Musonius Rufus
and Roman Ascetical Theory
Richard Valantasis
A
has for generations been a central interest
for scholars in the study of religion. In more recent years,
however, as interdisciplinary studies have brought together often divergent disciplines,1 asceticism has emerged as a
significant topic in the study both of religion and of philosophy
in antiquity, especially in Late Antiquity.2 The study of religion,
history of philosophy, and classics converge particularly well
for studying the history of western asceticism. This essay
explores the intersection of those interests by exploring the
ascetical theory of the Roman philosopher Musonius Rufus.
Musonius Rufus (ca 30–102 C .E .), born in Volsinii, was an
Etruscan by birth and an eques by status. His influence as a
philosopher, however, emerged from his teaching and political
involvement in Rome. Cora Lutz, the English translator of
Musonius’ treatises, maintained that “he was at the height of
his influence in the time of Nero,” while his political interactions
SCETICISM
1
This is best shown by the international conference on asceticism sponsored
by Union Seminary in New York City and Saint Louis University, which
brought together classicists, philosophers, historians of religions, Church
historians, patrologists, anthropologists, and sociologists. See the published
papers Asceticism, ed. Vincent Wimbush and Richard Valantasis (New York
1995: hereafter WIMBUSH/VALANTASIS).
2
There is a vast bibliography for asceticism in Late Antiquity. See especially
Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in
Early Christianity (New York 1988); Averil Cameron, Christianity and the
Rhetoric of Empire (Berkeley 1990); and Gillian Clark, “Women and Asceticism
in Late Antiquity: The Refusal of Status and Gender,” in Wimbush/Valantasis
33–48, and her Women in Late Antiquity: Pagan and Christian Lifestyles (Oxford 1993).
Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 40 (1999) 207–231
© 2001 GRBS
208
MUSONIUS RUFUS AND ROMAN ASCETICAL THEORY
included banishment by Nero, involvement in political activity
during the reign of Vespasian who also banished him, and reinstatement by Titus. His intellectual influence in the imperial
period and following extended far: among others he influenced
Pliny the Younger and Clement of Alexandria; and he taught the
influential philosophers Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus.3 Both
in antiquity and in modern times, Musonius has been characterized as the Roman Socrates.4 He is generally acknowledged
as an important philosopher of the imperial Stoa.5
Musonius is the first western author from whom we have a
recorded discourse on asceticism.6 Granted, the concept of
ascetical formation, verbally designated by the Greek words
meletãv, gumnãzv, and ésk°v and their cognates, 7 was part of
the philosophical tradition prior to Musonius, and many earlier
philosophers spoke of ascetical activity as part of philosophical
and civic life, some of whom may even have written treatises on
3
This biographical information is based on Cora Lutz, “Musonius Rufus:
‘The Roman Socrates,’” YCS 10 (1947: hereafter LUTZ) 13–20, quotation on 14.
Lutz provides all the documentation for Musonius’ biography and influence.
See also Joseph Samuel Houser, “The Philosophy of Musonius Rufus: A Study
of Applied Ethics in the Late Stoa” (diss. Brown Univ. 1997: hereafter HOUSER)
1–11; and Delbert L. Wiens, “Musonius Rufus and Genuine Education” (diss.
Univ. of Chicago 1970: hereafter WIENS) 1–16; and K. von Fritz, “Musonius,”
RE 16 (1933) 894.
4
Lutz 3–4 cites the sources and discusses the comparison. Amand Jagu,
Musonius Rufus Entretiens et Fragments: Introduction, Traduction, et Commentaire (Hildesheim 1979), provides an overview of his life and thought with a
French translation of the discourses; for an Italian introduction, overview of
life and thought, and translation, Sante Guidotti, Gaio Rufo Musonio e lo
Stoicismo Romano (Bolsena 1979).
5
Musonius’ Stoic credentials are difficult to establish. Houser 12–48
documents Musonius’ philosophical connections with known Stoics.
Musonius’ emphasis on practice resembles Cynicism. My argument is that the
question is not whether Musonius was Cynic or Stoic, but that he, like both
Cynicism and Stoicism, turns towards asceticism as a primary modality and
concern of philosophy. For further discussion, see the conclusions below.
6
Musonius did not leave any of his own writings. I accept the reliability of
the textual witnesses to his diatribes as edited by O. Hense, Musonius Rufus
Reliquae (Leipzig 1905) and revised by Lutz. On the question of the reliability
of the texts, see Lutz 6–13; Houser 2–7; Wiens 1–18.
7
See Hermigild Dressler, The Usage of ÉAsk°v and its Cognates in Greek
Documents to 100 A.D. (Washington 1947).
RICHARD VALANTASIS
209
asceticism.8 From the perspective of religious studies, the life
and teachings of the Cynics from their founding through Late
Antiquity provide an important witness to this prolonged interest and orientation toward asceticism.9 Additionally, the
therapeutic moral literature of the Hellenistic and Roman
period, read with ascetical theory in mind, points toward the
pervasive nature of the ascetical question.10 But none of these
writings on the theory of asceticism has survived from a period
earlier than Musonius.
The first tangible articulation of an ascetical theory11 emerges
8
See Joseph Ward Sain, The Hellenic Origins of Christian Asceticism (diss.
Columbia Univ. 1916); also the section on pagan asceticism by M. OlpheGalliard in the Dictionnaire de Spiritualité I (1932) 941–960 s.v. “Ascèse,
Ascétisme.”
9
The best collection of essays on Cynicism that spans the whole history is
that of R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, edd., The Cynics
(Berkeley 1966). See also Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, L’Ascèse Cynique: Un
commentarie de Diogène Laërce VI 70–71 (Paris 1986), and her “Le cynisme à
l’époque impériale,” ANRW II.36.4 (1990) 2720–2833. Another important
collection of essays in Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé and Richard Goulet, edd., Le
Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements (Paris 1993). The history of Cynicism may
be consulted (though with care) in the now classic Donald R. Dudley, A History
of Cynicism From Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D. (London 1937), as well as
the more recent Luis E. Navia, Classical Cynicism: A Critical Study (Westport
1996).
10
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in
Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton 1994). Nussbaum explores Hellenistic ethics and
underscores the performative dimension of ethics, but nowhere refers to
asceticism. Her references to Musonius are scant. But see Houser 12–48.
11
It is possible to document a corpus of theoretical treatments of asceticism in
western philosophy and religion beginning with the first century C.E. We know
of two treatises from the Roman imperial period: Discourse VI of Musonius
Rufus and Discourse XII of Epictetus. These treatises inaugurate a very long
literary tradition of works developing ascetical theory that gathers up all the
major religions of the Greco-Roman period and Late Antiquity; they include
such significant figures as Clement of Alexandria, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyry, Proclus, the Cappadocians Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, Evagrius of
Pontus, John Cassian, and John Climacus, among many others. There is a wide
diversity of sources. Among the most helpful: Elizabeth A. Clark, The Originist
Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian Debate (Princeton
1992); Susanna Elm, ‘Virgins of God’: The Making of Asceticism in Late Antiquity (Oxford 1994); Geoffrey Galt Harpham, The Ascetic Imperative in
Culture and Criticism (Chicago 1987); Philip Rousseau, Ascetics, Authority, and
the Church in the Age of Jerome and Cassian (Oxford 1978); Aline Rousselle,
Porneia: De la maîtrise du corps à la privation sensorielle, IIe–IV e siècles (Paris
1983). For sources and texts, see Ascetic Behavior in Greco-Roman Antiquity: A
Sourcebook, ed. Vincent L. Wimbush (Minneapolis 1990).
210
MUSONIUS RUFUS AND ROMAN ASCETICAL THEORY
from the summaries written by Lucius, a student or follower of
Musonius Rufus.12 From Musonius and his student Epictetus, as
James Francis demonstrates, Roman asceticism flourishes in the
second century C . E . 13 The most influential form of Roman
ascetical theory14 develops during the third and fourth centuries
in the work of Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus.15
Although Musonius provides the earliest extant ascetical
theory, few scholars have noticed, explored, or explained his
theory in relationship to his philosophy. A. C. Van Geytenbeek’s Musonius and Greek Diatribe, for example, reviews the
major doctrines of Musonian ethics and philosophy and intends
to locate Musonius’ teaching in the context of the diatribe, the
popular philosophy of the Hellenistic and Roman period. A
12
For a general overview of Musonius’ asceticism from a religious studies
perspective see Teresa M. Shaw, The Burden of the Flesh: Fasting and Sexuality
in Early Christianity (Minneapolis 1998) 33–37.
13
James A. Francis, Subversive Virtue: Asceticism and Authority in the
Second-Century Pagan World (University Park 1995: hereafter FRANCIS).
14
Parallel to the development of ascetical theory stand various other genres
of literature that apply ascetical theory without discussing the theory itself.
These applied ascetical writers include Marcus Aurelius (see Francis 21–52;
Pierre Hadot, The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, transl.
Michael Chase [Cambridge 1998] 183–231); Philo of Alexandria (Verna E. F.
Harrison, “The Allegorization of Gender: Plato and Philo on Spiritual Childbearing,” in Wimbush/Valantasis 520–534; and more peripherally, Michael L.
Satlow, “Shame and Sex in Late Antique Judaism,” 535–543); Lucian’s Peregrinus (see Francis 53–81); the sententiae of Sextus (Henry Chadwick, The
Sentences of Sextus: A Contribution to the History of Early Christian Ethics
[Cambridge 1959] 97–106); and the sayings collection in the Gospel of Thomas
(Richard Valantasis, “Is the Gospel of Thomas Ascetical? Revisiting an Old
Problem with a New Theory,” JECS 7 [1999] 55–81); perhaps the gospels of the
New Testament (see in L. E. Vaage and V. L. Wimbush, edd., Asceticism and the
New Testament [New York 1999]: Anthony Saldarini, “Asceticism and the Gospel of Matthew,” 11–27; Mary Ann Tolbert, “Asceticism and Mark’s Gospel,”
29–48; Susan R. Garrett, “Beloved Physician of the Soul? Luke as Advocate for
Ascetic Practice,” 71–96; David Rensberger, “Asceticism and the Gospel of
John,” 127–148); the apocryphal acts of the New Testament (Kate Cooper, The
Virgin and the Bride: Idealized Womanhood in Late Antiquity [Cambridge 1996]
20–67); as well as the biographies of Diogenes Laertius (see for example,
Goulet-Cazé [supra n.9]); among many other texts.
15
See Anthony Meredith, “Asceticism—Christian and Greek,” JThS 27
(1976) 313–332; and on the Platonist traditions, John M. Dillon, “Rejecting the
Body, Refining the Body: Some Remarks on the Development of Platonist
Asceticism,” in Wimbush/Valantasis 80–87; and J. Giles Milhaven, “Asceticism and the Moral Good: A Tale of Two Pleasures,” 375–394.
RICHARD VALANTASIS
211
chapter (96–123) entitled “The Problems of Asceticism” discusses Musonius’ teaching with regard to the regulation of food,
clothing, footwear, household living conditions, furniture, and
the personal hygiene of the philosopher without discussing
Discourse VI, which is entitled “On Asceticism.” Van Geytenbeek (40–50) treats Discourse VI primarily under the rubric of
“Practical education to virtue” where askesis relates principally
to the practice and enactment of ethical principles. Van Geytenbeek rejects Musonius’ own categorization and systematization
in exploring asceticism and analyzes only the applied categories
of Musonius’ asceticism. Two unpublished dissertations display
the same tendency. Delbert Wiens’ 1970 dissertation, “Musonius Rufus and Genuine Education,” treats asceticism as part
of the education of adults as distinct from the education of
children. Joseph Houser’s 1997 dissertation, “The Philosophy of
Musonius Rufus: A Study of Applied Ethics in the Late Stoa,”
also explores tantalizingly “applied ethics” and approaches
Musonius’ philosophy from its pervasive practical application.
While valuing Musonius’ applicability and even his theory of
askesis, Houser never expressly studies Musonius’ practicality as
part of the larger philosophical and theological discourse about
asceticism. For Houser, Musonius’ practicality remains an expression of a philosophical disposition rather than a reformulation of philosophy itself towards ascetical theory and
practice. 16 Indeed asceticism in the classical period was a
function of education beginning at least with Aristotle, but it
cannot be assumed that such an educational formation was the
only application of asceticism particularly among philosophers
exploring the moral life. Especially when Musonius addresses
the question of ascetical theory directly, that ascetical theory
must be taken seriously as central to a description and analysis
16
A similar academic treatment regarding Epictetus occurs in B. L. Hijmans,
Jr, ASKHSIS : Notes on Epictetus’ Educational System (Assen 1959).
212
MUSONIUS RUFUS AND ROMAN ASCETICAL THEORY
of his asceticism, and that ascetical theory ought to be integrated into an understanding of the author’s philosophy and
ethics. This has not been the case with those studying Musonius’
philosophy.
The evidence for Musonius’ ascetical theory is very strong.17
Lucius, Musonius’ student, transmits the teaching by summarizing what he heard from Musonius over a period of time.18 Discourse VI is presented as a set of arguments reconstructed by
Lucius about a subject upon which Musonius frequently spoke:
“He always vigorously urged his students toward asceticism
using arguments such as these” (par≈rma d¢ prÚw êskhsin
toÁw sunÒntaw §ntetam°nvw ée‹ toio›sd° tisi lÒgoiw xr≈menow). 1 9
This introductory statement makes two important points. First,
asceticism was central to Musonius’ teaching. Second, the
arguments presented in Discourse VI, therefore, are summary
arguments, not a recording of an argument as Musonius made it.
Musonius presented the case for asceticism to his students
frequently and consistently using a variety of arguments.
Musonius, however, has remained a peripheral figure to the
history of western asceticism. By explicating Musonius’ theory
of asceticism, this essay will attempt to locate Musonius as part
of the mainstream of Greco-Roman and Late Antique Roman
and Christian ascetical authors. In a four-part argument, I shall
argue first that Musonius Rufus’ ascetical theory begins in a
particular understanding of the human condition and its
attendant debilitation by negative socialization. Second, in the
context of the bad habits inculcated by socialization, Musonius
advances the cardinal virtues as the goal of ascetical effort,
constructing in the process dual subjectivities, a rejected one
17
Francis 11–19 provides a general and helpful introduction to Musonius’
and Epictetus’ ascetical teaching.
18
See Lutz 8–13 for a description of the two sources (Lucius and Pollio) for
summaries of Musonius’ teaching.
19
15.7–8, my translation. Unless otherwise noted, I use the text and translation of Lutz, cited by page and line number of the Greek.
RICHARD VALANTASIS
213
that remains in the state of negative socialization and an
embraced one that strives to understand and to practice the
virtues. Third, in this context Musonius’ two systems of
asceticism, one for the soul and body together and one for the
mind alone, give substance and direction to the effort to
practice the virtues. Fourth, Musonius’ ascetical theory will be
connected to his philosophy and ethics.
1. Philosophical anthropology and negative socialization
Musonius’ ascetical teaching originates in his philosophical
anthropology. His anthropology revolves around two elements:
an innate propensity for virtue and a correlative capacity for becoming like gods. In Discourse II, Lucius explains that Musonius
argued that “All of us, he used to say, are so fashioned by
nature that we can live our lives free from error and nobly”
(pãntew, ¶fh, fÊsei pefÊkamen oÏtvw, Àste z∞n énamartÆtvw
ka‹ kal«w, 36.16–17). He underscores that this capacity to live
well and blamelessly is for all and not simply for a few, and he
attributes this to the fact that “Clearly, then, there is no
explanation for this other than that the human being is born
with an inclination toward virtue” (d∞lon oÔn, …w oÈd¢n ßteron
toÊtou a‡tion µ tÚ prÚw éretØn gegon°nai tÚn ênyrvpon,
38.1–2). This is a very positive orientation concerning the
human condition and its innate inclination toward virtue.
Musonius also argued that “it is necessary for us to become of
one mind with God” (fr.38, oÈkoËn ka‹ ≤mçw sumcÆfouw xrØ
t“ ye“ gen°syai: 136.4–5, my translation) with respect to
human actions. This similarity of opinion with God (sumcÆfouw
t“ ye“) demands that humans accomplish that which is in their
control and that they entrust the things outside their control to
the benevolence of the cosmos. This high regard for human
capacity again underscores Musonius’ positive attitude toward
human effort.
214
MUSONIUS RUFUS AND ROMAN ASCETICAL THEORY
This positive construction of philosophical anthropology
contrasts markedly, however, with the perspective on the
human condition described in Discourse VI on asceticism. Here
Musonius’ ascetical theory problematizes human activity and
capacity in order precisely to articulate a basis for ascetical
activity.20 Musonius’ anthropology in this discourse on ascetical
theory has three elements. The first is a rather benign observation that human beings consist of a composite (ti sÊnyeton ) of
both soul and body (54.4), each of which must be addressed
fully in any ascetical activity. Musonius will use these constituent elements of human existence as the basis for developing
two distinct types of ascetical systems (this will be taken up
more fully below). He argues that the ascetic must attend to
both (énãgkh tÚn éskoËnta émfo›n §pimele›syai, 54.4–5),
without neglecting or denigrating either part. This anthropology
remains consistent with the very positive view of the human’s
capacity to incline toward virtue and the human’s ability to
cooperate with the divine mind.
The positive perspective on anthropology ends there, however, because the next two elements of Musonius’ ascetical
anthropology in Discourse VI take a decidedly negative turn. He
contrasts the necessity for training in philosophy with medical
and other training:
And moreover such practical exercise is the more important for
the student of philosophy than for the student of medicine or
any similar art (ka‹ tosoÊtƒ ge xrØ mçllon éske›n tÚn filosofe›n éjioËnta ≥per tÚn fiatrik∞w ≥ tinow t°xnhw ımo¤aw
§fi°menon), the more philosophy claims to be a greater and more
difficult discipline than any other study. The reason for this is
that men who enter the other professions have not had their
souls corrupted beforehand (oÈ prodiefyarm°noi tåw cuxãw) and
have not learned the opposite of what they are going to be
20
Houser 12–48 discusses the medical analogy and therapeutic model in
relation to Stoic teaching. My perspective here is different, but not contrary to
Houser’s.
RICHARD VALANTASIS
215
taught (oÈd' §nant¤a memayhkÒtew oÂw mayÆsesyai m°llousin), but
the ones who start out to study philosophy have been born and
reared in an environment filled with corruption and evil (§n diafyorò gegenhm°noi prÒteron pollª ka‹ §mpeplhsm°noi kak¤aw),
and therefore turn to virtue in such a state that they need a
longer and more thorough training (oÏtv met¤asi tØn éretÆn,
Àste ka‹ taÊt˙ ple¤onow dehy∞nai t∞w éskÆsevw, 52.26–54.2).
Musonius argues that the social and political environment
corrupts the soul. This corruption does not impede those who
pursue training in medicine and other practical arts, but has a
debilitating effect on those pursuing philosophy because this
environment in fact teaches the opposite of the virtues pursued
by the philosopher. Doctors and musicians may learn their arts
without reference to this depravity, but this environmental depravity forces the philosopher to pursue virtue with vigorous
ascetical training. This environmental depravity functions as the
spring-board to asceticism, the starting-point for the pursuit of
virtue.
The third element of Musonius’ ascetical theory builds upon
this idea of environmental depravity:
It is true that all of us who have participated in philosophic
discussion have heard and apprehended that neither pain nor
death nor poverty nor anything else which is free from wrong is
an evil, and again that wealth, life, pleasure, or anything else
which does not partake of virtue is not a good. And yet, in spite
of understanding this, because of the depravity which has been
implanted in us straight from childhood and because of evil
habits engendered by this depravity (˜mvw d¢ ka‹ taËy'
ÍpeilhfÒtew diå tØn épÚ pa¤dvn eÈyÁw gegonu›an ≤m›n diafyorån
ka‹ tØn ÍpÚ t∞w diafyorçw sunÆyeian ponhrãn ), when hardship
comes we think an evil has come upon us, and when pleasure
comes our way we think that a good has befallen us; we dread
death as the most extreme misfortune; we cling to life as the
greatest blessing, and when we give away money we grieve as if
we were injured, but upon receiving it we rejoice as if a benefit
had been conferred (54.30–56.5).
216
MUSONIUS RUFUS AND ROMAN ASCETICAL THEORY
Musonius presents this depravity as implanted from youth
onward. Depravity comes through socializing, not through the
ontology of the human condition (an ontology described in
neutral if not positive terms in other discourses as discussed
above). Negative socialization hardens into bad habits that
impede philosophical progress by habitually interpreting hardship as evil, pleasure as good, death as misfortune, life as a
blessing, monetary benefaction as loss, and monetary gifts as
gain. Musonius summarizes this habituation to false thinking
succinctly: “Similarly with the majority of other things, we do
not meet circumstances in accordance with right principles, but
rather we follow wretched habit” (paraplhs¤vw d¢ ka‹ §p‹
pleiÒnvn êllvn oÈk ékoloÊyvw ta›w Ùrya›w ÍpolÆcesi to›w
prãgmasi xr≈meya, t“ d¢ faÊlƒ ¶yei mçllon ékolouyoËmen,
56.5–7). These habitual responses to the impulses of daily life
delude and degrade human reactions by impeding the
principled response required by philosophy. Habit, precisely as
recrudescent evil socialization, puts a barrier between right
thinking and response and the true virtue of the philosopher.
The proper philosophical response to this situation is the
philosophical development of proper habits:
Since, then, I repeat, all this is the case, the person who is in
training must strive (de› tÚn éskoËnta zhte›n) to habituate
himself not to love pleasure, not to avoid hardship, not to be
infatuated with living, not to fear death, and in the case of
goods or money not to place receiving above giving (56.7–11).
The contrary ascetical discipline, oriented toward indifference
to pleasure, endurance of hardship, honesty about living,
bravery with respect to death, and giving money rather than
receiving it, establishes the values of the true philosopher.21
In general, Musonius’ anthropology remained positive. Human
beings consist of a composite of soul and body that inclines
21
Wiens 38–46 explicates well the Musonian concept of ethos.
RICHARD VALANTASIS
217
toward virtue and may agree with the mind of God. Only when
the issue turned to asceticism did Musonius introduce the
negativity of destructive socialization and evil habits. Without
this evil against which humans struggle there can exist no
correlative good for humans to develop. His theory needed the
negative habituation as a platform for positive philosophical
effort. Musonius’ positive articulations about human ontology
and potentiality set the goal for ascetic practice: to acquire
virtue and to become godlike despite the habits instilled by
society that impede those goals.
2. Virtues as the goals of ascetical effort
Musonius’ ascetical system promulgates the four cardinal
virtues as goals: the good person must display temperance,
justice, courage, and prudence. He presents these virtues not as
abstractions, but as fully embodied practices.22 Of temperance,
for example, he writes:
How, indeed, could a person immediately become temperate if
he only knew that one must not be overcome by pleasure, but was
quite unpracticed in withstanding pleasures (52.15–17)?
The practices associated with a particular virtue give the virtue
substance and authenticity. Justice requires not only knowing
what is fair, but practicing to avoid selfishness and greed;
courage requires not only knowing not to fear, but positively
practicing courage in the face of fearful things; prudence does
not simply list what is good and bad, but must also practice
scorn for what appears on the surface to be good. The goal of
the good life revolves around the practices associated with each
of the four cardinal virtues. Musonius summarizes his perspective: “Therefore upon the learning of the lessons appropriate to
each and every excellence (éretÆ), practical training (êskhsiw)
must follow invariably” (52.24). Musonius yoked virtue to
22
See Houser 83–93.
218
MUSONIUS RUFUS AND ROMAN ASCETICAL THEORY
ascetical training. These ascetical practices of virtue, however,
require special toil (pÒnow)23 precisely because people have been
socialized and habituated in an opposite direction from birth, a
depravity implanted early and seriously impeding progress.
Musonius argues that the theory of virtues and their practice
mutually develop the person. Like musicians and doctors,
theory must be performed: doctors and musicians “not only
must master the theoretical side of their respective arts but must
also train themselves to act according to their principles” (mØ
mÒnon éneilhf°nai tå yevrÆmata t∞w aÍtoË t°xnhw •kãteron,
éllå ka‹ gegumnãyai prãttein katå tå yevrÆmata). It is not
the specific vocation of philosopher who must practice the
theory of virtues, but any person who would become good (tÚn
§sÒmenon égayÚn êndra, 52.11–12). Any who seek the good
life and who desire to become good must know both the theory
and the practice of virtue. They must be trained in virtue to
perform their skills as admirably as a good doctor and an
accomplished musician. Those striving toward becoming good
must display and perform the virtues in their daily lives. Musonius argues that “Virtue is not simply theoretical knowledge, but
it is practical application as well, just like the arts of medicine
and music” (≤ éretÆ, ¶fh, §pistÆmh §st‹n oÈ yevrhtikØ mÒnon,
éllå ka‹ praktikØ kayãper ¥ te fiatrikØ ka‹ ≤ mousikÆ, 52.8–
10). The analogy with other arts implies that the acquisition of
virtue is also an art. Not only is the acquisition of virtue a performance, like the offering of a musician or the therapy of a
doctor, but also the end result is a work of art, a fabrication of
an artifact of the good person.24 The virtuous art produces a
person who displays the theory of virtues in the events of daily
living, the finished product of an artistic endeavor of creation.
The following summary presents this argument succinctly:
This is discussed explicitly in Musonius’ Discourse VII.
See Maude Gleason, Making Men: Sophists and Self-Representation in
Ancient Rome (Princeton 1995).
23
24
RICHARD VALANTASIS
219
Therefore, as the physician and the musician not only must
master the theoretical side of their respective arts but must also
train themselves to act according to their principles (de› oÔn
Àsper tÚn fiatrÚn ka‹ tÚn mousikÚn mØ mÒnon éneilhf°nai tå
yevrÆmata t∞w aÍtoË t°xnhw •kãteron, éllå ka‹ gegumnãsyai
prãttein katå tå yevrÆmata), so a man who wishes to become
good (tÚn §sÒmenon égayÚn êndra ) not only must be thoroughly
familiar (§kmanyãnein) with the precepts which are conducive
to virtue but must also be earnest (filot¤mvw) and zealous (filopÒnvw) in applying (gumnãzesyai) these principles (52.10–15).
The acquisition of virtue stands as a goal toward which humans
may apply themselves energetically. The achievement of the goal
will refashion and recreate the person fully, making them not
only an artisan but also an artifact of virtue as well.
In Musonius’ theory two distinct subjectivities may be understood to function for each person: the first person is that one
into whom depravity has been implanted from youth onwards;
the second is the one who aims toward becoming good and who
becomes good through practice of the virtues. These subjective
options are implicit in his treatment of the human condition and
the role of the virtues. The second person, the one who strives
for the good, receives deliberate training in rejecting the habits
formed from childhood onward—negative habits that inhibited
the ability to understand the virtues and to perform them
accordingly. The person striving toward living the virtuous life
rejects the normatively socialized person. The rejection of the
socially received subjectivity forms the foundation for the construction of the ascetically virtuous subjectivity. The struggle for
the ascetic revolves around the construction of an alternative
subjectivity oriented toward the understanding and performance of virtues.25
25
The theory undergirding this reading of Musonius’ asceticism comes from
Richard Valantasis, “Constructions of Power in Asceticism,” JourAmerAcad
Rel 63 (1995) 792–800.
220
MUSONIUS RUFUS AND ROMAN ASCETICAL THEORY
3. Musonius’ two interrelated ascetical systems
Musonius presents two interrelated systems of asceticism26 to
assist the seeker in understanding the steps toward the construction of this alternative and preferred subjectivity: “Now there
are two kinds of training, one which is appropriate for the soul
alone, and the other which is common to both soul and body”
(t∞w oÔn éskÆsevw ≤ m°n tiw fid¤a t∞w cux∞w mÒnhw g¤noit' ín
Ùry«w, ≤ d° tiw koinØ taÊthw te ka‹ toË s≈matow, 54.10–11).
Musonius describes the asceticism common to both soul and
body:
We use the training (êskhsiw) common to both when we
discipline ourselves (suneyizom°nvn ≤m«n) to cold, heat, thirst,
hunger, meagre rations, hard beds, avoidance of pleasures, and
patience under suffering. For by these things and others like
them the body is strengthened and becomes capable of enduring
hardship, sturdy and ready for any task (diå går toÊtvn ka‹
t«n toioÊtvn =≈nnutai m¢n tÚ s«ma ka‹ g¤netai duspay°w te
ka‹ stereÚn ka‹ xrÆsimon prÚw ëpan ¶rgon); the soul too is
strengthened since it is trained for courage by patience under
hardship and for self-control by abstinence from pleasures
(=≈nnutai d¢ ≤ cuxØ gumnazom°nh diå m¢n t∞w Ípomon∞w t«n
§pipÒnvn prÚw éndre¤an, diå d¢ t∞w épox∞w t«n ≤d°vn prÚw
svfrosÊnhn, 54.11–18).
Musonius based the ascetical system for both body and soul
upon the accommodation and endurance of physical hardship.
By training the body to endure a variety of negative physical
circumstances, the ascetic develops physical strength while at
the same time training the soul to manifest two of the four
primary virtues, courage and self-control.
There is no suggestion here of denigration or rejection of the
body. Nor is there any sense that bodily practices are secondary
to spiritual practices. The focus on the performance of specific
acts of endurance allows Musonius to integrate body and soul
in one common ascetical formation that benefits the whole per26
Francis 12–13; Shaw (supra n.12) 34–35; Wiens 73–85.
RICHARD VALANTASIS
221
son. In other words, the body-soul distinction reiterates the
distinction between the theory of virtue and the practice of
virtue discussed earlier: the theory only has validity when it is
put into practice, so that the practice, the physical actions,
perfect and complete the theoretical formulation.
The second ascetical system engages the mind and adapts
practices to intellectual discernment:
Training which is peculiar to the soul consists (fid¤a d¢ t∞w cux∞w
êskhs¤w §sti) first of all in seeing that the proofs pertaining to
apparent goods as not being real goods are always ready at hand
(pr«ton m¢n tåw épode¤jeiw proxe¤rouw poie›syai tãw te per‹ t«n
égay«n t«n dokoÊntvn …w oÈk égayã) and likewise those pertaining to apparent evils as not being real evils (ka‹ tåw per‹
t«n kak«n t«n dokoÊntvn …w oÈ kakã), and in learning to
recognize the things which are truly good and in becoming accustomed to distinguish them from what are not truly good (ka‹
tå élhy«w égayå gnvr¤zein te ka‹ diakr¤nein épÚ t«n mØ élhy«w §y¤zesyai). In the next place it consists of practice (e‰ta d¢
meletçn) in not avoiding any of the things which only seem evil,
and in not pursuing any of the things which only seem good; in
shunning by every means those which are truly evil and in pursuing by every means those which are truly good (54.18–25).
The second ascetical system describes a set of intellectual
practices correlative and parallel to the physical practices of the
asceticism appropriate to the body and the soul. These intellectual practices strive to exercise the mind in right judgment
and to lead the person to good living in a fully integrated system. This second ascetical system revolves around three steps.
The first step is insuring that proofs are ready at hand.27 The
proofs, presumably drawn from Musonius’ school lessons, indicate that apparent goods are not really good and apparent
evils are not necessarily evil. The proofs thereby undercut the
received reality that depends upon appearances and they probe
further to establish what is indeed good and evil within the
27
On the role of arguments and proofs in the Stoic context, see Houser 93–96.
222
MUSONIUS RUFUS AND ROMAN ASCETICAL THEORY
system that Musonius propounds. This step hinges on mastering
the principles that undercut appearances and having them available for easy use. These appearances in all likelihood reproduce
the depraved reality of the wider culture that impedes philosophic pursuit of the good and that results in deadening habits.
The second step follows more explicitly on the first. In addition to the proofs, the ascetic must recognize and distinguish
what is truly good, while at the same time developing a
familiarity and comfort with the understanding that follows
from that recognition and distinction. The second step, then,
consciously redefines the good and establishes the redefined
goods as patterns of response in daily circumstances. The
ascetic must not only master the classroom understanding but
also learn personally to understand and distinguish the truly
good things. This step describes a process of accommodation to
the redefined and re-articulated concept of the good central to
the development of a subjectivity oriented toward the development of virtue.
The third step, adhering to Musonius’ emphasis on the full
integration of theory and practice, advocates the practice of
acting on the basis of the newly redefined reality. Here the
ascetic practices the refusal to act on the wider culture’s
wrongly-conceived and false fantasy of reality regarding good
and evil. Positively put, the ascetic embraces the pursuit of a
good and the avoidance of evil articulated in the reality reconstructed away from the deadening habits of action and thought
promulgated in the wider culture.
It is possible now in summary to describe Musonius’ system
from all the parts that have been explored. Musonius developed
a fully articulated ascetical theory that integrates every facet of
human existence—the personal and the social, as well as the
intellectual and the physical. His ascetical system, the integrated system of theory and practice, recognizes that social
habituation ruins an otherwise healthy human inclination
RICHARD VALANTASIS
223
toward the development of virtue and the conforming of the
mind to the divine. Asceticism seeks to reverse this debilitating
social habituation by the intentional pursuit of virtues. This
reversal requires two strategies of reconstruction. The first
encompasses the redefinition of what is good and what is evil
apart from their socially received definitions and the construction of what is truly good and truly evil based on an
understanding of the virtues. The second strategy involves the
reconstruction of reality that follows from this redefinition of
good and evil so that the person learns to live naturally and
habitually in a world that at once deviates from the surrounding
received and common social world and manifests the newly
articulated morals and values. The ascetic must learn not only
to redefine good and evil, but to live a life based on this
redefinition and re-habituation. The strategies of reconstruction
provide the foundation for the practice of what has been
theoretically presented. The center of this ascetical system
remains the fabrication of the truly good person as an artifact,
an embodiment, of virtue. The reality of the good person’s life
will be known to exhibit the redefined understanding of the
world based upon the pursuit of truly good things and the
avoidance of evil things. In short, the lived religion of the person
will display the ethical, spiritual, and intellectual understanding
of the person. Two related kinds of ascetical programs lead to
the development of this fabricated personality: the intellectual
formation of the soul and the ethical (or practical) formation of
the soul and the body together. The person, a composite of soul
and body in this system, receives complete transformation of
mind and body in concrete experiences both mental and
physical. This ascetical system does not rest on a bifurcation of
physical and spiritual, but upon their mingling in the life of the
person. Through this complete ascetical system, the problem
that arose for the person through debilitating habituation is
224
MUSONIUS RUFUS AND ROMAN ASCETICAL THEORY
resolved: by dual ascetical work on soul and body, and on the
soul, the person is freed again to attain the virtuous life that
communicates the mind of God.
4. Asceticism in Musonius’ philosophy
Musonius’ ascetical system does not diverge from his
philosophical agenda. His ascetical system in fact explains
much about what has been recorded about his thought and his
concerns. Van Geytenbeek’s analysis of Musonius’ specific
practices makes sense only in relationship to this articulated
ascetical system. The ultimate goal in Musonius’ system
includes the regulation of food, clothing, footwear, living
conditions, furniture, and personal hygiene, not as separate
activities unrelated to one another, but as practical elements
displaying, or embodying, particular virtues. These practices,
both physical and intellectual, become ascetical for Musonius
precisely because they become arenas for the struggle against
received socialization and toward the attainment of virtue in
the practice of everyday living. Divorced from the system, these
practices seem quaint and common, but aligned with the ascetical system they become the concrete places where reality is
reconstructed and where the person gains mastery of a new self.
These seemingly unrelated topics such as food and clothing
are central, not peripheral, elements of his ascetical system.
Musonius’ system expands the conceptual mold of ascetical
concerns to include a wide variety of practices not normally
associated with asceticism by modern scholars. Here we can
include also the following as ascetic disciplines: exile (Discourse
IX), freedom from prosecuting others (X), farming (XI), disobedience (XVI), marriage (XII and XIII A and B),28 and the
education of women (III).29 Musonius purposefully connects
28
29
See Houser 135–136.
Houser 158–196 explores this fully in the context of Roman moralizing.
RICHARD VALANTASIS
225
theory and practice in every domain of human existence in
which humans might cultivate the life of virtue. For Musonius,
every human activity, not just a select few, holds the potential
for ascetic endeavor.
An analysis of one of these ascetical disciplines according to
Musonius’ own system will illustrate its ascetical modality and
the way Musonius’ system operates. Discourse IX30 takes up the
question of whether or not exile is an evil. After a brief argument
that a person in exile still has access to the physical world,
since exile “does not in any way deprive us of water, earth, air,
or the sun and the other planets, or indeed even the society of
other people,”31 the treatise presents the simple principle to be
applied readily to exile:
For such [an exiled person] does not value or despise any place as
the cause of his happiness or unhappiness (ı går toioËtow xvr¤on
m¢n oÈd¢n oÎte timò oÎt' étimãzei oÏtvw …w eÈdaimon¤aw <µ kakodaimon¤aw> a‡tion ), but he makes the whole matter depend upon
himself (aÈtÚw d¢ §n aÍt“ t¤yetai tÚ pçn ) and considers himself a citizen of the city of God (nom¤zei e‰nai pol¤thw t∞w toË DiÚw
pÒlevw) which is made up of humans and gods (68.19–22).
This is, of course, a familiar Stoic teaching, which is not peculiar
to Musonius, but he employs it as the basis for analyzing a
life-situation. There follows a series of propositions that explore
what is really good (or only apparently good) and what is really
bad (or only apparently bad): that one may acquire virtue in
any place; that exile provides the leisure for discerning and
practicing the good; that (contrary to wider opinion) exile may
be a blessing to some, as with Diogenes for personal transforma30
Lutz (5) argues that this treatise may in fact reflect an actual letter by
Musonius and may reflect more directly his own thinking and writing. Her
opinion has received little support; see Houser 2–3 and n.11. I find the treatise
a curious mixture of direct address (see the summary argument that follows) to
the reader and Lucius’ summary arguments. In agreement with Lutz I suggest
that an original letter may have served as the basis for the incorporation of
other summary materials by Lucius.
31
68.6–7 (translation slightly revised).
226
MUSONIUS RUFUS AND ROMAN ASCETICAL THEORY
tion; that exile provides an opportunity to live simply and
healthily and that it “helps rather than hinders health both of
body and of spirit” (ka‹ s«ma ka‹ cuxØn sunerge› mçllon µ
éntiprãttei ≤ fugÆ, 70.21–22); that virtuous people thrive
wherever they are; that some exiled people have even acquired
large fortunes, as with Odysseus and Themistocles; that there is
no opprobrium involved because the errors of the judicial
system are well known; and finally, that any restriction of
freedom of speech results not from exile but from the exiled
person’s fear of reprisal.32 These propositions redefine the
substance of good and evil, and they provide a new way of
understanding exile, the world, and the opportunities presented. By engaging in the mental exercise, the ascetic comes to
understand exile as an occasion of personal, social, and intellectual growth. The centrality of the virtues are made clear in
this summary argument:
The reflections which I employ for my own benefit (oÂw d¢
logismo›w xr«mai prÚw §mautÒn) so as not to be irked by exile, I
should like to repeat to you. It seems to me that exile does not
strip a person entirely, not even of the things which the average
man calls good, as I have just shown. But if he is deprived of
some or all of them, he is still not deprived of the things which
are truly goods (t«n ge élhy«w égay«n oÈ ster¤skei). Certainly
the exile is not prevented from possessing courage and justice
simply because he is banished, nor self-control, nor understanding, nor any of the other virtues which when present serve to
bring honor and benefit to a man and show him to be praiseworthy and of good repute, but when absent, serve to cause him
harm and dishonor and show him to be wicked and of ill-repute.
Since this is true, if you are that good man and have his virtues,
exile will not harm or degrade you, because the virtues are present in you which are most able to help and to sustain you (toÊtvn
d¢ taÊt˙ §xÒntvn, efi m¢n égayÚw e‰ otow ka‹ tåw éretåw ¶xeiw,
oÈk ên se blãptoi ≤ fugØ oÈd' ín tapeino¤h, parÒntvn ge t«n
32
I consider these summary arguments to be the product of Lucius’ work that
have been incorporated into Musonius’ earlier and original letter.
RICHARD VALANTASIS
227
»fele›n ka‹ §pa¤rein mãlista dunam°nvn ). But if you are bad, it
is the evil that harms you and not exile; and the misery you feel
in the exile is the product of evil, not of exile. It is from this you
must hasten to secure release rather than from exile.33
Musonius develops a compelling argument that redefined the
nature of reality with respect to apparent and real good and
evil, while at the same time opening avenues for the exiled
person to grow, develop, and become healthy of mind and
body. The ascetical program has combined physical and intellectual labor into a comprehensive program for reform. For
Musonius, exile is an ascetical practice.
Musonius presents a bold and consistent plan for transforming members of his society through rigorous ascetical activity, a
personal transformation in direct conflict with the prevailing
mores of the majority culture. It is not surprising that Musonius’
project, and that of other philosophers of his day, sufficiently
threatened the established order that they were at various time
persecuted by emperors of Rome.34 Their ascetical formation
was understood as a subversive program.35 Exile, banishment,
and sometimes death were the cost of pursuing these ascetical
aims.
Conclusions
From the perspective of a religious studies scholar, classicists
and historians of philosophy have missed the heart of Musonius’ philosophical agenda by not addressing the ascetical
dimension of his teaching. His ascetical project, that is, forms
33
74.20–76.1. I consider this summary statement to be part of Musonius’
original letter.
34
B. F. Harris, “Stoic and Cynic under Vespasian,” Prudentia 9 (1977) 105–
114. More generally, P. A. Brunt, “Stoicism and the Principate,” BSR 43 (1975)
7–35.
35
This has been fully explored, and convincingly argued, by Houser 53–96.
He argues that both philosophy and the philosopher could be viewed as
subversive.
228
MUSONIUS RUFUS AND ROMAN ASCETICAL THEORY
not a peripheral, but a central part of his program and his life.
By rejecting the traditional subjects of philosophical discourse
and teaching and by taking up asceticism as the center of his
philosophical program, Musonius placed ethical and religious
practice in the fore of philosophical activity. To be a philosopher meant to practice and manifest philosophically articulated
virtues. As Pierre Hadot describes it, philosophy became a way
of life.36 The instrument of that philosophy, however, was not
the ethical tradition alone, not the theoretical study of good and
evil, but the ascetical formation of people capable of living
according to values and mores divergent from the normative
culture and expressive of an alternative world and its understanding. That new way of life was thoroughly ascetical.
The existence in Rome of a philosopher with a fully articulated ascetical system generations before the so-called flowering
of asceticism in Late Antique Christianity demands a rewriting
of the scholarly reconstruction of the history of Western
asceticism. Not only must that history begin in Roman philosophical circles of the imperial era, but it must also begin to
explore the Roman philosophical interaction with Christian
asceticism. Musonius’ ascetical theory, as well as his emphasis
on asceticism in his philosophy, shifts attention both earlier in
time to the first century and further West to Rome and the
western Mediterranean basin.
Religious scholars also have much to learn from Musonius. His
theory of asceticism was developed during the critical period
during which most New Testament literature was being written.
His theory circulated in Rome and the Mediterranean basin at
the time of the writing of the Gospel of Mark, and was disseminated during the revisions of Mark produced by Matthew
36
Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates
to Foucault, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, transl. Michael Chase (Oxford 1995; revision and expansion of Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique2 [Paris
1987]).
RICHARD VALANTASIS
229
and Luke. His theory was in circulation during the collection of
the sayings of Jesus, a collection not unlike the collection of the
sayings of Musonius by his followers. The skeptical reception of
Musonius’ project by those in authority possibly sheds light on
the poor reception of Pauline theology in incipient Christianity.
In the face of Musonius’ ascetical project, scholars of early
Christianity cannot seek to define asceticism by first looking to
the fourth-century Christian ascetics and working backward in
time, 37 but now they must look across to Roman and Jewish
contemporaries of Christian writers to seek a different understanding of ascetical theory and practice in the first century.38
The definition of asceticism, dependent as it has been on Late
Antique models, must now shift to authors and projects of the
imperial period as models and systems of asceticism that preceded and perhaps even produced the later and more familiar
asceticism of Late Antique Romans, Jews, and Christians.39
Above all, Musonius’ ascetical project places in the center of
scholarly attention the critical question of systems of formation
in classical antiquity, the curious place where theory and practice meet to produce subjects empowered to live and to act in
their own society either as members of the dominant society or
as persons who withdraw from that dominant society to produce an alternative social grouping. All of this formative interest
may not have begun with Musonius, but Musonius provides the
37
Shaw (supra n.12) 5–10 also argues that asceticism must be contextualized
more widely.
38
There is serious resistance to looking at Roman asceticism as a model for
early Christian practice; see, for example, Tolbert ( supra n.14) 29–48. Here
Tolbert uses later Christian monastic asceticism as the model for interpreting
the Gospel of Mark, despite the existence of coeval Roman ascetical writings. A
more interesting and engaging study of ancient Greek models of asceticism and
their potential for interpreting early Christianity is displayed in the same
volume by Stephen J. Patterson, “ Askesis and the Early Jesus Tradition,” 49–
69.
39
The most valuable exploration of these issues, including the question of
cross-cultural ascetical studies, is Elizabeth A. Clark, “The Ascetic Impulse in
Religious Life: A General Response,” in Wimbush/Valantasis 505–510.
230
MUSONIUS RUFUS AND ROMAN ASCETICAL THEORY
first documented instance of a Roman ascetical project that has
theological, philosophical, and certainly political implications
then and now.
There is, however, more to say about the larger picture of
religion and philosophy in the imperial period. It is difficult to
know how to categorize Musonius Rufus in terms of the history
of philosophy. His thought certainly resembles, and often
develops from, Stoic philosophy. Yet his emphasis on practice
seems to align him more with the Cyncisim of the imperial
period. The style of his teaching, the diatribe, was certainly
common to both, so much so that it has been called by New
Testament scholars, the Cynic-Stoic diatribe.40 This attempt at
categorization in known philosophical movements does not
seem to account for the kind of thinking that begins to take
place in the first century C .E . Among at least a few of these
philosophers like Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Marcus
Aurelius, the distinguishing characteristic seems to revolve
around an interest in and pursuit of ascetical activity as the
heart of philosophy and religion. Such authors seem more appropriately to be identified with their asceticism than with
specific philosophical schools. Musonius Rufus leads the way in
this movement, providing both a complete ascetical system
central to his philosophy, and a set of applications of these
principles in the daily life of his followers. This is precisely
where Houser has correctly identified the heart of Musonius’
philosophy.41
My argument goes further than Houser’s to point to an
ascetical orientation not only in Musonius Rufus but also in a
variety of philosophical environments. For example, some
scholars who study the early Christian interaction with Hel40
See the classic study by Rudolph Bultmann, Der Stil der Paulinischen
Predigt und die Kynisch-Stoische Diatribe (Göttingen 1910). Now also Stanley
K. Stowers, The Diatribe and Paul’s Letter to the Romans (Chico 1981).
41
See Houser 101–157.
RICHARD VALANTASIS
231
lenistic and Roman religion and philosophy have argued that
Jesus was a Cynic42 and that Paul was a Stoic. 43 The CynicStoic alignment of formative Christianity has been commonplace
for over a century. All such arguments attempt to locate their
principals in known philosophical categories based on reconstructions of real and distinct Stoicism and Cynicism in the
imperial period. The definitions of Stoicism and Cynicism both
include an orientation toward asceticism. Perhaps what is
needed, and this follows from my argument about Musonius, is
not a redefinition of the philosophical schools, but a recognition
that asceticism emerged as a major factor in philosophical and
religious life. It is precisely this turn to asceticism witnessed in
Musonius Rufus that may also be detected in the emergence of
Rabbinic Judaism, Pauline Jewish-Christianity, and formative
Christianity. The list of ascetically oriented religious leaders and
philosophical teachers gathers up many of the leading minds of
the period. Musonius Rufus documents the emergence of this
ascetical orientation, and through his influence he set the agenda
for philosophers and theologians of generations to follow.
June, 2001
Iliff School of Theology
2201 S. University Blvd
Denver, Colorado 80210
[email protected]
42
F. Gerald Downing, Cynics and Christian Origins (Edinburgh 1992), and
Christ and the Cynics: Jesus and Other Radical Preachers in First-Century
Tradition (Sheffield 1988).
43
Most recently Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Louisville
2000).