Strategy, Conflict, and the Causes of War
Todd S. Sechser
Summary
Why do wars occur? Over the centuries, hundreds of millions of people have died as a result
of military conflict. The human and economic costs of war are well-understood – yet wars
continue to recur. Why?
This seminar will review and evaluate theories about the causes of war. Each week, we
will consider a different class of theories. We will dissect and evaluate the theoretical logic,
and discuss possible approaches to empirical testing. Often, we will use the First World
War as a starting point for hypothesis development because the theoretical literature about
World War I is unusually rich. However, we will conduct in-depth case studies of several
other modern wars as well.
Enrollment in this course is restricted to advanced undergraduates with an extensive
course background in international relations.
Objectives
By the end of the course, students should:
1. Attain a deep comprehension of the events precipitating the First World War.
2. Be able to evaluate competing explanations for military conflict using rigorous analytical techniques.
3. Learn to think more clearly and write more persuasively.
General Requirements
1. Complete the Readings. The reading load for this class is considerable. Students
unwilling to accept a heavy reading burden should not take this course. It is important
to absorb the readings beforehand in order to fully engage with the ideas discussed in
class. Common myths about the readings include: (1) believing that it is possible to
catch up on the readings by cramming at the end of the semester; (2) focusing on
trivial details rather than the big ideas of each reading; and (3) thinking that it is not
worth reading any of the assignments if they cannot all be completed. Be careful not
to succumb to these myths.
2. Contribute to Class Discussion. Participation is a critical element of this seminar, and
all students must attend and actively participate in class each week. Dialogue with
your classmates will help you gain a better understanding of the course material, and
will also help generate ideas for the final research paper. I will take attendance and
evaluate your participation in each class discussion.
3. Write a Final Paper. Each student will write a major research paper, due on the day
designated for the course’s final exam. The paper assignment is described in the packet
attached to the end of this syllabus.
4. Complete the Assignments. Throughout the semester, each student will be asked to
complete several assignments related to the final paper. These assignments will help
students make regular progress on the final paper and provide opportunities to make
revisions and correct errors.
5. Deliver a Final Presentation. An imminent public presentation can be a surprisingly
powerful research motivator. For this reason, toward the end of the semester each
student will give a 15-minute talk about the central points of their research paper and
answer audience questions. Each student will designate a short background reading
for the class to read beforehand. Use of PowerPoint is encouraged.
Assignments and Evaluation
There are four main components to the final semester grade.
• Participation
35%
• Final Presentation
15%
• Research Paper (and four assignments) 50%
Professionalism, Ethics, and Other Policies
1. In-Class Distractions. Please do not use your laptops in class. It is essential that
seminar participants focus on the discussion and not hide behind a computer screen.
Please also turn off your phones before class. Texting during class is distracting for
the instructor, those around you, and most importantly, you.
2. Late Arrivals. Please be prompt so that class may begin and end on time.
3. Academic Integrity. Cheating and plagiarism are taken very seriously in this course.
All assignments must be solely the original work of the student. Quoting or paraphrasing another author without attribution on any written assignment is considered
plagiarism. Avoid plagiarism by using footnotes (with page numbers) whenever you
quote, paraphrase, or otherwise borrow someone else’s ideas. Citing others’ work is a
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standard scholarly practice, and there is no punishment for having too many citations.
If you are unsure whether you are committing plagiarism, do not hesitate to ask the
instructor for guidance (before you submit your work). Violators risk failing the course
and being reported to the Honor Committee.
4. Group Collaboration. Colleagues are essential to one’s intellectual growth, and I urge
students to collaborate with classmates. Sharing written summaries, reading draft
papers, and commenting on others’ practice presentations are all acceptable forms of
collaboration. On the other hand, writing portions of a classmate’s paper or copying
a paragraph from a book or website without attribution are very serious violations.
5. Late Assignments. Late assignments will not be accepted for any reason. To ensure
that illness, computer failures, or other unanticipated events do not cause you to miss
an assignment deadline, it is recommended that you begin the assignments well in
advance of the deadline. Further, you should back up your work off-site using the
University’s Home Directory, Google Drive, Dropbox, or another free cloud backup
service.
Books and Readings
There are four required books, all available at the University of Virginia Bookstore. All
other readings can be accessed on Collab.
1. Blainey, G. (1973). The Causes of War. Macmillan, London.
2. Tuchman, B. W. (1962). The Guns of August. Macmillan, New York.
3. Van Evera, S. (1997). Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.
4. Van Evera, S. (1999). Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.
Schedule
1. Introduction: The Puzzle of War
• No assigned readings.
2. Theory and the Scientific Method
• Van Evera, S. (1997). Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, N.Y, chapters 1–2.
3. Case Study: The First World War
• Tuchman, B. W. (1962). The Guns of August. Macmillan, New York, chapters
1–9.
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4. The Balance of Power, Polarity, and Realism
• Nye, J. (1993). Understanding International Conflicts. HarperCollins, New York,
chapter 3.
• Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton,
New York, chapter 9.
• Glaser, C. L. (1994). Realists as optimists: Cooperation as self-help. International
Security, 19(3):50–90.
5. Power Transition Theory
• Van Evera, S. (1999). Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, N.Y, chapter 4.
• Levy, J. S. (1987). Declining power and the preventive motivation for war. World
Politics, 40(1):82–107.
• Mearsheimer, J. J. (2006). China’s unpeaceful rise. Current History, 105:160–62.
• Mearsheimer, J. J. and Brzezinski, Z. (2005). Clash of the titans. Foreign Policy,
146:46–51.
6. Case Study: The Pacific War
• Ienaga, S. (1978). The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945.
Pantheon, New York, chapter 7.
• Sagan, S. D. (1988). The origins of the Pacific War. Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, 18(4):893–922.
• Russett, B. M. (1967). Pearl Harbor: Deterrence theory and decision theory.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 4(2):89–106.
7. Offense-Defense Theory
• Assignment #1 due.
• Van Evera, S. (1999). Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, N.Y, chapter 6.
• Betts, R. K. (1999). Must war find a way? A review essay. International Security,
24(2):166–198.
• Lieber, K. A. (2000). Grasping the technological peace: The offense-defense balance and international security. International Security, 25(1):71–104.
8. Economics, Trade, and Interdependence
• Angell, N. (1910). The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power
to National Advantage. Knickerbocker, New York, chapter 3.
• Blainey, G. (1973). The Causes of War. Macmillan, London, chapters 2 and 6.
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• Friedman, G. and Lebard, M. (1991). The Coming War with Japan. St. Martin’s,
New York, chapter 14.
• Russett, B. (1983). Prosperity and peace: Presidential address. International
Studies Quarterly, 27(4):381–387.
• Copeland, D. C. (1996). Economic interdependence and war: A theory of trade
expectations. International Security, 20(4):5–41.
9. Student Research Meeting #1
10. Beliefs and Informational Approaches
• Van Evera, S. (1999). Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, N.Y, chapter 2.
• Blainey, G. (1973). The Causes of War. Macmillan, London, chapters 3 and 8.
• Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization,
49(3):379–414.
11. Case Study: The Winter War
• Assignment #2 due.
• Spring, D. W. (1986). The Soviet decision for war against Finland, 30 November
1939. Soviet Studies, 38(2):207–226.
• Anderson, A. T. (1954). Origins of the Winter War: A study of Russo-Finnish
diplomacy. World Politics, 6(2):169–189.
• Sechser, T. S. (2010). Goliath’s curse: Coercive threats and asymmetric power.
International Organization, 64(4):627–60.
12. Psychology and Misperception
• Jervis, R. (1968). Hypotheses on misperception. World Politics, 20(3):454–79.
• Levy, J. S. (1983). Misperception and the causes of war: Theoretical linkages and
analytical problems. World Politics, 36(1):76–99.
13. Student Research Meeting #2
14. Nationalism
• Van Evera, S. (1994). Hypotheses on nationalism and war. International Security,
18(4):5–39.
15. Diversionary War Theory
• Assignment #3 due.
• Blainey, G. (1973). The Causes of War. Macmillan, London, chapter 5.
• Levy, J. S. (1989). The diversionary theory of war: A critique. In Midlarsky, M. I.,
editor, Handbook of War Studies, pages 259–88. Unwin Hyman, Boston.
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16. Case Study: The Falklands War
• Arquilla, J. and Rasmussen, M. M. (2001). The origins of the South Atlantic War.
Journal of Latin American Studies, 33(4):739–75.
• Oakes, A. (2006). Diversionary war and Argentina’s invasion of the Falklands.
Security Studies, 15(3):431–63.
• Lebow, R. N. (1983). Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The origins of the
Falklands War. Journal of Strategic Studies, 6(1):5–35.
• Paul, T. (1994). Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers. Cambridge University Press, New York, chapter 8.
17. Student Research Meeting #3
18. Domestic Politics
• Snyder, J. L. (1991). Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y, chapters 2–3.
19. Democratic Peace
• Assignment #4 due.
• Russett, B. M. (1993). Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold
War World. Princeton University Press, Princeton, chapters 1–2.
• Layne, C. (1994). Kant or cant: The myth of the democratic peace. International
Security, 19(2):5–49.
• Schultz, K. A. (1999). Do democratic institutions constrain or inform? Contrasting
two institutional perspectives on democracy and war. International Organization,
53(2):233–266.
• Optional : Downes, A. B. and Sechser, T. S. (2012). The illusion of democratic
credibility. International Organization, 66(3):457–89.
20. Organization Theory
• Posen, B. R. (1984). The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and
Germany between the World Wars. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y, chapter
2.
• Betts, R. K. (1991). Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. Columbia University Press, New York, chapters 1 and 3.
• Optional : Sechser, T. S. (2004). Are soldiers less war-prone than statesmen?
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(5):746–774.
• Optional : Sechser, T. S. and Saunders, E. N. (2010). The army you have: The determinants of military mechanization, 1979-2001. International Studies Quarterly,
54(2).
21. Student Research Meeting #4
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22. Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence
• Sagan, S. D. (1993). The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear
Weapons. Princeton University Press, Princeton, chapters 1 and 6.
• Sechser, T. S. (2009). Should the United States or the international community aggressively pursue nuclear nonproliferation policies? In Haas, P. M., Hird,
J. A., and McBratney, B., editors, Controversies in Globalization: Contending
Approaches to International Relations, pages 164–174. CQ Press, Washington,
DC.
23. Case Study: The Kargil War
• Kapur, S. P. (2007). Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and
Conflict in South Asia. Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, Calif, chapter 6.
• Ganguly, S. and Hagerty, D. T. (2006). Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises
in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons. University of Washington Press, Seattle,
chapter 7.
• Sagan, S. D. (2001). The perils of proliferation in South Asia. Asian Survey,
41(6):1064–1086.
24. The Future of War
• Mueller, J. (1989). Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War.
Basic Books, New York, introduction.
• Trachtenberg, M. (1991). The future of war. Diplomatic History, 15(2):287–90.
• Easterbrook, G. (2005). The end of war? Explaining fifteen years of diminishing
violence. The New Republic, (May 30):18–21.
25. Student Research Presentations
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Bibliography
Anderson, Albin T. 1954. “Origins of the Winter War: A Study of Russo-Finnish Diplomacy.” World Politics 6(2):169–
189.
Angell, Norman. 1910. The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage. New
York: Knickerbocker.
Arquilla, John and Maria Moyano Rasmussen. 2001. “The Origins of the South Atlantic War.” Journal of Latin
American Studies 33(4):739–75.
Betts, Richard K. 1991. Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. New York: Columbia University Press.
Betts, Richard K. 1999. “Must War Find a Way? A Review Essay.” International Security 24(2):166–198.
Blainey, Geoffrey. 1973. The Causes of War. London: Macmillan.
Copeland, Dale C. 1996. “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations.” International
Security 20(4):5–41.
Downes, Alexander B. and Todd S. Sechser. 2012. “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility.” International Organization
66(3):457–89.
Easterbrook, Gregg. 2005. “The End of War? Explaining Fifteen Years of Diminishing Violence.” The New Republic,
May 30:18–21.
Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49(3):379–414.
Friedman, George and Meredith Lebard. 1991. The Coming War with Japan. New York: St. Martin’s.
Ganguly, Sumit and Devin T. Hagerty. 2006. Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear
Weapons. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Glaser, Charles L. 1994. “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help.” International Security 19(3):50–90.
Ienaga, Saburo. 1978. The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945. New York: Pantheon.
Jervis, Robert. 1968. “Hypotheses on Misperception.” World Politics 20(3):454–79.
Kapur, S. Paul. 2007. Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia. Palo Alto,
Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Layne, Christopher. 1994. “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace.” International Security 19(2):5–49.
Lebow, Richard Ned. 1983. “Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War.” Journal of
Strategic Studies 6(1):5–35.
Levy, Jack S. 1983. “Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems.” World
Politics 36(1):76–99.
Levy, Jack S. 1987. “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War.” World Politics 40(1):82–107.
Levy, Jack S. 1989. “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique.” In Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I.
Midlarsky. Boston: Unwin Hyman pp. 259–88.
Lieber, Keir A. 2000. “Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security.”
International Security 25(1):71–104.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2006. “China’s Unpeaceful Rise.” Current History 105:160–62.
Mearsheimer, John J. and Zbigniew Brzezinski. 2005. “Clash of the Titans.” Foreign Policy 146:46–51.
Mueller, John. 1989. Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic Books.
Nye, Joseph. 1993. Understanding International Conflicts. New York: HarperCollins.
Oakes, Amy. 2006. “Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falklands.” Security Studies 15(3):431–63.
Paul, T.V. 1994. Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Posen, Barry R. 1984. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Russett, Bruce. 1983. “Prosperity and Peace: Presidential Address.” International Studies Quarterly 27(4):381–387.
–8–
Russett, Bruce M. 1967. “Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
4(2):89–106.
Russett, Bruce M. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Sagan, Scott D. 1988. “The Origins of the Pacific War.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18(4):893–922.
Sagan, Scott D. 1993. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Sagan, Scott D. 2001. “The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia.” Asian Survey 41(6):1064–1086.
Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999. “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War.” International Organization 53(2):233–266.
Sechser, Todd S. 2004. “Are Soldiers Less War-Prone Than Statesmen?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(5):746–774.
Sechser, Todd S. 2007. “Winning without a Fight: Power, Reputation, and Compellent Threats in International
Crises.” Ph.D. diss., Stanford University.
Sechser, Todd S. 2009. “Should the United States or the International Community Aggressively Pursue Nuclear
Nonproliferation Policies?” In Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations,
ed. Peter M. Haas, John A. Hird and Beth McBratney. Washington, DC: CQ Press pp. 164–174.
Sechser, Todd S. 2010. “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power.” International Organization
64(4):627–60.
Sechser, Todd S. 2011. “Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001.” Conflict Management and Peace Science
28(4):377–401.
Sechser, Todd S. and Elizabeth N. Saunders. 2010. “The Army You Have: The Determinants of Military Mechanization, 1979-2001.” International Studies Quarterly 54(2).
Snyder, Jack L. 1991. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press.
Spring, Derek W. 1986. “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland, 30 November 1939.” Soviet Studies 38(2):207–
226.
Trachtenberg, Marc. 1991. “The Future of War.” Diplomatic History 15(2):287–90.
Tuchman, Barbara W. 1962. The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan.
Van Evera, Stephen. 1994. “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War.” International Security 18(4):5–39.
Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Van Evera, Stephen. 1999. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
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