Measuring the Effects of Legal Precedent in
U.S. Federal Courts
Daniel Chen 1
1
Jens Frankenreiter 2
Susan Yeh 3
Toulouse Institute for Advanced Study
2
ETH Zurich & Harvard Law School
3
George Mason University
ALEA Annual Meeting 2015
May 15, 2015
Introduction and related literature
Contents
1
Introduction and related literature
2
Research design
3
Empirical analysis
4
Extension 1 – Legalistic motivation?
5
Extension 2 – Other effects and extension of dataset to 2000-2012
6
Discussion/Conclusion
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Introduction and related literature
Introduction
I
How do judges at lower level courts adjust their decision-making to the
creation of new legal precedent?
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Introduction and related literature
Introduction
I
I
How do judges at lower level courts adjust their decision-making to the
creation of new legal precedent?
“Common sense approach”: Judges follow new rule set by precedent and
decide a subset of cases different than before
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Introduction and related literature
Introduction
I
I
How do judges at lower level courts adjust their decision-making to the
creation of new legal precedent?
“Common sense approach”: Judges follow new rule set by precedent and
decide a subset of cases different than before
I
Consistent with “legalistic” (traditional) concepts of judicial decision-making
– legal reasoning as the main determinant of judges’ decisions
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Introduction and related literature
Introduction
I
I
How do judges at lower level courts adjust their decision-making to the
creation of new legal precedent?
“Common sense approach”: Judges follow new rule set by precedent and
decide a subset of cases different than before
I
I
Consistent with “legalistic” (traditional) concepts of judicial decision-making
– legal reasoning as the main determinant of judges’ decisions
Less clear in “realistic” concepts of judicial decision-making
– legal reasoning (more or less) irrelevant. However: obedience to precedence
might be caused by strategic considerations
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Introduction and related literature
Introduction, contd...
I
Measuring legal change is challenging!
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Introduction and related literature
Introduction, contd...
I
Measuring legal change is challenging!
I
Priest and Klein (1984): it is not sufficient to compare success rates
before and after the change in law occurred
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Introduction and related literature
Introduction, contd...
I
I
Measuring legal change is challenging!
Priest and Klein (1984): it is not sufficient to compare success rates
before and after the change in law occurred
I
Most legal disputes are not litigated, most litigated disputes are not resolved by
trial
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Introduction and related literature
Introduction, contd...
I
I
Measuring legal change is challenging!
Priest and Klein (1984): it is not sufficient to compare success rates
before and after the change in law occurred
I
I
Most legal disputes are not litigated, most litigated disputes are not resolved by
trial
Parties adjust their expectations to a change in law and select different
disputes for litigation
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Introduction and related literature
Introduction, contd...
I
Measuring legal change is challenging!
I
Priest and Klein (1984): it is not sufficient to compare success rates
before and after the change in law occurred
I
More recent theoretical contributions challenge the selection hypothesis
(Klerman/Lee 2013)
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Introduction and related literature
Introduction, contd...
I
Measuring legal change is challenging!
I
Priest and Klein (1984): it is not sufficient to compare success rates
before and after the change in law occurred
I
More recent theoretical contributions challenge the selection hypothesis
(Klerman/Lee 2013)
I
However, inferences from litigated cases can be only drawn under certain,
rather strong, assumptions (Gelbach 2014)
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Introduction and related literature
Empirical strategy
Examine the effect of the universe of decisions issued by the courts of
appeals related to veil piercing claims on the proceedings at the district
court level in which veil piercing claims are raised
Timing of District Court cases and Circuit Court judgments for D.Nev.
Circuit Court judgment affirming merits of PCV claim
Circuit Court judgment denying merits of PCV claim
Other Circuit Court judgment pro PCV
Other Circuit Court judgment anti PCV
District Court case terminated by judgment
District Court case − other termination
District Court judgment pro PCV
District Court judgment anti PCV
District Court Cases
I
2001
2002
2003
2004
Time
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Introduction and related literature
Empirical strategy
I
Examine the effect of the universe of decisions issued by the courts of
appeals related to veil piercing claims on the proceedings at the district
court level in which veil piercing claims are raised
(1) Consider only cases pending at the time of the circuit court decisions
(2) Instrument for the direction of the appellate case
I
In order to hold the case sample constant, we consider only cases pending
at the time of the circuit court decisions. In doing so, we avoid the
fundamental selection problem first described by Priest/Klein (1984) (the
“selection of disputes for litigation”).
I
Selection effects caused by changes in the tried disputes (the “selection of
litigated disputes for trial”) constitute a potential limitation to this study.
However, such selection should counteract, and not reinforce, any impact
of a change in decision standards on success rates. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to interpret our findings as lower bounds.
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Introduction and related literature
Empirical strategy
I
Examine the effect of the universe of decisions issued by the courts of
appeals related to veil piercing claims on the proceedings at the district
court level in which veil piercing claims are raised
(1) Consider only cases pending at the time of the circuit court decisions
(2) Instrument for the direction of the appellate case
I
We exploit the idiosyncratic variation of the assignment of judges at the
courts of appeals with personal characteristics which predict their voting
behavior in order to instrument for the direction of the appellate case.
This allows us to isolate the causal effect of circuit court decisions on
decisions of district court judges.
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Research design
Contents
1
Introduction and related literature
2
Research design
3
Empirical analysis
4
Extension 1 – Legalistic motivation?
5
Extension 2 – Other effects and extension of dataset to 2000-2012
6
Discussion/Conclusion
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Research design
The U.S. federal court system
I
The U.S. legal system includes both state courts and U.S. federal courts
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Research design
The U.S. federal court system
I
I
The U.S. legal system includes both state courts and U.S. federal courts
The federal courts include three levels (Supreme Court, circuit courts,
district courts)
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Research design
The U.S. federal court system
I
I
The U.S. legal system includes both state courts and U.S. federal courts
The federal courts include three levels (Supreme Court, circuit courts,
district courts)
I
I
94 district courts (+ 3 territorial courts) generally act as trial courts or as
courts of appeals for specialized courts such as bankruptcy courts
13 circuit courts form the intermediate level of the federal judiciary. They
operate under a system of mandatory review which means they must hear all
appeals of right from the lower courts.
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Research design
The U.S. federal court system, contd...
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Research design
The U.S. federal court system, contd...
I
Cases are effectively randomly assigned to 1 (district court) respectively 3
(circuit court) judges.
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Research design
The U.S. federal court system, contd...
I
Cases are effectively randomly assigned to 1 (district court) respectively 3
(circuit court) judges.
I
Personal characteristics of circuit court judges (most prominently, the party
of the president who appointed the judge) have been shown to be correlated
with case outcomes (Sunstein et al, 1996)
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Research design
Piercing the corporate veil
I
Piercing the corporate veil (PCV) refers to a decision to hold the
shareholder/mother company liable for the duties of a
corporation/subsidiary
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Research design
Piercing the corporate veil
I
Piercing the corporate veil (PCV) refers to a decision to hold the
shareholder/mother company liable for the duties of a
corporation/subsidiary
I
In US corporate law, usually a corporation is solely responsible for its duties
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Research design
Piercing the corporate veil
I
Piercing the corporate veil (PCV) refers to a decision to hold the
shareholder/mother company liable for the duties of a
corporation/subsidiary
I
I
In US corporate law, usually a corporation is solely responsible for its duties
In exceptional circumstances, a court may pierce this corporate veil and extend
the obligations to its shareholders
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Research design
Piercing the corporate veil
I
Piercing the corporate veil (PCV) refers to a decision to hold the
shareholder/mother company liable for the duties of a
corporation/subsidiary
I
PCV is allegedly the most litigated issue in U.S. corporate law (Thompson,
1991)
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Research design
Piercing the corporate veil
I
Piercing the corporate veil (PCV) refers to a decision to hold the
shareholder/mother company liable for the duties of a
corporation/subsidiary
I
PCV is allegedly the most litigated issue in U.S. corporate law (Thompson,
1991)
I
It occurs in a wide range of different types of legal conflicts (see Boyd
and Hoffman, 2010)
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Research design
Data - four different databases combined
For the identification of
district court cases
related to PCV, we used the
Westlaw pleadings
database (search string
““alter ego liability” or pier!
/s corpor! /s veil or “unity of
interest” or (corpor! /s
(facade or shell or sham or
undercapitalized conduit))”
Data for D.Nev.
District Court Cases
I
2001
2002
2003
2004
Time
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Research design
Data - four different databases combined
For each identified district
court case, we obtained
detailed information on
case outcomes from the AO
Civil Terminations
Database
Data for D.Nev.
●
●
District Court Cases
I
●
●
●
●
2001
2002
2003
2004
Time
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Research design
Data - four different databases combined
We conducted a search on
Lexis for PCV-related
keywords in order to obtain
all PCV cases litigated
before the circuit courts
Data for D.Nev.
●
●
District Court Cases
I
●
●
●
●
2001
2002
2003
2004
Time
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Research design
Data - four different databases combined
We manually coded
information on case
outcome and judges
involved and linked the
information to databases
containing judge
characteristics for all US
circuit court judges
Data for D.Nev.
●
●
District Court Cases
I
●
●
●
●
2001
2002
2003
2004
Time
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Research design
Data - four different databases combined, contd...
We obtain a dataset identifying for each district court case which circuit
court cases were decided while the case was pending
Timing of District Court cases and Circuit Court judgments for D.Nev.
Circuit Court judgment affirming merits of PCV claim
Circuit Court judgment denying merits of PCV claim
Other Circuit Court judgment pro PCV
Other Circuit Court judgment anti PCV
District Court case terminated by judgment
District Court case − other termination
District Court judgment pro PCV
District Court judgment anti PCV
District Court Cases
I
2001
2002
2003
2004
Time
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Research design
Data - overview (1): Distribution of cases across district
courts
Number of judgments
Number of other cases
0
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20
40
Effects of precedent
60
80
100
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Research design
Data - overview (2): Numbers of circuit court decisions
per district court case (all circuit court cases)
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Research design
Data - overview (3): Numbers of circuit court decisions
per district court case (on the merits only)
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Empirical analysis
Contents
1
Introduction and related literature
2
Research design
3
Empirical analysis
4
Extension 1 – Legalistic motivation?
5
Extension 2 – Other effects and extension of dataset to 2000-2012
6
Discussion/Conclusion
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Empirical analysis
Specification
I
Specifications:
P(Yi,y,d,c = 1|X) =
lawi,c
=
β0 + β1 casesi,c + β2 lawi,c + β3 dd + β4 dy + i
π0 + π1 casesi,c + π2 chari,c + π3 dd + π4 dy + i
casesi,c count variable of circuit court cases while district court case pending
lawi,c count variable of pro-PCV circuit court cases while district court case pending
dd and dy district and year fix effects
chari,c vector of judge characteristics
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Empirical analysis
Specification
I
Specifications:
P(Yi,y,d,c = 1|X) =
lawi,c
=
β0 + β1 casesi,c + β2 lawi,c + β3 dd + β4 dy + i
π0 + π1 casesi,c + π2 chari,c + π3 dd + π4 dy + i
casesi,c count variable of circuit court cases while district court case pending
lawi,c count variable of pro-PCV circuit court cases while district court case pending
dd and dy district and year fix effects
chari,c vector of judge characteristics
I
We use lassoiv (Belloni et al., 2012) to identify the optimal set of
instruments from a multitude of judge characteristics and interactions.
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Empirical analysis
Regression results – Regression estimates
Outcome: Pro-plaintiff district court judgment
all circuit court judgments
Cases
Law
_cons
F (First stage)
N
judgments on merits only
(1)
(3)
(4)
(6)
OLS
LIML
OLS
LIML
-0.0869
-0.110
-0.0905
-0.115
(0.350)
(0.318)
(0.161)
(0.140)
0.291
0.406*
0.297***
0.371**
(0.050)
(0.033)
(0.000)
(0.006)
0.934**
0.784*
1.140***
1.094***
(0.003)
(0.042)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
139.25
-
334.67
78
78
78
78
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the circuit level.
IV estimates: p-values based on small sample t-statistics. District and Year F.E. included. Dependent
variable: Dummy indicating whether district court decided at least partly in favor of claimant.
Observation level: District court judgment. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Extension 1 – Legalistic motivation?
Contents
1
Introduction and related literature
2
Research design
3
Empirical analysis
4
Extension 1 – Legalistic motivation?
5
Extension 2 – Other effects and extension of dataset to 2000-2012
6
Discussion/Conclusion
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Extension 1 – Legalistic motivation?
Does this effect indicate a legalistic motivation in judges’
decision-making?
I
District court judges react to changes in the law that are caused by “outlier
panels.” Absent any binding force of precedent (either on the circuit court
level or on the district court level), this should not affect jugdes’
expectations in a purely attitudinalist world.
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Extension 1 – Legalistic motivation?
Does this effect indicate a legalistic motivation in judges’
decision-making?
I
District court judges react to changes in the law that are caused by “outlier
panels.” Absent any binding force of precedent (either on the circuit court
level or on the district court level), this should not affect jugdes’
expectations in a purely attitudinalist world.
I
Still, it it unclear whether district court judges are motivated by legal
considerations, or merely by reversal aversion.
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Extension 1 – Legalistic motivation?
Does this effect indicate a legalistic motivation in judges’
decision-making?
I
District court judges react to changes in the law that are caused by “outlier
panels.” Absent any binding force of precedent (either on the circuit court
level or on the district court level), this should not affect jugdes’
expectations in a purely attitudinalist world.
I
Still, it it unclear whether district court judges are motivated by legal
considerations, or merely by reversal aversion.
We investigate this further by estimating the effects for circuit court
decisions in the same legal area and in different legal areas:
I
1.
2.
3.
4.
Common Law
Bankruptcy Law
ERISA
Other federal statutory law (including CERCLA)
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Extension 1 – Legalistic motivation?
Regression results – Regression estimates (2)
Outcome: Pro-plaintiff district court judgment
all circuit court judgments
Cases (same area)
Cases (different area)
Law (same area)
Law (different area)
_cons
N
judgments on merits only
(1)
(3)
(4)
(6)
OLS
LIML
OLS
LIML
-0.225
-0.142
-0.078
-0.065
(0.089)
(0.219)
(0.453)
(0.466)
-0.066
-0.145
-0.139
-0.190
(0.541)
(0.140)
(0.053)
(0.055)
0.675
0.733
0.845
0.795*
(0.124)
(0.268)
(0.086)
(0.045)
0.399**
0.186
0.401
0.267**
(0.263)
(0.194)
(0.007)
(0.011)
0.784*
0.565
1.034***
0.965***
(0.049)
(0.164)
(0.000)
(0.000)
78
78
78
78
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the circuit level.
IV estimates: p-values based on small sample t-statistics. District and Year F.E. included. Dependent
variable: Dummy indicating whether district court decided at least partly in favor of claimant.
Observation level: District court judgment. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Extension 2 – Other effects and extension of dataset to 2000-2012
Contents
1
Introduction and related literature
2
Research design
3
Empirical analysis
4
Extension 1 – Legalistic motivation?
5
Extension 2 – Other effects and extension of dataset to 2000-2012
6
Discussion/Conclusion
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Extension 2 – Other effects and extension of dataset to 2000-2012
Effect of circuit court judgments on settlement, damage
awards etc...
I
Beside, we are also investigating the effect of circuit court case outcomes
on
I
I
the amount of damages awarded
the probability of a case to settle
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Extension 2 – Other effects and extension of dataset to 2000-2012
Effect of circuit court judgments on settlement, damage
awards etc...
I
Beside, we are also investigating the effect of circuit court case outcomes
on
I
I
I
the amount of damages awarded
the probability of a case to settle
This should allow us to get a better understanding of potential selection
effects occurring during trial
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Extension 2 – Other effects and extension of dataset to 2000-2012
Extension of analysis to 2000-2012
I
At the moment, we are working on extending the analysis to 2012
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Extension 2 – Other effects and extension of dataset to 2000-2012
Extension of analysis to 2000-2012
I
At the moment, we are working on extending the analysis to 2012
I
Complicated by different data structure in AOC database for 2005-2012
and potential coding errors
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Extension 2 – Other effects and extension of dataset to 2000-2012
Extension of analysis to 2000-2012
I
At the moment, we are working on extending the analysis to 2012
I
Complicated by different data structure in AOC database for 2005-2012
and potential coding errors
I
So far, we managed to match 2183 district pleadings (out of 3274) to cases
in the AOC database
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Extension 2 – Other effects and extension of dataset to 2000-2012
Extension of analysis to 2000-2012
I
At the moment, we are working on extending the analysis to 2012
I
Complicated by different data structure in AOC database for 2005-2012
and potential coding errors
I
So far, we managed to match 2183 district pleadings (out of 3274) to cases
in the AOC database
I
Regression results are blurred and even change direction
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Discussion/Conclusion
Contents
1
Introduction and related literature
2
Research design
3
Empirical analysis
4
Extension 1 – Legalistic motivation?
5
Extension 2 – Other effects and extension of dataset to 2000-2012
6
Discussion/Conclusion
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Discussion/Conclusion
Wrap-up and discussion
I
First attempt to directly estimate the effect of the creation of new
precedent on district court decision-making
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Discussion/Conclusion
Wrap-up and discussion
I
First attempt to directly estimate the effect of the creation of new
precedent on district court decision-making
I
Using data for 2000-2004, our results suggest that new precedent has a strong
effect on district court judges’ decision standards
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Discussion/Conclusion
Wrap-up and discussion
I
First attempt to directly estimate the effect of the creation of new
precedent on district court decision-making
I
I
Using data for 2000-2004, our results suggest that new precedent has a strong
effect on district court judges’ decision standards
Results are stronger when we focus on decisions in the same area of law
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Discussion/Conclusion
Wrap-up and discussion
I
First attempt to directly estimate the effect of the creation of new
precedent on district court decision-making
I
I
I
Using data for 2000-2004, our results suggest that new precedent has a strong
effect on district court judges’ decision standards
Results are stronger when we focus on decisions in the same area of law
Extending the data to 2012, our results get blurred or even change direction
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Discussion/Conclusion
Wrap-up and discussion
I
First attempt to directly estimate the effect of the creation of new
precedent on district court decision-making
I
By limiting our analysis to cases that were initiated before the appellate
decision, we control for selection into litigation.
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Discussion/Conclusion
Wrap-up and discussion
I
First attempt to directly estimate the effect of the creation of new
precedent on district court decision-making
I
By limiting our analysis to cases that were initiated before the appellate
decision, we control for selection into litigation.
I
Random case assignment and judge characteristics with predictive power
allow us to make a plausible claim about a causal relationship between
circuit court judgments and the decisions of district court judges
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Discussion/Conclusion
Thank you! Feedback very welcome!
[email protected]
http://nber.org/ dlchen/
[email protected]
www.lawecon.ethz.ch/people/frankenreiter
[email protected]
www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/fulltime/yeh_susan
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Annex
Clarification
I
Change of law = changes to statutory law, creation of new legal precedent
I
Legal change / change of decision standard = change to an imagined line
separating those cases that are decided in a certain way from those that are
not
Density
Case distribution and decision standard
Decision
standard y*
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
Case quality
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Annex
Related literature
1. Literature on judicial compliance in hierarchical systems
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Annex
Related literature
1. Literature on judicial compliance in hierarchical systems
I
Changes in case outcomes after cases were remanded on appeal: Boyd (2009)
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Annex
Related literature
1. Literature on judicial compliance in hierarchical systems
I
I
Changes in case outcomes after cases were remanded on appeal: Boyd (2009)
Constraining effect of diverging preferences on the decision-making of lower
courts: Randazzo (2008); Songer, Segal and Cameron (1994)
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Related literature
1. Literature on judicial compliance in hierarchical systems
I
I
I
Changes in case outcomes after cases were remanded on appeal: Boyd (2009)
Constraining effect of diverging preferences on the decision-making of lower
courts: Randazzo (2008); Songer, Segal and Cameron (1994)
Changes in the ideology of the enacting court and the effect on the importance
of precedents to lower courts: Westerland et al (2010)
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Related literature
1. Literature on judicial compliance in hierarchical systems
2. (Scarce) literature on isolating the effect of legal motivations
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
29 / 57
Annex
Related literature
1. Literature on judicial compliance in hierarchical systems
2. (Scarce) literature on isolating the effect of legal motivations
I
Individual Supreme Court Justices and the effect of precedent: Spaeth and
Segal (2001)
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Related literature
1. Literature on judicial compliance in hierarchical systems
2. (Scarce) literature on isolating the effect of legal motivations
I
I
Individual Supreme Court Justices and the effect of precedent: Spaeth and
Segal (2001)
Attempts to differentiate between legal and policy motivations: Cross (2005),
Gilbert 2011, Fishman 2014
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
29 / 57
Annex
Related literature
1. Literature on judicial compliance in hierarchical systems
2. (Scarce) literature on isolating the effect of legal motivations
3. (Mostly theoretical) literature on dispute selection
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
29 / 57
Annex
Related literature
1. Literature on judicial compliance in hierarchical systems
2. (Scarce) literature on isolating the effect of legal motivations
3. (Mostly theoretical) literature on dispute selection
I
“Divergent expectation” (DE) models of dispute selection: Priest and Klein
(1984), Waldfogel (1995), Hylton/Lin (2012), Gelbach (2014)
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Related literature
1. Literature on judicial compliance in hierarchical systems
2. (Scarce) literature on isolating the effect of legal motivations
3. (Mostly theoretical) literature on dispute selection
I
I
“Divergent expectation” (DE) models of dispute selection: Priest and Klein
(1984), Waldfogel (1995), Hylton/Lin (2012), Gelbach (2014)
“Asymmetric information” (AI) models of dispute selection: Bebchuk (1984),
Shavell (1996)
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Related literature
1. Literature on judicial compliance in hierarchical systems
2. (Scarce) literature on isolating the effect of legal motivations
3. (Mostly theoretical) literature on dispute selection
I
I
I
“Divergent expectation” (DE) models of dispute selection: Priest and Klein
(1984), Waldfogel (1995), Hylton/Lin (2012), Gelbach (2014)
“Asymmetric information” (AI) models of dispute selection: Bebchuk (1984),
Shavell (1996)
Empirical investigation into the effect of briefs and interim rulings on settlement:
Boyd/Hoffman (2012)
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
29 / 57
Annex
Related literature
1. Literature on judicial compliance in hierarchical systems
2. (Scarce) literature on isolating the effect of legal motivations
3. (Mostly theoretical) literature on dispute selection
4. Literature on measuring legal change
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
29 / 57
Annex
Related literature
1. Literature on judicial compliance in hierarchical systems
2. (Scarce) literature on isolating the effect of legal motivations
3. (Mostly theoretical) literature on dispute selection
4. Literature on measuring legal change
I
Exploiting uncertainty created by legal change: Priest (1987)
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
29 / 57
Annex
Related literature
1. Literature on judicial compliance in hierarchical systems
2. (Scarce) literature on isolating the effect of legal motivations
3. (Mostly theoretical) literature on dispute selection
4. Literature on measuring legal change
I
I
Exploiting uncertainty created by legal change: Priest (1987)
Holding constant the case sample by focussing on pending cases and
considering selection effects: Hubbard (2012)
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Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Summary statistics (2000-2004)
Min.
1st Qu.
Median
Mean
3rd Qu.
Max.
Days pending
1.00
124.00
237.00
316.10
412.00
1399.00
Termination by judgment
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.18
0.00
Judgment pro plaintiff
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.12
0.00
1.00
# CC judgm. while case pending
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.65
2.00
12.00
All cases (N=425)
- of which pro PCV
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.46
1.00
5.00
- of which % pro PCV
0.00
0.00
50.00
35.20
50.00
100.00
# CC judgments on the merits
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.43
2.00
12.00
- of which pro PCV
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.44
1.00
5.00
# CC judgments reversing
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.45
1.00
5.00
- of which pro PCV
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.14
0.00
2.00
Judgments only (N=78)
Days pending
13.00
144.00
263.50
340.40
479.00
1243.00
Termination by judgment
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Judgment pro plaintiff
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.68
1.00
1.00
# CC judgm. while case pending
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.68
2.75
8.00
- of which pro PCV
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.37
0.75
4.00
- of which % pro PCV
0.00
0.00
33.33
29.46
50.00
100.00
# CC judgments on the merits
- of which pro PCV
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.42
0.33
2.00
0.00
8.00
4.00
# CC judgments reversing
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.68
1.00
4.00
- of which pro PCV
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.18
0.00
2.00
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Summary statistics (2000-2012)
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Median
Days pending
2166
458.815
442.94
0
3221
326.5
Termination by judgment
2166
.228
.42
0
1
All cases (N=2166)
0
Judgment pro plaintiff
2166
.175
.38
0
1
0
# circuit judgments while case pending
2166
2.007
3.114
0
31
1
- of which pro PCV
2166
.922
1.646
0
15
0
# circuit judgments on merit
2166
1.555
2.494
0
23
1
- of which pro PCV
2166
.805
1.596
0
15
0
# circuit judgments reversing
2166
.426
.885
0
6
0
- of which pro PCV
2166
.212
.58
0
5
0
Days pending
494
564.265
541.707
20
3188
387.5
Termination by judgment
494
1
0
1
1
Judgments only (N=494)
1
Judgment pro plaintiff
494
.765
.424
0
1
1
# circuit judgments while case pending
494
2.719
4.286
0
31
1
- of which pro-plaintiff PCV
494
1.316
2.326
0
15
1
# circuit judgments on merit
3.353
1
494
2.095
0
23
- of which pro-plaintiff PCV
494
1.194
2.297
0
15
0
# circuit judgments reversing
494
.615
1.087
0
6
0
- of which pro-plaintiff PCV
494
.308
.702
0
5
0
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Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Timing of case resolution
0.0015
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
Density
0.0020
0.0025
All proceedings
Proceedings resolved by judgment
Proceedings resolved by settlement
0
500
1000
1500
Number of days pending. N = 425 (all cases) / 78 (judgment) / 154 (settlement)
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Effects of precedent
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Annex
Regression results – First stage OLS regression
2000-2004
Outcome: # pro-PCV judgments
by the circuit court
all judgments
Cases
# of democrat judges in panels
on merits only
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.115
0.164
0.0948
0.101
(0.426)
(0.263)
(0.597)
(0.599)
0.141*
0.177
(0.039)
(0.072)
# of panels with 1 democrat judge
-0.0984
0.0968
(0.656)
(0.639)
# of panels with 2 democrat judges
0.436*
0.374*
(0.026)
(0.018)
0.0270
-0.0301
# of panels with 3 democrat judges
(0.948)
_cons
F-statistics of instruments
N
(0.868)
1.041***
1.065***
0.269
0.259
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.471)
(0.439)
5.52*
26.11***
3.97
8.59**
78
78
78
78
p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the circuit level. Dependent variable: count
variable for the number of pro-PCV decisions by the circuit courts.
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Effects of precedent
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Annex
Regression results – Regression estimates (1)
Outcome: Pro-plaintiff district court judgment
all appellate judgments
Cases
pro − PCV
_cons
F (First stage)
N
appellate judgments on merits only
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
OLS
LIML 1
LIML 2
OLS
LIML 1
LIML 2
-0.0869
-0.123
-0.110
-0.0905
-0.186**
-0.115
(0.350)
(0.208)
(0.318)
(0.161)
(0.001)
(0.140)
0.371**
0.291
0.562
0.406*
0.297***
0.578**
(0.050)
(0.087)
(0.033)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.006)
0.934**
0.580
0.784*
1.140***
0.964***
1.094***
(0.003)
(0.276)
(0.042)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
26.11
139.25
-
8.59
334.67
78
78
78
78
78
78
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the circuit level.
IV estimates: p-values based on small sample t-statistics. District and Year F.E. included. Dependent
variable: Dummy indicating whether district court decided at least partly in favor of claimant.
Observation level: District court judgment. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Annex
Regression results – Regression estimates (2)
Outcome: Pro-plaintiff district court judgment
all appellate judgments
Cases (same area)
Cases (different area)
Law (same area)
Law (different area)
_cons
N
appellate judgments on merits only
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
OLS
LIML 1
LIML 2
OLS
LIML 1
LIML 2
-0.143
-0.225
-0.142
-0.078
-0.086
-0.065
(0.089)
(0.148)
(0.219)
(0.453)
(0.496)
(0.466)
-0.066
-0.110
-0.145
-0.139
-0.188
-0.190
(0.541)
(0.459)
(0.140)
(0.053)
(0.158)
(0.055)
0.675
1.221
0.733
0.845
0.961
0.795*
(0.124)
(0.118)
(0.268)
(0.086)
(0.078)
(0.045)
0.399**
0.186
0.254
0.401
0.267**
0.374
(0.263)
(0.424)
(0.194)
(0.007)
(0.202)
(0.011)
0.784*
0.392
0.565
1.034***
0.953***
0.965***
(0.049)
(0.526)
(0.164)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
78
78
78
78
78
78
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the circuit level.
IV estimates: p-values based on small sample t-statistics. District and Year F.E. included. Dependent
variable: Dummy indicating whether district court decided at least partly in favor of claimant.
Observation level: District court judgment. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Regression results – First stage OLS regression
2000-2012
Outcome: Number of pro-PCV
appellate court judgments
all judgments
# PCV cases
# of Democrat judges on panels
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.466***
0.297**
0.668**
0.356*
(0.000)
(0.008)
(0.006)
(0.049)
0.0241
-0.0532
(0.774)
# of panels with 1+ Democrat judge
(0.703)
0.314*
0.500*
(0.037)
(0.010)
-0.151
-0.515**
(0.401)
(0.007)
# of panels with 2+ Democrat judges
# of panels with 3 Democrat judges
Constant
F-statistics of instruments
N
on merits only
(1)
-0.0818
0.0556
(0.641)
(0.696)
2.090***
2.107***
1.102**
0.644
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.003)
(0.055)
0.087
495
2.165
495
0.153
495
7.104***
495
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. clustered at the circuit level.
District and Year F.E. included. Dependent variable: count variable for the number of pro-PCV decisions
by the circuit courts. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Regression results – Regression estimates
Outcome: Pro-plaintiff district court judgment
all appellate judgments
Cases
pro − PCV
_cons
F (First stage)
N
appellate judgments on merits only
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
OLS
LIML 1
LIML 2
OLS
LIML 1
LIML 2
-0.002
-0.020
0.057+
0.005
0.039
-0.017
(0.913)
(0.828)
(0.091)
(0.845)
(0.482)
(0.596)
0.002
-0.043
-0.117+
-0.010
0.066
-0.029
(0.963)
(0.811)
(0.074)
(0.784)
(0.434)
(0.506)
1.099**
1.067*
1.160*
1.313**
1.079**
1.139**
(0.000)
(0.006)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
2.165
7.914
-
7.104
163.550
495
495
495
495
495
495
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the circuit level.
IV estimates: p-values based on small sample t-statistics. District and Year F.E. included. Dependent
variable: Dummy indicating whether district court decided at least partly in favor of claimant.
Instruments in cols. 2 and 5: Number of panels with 1+, 2+, 3 Democrat appointees.
LASSO instrument in col 3: Number of panels with 2+ Jewish former law professors.
LASSO instrument in col 6: Number of panels with 1+ Catholic former federal prosecutor.
Observation level: District court judgment. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Possible selection effects
I
Although we evaluate the impact of circuit court judgments on ongoing
proceedings only, we still have to take into account possible selection
effects
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Possible selection effects
I
Although we evaluate the impact of circuit court judgments on ongoing
proceedings only, we still have to take into account possible selection
effects
I
Litigants might not only select different cases for litigation, but also select
different cases for trial
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Possible selection effects
I
Although we evaluate the impact of circuit court judgments on ongoing
proceedings only, we still have to take into account possible selection
effects
I
Litigants might not only select different cases for litigation, but also select
different cases for trial
I
Does this lead to biased results?
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Possible selection effects
I
Although we evaluate the impact of circuit court judgments on ongoing
proceedings only, we still have to take into account possible selection
effects
I
Litigants might not only select different cases for litigation, but also select
different cases for trial
I
Does this lead to biased results?
I
Although we can not fully rule out any selection effects, both theory and the
data suggest that the observed effect on district court judges is not caused
by selection effects
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Possible selection effects - theory
I
AI and DE models generally work very differently - however, in the context of
uncertainty about the law, it seems appropriate to use DE models
(Siegelman/Waldfogel, 1999), as there is no reason to assume that one
party has complete knowledge about how the judge is going to decide the
case
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Possible selection effects - theory
I
AI and DE models generally work very differently - however, in the context of
uncertainty about the law, it seems appropriate to use DE models
(Siegelman/Waldfogel, 1999), as there is no reason to assume that one
party has complete knowledge about how the judge is going to decide the
case
I
In most DE models (e.g., under the Priest/Klein assumptions), case
selection mitigates any effect of changes in judges’ decision standards
on the plaintiff’s success rates. Therefore, if any effect can be seen, it
could be interpreted as a lower bound on the change in decision standards
(see also Henderson/Hubbard, 2014)
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Possible selection effects - theory
I
In most DE models (e.g., under the Priest/Klein assumptions), case
selection mitigates any effect of changes in judges’ decision standards
on the plaintiff’s success rates. Therefore, if any effect can be seen, it
could be interpreted as a lower bound on the change in decision standards
(see also Henderson/Hubbard, 2014)
Y
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
Y'
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Possible selection effects - theory
I
In most DE models (e.g., under the Priest/Klein assumptions), case
selection mitigates any effect of changes in judges’ decision standards
on the plaintiff’s success rates. Therefore, if any effect can be seen, it
could be interpreted as a lower bound on the change in decision standards
(see also Henderson/Hubbard, 2014)
Y
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
Y'
AELA, May 15, 2015
39 / 57
Annex
Possible selection effects - theory
I
AI and DE models generally work very differently - however, in the context of
uncertainty about the law, it seems appropriate to use DE models
(Siegelman/Waldfogel, 1999), as there is no reason to assume that one
party has complete knowledge about how the judge is going to decide the
case
I
In most DE models (e.g., under the Priest/Klein assumptions), case
selection mitigates any effect of changes in judges’ decision standards
on the plaintiff’s success rates. Therefore, if any effect can be seen, it
could be interpreted as a lower bound on the change in decision standards
(see also Henderson/Hubbard, 2014)
I
However, following the logic employed by Gelbach (2014), we cannot fully
rule out the possibility that an increase (decrease) in decision standards lead
to lower (higher) quality cases being selected for trial
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
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Annex
Possible selection effects - data analysis
I
We also aim at analyzing the data in order to detect any effect of circuit
court judgments on settlement rates
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
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Annex
Possible selection effects - data analysis
I
We also aim at analyzing the data in order to detect any effect of circuit
court judgments on settlement rates
I
Note, however, that it is not possible to regress the probability of
settlement on the number of circuit court judgments, because the
number of circuit court judgments is highly correlated with the duration of
a case (proxy variable)
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
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Annex
Possible selection effects - data analysis
I
We also aim at analyzing the data in order to detect any effect of circuit
court judgments on settlement rates
I
Note, however, that it is not possible to regress the probability of
settlement on the number of circuit court judgments, because the
number of circuit court judgments is highly correlated with the duration of
a case (proxy variable)
I
A Cox regression (survival analysis) shows no increase in cases being
settled or dropped after a circuit court judgment is rendered. In fact, less
cases are terminated by settlement or dropped after the appearance of new
precedent.
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
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Annex
Regression results (3) – Effect on Amout Received
Outcome:
Log(Amount Received)
pro − PCV
Cases
F (First stage)
N
Award vs. No Award
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
OLS
LIML 1
LIML 2
OLS
LIML 1
LIML 2
-0.194
1.048
-0.461*
-0.003
0.211
0.082
(0.200)
(0.403)
(0.048)
(0.935)
(0.103)
(0.192)
0.269*
-0.504
0.435*
0.028
-0.100
-0.023
(0.014)
(0.515)
(0.012)
(0.301)
(0.222)
(0.590)
-
4.804
128.614
-
3.766
121.215
251
251
251
378
378
378
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the circuit level.
IV estimates: p-values based on small sample t-statistics. District and Year F.E. included. Sample
restricted to district court pleadings that terminated with a pro-plaintiff judgment.
Award includes monetary, cost, or injunction. Amount received is in thousand dollars.
Instruments in cols. 2 and 5: Number of panels with 1+, 2+, 3 Democrat appointees.
LASSO instrument in col 3: Number of panels with 1+ Black cross-party appointment.
LASSO instrument in col 6: Number of panels with 1+ Evangelical cross-party appointment.
Observation level: District court judgment. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Annex
Regression results (4) – Effect on Settlement
Outcome: Settlement
all appellate judgments
pro − PCV
Cases
F (First stage)
N
appellate judgments on merits only
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
OLS
LIML 1
LIML 2
OLS
LIML 1
LIML 2
-0.003
-0.111
-0.090*
-0.032+
-0.025
-0.051+
(0.912)
(0.388)
(0.091)
(0.079)
(0.732)
(0.058)
-0.005
-0.047
0.037+
0.010
0.007
0.021
(0.687)
(0.444)
(0.070)
(0.346)
(0.875)
(0.231)
-
0.930
257.061
-
3.899
243.210
1206
1206
1206
1206
1206
1206
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the circuit level.
IV estimates: p-values based on small sample t-statistics. District and Year F.E. included. Dependent
variable: 1=Settlement, 0=Judgment. Instruments in cols. 2 and 5: Number of panels with 1+, 2+, 3
Democrat appointees. LASSO instrument in col 3, 6: Number of panels with 1+ Catholic former federal
prosecutor. Observation level: District court judgment. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
42 / 57
Annex
Combined information on DC and CC cases in N.D.Ill.
Timing of District Court cases and Circuit Court judgments for N.D.Ill.
District Court Cases
●
●
Circuit Court judgment affirming merits of PCV claim
Circuit Court judgment denying merits of PCV claim
Other Circuit Court judgment pro PCV
Other Circuit Court judgment anti PCV
District Court case terminated by judgment
District Court case − other termination
District Court judgment pro PCV
District Court judgment anti PCV
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
2001
2002
2003
2004
Time
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
43 / 57
Annex
Combined information on DC and CC cases in S.D.Fla.
Timing of District Court cases and Circuit Court judgments for S.D.Fla.
District Court Cases
●
●
Circuit Court judgment affirming merits of PCV claim
Circuit Court judgment denying merits of PCV claim
Other Circuit Court judgment pro PCV
Other Circuit Court judgment anti PCV
District Court case terminated by judgment
District Court case − other termination
District Court judgment pro PCV
District Court judgment anti PCV
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
2001
2002
2003
2004
Time
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
44 / 57
Annex
Combined information on DC and CC cases in D.Nev.
Timing of District Court cases and Circuit Court judgments for D.Nev.
District Court Cases
Circuit Court judgment affirming merits of PCV claim
Circuit Court judgment denying merits of PCV claim
Other Circuit Court judgment pro PCV
Other Circuit Court judgment anti PCV
District Court case terminated by judgment
District Court case − other termination
District Court judgment pro PCV
District Court judgment anti PCV
2001
2002
2003
2004
Time
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
45 / 57
Annex
Combined information on DC and CC cases in S.D.Cal.
Timing of District Court cases and Circuit Court judgments for S.D.Cal.
District Court Cases
●
●
Circuit Court judgment affirming merits of PCV claim
Circuit Court judgment denying merits of PCV claim
Other Circuit Court judgment pro PCV
Other Circuit Court judgment anti PCV
District Court case terminated by judgment
District Court case − other termination
District Court judgment pro PCV
District Court judgment anti PCV
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
2001
2002
2003
2004
Time
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
46 / 57
Annex
Combined information on DC and CC cases in S.D.N.Y.
Timing of District Court cases and Circuit Court judgments for S.D.N.Y.
District Court Cases
●
●
Circuit Court judgment affirming merits of PCV claim
Circuit Court judgment denying merits of PCV claim
Other Circuit Court judgment pro PCV
Other Circuit Court judgment anti PCV
District Court case terminated by judgment
District Court case − other termination
District Court judgment pro PCV
District Court judgment anti PCV
●
●
●
●
2001
2002
2003
2004
Time
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
47 / 57
Annex
Combined information on DC and CC cases in E.D.Pa.
Timing of District Court cases and Circuit Court judgments for E.D.Pa.
●
District Court Cases
●
Circuit Court judgment affirming merits of PCV claim
Circuit Court judgment denying merits of PCV claim
Other Circuit Court judgment pro PCV
Other Circuit Court judgment anti PCV
District Court case terminated by judgment
District Court case − other termination
District Court judgment pro PCV
District Court judgment anti PCV
●
●
2002
2003
2004
Time
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
48 / 57
Annex
Combined information on DC and CC cases in N.D.Ohio
Timing of District Court cases and Circuit Court judgments for N.D.Ohio
District Court Cases
Circuit Court judgment affirming merits of PCV claim
Circuit Court judgment denying merits of PCV claim
Other Circuit Court judgment pro PCV
Other Circuit Court judgment anti PCV
●
●
●
●
●
2003
District Court case terminated by judgment
District Court case − other termination
District Court judgment pro PCV
District Court judgment anti PCV
2004
Time
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
49 / 57
Annex
Descriptive statistics (1) - District court cases
District
Cases
Judgments
Cases
Judgments
Cases
Judgments
D.Me
3
0
N.D.Fla.
District
1
0
District
E.D.Wis.
2
0
D.Mass
7
1
M.D.Fla.
28
2
W.D.Wis.
1
0
D.N.H.
2
0
S.D.Fla.
50
8
E.D.Ark.
6
2
D.Conn.
2
0
N.D.Ga.
6
0
S.D.Iowa
1
0
N.D.N.Y.
2
0
S.D.Ga.
2
0
D.Minn.
1
0
E.D.N.Y.
3
2
E.D.La.
9
3
E.D.Mo.
5
0
S.D.N.Y.
16
6
M.D.La.
1
0
W.D.Mo.
5
0
W.D.N.Y.
2
1
W.D.La.
2
0
D.Neb.
1
1
D.N.J.
4
0
S.D.Miss.
1
0
D.S.D.
1
0
E.D.Pa.
14
2
N.D.Tex.
10
2
D.Ariz.
1
0
M.D.Pa.
2
1
E.D.Tex.
3
0
C.D.Cal.
4
0
D.Md.
6
2
S.D.Tex.
9
1
S.D.Cal.
22
7
E.D.N.C.
1
1
E.D.Ky.
3
1
D.Nev.
24
6
M.D.N.C.
3
1
W.D.Ky.
1
0
D.Or.
2
2
W.D.B.C.
7
0
E.D.Mich.
0
E.D.Wash.
5
0
D.S.C.
8
0
W.D.Mich.
1
0
W.D.Wash.
14
0
E.D.Va.
1
0
N.D.Ohio
14
3
D.Colo.
1
1
N.D.W.Va.
1
0
S.D.Ohio
3
0
D.Kan.
1
0
S.D.W.Va.
1
0
E.D.Tenn.
1
0
N.D.Okla.
3
0
N.D.Ala.
4
0
N.D.Ill.
87
25
W.D.Okla.
3
1
M.D.Ala.
1
0
N.D.Ind.
2
1
D.Utah
8
0
S.D.Ala.
2
1
S.D.Ind.
2
1
D.D.C.
2
1
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
1
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
50 / 57
Annex
Descriptive statistics (2) - District court cases, contd...
Number of judgments
Number of other cases
0
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
20
40
Effects of precedent
60
80
100
AELA, May 15, 2015
51 / 57
Annex
Descriptive statistics (3) - Circuit court cases
Circuit
Judgments on merits of PCV claim
PCV judgments reversing DC
# Judgments
Judgments on PCV
# Pro Plaintiff
# Judgments
# Pro Plaintiff
# Judgments
# Pro Plaintiff
Fed.
1
0
1
0
0
0
D.C.
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
6
2
5
2
1
0
2
13
1
9
1
4
4
3
11
4
10
4
1
1
4
3
0
3
0
1
1
5
17
6
16
5
8
7
6
9
5
8
5
3
2
7
9
2
7
1
6
4
8
4
1
4
1
1
1
9
14
6
14
6
2
2
10
3
2
2
2
1
0
11
5
2
2
1
0
0
96
31
82
28
28
22
TOTAL
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
52 / 57
Annex
Descriptive statistics (4) - Circuit court judgments while
district court case pending
Relationship between duration of district court case
and number of circuit court cases issued while pending
5
10
15
20
10
8
●
●
● ●
●●
●
●
6
●
●
●
4
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●● ● ●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●
●●●
●●
●●●
●
●
●●
●●●●
●
● ●
●●
●●
●
●●
●
●●●
●●
●
●●●
●●●●
●
● ●●
●●●●●
●●
●
●●
●●
25
●
●
● ●
●●
●
● ●● ●
200
400
●
●
●
● ●● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●● ●
●
●
● ●● ● ●● ● ●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●● ●
●●
●●●●●
● ●●
●●
● ●●
0
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●●
●●
●●●
●
●
●●●
●● ●●●
●●
● ●● ●
● ●●● ● ●●
Number of circuit court judgments
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
●
●
0
0
●
2
80
60
40
20
0
Frequency
100
120
Number of circuit court decisions while case pending
12
140
Numbers of circuit court judgments in same circuit
while district court proceedings are pending
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Days pending
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
53 / 57
Annex
Descriptive statistics (5) - Circuit court judgments while
district court case pending
No. of circuit court judgments while district court
case pending per circuit (all cases)
No. of circuit court judgments while district court
case pending per circuit (judgments only)
District court case terminated by judgment
●● ●
●
●
●● ●
●
●
●
●
DC
●
● ●
●●●
●●
●
●●
●●
●●
1st
2nd
● ●
●
●
●
● ●
●●●
●●
●●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
3rd
4th
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●●●●
● ●●●
5th
●● ●●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●
●●● ●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
6th
7th
1500
20
15
●
●●
●●●
●
●●
●
●● ●
●
8th
●●●
●●
●●
●
●
●●
● ●
●●
●●
●●●
●
● ●
●● ●
●
●●
9th
500
● ●
●● ●●
● ●●
●
●●
●●●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
● ●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●
●
●●
10th
11th
0
●
● ●
●● ●
●● ●
●
5
●
●●●●●
●
● ●●
●
●
500
●
●●●●
0
●
● ●
●
0
●
●
●
1000
●
10
●
2000
25
●
●
10
1000
1500
2000
No. of circuit court judgments
20
15
●
●
5
No. of circuit court judgments
● ● ●
●
●●
0
Mean of cc judgments per decision
Mean of days pending
Total no. of cc decisions
30
Mean of cc judgments per decision
Mean of days pending
Total no. of cc decisions
25
30
●
District court case w/ judgment
Other district court case
DC
1st
Circuit
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
Circuit
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
54 / 57
Annex
Descriptive statistics (6) - Circuit court judgments while
district court case pending
30
Mean of cc judgments
Mean of days pending
●
●
● ●●
●
● ●● ●
●
●●
●
●
● ●● ●
●
●●●●
●
2000
●
● ●●
●
●
●●● ●● ● ● ●●
●
●
● ●●●
●
●
2001
●●●● ● ●●
●● ●●
●●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●●● ●●
2002
●●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
● ●
●
●●●
●
●● ● ●●●
●
● ● ●●
●●●
●●
1500
20
●●
●● ●
● ●●
●
●
500
●●
●●
●
●●
● ●
●●
●●● ●●
●● ●
●●●●
●
●●
● ● ●●
●
● ●●
●●●●
●● ●●
●
●
●●●
●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●
●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●● ●
● ●●●● ●● ●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
2003
2004
0
●
●
●
● ●
5
●
●
●●
500
5
●●
●
●
●
●
● ● ●
0
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
0
10
●
●
●
1000
●
●
2000
25
District court case terminated by judgment
15
●●
●
1000
1500
2000
No. of circuit court judgments while pending
20
15
●
●
●
0
No. of circuit court judgments while pending
25
●
No. of circuit court judgments while district
court case pending per year (judgments only)
Mean of cc judgments
Mean of days pending
10
30
No. of circuit court judgments while district
court case pending per year (all cases)
District court case w/ judgment
Other district court case
2000
Year of termination of district court proceedings
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
2001
2002
2003
2004
Year of termination of district court proceedings
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
55 / 57
Annex
Descriptive statistics (7) - Relationship between district
court case duration and decision type
● ●● ●
●● ●
●
●● ●
● ● ●
●
●
●
●
●●● ● ●
●
●
●
●
● ● ●
●●●●●
● ●●
●● ●
● ●
●
●●
●●
● ●
●
●● ●●
●
● ●
● ●
●●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
No judgment
Case decided by judgment
Judgment
Relationship between duration of district court case and judgment
● ●●
● ●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●● ● ●● ●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●●●●
●● ●●
●●
●● ●● ●
●●
●
●
● ●●
●
● ●● ●
● ●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●●
●●●
●
●●●● ●
●
●
● ●
●
●●●
●
●●
●●●●●
●
●
● ●●
●
●
● ●●
●
●●
●●
●●
●
● ●●●
●●
●●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●● ●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●
●●●
●●●
●
●●
●●
●●
●
●●
● ●●● ● ●●●● ● ●●● ●
●
● ●●
● ●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●●●
●
●●
●
●●●●
●●●
●●●
● ●●
● ●●
●
●●● ●
● ●●●●
●
●
●●
● ●●●
●●●
●
●●
●●
●●
●●●●●
●●●
●●●●
●●●●
●●● ●
●
●●
●
●
●●●● ●
●●●
●● ●
● ●
0
500
●
●
● ●●
●●
●
1000
●●
●
●
●
● ●
● ●
●
●
1500
Days pending
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
56 / 57
Annex
Descriptive statistics (8) - Relationship between cc
judgments pro and anti PCV
2
●
●
●●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
6
8
●
●
4
●
Number of circuit court judgments pro PCV
6
4
●● ●
●
● ●
●
●
●
● ●
● ●●●
●●
●
● ●
●
●●
●● ● ●
●
●
●
●●●
●● ●
● ● ●●
● ●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●● ●●
●
●●
●●
●●
●●●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●●●
●●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●●●● ●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●●
●●●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●●●
●●●
●
●●
●
●
●● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
● ●●●
●●
●●
0
●
●●
●
●
●●
●● ●
●
●
●
● ●●●
●
●
● ●●
● ●
●
●●
●● ●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
2
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
0
0
Number of circuit court judgments pro PCV
●
Number of circuit court judgments pro and anti PCV
while case pending (judgments only)
District court case w/ judgment
2
8
Number of circuit court judgments pro and anti
PCV while case pending (all cases)
District courtbycase
Terminated
judgment
w/ judgment
Other district
case termination
court case
●
4
6
8
0
Number of circuit court judgments anti PCV
Chen/Frankenreiter/Yeh
2
4
6
8
Number of circuit court judgments anti PCV
Effects of precedent
AELA, May 15, 2015
57 / 57