Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences
Author(s): Martin Gilens
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Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 2 (Jun., 2001), pp. 379-396
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Vol. 95, No. 2 June 2001
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
Preferences
Collective
and
Political
Policy
Ignorance
MARTIN GILENS Universityof California, Los Angeles
n contrastwith the expectationsof many analysts,I find that rawpolicy-specificfacts, such as the
directionof changein the crimerateor the amountof thefederalbudgetdevotedto foreignaid, have
a significantinfluenceon thepublic'spoliticaljudgments.Usingbothtraditionalsurveymethodsand
survey-basedrandomizedexperiments,I show that ignoranceof policy-specificinformationleads many
Americansto holdpoliticalviewsdifferent
from thosetheywouldhold otherwise.I also showthatthe effect
is
not
capturedbythemeasuresof generalpoliticalknowledgeused
adequately
information
ofpolicy-specific
inpreviousresearch.Finally,I showthattheeffectofpolicy-specific
ignoranceis greatestforAmericanswith
thehighestlevelsofpoliticalknowledge.Ratherthanserveto dilutetheinfluenceof newinformation,
general
knowledge(and the cognitivecapacities it reflects) appears to facilitate the incorporationof new
policy-specificinformationintopoliticaljudgments.
he Americanpublic'signoranceof politicalmat-
ters is well documented,but the consequences
for democracyare far less clear. For some, a
disengagedand ill-informedcitizenrysignifiesa failure
of democracy.But for others, the practicalquestionis
whether politicaljudgmentswould be any differentif
citizenswere betterinformed.If a "rationallyignorant"
public can nevertheless manage to approximatethe
"enlightenedpreferences"that a fully educated and
engagedcitizenrywouldhold, then perhapsdemocratic
governmentand politicalignorancecan coexist.
A growingbody of research assesses the extent to
which Americans'political judgmentswould differ if
the publicwere well informedaboutpolitics.The most
way to addressthis issue is to informa
straightforward
representativegroup of citizens about some set of
political matters and see whether their judgments
changeas a result.This is the approachtakenby James
Fishkinand his colleagues in a series of "deliberative
polls"that bringtogethera large numberof randomly
selected individualsand providethem with a wealthof
information about specific political issues (Fishkin
1997;LuskinandFishkin1998).This strategyhas many
advantagesbut is limited by its great expense and by
the unusual circumstancesin which information is
acquired.In addition,deliberativepolls are explicitly
designedto assess the effectsof both informationand
deliberationon citizens'policypreferences.We cannot
judge how much of the changerevealedby a deliberative poll shouldbe attributedto new informationof the
sort thatmightbe acquiredthroughthe mediaandhow
much is due to the process of collectivedeliberation.
A second approach uses statistical models rather
than experimentalinterventionsto comparethe political preferencesof more and less informedAmericans.
MartinGilensis AssociateProfessorof PoliticalScience,University
of California,Los Angeles, CA 90095.
The authorthanksScottAlthaus,LarryBartels,StanleyFeldman,
Alan Gerber,JamesGlaser,DonaldGreen,and MichaelHagenfor
helpful commentson earlier drafts and the Block Fund and the
Institutionfor Social and PolicyStudiesat Yale Universityand the
Institutefor SocialScienceResearchat UCLAfor financialsupport.
The Multi-Investigator
Studyof PoliticalPreferenceswasdirectedby
PaulM. Snidermanand HenryBradyandsupportedby the National
ScienceFoundation(SBR-9818742).
Bartels (1996), Delli Carpiniand Keeter (1996), and
Althaus(1998) all use this methodto imputehypothetical "fully informed" preferences to less informed
respondents while taking into account a range of
demographiccontrols. This technique adjusts each
respondent'spolitical preferences to match the predicted preferences of a respondent who shares the
same set of demographiccharacteristicsbut possesses
the highest level of politicalinformation.'The importance of political ignoranceis revealedby comparing
the sample's observed preferenceswith the imputed
preferencesif all respondentswere "fullyinformed."
This articledrawsprimarilyon the latterapproachto
the studyof politicalignoranceand expandsupon it in
threeways.First,I note that most of the politicalfacts
in typicalinformationscales are unlikelyto contribute
directly to such judgments as vote choice or policy
preferences. Although knowing which office Ted
Kennedy holds or how many justices sit on the Supreme Court does distinguishthe politically knowledgeable from those who are less informed, and respondents who score high in such knowledge do
express political preferences differentfrom those of
otherwise similar respondents who score low, this
knowledge per se is unlikely to influence political
choices or preferences.Instead, as Zaller (1992) suggests, measuresof generalpoliticalknowledgecapture
an amalgamof information,interest,engagement,and
cognitive capacity for understanding the political
world. It is some unknowncombinationof these elements that leads "fullyinformed"respondentsto expresspoliticalpreferencesdifferentfrom those of their
less informed peers. (Following the convention of
previous research in this paradigm,I will use "fully
informed" to refer to the highest level of general
politicalinformation,as reflectedby the relevantsurvey measureof general information.)
Althoughthe "opacity"of generalinformationmea1 The "highestlevel of politicalinformation"can reflect either an
existingcategoryof respondentsor a hypotheticalrespondentat the
extremeend of the underlyinginformationdistribution.Delli Carpini
and Keeter (1996) and Althaus (1998) take the former approach.
Bartels(1996) takes the latter,usinga score of 1.0 to representthe
highestlevel of politicalinformationbased on a five-pointmeasure
on whichactualscoresrangefrom .05 to .95.
379
PoliticalIgnoranceand CollectivePolicyPreferences
sures has been recognizedby researchers,these measures are usually thought to be related to specific
politicaljudgmentsbecause those who score high are
morelikelyto possessthe specificinformationthatmay
contribute directly to particularpolitical judgments
(Althaus1998,547; Delli CarpiniandKeeter1996,223;
see also Downs 1957, 79-80). But as Kuklinskiand
others (1998) point out, even Americans who are
politicallywell informed in general (includingthose
identifiedas fully informedby the criteriaof previous
research) may well be ignorant of highly relevant
policy-specificknowledge.For example,in 1998, only
28% of Americanswith the highest level of general
political knowledge knew that the crime rate was
falling,despiteseven consecutiveyearsof declines(see
analyses below). I will assess the effect of "policyspecificignorance"on the policy preferencesof those
who are deemed fullyinformedby the criteriaof prior
research. In other words, I ask what effect policyspecific ignorancehas on the political preferencesof
fully informedrespondents.
The second way in which I expandon the literature
is to supplementthe calculationof imputed preferences with the experimentalmanipulationof political
information.Combiningelements of the two different
approachesoutlinedabove, I comparethe policypreferences expressedby respondentswho were randomly
chosen to receive specificpoliticalinformationto the
preferences of a control group. The experimental
design affirmsthat the estimated effects of political
informationon policy preferencesare causal and not
spurious.
Finally,I ask how the effect of policy-specificinformation differsfor respondentswith differentlevels of
general political knowledge. Two alternatives have
been suggested. On the one hand, general political
knowledge(and its correlates,such as politicalinterest
and cognitivesophistication)may enhanceindividuals'
abilityandmotivationto respondto new policy-specific
information(Delli Carpiniand Keeter 1996). On the
other hand,generalpoliticalknowledgemay providea
resourceto resist the influenceof new policy-specific
information(Zaller 1992). And if both forces are at
work we may find either a curvilinearrelationship
between general politicalknowledgeand the effect of
policy-specificinformationor no apparentrelationship
at all.
My analyseslead to three conclusions.First,studies
of political informationbased on general knowledge
scales offer a useful but incomplete account of the
effectof politicalignorance.The limitsof this approach
arise from the fact that many people who are fully
informedin terms of general political knowledgeare
nonethelessignorantof policy-specificinformationthat
would alter their politicaljudgments.Second, policyspecificignorancemaywell have a greaterinfluenceon
political preferencesthan the lack of general knowledge as measuredby political informationscales. In
five of the seven situationsI examine,that is the case.
Of necessity, I looked only at a limited number of
examples,and two were chosen preciselybecause substantial policy-specificinformation effects were ex380
June 2001
pected. Nevertheless,the resultssuggestthat much of
what separatesactualpoliticalpreferencesfrom hypothetical "enlightenedpreferences"is due to ignorance
of specificpolicy-relevantfacts, not a lack of general
politicalknowledgeor the cognitiveskills or orientations that measures of general political information
reflect.
Third, policy-specificinformation has a stronger
influenceon respondentswho displayhigherlevels of
general political knowledge. Rather than dilute the
effect of new information,generalknowledge(and the
cognitivecapacitiesit reflects)appearsto facilitateits
incorporationinto politicaljudgments.
DATAAND MEASURES
My analysesrequirethree kindsof data fromthe same
survey:a measure of general political knowledge, a
measureof policy-specificinformation,and a measure
of policy preference plausiblyrelated to the specific
information.(By "plausiblyrelated"I mean only that
the specific information may affect a respondent's
policy preference,not that it should have an effect. I
treat as an empirical question whether any policyspecificinformationX is related to politicaljudgment
Y, and I leave asidethe normativequestionof whether
judgmentY shouldbe influencedby X.)
Policy-Specific Information
Surveyquestionsthat assess the level of generalpolitical informationare relativelyuncommon,and items
that assesspolicy-specificinformationare rare indeed.
I make use of two surveys,one of which happens to
have the necessary elements and one of which I
designedfor this purpose.The firstis the 1988 American NationalElection Study(NES), which includesa
numberof items about perceptionsof change during
the Reagan administration.I focus on three items:(1)
whether "federalefforts to improve and protect the
environmentincreased,decreased,or stayedaboutthe
same as theywere in 1980";(2) whether"comparedto
1980, the federal budget deficit has gotten smaller,
stayed about the same, or gotten larger";and (3)
whether "comparedto 1980, the level of unemployment in the countryhas gotten better,stayedaboutthe
same, or gotten worse."
Responsesto these questions,like the items used in
general measures of political information, can be
clearlyclassifiedas corrector incorrect.Federalefforts
to improvethe environmentunquestionablydeclined
between 1980 and 1988,whether assessed in terms of
dollars spent, legislative changes, or environmental
policy enforcement(e.g., Kraft 1990; Vig 1990). The
federal deficitincreaseddramaticallyin both real and
nominalterms over this same period (U.S. Bureauof
the Census 1997).Unemploymentdeclinedfrom 7.5%
in fall 1980 to 5.4% in fall 1988 (Bureau of Labor
Statistics1999).
To supplementthe measuresof policy-specificinformationavailablein existingsurveys,I wrote two sets of
questions for the 1998 Multi-InvestigatorSurvey
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
(MIS), conductedby the SurveyResearch Center at
the Universityof Californiaat Berkeley.The MIS was
a national random-digittelephone surveyof Englishspeakingadultsin the 48 contiguousstates, supported
by the National Science Foundation(SBR-9818742),
and directedby Paul M. Snidermanand HenryBrady.
It combinedthirteendifferentprojectsdesignedby 20
social scientists from around the country.The 1,067
completed interviewswere conducted between June
1998 and March 1999, and the response rate was
55.8%. In my analyses, these data are merged with
another 105 cases from a nationalpilot sample.2The
MIS dataareweightedto take into accountthe number
of eligible respondentsand the numberof voice telephone lines per householdandto matchthe population
joint distributionsof age, sex, race, and education.
The two policy-specificinformationitems from the
1998 MIS relate to crime and foreign aid. The first
asks:"Wouldyou say there is more, less, or about the
same amount of crime in the United States today as
comparedto 10 yearsago?"The second reads:"Please
give your best guess for this next question.For every
dollarspent by the federalgovernmentin Washington,
how muchof each dollardo you thinkgoes for foreign
aid to help other countries?"
The correct answer to the crime question is fairly
clear: FBI statistics show a decline of 18% in the
overall crime rate between 1988 and 1998 (Federal
Bureau of Investigation1999). Respondentswho answered that there is less crime than ten years ago are
consideredto be informedin this regard;those who
respondedthat crime has increased,stayed about the
same, or "don't know" are considered to lack this
information.
More discretion is involved in defining a correct
answer to the question about foreign aid. In 1998,
foreignaid of all kindsamountedto eight-tenthsof one
percent of the federal budget (U.S. Bureau of the
Census 1998, 339, 796). It would be unrealistic to
expectrespondentsto knowthe exactpercentage,so as
a reasonable approximation,I considered responses
that foreign aid accountsfor 5% or less of the federal
budget as "correct."3
RandomizedProvisionof Policy-Specific
Information
My objectivein designingrandomizedexperimentsfor
policy-specificinformationwas to mimic the kind of
informationthat a person might acquire in everyday
life. Randomlychosen respondentswere given informationaboutcrimeor foreignaid in the guise of asking
2 In terms of
sample frame, interviewingprocedures,and sample
weights,the pilot is identicalto the MISsurvey.After the pilot cases
were collected, changes were made to some of the MIS items.
Becausenone of the itemsused in my analyseswere involved,I was
able to combinethe two samples.
3 Sensitivityanalysesshowed that the particularcutofffor perceptionsof foreignaid spendinghadlittleeffecton the results.Similarly,
combiningrespondentswho answeredthat crime remained"about
the same"as ten years ago with those who indicatedit had fallen
would not changethe substantiveconclusionsof this research.
Vol. 95, No. 2
whetherthey had heard about particularnews stories.
To make the treatment and control conditions as
parallelas possible,bothgroupswere askedaboutnews
storieson the topic in question,but only the treatment
groupwas providedwith the relevantinformation.The
treatmentversion of these two questionsread as follows.
Ourfirstquestionsareabouttwostoriesthathavebeenin
thenewslately.Thefirststoryis:thecrimerateinAmerica
has gonedownfor the seventhyearin a rowandis now
lowerthanat anytimesince1974.Haveyouheardabout
thisstory?
The secondstoryis abouta new reportthat was just
releasedaboutAmericanforeignaidto helpothercountries. It said that the amountof moneywe spendfor
foreignaidhasbeengoingdownandnowmakesup less
thanone centof everydollarthatthe federalgovernment
spends.Haveyouheardaboutthisstory?
Respondents in the control group were asked the
followingquestions.
Ourfirstquestionsareabouttwostoriesthathavebeenin
thenewslately.Thefirststoryis aboutthereleaseof a new
government
reportaboutthecrimeratein America.Have
youheardaboutthisstory?
The secondstoryis abouta new reportthat was just
releasedaboutAmericanforeignaidto helpothercountries.Haveyouheardaboutthisstory?
The crime and foreign aid stories were randomized
independently,so thathalf of those who were provided
with informationabout the crimerate were also given
informationaboutforeignaid andvice versa.All 1,172
MIS respondentsreceivedone of the two versionsof
the foreignaid question.The crimequestion,however,
had three additionalversions that were designed for
other purposesand are excludedhere. Consequently,
fewer cases are available for analysis of attitudes
towardcrime than of attitudestowardforeign aid.
Policy Preference Measures
I associate a particularpolitical judgment (or judgments)with each of the five policy-specificinformation
items describedabove.I makeno normativeclaimthat
these particularbits of informationshould influence
respondents'policy preferences;I simplyseek to determine whether they do so. Any particularsocial or
political fact may have multiple consequencesfor a
given individual'spolicy preferences. For example,
knowingthat crime has declined may influenceone's
views on a rangeof relatedpolicymatters,fromprison
construction,to court procedures,to police conduct.
Whenever possible, I assess the influence of policyspecific informationon more than one policy preference or politicaljudgment.
I pair the measure of respondents' information
about changesin the unemploymentrate with preferences for federal governmentspending to help the
unemployed and with respondents'attitudes toward
"placing new limits on foreign imports in order to
protectAmericanjobs."My expectationis that knowledge of a declinein unemploymentwill,ceterisparibus,
381
PoliticalIgnoranceand CollectivePolicyPreferences
June 2001
lessen the desire to increase spendingfor the unem- with each scale score.Alphareliabilityfor the NES and
ployedandboost oppositionto importlimits.Similarly, MIS scales are .88 and .68, respectively.
I anticipatethat knowledgeof deficit growthwill be
associatedwitha greaterwillingnessto payhighertaxes
Control Variables
in order to shrinkthe deficit. I pair knowledgeof a
decline in federal efforts to protect the environment My analysisof the NES uses the same set of 25 control
with a preference for increasingfederal spending in variables described in Althaus (1988), which covers
that area and with the perceptionthat George Bush, demographiccharacteristicsand partisan identificathen vice president, was less concerned about the
tion. The MIS analysis examines the 17 of these
environmentthan Michael Dukakis,his opponent in variablesavailableon that survey,coded as similarlyas
the 1988 presidentialelection. The MIS crime item is
possible to the NES measures(see the Appendixfor
paired with a measure of respondents'support for details).
governmentspendingon prison construction.Finally,
perceptionsof foreign aid spending are paired with
support for federal spending for foreign aid.4 (The GENERALAND POLICY-SPECIFIC
INFORMATION
question wordingsand response distributionsfor the
MIS items are providedin the Appendix;see Miller Some scholars
argue that Americanstend to be polit[1989]for details of the NES questions.)
ical specialists,knowledgeableabout the few issues in
which they have a particularconcern (Bennett 1990;
Iyengar1990; Krosnicket al. 1993). If so, we cannot
General Information Measures
hope to assess the importanceof political ignorance
To measure general political informationfrom the withoutmeasuresof policy-specificknowledge.Others
NES, I use the 16-item additive index developed by believe that citizens tend to be generalistsand that
Delli CarpiniandKeeter(1993, 1996)andemployedby measuresof policy-specificinformationadd only modAlthaus (1998). Fifteen of the items are binarymea- estlyto our understandingof politicalknowledge(Delli
sures, scored 1 for a correct answer and 0 for an Carpiniand Keeter 1996;Neuman 1986;Smith 1989;
incorrector no answer.These questions asked about Zaller 1986).I will not attemptto resolvethis debatein
the officesheld byvariouspoliticalfigures,the majority any broad sense, but in most of the cases examinedI
partyin the House and Senate, the relativeideological will show that policy-specificfacts have a substantial
positionsof Bush and Dukakis,the relativeideological influenceon policypreferences,even for thosewho are
positions of the Republicanand Democraticparties, fully informedin termsof generalpoliticalknowledge.
and the relativepositionsof the two partieson a series
The first column of Table 1 shows the correlation
of issues (see Althaus 1998for details).The final item between each policy-specificinformationmeasureand
was a five-pointinterviewerratingof the respondents' the general knowledgescale from the NES and MIS
general level of informationabout politics and public surveys.(The analysesin this table use only responaffairs.The raw scale scores ranged from 1 (lowest dents assigned to the control conditionsof the MIS
interviewerrating and no correct answers)to 20. To
questions; i.e., those not provided with information
ease interpretationand compatibilitywith the general about crime or foreign aid). The correlations(Eta's)
informationscale from the MIS, I convertedthe raw range from a fairlyweak .19 (for knowledgeaboutthe
scores into percentiles based on the proportion of
crime rate) to a more robustbut still modest .39 (for
respondentsat each value of the scale."
knowledgeaboutthe deficit).Moreimportantthanthe
The generalinformationmeasurefrom the MIS is a
relationshipbetweenthese two kindsof informationis
seven-item additiveindex that consists of such ques- the extent of policy-specific ignorance, especially
tions as whichpoliticalpartyhas the most membersin
among highlyinformedrespondents.The second colthe House of Representativesand how largea majority umn of Table 1 showsthe proportionof all respondents
is needed to override a presidentialveto (see the who correctly answered each of the policy-specific
Appendix). Among these seven are the five items informationquestions,and the thirdcolumnshowsthe
recommended by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993, same proportionfor respondentsat the highend of the
1996). Like the NES scale, raw scoreswere converted general knowledgescale (scores at or above the 87th
to percentilesbased on the proportionof respondents percentileof generalinformationfor the NES and the
90thpercentilefor the MIS;the differentcut pointsare
necessitated by the differentdistributionof respon4 For most of the spendingpreferencequestionsI assessedsupport
dents across the values of general informationin the
by dividingrespondentswho wanted an increasefrom those who
two surveys).
wantedto maintainor decreasespending.Becauseso few respondents indicateda desirefor more foreignaid, I presentestimatesof
Knowledge of the five policy-specificfacts varied
the proportionwho preferredcuts as comparedwith those who
both for the sample as a whole and for
dramatically,
preferredto maintainor increaseforeignaid.
informed
highly
respondents.6Virtuallyall the highly
5 For example,3.6% of respondentshad the lowest value on the
generalinformationscale. I assumedthat this groupof respondents
was distributedevenly across the bottom 3.6 percentilesof the
underlyingdimensionof general information.I thereforeassigned
these respondentsa score of .018, representingthe midpointof this
set of percentiles(on a 0-to-1 scale). The next highestvalue on the
informationscale contained3.2%of the sample,and these respondents were assignedthe midpoint(.052) of their set of percentiles
(whichrangedfrom 3.6 to 6.8).
382
For the sampleas a whole, the levelsof policy-specificinformation
reportedin Table 1 are consistentwith earlierresults(Delli Carpini
and Keeter 1996).For example,in the 1988 NES data, 75%were
awarethat the deficithad increasedunderReagan,and 53%knew
that unemploymenthad declined.In comparison,Delli Carpiniand
Keeter (p. 80) reporta 1985 surveyin which83%knew the deficit
had risen since 1981 and a 1984 surveyin which 48% knew the
6
Vol. 95, No. 2
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
TABLE1. Generaland Policy-SpecificPoliticalInformation
CorrelationBetween
Generaland PolicySpecific Information'
Percentage of All
Respondents with
Policy-Specific
Information
Percentage of Highly
InformedRespondents
with Policy-Specific
Informationb
Deficitincreased under
Reagan
Unemploymentdeclined
under Reagan
Environmentalefforts
declined under Reagan
1998 MIS
.39***
75.3
93.8
.25***
53.6
80.0
.36***
21.3
52.2
Foreignaid is 5% or
less of federal spending
Crimerate declined over
past decade
.23***
17.2
36.9
.19
12.2
28.0
Policy-Specific Information
1988 NES
Note: Generalinformationmeasuresconsist of additive16-itemand 7-itemscales forthe NESand MISsurveys, respectively.(See Appendixfor details.)
N's: deficit, 1,756; unemployment,1,758; environment,1,761; foreignaid, 586; crime,208. ***p< .001.
aEtawith policy-specificinformationdependent;significancetests are likelihoodratiochi-square.
forthe NESand the 90th percentileforthe MIS.(Differentcut points
blncludes respondentsscoringat or above the 87th percentileof generalinformation
are necessitated by the differentdistributionof respondentsacross generalinformationcategories in the two surveys.)
informedknewthat the federaldeficitincreasedduring
the Reagan administration,and 80%knewthat unemployment declined, but only half were aware that
environmentaleffortsdeclined,fewer than two in five
estimatedthat foreign aid amountedto 5% or less of
federal spending,and only 28% knew that crime had
declined over the past decade.
Those who are generallymore knowledgeableabout
politics are more likely to know each of the policyspecificfacts examined.Nevertheless,the level of specific knowledgevaries greatlyfrom fact to fact, and in
severalcases ignoranceof specificinformationappears
widespread,even amongthose who are best informed
accordingto general knowledge scales. As a consequence,it is possiblethat even Americanswho are fully
informedin termsof generalpoliticalknowledgemight
hold very differentpolicypreferencesif they were also
informed about the specifics relevant to particular
politicaljudgments.
sists of a logistic regressionthat predicts policy preferences on the basis of politicalinformation,demographic
and partisancontrolvariables,and interactionsbetween
the measuresof informationand the controls.Whenboth
generaland policy-specificknowledgeare includedin the
model, an interactionterm between these two forms of
political informationis also included.As in the models
developedby Bartels(1996) and Delli Carpiniand Keeter
(1996), the interactionterms in these analysesallow for
the differentialeffectof informationfor respondentswith
different demographicand partisan characteristics.In
addition,the interactiontermbetweengeneralandpolicyspecificinformationallowsfor the possibilitythat general
knowledgeeither facilitatesor inhibits the influence of
policy-specificinformationon politicaljudgments.
To assess the effect of informationon policy preferences, two separate equations are estimated. The first
includes only general political knowledge among the
predictors,and the second adds policy-specificinformation. The model for general informationtakes the form
ON
THE EFFECTOF INFORMATION
POLITICAL
JUDGMENTS
prob(Yi = 1) = a + r1Gi +
The first stage of my analysisreplicates the Althaus
(1998) model of informationeffectsand then extendsit
to include policy-specificknowledge.The model con-
and the model for both general and policy-specificinformation takes the form
currentunemploymentrate.Similarly,the 1998MISfoundthatonly
17% estimatedwithin 5 percentagepoints the proportionof the
federalbudgetdevotedto foreignaid, and Delli Carpiniand Keeter
(1996,93) reportthat24%correctlyestimatedthe federaleducation
budget within that same range. The public's specific knowledge
dependsgreatlyon the salienceof certainfactsto currentissuesand
debates. Nevertheless,it appearsthat at least over short periods
thereis considerablestabilityin this level of knowledgefor anygiven
type of information.
+ Ik(Gi
lPkDik
Dik) + ei,
(1)
prob(Yi= 1) = aot+ 31Gi+
+
2Pi +
Dik) +
.,yk(Gi
3GiPi
+
Dik) + ei,
pkDik
(2)
•,k(Pi
where Yi is respondenti's policypreference,Gi is respondent i's general politicalinformationscore, Pi is respondent i's policy-specificinformationscore, Dik is respondent i's scores on a vectorof k controlvariables,and ei is
the errortermfor the ith observation.By wayof example,
383
PoliticalIgnoranceand CollectivePolicyPreferences
TABLE2. Effectof Generaland Policy-SpecificIgnoranceon PoliticalJudgments by Issue:
NonexperimentalAnalyses (NES)
Policy Information:DeficitIncreased
UnemploymentDeclined
Increase
Unwillingto Pay Oppose Import Spending to
More in Taxes to
Limitsto
Help
Save Jobs
PoliticalJudgment: Reduce Deficit
Unemployed
74.4 (1.1)
24.3 (1.1)
30.6 (1.0)
A. Observed
B. Fullgeneral information
56.6 (3.9)
30.7 (2.6)
36.8 (3.0)
C. Fullgeneral and policy-specific
51.4 (4.2)
24.7 (3.8)
38.3 (4.6)
information
D. Effectof general political
12.5 (3.0)
0.1 (2.4)
-17.8 (3.8)
ignorance(B-A)
E. Effectof policy-specific
ignorancefor the fullyinformed
-5.2 (2.2)
1.5 (2.9)
-6.0 (3.1)
(C-B)
N
1,620
1,562
1,422
EnvironmentalEfforts
Declined
Increase
Bush Cares
Less for the
Spending
for
Environment
Environment than Dukakis
63.7 (1.1)
31.8 (1.3)
71.7 (2.7)
43.5 (3.6)
89.9 (2.7)
58.1 (5.6)
8.0 (2.5)
11.7 (3.3)
18.2 (2.8)
14.6 (5.1)
1,597
1,384
Source: 1988 NationalElectionStudy.
Note: Entriesin rows A throughC show the percentageof respondentsexpressingthe politicaljudgmentindicated.Predictedproportions(rows B and
C) are based on equations 1 and 2, respectively.Standarderrorsare in parentheses.
the resultsof equation2 for the perceptionthat Bush informationis associatedwith both a greaterwillingcared less about the environmentthan Dukakis are ness to pay higher taxes for deficit reduction and
shownin Table A-1.
greatersupportfor environmentalspending.Both are
Following the proceduresused by Bartels (1996), consistent with Althaus's (1998, 552) more general
Delli Carpiniand Keeter (1996), and Althaus(1998), I
findingthat "fullyinformedopinion"reflectsa liberal
use the estimatedcoefficientsfromthe abovemodelsto
tendency across an array of fiscal issues. Similarly,
imputestatisticallyhypotheticalpolicypreferencesfor Althaus'sfindingthat fully informedopinion is more
conservativeon issues pitting the free marketagainst
respondentswith less than full information.This is
done by attributingto each respondenther observed governmentcontrol is consistent with the results in
demographicand partisancharacteristicsbut changing Table 2 that show an association between general
her informationscore to 1.0. For generalinformation, political knowledgeand greater oppositionto import
this score representsthe hypotheticalfully informed limits.
Next, I expandthe Althaus(1998) model to include
respondentat the 100th percentileof politicalknowlthis
score
information
for
repre- policy-specificinformationto determinewhat (if any)
policy-specific
edge;
sents "correct"information.Finally,the imputedfully additionaleffectit mighthave.Row C of Table2 shows
informed preferences of all respondents are aggre- the imputedpolicypreferencesthat resultby attributgated to produce a simulated percentage favoring ing to the entire NES sampleboth full general inforeither side of each politicaljudgment.With this ap- mation and the policy-specificinformationindicated;
proach,the effect of politicalignoranceis assessedby row E reports the difference between the imputed
preferencesof a samplethat is fullyinformedin terms
comparing the observed policy preferences of the
of general information and a sample that is fully
sample with the simulated policy preferences of a
informed in both general and policy-specificterms.
hypotheticalfully informedsample.
Rows A and B of Table 2 show the observedpolicy Again, there is considerablevariationfrom issue to
issue. For example, policy-specificignorance about
preferencesand the fullyinformedpreferencesfor the
NES respondents(row D indicatesthe differencebeunemploymenthas almost no effect on oppositionto
tween the two). Consistentwith Althaus'sresults,the
importlimits.In contrast,ignoranceaboutthe decline
influenceof generalinformationon policypreferences in environmentaleffortsis associatedwith a deficitof
varies considerablyfrom issue to issue. For example, 18.2 percentagepoints in support for environmental
observedandfullyinformedpreferencesfor not raising spendingand of 14.6 percentagepoints in the perceptaxes in order to decrease the budget deficit differby tion that George Bush is less concerned about the
almost 18 percentage points (74.4% versus 56.6%). environmentthan MichaelDukakis.
These analysessuggestthat policy-specificignorance
Yet, the two categoriesare almostidenticalwith regard
can have a significantinfluenceon Americans'political
to an increase in governmentspending to help the
judgments, above and beyond the effect of general
unemployed.
The directionaleffectsof generalpoliticalknowledge political information.But drawingcausal inferences
revealed in row D of Table 2 are also consistentwith from quasi-experimentsis often risky (e.g., Achen
Althaus'sresults.As shownin Table2, generalpolitical 1986), and it is possible that the apparenteffect of
384
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
Vol. 95, No. 2
policy-specificinformationis partlyor whollyspurious.
Respondentswho correctlyanswerthe policy-specific
questions differin a host of ways from those who do
not. And despite the long list of controlvariablesused
in these analyses, we cannot hope to identify and
adequatelymeasure all the characteristicsthat might
distinguishthese two groups.
For example, one way in which respondentswho
correctlyand incorrectlyanswer these policy-specific
questionsmay differis in their attitude towardPresident Reagan. Because the policy-specificitems on the
NES refer to changes in conditions during Reagan's
term, his supportersmay be reluctantto "admit"facts
that reflect poorly on him, such as the federal deficit
increaseand decline in environmentalefforts.Control
variables were used in an attempt to address such
concerns, and measures of respondents'partisanship
should help in this regard.
As a further assessment of whether "willfulignorance"on the partof Reagansupportersmightbias the
results,I reestimatedsome of the equationsreportedin
Table 2, using respondents'reportedpresidentialvote
in 1984as an additionalcontrol.(Twodummyvariables
were used to indicatea vote for Reagan or a vote for
anotherpresidentialcandidate;nonvotersservedas the
comparison group. As with all the other controls,
interactiontermswere constructedbetween each control variable and both general and policy-specific
knowledge.) Reagan voters did not differ from those
votingfor Mondaleor a minorpartycandidatein their
perceptionsof changes in the deficit (80% of Reagan
voters and 83%of the other voterssaid the deficithad
increased),but they did differwith regardto environmental efforts(17% of Reaganvoters and 38% of the
other voters perceived a decline). Consequently, I
looked for the effect of "willfulignorance"only in the
two analyses of environmentalperceptionsshown in
Table 2.
The results (availablefrom the author)are virtually
identical with those shown in Table 2 that do not
include 1984 vote choice as a control variable,which
suggests that any bias of Reagan supporterson the
environmentalissue is capturedby the other control
variablesin the model.7
ings as well. One concern in this case is that the
apparent"change"in politicaljudgmentsproducedby
new policy-specificinformationmay reflect a momentary response to the experimentalstimulus.This may
occur if exposure to the informationinfluences responses by "priming"one aspect of the issue, rather
than by promptinga genuine reevaluationof the issue
in light of new information(Iyengarand Kinder1987;
Nelson, Clawson,and Oxley 1997;Nelson and Kinder
1996).For example,the crimerate is one consideration
among many upon which respondentsmay focus in
forming a preferencetowardprison spending.By informing some respondentsabout the crime rate, the
interviewermay prime them to place more weight on
that aspect. If so, their preferencesmight be altered
not by new knowledge but by greater salience of
somethingalreadyknown.
Primingeffects cannot be completely ruled out as
contributingto experimentaleffects reported below,
but they are unlikelyto play an importantrole. First,
the questionswere designed to provideboth random
groupswith as similaran experienceas possibleexcept
for the actual informationprovided.Thus, both the
treatmentand control groupswere "primed"to think
aboutthe crimerate, even thoughinformationaboutit
was restrictedto the treatmentgroup (see above for
questionwording).Second,concernsaboutprimingdo
not applyto the cross-sectionalanalysesthat compare
respondentswho already know the relevant policyspecific informationwith those who do not, and as
Table 3 shows, the predicted effect of policy-specific
informationis quite similarusingthe experimentaland
cross-sectional approaches. Finally, to assess the
broadercategoryof "temporaryeffects,"which might
includepriming,respondents'preferenceson spending
for prison constructionand foreign aid were assessed
twice duringthe MIS survey:at the beginning,in close
proximityto the experimentalstimuli (i.e., the news
stories about crime and foreign aid), and towardthe
end of the 40-minuteinterview.8
As shownin rowE of Table3, providinginformation
aboutthe crimerate reducedsupportfor prisonspending by 18.9percentagepointsusingthe firstmeasureof
policypreference.An otherwiseidenticalanalysisusing
the policy preference measure from the end of the
interviewshoweda reductionin supportof 15.4points.
RandomizedProvisionof Policy-Specific
The comparablefiguresfor foreign aid spending are
Information
16.6 points (Table 3) and 10.3 points.Thus, the inforIn response to the uncertaintiesinvolved in drawing mation effect faded somewhat in both cases, but it
causal inferences from traditional survey data, re- persistedthroughthe "distraction"of numerousquessearchers have turned increasinglyto survey-based tions on a rangeof politicalissues. The persistenceof
randomizedexperiments(Piazza,Sniderman,and Tet- the information effect does not mean respondents'
lock 1989; Snidermanand Grob 1996). Embedding views were permanentlychanged by the information
randomized experiments within traditional surveys provided,but meaningfulchange need not be permacombinesthe causalpower of randomizedassignment nent. Indeed,in the realworldalso the influenceof any
with the large-scaleand representativenature of the given bit of policy-specificinformationis likelyto fade
over time unless it is reinforcedthroughrepetition.
sample survey.
Of course, randomizedexperimentshave shortcomam indebtedto an anonymousreviewerfor raisingthis issue and
for suggestingthe use of respondents'1984presidentialvote choice
as an additionalcontrol.
7I
8 To reduce the awkwardnessof asking respondentsthe same
questiontwice, the second item on prisonconstructionand foreign
aid differed very slightly from the first (see the Appendix for
wording).
385
PoliticalIgnoranceand CollectivePolicyPreferences
June 2001
TABLE3. Effectof Generaland Policy-SpecificIgnoranceon PoliticalJudgments by Issue:
Experimentaland NonexperimentalAnalyses (MIS)
Information:
PoliticalJudgment:
A. Observed
ForeignAid Is 5% or Less of Federal
Spending
Cut Spending
Cut Spending
for ForeignAid
for ForeignAid
(Nonexperimental)
(Experimental)
61.5 (2.5)
62.0 (1.8)
CrimeHas Decreased
Increase Spending for
Prison Construction
(Experimental)
33.9 (2.5)
B. Fullgeneral information
60.3 (6.4)
58.6 (5.7)
45.8 (8.2)
C. Fullgeneral and policyspecific information
D. Effectof general
politicalignorance(B-A)
E. Effectof policy-specific
ignorancefor the "fully
informed"(C-B)
N
46.7 (14.8)
42.0 (5.1)
26.9 (6.4)
-1.2 (6.6)
-3.4 (5.3)
11.9(8.1)
-13.6 (15.4)
-16.6 (7.8)
-18.9 (9.7)
564
1,102
409
Source: 1998 Multi-investigator
Study.
Note: The firstcolumnreportsthe nonexperimentalanalysis of controlgroup respondentsonly (i.e., those who were not providedwith policy-specific
the second and thirdcolumns reportthe experimentalanalysis of all respondents. Entriesin rows A throughC show the percentage of
information);
respondents expressing the politicaljudgment indicated. The observed proportions(row A) reflect the preferences expressed by control group
respondents.The predictedproportions(rowsB and C) for the nonexperimentalanalyses are based on equations 1 and 2, respectively;the predicted
proportionsfor the experimentalanalyses are based on equation3. Standarderrorsare in parentheses.
A second shortcomingtypicalof experimentsconcerns external validity, or the extent to which they
successfullymimicreal worldphenomena.In the MIS
experiments,the phenomenonof interest is exposure
to policy-specificinformationfrom the news. The experimental analogues are the questions about two
storiesthat "havebeen in the newslately."Exposureto
informationin this wayclearlydiffersfromexposureto
the same informationin the real world. On the one
hand,respondentsmayfeel obligedto pay more attention to the surveyinterviewerthan to the news media.
On the other hand, respondentsmay doubt the interviewer'sclaimthat these storieshavebeen in the news,
as well as the implicitclaim that the informationthey
contain is accurate.
In sum,neitherthe experimentalprovisionof policyspecificinformationnor the nonexperimentalcomparison of respondentswho alreadydo or do not possess
this informationis without problems.But the consistent findingsacrossthese two approacheslend considerable confidenceto the results.
As shown in the first two columns of Table 3, the
MIS data were used to comparethe nonexperimental
and experimentalapproachesto informationeffects.
The first column shows results from the identical
nonexperimentalmodelused aboveto analyzethe NES
data. (This analysisuses only respondentsin the control conditionof the MIS data:those who were asked
for their perceptions of foreign aid but were not
provided with correct information.) Based on this
model, a fully informedsample would expressnearly
identical attitudestowardforeign aid (diminishedby
only 1.2 percentagepoints), but if the entire sample
also possessed"correct"information(specifically,that
foreignaid amountsto 5%or less of federalspending),
386
then opposition to foreign aid is predictedto fall by
more than 13 additionalpercentagepoints.
The second column of Table 3 reports a parallel
analysisof attitudestowardforeign aid. In this case,
however, the effect of policy-specificknowledge is
assessed by comparingpreferences expressedby respondentsin the treatmentand controlconditions.The
same logistic equation is estimated as in equation 2,
except that in place of a measure of respondents'
observedpolicy-specificinformation(P), I use a variable (T) to indicate whether the respondent was
randomlyassignedto the treatmentgroup(scored1) or
the controlgroup (scored 0):
j+
prob(Yi= 1) = ct +
jlGi
+
+
+
T, •PkDik
3Gi
(3)
'yk(Gi Dik) + Y8k(Ti Dik) + ei.
2Ti
Imputed preferencesfor a hypotheticalsample with
full generalinformationare estimatedby setting G to
1 and T to 0; preferencesfor a hypotheticalsample
with both full general informationand specificknowledge about foreign aid are derivedby setting both G
and T to 1.9 Like the nonexperimentalanalyses,this
model allows for policy-specificinformationto have
differingeffects for respondentswith differentdemographic characteristicsas well as different levels of
general politicalknowledge.
Row E of Table 3 showsthat the estimatedeffectof
9 Note that setting T = 0 in equation 3 reflects the predicted policy
preferences of a sample with the observed level of policy-specific
information. In contrast, setting P = 0 in equation 2 would reflect
the preferences of a sample in which all respondents were ignorant of
the relevant policy-specific information. Consequently, the figures in
row B of tables 2 and 3, and row A of Table 4, are estimated with T =
0 and P at its observed level.
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
tellingrespondentsaboutforeignaid is quite similarto
the estimated effect of this knowledgebased on the
nonexperimentalmodel. The first column in row E
indicates that opposition to foreign aid among fully
informedrespondentswouldbe 13.6percentagepoints
lower if theywere also awarethat foreignaid accounts
for 5% or less of federalspending.The second column
of row E showsthat actuallygivingthis informationto
a random subsampleof respondentsleads to a predicted 16.6 percentagepoint decreasein oppositionto
foreign aid among those who are fully informed in
generalterms.Based on this one example,at least, the
estimates derived from the nonexperimentalmodel
appearto be reasonableapproximationsof the causal
influenceof policy-specificinformation.
This same comparisonbetween experimentaland
nonexperimentaltechniquescannotbe made using the
crimequestions.First,the numberof availablecases is
much smaller because most of the respondentswere
assignedto other experimentaltreatmentsnot used in
these analyses.Second,only 12%of the respondentsin
the controlgroupperceiveda declinein crimeover the
past decade (Table 1). This representsonly 25 cases,
too few to producea reliableestimate of the effect of
this information.
The public'signoranceaboutthe crimerate presents
an obstacleto nonexperimentalanalysis,but there is no
such obstacle to the experimentalapproach,since the
200 cases in the treatmentgroupwere told that crime
had been falling. The results of this analysisare reported in the last column of Table 3. When informed
that crime had declined, estimatedsupportfor prison
constructionamongfully informedrespondentsfell by
18.9 percentagepoints.
The five specific examplesof policy-relevantinformation and the seven politicaljudgmentsexaminedin
tables 2 and 3 are a small sample of all possible
combinationsof preferences and information.They
were based on what happened to be availablefrom
existingsurveys(in the case of the NES items) or were
chosen because I expected to find the public misinformedaboutpotentiallyinfluentialpolicyfacts.These
resultscannot,therefore,be taken as representativeof
some larger set of political judgments.Nevertheless,
the findingsare consistentenough to indicatethat (1)
ignoranceof policy-specificfacts is extremelyimportant in creatinga gap betweenthe politicalpreferences
thatAmericansexpressand the preferencestheywould
expressif they were well informedabout the issues at
hand, and (2) measuresof generalpoliticalknowledge
do not adequatelycapture the importanceof policyspecificignorance.
For the seven political judgmentsI examined,the
differencebetween observedand fully informedpreferences averaged9.3 percentagepoints (roughlycompatiblewithAlthaus's[1998]averageof 7.1 percentage
points for the 45 issues he analyzed).But for respondents who are fully informed in terms of general
political knowledge,I found an averagedifferenceof
11.6 percentage points between those who possess
policy-specificinformationand those who lack it. In
five of the seven cases, lack of generalpoliticalknowl-
Vol. 95, No. 2
edge (and its cognitivecorrelates)has a smallereffect
on politicaljudgmentsthan does ignoranceof policyspecificinformation.Clearly,any assessmentof the gap
between expressed and "enlightened" preferences
must take account of shortfallsin the public'sknowledge of policy-specificfacts as well as shortfalls in
general politicalknowledge.
POLICY-SPECIFIC
INFORMATION
AND
IGNORANCE:FOR WHOMDO THEY
MATTER?
The analysesabove reveal the importanceof policyspecificignorancefor the politicaljudgmentsmade by
fully informedrespondents.Do these effects differfor
people with differentlevels of generalpoliticalknowledge?
One set of considerationssuggeststhat "providing"
policy-specificfacts-either experimentallyor by statistical imputation-should have less effect on the
politicaljudgmentsof respondentswith higherlevels of
general politicalknowledge.First,respondentshigh in
general knowledgeare likely to have a largerstock of
other informationrelevantto the politicaljudgmentat
hand. Studies of learningand persuasionsuggest that
psychologicaljudgmentsare based on a weighted average of available information. Consequently,each
new fact becomes less influential as an individual's
stock of existing informationgrows (e.g., Anderson
1981).1oIn addition, respondentswith more general
knowledge are more likely to already possess the
particularpolicy-specificfact examined(Table 1).11For
both reasons,policy-specificignoranceshould be less
importantin explainingthe views of those with high
levels of generalpoliticalknowledge.
But other considerationssuggestthatgeneralknowledge should enhance ratherthan diminishthe importance of policy-specificinformation.Respondentswho
score high in general knowledgepossess greater cognitive capacityand a greaterinterest in politics (Delli
Carpiniand Keeter 1996), and they are likely to have
more integratedbelief systems(Converse1964).These
resources may provide the ability and motivationto
incorporate new policy-specificinformation and reFor exshape one's politicaljudgmentsaccordingly.12
1o In Zaller's (1992) model of political attitude formation, this
phenomenon is labeled "inertial resistance." Note that the "dilution"
of new information in a pool of existing considerations leads to a
lower probability of attitude change, but it does not constitute
"resistance" to the new information per se. For an earlier statement
of this perspective, see Converse 1962.
11The greater likelihood that the politically knowledgeable will have
encountered specific information is reflected in Zaller's (1992)
discussion of "reception." It is important to note that if one is
assessing the influence of information, a higher probability of
reception is associated with a greater likelihood that the information
will affect an individual's policy views. But if one is assessing the
importance of ignorance, a higher probability of reception is associated with a lower likelihood that ignorance has "distorted" a given
individual's policy views.
12 It is important to
distinguish between persuasive and informational communications. To the extent that a persuasive message is
propaganda, we would expect the smallest change in policy preferences among the most sophisticated and informed individuals. To the
387
PoliticalIgnoranceand CollectivePolicyPreferences
June 2001
ample, Rhee and Capella (1997) and Capella and
Jamieson(1997) found that people who scoredhigh in
politicalsophisticationlearnedmore from news stories
on healthcare and a mayoralelection. Fiske, Lau, and
Smith (1990) similarlyfound that people with higher
levels of political knowledge are more efficient and
effective in processing informationfrom newspaper
articlesabout local politicalissues.
The relativestrengthof these two sets of considerationswill determinethe importanceof policy-specific
informationacrosslevels of general politicalinformation. If general knowledgeand its correlatesprompt
resistenceto new information,we wouldexpectpolicyspecificinformationto have the strongestinfluenceon
the political judgments of the least knowledgeable
respondents.But if cognitive ability and motivation
dominate,then we would expect policy-specificinformation to have the strongesteffect among those who
score highest in general political knowledge.And if
these two sets of offsettingfactorsare both important,
then we might find either similar importanceacross
levels of general knowledgeor perhaps a curvilinear
effect, that is, policy-specificignorancemight have its
greatestinfluenceamongthose with moderatelevels of
politicalknowledge(because a very high level of general politicalknowledgeleads to resistenceand a very
low level to indifferenceor incomprehension).
As a first step I conducted a series of tests for
nonmonotonicityin the importanceof policy-specific
ignorance. Using dummy variables in place of the
continuousmeasure of general political knowledge,I
estimatedthe followingequation:
ses because the cut points are constrainedby the
distributionof respondentson the generalknowledge
measures. For one set of equations I defined "high
information"as the top 30% (NES) or 28% (MIS) of
respondents on the general knowledge scale; "low
information"was definedas the bottom32% (NES) or
34%(MIS).For the secondset of equations,I included
only the top 13%(NES) or top 10%(MIS)in the "high
information"category;"lowinformation"includedthe
bottom 16% (NES) or 20% (MIS).
The 14 analyses(two sets of cut points times seven
politicaljudgments)showed little evidence of departure fromthe logisticmodel.Onlyone of the 14 x2 tests
comparingthe logisticmodel (equations2 and 3) with
the dummyvariablemodel in equation 4 was significant.13Given the apparentmonotonicity,I will follow
the lead of earlieranalystsin usinga logisticfunctionto
assessthe relationshipbetweenpolicy-specificinformation and generalpoliticalknowledge.14
SectionsA and B in Table 4 show the observedand
fully informed policy preferencesfor respondentsat
the 35th, 65th, and 100thpercentilesof generalpolitical knowledge.These percentileswere chosen to represent rather poorly informed, moderately well-informed, and fully informedrespondents,respectively.
Section C of Table4 showsthe effect of policy-specific
ignoranceat each of these levels of generalknowledge
(i.e., the differencebetween imputedscores based on
the observed level of policy-specificinformation at
each percentileof generalknowledgeand the imputed
scoresbasedon a samplein whichall respondentsheld
the relevantpolicy-specificinformation).
Two of the seven politicaljudgmentsshowno appre=
+
+
+
a
=
ciable
differencesin the importanceof policy-specific
33Pi
prob(Yi 1)
31Gli 32G2i
ignoranceacrosslevels of generalknowledge("oppose
+ 34G1iPi+ P5G2iPi + •I•kDik+•Yk(Gli Dik)
importlimitsto savejobs"and "Bushcaresless for the
environmentthan Dukakis").For the other five polit+ Ik(G2i Dik)+ 1k(Pi Dik)+ei,
(4)
icaljudgments,policy-specificignoranceis most important in distortingthe policy preferencesof those who
where Yi is respondenti's policy preference,G li is
in general knowledge,and in three of
score
respondenti's scoreon a dummyvariablethatindicates these highest
cases the differencesare quite substantial(relow generalpoliticalinformation,G2i is respondenti's
score on a dummyvariablethat indicateshigh general gardingspendingfor the environment,foreignaid, and
construction).These results support the "repoliticalinformation,Pi is respondenti's policy-specific prison
source"
hypothesisthat policy-specificfacts are more
informationscore, Dik is respondenti's scores on a
to
be
likely
incorporatedinto the politicaljudgmentsof
vectorof k controlvariables,andei is the errortermfor
the ith observation.The analogousmodelfor the exper- those who are more knowledgeable,interested, and
sophisticatedaboutpolitics.Despite theirgreaterstore
imentaldata from the MIS substitutesthe indicatorof
randomizedassignment(T) for the measureof policy- of political knowledge,these respondentsdo not appear to resistnew information,at least not the kindof
specificknowledge(P), as was done in equation3.
Lackingstrongtheoreticalexpectationsfor the spe- specificfactualinformationexaminedhere.
A complicationin interpretingthe differingimporcific shape of any nonmonotonicpatternthat mightbe
found, I used two differentspecificationsin construct- tance of policy-specificignoranceacrosslevels of general politicalknowledgestems fromthe possibilitythat
ing the measuresof general politicalknowledge.The
who score low on general knowledgemay be
people
exact percentagesdifferedin the NES and MIS analyextent that the message is informational, we might expect the largest
changes in policy preferences among this group (see McGuire 1968).
Identifying the extent to which a message falls into each of these
categories can be problematic. Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that
most people would regard the kind of policy-relevant facts examined
here as primarily informational (although they can, of course, be
included in broader, more propagandistic, messages).
388
13 Using the 30%-32% cutpoints only, the effect of policy-specific
ignorance about the Reagan administration's environmental policies
was significantly smaller for moderately informed respondents than
for those with either high or low general political knowledge.
14 Bartels (1996) reports that his examination of a variety of nonlinear functions (both monotonic and nonmonotonic) did not produce
any significant improvement in fit over his linear model of general
information effects.
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
Vol. 95, No. 2
TABLE4. Effectof Policy-SpecificIgnoranceon PoliticalJudgments by Levelof GeneralPolitical
Knowledgeand Issue
ForeignAid
Is Less
Than 1%
of Federal
Spending
Crime
EnvironmentalEfforts
Deficit
Has
Unemployment
Declined
Declined
Information: Increased
Declined
Bush Cares
Unwillingto Oppose
Increase
Increase
Less for
Cut
Increase
Import
Pay
MoreTaxes Limits
Spending
Spending Environment Spending Spending
for
to Reduce to Save
to Help
Than
for Foreign for Prison
Jobs
Aid
Construction
PoliticalJudgment: Deficit
Unemployed Environment Dukakis
A. Observed level of policy-specific information
Generalknowledge
percentile
81.8 (1.5) 18.2 (1.6) 29.7 (1.5)
62.2 (1.7)
26.8 (1.7)
35th percentile
66.5 (2.9)
35.0 (5.2)
72.1 (1.8) 25.6 (1.4) 29.2 (1.8)
67.8 (1.8)
65th percentile
34.6 (2.0)
63.3 (3.3)
38.8 (5.1)
56.6 (3.9) 36.8 (3.0)
30.7 (2.6)
71.7 (2.7)
43.5 (3.6)
58.6 (5.7)
45.8 (8.2)
B. Fullpolicy-specific information
Generalknowledge
percentile
35th percentile
82.9 (1.8) 16.7 (2.0)
27.7 (2.4)
64.1 (4.7)
38.8 (4.9)
59.2 (3.3)
36.6 (5.5)
65th percentile
71.5 (2.1) 25.0 (1.8)
25.1 (2.5)
79.4 (2.8)
48.6 (3.5)
50.6 (3.3)
30.2 (4.5)
100th percentile
51.4 (4.2) 38.3 (4.6)
24.7 (3.8)
89.9 (2.7)
58.1 (5.6)
42.0 (5.1)
26.9 (6.5)
1.1 (1.2) -1.5 (1.4) -2.0 (1.9)
-0.6 (1.0) -0.6 (1.3) -4.1 (2.0)
-5.2 (2.2) 1.5 (2.9) -6.0 (3.1)
1.9 (4.5)
12.0 (4.7)
1.6 (8.0)
11.6 (2.8)
14.0 (3.1)
-7.3 (4.5)
-12.7 (4.5)
18.2 (2.8)
14.6 (5.1)
1,562
1,597
1,384
100th percentile
C. Effectof policy-specific ignorance (B-A)
Generalknowledge
percentile
35th percentile
65th percentile
100th percentile
N
1,422
1,620
-8.6 (6.6)
-16.6 (7.8) -18.9 (9.7)
409
1,102
Sources: 1988 NationalElectionStudy and 1998 Multi-Investigator
Study.
Note: Entriesinsections A and B show the predictedpercentageof respondentsexpressingthe politicaljudgmentindicated.Thefirstfivecolumnsreport
resultsbased on nonexperimentalanalyses of NESdata using equation2; the last two columnsreportresultsbased on experimentalanalyses of the MIS
data using equation3. Standarderrorsare in parentheses.
more likely to answer the policy-specificquestions
correctlyby taking a random guess than are people
who score high on general information(who may be
more likelyto answerthese questionscorrectlybecause
they actually know the answer). If so, this would
attenuate the apparent association between general
and policy-specificinformationand lead to an alternative interpretationof the finding that policy-specific
ignorancematters more for those who score high in
general information:Their correct answeris a better
indicatorof actuallypossessingthe policy-specificfact
in question.
Although some part of the relationshipbetween
general political knowledge and the importance of
policy-specificignorance may be due to "differential
guessing" among respondents at different levels of
general political knowledge,a numberof factors suggest that any such biases are likely to be quite small.
First,two of the three Reagan retrospectivequestions
have an explicit"don'tknow"filter(e.g., "Havefederal
efforts to protect the environment increased, decreased,or stayedaboutthe same as theywere in 1980,
or haven't you paid much attention?").Such filters
reducethe tendencyto guess when respondentsdo not
know an answer (e.g., Schuman and Presser 1981).
Second,amongrespondentswho scored at the bottom
of the generalpoliticalinformationscale, the proportion who gave a correct answerto the environmental
question was only 5%; 73% said "don'tknow."Similarly,only 7% of the least well-informedrespondents
gave the correctansweron the crime question.
These smallproportionssuggestthat the tendencyof
poorly informed respondentsto guess is not strong.
These data also suggestthat, unless people were more
inclined to guess on the other policy-specificfactual
questionsthan on these, most of the poorly informed
who answered the other factual questions correctly
must have possessedthe relevantinformation.Finally,
389
PoliticalIgnoranceand CollectivePolicy Preferences
June 2001
TABLE5. Effectof Policy-SpecificInformationon PoliticalJudgments by Levelof General
PoliticalKnowledgeand Issue
Information:
PoliticalJudgment:
A. No policy-specific information
Generalknowledge percentile
35th percentile
Deficit
Increased
Unwillingto
Pay More
Taxes to
Reduce
Deficit
UnemploymentDeclined
Oppose
Increase
Import
Limits
Spending to
to Save
Help
Jobs
Unemployed
EnvironmentalEffortsDeclined
Increase
Bush Cares Less
for the
Spending
for
Environment
Environment Than Dukakis
80.6 (2.7)
20.2 (2.3)
32.5 (2.2)
61.0 (1.9)
25.0 (2.0)
65th percentile
74.7 (4.5)
25.8 (3.0)
34.4 (2.8)
61.8 (2.1)
28.3 (2.2)
100th percentile
66.0 (7.8)
33.6 (5.3)
38.3 (4.5)
61.5 (3.4)
33.0 (3.8)
35th percentile
82.9 (1.8)
16.7 (2.0)
27.7 (2.4)
64.1 (4.7)
38.8 (4.9)
65th percentile
71.5 (2.1)
25.0 (1.8)
25.1 (2.5)
79.4 (2.8)
48.6 (3.5)
100th percentile
51.4 (4.2)
38.3 (4.6)
24.7 (3.8)
89.9 (2.7)
58.1 (5.6)
-3.5 (2.9)
-0.8 (3.5)
-4.8 (2.8)
-9.3 (3.7)
3.1 (5.0)
13.8 (5.2)
17.6 (3.5)
20.3 (4.0)
4.7 (7.1)
-13.6 (6.3)
28.4 (4.0)
25.1 (6.8)
1,620
1,597
1,384
B. Fullpolicy-specific information
Generalknowledge percentile
C. Effectof policy-specific information(B-A)
Generalknowledge percentile
35th percentile
2.3 (3.1)
65th percentile
-3.2 (4.5)
-14.6 (7.7)
100th percentile
N
1,422
1,562
Source: 1988 NationalElectionStudy.
Note: Entriesin rowsA and B show the predictedpercentageof respondentsexpressingthe politicaljudgmentindicatedbased on equation2. Standard
errorsare in parentheses.
guessingis unlikelyto producea correctansweron the
open-endedquestionabout level of foreignaid spending, and that item showsthe same patternof relationship with general knowledge as do the close ended
questions,whichcan be guessed at more easily (Table
4).
The results in Table 4 reveal the practicalimportance of policy-specificignoranceat differentlevels of
general knowledge.But these figuresreflect both the
effectof existinglevels of policy-specificignoranceand
the influenceof policy-specificinformationon political
judgments.For a better assessmentof the more theoreticallyorientedquestionof how responsesto policyspecific informationvary across levels of political information,I next compare the imputed scores under
the conditionthat all respondentsare ignorantof the
policy-specificfacts or that all respondents are informed. (The randomizedexperimentin the MIS survey provides policy-specificinformationto the treatment group but cannot "takeaway"such information
fromthe controlgroup.Consequently,the comparison
of the whollyignorantand whollyinformedconditions
must rely on statistical imputation rather than the
experimentalapproach.)
Section A of Table 5 shows the imputedjudgments
390
of a hypotheticalsamplein which all respondentslack
the relevant policy-specificinformation, section B
shows the imputed scores for a sample in which all
respondentspossess this information,and section C
gives the differencebetween the two.'5 Unlike tables
2-4, Table5 does not reportthe actual(i.e., observed)
levels of policy-specificinformation.Consequently,the
tendencyfor respondentswith higherlevels of general
political knowledge to possess the relevant policyspecificfacts does not affectthe resultsof these analyses, and the patternthat emergedin Table 4 is even
more pronounced here. For each of these political
judgments,the influenceof policy-specificinformation
is greatest at the highest level of general political
knowledge.Withthe exceptionof oppositionto import
limits, in all cases knowledge of policy-specificfacts
makes a substantialdifference in the political judgments of highlyinformedrespondents.For the poorly
informed, however, only knowledge about environ15 Following the analogous procedure used to impute scores for a
fully informed sample, I computed the scores reported in Table 5 by
assigning to each respondent a score of 0 (section A) or 1 (section B)
for policy-specific information and then aggregating the predicted
probabilities as estimated with equation 2.
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
Vol. 95, No. 2
mentaleffortsduringthe Reaganadministrationseems
to have any effect, and that appearsto be restrictedto
judgmentsabout the environmentalconcernsof Bush
and Dukakis,not governmentspendingto protect the
environment.
The sort of policy-specificinformation examined
here seems to be importantin shaping the political
judgmentsof the most politicallysophisticatedAmericans. But the effect is weakerand less consistenteven
for those with moderatelyhigh levels of sophistication
(i.e., at the 65th percentile), and it is mostly absent
among the poorly informed. It appears that lack of
political sophisticationaffects political judgments in
two ways: directly, as previous research has demonstrated,and by diminishingthe likelihoodthat policyspecificinformationwill be incorporatedinto political
judgments.
simply not particularlyrelevant to the judgment at
hand.In other cases,the informationmaybe perceived
as more relevant.Thus informationabout unemployment,whichhas little effecton attitudestowardimport
limits,has a largerinfluenceon preferencesfor spending to help the unemployed(Table 5).
The second factor is that the precise content of
policy-specificinformationcan affect its influence on
politicaljudgments.For example,unemploymentwas
about two percentage points lower in 1988 than in
1980.Knowledgeof the declinemighthavehad a larger
influenceon policypreferencesif the size of the decline
had been larger.
Furthercomplicatingthe situationis that both perceived relevanceand informationalcontent are mediated by personalfactors.My analysesallowthe effectof
policy-specific information (and general political
knowledge)to vary among respondentswith different
but other individualchardemographiccharacteristics,
DISCUSSION
acteristicsmaybe more important(and more theoretThe analysesrevealconsiderablevariationin the impor- icallysignificant).For example,people with conflicting
tance of policy-specific
ignoranceacrossthe sevenpolit- considerationson a particularissue may be more
ical judgmentsexamined.Fully informedrespondents sensitive to policy-specificinformationon that issue.
with policy-specific
informationdiffersubstantially
from Thus, the influence of the unemploymentrate on
thosewho lacksuchinformationin termsof theirpercep- supportfor importlimits may be substantialfor those
tions of whereBush and Dukakisstandon the environ- who place a highvalue on both Americanjobs and free
ment as well as in termsof preferencesfor spendingon
trade,but it may be minimalfor those whose thinking
aboutimportpolicyis dominatedby nationalistfeelings
and
the
environment
2
and
aid,
prisons,foreign
(tables
3).
and concern for Americans'jobs, since both of these
Policy-specificignorance is much less important in
explainingpreferencesfor spendingto help the unem- considerationslead to the same policy conclusion.
The broaderprojectimpliedby these observationsis
ployed or willingnessto pay highertaxes to reducethe
to
and
it
seems
to
have
on
no
for
develop a theory of policy-specificinformationefdeficit,
effect support
fects
that can identifyin advancethe individualcharin
to
order
American
limitingimports
protect
jobs.
What accounts for this variation across political acteristics and the combinationof information and
judgments?One factor alreadydiscussedis the varia- politicaljudgmentsthat will producethe strongestand
tion in ignorance of the various policy-specificfacts weakest effects.
examined.In the cases of heaviest influence,between
one-half and three-quartersof fully informedrespondents lacked the relevant policy facts.'6 In contrast, CONCLUSION
only one in five of the fullyinformedwas unawarethat Previousresearchdemonstratesthat"informationmatunemploymenthad declined, and only one in twenty ters" in shapingthe public'spoliticaljudgments.This
was unawarethat the federal deficit had grown.
articlerevealsthatthe kindof informationthatmatters
is not only general political knowledge, interest, or
Nevertheless,when we assess not the influence of
cognitivecapacitybut also the specificfactsgermaneto
policy-specificignorance (which reflects, in part, the
extent of ignoranceabout any particularfact) but the
particularpoliticalissues. More specifically,three coninfluenceof policy-specificinformation(whichreflects clusionscan be drawn.First,policy-specificfactscanbe
the effectof informationon preferencesirrespectiveof
an importantinfluenceon politicaljudgments.Second,
the prevalenceof that informationin the population), this influenceis not adequatelycapturedby measures
we still find considerablevariation across the judg- of general political knowledge. Third, the consements examined(Table 5). Two factors contributeto
quences of policy-specificignoranceand the effectsof
this variation.The first is variationin the perceived policy-specificinformationare greatestfor Americans
relevance of the information to respondents'judg- with the highestlevels of generalpoliticalknowledge.
ments of the issue at hand. For example,knowledge
It mayseem obviousthatrespondentswho knowthat
about a change in the unemploymentrate may be
environmentaleffortsdeclined duringthe Reagan adunrelated to attitudes toward import limits because ministrationare less likely to view George Bush as
these attitudesare rooted in other kinds of consider- concerned with the environment,or that informing
ations (such as nationalismor supportfor free trade). respondentsthat foreign aid representsless than one
In this case, the information may be perceived as percentof the federalbudgetdiminishestheirdesireto
cut foreign aid spending.But the powerof such infor16 That
mation to shape the public's political judgments is
is, environmental efforts declined during the Reagan administration, crime declined over the previous decade, and foreign aid
anythingbut obvious.First, as tables 4 and 5 showed,
such facts have a weak and inconsistenteffect on the
represents 5% or less of federal spending.
391
PoliticalIgnoranceand CollectivePolicyPreferences
June 2001
preferencesexpressedby less politicallyknowledgeable 5%; two-thirds:46%;three-quarters:13%;other: 1%;don't
Americans. For these citizens, policy-relevantfacts know:18%)
In general,thinkingaboutthe politicalpartiesin Washingseem to carrylittle weight.
Furthermore,previousanalystsof policypreferences ton, would you say Democratsare more conservativethan
have not expressedmuch faith that the kind of policy- Republicans,or Republicansare more conservativethan
(Democrats: 29%; Republicans:60%; both
specificinformationdiscussedhere playsan important Democrats?
don't
know:7%)
4%;
equal:
role in shaping Americans' political views. Zaller's
Whose responsibilityis it to determineif a law is constituin
mass
studies
of
influential
change
opin- tional or not-is it the
(e.g., 1992)
president,Congress,or the Supreme
ion focus stronglyon elite leadershipas the source of
Court?
5%;
Congress:22%; Supreme Court:
(president:
and
Even
the
foremost
change.
preferenceformation
don't
know:
68%;
4%)
proponentsof the "rationalpublic"attributethe pubHow manyfour-yeartermscan the presidentof the United
lic's rationalityprimarilyto the use of elite cues rather States
serve? (two: 89%; some other number:9%; don't
than raw policy-relevantinformation.Page and Shaknow:
3%)
piro (1992) allow that individualsmay at times recogHow manymembersof the U.S. SupremeCourtare there?
nize the significanceof new policy-relevantfacts and
20%;some other number:39%;don't know:41%)
(nine:
adjusttheir policypreferencesaccordingly.But "more
What political office is now held by Al Gore? (vice
likely,"they write,"responsivenessto new information
83%;some other office:2%;don't know:16%)
results from individualsusing cognitive shortcuts or president:
rulesof thumb,such as relianceupon trusteddelegates Policy-Specific Information and Policy Preferences. Please
or referencefigures (friends,interest groups,experts, give me your best guess for this next question. For every
dollarspent by the federalgovernmentin Washington,how
politicalleaders)to do politicalreasoningfor them and muchof
each dollardo you thinkgoes for foreignaid to help
to provideguidance"(p. 17).
other
countries?
(mean: 26 cents; standarddeviation:20
The findingspresented here do not contradictthe
of respondentswho were not provided
[Asked
only
cents)
in
the
more
belief that elite cues are
important shaping
with
information
aboutforeignaid.]
correct
public'spoliticaljudgmentsthan are raw policy-relethere
is more, less, or about the same
Would
say
you
vant facts. But they do suggest that, at least for the
amountof crimein the United States today as comparedto
and
more politicallyknowledgeable
sophisticatedseg10yearsago?(more:73%;less:12%;same:15%;don'tknow:
ments of the public,the influenceof raw facts can be
1%)[Askedonlyof respondentswho were not providedwith
substantial.
correctinformationaboutcrime.]
Despite the centralimportanceof the public'spolicy
How do you feel about the amountof moneythe federal
preferencesto democratictheory,we remain surpris- government(in Washington)spendson foreignaid to other
ingly ignorantof the forces that shape them. Future countries? Do you think the federal governmentshould
research needs to bring together microlevel studies spendmore on foreignaid, less, or aboutthe same as it does
that examinethe effecton individualsof differentkinds now? (more:9%;less: 56%;same:34%;don't know:1%)
of politicallyrelevantmessagesand macrolevelstudies
How do you feel about the amount of money state and
of the distributionof such messages in American federalgovernmentsspendon buildingprisons?Do you think
society.For example,attitudestowardanticrimepolicy we shouldspendmore on buildingprisons,less, or aboutthe
surelyreflectsome combinationof factualinformation same as we do now? (more: 30%; less: 27%; same: 42%;
(or misinformation),policy endorsementsfrom social don't know:2%)
and political elites, personal experience with crime, Reassessmentof Policy Preferences(AskedNear the End of the
deeply seated beliefs about human nature, and the MISInterview). For each of the followinggovernmentprosubtextualmessages about crime that permeate both grams,pleasetell me if you thinkthe governmentis spending
fictional and nonfictionalmedia. Much creative and too littlemoney,too muchmoney,or aboutthe rightamount.
valuable work along these lines has already been
accomplished,but the patchesof illuminationmakethe
darkness that surrounds them all the more conspicu-
ous. The findings presented here contribute to this
larger project by demonstrating the value of directing
more light toward the role of basic policy-relevant
perceptionsand misperceptionsin shapingthe public's
political judgments.
APPENDIX
Survey Items from the 1998 MultiInvestigator Study
GeneralInformation. Now for some questions about the
federal government.Whichpartyhas the most membersin
the House of Representativesin Washington?(Democrats:
18%;Republicans:56%;don't know:26%)
How much of a majorityis requiredfor the U.S. Senate
and House of Representativesto override a presidential
veto--one-half plus one vote, three-fifths,two-thirds,or
three-quarters?(one-half plus one vote: 17%; three-fifths:
392
How aboutfor foreignaid to othercountries?Wouldyou say
the federalgovernmentin Washingtonis spendingtoo little
money, too much money, or about the right amount for
foreign aid? (too little: 7%; too much: 61%; about right:
31%;don't know:1%)
How aboutfor buildingprisons?Wouldyou say the state
and federalgovernmentsare spendingtoo little money,too
muchmoney,or aboutthe rightamountfor buildingprisons?
(too little: 25%; too much: 28%; about right:46%; don't
know:1%)
ControlVariables(Dummy VariableCategoriesAre Indicatedby
Italics). What is your present religious preference?Is it
Protestant,Catholic,Islam,Jehovah'sWitness,or something
else? (Protestant: 48%; Catholic: 23%; Other religion: 20%;
none: 9%)
Whatis the highestgradeor yearof schoolyou completed?
(eighth grade or lower: 2%; some high school: 10%;high
school graduate(or GED): 40%;some college:25%;college
graduate:15%;some graduateworkor graduatedegree:9%)
What race or ethnic group do you consider yourself?
(Black:13%;nonblack:87%)
Are you male or female? (male:48%;female:52%)
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
Are you currentlymarried, living with someone in a
marriage-likerelationshipbut not legallymarried,separated,
divorced,widowed,or have you never been married?(married: 58%;other:42%)
Do you have anychildren?How manyof yourchildrenare
under 18? (one or more childrenunder 18:39%;no children
under 18: 61%)
Region. (East: 17%;Midwest:26%; South: 34%; West:
23%)
Which of the followingbest describesthat area you live
in-urban, rural, or suburban?(Urban:32%;Rural:32%;
suburban:36%)
Are you currentlyemployedfull-time,employedpart-time,
unemployed,retired, a student, keeping house, or what?
(Retired:15%;Keepinghouse:5%;other:80%)
Generallyspeaking,do you usuallythink of yourselfas a
Democrat,a Republican,an Independent,or what?(Democrat:37%;Republican:27%;other:36%)
General Knowledge Items from the 1988
National Election Study
V555 (interviewerrating): Respondent's general level of
informationabout politics and public affairsseemed:
(veryhigh:10%;fairlyhigh:26%;average:32%;fairly
low: 21%;very low: 10%)
V871: I'm going to read the namesof variouspublicfigures.
We want to see how much informationabout them
gets out to the publicfromtelevision,newspapers,and
the like. The first name is Ted Kennedy. Do you
happen to know what job or political office he now
holds?(CorrectlyidentifiesKennedyas senator(from
Massachusetts):69%;identificationis incompleteor
wrong:6%;makesno attemptto guess:25%)
V872: George Schultz?(CorrectlyidentifiesSchultzas secretaryof state (foreignaffairs):39%;identificationis
incomplete or wrong: 11%; makes no attempt to
guess:50%)
V873: William Rehnquist?(Correctlyidentifies Rehnquist
as Chief Justiceof the SupremeCourt:3%; identification is incomplete or wrong: 20%; makes no attempt to guess:76%)
V874: MikhailGorbachev?(CorrectlyidentifiesGorbachev
as leaderof the (Russian)CommunistPartyor of the
Soviet Union (Russia)-i.e., GeneralSecretaryof the
CommunistParty;Presidentor PrimeMinisterof the
Soviet Union/Russia;the Russianleader;Head Red:
71%; identificationis incomplete: 9%; makes no
attemptto guess:20%)
V875: MargaretThatcher?(CorrectlyidentifiesThatcheras
Prime Minister of Great Britain (England): 60%;
identificationis incomplete:19%;makes no attempt
to guess:21%)
V876: Yasser Arafat?(CorrectlyidentifiesArafat as leader
of the Palestinian Liberation Organization-i.e.,
Chairmanof the PLO; leader of the Palestinian
people; "PLO";Palestinianleader; leader of Palestine: 37%; identificationis incomplete:19%;makes
no attemptto guess:44%)
V877: Jim Wright?(CorrectlyidentifiesWrightas Speaker
of the House of Representatives:14%;identification
is incomplete:9%;makesno attemptto guess:77%)
V878: Do you happen to know which party had the most
membersin the House of Representativesin Washingtonbefore the election (this/last)month?(Republicans:12%;Democrats:59%;No, don't know:28%)
V879: Do you happen to know which party had the most
members in the U.S. Senate before the election
Vol. 95, No. 2
(this/last) month? (Republicans:11%; Democrats:
54%;No, don't know:35%)
V231: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and
conservatives.Here is a 7-point scale on which the
political views that people might hold are arranged
from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.
Where would you place Michael Dukakis on this
scale? (extremelyliberal:9%; liberal:22%; slightly
liberal:15%;moderate;middleof road:14%;slightly
conservative:7%;conservative:6%;extremelyconservative:2%;don't know:24%)
V232: Wherewouldyou place George Bush (on this scale)?
(extremelyliberal: 2%; liberal:3%; slightly liberal:
5%; moderate;middleof road: 11%;slightlyconservative: 18%;conservative:31%; extremelyconservative: 9%;don't know:21%)
V234: Wherewouldyou place the RepublicanParty(on this
scale)? (extremelyliberal: 2%; liberal: 6%; slightly
liberal:5%; moderate;middle of road: 12%;slightly
conservative:17%;conservative:33%;extremelyconservative:10%;don't know:15%)
V235: Wherewouldyou place the DemocraticParty(on this
scale)? (extremelyliberal:6%; liberal:25%; slightly
liberal:20%;moderate;middleof road:16%;slightly
conservative:10%;conservative:7%; extremelyconservative:2%;don't know:14%)
V321: Thereis muchconcernaboutthe rapidrisein medical
and hospitalcosts.Somepeople feel thereshouldbe a
governmentinsuranceplan which would cover all
medical and hospital expenses for everyone.Others
feel that all medical expenses should be paid by
individuals,and throughprivateinsuranceplans like
Blue Cross or other company paid plans. Where
wouldyou placethe RepublicanParty(on this scale)?
([1] governmentinsuranceplan:2%;[2]: 1%;[3]:4%;
[4]: 13%;[5]: 15%; [6]: 15%; [7] private insurance
plan: 12%;don't know:21%;haven'tthought much
about it: 16%)
V322: Wherewouldyou place the DemocraticParty(on this
scale)?([1] governmentinsuranceplan:8%;[2]: 12%;
[3]: 16%; [4]: 13%; [5]: 7%; [6]: 4%; [7] private
insuranceplan;2%;don'tknow:22%;haven'tthought
much about it: 16%)
V307: Some people think the governmentshould provide
fewer services, even in areas such as health and
educationin orderto reducespending.Supposethese
people are at one end of the scale at point 1. Other
people feel it is importantfor the governmentto
provide many more services even if it means an
increasein spending.Supposethese people are at the
other end, at point 7. And of course, some other
people haveopinionssomewherein betweenat points
2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Wherewouldyou place the Republican
Party(on this scale)? ([1] governmentprovidemany
fewer services,reduce spendinga lot: 6%; [2]: 12%;
[3]:20%;[4]:22%;[5]: 11%;[6]:5%; [7] government
providemanymore services,increasespendinga lot:
3%;don't know:21%)
V308: Wherewouldyou place the DemocraticParty(on this
scale)? ([1] governmentprovidemanyfewer services,
reducespendinga lot: 1%;[2]:3%;[3]:6%;[4]: 18%;
[5]: 22%; [6]: 19%; [7] governmentprovide many
more services, increase spending a lot: 8%; don't
know:22%)
V315: Some people believe that we shouldspend muchless
moneyfor defense.Othersfeel that defense spending
should be greatlyincreased.Where would you place
the Republican Party (on this scale)? ([1] greatly
393
PoliticalIgnoranceand CollectivePolicy Preferences
June 2001
TABLEA-1. LogisticAnalysisof Preferencefor Environmental
Spending
Generalinformation
Policy-specific information
Income
MainEffects
2.390 (1.792)
1.844 (1.579)
Interactionswith
Policy-Specific
Information
3.119 (.843)
-1.257 (.756)
-1.275 (1.067)
2.210 (1.469)
Married
-.280 (.283)
.749 (.526)
-.101 (.435)
Education
1.907 (.910)
-1.178 (1.679)
Republican
Democrat
.624 (.368)
-2.335 (1.018)
-.911 (1.027)
-1.321 (1.468)
-2.311 (1.155)
Age
.858 (.600)
Interactionswith
GeneralInformation
.268 (.364)
-.092 (.881)
1.277 (1.336)
-2.221 (1.132)
.874 (.628)
Female
-.139 (.365)
-.401 (.287)
-.456 (.792)
.438 (.514)
Unionfamily
-.118 (.342)
.304 (.623)
.318 (.471)
Homeowner
-.058 (.285)
-.470 (.547)
-.285 (.464)
.228 (.267)
.184 (.407)
Black
Childrenunder 18
.685 (.433)
Worse off than last year
-.051 (.268)
-.649 (.505)
-.547 (.515)
Protestant
-.051 (.428)
.025 (.724)
-.667 (.593)
.730 (.475)
-1.073 (.815)
1.745 (.775)
-1.026 (.642)
.136 (.609)
.270 (.691)
.186 (.498)
.076 (.674)
.371 (.511)
-.117 (.591)
-.187 (.515)
.423 (.482)
Catholic
East
Midwest
South
Urban
Rural
Retired
Homemaker
Executive/professional
Clerical
Technical/sales
Constant
-.792 (.446)
-.252 (.409)
-.201 (.392)
-.101 (.332)
-.273 (.272)
.043 (.493)
.535 (.381)
-.321 (.456)
1.001 (.453)
.003 (.467)
-.004 (.876)
-1.043 (.843)
.414 (.396)
-.284 (.444)
-1.456 (.714)
.355 (.714)
.521 (.742)
.419 (.552)
-1.670 (.842)
.300 (.805)
.272 (.677)
-.120 (.616)
-.848 (.856)
Source: 1988 NationalElectionStudy.
Note: The dependent variableis the preferencefor increasingspending to protectthe environment(scored 1) versus decreasing spending or keeping
consists of knowledgethatenvironmentaleffortsdeclined
spendingthe same (scored 0). Standarderrorsare in parentheses.Policy-specificinformation
duringthe Reagan administration.Log-likelihood= -929.5, chi-square = 233.8, p < .0001, n = 1,597.
decreasedefense spending:1%;[2]:2%;[3]:4%;[4]:
14%;[5]: 23%;[6]: 24%;[7] greatlyincreasedefense
spending:12%;don't know:20%)
V316: Wherewouldyou place the DemocraticParty(on this
scale)? ([1] greatly decrease defense spending:5%;
[2]: 11%;[3]: 18%;[4]: 24%; [5]: 12%;[6]: 5%; [7]
greatly increase defense spending:2%; don't know:
22%)
V328: Some people feel the governmentin Washington
shouldsee to it thateverypersonhas a job and a good
standard of living. Others think the government
shouldjust let each personget aheadon his/herown.
Wherewouldyou placethe RepublicanParty(on this
scale)? ([1] governmentsee to job and good standard
of living:1%;[2]:2%;[3]:4%;[4]:15%;[5]:18%;[6]:
394
18%;[7] governmentlet each personget ahead:10%;
don't know: 17%; haven't thought much about it:
15%)
V329: Wherewouldyou place the DemocraticParty(on this
scale)?([1] governmentsee to job and good standard
of living: 5%; [2]: 12%; [3]: 18%; [4]: 18%; [5]: 7%;
[6]: 4%; [7] governmentlet each person get ahead:
2%;don'tknow:19%;haven'tthoughtmuchaboutit:
15%)
Calculating Imputed Preferences
To clarifythe analyticprocedureused to producethe imputedpreferencesreportedin tables2-5, I illustratethe logic
Vol. 95, No. 2
AmericanPoliticalScience Review
of these calculationswith an exampleof a singlehypothetical
respondentand a single model of policy preferences(environmentalspending).As describedin the text, the model
used to imputefullyinformedpreferencescontainsmeasures
of generalpoliticalknowledge,policy-specificinformation(in
this case, whether federal environmentalefforts declined
during the Reagan years), a vector of control variables,
interactions between each control variable and general
knowledge,interactionsbetween each control variableand
policy-specificinformation,and the interactionbetweengeneral knowledgeand policy-specificinformation.The coefficientsfromthis model,estimatedwith logisticregression,are
shownin TableA-1 (allvariablesare rescoredto a 0-1 scale).
Note that, like any model with interactionterms, the main
effects represent not some kind of average effect but the
conditionaleffect of a given predictorfor a respondentwith
a score of 0 on both general knowledgeand policy-specific
information.
To calculateimputedenvironmentalspendingpreferences
for the respondent(R) usingthese coefficients,R's scoreson
each of the predictorsare multipliedby the coefficientfor
that predictor.These productsare then summedalongwith
the constantterm to producethe estimated"logit"or "logodds"of R scoring1 on the dependentvariable(in this case,
of holdinga preferencefor increasedenvironmentalspending). Finally,the resultinglogit is convertedinto the predicted probabilityof R preferringincreasedenvironmental
spendingas follows:
P(Y = 1)=
elogit
+
elogit
This entire process is repeatedfor each respondent,and
the resultingprobabilitiesare averagedto producethe imputed aggregate preferences reported in tables 2-5. By
substitutingalternativescores on the two informationmeasures (i.e., general knowledgeand policy-specificinformation), and their respectiveinteractionterms,imputedpreferences can be calculatedfor any combinationof generaland
policy-specificinformation.
For example,to computethe estimatedprobabilitythat R
would favor increased environmentalspending if fully informed in terms of both general and policy-specificknowledge, one would substitute a value of 1 in place of R's
observed scores on both the general and policy-specific
measures.To computethe analogousprobabilityif R were at
the 35th percentileof generalknowledgebut informedabout
the relevantpolicy-specificfact, one wouldsubstitutea value
of .35 for R's general knowledge score and 1 for the
policy-specificknowledgescore. These substitutionswould
also affect R's scores on the interactionterms, since the
scores on the interactionvariablesare calculatedby multiplyinga respondent'sinformationscoresby his or her scores
on each of the controlvariables.For example,a 37-year-old
respondentwould score .26 on the 0 to 1 age variable.If R
were 37 years old, the imputed score for the interaction
between age and general knowledgeat the 35th percentile
would be .26 x .35 = .091, and the imputedscore for the
interactionbetweenage and policy-specificknowledgewould
be .26 x 1.0 = .26.
Basedon the coefficientsshownin TableA-i, R's predicted
logit under the hypotheticalconditionof being at the 35th
percentile of general knowledge (general information
score = .35) and aware that environmentalefforts had
declined (policy-specificinformationscore = 1.0) would be
the sumof the productsshownin TableA-2 plusthe constant
term.
For each respondent,then, any specific pair of imputed
TABLEA-2. Calculatingan Individual
Respondent's ImputedPolicy Preferenceat
the 35th Percentileof GeneralInformation
and FullPolicy-SpecificInformation
Product
Value
Coefficient
General
information
2.390
x
.35
=
.837
Policy-specific
information
1.844 x
1.00
=
1.844
x
.26
Age
All other control
variables...
-1.257
General
informationx
age interaction
All other general
informationx
control
interactions...
Policy-specific
informationx
age interaction
= -.327
x .35 x .26 =
.201
1.277 x 1.00 x .26 =
.332
x .35 x 1.0 =
1.092
2.210
All other policyspecific
informationx
control
interactions ...
Generalby
policy-specific
interaction
3.119
generaland policy-specificinformationscoresproducesa set
of imputedscoresfor the interactionterms.All these scores
are then substitutedinto the model of policypreferencesas
described above, the resulting logits are converted into
probabilities,and the probabilitiesare averagedto produce
the imputedaggregatepreferencesof interest.
Standard Errors
Note that the large number of interactionterms in these
equationsleads to high standarderrorsfor the logit coefficients,a resultreportedby Althaus(1998)andBartels(1996)
as well. Because the nonsignificantpredictorsare theoretically relevant,and to parallelmore closely the approachof
earlierresearch,I retainthem in most models.When sample
size is small, however (the nonexperimentalanalysis of
opposition to foreign aid spending and the experimental
analysisof supportfor prisonconstruction),I excludethose
sets of predictorsfor whichneitherthe maineffectnor either
interaction effect produces coefficients that exceed their
standarderrors.This helps conservedegrees of freedom in
these analysesand has a veryminimaleffecton the estimated
coefficients.
The bootstrappedstandarderrorsreportedin tables 2-5
are estimated as follows. For each logistic analysis, 100
differentsamplesof observationsare drawnwithreplacement
from the set of cases availablefor that analysis,and each of
these sampleshas the same samplesize as the originalset of
cases. From each of these samples, a complete analysisis
395
PoliticalIgnoranceand CollectivePolicyPreferences
conducted that produces logit coefficients and then the
projected policy preferences under the various information
conditions identified in tables 2-5. The bootstrapped standard error for a particular projected policy preference is
simply the standard deviation of the estimates from the 100
different samples. (For a more detailed discussion of the
bootstrap and related techniques, see Efron and Tibshirani
1986; Mooney and Duval 1993.)
Note that the standard error for the difference between
two information conditions (e.g., observed and fully informed) can be smaller than the standard errors for either or
both of the two information conditions themselves. This
simply reflects the fact that the variance of the quantity (X
minus Y) is equal to the variance of X plus the variance of Y
minus twice the covariance of X and Y.
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