Chapter - One
1.1
Introduction
An agricultural people owning some amount of land can
organise
production
in
self-cultivation with family
three
alternative
labour,
ways
cultivation with the
use of hired labour (or wage labour) and leasing out land to
tenants.
In the case of leasing of land,
between share tenancy and fixed rent
tenancy
the
tenant
contracts
to
the option is
In share
tenancy.
pay
the
landlord
a
stipulated fraction of total output while under fixed rent
system he pays a fixed amount (either in cash or kind) per
acre.
Of these three forms of organisation in agriculture,
sharecropping is one of the earliest.
It existed in France
for five hundred years, beginning in the thirteenth century.
There it was called the Metayer system1 . We find reference
to it in Adam Smith : "[The Metayers in France] have been so
long in disuse in England that at present I know no English
name for them" (Wealth of Nations, Book 3, Ch. 2).
Arthur
Young in his 'Travels during the Years 1787, 1788 and 1780
in the Kingdom of France (1798)' and Richard Jones in his
1
The term Metayer applies properly only to cases in which the
landlord's share of the produce is one-half; but it is usually
applied to all arrangements of this kind whatever the landlord's
share be (Marshall, 1920, Book 6, Ch. 10).
2
'An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth and on the Sources
of
Taxation'
(1831)
sharecropping.
also
commented
on
the
practice
of
Sismondi who owned land in Tuscany described
the life of metayers in romantic terms, quite contrary to
Young's description (Johnson,
1950).
Even in the United
States sharecropping could be observed in the Mississipi
delta at
really
least up to
widespread
the 1930's.
and
But its prevalence is
significant
backward regions of Africa and Asia,
coexists with fixed rent tenancy.
in
the
economically
\vhere it frequently
Let us take a look at the
situation in India.
Hanumantha Rao (1971) has observed that "Sharecropping
is extensive for the rice crop in the eastern and southern
regions of India and for wheat in the northern regions".
With examples from Ladejinsky (1965) he revealed that crop
sharing is extensive for
the rice crop in west Godavari
(Andhra Pradesh) and Thanjavur (Tamil Nadu) in the south and
for
the
wheat
crop
in Ludhiana
(Punjab)
in
the
north.
National Samples Survey (NSS) 8th Round data of interstate
sharecropping in the early 1950's and in the early 1960's
are as follows :
3
Table - 1.1. Incidence of sharecropping in India
Percentage of area under
sharecropping
Selected important
regions
1950's
1960's
Uttar Pradesh
54.17
62.67
Bihar
68.47
83.60
Orissa
60.28
52.71
89.57
92.53
Assam
22.64
67.05
Andhra Pradesh
43.05
37.70
Madras
21.54
28.87
Madhya Pradesh
64.03
48.88
Punjab
76.89
65.39
Rajasthan
23.21
26.72
Jammu
67.31
61.49
~~est
Bengal
&
Kashmir
Source
NSS,
8th Round, 1950's, 1960's cited in Bardhan
(1977)
Another
Relations,
table
1975
and
furnished
by
quoted
Rudra
in
Survey
(1982)
of
Agrarian
showed
the
importance of sharecropping over the fixed rent system and
its widespread prevalence in India.
4
Table - 1. 2. Importance of sharecropping and fixed rent
tenancy
Percentage
sharecropping
State
of
area under
fixed rent
West Bengal
91
9
Bihar
90.6
9
Orissa
100
Uttar Pradesh
Source
0
6.7
93.3
Survey of Agrarian Relations, 1975, quoted in Rudra
(1982)
NSS 37th Round data (1982) give percentage distribution
of leased in land in operated area on all India basis.
Table - 1. 3. Percentage distribution of leased-in land in
operated area : all-India- 1981-82
NSS Round
37th Round (1982)
26th Round (1971-72)
17th Round (1960-61) and (1961-62)
Share produce
41.92
47.86
38.22
Source : Sarvekshana : NSS (37th Round, 1982)
5
The table shows that the percentage of opera ted area
under sharecropping increased considerably between the 17th
and the 26th Rounds but declined between the 26th and the
37th.
The percentage of area under sharecropping is still
significant.
figures
on
NSS
percentage
sharecropping.
Table- 1.4.
37th Round
data
also
distribution
give
of
statewise
area
under
We reproduce it below.
Statewise distribution of area under sharecropping
State
Percentage of area under
sharecropping
1. Bihar
73.32
2 . Haryana
41.22
3 . Orissa
42.04
4. Punjab
39.89
5 . Tamil Nadu
36.54
6 . Uttar Pradesh
4.88
7 . West Bengal
55.59
8 . All India
41.92
Source
Sarvekshana : NSS (37th Round, 1982). Quoted in
Parthasarth¥
( 1991)
6
All these tables corroborate that though sharecropping
has disappeared from the advanced countries it is still very
much a part of the contemporary agricultural scene in our
land.
Going through the writings of the classical economists
on the subject we are struck at once by their conflicting
opinions on the strength and viability of the practice of
sharecropping.
intermediate
cultivation
According to Smith, the Metayer system is an
and
(1776,
unsatisfactory
Book 3,
stage
Ch.2).
from
ancient slave
Adam Smith condemned
sharecropping and most of the classical and neoclassical
economists had
agreed with him excepting J.S.
Mill
and
was
an
S ismondi.
Adam
Smith
thought
that
sharecropping
institution which acted as an impediment to agricultural
improvement because under this system, "it could never be
the interest [of the Metayers] ....... to lay out, in the
further
improvement of
the land,
any part of the little
stock .... because the [land] lord, who laid out nothing,
was to get one-half of whatever it produced.
The tithe,
which is but a tenth of the produce, is found to be a great
hindrance
to
improvement"
(1776,
Book 3,
Ch.2).
Arthur
Young in his Travels condemned sharecropping in France and
7
he ascribed the low rent of land in France as compared to
English
[fixed-rent
system]
[metayage system in France].
to
the
sharecropping
system
Richard Jones (1831) denounced
the metayage system on two grounds : first,
"the divided
interest which exists in the produce of cultivation mars
almost eVery attempt at
metayage
very
system,
low.
improvement" and second,
productivity
J.R.
McCulloch
of
agricultural
(1843)
agreed
with
in the
labour was
Smith
and
observed that "wherever [share renting] has been adopted, it
has put
a stop to all improvements and has reduced the
cultivators to the most abject poverty".
He concluded that,
"the widest experience shO\vs that tenants will never make
any
considerable
conviction
that
improvements
they
will
unless
be
able
they
to
have
reap
a
the
firm
whole
advantage arising from them".
John
Stuart
Mill
(1920),
however,
favoured
the
sharecropping sys tern and argued that most of the defects
pointed out by earlier economists were due to imperfections
of
the metayage system as
itself.
practised and not
the system
Mill felt that insecurity of tenure was the major
defect of the metayage system in France and that if this
were
1950).
overcome,
the
system would
function
well
(Johnson,
In support of his argument he advanced two pieces of
8
evidence.
One, the poor state of the Irish Cottier was due
to insecurity of tenure and the other, in Italy agricultural
improvement would take place if the tenants were secure.
Mill
relied upon
landowner
evidence presented by
and
a
metayer
landlord
Sismondi
that
favoured
a
the
[sharecropping] system.
Alfred Marshall (1920) renewed the inefficiency thesis
of
sharecropping
with
the
help
of
superior
framework based on his marginal analysis.
the
aid
of
marginal
product
curve
of
analytical
Marshall, \vi th
labour,
marginal
earnings curve and marginal tenant cost curve, proved that
under ownership (capitalist) farming and fixed· rent system,
total
employment
of
would be more and
labour was higher,
total
production
landlord would receive a higher
compared to the sharecropping system.
rent
Marshall showed that
sharecropping is an }nstitution which results in suboptimal
use of inputs and thereby generates an inefficient outcome.
With
the
exception
of
a
few
dissenting
voices
the
immense prestige and authority of Marshall led to a general
acceptance of his verdict and the inefficiency thesis became
part of the conventional wisdom of the profession.
About
fifty years later the debate was vigorously reopened through
the seminal contribution of Cheung (1968, 1969).
9
Cheung broke the Marshallian tradition and showed that
if the landlord can con tro 1 the amount of non-landinput s
used by the share tenant or if costs are sharedbetween the
landlord and the tenant,
share tenancy would produce the
same result as ownership cultivation and fixed rent tenancy
in respect of tl'E !liSe a£ non-land input,
rental income per unit of land.
the output and the
This result is known in the
literature as 'The Equivalence Theorem'.
Cheung's analysis,
however, have not been universally accepted by economists.
For example,
Bard han and Srinivasan ( 1971) and Bell and
Zus man ( 1976) rejected Cheung's argument on sharecropping
and pursued a Marshallian
line and Rao ( 1971) expressed
doubts on Cheung's assumed impetus to sharecropping.
contrary,
Newbery
(1973,
1975,
On the
1977) and Stiglitz (1974)
extended Cheung's approach in a major way.
From the above
analysis, it is clear that there are conflicting views on
sharecropping in regard to efficiency.
sharecropping
is
an
inefficient
Some argued that
system
while
others
maintained that "sharecropping must be an efficient way to
organise agricultural production".
It is held to be as
efficient as the fixed rent contract and wage contract.
1.2 The Puzzle of Coexistence
It has long been a source of puzzlement to economists
10
that if sharecropping is indeed as inefficient as it is made
out
to
be
centuries.
then
what
explains
it
persistence
over
the
Why has it not been completely replaced by more
efficient forms of organisation ?
This has inspired a vast
amount of research in the field of development economics.
The
general
theme of
explanations
suggested
in
the
various studies is that sharecropping is a response to risk
and uncertainty, asymmetric information and market failures
relating
to
capital
and
credit.
Not
forgetting
their
interdependence, we nevertheless deem it convenient to list
these factors
separately as
(a)
risk sharing,
(b)
input
incentive, (c) screening and (d) cost sharing.
Analytical models of various degrees of complexity have
been built around these explanatory hypotheses.
Nirvikar
Singh in Bardhan ( 1989b) presents an excellent,
insightful
survey.
the
The primary objective of this study is to evaluate
appropriateness
of
these
different
hypotheses
in
explaining the nature and incidence of sharecropping in the
light of observations relating
\~est
Bengal.
to some selected areas of
For this purpose primary data were collected
from one hundred and fourteen villages in several districts
of the state.
The methodology will be discussed in more
detail in the next chapter.
ll
In the next section we propose to acquaint the reader
with the general idea behind each hypothesis and the more
important
pieces
of
research
in
the
area.
Studies
pertaining to West Bengal will receive special attention.
1.3
General Discussion of Issues and Overview of Literature
The
idea
sharecropping
behind
the
risk-sharing
enables
the
tenant
to
argument
share
the
is
risks
that
of
agricultural production with the landlord in the absence of
insurance markets and other risk reducing means.
With fixed
rent contract, the tenant bears all the risks of production
and with capitalist farming,
risks.
the landlord bears all
the
As it happens that both the landlord and the tenant
are risk- averters, neither arrangement is optimal in terms
of risk bearing.
A sharecropping arrangement, according to
Cheung (1968, 1969) and Newbery (1977), enables the tenant
to share the risks and is preferable.
This explanation is
based on the assumption that there is no incentive problem
so that inputs such as labour are observable and can be
specified in the contract.
Reid (1976) and Newbery and
Stiglitz ( 1979) challenged this view of sharecropping and
demonstrated that if there are constant returns to scale in
production and no indivisibilities, a combination of wage
and fixed rent contract on two subplots would produce the
12
same pattern of returns in every state to the landlord and
to the tenant as does a sharecontract for the whole plot.
Sharecropping, they argued, is irrelevant.
But this irrelevance result is not very robust.
It has
been demonstrated that : (a) if there are multiple sources
of
risk,
share-contracts
combination
of
share-contracts
non-tradable
fixed
may
inputs
can
improve
rent
improve
such
as
and
matters
\vage
risksharing
managerial
labour and the servicfes of draft animals.
over
a
contract,
(b)
if
are
and
there
supervisory
J
Secondly, Newbery (1977) has shown that if there are
risks not only in production but also in labour markets,
sharecropping may offer additional risk-sharing advantages.
If labour markets are risky, fixed rent and wage contracts
will
be
economy
inefficient,
will
employment
of
achieve
but
if
production
labour will
share-contracts
efficiency
exist
the
in that full
be a possibility.
In
a rural
economy where agriculture is the main activity it is very
unlikely that labour markets will be able to guarantee both
full employment and a predictable certain wage throughout
the year or in times of heavy demand for labour in the peak
season.
13
With
reference
to
the
contractual provision of
costs,
sharecropping
problem of
inputs
provides
enforceability of
and differing monitoring
an additional
explanation.
Since there is a natural tendency to shirk work and actual
effort
provided
monitor,
by
is
wage contracts with
costly monitoring
more
labour
incentive
to
and
difficult
observe
and
time rates of payment need
supervision.
deliver
to
Sharecropping offers
efforts unmoni to red.
But with
sharecropping there is a disincentive problem also as the
tenant gets only a fraction of his contribution to output.
This disincentive problem of sharecropping can be eliminated
by the fixed rent contract.
However,
Dat~
and Nugent (1981)
and Newbery ( 1977) favoured sharecropping on the basis of
differential monitoring costs.
A landlord under fixed rent
contract could monitor the tenant's labour but would receive
no benefit from it.
But if the landlord rents out land on
sharecropping arrangements and specifies the labour input
required and thus bears monitoring costs, he could benefit
from
the
contract.
sharecropping contract as
in
the case
of wage
Considered from this perspective, sharecropping
may be regarded as a compromise between risk and incentive
effects
while
fixed
rent
contracts
provide
perfect
incentive to the tenant, the tenant has to absorb all the
risk; wage contracts in which the landlord absorbs all the
risks provide no
incentive
to work unless
labourers are
14
closely
monitored
[Stiglitz
in
Bardhan
(1989b~.
This
increases the importance of sharecropping as a compromise
between wage and rent contracts.
So far we have not brought in any considerations of
risk, uncertainty and related problems of information.
the
presence
of
uncertainties
(in
production
and
In
with
respect to price) and imperfections in the capital, credit
and insurance markets, sharecropping may emerge superior to
other
contracts.
If
the
fixed
rent
contract
involves
advance payments of rent, a capital-poor or credit-rationed
tenant is likely to prefer sharetenancy where the rental
share is received at the time of harvest.
Further, if the
tenant is risk-averse and if there is no insurance markets,
the
landlord
insurance
and
plays
the
a
dual
optimal
role
by
contract
providing
involves
a
land
and
trade-off
between the provision of incentive and insurance [Singh in
Bardhan
(1989b)J.
sharecropping
1977).
This
model
was
literature by Stiglitz
A very
good
treatment
is
introduced
(1974),
Reid
contained
in
in
the
(1976,
Rakshit
(1982).
Another explanation of sharecropping has been provided
by Hallagan (1978), Newbery and Stiglitz (1979), Hurwicz and
Shapiro (1978) and Shetty (1988).
The basic idea behind
15
this
explanation
respect
to
landlord's
wealth
the
heterogeneity
and
other
inability
characteristics
productivity.
device.
is
of
to
of
tenants
characteristics
observe
potential
the
tenants
with
and
the
particular
that
affects
They emphasized sharecropping as a screening
The
most
productive
tenants
will
self-select
themselves by choosing fixed rent contract; those who are
least
productive
intermediate
will
ability
work
will
opt
for
for
wages
and
those
sharecropping.
screening model has some attractive features.
of
This
First,
it
explains the coexistence of sharecropping with fixed rent
and wage contract.
Second, it fits with the observation that
share tenancy is often associated with lower productivity
than fixed rent tenancy since the model predicts that the
more able (and more productive)
tenant will choose fixed
rent contract and the less able will choose sharecropping.
Third, the model supports the agricultural ladder hypothesis
that
as
capital,
agricultural
workers
gain
physical
and
human
they progress from wage labour to sharecropping,
then to renting and finally to owner-operation (Spillman,
1919; Cox, 1944).
Similar observations can be found in Adam
Smith.
Lastly, sharecropping may be explained by cost sharing.
The tenant and the landlord under sharecropping contract to
16
share
the
costs
of
capital-constrained,
production
as
explicitly
or
both
of
them
implicitly.
are
Jaynes
( 1982, 1984) observed that cost sharing potentially occurs
because the landlord does not have enough capita 1 himself
and hence seeks households with sufficient wealth.
Jaynes'
observation and explanation are based on the view that there
are
imperfections
in
the
market
to
emerge
for
shared
inputs
and
capital.
The
sketched
common
above
theme
is
that
from
sharecropping
the
is
explanations
a
response
to
uncertainty, risk, asymmetries in information and failures
in different markets such as labour, capital and insurance.
Many economists have, over the years, attempted to test
the theoretical conclusions on crop-sharing in the context
of countries having a backward agricultural sector.
not
unexpectedly,
Some of
has
featured
prominently
in
India,
the work.
the most important research is contained in Rao
(1971), Rudra (1975), Bharadwaj and Das (1975), Bell (1976,
1977), Bardhan (1979), Jodha (1981), Bliss and Stern (1982),
Pant (1983) and Murty (1987).
Tenancy relations in the state of West Bevngal itself
have had its share of attention from economists.
This is of
special relevance to us since our work is also based on
17
field-surveys in some rural regions of the state.
Let us
now quickly go over the significant body of work analysing
tenancy in West Bengal.
Before moving on, however, we would
like to make one point.
The impact of Operation Barga in
the villages of West Bengal has been the subject of numerous
studies
in
recent
orientation
years.
altogether
Our
and
study
therefore,
has
a
different
the
question,
important as it is, will not be directly addressed.
The
interested reader is referred to the interesting article by
Chadha and Bhaumik (1992) and the references cited therein.
In the early seventies there were a large number of
studies
combining
theoretical
sharecropping in West Bengal.
and
empirical
research
on
Bardhan and Srinivasan (1971)
constructed along the Marshallian line a competitive model
to determine the equilibrium rental share and they tried to
identify economic factors that might explain variations in
the incidence of sharecropping across
the regions and to
test for their significance on the basis of NSS data for the
year 1960-1961 and Farm Management Survey data.
admit ted that
Though they
the incidence of sharecropping depended on
various economic and non-economic factors, they have tried
to identify agricultural wage rate and irrigation as two
major
economic
incidence
of
factors
explaining
sharecropping
and
variations
tested
for
in
the
their
18
significance.
Using the State level (West Bengal) NSS data
for the year 1960-61 they got the result that the incidence
of sharecropping is positively correlated with agricultural
wage rate and with irrigation.
The regression coefficients
for wage and irrigation are significant at 5 per cent level.
But this model is very crude as it ignored imperfection in
the markets for land, labour and credit and their possible
interlinkage
factors
that
may
distort
the
results
of
competitive model.
Bardhan in later papers (1977, 1979) has tried to sort
out the deficiencies of earlier work and to overcome them.
In
these
models
he
included
complex
interlinkage
and
imperfections in the land and credit markets.
He tried to
generate
agricultural
hypotheses
about
the
impact
of
development on the incidence of tenancy and to relate these
hypotheses to empirical data on Indian agriculture.
He took
the incidence of tenancy (sharecropping) to be dependent on
the extent of irrigation,
labour intensity of crops,
proportion of borrowings for household expenses
borrowings by small
tenants,
interstate
sharecropping
to total
the agricultural wage rate,
tot a 1 number of unemployed days etc.
using
the
and
He tested hypothesis
other data
for
early
1950' s and 1960's and compared them with the results of
National Sample Survey of Landholdings for 1970-71.
He got
19
the result
related
that incidence of sharecropping is posi ti vel y
to
irrigation,
labour
intensity
of
crops
and
agricultural wage rate and is negatively related to the
indices of dependence of small cultivators on borrowing for
household
obtained
consumption
that
and
incidence
tenurial
of
share
insecurity.
cropping
He also
is
positively
related to production uncertainty. This is also supported by
the empirical findings of Rao (1971).
Bhaduri (1973) for the case of West Bengal and Prasad
(1974)
for Bihar constructed models on the basis of the
Marxian
scheme
relations
of
of
interaction
production"
to
between
analyse
"the
the
forces
and
influence
of
relations of production (semi- feudalism and usury) on the
introduction
interlinked
of
improved
technology.
credit-sharecropping
Using
contract
a model
they
of
concluded
that semi-feudalism may block advancement in agriculture
since the landlords have little incentive to make productive
investment and often resist yield increasing innovations.
This has attracted economists to work in this area.
Chandra's
study
(1974)
failed
to
corroborate
Bardhan.
Bardhan and Rudra (1978, 1980) and Bardhan (1980) in their
"fairly
randomly
large
chosen
scale
and
villages
yet
in
intensive"
West
Bengal,
survey
Bihar,
on
334
Uttar
20
Pradesh and Orissa considered the terms and conditions of
sharecropping contracts and interlinkage of land, labour and
This survey result suggested that the
credit relations.
institution of sharecropping tenancy did not conform to the
stereotyped semi-feudal relationship and that sharecropping
had been adapting itself more and more
to
the needs of
increasing production.
They found that landlords often make
productive investment
and encourage production by giving
production loans
seeds,
to the
fertilisers
and
tenants and sharing in costs of
participating
in
decision-taking.
They also observed that even in areas noted by Bhadhuri,
usury
is
landlord.
relate
not
the
dominant
mode
of
exploitation
by
the
Their analyses are illuminating but their data
to the period 1975-76 which needs updating.
Our
survey results (based on village level data) are in line
with the findings of Bardhan-Rudra in regard to occupation
of
landlords,
production
relationship
loans,
the
between
existence
costsharing
of unpaid and
and
underpaid
labour services and on eviction of tenants.
Rudra
( 197 5)
sharecropping,
considers
which
lS
on
only
one
annual
form
basis.
of
tenancy,
He
noted
variations in the proportion of output claimed as rent, both
across villages as well as within villages.
explain it by differences in soil quality,
He tried to
types of paddy
21
grown by tenant (that is, HYV paddy/Boro paddy) and by cost
sharing by the tenant.
According to him, cropsharing is
mainly explained by costsharing.
The 3/4th share goes to
the tenant when he bears all the costs while the tenant
~th
receives
share in case owner bears the cost of seeds and
fertiliser.
In his survey in Uttar Raipur of West Dinajpur
he observed that in a large .nunre:rr of cases the tenant bears
the
full
cost
of
seed,
fertiliser
and
manure
and
landowner bears the full share of irrigation cost.
the
However,
when the source of irrigation is private, the tenant bears
fully
or
partly
irrigation,
books
irrigation
cost
but
when
it
the landowner pays all the cost.
(Rudra,
1982,
1992),
is
In
he draws evidence
canal
~ther
from West
Bengal, Orissa, Bihar and U.P. using Farm Management Survey
for Hooghly district for the year 1970-71.
whether
tenancy
is
efficient
and
covered
He considered
the
issues
of
contractual terms, variations in cropshare and cost shares,
use of modern inputs and the sharing of hi-products.
He
started with two basic premises, that tenant farms are less
efficient than owner-operated farms and that it is through
tenancy that the landlords exploit the tenants.
Tenancy is
taken to be a characteristic feature of capital ism.
s ta tis tic a 1 test procedures,
Using
results are obtained to the
effect that for all size-classes output and input per acre
are
in
most
of
the
cases
lower
for
tenants
than
for
22
landlords.
Regarding the second proposition Rudra observed that
tenancy
arrangement
has
nothing
feudal
about
it·
'
it
is
perfectly compatible with capitalist relations between the
mvners of land and the tenants.
The owners are found to be
actively
productivity
engaged
in
increasing
labour so as to increase the surplus.
of
land
and
Similarly it was
observed that a substantial proportion of landowners (more
than 50 per cent) played an active part in decision making
relating
to crops
and
inputs.
As
to
the non-farm work
supplied by the tenants to the landlord household, it was
observed that for
rendering non-farm services
tenants in
West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa are either properly paid or
underpaid
at
the
worst.
No
case
of
completely
unpaid
labour-services for non-farm work has been reported in the
study.
Bandyopadhyay (1975) observed the emergence of fixed
rent tenancy in some areas of West Bengal where all costs
are borne by the tenant.
According to his study,
share
tenancy in West Bengal is getting more and more confined to
districts
enjoying
lacking
better
irrigation
irrigation
facilities.
facilities
In
a
new
the
areas
class
of
entrepreneurs with access to institutional finance leases in
land on a fixed rent basis.
23
Working on 13 samples villages of Hooghly district Ray
(1978) observed that both the lessees and the lessors were
dominated by petty owners.
Hotvever,
the author failed to
find any support for the hypothesis that relatively higher
economic status of lessors necessarily led to contractual
terms which are more exploitative.
Khasnabis and Chakraborty (1982) noted the presence of
semi-feudalism in rural areas of Nadia district.
The hold
of semi-feudal authority deprived the tenants from legally
stipulated share of produce and prevented a large section of
tenants from recording their names through operation barga.
Chattopadhyay and Ghosh (1983), on the basis of field
survey data in the
'intersection'
and
'non intersection'
villages in the Naxalbari, Kharibari and Phansidewa regions
of
Siliguri
subdivision,
considered
the
land
tenure
structure, types of tenurial arrangements and role of credit
in tenurial contracts.
and
the
lessees
They observed that both the lessors
belong
(namely,
Rajbansi),
region.
The
to
which
the
is
a
schedule
caste
unique
feature
community
of
this
land ownership pat tern shovled that lessors
belong to the categories of big and middle peasants while
the majority of lessees belong either to the category of
landless
tenants
implying
tenants'
or
to
poor
the
category
bargaining
of
power
small
tenants,
vis-a-vis
their
24
landlords.
that
On types of tenurial arrangement,
sharecropping
is
the
principal
farm.
they noted
For
all
categories of villages cost participation by a large number
of landlords were observed, though they are less interested
in farm supervision and production investment on tenanted
farm.
A significant finding is the dominance of landlords
in the credit market and the participation of the majority
of tenants as the receivers of loans.
They observed that
the incidence of credit is high in the customary form of
tenancy
form
of
(~
:
~
sharing) and low in the case of post reform
tenancy
(3/4
1/4
sharing).
A significant
percentage of tenants in all the categories do not get loan
either due to lack of cordiality with their landlords or due
to indifferent attitude of landlords in farm supervision and
in decision making.
The rate of interest on loans provided
by landlords is found to be exorbitantly high and varies
between 50 and 100 per cent.
Dasgupta (1984) tried to analyse the emergence, growth
and change in the sharecropping system in West Bengal during
the colonial periods.
He noted that sharecropping system
was widespread in the western part (now in Bangladesh) which
was vulnerable to flood and drought causing higher risk of
production.
25
Chada and Bhaumik (1992) with the help of primary data
from twelve purposively
district
in West
tenancy
relations
Bengal
tried
to understand and analyse
following
mobilisation
of
Their major
findings
the
organisation
and
tenantry in \-Jest Bengal in recent years.
struggle are able
their favour
chosen sample villages in Midnapore
to
are
i)
exercise
tenants
through organised
the cropsharing rights 1n
ii) sharecropping is the predominant form of
tenancy ; iii) in the majority of the cases, costsharing by
landlords has been very low, iv) all production decisions
are taken by the tenants themselves
; v)
tenant-landlord
relation worsens following recording of names by the tenants
and vi) the transactions between the lessors and the lessees
are being increasingly restricted to landlease market only.
This
makes
the
phenomenon
of
market
i nterlockings
insignificant.
1.4
In
Chapter
one
Outline of the Thesis
the
system
of
share
tenancy
is
considered in historical perspective and the significance of
the phenomenon in the contemporary agricultural scene of the
less developed countries is established.
The conflicting
views of economists on the strength and viability of the
system are recorded.
Chapter two states the methodology of the study and
26
presents a broad overall view of the study area.
Observers
have
historically
noted
an
inverse
relationship between the prevalence of share tenancy and the
Chapter three examines
level of development of a region.
this issue using some well known criteria of development.
The
risk
coexistence
of
s baring
hypothesis
sharecropping
for
with
explaining
other
forms
the
of
organisation is the subject of analysis of chapter four.
Both
production
and
price
uncertainty
are
taken
into
account.
Heterogeneity of tenants with respect to (i) efficiency
(ii) wealth ownership and (iii) family size has received
considerable attention in the literature dealing \vith the
problem of production organisation in backward agriculture
and
several
productivity
predicted
hypotheses
of
about
different
theoretically.
the
types
Chapter
relative
of
tenants
five
efficiency/
have
been
takes up some of
these for statistical testing.
In chapter six the relationship between cost sharing
and crop sharing and the issue of productive investment by
landlords are the subject of analysis.
It is shown that our
sample survey is able to yield unambiguous results.
27
The
final
chapter
summarises
the major
points out directions for further research.
findings
and