part in the
military exercise, which strengthened the military cooperation between NATO
and non-members (NATO, 2016). A change to the system of trainings came in
2002, when the exercises began focusing on the NATO Response Force
(NRF). Most recently the number of exercises has gone up due to the changing
6
More in detail about the aim and way of NATO military exercises can be accessed here:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49285.htm?selectedLocale=en
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security environment and their nature began incorporating scenarios of
collective defence (NATO, 2016).
Eastern Europe has been a witness to the largest war game ‘Anaconda
2016’ since the end of Cold War, in order to show the strength of the alliance
to the more assertive Russia. During the 10 days, more than 31,000 troops and
thousands of military vehicles from 24 countries took part in a military
exercise in Poland, preparing the forces for a ‘nightmare scenario’ of military,
chemical and cyber threats (Smith, 2016). Poland perceived the exercise on its
land as an act of reassurance from the alliance. Recently in November, the
‘Iron Sword 2016’ exercise was the largest in Lithuania up to date (RT, 2016).
The nearly perpetual military exercises in Eastern Europe and Baltics
send a clear deterrence message to Moscow; however the alliance should be
prepared for a potential countermeasure.
Bloc positions
NATO members in the past were torn between the eastward expansion
of the alliance, as shown by the statement of former French Prime Minister
Francois Fillon, saying that the admission of Georgia and Ukraine will not
bring balance of power between Europe and Russia (Taylor, 2014). NATO’s
lead allies still see the eastern European security frictions to be best addressed
through diplomatic means. On the other hand, Baltic and Eastern member
countries will welcome deterrence measures as they were great supporters of
the Readiness Action Plan; however will aim to push the measures further.
Delegates should come prepared knowing their country’s position on the
topics mentioned in this study guide, including those highlighted ones:
 Policy on ballistic-missile defence shields – will the country support an
establishment of one within its borders, has it been vocal in supporting
their construction?
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 Policy on NATO’s membership enlargement
 Support provided to Ukraine as a response to the annexation of Crimea
 Stance towards Russia’s manoeuvres in Kaliningrad and along the
borders
 Contribution and stance towards the deployment of rapid response forces
 Overall military and logistics personnel contribution to NATO’s military
exercises
 If an Eastern Europe nation, what are your country’s concerns regarding
Russia’s regional policy?
Questions a Resolution Should Answer
 Should the ballistic-missile defence shield protect NATO member states
only from the threats by Middle Eastern states, or should there be a
contingency plan in case of an attack from Russia?
 What should be the next steps of NATO regarding Georgia’s
membership – partnership or membership offer?
 How can NATO strengthen its support and successfully execute
Comprehensive Assistance Packages to Ukraine to enhance its ability to
provide for its own security?
 How should NATO respond to Iskander missile launchers in
Kaliningrad?
 Should the monitoring of borders with Russia be strengthened by
deploying permanent aircraft?
 Is NATO permitted to place permanent bases in Eastern Europe?
 Should member states dedicate more of their GDP to increase their
defence budgets?
 Is there a scope for NATO-Russia diplomatic meetings?
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DW.COM. (2014). Ukrainian PM appeals for help from NATO, EU | News | DW.COM | 16.12.2014.
[online] Available at: http://www.dw.com/en/ukrainian-pm-appeals-for-help-from-nato-eu/a18133326 [Accessed 1 Dec. 2016].
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LONDON INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2017
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Conference Information
When looking for information regarding LIMUN 2017 (and subsequent
editions) your first step should be to visit our website: www.limun.org.uk
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Agenda & Rules of Procedure
The agenda for the 2017 conference is available online at
www.limun.org.uk/agenda
Since its 17th session last year, LIMUN has introduced changes to its Rules of
Procedure. The revised Rules can be accessed here: http://limun.org.uk/rules
Conference Information
When looking for information regarding LIMUN 2017 (and subsequent
editions) your first step should be to visit our website: www.limun.org.uk
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