POLITICAL CORRUPTION,
CAMPAIGN SLUSH FUNDS
AND THE IMPACT ON THE
QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL
Written for the XXII World Congress of Political Science
IPSA – International Political Science Association
Panel: "Corruption, Clientelism, Cronyism and Quality of Democracy"
July 2012
CARLOS JOEL CARVALHO DE FORMIGA-XAVIER
[email protected]
Abstract: This study approaches political corruption and illegal funding for
electoral campaigns in Brazil, evaluating their impact on the quality of democracy,
especially the responsiveness of governments to the preferences of the majority
of its citizens. Based on descriptive observations from statements, news reports
and research data, it investigates how these phenomena affect vertical
accountability and distort electoral competition. The findings hereby presented
are intended to serve as a framework for future empirical studies, including the
evaluation of political reform proposals aimed at preventing political corruption in
the pursue of an enhancement on the quality of the Brazilian democracy.
Keywords: quality of democracy, political corruption, illegal campaign funding
2
1. Introduction
This study is based on three premises. 1) It is desirable that government
be responsive, considering that this happens when it forms and implements
policies according to the preferences of most of the citizens; 2) Responsiveness
varies according to the choices and actions of actors who hold political power
bestowed by the popular vote; and 3) Democratic institutions, supported by a
mass culture compatible with democratic values, should work to create the
possibility and increase the probability that this responsiveness is effective
(from Dahl, 1977).
It is known, however, that the existence of corrupt practices affects
responsiveness, paramount to quality of democracy. Therefore, the intent is to
examine how the electoral dimension of vertical accountability — an essential
mechanism to the functioning of a democratic system through which voters can
reward or punish political actors who act either in agreement or in disagreement
with their preferences — operates on political corruption and is influenced by it,
with particular attention to the phenomenon of illegal campaign slush funding.
To some extent, this study reassesses the somewhat consensus around the
good reputation elections in Brazil have, from the perspective of its
effectiveness in the coercion of political corrupt practices, aiming at improving
quality of democracy in our country.
Both phenomena studied here - campaign slush funding and political
corruption - are illegal practices and, therefore, treated as secret by the actors
who perform them, giving no publicity of their acts and taking all necessary
measures not to leave any tracks. The consequent scarcity of empirical data
imposed limitations that led to the adoption of an unorthodox methodology,
compatible with the empirical difficulties found during the research on the
subject. This was based on descriptive observations of the phenomena studied
from interviews, newspapers and, in some cases, survey data, when available. I
acknowledge the analytical limitations of such an option in the light of both
academic and scientific terms. Nevertheless, given the relevance of the topic,
the intention here is to give an initial contribution towards a better knowledge of
the phenomena analyzed and approached in this study, and, at the same time,
define an agenda for future research on the topic. Despite the impossibility of
empirical confirmation of the hypotheses suggested here, this study intends to
be relevant by bringing light possible and/or probable mechanisms in an attempt
to explain the phenomena of political corruption and campaign slush funding,
discarding logically irrelevant hypotheses of action. This reduction in the
universe of possibilities aims at assisting the development of research
methodologies that allow an empirical study of the topic in the future.
2. Political corruption
The word “corruption” has a wide range of meanings. Fernando Filgueiras
notes that "there is not, in the tradition of Western political thought, consensus
as to what corruption really is" (2008-a, p. 353, our translation). Before modern
history, the word corruption was used mainly in a moral sense. It was most
commonly used with regard to corruption of values, perversion or depravity.
3
Even today, the reflexive form of the term has a similar connotation: to corrupt
one self means to give up values and beliefs in response to some material or
immaterial stimulus, whether positive or negative. The concept of corruption
used in this study does not incorporate the morality which is sometimes
attributed to the expression. As highlighted by Filgueiras, "in what concerns the
concept of corruption, the realm of modern science has provided a turning point
in its linguistic meaning, as it detaches the problem of corruption from the moral
problem of virtues" (2008-b, p. 67, our translation). Renato Janine Ribeiro
seems to agree, stating that "ancient corruption was of morals. Modern
corruption is related to the private appropriation of public funds, to the theft of
public property, reduced to public treasury" (Ribeiro, 2006, p. 78, our
translation).
Hence, it is essential, before going any further, to adopt a definition that
provides the necessary limits and contours for the discussion of such
phenomenon. For the purpose of this study, I will adopt the technical definition
given by Daniel Treisman, to whom political corruption is "defined here as the
misuse of public office for private gain" (2000, p. 2). Thus, political corruption
occurs when something public is sold in return for private gain. The definition of
corruption, therefore, is very similar to bribery as listed by some dictionaries.
The word “misuse” above enables a certain interpretative flexibility in
relation to what standards should be used to define it. Fernando Filgueiras
pinpoints the main normative aspect in the characterization of such kind of
misuse. According to the author, corruption, in modern societies, cannot be
defined in moral terms. He justifies his assertion by arguing that
there can be no consensus as to moral values, thus value can be defensible, given
that complex societies are necessarily plural societies permeated by diverging,
reasonable doctrines, which enable different types of judgment by the actors. (...)
This disagreement inhibits institutions from admitting values. In complex societies,
notwithstanding, order takes place through an overlapped constitutional
consensus, designed to absorb the sources of disagreement and judgments to
process them towards stability (...). Saying, therefore, that a certain political order
is corrupt, or that an actor performs an act of corruption, is to gather, in this
assertion, norms that are in the normative consensus plan, around behavioral
expectations (2008-b, p. 88-89, p. 92, our translation).
Gianfranco Pasquino, in Dicionário da Política (Bobbio, Matteucci and
Pasquino, 2007), reinforces the relevance of the normative component in the
definition of corruption, explaining that corruption
designates the phenomenon by which a civil servant is moved to act in a different
way from the normative standards of the system, favoring private interests in return
for compensation. Thus, corrupt is the illegal behavior of someone who plays a role
in the governmental structure (2010, p. 291, our translation).
Taken into account the centrality of institutions, Mauro Campos'
observation is cause for some concern, when the author says that "despite the
discomfort that crises involving electoral corruption cause in democracies, they
always end up winning a connotation much more moral and less institutional"
(2009, p. 206, our translation). This can be interpreted as a sign that the
institutions dedicated to monitoring compliance with the rules regulating
corruption may not be functioning properly.
4
In particular, the focus here is the corruption practiced by elected political
actors or public officials appointed by them, acting on their request or behalf. By
this definition, it is clear the intention not to include forms of corruption which
occur in the private sector, nor those that, even involving public goods, are
practiced by bureaucrats or administrative public officials who are not
characterized as political actors1. Such exclusions are meant to allow all efforts
of this study to focus on the political aspects of corruption, on its main actors
and on its consequences to the quality of democracy.
2.1. Levels of political corruption in Brazil
Corruption is a difficult phenomenon to be measured. Most efforts in
Political Science are in the direction of measuring its perception, which can be
obtained by opinion survey. According to the CPI (Corruption Perceptions
Index), published by Transparency International2, in 2011, Brazil occupied the
73rd position among 182 countries assessed in that edition, with a CPI of 3.8 on
a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean) - stable in comparison to the
previous year. The top-ranked countries are New Zealand, Denmark, Finland,
Sweden and Singapore, with CPIs between 9.5 and 9.2, and the bottom-ranked
are Afghanistan, Myanmar, North Korea and Somalia, all with scores from 1.5
downwards. In the same range as Brazil are Samoa and Macedonia, just
above, and Italy, Tunisia, China and Romania, right below. Other countries that
deserve attention due to its comparative relevance to Brazil are the United
States with a CPI of 7.1, in 24th place, Mexico and Argentina, tied in 100th with
3.0, Russia in 143rd with 2.4, and Venezuela in 172nd, with 1.9.
The perception of corruption in Brazil, as measured by the CPI, seems to
be in line with the descriptive remarks made by political scientists on the high
levels of corruption in our country, who often point to a worrying tendency
towards further degradation of current conditions. Quoting Matthew Taylor, José
Álvaro Moisés calls attention to the fact that
corruption permeates (...) all spheres of public life in Brazil, featuring a relatively
out-of-control situation, that is, of endemic nature, for which the political system has
not yet been able to develop effective institutional antibodies (2008, p. 19, our
translation).
Filgueiras says
corruption has become a kind of ordinary practice in politics, especially in its
representative dimension, in which the lack of responsiveness implies the fact that
its uncovering generates an endemic of delinquencies of the public man (2008, p.
167, our translation).
Rogério Arantes diagnoses that
1
2
1 the act of corruption committed by a police officer, who receives bribes in exchange for not fining a
driver, does not characterize political corruption for the purpose of this study, under such definition.
2 http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/#CountryResults, as of April, 2012.
5
corruption in Brazil is widely spread among diverse sectors of public administration
and political institutions. (...)The picture that the police operations analyzed here
paint of corruption in Brazil is terrifying (2010, p. 35).
Fernando Henrique Cardoso says that corruption "is well alive", causing
enormous damages. According to the former President
from a certain level of its existence and, worse, from tactical acceptance of its
practices as "facts of life", if corruption does not consume the country, it deforms it
to an unacceptable standard. We are approaching this threshold. (...) The day will
come — if there is no reaction— when corruption will be a condition of
governability, as it occurs in the so-called narco-states. Not, of course, because of
drug trafficking and gambling (which can also propagate), but due to the availability
of the use of the pen to sign service orders or important contracts3.
3. Corruption effects on the quality of democracy
Passed thirty years of the so-called third wave of democratization, the
attention of democracy scholars is no longer so focused on the transition to
democratic regimes or to their consolidation and stabilization, as was the case
in the 80s and 90s, respectively. “As a number of commentators and scholars
have pointed out, democracy has triumphed as the only game in town (Morlino,
2009, p. 211). But many of these democracies, no longer so new, are still highly
imperfect or incomplete like Russia, in Eastern Europe, Venezuela, in Latin
America, and Pakistan, in the Middle East. This has led social scientists and
practitioners of democracy to turn their attention to the means of assessing
quality of democracy. Pipa Norris notes that by the end of the 20th century, the
greater concern was in relation to the quality of democratic governments in
semi-democracies, and not so much with its persistence and stability (1999).
Accepting democracy as a moral good, if not an imperative for people’s
commonwealth and realization, enhancing its quality to the full establishment of
freedom and equality became the desirable goal of good performance to be
adopted in the evaluation of democratic institutions.
Quality of democracy, according to Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino,
can be assessed through eight dimensions: rule of law, vertical accountability,
responsiveness, freedom, equality, participation, competition and horizontal
accountability. The authors recognize this is not a closed list, and that the
different aspects of democratic quality integrate and overlap. They suggest that
democratic quality can be thought of as a system, in which improvements in one
dimension can have diffuse benefits for others (and vice versa). At the same time,
however, there are some times tradeoffs between the different dimensions of the
democratic quality, and it is impossible to achieve each of them to the maximum
degree (2005, p. x).
While the authors point out to participation and competition as the engines
of democracy — for its transforming capacity within a political system — they
emphasize responsiveness as an essential element, “the results dimension”
(2005, p. xxix). Bingham Powell argues that “responsiveness (...) is one of the
justifications for democracy itself (2005, p. 62). He defines democratic
3
3 From the author’s column, published in Estado de São Paulo, April 1st, 2012, our translation.
6
responsiveness as “what occurs when the democratic process induces the
government to form and implement policies that the citizens want” (2005, p. 62).
Several authors discuss the impact of corruption on democracy. Moisés
draws attention to the scope of the effects of corruption going beyond the direct
relations with the State, due to the impact of political corruption on the rule of
law and participation as dimensions of the quality of democracy. He states that
the effects of corruption acceptance affect the quality of democracy: they reduce
adhesion to the regime, encourage the acceptance of authoritarian choices,
adversely influence the submission to the law and interpersonal trust, and inhibit
tendencies for political participation (2010, p. 35, our translation).
Bignotto says that "corruption is seen as a problem to Brazilian society,
largely because it is perceived as an extensive part of political life and not just in
one of its dimensions" (2006, p. 83, our translation). In this sense, the author
draws attention to a broader aspect of corruption, which "affects a State’s
citizens relationship with political life in general and not just with one of its most
easily identifiable instances" (2006, p. 83, our translation), which is the State.
Filgueiras lists four effects of corruption on democracy (2008-b, p. 159,
our translation):
1.
delegitimation of democratic institutions;
2.
growing distrust towards political elite;
3.
foundation of social inequality; and
4.
excessive centralization via the creation of a political elite who reproduces
itself in power.
It is possible to draw a parallel between the four effects listed by Filgueiras
and some of the eight dimensions of quality of democracy listed by Diamond
and Morlino. Legitimacy is closely linked to responsiveness, distrust leads to
less participation, social inequalities affect the equality between citizens and,
finally, the excessive centralization of power affects competition and, as a result,
vertical accountability.
3.1 - Legitimacy and responsiveness
The question of legitimacy deserves special attention because of its
connections with responsiveness. Morlino explains that
If the analysis has to focus on representative democracies, then responsiveness –
a core feature in the experience of representative democracy – can reasonably
become a truly central dimension, in so far as it makes it possible to check the
compatibility between decisions made, those actually implemented and the explicit
or non-explicit needs of citizens and civil society in general (2009, p. 214).
In his text on legitimacy and quality of democracy, Morlino even suggests
that “Perhaps the most effective method for measuring the dimension of
responsiveness is to examine the legitimacy of the government or the citizens’
7
perception of responsiveness, rather than the reality” (2009, p. 215). According
to the author’s definition,
legitimacy is a set of positive societal attitudes toward democratic institutions,
which are considered to be the most appropriate form of government. In other
words, there is legitimacy when there is a widespread belief among citizens that, in
spite of their shortcomings and failures, existing political institutions are better than
any others that might be established (2009, p. 211).
On the other hand, Filgueiras emphasizes the importance of normative
consensus that "expresses the fundamental values of moral in politics, which
ensure the legitimacy of the system" (2008-b, p. 142, our translation), by
pointing out a
common point to the democratic theories from the twentieth century: the legitimacy
of the democratic system is built based on the existence of stable constitutional
rules, in accordance with the support given by voters through regular and clean
elections. That is, the legitimacy of democracy is possible only from a formal model
(2008-b, p. 147, our translation).
Morlino reinforces the association of responsiveness with the legitimacy
explaining his assumption that
if there is responsiveness, there is also legitimacy in the form of specific legitimacy
or satisfaction; conversely, a lack of responsiveness implies varying degrees of
dissatisfaction. In other words, the empirical consequence of responsiveness is
specific legitimacy and vice versa (2009, p. 215).
According to Filgueiras, corruption "is the expression of illegitimacy,
becoming more common in times of crisis" (2008-b, p.142, our translation).
Concerning the objective limitations on the responsiveness of a
government towards its citizens, Morlino highlights a number of conditions
“shaped by the resources a government has at its disposal to respond to the
needs of its citizens” (2009, p. 215). In this context, let us consider a simple
example: the paving of a public road, made under the influence of political
corruption schemes, would cost much more to the treasury if not for this factor.
If in the example above we consider that budgetary resources are limited and
fixed, the overpricing should result in less miles asphalted than would be
possible to deliver to the population if there was no corruption. This means less
responsiveness. There is, however, another aspect of the impact of political
corruption to be considered: the influence on the definition of priorities for public
expenditure. In the above example, perhaps more damaging than those
remaining unpaved miles is the left undone implementation of some educational
technology in public schools or additional doctors for the local hospital, not
covered by budget allocation, which could be a priority for that community. It is
important to notice that political corruption affects how public budget priorities
are set in order to benefit companies that are more interested in a certain kind
of public expenditure than in others and are willing to pay bribes to have their
preferences served. This leads to government priorities not in alignment with
the preferences of the majority of the citizens4. As stressed by Diamond and
4
4 Example: scandal at the Ministry of Cities with alleged tampering of technical reports which originally
recommended investments in BRT (bus corridors) to recommend VTL (light rail trains) for triple the cost.
http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,gambiarras-para-a-copa-,828342,0.htm, April, 2012.
8
Morlino, "no government can afford for long to be fully responsive to all the
different demands from major constituencies for services, benefits and other
program expenditures. Governing responsibly — as opposed to purely
responsively — involves setting priorities and making difficult choices. One of
the most important aspects of responsiveness in a democracy is to infer from
the cacophony of policy commitments, election results, and interest group
demands precisely what ‘the electorate’s’ priorities are. Inevitably, some groups
will be disappointed” (2005, p. xxx).
3.2. Trust and participation
Whereas Morlino assembles the bivalence shown above between
legitimacy and responsiveness, Filgueiras suggests a causal relationship
between distrust and loss of legitimacy. According to the author,
if accountability mechanisms for politicians are not created in democratic
institutions, delegitimation will be at the risk of increasing. Corruption contributes to
a growing delegitimation of democratic institutions by reducing the trust accredited
by citizens (2008-b, p. 160, our translation).
This distrust which Filgueiras projects mainly on the political elite is
considered by some authors as having a broader scope, reaching the political
regime itself and democratic institutions. According to Moisés, "research results
indicate that corruption is one of the factors responsible for increasing citizens'
distrust upon democratic institutions" (2010, p. 35-36, our translation). Diamond
and Morlino state that
In fact, these latter trends - the broad decline of public confidence in government
and political institutions, the growing citizen alienation from political parties in
particular, and the wide spread perception that democratic governments and
politicians are increasingly corrupt, self-interested and unresponsive – are common
to many democracies, new and old, and have even led prominent scholars to
speak of a ‘crisis of democracy’” (2005, p. ix).
In his study on the effects of corruption on the quality of democracy in
Brazil, Moisés makes use of analytical models with high explanatory capacity to
conclude that "the less people trust democratic institutions the more they view
corruption as a part of the political system" (2010, p. 31, our translation).
Pipa Norris believes that there is a growing mistrust in democratic
institutions and regimes all over the world, which can be observed in old or
recently established democracies (1999). William Mishler and Richard Rose
point out that there are even more reasons for concern on recent and
transitional democratic regimes, and about partial or incomplete semidemocracies, highly faulty, in which excessive skepticism may hinder their
consolidation and advancement — since, according to the authors, for the
survival of democratic regimes and the fostering of participation quality and
quantity, there should always be confidence in democratic values (2005). A
prolonged distrust can have a huge impact on the belief in such democratic
values. Moisés alerts us that
9
if citizens manifest themselves incapable of realizing that corruption exists and
understanding the implications of corruption to democracy, or if they disqualify the
fact that it is object of contest by the media and political opposition, it is likely that
its existence - and its continuity in time - will put in check the foundations of the
democratic system (2008, our translation).
Warning us about the general dissatisfaction caused by corruption that
might lead to a total disbelief in the fundamental values of democracy, Cardoso
comments that “the danger, notwithstanding, is the surge of an expectation that
an authoritarian leader or a savior party be the antidote to restrain the
dissemination of such practices5.
Diamond and Morlino point out that
A common subversion comes through the apathy of a citizenry that doubts the
efficacy of democratic mechanisms or has become alienated from the democratic
process as a result of the low quality of democracy in other respects (for example,
corruption, abuse of Power and a lack of competitiveness). Of course, such
systemic flaws can, under the right conditions of popular outrage and effective civic
mobilization, generate increases in participation, but in the absence of viable
reform alternatives, they induce civic withdrawal (2005, p. xvii).
To Misher and Rose, confidence in institutions is indispensable for the
survival and effective functioning of democracy (2005). According to Norris,
poor performances of successive democratic governments could erode the
belief in democratic values (1999). Mishler and Rose point out that poor
economical and political performances are the main cause of people’s disbelief
in institutions of a regime (2001). While the former is typically considered the
main source, attention given to political performance has been growing — which
includes the protection of civil rights, establishment of the rule of law and
remission of corruption (Mishler and Rose, 2005). More specifically for new or
transitional democratic regimes, according to these authors, corruption is the
most common political performance indicator. Whether or not the most
important, it is a frequent and well disseminated indicator in these regimes.
Indeed, although it is highly unlikely that corruption in advanced
democracies might erode public support for democracy as the most desirable
form of government, there are fewer reasons to expect this unwavering
commitment to democracy in Latin American countries. Most Latin Americans
seem genuinely ambivalent or hostile towards democracy as a form of
government — according to Latinobarometer survey 20026, only 56% of
respondents completely support democracy in the region (Canache and Allison,
2003). The same survey in 2009 shows a slight increase at 59% —
nevertheless, still below the historical peak of the series started in 1995, which
was 63% in 1997. In his researches, Alberto Almeida ascertains that
Brazilians have very little faith in others, but enormous trust in their family (13%
trust or rely on most people, 34% on friends, 88% on the family). (...) It is clear that
Brazilians do not care, or don’t give importance to associative politics. The
reflection is as harmful in the consolidation as in the construction of the identity of
political associations (2006, p. 48, our translation).
5
5 From the author’s column, published in Estado de São Paulo, April 1st, 2012, our translation.
6
6 http://www.latinobarometro.org, on December 1st, 2010.
10
Based on a widening of the analysis horizon, Bignotto also sees corruption
as a threat to the foundations of democracy. According to him,
one can conclude that, in Brazil, if corruption is to a great extent the effect of
unlawful conduct by public officials, it is a phenomenon that affects much broader
sectors of our society and threatens to disrupt the constitutional balance, attacking
some of its fundamental principles (2006, p. 85, our translation).
The author argues that this broadened concept is closer to the concerns of
ordinary citizens, and helps to portrait corruption as a threat to the foundations
of democracy.
In Brazil, the crisis of confidence in democratic institutions and political
actors seems quite acute. Citizens, in general, have an extremely negative view
of politicians. In his research, Almeida found that 50% of the Brazilian electorate
believes that all politicians are corrupt (2006). According to the 1995-1997
World Value Survey, 58.9% of respondents in Brazil believe that all public
officials engage in corruption, and other 23.5% believe that most do (Canache
and Allison, 2003). Norris points out to additional effects of such growing
cynicism, since this could lead to lower political engagement and prevent
amongst the elite the best and brightest from entering public service (1999).
According to Filgueiras,
just as democratic institutions suffer the effects of corruption, the political and
partisan elite does not have prestige with the electorate. (...) Since democracy is a
method of establishing a political elite, its relation to corruption lowers the political
participation. Moreover, a fragmentation of the party system takes place, as
political elite is split (2008-b, p. 161, our translation).
In other words, the lack of prestige of political leaders reduces citizen
participation in the democracy which is responsible for establishing such
leaders.
3.3. Social and political inequalities
Another effect of corruption on democracy mentioned on the literature, the
third on Filgueiras' list (2008-b, p. 159), is the deepening of social inequalities.
This effect correlates with equality in quality of democracy as put forward by
Diamond and Morlino. Although the later has been thought mostly in terms of
political equality, Dietrich Rueschemeyer notes that the structures of social and
economic equality are intertwined with political equality (2005). Dahl's
democratic ideals suggest a point of contact between equality and
responsiveness, by demanding "the continuous responsiveness of government
to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals" (Dahl, 1977, p.
25, our translation). Rueschemeyer indicates that
It bears repeating that much more is at stake here than the role of money in
electoral campaigns. The wealthy have tremendous influence on all phases of
policy making and policy implementation even if direct corruption is under control,
which of course is not in many countries (2005, p. 55).
Filgueiras says that
11
corruption has distributional effects depending on the relationship between the
State and the private sector. Systems of bribery and kickback payments create
market asymmetries, thus undermining democracy in the sense of allocation of
public resources. The larger share of earnings is accumulated by the winners of
corruption schemes, leaving the social basis with a smaller share (2008-b, p. 161,
our translation).
One might add that it also undermines democracy by generating unequal
opportunities for intervention in the political process and the State for citizens
who do not have economic power and do not participate in corruption schemes.
Campos suggests the existence of a similar concentration mechanism:
to the private sector, the inclusion in the political spectrum by means of cash
contributions can lead to profit opportunities which results could be the very
distortion of free market competition, given the degree of previous influence of
certain individuals or social groups. In this sense, there would be a clear political
inequality, which could be translated into concentrated benefits to some and diffuse
costs to all others (2009, p. 21, our translation).
Analyzing the high costs of electoral campaigns and their forms of
financing, David Samuels concludes that "the analysis of the sources of
campaign funds in Brazil gives us an empirical basis for asserting that the
interests of business elite influence elections and the political process as well"
(Samuels, 2006, p. 139, our translation). The author points out the fact that
although power has historically been concentrated in the hands of a few in Brazil,
democratic competition offers the popular possibility in government policies.
However, the Brazilian out-of-control system of campaign financing (…) tends to
perpetuate the status quo by further tightening bonds between conservative
political elite and business interests as well as limiting the capacity of new interests
in having voice in the Brazilian representative institutions (2006, p. 152, our
translation).
Although this author has specified conservative political elite, it seems that
such a comment is valid even with the so-called progressive political elite. In
any case, one can probably say that any elite is conservative in itself,
regardless of its ideological positioning towards society.
As Filgueiras concludes, "corruption, from the economic viewpoint, has
harmful effects on democracy, since it strengthens an unequal system of public
resources allocation" (2008-b, p. 161, our translation).
By analyzing the authors studied here, one can assume a mechanism that
feeds itself, operating as follows: socioeconomic inequality implies political
inequality. Such disproportionate representation, amplified by political
corruption, favors the established elite, increasing the concentration of wealth
through its influence on the State's distributive mechanisms, leading to greater
social inequalities.
3.4. Competition and centralization of political power
The fourth effect of political corruption on democracy listed by Filgueiras is
"excessive centralization by creating a political elite which reproduces itself in
power" (2008-b, p. 159, our translation). The author elaborates that
12
Corruption contributes to an excessive centralization of power as it enables the
hegemony of a political elite, which is rooted in command by manipulating political
access in exchange for other economic gains. In other words, corruption enables
the reproduction of a political elite which entrenches itself in power, controlling
economic opportunities as a result of low competition, aiming to control the access
to public offices and the prevention of substantially political openings (2008-b , p.
162, our translation).
In face of this formulation, it becomes clear that this effect has a direct
impact on the competition, as a dimension of democratic quality.
Filgueiras describes low competition as part of the mechanism capable of
leading a political elite in power towards hegemony. At least in Brazil, other
authors have a different understanding, that there is intense competition.
According to Samuels, "expensive political campaigns are indications of intense
political competition" (2006, p. 148, our translation). Even though, the author
believes that the obvious importance of money for electoral success has much
more negative than positive implications for democracy in Brazil. Samuels
reinforces the idea of the hegemony phenomenon suggested by Filgueiras, by
explaining how the historical concentration of power in the hands of a few tends
to be perpetuated by the out-of-control Brazilian campaign system (2006).
Perhaps the conciliation of these thoughts can be found in Bruno Speck's view,
which points to the distortion of electoral competition from the distribution of
resources, for the following reasons:
[1] economic power of candidates who self-finance; [2] abuse of State resources to
fund unilaterally governing parties or candidates, and [3] unequal access to private
finance (2006, p. 154, our translation).
According to Almeida,
the best explanation for the variation in available resources — in which the minority
has plenty, and the majority has little — is in the marriage between politics and
public administration. There are compelling evidences that the higher the insertion
of the party in government jobs, the greater the ability to raise private and public
funds (2006, p. 84, our translation).
In other words, there seems to be in Brazil an intense political competition,
evidenced by the large amounts spent on electoral campaigns. This competition
is, however, distorted by disproportionate amounts of money spent on
campaigns by empowered political elite, which would raise such resources
through the practice of political corruption during the exercise of their political
power. The fact that actors holding political power are encouraged by this
intense competition to practice political corruption affects, as has been seen,
the quality of democracy.
4. The (in)effectiveness of vertical accountability in punishing corruption
Taking responsiveness as a central dimension of democratic quality, and
considering the negative impact of political corruption on it, as previously
discussed, and the importance of elections as a paramount institution for the
functioning of a representative democracy, we are led to investigate the
effectiveness of vertical accountability as an instrument for inhibiting corrupt
13
behavior by politicians. This requires the definition of parameters to examine
such effectiveness. I propose, in this study, the concept of vertical accountability
being effective in the prevention of political corruption if one can observe a
significant rejection by the electorate of candidates or parties who have
committed political corruption during the period between elections, thus
reducing their chances of maintaining or expanding political power in electoral
races. In other words, the vertical accountability operates effectively against
political corruption when voters punish the political actors who perform it,
denying them the vote and not re-electing them.
This study suggests a mechanism to explain a voter's decision to punish
corruption, which is based on the satisfaction of three necessary conditions,
namely:
1.
The voter must have access to information about the candidate having
performed corruption acts while holding a mandate in elective office, as a
political actor in the period between elections;
2.
The voter must see this as a priority problem in relation to other criteria - a
bad thing to be avoided. He/she needs to feel encroached or betrayed by
the political candidate due to the act of corruption; and
3.
It is essential for the voter to see alternatives that are acceptable and valid,
feeling able to identify those candidates who are corrupt and those who are
not. In order to punish a candidate or a party, the voter has, at least, to
believe that he is able to distinguish between more and less corrupt
candidates or parties, thus, punishing one by voting for the other.
The first of such conditions, access to information, depends, as discussed
before, on the proper functioning of horizontal accountability, through which
control agencies, parliament and opposing parties monitor the political actors in
office and denounce irregularities. In this process, it is fundamental the role
played by the media, which must be free, accessible to different political views
and active in publicizing them, in order to strengthen both horizontal and vertical
accountability, since it facilitates the connection between them, as it informs
voters about the findings of control agencies, parliament and opposing parties.
In Brazil, given the high volume of corruption scandals the media,
including mass media, we can say that access to information is working. The
press has good access to control agencies and the judiciary, thanks to
guarantees for the protection of the source, and has managed to offer society
data and facts from police investigations and court proceedings, including
wiretapping and videos, which help make up enough evidence to meet this
condition satisfactorily. News on corruption reaches most voters, at least in
those cases that have become greatly notorious.
The second condition, that voters give relative importance to corruption,
may not be met in the same proportion. Although Moisés recognizes that there
is insufficient research on the relationship between citizens' perceptions and
attitudes towards corruption and its consequences for the functioning of
democracy — and that more recent studies, in addition to not presenting
conclusive results, have seldom addressed objectively the voters' approach to
14
corruption, and the consequences of this relationship towards quality of
democracy — he asserts that the reaction of the Brazilian electorate to
corruption evidences has generated considerable concern about the
effectiveness of vertical accountability as a means of preserving and improving
the quality of democracy (2008). The signs of permissiveness by Brazilian
voters regarding corruption evidences have a strong negative effect on the
incentives that political actors are subject to when making decisions during their
mandates in between elections periods.
Moisés sees signs of such permissiveness when he acknowledges that, in
spite of Luis Inacio Lula da Silva government having been shaken in mid-2005
by a severe political crisis caused by corruption scandals involving his scheme
of parliamentary support as well as his party and his most important ministers,
Lula was re-elected in 2006 with over 60% of votes from the electorate, which
suggests that, although the vote is the most direct accountability instrument over
elected officials available to citizens, the majority of Brazilian voters does not relate
the misuse of public resources for private purposes to the deficits in the quality of
democracy in the country, or, worse, does not attach importance to it (2008, p. 1,
our translation).
Almeida's researches between 1998 and 2002 point out that corruption
was only considered a major problem in Brazil, on average, by 2% of voters
(2008).
Data from previous studies by the same author also suggest that the third
and last condition for the effectiveness of vertical accountability in the
prevention of political corruption has not been seen to, that is, the electorate's
perception that there are viable alternatives that allow punishing corrupt actors
by voting for candidates or parties who are not corrupt. Almeida found that 49%
of the Brazilian electorate think honest politicians do not succeed in politics;
41% think it is best to quickly solve a population problem, even if it is necessary
to pay bribes; 39% think the politician who does a lot and steals a little deserves
to be voted for; 39% think a very honest politician does not know how to govern;
and 33% think that it makes no difference whether a politician steals or not, as
long as he does the things that people need (2006). These results led Almeida
to conclude that "there is huge tolerance for the private use of what is public,
inasmuch as this happens, from the solidarity viewpoint, in order to improve the
situation of our fellowmen" (2006-b, p. 46, our translation). Moisés warns that
to believe that all political leaders are corrupt, and that corruption is justified
because many politicians practice it (...) does not help democracy to improve its
quality, because the electoral options guided by this attitude, as they are presented
to society, simply assume there is no possibility of political change (2008, p. 3, our
translation).
Thus, it is observed that the average voter in Brazil has sufficient and
appropriate access to information about political corruption and its actors.
However, such voter does not seem to connect these facts to the pretermission
of their own preferences in favor of the preferences of the financiers of the
political class, or does not give much importance to it. Given this and the
perception that there are no viable alternatives available, the voter develops a
tolerance for corruption, which has an impact on the effectiveness of vertical
15
accountability in improving quality of democracy by reducing political corruption7
— a reduction that would allow increasing responsiveness of governments to
the preferences of the majority of its citizens, instead of the preferences of the
financiers of the political class. The disregard of the corrupt criteria makes
voters more susceptible to massive investments in political marketing,
increasing the pressure for funds on the political actors as candidates.
5. Vote decision and political marketing
Although it is impossible to fully understand the voter decision process,
and knowing that the actual measurement of most factors is impractical, it is
possible to identify the influence of some isolated factors. It seems valid to
consider that such factors act on voter's behavior, knowing that the relative
influence varies from one election to another. In the midst of all these factors,
there is the image of candidates or political parties as preconceived by voters.
Such image, whose conception and manipulation are the aim of political
marketing in electoral campaigns, demands large sums to be build and
maintained. "It is known that the weight of money in elections is not negligible,
which tends to concentrate the electoral success in the hands of political parties
(or candidates) with better access to financial resources" (Campos, 2009, p. 16,
our translation).
The recent growth of political and electoral marketing professionalization,
as pointed out by Silvia Cervellini (2000), is one of the ways in which money
spent on campaign influences the electoral process, as the best and most
talented professionals and advertising agencies are attracted by opportunities
for financial gain and prestige for their careers. Another way is in the creation
and proliferation of training courses and post-graduations in Political Marketing.
The financial resources of a political campaign are spent in the process of
convincing voters through political marketing, which goes beyond rational
persuasion by understanding and alignment to voters’ preferences, focusing
more on forging perceptions, creating empathy, exploiting fears, hopes or other
emotional and subconscious factors, and conquering by insistence and
repetition. Practices aimed at affection, which are common in commercial
marketing — where, although explicit false or misleading advertising is no
longer tolerated, it is clear that society still allows and accepts as ethical such a
fanciful advertising full of subjective allegations — more and more applied in
political marketing. According to Jerry Palmer, there is a common analogy
between commercial marketing and political marketing. The main elements
within both are competition, product, communication channels and persuasion.
The following basic rule applies in both cases: "know the product, know the
competition, understand the audience" (Palmer, 2002, p. 351). Following the same
reasoning, Cervellini (2000) lists the convergence points between political
marketing and products: 1) similarity in the action focus: the person; 2) similarity
in the social role: regulating/organizing the competition;3) similarity in the action
7
7 Out of 25 candidates for 2010 elections involved in 17 corruption scandals surveyed by O Estado de
São Paulo, as published on August 8th, 2010, 15 candidates had enough votes to be elected (although
some were rejected), 2 gave up running and only 8 did not have enough votes.
http://www.estadao.com.br/estadaodehoje/20100808/not_imp592058,0.php, on January 11th, 2011.
16
result: influencing/determining a choice;4) similarities in the action environment:
opinions, beliefs and values. Renato Janine Ribeiro offers an explanation for
voters' susceptibility towards political marketing, comparing it with consumer's
susceptibility towards commercial marketing:
voters do not decide their votes by analytical reasoning, examining the various
political promises, but by affection (...), which is legitimate, since votes essentially
represent values (...), the problem is in the affection hijacking by the media, which
increases the campaign costs even when advertising is free" (2006, p. 79, our
translation).
5.1. Electoral campaigns high costs and the power of money in elections
One of the key elements connecting political corruption to electoral
accountability ineffectiveness is the high cost of campaigns. According to David
Samuels "conventional wisdom says that money counts a lot in politics" (2006,
p. 133, our translation). As it is expensive to keep or expand political power,
candidates and parties are encouraged to practice political corruption in order to
raise enough campaign funds to turn them competitive. In this sense, the
existence of elections has a side effect opposite to its original democratic intent,
since (as already discussed) political corruption deteriorates the quality of
democracy. It is relevant then to examine how expensive campaigns are in
Brazil, and what factors affect their costs.
Samuels notes that Brazilian elections are extremely expensive in
comparative perspective (2006), especially taking into account that in Brazil the
official figures underestimate the real value of a campaign, due to illegal,
undeclared campaign funds. The declared costs by them selves would be
higher than in most other countries, and presidential elections in Brazil are
almost as expensive as in the U.S. (Samuels, 2006), at least those prior to the
election of President Barack Obama in 2008. Campos stresses that
money represents an increasingly important component of electoral success, and
political parties, as well as candidates, need, in every campaign, more money in
order to succeed in their electoral races (2009, p. 16, our translation).
According to TSE8 (Superior Electoral Court), the total cost for all
campaigns of all candidates roughly doubled every four years from 2002 to
2010; that is, R$ 676 million in 2002 and R$ 3,230 million in 2010. The cost of
local elections has always exceeded the amount declared for state/federal
elections 2 years before, forming a growing exponential sequence. It is
important to emphasize, however, the possibility of some level of distortion in
such temporal analysis, because an increase in "legal" donations may
represent a partial migration of donations made off the books in previous
elections, without representing an actual increase in total donations. Although
common sense points to a significant increase in electoral campaigns costs,
one cannot take the official data from TSE alone as evidence.
Wendy Hunter also said that Brazil is a country where political campaigns
are among the most expensive in the world, where money greatly influences the
8
8 Data from 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 http://www.asclaras.org.br, ONG Transparência Brasil; and data
from 2010, TSE, http://www.tse.gov.br, both consulted on December 30th, 2010.
17
chances of succeeding, and where the financing of a campaign suffers little
legal intervention. According to the author, this behavior favors even more the
relationship between conservative political elite and the interests of the
business class (2007). It may be noted that this relationship also occurs with the
so-called progressive political elite, just as the author herself leads us to
conclude during the course of her study about the physiological behavior of the
Workers' Party (PT) from 1995 on.
Literature suggests a few reasons for the high costs of electoral
campaigns in Brazil, which reinforce the crucial dominant role of money on
elections outcome in Brazil. One of these reasons is the use of open lists in
case of proportional legislative elections. Candidates for proportional seats —
city councilmen, state and federal legislators — have to distinguish themselves
individually, raising and spending funds in order to build a personalized voting
base through favors, gifts and other benefits (Samuels, 2006). The open list
tends to encourage campaigns centered on candidates who seek to strengthen
their attributes (personal reputation) so they can be distinguished from their
colleagues or from the political party common attributes (partisan reputation)
(Nicolau, 2002). IUPERJ-2002 research showed that for 92% of voters, voting
for federal legislator, the candidate was more important than his political party
(Nicolau, 2007).
Analyzing samples from 1994, 1998 and 2002 elections, Nicolau (2007)
observed that the number of federal legislators who were not re-elected
because they were defeated by other candidates from the opened list of the
same party or coalition is higher than those who were not re-elected because of
their political party performance. These facts can be interpreted as a strong
evidence of intense competition between candidates of the same party. And this
competition makes elections much more expensive, for politicians do not have
inexpensive ways to reach voters, of which the most obvious would be the
partisan appeal, based on programs and platforms (Samuels, 2006).
Another problem with the open lists is the possibility of coalition between
parties, which reduces the predictability of election results, making it difficult for
voters to reward or punish a candidate for his or her performance, since
candidates can increase their vote and yet not be re-elected, while others may
get a lower number of votes and still ensure their re-election (Nicolau, 2002).
Campos emphasizes that
such uncertainties about election results also populate the minds of political actors
and can lead them to adopt measures which may maximize their chances of
accessing elective offices. One form of access is to increase the availability of
resources to be spent in electoral disputes, which may induce political actors to
accept commitments during campaigns (2009, p. 16, our translation).
The need for significant financial resources can lead to a dependency
relationship between political actors, candidates and parties on one side and
powerful economical groups on the other. In a survey conducted by Época
Magazine, 64.3% of all congressmen believe to be very slim the chances of an
ordinary citizen to be elected to the House of Representatives without the
support of corporate economic or religious group, and 86.1% find even slimmer
18
the same chances towards the Federal Senate 9. This financial barrier into
political power may be behind Helio Jaguaribe's observation that "there are
more corrupt people being elected than elected officials who become corrupt"10.
Dimitri Vlassis, Corruption and Economic Crime Branch Chief at the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), stated, while alerting
about 2010 presidential elections in Brazil, that "campaign financing is a key
problem in many countries. The higher the costs, the greater the risks (of
corruption)”11. According to Campos,
in modern democracies, electoral programs increasingly assume a complex and
expensive character, with the use of sophisticated television features and with high
degrees of professionalization through electoral marketing12. Thus, as they
represent a significant amount, the advertising costs for political parties and
candidates can become a differential in electoral competition. Therefore, spending
on advertisement and media becomes one of the major attributes of electoral
competition, and may have an effective impact on voters choices (2009, p. 61-62,
our translation).
The voter's relative tolerance to evidences of corruption (as discussed
before) coupled with the demand for funds, due to the increasing importance of
political marketing in the competitiveness and effectiveness of electoral
campaigns, create a powerful persuasive mechanism, influencing the political
actor towards the practice of political corruption, especially when considering
the relative ineffectiveness of electoral justice in curbing the use of campaign
slush funds, as elaborated later in this study.
6. Illegal slush funds in electoral campaigns
This study adopts Speck's definition for electoral campaign financing:
"the material resources used by competitors in popular elections (parties and
candidates) in order to organize the campaign and convince citizens to give
them their vote" (2006, p. 153, our translation). Therefore, the following are not
regarded as campaign financing: resources used to finance regular party
organizations, the cost of public administration responsible for conducting and
supervising the electoral process itself, or the remuneration of elected
representatives. The author points out that
although financial resources tend to become the most usual currency in the
material support to political campaigns, other support materials are quite common.
Companies make automobiles available to candidates, and provide t-shirts and
other goods. Service providers help with discounts on research, advertising or
other valuable resources for campaigns (Speck, 2006, p. 154, our translation).
9
9 Época Magazine interview, published in July 6th, 2009.
1
10 Interview published in March 8th, 2009, by O Estado de São Paulo, our translation.
1
11 Interview published on March 20th, 2010, by O Estado de São Paulo, our translation.
1
12 Literally, the use of "political marketing" outweigh by far the expression "electoral marketing" used in
this case. Although there may be a difference in meaning, it is deemed irrelevant for this study.
19
Campaign slush funds are here defined as private donations intended to
finance electoral campaigns whose true sources are not declared to the
electoral justice - TSE, as required by law. The specificity of "true source" aims
to classify as slush funds those donations from undeclared donors which gain
legal appearance by being declared by the so-called "stooge" donors13, who
accept the responsibility of donations made by others who do not want to be
identified or exposed.
Even if such component adds difficulty to any measuring effort, there is
evidence that leaving it out would be a meaningful omission, as suggested by
an investigation carried out in 2009 by TSE and the Receita Federal14, which
pointed out that 18,300 companies and individuals had made campaign
donations to candidates for deputy, senator, governor and president, in the 2006
elections, above the legal limit15. This number represents 13.3% of all donors,
totalizing R$ 328 million or 20.9% of all the declared donations for all 2006
campaigns.
It is not automatic to deduce that such donations by companies which do
not have income to justify them or by citizens who in many cases don’t even
declare their income are mostly illegal funds made legal by stooge donors. Nor
is it possible to apply scientific methods based on empirical evidence to confirm
if these official donors are indeed stooges acting in lieu of donors of slush
funds. However, this suspicion is very plausible, if not probable. According to
Pedro Paulo Grubits, the electoral regional general prosecutor of Mato Grosso
do Sul state, "the more unequal the value of the donation as to that reported to
the tax authority, the greater the probability that it represents campaign slush
funds"16. The change in donors behavior in the subsequent 2008 and 2010
elections supports this explanatory theory: by analyzing the amounts declared
for campaigns for governor and mayor in the three largest states in Brazil and
their respective capitals, one can observe that the donations made to political
parties, and from the parties to their candidates, which the media then called
hidden donations, almost quadrupled, from R$ 68.4 million in 2006 to R$ 251.4
million in 2008. These donations to parties are not subject to the limits imposed
to donations made directly to candidates, freeing possible "stooges" from the
scrutiny of the electoral justice. In 2010, when the electoral court began to
demand information from the source of the money donated by parties to their
candidates, another change in the behavior of donors was observed, with
record number of millionaire donations made by candidates to their own
campaigns — again, these are not subject to legal limits, thus facilitating the
questionable donations to campaign slush funds. In this case, the candidate
would allegedly be acting as his own "stooge". In 2010, unprecedented thirty
1
1
1
1
13 "Stooge" is here used in its popular meaning, as to the person who accepts to be accused in order to
protect another; naive person; person who replaces another in many situations. In Portuguese, “laranja”.
14 The Brazilian federal tax agency, equivalent to the IRS in the US.
15 Law No. 9,504/1997 establishes 2% of gross revenue for companies and 10% of income for
individuals. According to a news report published by O Estado de São Paulo, on June 6th, 2009.
16 Interview published on O Estado de São Paulo newspaper, June 6th, 2010, our translation.
20
candidates declared millionaire donations to their own campaigns, totalizing R$
70.1 million17.
Thus, considering this definition, what characterizes slush funds in
electoral campaign financing for the purpose of this study is the source of
donations — not expenses — whenever such source is hidden or declared in a
fraudulent way. Concept defined, this study seeks to confirm the existence and
relevance of campaign slush funds in Brazil, and to suggest mechanisms by
which they operate, in addition to investigating agencies and incentives that
participating actors - politicians and private donors - are subject to.
According to Walter de Almeida Guilherme, named president of the
Regional Electoral Court of Sao Paulo state (TRE-SP) in 2010, “illegal funds are
everywhere in Brazil, not only in elections''18. Later that same year Guilherme
claimed that, with regard to campaign spending, "campaign slush funds are
widespread, and I am skeptical of it being banned one day" 19. Although the
President of TRE-SP acknowledges this practice as one of the most damaging
aspects of the electoral process in Brazil, he does not believe it is possible to
eliminate it, being the duty of the electoral justice "to minimize, to reduce the
damage, as much as possible". This opinion is supported by the then country's
electoral deputy general prosecutor, Sandra Curreau, in charge of supervising
the 2010 presidential elections, which claimed to be an almost impossible
mission to track down the illegal source of the money used in elections20.
In a speech to the Legislative Assembly of Paraná, in April 2010, amid the
scandal of secret decisions of that state legislature, state legislator, Jocelito
Canto, (party: PTB), asked during a plenary session, "Who doesn't perform
illegal funding when campaigning?" and declared: "campaign slush funds are
invisible. They win elections. They are stronger than the official resources.
Who's paying these 50-people teams who travel throughout the state?" 21.
Jocelito had been re-elected in 2006 as the 12th most voted member, receiving
65,284 votes, having declared revenues of R$ 126,000 in that campaign.
Estimating, in a conservative way, the monthly cost of a campaign aide,
including remuneration and travel expenses, at about R$ 2,000 to R$ 3,000,
one 50-people team as mentioned by the Canto would have meant expenses
way over R$ 350,000 in the 3 months campaign period. This expense alone
represents three times the total expenditures reported by him in that election22.
1
17 According to a news report on the Instituto Brasil Verdade, accessed on April 17th, 2012, at
http://www.institutobrasilverdade.com.br/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=6487&Itemid=99
1
18 According to an interview to O Estado de São Paulo, published on February 14th, 2010.
1
19 News report on O Estado de São Paulo, published on June 11th, 2010, our translation.
2
20 According to an interview to O Estado de São Paulo, published on July 4th, 2010.
2
2
21 According to a news report published by the newspaper A Gazeta do Povo (Londrina, Paraná), on April
15th, 2010, our translation.
22 Canto declared the end of his political career in 2010, and did not run for re-election, alleging
uncertainties derived from the so called "The Clean Record Law", promulgated that year.
21
The "Mensalão” 23 Scandal" in 2005, while under Lula’s first presidency,
brought important revelations about illegal campaign funding during his electoral
campaign as well as of many other supporting parties' candidates, through
federal congressman Roberto Jefferson's testimonies, published by several
newspapers at the time. In his words,
(...) these ghosts who surround power are always the ghosts of electoral financing:
Delúbio24, PC Farias25, Marcos Valerio26. It is always the same people. Always the
same practice, because our electoral legislation is still that by Castelo Branco 27. It
is not clear; it does not allow for political financing that protects the donor, so that
he cannot be accused of wanting to buy legislators. (...) If PC Farias did it – and he
did - today Delúbio and Marcos Valerio do it, and others to come will continue to do
it, if we don’t change these electoral financing practices. I've brought here (...) all
the campaign income and expenses declarations, mine and yours, gentlemen, to
the Electoral Justice. Here is the beginning of the lie that we live. This process
starts on lies and flows to PC Farias, flows to other campaign treasurers, now to
Delúbio, to Marcos Valério (quoted by Campos, 2009, p. 120, note 48, our
translation).
Although Roberto Jefferson's comments do not provide quantitative traces
of the levels of campaign slush funds, they testify not only to its existence, but
also of its influence and perennial, in the congressman’s opinion. The
impression he seeks to convey to voters and to society in general is that such
practices are normal and generic, thereby contributing to break the possibility of
punishment of the corrupt by the electorate at the time of voting by forging the
perception that there are no viable alternatives, as already discussed in this
study.
The analysis of two Federal Police operations suggests the possibility that
the practice of political corruption and illegal campaign funding pervade much of
political life, political groups and parties. As reported by Folha de São Paulo
newspaper, on November 22nd, 2010, the Superior Court of Justice (STJ)
decided for the definitive suspension of the so-called "Operation Sand-castle"
(in Portuguese, Castelo de Areia), confirming the provisional suspension
imposed earlier that year. Investigations carried out by this operation — that
struck, among others, the contractor Camargo Correa, which had four of its staff
directors temporarily arrested — had for starting point the monitoring of illegal
remittances of U.S. dollars abroad and resulted in the identification of crimes
such as tax evasion, financial institutions operating without the appropriate
authorization, conspiracy, money laundering and fraud in public bids, as
reported by the Federal Police28. The justification provided by the Minister César
2
23 Nickname for the scandal of buying parliamentary support through bribes from the federal
government.
2
24 Workers party (PT) treasurer, caught in the center of the “Mensalão” scandal in 2005.
2
25 Paulo Cesar Farias, impeached president Collor’s treasurer for bribe schemes in the late 80’s.
2
2
2
26 Advertising executive involved in the “Mensalão” scandal in 2005, accused of being the financial
operator of bribery schemes funded by corruption in the federal government.
27 Brazilian president during the military dictatorship in the mid 60’s.
28 http://www7.dpf.gov.br/DCS/noticias/2009/Marco/25032009_OpCastelodeAreiaSP.html, on
December 14th, 2010.
22
Asfor Rocha, then president of STJ, was the initial use of anonymous
denunciation in order to request authorization to wiretap phone calls that led to
other evidences of the alleged crimes. This decision, according to a research
commissioned by that newspaper, contradicted previous and later rulings by
that court, including a few issued by Minister Asfor Rocha himself29.
Another example of the impunity of electoral crimes involving contractors
was identified during operations conducted by Federal Police in May 2009.
Police seized a folder named "Elections 2008" at OAS contractor, in a search
and seizure operation related to the investigation of the misappropriation of R$
30 million from the construction of Rio Baquirivu road complex, in Guarulhos, in
the São Paulo metropolitan area, under the supervision of that contractor. This
case draws attention not so much for the content or the amounts involved in the
alleged misappropriation, but because a federal judge ordered the return of the
folder to the company and forbade it to be copied. All this, despite the
connection perceived by prosecutor Matheus Baraldi Magnani between the
hiring of OAS and the donations, and even under the suspicion by federal
prosecutors that these transfers would had fed slush funds into campaigns for
mayor and city council candidates for that city. Possibly, also an example of the
side effects caused by the Electoral Court severance from the rest of the judicial
system, appointed by Taylor (2006), and another evidence of the relationship
between corruption and campaign slush funds.
These cases present common points worth mentioning. In both, the target
of the investigations which the contractors were subject to was not electoral
crimes, originally; even though, the evidence collected in searches and seizures
pointed to such suspicions collaterally. Both OAS and Camargo Correa kept
records of the alleged donations made as illegal campaign slush funds. Finally,
the interruption of the investigations did not cause, in any of the two cases
presented above, major adverse reactions in the political arena. No
representative of the opposition demanded clarification of the facts and the
continuity of the investigations, at least not in the intensity one could expect,
given the severity of the mentioned crimes, the strength of collected evidence
and the questionability of court rulings in favor of contractors and politicians.
This omission can be interpreted as an indication of the malfunctioning of
horizontal accountability, which should be exercised by the legislative power
and the opposition, and it raises suspicions that a significant portion of the
political class, or at least their prominent leaders, are committed to illegal
campaign donations from large contractors or entrepreneurs from other sectors.
This may suggest that the majority of politicians could be under the influence of
the “glass roof effect”30. News found in secondary media like websites, blogs
and alike, but which did not receive attention from the main press, relate that in
2
3
29 A similar strategy, also successful, was used in 2011 by the defense – led by Marcio Tomaz Bastos,
former Minister of Justice – of defendants, including Fernando Sarney, son of the Senate president,
accused of a series of white collar crimes by the Public Prosecutor (MP) and the Federal Police (PF) as a
result of operation “Boi Barrica”. STJ rescinded all collected evidences when it reversed the very first
decision from federal justice allowing the wiretapping of phone calls, according to the principle known as
"rotten tree".
30 In Portuguese, it is said that one with “Telhado de Vidro” (glass roof) shoud not trough rocks at his
neighbor.
23
the beginning of 2010 Senator Pedro Simon from PMDB/RS (political party) —
in the light of the discovery made through federal police operations and the
barriers imposed by the Judiciary Department that prevented the investigations
from continuing —defended by himself the creation of a legislative investigation
of contractors, reviving his own proposal, already submitted years before, also
with no support from his parliamentary colleagues.
7. Final considerations
This study aimed at investigating political corruption and illegal funding in
electoral campaigns in Brazil, analyzing their effects on the quality of
democracy, in particular the responsiveness of government to the preference of
the majority of the citizens. It also analyzed the ineffectiveness of vertical
accountability as an instrument for preventing corruption, considering the
tolerant behavior of Brazilian electorate when facing these phenomenon and the
investments made in political marketing, and how it leads to a distortion in the
electoral competition.
The literature studied pointed out to a very serious picture of political
corruption in our country. It seems to be a natural part of political life and
perceived as widespread by society. Voters give signs that they accept all
politicians as corrupt and tend not to punish them even when cases are made
public, be it due to the perception that there are no viable alternatives or to
indifference. Citizens do not seem to relate political corruption to the quality
deficits of Brazilian democracy, to the disregard of their own preferences in
favor of a corrupting elite, or even to the decay of public services and erosion
on public investments as a consequence of higher costs under corrupt
schemes.
Given this relative acceptance by the electorate and the impunity resulting
from the inefficiency of the control agencies responsible for horizontal
accountability, political actors see themselves justified to engage in political
corruption, and at the same time encouraged to do so in order to raise funds to
face the ever growing costs of electoral campaigns, inflated by political
marketing and other factors.
Confirmatory signs were found pointing to the relationship between illegal
campaign funding and political corruption — on the one hand, a significant
amount of funds invested in the form of slush funds for financing electoral
campaigns has its roots in political corruption; on the other hand, an important
share of political corruption is meant to finance electoral campaigns.
Political corruption has a direct impact on responsiveness - a fundamental
dimension of the quality of democracy. Another affected dimension which
deserves highlight is participation, as corruption generates distrust in society
towards politicians and democratic institutions, reducing interest in politics and
leading citizenship into an apathy state. Competition is also affected, especially
as part of the bribes received by candidates and parties are used during
election campaigns to pay for political marketing. In Brazil, this phenomenon
may have reached a level which makes illegal resources the only way for
24
politicians - even originally honest ones – conquer and keep power. The
competition distortion in favor of corrupt politicians, the relative tolerance by
voters and the electoral justice ineffectiveness in punishing campaign slush
funds have been identified as major causes of vertical accountability failure in
the prevention of political corruption. All indicates that corruption is not punished
accordingly by voters.
The suspicions raised by this study regarding the distortion of the electoral
competition and the inefficacy of the vertical accountability in the prevention of
corruption have implications for the prevailing theory around quality of
democracy, because they point out to an important element which should be
considered when judging elections: the quality of the competition, and not just
its intensity. There is a certain political, social and academic consensus about
the considerable credibility enjoyed by Brazilian elections. Our electoral process
takes place under a legal appearance, there is freedom to vote and to compete,
vote secrecy is preserved, vote counting is trusted31 and official results are
respected. In a recent study published by The Economist with the democratic
ranking of 167 countries, Brazil shows in the 47th position, with a 7.12 grade on
a scale from zero (authoritarian) to 10 (full democracy). Such index is
composed of five factors, one being "electoral process and pluralism", in which
Brazil scored 9.58, the same as Sweden, placed fourth overall and as three
other countries among the top 10, and above countries like USA and Japan
(both scoring 9.17). The consensus above on the quality of Brazilian elections
and the methodology employed in elaborating indexes, such as the one
adopted by The Economist, are not consistent with the findings of this study.
There is apparent need for a revision of the criteria adopted by society and by
the literature as to what are free, competitive and plural elections, so that such
perception and all associated typifications can better serve the purpose of
evaluating the quality of democracy and help building the roadmap for the
improvement of our democratic regime.
Although the analysis of future trajectory is not the aim of this study, it is
possible to risk a prediction of stability of the current picture, if not for contingent
events. With vertical accountability not working properly on continuously
improving the political class, with social participation inhibited by distrust in
politicians and in the democratic institutions and with the distortion of
competition caused by bribes from corruption being invested in political
marketing, the chances for enhancement of the quality of democracy in Brazil
may be compromised. Brazilian democracy flaws are no longer those typical of
democratic transition, as was the belief a decade or more ago, but seem more
like intrinsic components of a stable regime, which contains preserving
mechanisms that point to the presumption of its continuity in time. Nevertheless,
the possibility of deterioration of this picture should not be ruled out, mainly
when one considers the continuing effect the lack of prestige of political careers
and the criminalization of the political activity have on the renewal of the
Brazilian political class, since it may no longer attracts the best, brightest and
most well-meaning citizens in our country.
3
31 Despite some recent allegations of localized fraud and the growing consensus around the issue of the
impossibility of performing audits due to the lack of printed votes in Brazilians 1st generation electronic
ballots.
25
Thinking of contingent factors that might reverse the trend of this serious
situation towards improving the quality of democracy with a retraction of
corruption, one can make an exercise having the reduction of campaign slush
funds as a starting point - which could come a more efficient curfew from control
agencies and by society in general. By curtailing the use of money from political
corruption in electoral campaigns, and once it applies to all candidates,
competition would be less distorted, more balanced and, if not less intense, at
least not so expensive, which would relieve the pressure for financial resources
in elections. That initial change would make room for politicians who would
adopt anti-corruption strategies and act against campaign slush funds,
interrupting the on going "glass roof effect" cycle. Such leadership could
encourage greater political participation by the society, as they present
themselves as viable alternatives, not perceived by voters today. Therefore,
vertical accountability could better perform the role of discouraging the practice
of corruption through the effective punishment of corrupt politicians, starting a
virtuous cycle of improvement in democratic quality in Brazil.
Taking into account the importance of the phenomena studied and its
empirical difficulties, I hope that the explanatory alternatives presented, the
suggestion of possible and/or probable mechanisms, and the dismissal of
logically irrelevant hypotheses compose a somewhat valuable and helpful although modest - contribution to future studies on political corruption and the
quality of democracy.
26
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