working
THEDEVELOPMENTALLEGACIESOFTHEBIFURCATED
COLONIALSTATE:STATISTICALEVIDENCEFROMSIXTYSEVENBRITISH,FRENCH,ANDPORTUGUESECOLONIES
OLUKUNLEP.OWOLABI
419
April
2017
paper
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THE DEVELOPMENTAL LEGACIES OF THE BIFURCATED COLONIAL STATE:
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE FROM SIXTY-SEVEN BRITISH, FRENCH,
AND PORTUGUESE COLONIES
Olukunle P. Owolabi
Kellogg Institute for International Studies
Working Paper #419 – April 2017
Olukunle P. Owolabi is assistant professor of political science at Villanova University. His
research explores the long-term developmental and political consequences of colonialism, with a
particular focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean region. His work has been published
in Comparative Politics and the APSA’s Comparative Democratization newsletter. He is
currently completing the book manuscript “The Colonial Origins of (Under)development,
Authoritarianism and Democracy: Africa and the West Indies in Comparative-Historical
Perspective.” After earning his PhD from the University of Notre Dame in 2012, Owolabi
returned to the Kellogg Institute for International Studies as a visiting fellow during the spring
2016 semester.
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of bifurcated colonial institutions—i.e. the use of distinctive
legal codes for “native” vs. “settler” populations—for long-term development in 67 former
British, French, and Portuguese colonies. Building on theoretical arguments by Mahmood
Mamdani (1996) and Matthew Lange’s empirical research on the distinctive developmental
legacies of direct vs. indirect British rule, I develop a new measure of legal-administrative
bifurcation in French and Portuguese colonies. Consistent with Mamdani’s theoretical
arguments, the statistical models in this paper demonstrate that bifurcated colonial institutions
contributed to poor development outcomes and ineffective postcolonial governance among
British, French, and Portuguese colonies alike. Regardless of the colonizing power, directly ruled
colonies with a uniform and inclusive legal-administrative framework have better development
outcomes than bifurcated colonial states that maintained distinctive “native” legal codes for
indigenous populations. These results are robust to a variety of statistical controls, as well as to
instrumental variable analysis, highlighting the enduring legacy of colonial institutions for
human well-being and governmental effectiveness today.
RESUMO
Este trabalho examina o impacto de instituições coloniais bifurcadas—isto é: o uso de códigos
legais distintos para populações “nativas” e “colonas”—para o desenvolvimento no longo prazo
de 67 antigas colônias britânicas, francesas e portuguesas. A partir dos argumentos teóricos de
Mahmood Mamdani (1996) e a pesquisa empírica de Matthew Lange sobre as diferentes
heranças desenvolvimentistas entre o domínio direto e indireto britânico, desenvolvo uma nova
medida de bifurcação das instituições coloniais francesas e portuguesas. Concordando com os
argumentos teóricos de Mamdani, os modelos estatísticos neste trabalho demonstram que as
instituições coloniais bifurcadas contribuíram para os pobres resultados no desenvolvimento e a
governança ineficaz pós-colonial das colônias britânicas, francesas e portuguesas. Sem importar
a potência colonizadora, colônias governadas diretamente com estruturas legais-administrativas
uniformes e inclusivas têm melhores resultados no seu desenvolvimento do que estados coloniais
bifurcados que mantiveram códigos legais “nativos” para a população indígena. O resultados são
robustos para múltiplos controles estatísticos, assim como uma análise de variáveis
instrumentais, mostrando assim os duradouros legados das instituições coloniais para o bem-estar
humano e a efetividade governamental atual.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article examine l’effet des institutions coloniales doubles—l’usage de codes
légales différents pour des “autochtones” vs. des “colonnes”—sur le développement à long terme
dans 67 anciennes colonies Britanniques, Françaises et Portugaises. En me basant sur les
arguments théoriques de Mahmood Mamdani (1996) et la recherche empirique de Matthew
Lange sur les héritages en matière de développement laissés par l’administration du Britannique
direct vs. indirect, je propose une nouvelle méthode pour calibrer les institutions juridiqueadministrative dans des colonies Françaises et Portugaises. Conformément aux arguments
théoriques de Mamdani, les modèles statistiques de cet article montrent que le double système
d’institutions coloniales a contribué à faible développement et l’inefficacité de la gouvernance
postcoloniale. N’importe le pouvoir colonisateur, les colonies sous l’administration direct avec
un cadre juridique-administratif uniforme et incluant ont des meilleurs résultats en matière de
développement que les états coloniaux qui ont maintiennent des codes légaux différenciés pour
les populations natives. Ces résultats sont cohérents avec divers contrôles statistiques, même
avec l’analyse des variables instrumentales, soulignant l’héritage durable des institutions
coloniales pour le bien-être humain et l’efficacité jusqu’au nos jours.
Owolabi 1
INTRODUCTION
The past two decades have seen a resurgence of empirical scholarship examining the
developmental and political legacies of European colonialism in different parts of the world (see
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine 2013; Lange 2004, 2009;
Lange et al. 2006; Mahoney 2010; La Porta et al. 1998, 1999). There is widespread agreement
among scholars that European settler colonialism generated favorable development outcomes
relative to “extractive” colonialism (see Krieckhaus 2006; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
2001, 2002; Sokoloff and Engerman 2000) and that British colonial and/or legal institutions
generated favorable developmental outcomes relative to continental European colonial and/or
legal institutions (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008; La Porta et al. 1998, 1999;
Brown 2000). More recently, a number of influential studies have highlighted the important
contribution of Christian, and especially Protestant missionaries, in promoting mass education
and postcolonial democratization in many parts of the Global South (see Woodberry 2012;
Lankina and Getachew 2012, 2013; Gallego and Woodberry 2010). Notwithstanding these
general trends, there is a surprising amount of unexplained developmental variation across
former colonies with limited European settlement, and this is as much the case among French
and Portuguese colonies as it is among British colonies.
The data in Table 1 highlight the significant variation in human well-being across sixtyseven former British, French, and Portuguese colonies that experienced at least thirty years of
colonial rule ending after 1945.1 This paper includes former colonies that never gained
independence (such as Hong Kong, Macau, and France’s overseas departments and territories) if
their population exceeded 100,000 at the end of the colonial era. Apart from Hong Kong, these
dependencies are generally excluded from existing literature on the colonial origins of
development. Nevertheless, their omission significantly understates the developmental variation
1
This data sample excludes countries that experienced less than thirty years of British, French, or
Portuguese rule, such as Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, and Syria. It also excludes British protected states,
such as Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, whose political elites retained control over
domestic affairs during the colonial era (see Owolabi 2015). The data sample also excludes micro-states
with fewer than 100,000 people at the end of the colonial era.
Owolabi 2
across former French and Portuguese colonies relative to former British colonies.2 Human wellbeing is measured using the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI), which accounts
for per capita income, educational attainment, and life expectancy in 2015.
The HDI scores in Table 1 reveal two interesting trends. First, there is considerable
variation in human well-being among former British, French, and Portuguese colonies with
predominantly nonwhite populations. Within each imperial system, the 2015 HDI scores range
from very high to low, as exemplified by the developmental extremes of Singapore (0.912) and
Sierra Leone (0.413) as former British colonies, Martinique (0.859) and Niger (0.348) as former
French colonies, and Macau (0.892) and Mozambique (0.416) as former Portuguese colonies.
Second, although the mean HDI score among former British colonies is somewhat higher than
among former French or Portuguese colonies, the developmental variation across the three
colonial powers is surprisingly similar. In fact, the standard deviation in 2015 HDI scores among
former French and Portuguese colonies (at 0.155 and 0.162 respectively) is slightly larger than
among former British colonies (0.144). To explain the significant developmental variation
among former British colonies, previous studies have examined the distinctive developmental
and political legacies of indirect vs. direct British rule (see Lange 2004, 2009). Indirect British
rule institutionalized a bifurcated legal-administrative framework in which rural indigenous
populations were subject to customary laws enforced by traditional “chiefs,” whereas the
bureaucratic institutions of the modern state were primarily limited to the colonial capital and
areas of European settlement. Although other colonial powers such as France and Portugal also
established bifurcated colonial states (see Lange 2009, 199–204; Mamdani 1996), the
developmental consequences of legal-administrative bifurcation have never been empirically
tested outside of the British colonial empire.
2
Most existing studies significantly underestimate the extent of developmental variation in the former
French and Portuguese colonial empires, because they exclude many successful colonies that never
gained independence. Prior to 1946, France’s “old colonies” (i.e., French Guiana, Guadeloupe,
Martinique, and Réunion) had similar patterns of socio–economic development and more extensive
political rights than many of the British Caribbean colonies that became independent after 1962 (see
Murch 1968, 548–550, and 1971). According to the data in Table 1, these former French colonies
continue to outperform their British equivalents (such as Barbados, Jamaica, or Mauritius) in terms of
human well-being, yet they are generally excluded from most empirical studies because of their current
political status as overseas French departments (since 1946). At the same time, many empirical studies
include Hong Kong as a former British colony (e.g., Fails and Krieckhaus 2010; Krieckhaus 2006; Lange
2004, 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 2002), while excluding Macau, which experienced similar
development under Portuguese rule.
Owolabi 3
TABLE 1
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN SIXTY-SEVEN FORMER BRITISH,
FRENCH, AND PORTUGUESE COLONIES
HDI Scores (2015)
Very High (>0.800)
[N=8]
British Colonies
Brunei, Hong Kong,
Singapore
French Colonies
French Guiana,
Guadeloupe, Martinique,
Réunion
High (0.700–0.799)
[N=12]
Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, Fiji, Jamaica,
Malaysia, Mauritius, Sri
Lanka, Trinidad and
Tobago
Bangladesh, Botswana,
Ghana, Guyana, India,
Zambia
Algeria, Tunisia, French
Polynesia
Medium (0.550–
0.699)
[N=15]
Low (<0.550)
[N=32]
Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho,
Malawi, Myanmar,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra
Leone, Solomon Islands,
Sudan, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Uganda,
Zimbabwe
Mean HDI Score
0.629
[Standard
[0.144]
Deviation]
Min.
0.413 (Sierra Leone)
Max.
0.912 (Singapore)
N=67
32
Dependent territories in italics.
Portuguese Colonies
Macau
Cambodia, CongoBrazzaville,
Gabon, Laos, Morocco,
Vietnam
Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, Cote D’Ivoire,
Djibouti, Guinea,
Madagascar, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger,
Senegal, Togo
0.572
[0.155]
Cape Verde, São Tomé
and Principe, TimorLeste
0.348 (Niger)
0.859 (Martinique)
28
0.416 (Mozambique)
0.892 (Macau)
7
Angola, GuineaBissau, Mozambique
0.579
[0.162]
Source: HDI scores from Wikipedia (2016). “List of Countries by Human Development Index,”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Human_Development_Index .
This paper seeks to fill this gap by developing a new measure of legal-administrative
bifurcation in French and Portuguese colonies. Although British indirect rule devolved more
local political autonomy to traditional chiefs than was commonplace in French or Portuguese
colonies, all three powers developed bifurcated legal-administrative institutions that restricted
the legal rights of rural indigenous subjects relative to colonial settlers. I argue that bifurcated
legal-administrative institutions undermined long-term development and postcolonial
Owolabi 4
governance by creating colonial states with limited bureaucratic capacity and limited
inclusiveness and by impeding the development of a uniform and inclusive legal system that
protects individual civil liberties. Because bifurcated colonial states lacked the bureaucratic
capacity to provide public goods such as education, sanitation, and a uniform legal system that
protected individual civil liberties (Lange 2009), they generally struggled to democratize after
independence (Owolabi 2015; Lange 2009; Mamdani 1996). Consequently, I expect bifurcated
colonial states to have worse developmental outcomes and less effective governance today
relative to states that established a bureaucratic and inclusive legal-administrative framework
during the colonial era.
After exploring the distinctive ways in which the British, French, and Portuguese created
bifurcated colonial states, this paper develops a new indicator that measures the extent to which
indigenous populations in French and Portuguese colonies were governed under distinctive
“native” legal codes prior to the Second World War. In the statistical models that follow,
bifurcated colonial legal institutions—whether British, French, or Portuguese—predict lower
rates of primary school enrollment in 1960, worse governmental performance (1996–2012), and
lower HDI scores in 2015. These results are robust to statistical controls for colonial (i.e.,
European and Asian) settlement, ethnic diversity, geographic region, religion and missionary
presence. They are also robust to instrumental variable analysis. Furthermore, these empirical
results are consistent in separate samples of British and non-British colonies, as well as in the
combined sample of sixty-seven former British, French, and Portuguese colonies. Consequently,
these results demonstrate that Mamdani’s (1996) theoretical arguments regarding the negative
developmental consequences of the bifurcated colonial state can be generalized beyond the
British colonial empire.
THE BIFURCATED COLONIAL STATE, INEFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE,
AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT
In his detailed ethnographic study of the African colonial state, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) notes
that the bureaucratic apparatus of the colonial state was primarily limited to the administrative
capital and areas of European settlement, while rural, indigenous populations were governed
under distinctive “customary” laws. In general, urban and settler populations were subject to
European laws, which protected their property rights and individual civil liberties, while
Owolabi 5
provincial district officials oversaw a network of local intermediaries (known as “chiefs” in
British colonies, chefs de canton in French colonies, and régulos in Portuguese colonies) who
enforced “customary” laws that applied only to indigenous subject populations. In rural,
indigenous districts, local state authority operated along highly patrimonial lines, as local chiefs
combined legislative, executive, judicial, and administrative authority and were responsible only
to the local district administrator (Mamdani 1996, 56–61). Mamdani emphasizes the bifurcated
nature of this authority structure, noting that “customary justice was dispensed to native
[subjects] by chiefs and commissioners,” whereas European laws generally protected the civil
liberties of non-natives (Mamdani 1996, 109).
Because indigenous intermediaries were responsible only to the colonial authorities who
appointed them, chiefs often abused their powers for self-enrichment, through forced labor (on
their private properties) or forced contributions. Furthermore, the definition of “custom” often
changed over time to suit the interests of chiefs and the needs of the colonial state. Often, new
laws regarding taxation, forced labor, agricultural cultivation, and restrictions on the free
movement of peoples, had little to do with traditional customs. In fact, chiefs often manipulated
the so-called “customary laws” for extortion and self-aggrandizement (Mamdani 1996, 122–
125). Consequently, Mamdani refers to this patrimonial authority structure as “decentralized
despotism,” given the bureaucratic weakness and limited capacity of the modern state (Mamdani
1996, 56–61).
Mamdani (1996) argues that legal-administrative bifurcation generated poorly integrated
states with limited bureaucratic capacity and inclusiveness, which undermined their long-term
development. He also argues that the bifurcated colonial state institutionalized a highly
patrimonial authority structure that has persisted in many African countries long after
independence. Despite the important theoretical contributions of Mamdani’s (1996) work, the
empirical test of his argument is primarily limited to a detailed longitudinal analysis of urban vs.
rural development outcomes in South Africa and Uganda.
Legal-Administrative Bifurcation in the British Colonial Empire
To date, the most rigorous test of Mamdani’s theoretical framework has been Matthew Lange’s
empirical research on the distinctive developmental and political consequences of direct vs.
indirect British rule (Lange 2004, 2009). Lange measures the extent of indirect rule in each
Owolabi 6
British colony on the basis of the percentage of legal cases heard in “customary courts”
controlled by traditional “chiefs” c. 1955. As such, the extent of indirect rule ranged from over
80% in Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Uganda, to approximately 50% on the Indian
subcontinent, to 0% in directly ruled British colonies such as Barbados, Hong Kong, Jamaica,
Mauritius, and Singapore (Lange 2009, 48). In directly ruled colonies, by contrast, Europeans
constructed “centralized, territory-wide, and bureaucratic legal-administrative institutions” that
resembled the type of state domination that emerged in early modern Europe (Lange 2009, 4).
Directly ruled British colonies also developed strong legal protections for individual civil
liberties and property rights based on British common law.
Lange argues that indirect British rule institutionalized poorly integrated states with
limited bureaucratic capacity, limited infrastructural power, and limited inclusiveness (see Lange
2009, 47–49). A high degree of indirect rule also suggests that British common law, with its
strong protections of individual civil liberties and property rights, was only weakly
institutionalized during the colonial era, which likely had adverse consequences for long-term
development and postcolonial governance. Perhaps not surprisingly then, Matthew Lange’s
statistical models demonstrate that the extent of indirect rule consistently predicts worse
development outcomes (in terms of per capita GDP, educational attainment, and infant mortality
rates), less effective postcolonial governance (1996–2005), and lower mean democracy scores
(1972–2005) than in directly ruled British colonies, which developed more effective bureaucratic
and inclusive state structures (Lange 2009).
Legal-Administrative Bifurcation in French and Portuguese Colonies
French and Portuguese colonial administration was considerably more rigid and centralized than
Britain’s and generally less tolerant of traditional authority structures. Consequently, many
scholars regard French and Portuguese colonial administration as synonymous with “direct” or
assimilationist rule (see Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 231; Njoh 2000; Young 1994,
Ch. 4; R. Collier 1982, 81–87). Yet, despite their republican bias toward administrative
centralization and cultural assimilation, France and Portugal also developed bifurcated legaladministrative structures in colonies with significant indigenous populations. The data in Tables
A2 and A3 clearly demonstrate that only a handful of French and Portuguese colonies developed
an inclusive and integrated legal-administrative framework that extended citizenship rights to the
Owolabi 7
majority of the population (see Appendix). Consequently, I avoid the standard practice of
equating British administration with “indirect rule” and French and Portuguese administration
with “direct” or assimilationist rule. In each colonial empire, there were directly ruled colonies
with a uniform and inclusive legal-administrative framework, as well as bifurcated colonies that
maintained a distinctive legal-administrative framework for rural, indigenous populations.
Direct rule was only fully implemented in the “old” French colonies of Guiana,
Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion, where a uniform legal-administrative structure and
inclusive citizenship rights were established following the abolition of slavery in 1848 (France
1944; Murch 1971). This had profound consequences for the extension of civil liberties and
political rights, as well as the expansion of public schooling after 1880. In fact, the “old” French
colonies have had elected representatives to their local assemblies and the French national
parliament since the introduction of universal male suffrage in the 1870s, and they also benefited
from the Jules Ferry laws, which made secular primary education free and compulsory for all
French citizens (Murch 1971, 32–36). Beginning with Algeria, however, all remaining French
colonies developed bifurcated legal-administrative institutions that denied citizenship rights to
their indigenous subject populations. The French indigénat legal code was first implemented in
Algeria during the 1870s but later extended to West and Equatorial Africa, Indochina, and the
Pacific islands during the final decades of the nineteenth century (Merle 2002).3 In Morocco and
Tunisia, Arab Muslims were under the authority of their traditional indigenous rulers and lacked
civil and political equality with metropolitan French citizens (Lawrence 2009, 28; France 1944).
Portugal also established distinctive “native” labor and criminal codes for indigenous subject
populations in Africa and Timor. These were officially codified as the regime do indigenato in
1929 (Duffy 1961).4 By contrast, Portuguese citizenship rights were extended to the entire
populations of Cape Verde, Macau, and Portuguese India (i.e., the Indian state of Goa) during the
nineteenth century, and to São Tomé and Principe after 1954 (Duffy 1961; Portugal 1960). Like
Britain, France and Portugal generally established bifurcated legal institutions in colonies with
significant indigenous populations and where the territorial control of the colonial state remained
limited until after 1880.
3
Mann (2009) also offers a critical evaluation of the French indigénat legal code in West Africa.
4
For a comprehensive overview of the Portuguese indigenato legal code, see Ferreira (1974, Ch. 2) and
O’Laughlin (2000).
Owolabi 8
The French indigénat and Portuguese indigenato legal codes empowered local officials to
impose summary justice on indigenous populations, who were not protected by French or
Portuguese civil law. French and Portuguese officials appointed “administrative chiefs” to collect
taxes and forcibly recruit labor for public works and even private enterprises. Whereas British
indirect rule often supported traditional authority structures, French and Portuguese officials
frequently appointed indigenous soldiers, policemen, or interpreters to serve as “administrative
chiefs.” These administrative appointees often enforced the most repressive aspects of the
colonial state (i.e., tax collection, labor recruitment, and “summary justice,” which relied heavily
on fines and corporal punishment) in rural communities (see Mamdani 1996, 125–128;
O’Laughlin 2000; Mann 2009). Despite the differences in British vs. continental European
approaches toward indigenous administration (see Ajayi and Crowder 1971; Crowder 1964),
French and Portuguese “native” codes also created bifurcated colonial states with limited
bureaucratic capacity and where indigenous subjects were not protected by European civil laws
and citizenship rights. This had profound consequences for the protection of property rights,
individual civil liberties, and access to public services such as education. Consequently, this
paper explores whether the development of bifurcated colonial states and the extensive use of
“native” legal codes in French and Portuguese colonies had similar negative consequences for
long-term development and postcolonial governance to those of indirect rule in former British
colonies.
THE LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENTAL LEGACIES OF
BIFURCATED COLONIAL STATES
Building on previous arguments outlined by Lange (2009), Mamdani (1996), Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012), and others, I expect bifurcated colonial institutions to generate worse
developmental outcomes than those in directly ruled colonies with a uniform legal-administrative
framework based on British common law or French/Portuguese civil law. I outline three distinct
causal mechanisms linking the bifurcated colonial state to poor developmental outcomes: limited
bureaucratic capacity, limited inclusiveness, and weak political legitimacy/rule of law. First,
existing studies suggest that governments are rarely able to efficiently provide public goods and
services such as roads, schools, healthcare facilities, and sanitation without a capable
bureaucratic state apparatus that can implement policies throughout the national territory (see
Owolabi 9
Lange 2009; Krieckhaus 2006; Kohli 2004). The bureaucratic-administrative capacity of most
bifurcated colonial states remained extremely limited outside of the principal urban centers, and
many postcolonial governments maintained a strong pro-urban bias in their developmental
policies while extracting tax revenues and profits from small rural producers. This practice was
particularly widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Bates 1981), where state policies have tended
to reinforce the urban-rural divide established during the colonial era.
Second, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that inclusive economic and political
institutions promote better development outcomes than extractive institutions that limit
individual liberties and property rights. The legal-administrative institutions of the bifurcated
colonial states were anything but inclusive, as they generally denied citizenship rights to rural
indigenous populations, who were legally regarded as native “subjects” (see Mamdani 1996).
Consequently, Matthew Lange argues that indirect [British] rule “obstructed inclusiveness to a
greater extent than direct [British] rule” by empowering local elites to serve as “gatekeepers”
between the state bureaucracy and the general public (Lange 2009, 39). The legal recognition of
“customary laws” also undermined the institutionalization of British common law, which is
known for its strong protections of property rights and individual civil liberties (La Porta et al.
1998, 1999). Similarly, bifurcated French and Portuguese colonies had highly restrictive
citizenship laws that excluded the vast majority of the population, thereby denying their
protection under French or Portuguese civil law (see Appendix, Tables A2 and A3). In the
French and Portuguese colonial empires, entry to public schools was mainly limited to
metropolitan citizens prior to 1946 and 1961 respectively, resulting in vast differences in
educational attainment. School enrollment was significantly higher in colonies with inclusive
citizenship rights. On the eve of the Second World War, for example, 48% of children in
Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion were enrolled in primary schools, compared with just
2.0% in French West Africa and 2.4% in French Equatorial Africa (Benavot and Riddle 1988).5
And at the end of the Second World War, there were more children enrolled in primary schools
in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Réunion than in all of French West Africa, where the population
was twenty times greater (France 1949). And because human capital is a central component of
socioeconomic development, the stark differences in educational attainment during the colonial
era likely affected subsequent patterns of socioeconomic development and political governance.
5
These estimates are based on population-weighted data from France (1944).
Owolabi 10
Third, the distinctive, and often highly repressive “native” legal codes in bifurcated
colonial states likely had lasting negative consequences for postcolonial governance due to the
fact that the rule of law was only weakly institutionalized during the colonial era. Bifurcated
colonial states did not develop a uniform legal code during the colonial era, and most of them
failed to democratize after independence (Owolabi 2015; Mamdani 1996). The impartial and
uniform enforcement of the rule of law is an important component of effective governance
(O’Donnell 1993), which is essential for successful long-term development (Lange 2009, 36;
Kohli 2004; Englebert 2000). In the absence of an effective and consolidated state, political
leaders often pursue policies that enhance their political power rather than promote effective
broad-based development (see Englebert 2000; Bates 1981). Due to these corrosive effects on
political legitimacy and governance, I expect bifurcated colonial states to continue to suffer from
significant developmental deficits over the longue durée.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA ANALYSIS
The following section examines the developmental consequences of bifurcated colonial legaladministrative institutions for educational attainment at the end of the colonial era (c. 1960),
postcolonial governance (1996–2012), and overall human well-being in 2015. The data sample
consists of sixty-seven British, French, and Portuguese colonies that experienced at least thirty
years of European rule ending after 1945, where European settlers made up less than one-quarter
of the population, and whose population exceeded 100,000 inhabitants at the end of the colonial
era. In contrast to most existing studies, I include former colonies that never gained political
independence, as long as they meet the conditions outlined above. The small number of cases
limits the number of statistical controls in each model, although some models control for
competing explanations of long-term development, including colonial settlers, ethnic
fractionalization, religious composition and/or missionaries, and geographic region. Other
influential statistical analyses of the long-term developmental consequences of colonialism—
including Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Lange 2004, 2009; Kenny 2013; and
Frankema 2012—are also based on small samples of thirty-two to sixty-four countries.6
6
Matthew Lange’s statistical analysis of the developmental and political consequences of direct vs.
indirect British rule is based on a small sample of thirty-three to thirty-nine former British colonies
(Lange 2009). Paul Kenny (2013) tests his hypothesis about the impact of colonial state-building and
Owolabi 11
Measuring Legal-Administrative Bifurcation in British, French, and Portuguese Colonies
Given the distinct ways in which different European colonizers interacted with pre-existing
authority structures in bifurcated colonies, I use different indicators to measure the extent of
legal-administration bifurcation in British vs. French and Portuguese colonies. Because British
administrative policy tended to empower traditional chiefs, I use Matthew Lange’s indirect rule
indicator to measure the extent of legal-administrative bifurcation in former British colonies.
Lange (2009) operationalizes indirect rule as the percentage of total legal cases that were heard
in “customary courts” maintained by traditional “chiefs” during the mid-1950s. The extent of
indirect rule ranged from 0% in directly ruled colonies such as Barbados, Hong Kong, Mauritius,
and Trinidad, to 50% on the Indian subcontinent, to more than 80% in Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, and Uganda (see Appendix, Table A1).
Comparable data on “customary courts” are not available for French and Portuguese
colonies, where colonial authorities developed their own “native” legal codes that denied
citizenship rights to indigenous subject populations. Because the bureaucratic capacity of the
bifurcated colonial state was primarily limited to urban areas, I assume that the French and
Portuguese “native” codes were primarily enforced in rural areas. Consequently, I calculate the
extent of legal-administrative bifurcation in French and Portuguese colonies by multiplying the
percentage of the population with indigenous legal status c. 1945 by the percentage of the
population living in rural areas in 1955.7 This creates an index that ranges from 0% in directly
ruled colonies with inclusive citizenship rights (such as Cape Verde, Macau, and the “old French
colonies”), to 60–70% in North African colonies, to more than 80% in French Indochina and
many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa (see Appendix, Tables A2 and A3). This suggests that French
decolonization on current perceptions of corruption using a sample of thirty-two former British colonies.
And Ewout Frankema’s (2012) statistical analysis of the development of colonial education is based on a
small sample of forty-two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although larger samples enable a more
rigorous test of empirical patterns with more statistical controls, each of the studies above nonetheless
demonstrates clear and consistent patterns, despite their limited sample size. Even Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson’s (2001) path-breaking study on colonial settler mortality, institutions, and economic
development only uses a sample of sixty-four countries, and the settler mortality rates are actually
imputed for more than half of the countries in the sample (see Albouy 2012).
7
Due to the availability of colonial census data, I use French census data for 1945 (see France 1949) and
Portuguese data for 1950 (see Portugal 1960). The percentage of the population living in rural areas in
1955 is obtained from the United Nations’ World Population Prospects, http://data.un.org.
Owolabi 12
and Portuguese colonies with a bureaucratic legal-administrative structure and inclusive
citizenship rights (such as Guadeloupe, Martinique, or Macau) are the functional equivalent of
directly ruled British colonies such as Barbados, Hong Kong, or Singapore, which developed
strongly bureaucratic states with an inclusive legal-administrative framework based on British
common law. At the same time, British colonies that relied heavily on indirect rule (such as
Nigeria or Sierra Leone) are functionally equivalent to French or Portuguese colonies that
enforced distinctive “native” legal codes on rural, indigenous populations (such as Benin or
Guinea-Bissau).
Dependent Variables
This paper examines the impact of both measures of legal-administrative bifurcation on three
distinct developmental outcomes in thirty-two former British colonies, followed by thirty-five
French and Portuguese colonies. First, I examine primary school enrollment rates in 1960, as a
measure of bureaucratic capacity and human capital at the end of the colonial era. Since the end
of the Second World War, virtually all political leaders have regarded public education as one of
the most important goals of the modern state, as public schools are important for building a
national political community and strengthening citizens’ loyalty to the state (see Ulsaner and
Rothstein 2016, 233–235; Ramirez and Boli 1987; Benavot and Riddle, 1988). Yet, most
colonial states did not promote mass education unless they had already developed inclusive
citizenship rights and/or legal systems prior to the Second World War. Consequently, the
colonies with the highest literacy rates in 1960 were generally those that developed a
bureaucratic state with inclusive legal rights, such as directly ruled British colonies and French
or Portuguese colonies with inclusive citizenship rights (see Owolabi 2015). Consequently, I
expect indirect British rule, or the use of “native” legal codes in French or Portuguese colonies to
predict lower rates of primary school enrollment in 1960.
Postcolonial governance (1996–2012) is measured by averaging the World Bank’s (2016)
data on governmental effectiveness, the rule of law, voice and accountability, political stability,
and the control of corruption. These governance indicators have a global mean of 0, with most
countries ranging from -2.5 (extremely ineffective governance) and +2.5 (extremely effective
Owolabi 13
governance).8 Because bifurcated colonial states enforced extractive and repressive legal systems
for indigenous subject populations, I expect both measures of legal-administrative bifurcation—
i.e., British indirect rule and French/Portuguese native codes—to predict worse governmental
performance between 1996 and 2012.
Finally, I use the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI) scores as a broad
measure of human well-being in 2015. For ease of interpretation, HDI scores are multiplied by
100, with higher scores demonstrating higher levels of human well-being. Once again, I expect
bifurcated legal-administrative institutions to predict worse developmental outcomes among
British and non-British colonies alike.
Control Variables
The regression models control for various contravening factors that might also affect long-term
development and/or postcolonial governance. These include the presence of colonial settlers,
ethnic fractionalization, religious composition or the historical presence of Protestant
missionaries, and geographic region. Existing studies demonstrate that European settlement
contributed significantly to long-term development, although scholars debate whether this is
primarily due to the political and economic institutions demanded by settler populations (see
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Acemoglu, Gallego, and Robinson 2014; Easterly and
Levine 2013) or the human capital that settlers brought with them (Engerman, Mariscal, and
Sokoloff 2009). Asian settlers may have also contributed to successful long-term development,
given that they were generally governed under bureaucratic Western institutions rather than
“customary law” (Mamdani 1996). Furthermore, Asian settlers and labor migrants were often
attracted by economic opportunities in various colonies. By contrast, many scholars have argued
that high levels of ethnic fractionalization have adverse effects for democratic stability (Horowitz
1985) and the provision of public goods (Habyarimana et al. 2007; P. J. Collier 2000; Easterly
and Levine 1997). Consequently, some of the statistical models control for ethnic
fractionalization in each colony.
Recent empirical scholarship has also examined the developmental consequences of
colonial-era missionary activity, as Christian missionaries often established denominational
8
The World Bank governance indicators do not cover French Polynesia and Guadeloupe, which are
excluded from the data results in Table 6.
Owolabi 14
schools, which facilitated the development of civil society and, in some cases, postcolonial
democracy. Previous studies suggest that Protestant missionaries brought more developmental
benefits than Catholic missionaries, given their greater emphasis on education, mass printing,
and promoting bible literacy in indigenous languages. Furthermore, Protestant missionaries often
exercised greater independence from colonial state authorities than their Catholic counterparts
(see Woodberry 2012; Gallego and Woodberry 2010). In general, Protestantism is associated
with positive development outcomes (see Grier 1997; Bollen 1979), whereas Islam may have
hindered long-term development by slowing the spread of Western education (Frankema 2012).
Furthermore, because Islamic law does not recognize the separation of church and state and
prohibits certain capitalist economic practices, this may also impede socioeconomic development
and postcolonial democracy (see Anckar 2011; Hadenius 1992; Huntington 1991). Consequently,
many statistical models control for the percentage of Muslims or Protestants in each colony, or
the historical presence of Protestant missionaries.
Some statistical models also include regional “dummies” for countries located in the
West Indies or Sub-Saharan Africa to measure the impact of unmeasured factors that might have
shaped the developmental outcomes in each region (e.g., small island states in the West Indies;
landlocked states, low population densities, or lack of access to navigable rivers in Sub-Saharan
Africa). This is important because many existing studies demonstrate unexplained negative
developmental outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa,9 whereas Caribbean states and territories have
surprisingly high levels of educational attainment and postcolonial democracy (see Benavot and
Riddle 1988; Dominguez et al. 1993; Edie 1994). Other models control for Portuguese
colonization, which may have had worse developmental consequences than French or British
colonization, given Portugal’s unique status as a relatively impoverished, semi-peripheral
colonial power with a repressive authoritarian regime from 1926 until 1974. Finally, some
models control for “dependent territories”—i.e., former colonies that never gained independence
after the Second World War. After all, it is reasonable to expect that Europeans would be most
likely to maintain their most “successful” colonies as overseas dependencies (e.g., Hong Kong,
9
Including a dummy variable for Sub-Saharan African countries is extremely common in large-N
statistical models (e.g. Easterly and Levine 1997; Lange 2004; Owolabi 2015), as many empirical studies
demonstrate poor development outcomes in this region, even after controlling for colonial legacies, ethnic
fractionalization, and other factors. The Africa dummy is typically insignificant, however, after
controlling for environmental factors (see Sachs and Warner 1997) or measures of state legitimacy (see
Englebert 2000).
Owolabi 15
Macau, and the French Caribbean and Pacific territories), so I expect to find superior
developmental and political outcomes in these territories. Summary statistics for the dependent
variables, focal independent variables, and control variables are found in Table 2.
Diagnostic Tests
For each statistical model, I inspected the bivariate correlations and variance inflation factors of
the independent variables, to ensure that models do not suffer from high levels of collinearity.10
Almost all of the regression models have homoskedatistic error terms, and although a few
models have one or two outlying or influential observations, I re-estimated each model using
robust regression (Stata’s rreg command) and with robust standard errors. The results are broadly
consistent, so only the OLS (or 2SLS) results are presented here. I also ran various diagnostic
tests to check for over-identification, under-identification, and weak instruments in the 2SLS
models. All of these tests can be rejected at conventional levels of statistical significance.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Colonial Education
The regression models in Table 3 support the hypothesis that bifurcated colonial institutions are
associated with lower rates of primary school enrollment at the end of the colonial era. Among
thirty-two former British colonies (Models 1–5), the indirect rule variable has the expected
negative sign and is statistically significant at p<0.05 in every model.11
10
None of the variance inflation factors exceed 4.5, demonstrating high levels of tolerance for the
independent variables.
11
Woodberry’s (2012) missionary data do not cover dependent territories, so these are omitted from
Models 4 and 9. Similarly, Maddison’s (2006) GDP data do not cover the Solomon Islands (omitted from
Model 5), French Polynesia or Timor-Leste (missing from Model 10).
Owolabi 16
TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Dependent Variables
N
Net Primary Enrollment Rate (1960)
Mean Governance (1996–2012)
HDI Score (2015)
67
65
67
41.66
-0.35
60
Focal Independent Variables
% British Indirect Rule
% French/Portuguese Native Code
% Bifurcated
32
35
67
36.44
68.06
52.96
31.75
34.19
36.45
0
0
0
93
96
96
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
59
0.55
2.17
6.46
10.44
5.67
20.76
20.86
10.21
28.42
0.91
0.27
3.78
16.90
24.20
15.64
34.69
31.89
12.31
35.32
1.60
0
0.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.93
25
81.2
99.8
81.2
100
99.9
54.5
99.1
9.05
59
95.52
56.77
0
254
64
64
67
67
6.86
7.58
0.13
0.57
0.74
1.04
0.34
0.50
5.67
5.96
0
0
9.29
10.07
1
1
Excluded Instruments:
Colonial Occupation
Years since Colonization
67
67
0.70
150.1
0.46
128.1
Logged Population (1900)
67
6.46
1.92
Key Control Variables
Ethnic Fractionalization
% European Settlers
% Asian Settlers
% Catholic (1900)
% Protestant (1900)
% Christian (1900)
% Muslim (1900)
% Protestant (2000)
% Muslim (2000)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop.
(1923)
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions
(1960)
Logged per capita GDP (1950)
Logged per capita GDP (1950)
West Indies
Sub-Saharan Africa
Mean
Standard
Deviation
26.34
0.73
15.23
Min.
4
-1.56
34.80
0
38
2.94
Max.
100
1.40
91.20
1
500
12.35
The results for former French and Portuguese colonies are strikingly similar. In Models
6–10, the use of “native” legal codes also depresses 1960 primary school enrollment rates in
French and Portuguese colonies, significant at p<0.05 or p<0.01. The similarities between the
two samples of colonies are striking, as this represents a stark contrast from previous empirical
studies that demonstrate superior levels of education and literacy in former British colonies
Owolabi 17
relative to non-British colonies (see Brown 2000; Grier 1997). Nevertheless, in both samples
(i.e., Models 1 and 6) the extent of legal-administrative bifurcation explains 45% of the variation
in 1960 primary enrollment rates, and the magnitude of this coefficient is virtually identical. In
the absence of legal-administrative bifurcation, these models would predict 70% primary
enrollment in a directly ruled British colony, compared with 68% in a directly ruled French or
Portuguese colony. Nevertheless, given that the median extent of legal-administrative bifurcation
was 60% in British African colonies and 88% for French and Portuguese African colonies, this
would drop the predicted primary enrollment rate to 39% for the median British Africa colony
and 24% for the median French or Portuguese African colony.
After accounting for the impact of bifurcated legal institutions, most of the competing
explanations for variation in 1960 primary school enrollment rates are statistically irrelevant or
inconsistent between the two samples. In fact, the only control variables that affect 1960 primary
enrollment rates at statistically significant levels are the percentage of Protestants in 1900 and the
number of Protestant missionaries per capita in 1923, supporting Robert Woodberry’s (2012)
theoretical arguments. Catholicism is only advantageous for primary school enrollment in British
colonies, where colonial authorities and Catholic missionaries faced competition from Protestant
missionaries (see Gallego and Woodberry 2010; Woodberry 2012). By contrast, the percentage
of Muslims in 1900 depresses 1960 primary enrollment in former British colonies, while having
no effect in French and Portuguese colonies. This may reflect Muslim opposition to
denominational Christian schools in former British colonies (see Frankema 2012) as well as the
fact that British administrators often restricted Christian missionary activity in predominantly
Muslim areas (see Tibenderana 1983).12 The remaining control variables are either statistically
irrelevant or insignificant.
Postcolonial Governance
In Table 4, the statistical models support the hypothesis that bifurcated colonial institutions
contributed to ineffective postcolonial governance. Both British indirect rule (Models 1–3) and
French/Portuguese “native” codes (Models 6–8) predict worse governance scores today,
12
Tibenderana (1983) provides detailed historical evidence of this from northern Nigeria, which continues
to lag behind southern and Christian parts of the country in terms of educational attainment and economic
development. The lasting consequences of this policy are particularly severe for girls’ education.
Owolabi 18
significant at p<0.05. This suggests a high level of continuity in institutional quality from the
colonial era until today. The magnitude of this effect is similar in both samples, although the use
of bifurcated legal codes predicts an even higher percentage of the variation in the quality of
governance among former French and Portuguese colonies (Models 6–8) relative to former
British colonies (Models 1–3). This likely reflects the particularly arbitrary and repressive nature
of French and Portuguese “native” legal codes, which were not based on precolonial customs or
traditions. Consequently, their long-term consequences for the rule of law may have been even
more pernicious than in former British colonies, where democracy was more likely to survive
after independence (see Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004; R. Collier 1982). Another
possible explanation is that the greater presence of Protestant missionaries in the British colonial
empire mitigated some of the negative developmental consequences of indirect British rule
relative to bifurcated French or Portuguese legal institutions. After all, Woodberry (2012)
suggests that there were nearly eight times as many Protestant missionaries per capita in the
British colonies in this sample, relative to French or Portuguese colonies.13 The negative effects
of bifurcated colonial legal institutions on postcolonial governance remain statistically
significant after controlling for colonial settlers (Models 2 and 7), ethnic fractionalization, and
religious composition (Models 3 and 8). None of these control variables are statistically
significant at conventional levels.
13
Because Woodberry’s (2012) missionary data do not cover former colonies that never gained
independence, these models control for the extent of Protestantism in 2000 rather than the historical
presence of Protestant missionaries in 1923.
Owolabi 19
TABLE 3
COLONIAL EDUCATION (OLS RESULTS)
VARIABLES
British Indirect Rule (%)
Net Primary Enrollment Rate (1960)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.52**
(0.10)
-0.30*
(0.13)
-0.37**
(0.08)
-0.50**
(0.11)
-0.35*
(0.16)
French or Portuguese
“Native” Legal Code (%)
Ethnic Fractionalization
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
-0.50**
(0.10)
-0.49**
(0.11)
4.13
(11.93)
-0.88
(0.68)
4.22**
(1.14)
-0.43**
(0.15)
-0.26*
(0.12)
-0.39**
(0.13)
-2.45
(13.15)
3.65*
(1.38)
0.29
(0.15)
% European Settlers
% Asian Settlers
% Catholic (1900)
0.63*
(0.27)
0.35*
(0.15)
-0.28**
(0.10)
% Protestant (1900)
% Muslim (1900)
Protestant Missionaries per
10,000 pop. (1923)
Years Protestant Missions x
100 (1960)
Logged per capita GDP
(1950)
West Indies
0.05
(0.17)
0.55**
(0.23)
-0.15
(0.09)
4.01*
(1.61)
-0.05
(0.07)
23.34**
(8.00)
0.09
(0.07)
7.84
(5.07)
17.29
(9.74)
7.17
(9.01)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Portuguese Colony
Constant
69.69**
(4.93)
53.38**
(8.35)
62.64**
(5.27)
69.81**
(11.54)
2.14
(38.22)
67.64**
(7.38)
61.91**
(8.44)
64.16**
(13.48)
-11.60
(6.70)
37.65**
(11.07)
Observations
R-squared
32
0.45
32
0.60
32
0.75
31
0.58
31
0.58
35
0.45
35
0.63
35
0.59
28
0.49
Coefficients in parentheses, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
5.80
(5.70)
5.18
(14.69)
-8.04
(7.41)
-12.62
(8.83)
27.56
(42.67)
33
0.60
Owolabi 20
TABLE 4
POSTCOLONIAL GOVERNANCE
VARIABLES
British Indirect Rule (%)
Mean Governance Score, 1996–2012
(1) OLS
(2) OLS
(3) OLS
-0.016**
(0.004)
-0.012*
(0.005)
-0.014**
(0.004)
French or Portuguese
“Native” Legal Code (%)
% European Settlers
(4) OLS
(5) 2SLS
(6) OLS
(7) OLS
(8) OLS
-0.016**
(0.002)
-0.012**
(0.004)
-0.008
(0.015)
0.004
(0.041)
-0.014**
(0.003)
0.053
(0.053)
0.006
(0.006)
% Asian Settlers
Ethnic Fractionalization
-0.400
(0.494)
0.010
(0.010)
-0.002
(0.005)
% Protestant (2000)
% Muslim (2000)
Logged per capita GDP
(2001)
Logged per capita GDP
(2001)—Instrumented
West Indies
(10) 2SLS
-0.291
(0.311)
-0.002
(0.013)
-0.000
(0.002)
0.645**
(0.096)
0.140
(0.251)
0.397
(0.228)
Sub-Saharan Africa
(9) OLS
0.587**
(0.122)
0.673**
(0.138)
0.125
(0.240)
0.432
(0.249)
Portuguese Colony
Dependency
Constant
0.370*
(0.171)
0.062
(0.278)
0.418
(0.312)
-5.487**
(0.818)
-5.725**
(1.165)
0.600**
(0.155)
0.492
(0.368)
0.31
(0.30)
Observations
R-squared
32
0.39
32
0.43
32
0.46
31
0.69
31
0.69
33
0.66
33
0.69
0.780*
(0.346)
0.347
(0.214)
0.178
(0.195)
0.915**
(0.188)
0.528
(0.373)
0.660*
(0.258)
0.057
(0.207)
0.685**
(0.179)
-5.090**
(0.975)
-7.663***
(1.486)
33
0.68
32
0.64
32
0.54
Standard errors in parentheses; 2SLS models use British indirect rule (Model 5) or French/Portuguese native code (Model 10) as the excluded
instrument; Centered R-squared values reported for 2SLS models, **p<0.01,*p<0.05.
Owolabi 21
Models 4 and 9 test the (likely) possibility that variation in governance scores for 1996–
2012 might reflect current socioeconomic conditions rather than bifurcated legal institutions
from the colonial era. Existing studies demonstrate a positive association between economic
development and effective governance (e.g., Lipset 1959; Hadenius 1992; Przeworski et al.
2000), even if scholars disagree about the causal direction of this relationship. In Models 4 and 9,
economic development is positively associated with governmental effectiveness (significant at
p<0.01),14 although existing studies demonstrate that per capita income is itself shaped by
institutional quality (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). Consequently, Models 5 and
10 use bifurcated colonial institutions to instrument for per capita income in 2001. These 2SLS
models are substantively similar to the corresponding OLS models, suggesting that economic
development is an important causal mechanism linking colonial institutions to postcolonial
governance. The highest postcolonial governance scores are found in four directly ruled British
colonies (i.e., Singapore +1.4, Barbados +1.26, Hong Kong +1.21, and the Bahamas +1.12),
which have some of the most impressive development records in the Global South. Directly
ruled French and Portuguese colonies (e.g., Réunion +0.92, Martinique +0.79, or Macau +0.62)
do not perform quite as well as their British equivalents, yet their governmental performance
greatly exceeds that of bifurcated French or Portuguese colonies (such as Guinea -1.22,
Cameroon -0.93, or Angola -1.23).
Human Well-Being in 2015
The statistical models in Table 5 demonstrate that bifurcated legal-administrative institutions
from the colonial era are associated with lower levels of human well-being today. Both British
indirect rule (Models 1–3) and French/Portuguese native codes (Models 6–8) have the expected
negative sign, significant at p<0.01. In the bivariate models, bifurcated colonial legal institutions
predict 66% of the variation in current levels of human well-being among former British colonies
(Model 1) and 61% among former French and Portuguese colonies (Model 6). This is an
enormous impact that has been overlooked by existing studies on the colonial origins of longterm development (e.g., Fails and Krieckhaus 2010; Krieckhaus 2006; Acemoglu, Johnson, and
14
Maddison’s per capita GDP data do not cover the Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste, which are omitted
from Models 4 and 5 and Models 9 and 10 respectively.
Owolabi 22
Robinson 2001, 2002). These statistical models demonstrate empirically that the negative
developmental consequences of bifurcated legal institutions in the British colonial empire (see
Lange 2009) are consistent among French and Portuguese colonies as well. The statistical
controls for European settlement are insignificant in these models, suggesting that European
settler minorities were more likely to favor extractive institutions that protected their political
and economic privileges rather than inclusive institutions that protected everybody’s property
rights and individual civil liberties (see Fails and Krieckhaus 2010). This casts some doubt on
earlier studies that suggest a positive and linear relationship between European settlement and
long-term development (see Easterly and Levine 2013). Similarly, the statistical controls for the
percentage of Christians and Muslims in 1900 are statistically insignificant.15 Overall, these
models suggest that current levels of human well-being were primarily shaped by colonial legaladministrative institutions and that the magnitude of this effect is striking and robust to statistical
controls for colonial settlement patterns or religious composition.
Nevertheless, because current levels of human well-being might be better explained by
contemporary political institutions, Models 4 and 9 examine the relationship between
postcolonial governance and human development in 2015. Not surprisingly, effective political
governance (1996–2012) predicts higher 2015 HDI scores among British and non-British
colonies alike.16 2SLS Models that use bifurcated colonial institutions as an instrument for
15
These models control for the percentage of Christians in 1900 rather than the historical presence of
Protestant missionaries, because Woodberry’s missionary data do not cover dependent territories.
Presumably, however, the colonies with the highest percentage of Christians in 1900 also had high levels
of missionary exposure. Controlling for the historical presence of Protestant missionaries reduces the
sample size considerably but generates substantively similar results. British indirect rule and
French/Portuguese “native” codes predict worse human development outcomes (significant at p=0.00 and
p=0.05 respectively), whereas the missionary controls are generally insignificant.
16
These models also control for ethnic fractionalization and the impact of being located in the Caribbean
or Sub-Saharan Africa. The statistical significance of the Africa dummy may reflect the impact of
diseases such as malaria (in Equatorial Africa) or HIV/AIDS (in Southern Africa), which are more
prevalent than in other parts of the developing world. According to UNICEF, roughly half of the world’s
HIV-infected population lives in Southern Africa and East Africa. In nine Southern African countries, the
HIV infection rate exceeds 10% of the total populations (http://www.unicef.org/esaro/
5482_HIV_AIDS.html). Malaria is also a major killer in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although this mosquitoborne disease is also fairly common in parts of Southeast Asia and Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa
accounts for thirty-eight of the forty countries with the highest rates of mortality from malaria
(http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/cause-of-death/malaria/by-country/). Nevertheless, effective
governance can go a long way toward reducing the death rate from malaria—even eradicating the disease
altogether. In the British, French, Dutch, and US Caribbean territories, which have a similar climate to
Owolabi 23
postcolonial governance generate substantively similar results (see Models 5 and 10
respectively). This suggests that bifurcated colonial institutions affect the quality of postcolonial
government, which in turn shapes human development outcomes.
Endogeneity Concerns
So far, these statistical models have assumed the extent of legal-administrative bifurcation to be
an exogenous factor that was not shaped by pre-existing conditions in the various colonies. This
assumption seems unlikely, given that European administrators only enforced “native” codes in
territories with significant indigenous populations, which were arguably more difficult for them
to control. Furthermore, colonies acquired prior to 1815 were far less likely to have bifurcated
legal-administrative institutions during the early twentieth century than those colonized after
1850. As Mamdani (1996) suggests, the bifurcated colonial state developed with the significant
territorial expansion of European colonial empires during the nineteenth century. Because these
“omitted” factors might in fact explain the empirical results in Tables 3–5, I estimated six 2SLS
models that use colonial occupation (i.e., countries and territories in which indigenous peoples
made up more than three-quarters of the total population in 1975), the duration of colonial rule
prior to 1960, and the size of population in 1900 as instruments for the extent of legaladministrative bifurcation during the colonial era. These instruments should not directly affect
postcolonial outcomes except through their impact on colonial legal-administrative institutions.
For the first time, British, French, and Portuguese colonies are combined into a single sample.
These results should be interpreted cautiously, given the different measures of legaladministrative bifurcation in British vs. non-British colonies. At either extreme—i.e., directly
ruled colonies that lacked native codes and highly bifurcated colonial states with high levels of
indirect British rule, or the widespread use of French/Portuguese “native codes”—should not
significantly bias the regression results. In the middle ranges (i.e., 35% to 65%), however, my
estimates of legal-administrative bifurcation in French and Portuguese colonies might not map
onto Matthew Lange’s measure of indirect rule.
many parts of West Africa, malaria was largely eradicated after the Second World War (see Rawlins,
Hinds, and Rawlins 2008).
Owolabi 24
TABLE 5
POSTCOLONIAL DEVELOPMENT
VARIABLES
HDI Scores, 0–100 (2015)
British Indirect Rule (%)
(1) OLS
-0.37**
(0.05)
French or Portuguese
“Native” Code (%)
% European Settlers
(2) OLS
-0.30**
(0.06)
(3) OLS
-0.37**
(0.06)
(4) OLS
(5) 2SLS
(6) OLS
(7) OLS
(8) OLS
-0.36**
(0.05)
-0.23**
(0.08)
0.30
(0.36)
1.04
(0.76)
-0.29**
(0.08)
0.48
(0.69)
0.16*
(0.07)
% Asian Settlers
% Christian (1900)
-0.00
(0.06)
-0.04
(0.07)
% Muslim (1900)
Mean Governance Score
(1996–2012)
Mean Governance Score—
Instrumented (1996–2012)
Ethnic Fractionalization
-0.67
(4.43)
-0.76
(3.55)
-13.03**
(2.46)
Sub-Saharan Africa
(10) 2SLS
0.08
(0.08)
0.00
(0.05)
12.35**
(1.64)
West Indies
(9) OLS
10.85**
(3.30)
22.07**
(4.68)
14.65
(8.43)
-8.74
(5.29)
-11.86**
(3.85)
Portuguese Colony
Dependency
Constant
76.34**
(2.33)
71.14**
(3.62)
76.97**
(3.82)
71.52**
(2.25)
67.00**
(3.98)
81.67**
(3.78)
10.53
(8.28)
69.15**
(6.89)
Observations
R-squared
32
0.66
32
0.71
32
0.66
32
0.74
32
0.63
35
0.61
35
0.70
-8.17
(7.16)
4.14
(8.02)
-13.27**
(4.10)
0.59
(0.37)
22.33**
(5.77)
4.55
(9.26)
-11.06
(10.59)
-15.90**
(4.58)
-2.27
(4.22)
75.65**
(6.96)
74.76**
(3.81)
76.59**
(4.21)
35
0.62
35
0.73
35
0.61
Standard errors in parentheses; 2SLS models use British Indirect rule (Model 5) or French/Portuguese Native Code (Model 10) as the excluded
instrument; Centered R-squared values reported for 2SLS models, **p<0.01,*p<0.05.
Owolabi 25
TABLE 6
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE MODELS
VARIABLES
% “Native” Code
% “Native” Code—
instrumented
British Colony
Portuguese Colony
Net Primary Enrollment Rate (1960)
(1) OLS
-0.53**
(0.07)
-3.89
(5.15)
-20.81**
(7.57)
(2) 2SLS
-0.64**
(0.08)
-7.41
(5.23)
-22.23**
(6.27)
% European Settlers
% Asian Settlers
Ethnic Fractionalization
% Protestant (1900)
(3) 2SLS
-0.34**
(0.10)
-6.94
(4.24)
-23.95**
(5.89)
-0.08
(0.50)
0.23*
(0.11)
-10.67
(7.83)
Mean Governance Score (1966–2012)
(4) OLS
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.13
(0.17)
-0.03
(0.22)
(5) 2SLS
(6) 2SLS
-0.02**
(0.00)
-0.28
(0.18)
-0.09
(0.22)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.26
(0.20)
-0.11
(0.23)
0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.00)
-0.49
(0.29)
0.34**
(0.12)
-0.27**
(0.06)
8.07
(7.20)
-0.61
(4.30)
% Muslim (1900)
West Indies
Sub-Saharan Africa
Dependency
Constant
73.98**
(5.83)
81.23**
(6.27)
73.14**
(6.99)
0.48
(0.23)
0.39
(0.23)
Observations
R-squared
67
0.57
67
0.55
67
0.76
65
0.54
0.23
(0.31)
0.69**
(0.25)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.30)
0.26
(0.16)
0.35
(0.33)
0.57
(0.38)
65
0.52
65
0.59
HDI Score (2015)
(7) OLS
-0.30**
(0.04)
-2.95
(3.01)
-3.00
(3.81)
(8) 2SLS
(9) 2SLS
-0.36**
(0.05)
-5.63
(3.21)
-3.98
(3.76)
-0.30**
(0.07)
-5.96*
(2.97)
-4.18
(3.37)
0.34
(0.27)
0.11
(0.07)
-3.01
(4.25)
11.47*
(4.59)
76.56**
(3.92)
7.47
(4.88)
81.56**
(4.54)
0.07
(0.06)
-0.04
(0.03)
-9.35*
(4.15)
-8.30**
(2.31)
6.98
(4.38)
84.85**
(5.59)
67
0.68
67
0.67
67
0.80
Standard errors in parentheses; Centered R-squared values reported for 2SLS models, **p<0.01,*p<0.05. Excluded instruments in 2SLS models:
colonial occupation; logged number of years since colonization (1960); logged population in 1900.
Owolabi 26
The OLS models in Table 6 demonstrate that bifurcated colonial legal institutions predict
worse developmental outcomes in the combined sample of sixty-five to sixty-seven British,
French, and Portuguese colonies, significant at p<0.01. These results are substantively similar to
the split-sample results in Tables 3–5, suggesting that combining British and non-British
colonies into a single sample does not bias the regression estimates. The instrumented measure
of bifurcated legal institutions is negatively associated with each outcome variable, confirming
that the duration of colonial rule, the size of the population in 1900, and a predominantly
indigenous population shaped the extent of legal-administrative bifurcation during the colonial
era, which in turn had negative developmental consequences for primary school enrollment in
1960, postcolonial governance from 1996 to 2012, and human well-being in 2015.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The statistical models in this paper provide overwhelming empirical support for Mamdani’s
(1996) hypothesis that bifurcated colonial institutions hindered long-term development and
undermined effective postcolonial governance. While previous empirical research by Matthew
Lange (2009) demonstrates the negative developmental consequences of bifurcated legal
institutions in former British colonies, this paper demonstrates similar outcomes for French and
Portuguese colonies with limited European settlement. British indirect rule devolved significant
local autonomy to traditional indigenous elites, generating poorly integrated states with highly
restrictive legal systems and limited bureaucratic capacity. This limited their ability to promote
broad-based development and establish effective governmental institutions after independence
(Lange 2009). The use of distinctive “native” legal codes in French and Portuguese colonies had
similarly pernicious effects on the bureaucratic capacity and inclusiveness of the colonial state,
with similarly negative developmental consequences. By contrast, directly ruled colonies,
whether British, French, or Portuguese, developed bureaucratic institutions within a uniform and
inclusive legal-administrative framework that promoted governmental effectiveness and
successful development outcomes over the longue durée.
Consider, for example, the significant developmental gap between the “old” French
colonies that established a uniform legal-administrative framework and inclusive citizenship
rights during the nineteenth century (i.e., French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion)
and other French colonies that maintained bifurcated legal-administrative institutions until after
Owolabi 27
the Second World War. In 1935–40, the primary school enrollment rate in the “old” French
colonies was 48%, compared with only 13% in Algeria, 11% in Indochina, and only 2% in
French West and Equatorial Africa (Benavot and Riddle, 1988). This gap persisted for several
decades. By 1960, the median adult literacy rate in the “old” French colonies was 75%,
compared to 14% in all remaining French colonies (United Nations 1963, 1967). If we examine
life expectancy as another indicator of human well-being, the developmental gap between the
two groups of French colonies is equally large and enduring. In 1955–1960, the median life
expectancy in the “old” French colonies was 56.7 years, compared with 40.5 years in bifurcated
French colonies. Although life expectancy has increased significantly across the board during the
past five decades, the “old” French colonies enjoyed an even larger development advantage (with
a median life expectancy of 78.8 years, compared with 59.7 years in other French colonies) by
2005–2010.17 Although some of the developmental success of the old French colonies might be
due to their current political status as overseas departments of the French Republic (which
enables them to share some of the benefits of the French welfare state), the historical evidence in
this paper suggests that this developmental advantage originated as a result of inclusive legal and
political institutions established during the colonial era. After all, the developmental gap between
the two groups of French colonies had already emerged prior to 1946, and it remains stubbornly
persistent today. Not surprisingly then, the statistical models in this paper demonstrate worse
developmental outcomes in bifurcated colonial states compared to directly ruled colonies that
established a uniform, bureaucratic, and inclusive legal-administrative framework. And this
pattern remains consistent regardless of the colonizing power.
In many ways, the conceptual framework and empirical analysis of this paper challenge
the dominant narratives of leading empirical studies from the previous decade. Many of these
studies highlight the distinctive developmental consequences of “settler” vs. “extractive”
colonialism (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Sokoloff and Engerman 2000;
Krieckhaus 2006; Easterly and Levine 2013), the developmental advantages of British colonial
and/or legal institutions (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008; La Porta et al. 1998,
1999), or the developmental advantages that resulted from Christian (and especially Protestant)
evangelization (see Woodberry 2012; Lankina and Getachew 2012, 2013). Nevertheless, these
17
Author’s calculations based on data from the United Nations’ (2016) World Population Prospects.
Owolabi 28
studies do not account for the use of distinctive “native” legal codes, which had negative
developmental consequences in British, French, and Portuguese colonies alike.
Building on Matthew Lange’s (2004, 2009) research on the distinctive developmental
legacies of direct vs. indirect British rule, the statistical models in this paper confirm Mahmood
Mamdani’s (1996) hypothesis that bifurcated colonial institutions had negative developmental
consequences in British and continental European colonies alike. Regardless of the colonial
power, the use of distinct legal-administrative institutions for rural indigenous populations is
consistently associated with poor development outcomes and ineffective postcolonial
governance, as demonstrated by the experience of countries such as Sierra Leone (British),
Guinea (French), and Guinea-Bissau (Portuguese). By contrast, colonies that developed a
uniform, bureaucratic, and inclusive legal-administrative institutional framework, such as
Barbados (British), Martinique (French), and Macau (Portuguese) have much better
developmental outcomes and governing institutions today. Consistent with other historicalinstitutionalist literature (e.g., Lange 2004, 2009; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001,
2002), the statistical models in this paper suggest that legal-administrative institutions
established during the colonial era continue to impact current developmental outcomes and the
institutional quality of government today.
Owolabi 29
APPENDIX
MEASURING LEGAL-ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS IN BRITISH,
FRENCH, AND PORTUGUESE COLONIES
TABLE A1
LEGAL-ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS IN BRITISH COLONIES
Colony
Bahamas
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belize
Botswana
Brunei
Fiji
Gambia
Ghana
Guyana
Hong Kong
India
Jamaica
Kenya
Lesotho
Malawi
Malaysia
Mauritius
Myanmar
Nigeria
Pakistan
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Solomon Islands
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Trinidad and Tobago
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Start of
Colonization
1717
1756
1627
1638
1885
1888
1871
1888
1874
1623
1842
1757
1655
1886
1884
1891
1873
1715
1826
1885
1857
1896
1819
1893
1580
1898
1894
1890
1592
1893
1890
1895
Type of
Colonization
Forced Settlement
Occupation
Forced Settlement
Other
Occupation
Other
Other
Occupation
Occupation
Forced Settlement
Other
Occupation
Forced Settlement
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Other
Forced Settlement
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Other
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Forced Settlement
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Bifurcated
Colonial State
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
% Indirect Rule,
1955
0
50
0
0
43
1
55
37
65
0
0
49
0
59
50
82
6
0
16
93
50
81
0
52
0
73
49
75
0
80
60
40
Sources: The initial year of colonization is based on data from Lange and Dawson (2009), except the
Bahamas, Belize, Brunei, Hong Kong, and the Solomon Islands, which I obtained from the Worldmark
Encyclopedia of Nations, 2004; mode of colonization is based on the author’s coding; colonial state
institutions are coded as “bifurcated” if the legal system is partially based on customary law; the extent of
indirect rule is based on data from Lange (2009, 48).
Owolabi 30
TABLE A2
LEGAL-ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS IN FRENCH COLONIES—
“NATIVE” LEGAL CODE
Colony
Algeria
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cambodia
Cameroon
Central African
Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Rep.
(Brazzaville)
Cote d’Ivoire
Djibouti
Fr. Guiana
Fr. Polynesia
Gabon
Guadeloupe
Guinea
Laos
Madagascar
Mali
Martinique
Mauritania
Morocco
Niger
Réunion
Senegal
Togo
Tunisia
Vietnam
Onset of
Colonization
Type of
Colonization
Pop. in 1900
(thousands)
% European
and/or
Assimilated,
1945
12.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
% Native
Code, c.
1955
1830
1900
1898
1884
1889
1900
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
4600
620
1400
2500
2620
770
65
93
96
90
68
81
1910
1886
1891
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
1700
70
540
0.1
0.5
0.2
95
93
68
1893
1888
1604
1844
1880
1635
1849
1893
1896
1898
1635
1900
1912
1922
1650
1895
1884
1881
1859
Occupation
Occupation
Other
Other
Occupation
Forced Settlement
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Forced Settlement
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Forced Settlement
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
Occupation
1000
20
21
37
280
182
990
1500
2580
1300
208
220
5200
910
173
1000
470
1600
11,000
0.1
3.2
100.0
14.5
4.5
100.0
0.2
0.1
1.4
0.1
100.0
0.1
3.8
<0.1
100.0
1.2
0.1
7.4
0.1
84
55
0
0
86
0
91
92
90
90
0
96
70
95
0
68
92
62
87
Sources: The initial year of colonization is based on data from Lange and Dawson (2009), except for
Comoros, French Guiana, French Polynesia, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion, which I obtained
from the Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations, 2004; mode of colonization is based on the author’s
coding; population in 1900 is obtained from the World Christian Encyclopedia, 2001; the percentage of
European and/or “assimilated” persons in the population is obtained from France (1949); the % native
code is estimated by multiplying the percentage of the population with indigenous legal status in 1945
(France 1949) by the percentage of the population living in rural areas in 1955 (United Nations, 2016).
Owolabi 31
TABLE A3
LEGAL-ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS IN PORTUGUESE COLONIES
Colony
Angola
Cape Verde
Guinea-Bissau
Macau
Mozambique
São Tomé and
Principe
Timor-Leste
Onset of
Colonization
Type of
Colonization
Pop. in
thousands
(1900)
1576
1460
1885
1557
1885
1485
Occupation
Forced Settlement
Occupation
Other
Occupation
Forced Settlement
2970
70
120
64
2600
40
1520
Occupation
370
% European
and/or
“Assimilated”
(i.e., civilisado),
1950
3.3
100.0
1.6
100.0
1.6
72.1
1.7
% Native
Legal Code,
1955
88
0
87
0
95
40
89
Sources: The initial year of colonization is based on data from Lange and Dawson (2009), except for
Cape Verde, Macau, São Tomé and Principe, and Timor-Leste, which I obtained from the Worldmark
Encyclopedia of Nations, 2004; mode of colonization is based on the author’s coding; population in 1900
is obtained from the World Christian Encyclopedia, 2001; the percentage of European and/or
“assimilated” persons in the population is obtained from Portugal (1960); the % native code is estimated
by multiplying the percentage of the population with indigenous legal status in 1950 (Portugal 1960) by
the percentage of the population living in rural areas in 1955 (United Nations, 2016).
These data clearly demonstrate that Britain introduced some degree of indirect rule in
most colonies with significant indigenous populations (see Table A1). Similarly, France and
Portugal enforced distinctive “native” legal codes in colonies with significant indigenous
populations (see Tables A2 and A3). Consequently, all three powers developed bifurcated legaladministrative institutions in the majority of their colonies. In general, territories that lacked
significant indigenous populations, and those that were colonized prior to 1815, were less likely
to maintain bifurcated legal-administrative institutions into the twentieth century. The data in
Table A1 are largely consistent with Matthew Lange’s historical overview of British colonization
(see Lange 2009, Ch. 2). Direct rule was commonly used in British colonies acquired prior to
1815, including the forced settlement colonies of the Caribbean and Indian Ocean region (where
white planters imported large numbers of African slaves and/or Asian indentured laborers), and
Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka). Britain also established direct rule in colonies with significant
commercial or geo-strategic importance, such as Hong Kong and Singapore. By contrast, indirect
Owolabi 32
rule was widely used in “occupation” colonies with significant indigenous populations.18 Indirect
rule was first formalized on the Indian subcontinent following the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. It later
became the dominant form of colonial administration in British African territories acquired after
1880 (see Lange 2009, Ch. 2).
Tables A2 and A3 demonstrate similar geographic and temporal variation in the French
and Portuguese colonial empires. Forced settlement colonies (such as Martinique, Guadeloupe,
and Réunion) and commercial city-states with significant geo-strategic importance (such as
Macau) were more likely to develop bureaucratic and inclusive state structures that resembled
direct British rule. By contrast, the French and Portuguese also developed bifurcated state
structures in colonies with significant indigenous populations, and especially in colonies
acquired after 1830. The extension of “native” legal codes was particularly widespread in French
and Portuguese colonies with significant indigenous populations and limited urbanization.
French colonial census records distinguish between “European and assimilated” persons subject
to the French civil code and indigenous persons subject to traditional authorities (in Morocco and
Tunisia) or to the French indigénat legal code (see France 1944; France 1949). Similarly,
Portuguese colonial census records distinguish between European and assimilated persons (i.e.,
civilisados) who were recognized as Portuguese citizens vs. native populations subject to the
indigenato legal code (Portugal 1960), which was used in all Portuguese occupation colonies
until 1961.
18
I define forced settlement as the mode of colonization based on the mass import of African slaves and/or Asian
indentured labor, whose descendants make up more than three-quarters of the postcolonial population. By contrast,
colonial occupation refers to European domination over territories in which indigenous peoples comprise more than
three-quarters of the postcolonial population. In previous work, I demonstrate that forced settlement generated
superior outcomes for colonial literacy and postcolonial democracy as a result of nineteenth-century reforms that
extended metropolitan legal rights to emancipated populations following the abolition of slavery. By contrast, most
“occupation” colonies maintained bifurcated legal institutions into the twentieth century, with negative
consequences for educational attainment and postcolonial democracy (see Owolabi 2015).
Owolabi 33
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