Bacon's Imperialism
Author(s): Howard B. White
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Jun., 1958), pp. 470-489
Published by: American Political Science Association
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BACON'S IMPERIALISM
HOWARD
B. WHITE
New School for Social Research
To understandthe political philosophyof Francis Bacon, or what he tried
to do in politicalphilosophy,one mustmake the clear-cutdistinctionhe saw, I
believe, betweena provisionaland a definitivepolitical teaching. The latter,
whichhe put chieflyin the New Atlantisand the De Sapientia Veterum,could
be but imperfectlyexplored,because man could only build a final political
teaching out of an as yet unconstructednatural philosophy.The former,on
the otherhand, could be knownand conveyedwith some precision.It was to
serve the purpose of furnishinga temporarystation for mankind,one that
would be liveableand even comfortableas a dwellingplace, and one that would
at the same time,permitphilosophyor scienceits own discoveryof something
better. Of the provisional political order,as Bacon saw it, there were three
pillars: crown,church,and empire. The imperial pillar is certainlythe most
importantto him of the three,and its constructionrequireda greaterboldness
than the constructionof eitherof the others.
I
The centralidea in Bacon's treatmentof foreignpolicyis the idea of "greatness." It is in the titleof his longest,and, in the finaledition,his centralessay,
and it is in the title of one of his most importantpolitical papers.' Yet, while
thereare at least threekindsofgreatnessin Bacon-greatness ofmen,greatness
of "kingdomsand estates" or national greatness,and greatnessof times-he
does not tell us explicitlywhat he means by greatness.The idea of greatnessof
commonwealthsis, of course,an ancientone. Yet ancientwriterswho spoke of
national greatnessoftenadopted an apologetic tone, insistingthat conquests
were originallydefensive,or that conquests were necessaryfor a people to
hold what they had.2 With the growthof Roman power,however,the idea of
the greatnessof commonwealthsreceivedan ineluctableimpetus.The greatness
as Cicero,
of Rome has been admired by political philosophers as different
Machiavelli, Montesquieu,Rousseau, and, withsome reservations,the authors
of the Federalist.But there was more than one Rome, and at a time when
the age of Roman greatness,Livy
Vergilwas, at least apparently,glorifying
was deploringits decay. And in the SeventeenthCentury,while Britishmonarchistswere praisingthe Roman Empire, Britishrepublicanswere glorifying
the Roman republic.3
I "True Greatnessof Kingdoms and Estates," 29th Essay, Bacon's Essays, W. A.
Wright,ed. (London, 1939); "True Greatnessof the Kingdom of Britain," in Works,
Spedding,Ellis, and Heath, ed., (Boston, 1861), XIII, 231 ff.
2 Xenophon, Cyropaedeia:cf. VII, C. 5, 77 and 70; Thucydides,Pel. War, I, 75;
II, 63, 58; IV, 61-62; V, 104, etc. Sallust,Catiline,Par VI. "At Romani,domi militiaeque
intenti.. . .
3 See Zera S. Fink, The Classical Republicans (Evanston, 1945), passim.
470
BACON' S IMPERIALISM
471
Did Bacon's concept of national greatness,or the greatnessof "kingdoms
and estates," representany marked change from the tradition of Roman
greatness?The Latin writerswho admiredRoman greatnesssaw in that greatness a unity of magnitude,longevity,and quality. Greatnessimpliesthe long
enduranceof the extraordinary.A great nation or a great city is a model for
others.It inspires,whetherthroughrealityor myth,the convictionthat its
gloryis somethingthat may come again to man. To men dissatisfiedwiththeir
own fatherland,it engendersa vicarious patriotism.To men dissatisfiedwith
the present,a great past serves to remindthem of the greatnessthey might
have.4Whetherthat greatnesshas a real advantage forthe privatecitizenis a
question not completelyresolved. Pericles, as reportedby Thucydides, suggestedthat the benefitofthe polis was moreto the advantage ofprivatecitizens
than any individualwell-being,if the latterwere coupled withthe humiliation
of the polis.5Were national greatnessidentical with public virtue,we might
accept thisstatement,but in our own timewe have seen the locus ofpublic and
private virtueoftenassigned to small states, freedof jingoisticpride and the
drivingnecessityto maintaintheirplace in the sun: states like Norway,Israel,
Denmark,Switzerland.What may be resolvedin the highestcase, of a nation
both politicallyand morallygreat,may not be so easy to discoverin the ordinarycase. It is not hard to understandthat whileRome, withits power,its long
enduranceand its durable contributionto the historyofthe westernworld,was
a modelforothers,it was a model ofuncertainstamp; or that it was morethan
one model.
VergiltracesRoman greatnessto a gloriouspast, even suggestingthe ancestryof the Julianhouse in Ilium, and promisesforRome a great future.That
promiseis firstone of magnitudeand longevity;the realmsof the Nile and the
Caspian are said to trembleat the comingof Augustus.Yet it is also a promise
of quality,of peace and justice:
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento
(hae tibi erunt artes), pacisque imponere morem,
parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.6
O.S.A., has pointed out that Augustinequestioned the
Rudolph Arbesmnann,
sincerityof those who promisedeternityto earthlyempires,suggestingthat
Vergil "put the words containingthe promise of 'dominionwithout end' to
the Romans purposelyinto the mouth of Jupiter,'a false god' and 'deceptive
prophet,'thus indicatingthat it was not his own (the poet's) conviction,but
onlya complimentpaid to the pride of the Romans." AugustinefoundVergil's
true belief,as Father Arbesmannpoints out, in the passage in the Georgics
where,in speakingof the power of Rome, Vergilrefersto "Kingdoms doomed
to fall." Withouthaving investigatedthe question,I thinkit is morelogical to
accuse a great writerof flatteringan emperorthan of misleadinghistory,and
4
Plato, Critias, passim; Machiavelli, Discourses, I, Preface.
5 II, 60.
6
Aeneid, VI, 851-3. Cf. I, 257 ff; VI, 793 if; VIII, 626 ff,715 ff.
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so that Augustine's interpretationmakes sensed7Allowing,however,for all
this, and forTacitus's complaintthat the spiritof adulation of the Augustan
age loweredthe dignityof Latin authors,8thereis no doubt of Vergil'sexplicit
high praise forthe mixtureof power and humanitarianismthat characterized
imperialRome, and has commandedthe respectof subsequentgenerationsthat
loved peace and condemnedslaveryor oppression.How different
were the lamentsof Cicero,Livy and Sallust! To Cicero,Rome had lost at least much of
its greatness,because Sulla had changed it froma patrociniumterraeinto an
imperium,Caesar had destroyedthe republicand replaced it with a tyranny,
the laws of war and peace had been disregarded,and the ancientcustomshad
been completelyforgotten.To Livy, the "principal" people of the world,proceeding fromslenderbeginnings,had created a regimewhich was never surpassed in greatnessor righteousness.The rise of luxuryand avarice, and the
declineofpovertyand thrift,
wereharbingersofRome's decline.To Sallust too,
avarice was the seed of corruption.To these men, the greatnessof Rome was
probablya memory.9
Historyhas inheritedmorethan one conceptionofRoman greatness,distinct
and oftenirreconcilable.The Roman republic,on the one hand, was admired
formagnitude,longevity,and moral quality: its people were austere,devoted,
hard-working,
and free.And later generationswere to rememberthat
thrifty,
Dionysius of Halicarnasuss had described the historyof the republic from
Romulus to Gaius Gracchusas 630 years withoutinternecinebloodshed.'0The
Roman Empire,on the otherhand, was admiredformagnitude,longevity,and
"civilization":its people werepowerful,cultivated,and relativelyhumane. Let
me stressthat my presentconcernis not with the correctnessof eitherrepresentation,but withwhat each meant historically.
The wholeproblemofthe relativegreatnessofthe two Romes was put aside,
though not so radically as we might expect, by Christian writers.Indeed,
Eusebius ends his EcclesiasticalHistorywitha panegyricon Constantine,which
comes dangerouslyclose to identifying
the futureof Roman greatnesswiththe
emperor'sconversion,Father Arbesmannpointsto the honorwhichTertullian
demanded of Christiansforthe Roman Emperor,and to the dismay Jerome
felt over the stormingof Rome by Alaric."1The feeling,even of Christian
writers,that the fall of Rome would mean the fall of the ancient world,was
significantlychanged by Augustine. And that altered sentimentbrought a
corresponding
change in the concept of national greatness,which in turnwas
Rudolph Arbesmann, O.S.A., "The Idea of Rome in the Sermons of St. Augustine,"
in Augustiniana, IV (1954), 305-324, p. 316. Aeneid, I, 278 ff; Georgics,II, 498.
8 Annals, I, 1.
9 Cicero, De Officiis,II, 26-28; I, 36-37, 61; III, 85-86; De Re Publica, II, 29; V, 1;
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita Praefatio, par. 9, 11 and passim. Sallust, Catiline, X. See also Tacitus, Agricola, passim; Plutarch, Moralia: Fortune ofRomans, Fortune and Virtue of Alexander the Great, opening of essay on Romulus in Lives; Augustine, City of God, II, 21.
10 Fink, op. cit., p. 8
"1Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, X, esp. X, 9.3. Cf. Karl Lowith, Meaning in History
(Chicago, 1949), p. 171. Arbesfnann, oc. cit., pp. 307-8.
BACON S IMPERIALISM
473
to influenceChristianthoughtprofoundlyuntilits modificationby the secular
trendsofwhichBacon was a primemover.Augustinefeltand regretteddeeply
the tragedyof the times when Rome was sacked. Yet thereis some reason to
believe that he could not, even fromthe limitedview of earthlyfelicity,have
admiredRome. Grantedthat the peace whichit broughtwas, as Lowith says, a
"conditionforspreadingthe gospel," and that Augustineon that account must
have preferredits full-blowndevelopmentto its infantstages,Rome had serious drawbacks. Moral virtue and earthlyfelicity-legitimate,though hardly
aims to a Christianwriter-pointedto the superiorityof the modersufficient,
ate state over the great empire.Justas the moderateman was morefelicitous
than the richman, the moderatecitywas morefelicitousthan the richcity,or
the distractedcity. The virtuesCicero and Sallust had foundin a more primitive cityhad long since ceased to exist. Even by Cicero and Sallust they were
seen chieflyin a remotepast, and likened ratherto a colored paintingthan a
"living reality." At one point Augustineseems to preferthose "barbarians"
who, contraryto the laws ofwar of the Roman world,spared the Romans, and
spared themforChrist'ssake. And sincethe authorregardsit as his aim in the
City of God to "persuade the proud of the great virtueof humility,"he must
have regardedthe prideof the Romans as a particulartarget.'2
II
Whateverthe forebodingof Christianwritersforthe doom of Rome, it was
not,twelveand morecenturieslater,primarilyCatholic writerswho thoughtin
terms of the restorationof an imperialismon the Roman model. Indeed,
Machiavelli's admirationforancientinstitutionsis presentedin expressrepudiation of Christianinstitutions.It was republicanratherthan autocraticRome
that had been farthestfrom Christian influence,unconvertedand strongly
dependenton its ancientsuperstitions;yet it was in republicanRome that the
private citizen was freed of the humiliationof which Pericles had spoken.
Bacon's own imperialism,and his conceptofnational greatness,mustbe understood less as a heritagefromancient pagan and Christianwritersthan as a
counterpartto Machiavelli's essentiallyanti-Christianattemptto reconstruct
republicanRome, withvarious Machiavellian improvements.Yet even Machiavelli was not, as has been noted, withoutadmirationforthe Empire; he accepted the declinein politicalliberty,underthe good emperorsfromNerva to
Marcus Aurelius,as a fairpriceforthe growthin intellectualliberty."3
Bacon,
on the contrarydid not regard"learnedtimesand politictimes" as distinct,but
said that the "same times that are most renownedforarms are likewisemost
admiredforlearning."'4There can be littlequestionthat,howevermuch Bacon
See Preface;; also I, 1, 30; II, 17 if; III, 10, 14; IV, 3, 15; V, 12, 18, 19 if, in City
of God. Cf. Karl Lowith, op. cit. ch. 9.
18 Discourses, I, 10; cf. ibid, I, 6; II, 13; III, 1. Leo Strauss, unpublished Walgreen lectures on Machiavelli.
14 Advancementof Learning, Bk. 1, Ch. II, Par. 2. But compare 58th Essay, "Of Vicissitude of Things," final paragraph.
12
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mightcite Egypt,Assyria,Persia, Greeceand Rome, he had beforehis eyes the
example he consideredmost telling:Elizabethan England.
This examplemay lead us to recognizeBacon's departurefromearlierviews
ofnational greatness.We shouldexpectBacon to thinkmorehighlyofimperial
Rome and less highlyof republicanRome than Machiavelli did. I restthat expectationnot simplyon aestheticattractions,such as Bacon's apparentregard
for the trappingsof monarchyor his rathersnobbishcontemptfor plebians,
but on the much more importantconsiderationof leisure-a relieffrompublic functionsforthose best equipped to bringthe "reliefof man's estate." Yet
Bacon's preferenceis by no means unequivocal.'5 His praise and blame of
republicaninstitutionsis matchedby his praise and blame of the Caesars. The
a perfectexample of national greatnessfromeitherof
impossibilityofinferring
these historicalexperiencessuggests the inadequacy of both, and indicates
that Bacon intendeda moreradical departurefromthe greatnessof past ages.
at once suggestthemselves:Rome was not oriTwo significantdifferences
ginallya Christianpower,and it was not primarilya naval power.Both Christianityand naval powerplay rolesin Bacon's treatmentof national greatness.
In his insistencethat greatnessdoes not depend on bulk or "fall under measure," Bacon turnsto the parable of the mustardseed."6This use of the parable
is, to put it mildly, highly questionable. What Christian writersadmired
not the expansivepoliabout Rome was the peace it broughtwhenfull-grown,
cies of its earlierdays. What Bacon's use of the parable suggests,on the contrary,is that he would preferthe seed to the treeitself.Whateverthat means,
it emphaticallydoes not mean peace. Whilehis use ofthe parable is an analogy
ratherthan an exegeticconstruction,it is none the less blasphemous,froma
Christianpoint of view, because it ignoresAugustine's stricturesof earthly
glory.Yet Bacon's admirationforthe love offameas the politicalpassionwhich
led to justice has an analogy in national fame,or in the greatnessof kingdoms
and estates. And Bacon was bold enoughto draw the analogy. He participated,
as Machiavelli had done beforehim,in the effortto restorethe pagan idea of
greatness.Bacon, however,added to that efforta Christian,or a pseudo-Christian, twist.The analogy is vulnerable,not merelybecause it suggestsa concept
of national greatnessthat is fundamentallypagan, but also because it is a
faultyanalogy. The kingdomofheaven,like a mustardseed, may develop both
internallyand externally.The characterofits internaldevelopmentis obvious.
Externally,the kingdomof heaven can grow,on earth,by a wider conversion
to the true faith. That conversionis essentiallyinternational.To use the analogy ofthe parable ofthe mustardseed foran expositionofnational greatness
is not onlyto substituteworldlygloryforthe gloryof God. It is also to substitute national imperalismforinternationalconversion.Whereas the kingdom
16 Advancement of Learning, Bk. 2, Ch. XXII,
13; Essay 55; Works, XII, 27-33; De
Aug., VIII, in Works, III, 106; also the praise of the Roman "triumph" in the 29th Essay.
16 "True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates," "True Greatness of the Kingdom of Britain," "Considerations Touching a War with Spain." Compare Matthew, 12: 31 if; Mark,
4:31 ff;Luke, 13: 19.
BACON'S
IMPERIALISM
475
ofheaven is accessibleto all by means of the theologicalvirtues,Bacon's mustard tree is accessible to all only by means of Britishexpansionand conquest.
antitheticalto
is not only divergentfrom,it is, most strikingly,
Its fulfillment
ofthe kingdomof God in history.
the fulfillment
That the parable of the mustardseed is used as an analogy forimperialexpansion is absolutelyclear and strengthenedby the fact that, in the De AugofLearning)Bacon incorpomentis(the Latin enlargementof the Advancement
rates a translation,with few changes,of his essay on "The True Greatnessof
Kingdom and Estates," calling it here "Example of A SummaryTreatise on
Extendingthe Bounds of Empire." There are, Bacon says, threepolitical duand to amplify,
ties."7They are: to preserve,to renderhappy and flourishing,
the bounds ofempire.The last oftheseis the neglectedone, and has not, Bacon
forwhilethe firsttwo would have
says, been treated.This is hardlysurprising,
as legitimatepolitical duties,
writers
by
most
political
been readily accepted
a
presentedin such shocking
is
duty
is
seldom
expansion
the idea that imperial
Bacon,
nakedness.NeitherDulles norKhrushchevwould be quite so forthright.
or
duty,
of
the
imperial
precise
character
not
spell
out
the
really
indeed, does
tell us why it is a duty. Nor can a decisive answer be given, I think,on the
basis of the provisionalteaching.A few things,however,are clear. Bacon inessay in the De Augmentisin order
cludes the translationof his twenty-ninth
to make up forthe absence of such studiesin politicalphilosophy.It is certainly
to this essay that we must look to findBacon's meaningof national greatness,
thoughhe says thereis "nothingin civil affairsmoresubject to error"thanthe
ofthe meaningofnational greatnessor imperialexpansion.'8
trueinterpretation
The duty to expand is not only the most neglectedduty in theoreticaldiscusboth in theoryand in practice.Bacon himself
sion; it is also the most difficult,
and forthe neglectwhen he adds, at the
suggestsone reasonforthe difficulty
end of his Latin version: "To what purpose indeed is this study, when the
Roman monarchyis going to be the last (as it is believed), among the mundane."'9 The suggestionthat the Roman experiencehad not been repeated
offulfilling
thisduty.The suggestionthat it
showsus somethingofthe difficulty
was not expectedto be repeatedhelps to explain the neglectof this subject by
Christianwriters.The neglectof imperialexpansionby ancientwritersBacon
in the lightofthe factthat imperialismwas contraryto
thoughtcomprehensible
the classical virtue of moderation. What is harder for us to understand is
Bacon's neglectof Machiavelli. If imperialexpansionis a duty,it is a duty of
whichMachiavelli was fullyaware, and to whichhe gave a good deal of attention. It is true that Machiavelli considersthe prolongationof an empire a
function,in part, of the celerityof its conquests,one of the two chiefcauses of
the dissolutionof the Roman republic.20He cannot thereforebe regardedas a
17
Works, III, 120 ff.
Compare "True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates" in Essay 29 with "True
Greatnessof the Kingdom of Britain" (near beginning).
18
19 Works, III, 134.
20
Discourses, III, 24.
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completeimperialist,forhe saw Roman greatnesspartlyin the acquisitionofan
empire,and Roman weaknesspartlyin the fact that it was too quicklyaccomessay, he is writing
plished. When Bacon suggeststhat, in the twenty-ninth
somethingbrand new, he may be supposed to have regarded Machiavelli's
fromhis own.
and certainlyas different
treatmentofthe subject as insufficient,
III
Strictlyspeaking there is little that goes beyond Machiavelli in eitherthe
essay or the paper on "The True Greatnessof the Kingdom of
twenty-ninth
Britain." In both essays, the primarythesis seems to be that while national
greatnessis certainlya materialgood, it does not restchieflyon wealth (ampliBut Machiaofthe soil, "treasure,"or fortifications).
fertility
tude ofterritory,
velli too suggestedthat "moneyis not the sinewsof war," and deprecatedunand dependence on mercenarytroops. If national
due trust in fortifications
greatnessdoes not depend, therefore,on wealth, upon what does it depend?
The Baconian answercan best be summarizedin a fewwords:public spiritand
properlocation. In order,however,that eitherpublic spiritor geographymay
contributeto national greatness,the idea that Rome was, or would prove to
be, the last great empire had to be abandoned. In otherwords, a change in
what we should call the moral climatewas necessary.This changeis the most
crucial one in Bacon's view of imperialism.To see it more clearly,however,
let me turn firstto the twin goods of public spiritand strategiclocation,and
the good which derivesfromtheirunity: naval power.2"
Bacon did not speak, of course,ofpublic spiritas such. In a tone reminiscent
of the famous speech of Johnof Gaunt fromRichardII, he spoke of "breed"
and "disposition." The chiefingredientof this breed is fortitude,the virtueof
the "stout and warlike" people. A nation that wishesto be great must profess
armsas its principalstudy.And ifexpansionis a duty,we mustinferthat every
just nation will professarms as its principalstudy. Throughits study of arms
it will produce men of iron,and iron subjugates gold, as Solon is supposed to
have told Croesus. Fortitude,whichis a virtueof adversity,is "more heroical"
Yet the praise ofadversity
than temperance,whichis the virtueofprosperity.22
rings strangelyon Baconian chimes, and we are obliged to wonder whether
essay suggests.
Bacon really admired fortitudeso much as the twenty-ninth
Certainlythe brave and warlikepeople had to join other qualities with fortitude. Duels, Bacon says, are not valiant, because theyare unjust. Gloryis not
true valor. The Spaniards have a "valor of glory," but the English have a
"valor ofnaturalcourage,"and, "Spanish valor liethin the heart ofthe lookeron; but the Englishvalor lieth about the heart of the soldier."23The brave and
warlikepeople had, moreover,to have less desirablequalities. Vainglory,which
2' "True Greatness of the Kingdom of Britain," Works, XIII,
243; "True Greatness
of Kingdoms and Estates," Essays (Macmillan), 121; Machiavelli, Discourses, II, 10.
22 Essay "Of Adversity."
23 "Charge Touching Duels,"
Letters and Life, IV, 101 (J. Spedding, ed., London,
1?561); "Considerations Touching a War with Spain," ibid., VIII, 483.
BACON'S IMPERIALISM
477
Bacon probablydid not admire,and idleness,whichhe certainlydisliked,were
characteristics
ofthe "breed and disposition"of the greatnation. We are given
continuous
the
impressionthat Verulam is a little afraid of the professionof
armsas the principalstudyof the brave and warlikepeople, and that the heroical virtue that he admired is ratherfunctionalthan honorific.Iron is better
than gold, because the iron of finesoldierswill take the gold of the Indies, rather than because the heroic virtues are morally superiorto the mercantile
virtues-the virtuesassociated with the spiritof capitalism.I do not suggest
that Bacon did not admire bravery,simplythat his admirationforbraveryis
functionalratherthan categorical,as I hope in the sequel to show.
If fortitudeis a national virtue,fortitudeis part of a widely shared public
spirit,or breed and disposition.A nation fitforimperialexpansionmust be a
well populated nation. Bacon saw clearlythe weaknessof Spain, a nation "thin
sewn" withpeople.24As Bacon seems to have envisageda combinationofinternational professionaltroopsand a national militia,the populationwould have
to be ready to serve in the militia; that is, the warlikedispositionwould have
to be fairlywidespread.For yeomen,"freeservants,"and practitionersof certain "manly" arts (e.g., carpentry),that was no problem.Bacon knew,however, that a large population of "sedentary" and, by inference,"unmanly"
artisans, could be fatal to the breed and dispositionhe had in mind. After
rejecting,not withoutregret,the ancient solutionto this problem,slavery,as
contraryto Christianlaw, Bacon proposes the introductionof foreignersto
pursue the unmanlyarts. A nation that has a "liberal" naturalizationpolicy
That means,as Bacon granted,a rejectionof Sparta in favor
is fitforempire.25
of Rome. But therewere difficulties
involvedin Bacon's acceptance of Roman
imperialism.One, as he said, was the Christianrejectionof slavery. Another
was the fact that Baconian imperialismwas a naval imperialism.That meant
more seamen and relativelyfewersoldiers.It also meant more freedomand
less fortitude.
IV
To understandthis problemwe must put the opinion,or the public spirit,of
our own timesin the contextofthe thoughtofformertimes.Fortitudeis always
a verydoubtfulvirtue,forit is a virtueassociated withwar, and everydecent
man preferspeace to war, as Bacon certainlydid. It is, moreover,associated
with manliness,and manlinessis a characteristicof one part, and not necessarilythe most virtuouspart, of the community.In Plato's Republic,fortitude
suggeststhe conservationof lawfulbelief,and becomes almost identicalwith
withthe good.26
conformity,
though,in the contextof the Republic,conformity
Hence it becomes a provisionalbut still necessaryvirtue. Moreover a virtue
whichis doubtful,so long as it is directedto a doubtfulgoal, is not necessarily
doubtfulintrinsically,once the legitimacyof that goal is admitted.The ques24
25
26
"Considerations Touching a War with Spain," loc. cit. 463.
"True Greatness of the Kingdom of Britain."
Republic, 429 B if.
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tion, then,is whether,once the necessityfor virtuein warfareis established,
that virtueis purelyfunctional,that is, directedtowardsthe cessationof war
and the goal of victory,or whetherthat virtue is, given the situationof the
soldier,categorical.The functionalcharacterof moderncultureis indicated by
the fact that modernpolitical commentatorssee nothingstrangein the great
safetyprecautionstaken on behalfof statesmen,generals,or kings.They find
the flightsof princesand governmentsinto exile a matterof course,and they
considercertaingeneralsas indispensablemen,whose self-exposurecould only
be regardedas folly.Plato would not have so regardedit, and fromPlato's doctrineto ours is a long and slow developmentin whichBacon is a milestone.Of
course,as anyonefamiliarwith Churchill'sdescriptionof the Battle of Britain
knows,my brushis too broad to paint an accurate picture.The BritishPrime
Ministerwas persuaded, aftermuch life amid bombing,and with great difficulty,to accept a bomb-proofshelterfor night raids.27I am here concerned,
however,not with the abundant heroismof our time, but with a perspective
towardsthat heroism.The changein perspectivecan be illustratedby comparing an importantpassage in whichBacon speaks of the need to masterthe sea
with a parallel passage in Plato.
"He that commandsthe sea," says Bacon, "is at greatliberty,and may take
as much and as little of the war as he will."
"Marines," says Plato, "are habituated to jumping ashore frequentlyand
runningback at fullspeed to theirships,and theythinkno shame of not dying
boldlyat theirposts when the enemyattacks."28
I am aware of the pillage done to the Platonic ironyby thus quotinga pasage out of context,but surelythere are serious inferencesto be drawn from
Plato's statement.Whateverthe ironyin the Platonic passage, thereis a clear
preferenceforthe regimeof citizensoldiersover the less moral regimeof commerce, a sufficientcontrastwith Bacon. The precise reason for condemning
naval warfarein Plato becomes, in Bacon, the great militaryadvantage of
naval warfare.Relativelyfew changes in the historyof ideas are so radical as
thisone, whereinwhat once was a vice becomesa virtue.
To effectsuch a change,many smallerchangesin men's mindswere needed.
Some of themrelateto the fact that naval greatnessis added to militarygreatness. Bacon was not a militarist,in any sense in whichthat termis likelyto be
to us. He feltthe need to adjust the martialvirtuesto a society
comprehensible
of industriouscivilians. So, while the militaryelementis primaryin national
greatness,it never stands alone. Bacon could insist on the subordinationof
the role of militarymen in politics and the dangers of militarypopularity.29
of national greatnesswithmilitary
Yet that does not dislodgethe identification
greatness.Nor does the insistenceon naval power,howeverprofoundlyit may
affectthe characterof imperialism.For the expansive republicanRome, admiredby Machiavelli, Bacon substitutesthe brave and warlikeisland people,
27
28
29
Their Finest Hour (Boston, 1949), p. 375 and passim.
"True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates," 128; Laws, 706 C-D.
Lettersand Life, II, 174; III, 313.
BACON'S
IMPERIALISM
479
whose geographynecessitatesthe acquisition rather of remote than of contiguous territories.The wealth of Bacon's warlike people lay in the Indies,
waitingforwhoevercould unite fortitudewith interest,and seize these fabulous riches.To Machiavelli,the mainstayofwarfarewas the infantry,
an infantrythat would lead to the democratizationof the armyand the defeatof baronial power. To Bacon, the mainstay of modernwarfarewas the fleet,a fleet
that could protecthis own England, enlargethe bounds of Empire,permitthe
riseofsailorsfromthe ranks,and lay open the wealthofthe Indies.
V
To see to what extentBacon's identification
ofnationalgreatnesswithnaval
powerrepresenteda changein politicalthinking,we may turnto the discussion
of geographicalproblemsin "The True Greatnessof the Kingdom of Britain."
Bacon, who saw that large territory,
like large treasure,was not invariablya
could be a politicalasset if fourother
politicalasset, said that a large territory
conditionsexisted:compactness,the maintenanceof the branchesby the stem,
a correspondingmartial virtue,and the absence of unprofitableregions.The
requirementof compactnessdoes not referto colonization.Compact empires
are thosewhichdo not requiretheirarmiesto marchthroughhostileterritory,
or whichneed not hold land as hard to hold as Calais was forEngland, or the
Low Countrieswere for Spain. The compact empiremightinclude Rome, as
Bacon suggested.It would excludeboth Athensand Sparta.
The second requirement(withoutwhich a large territorywould become a
liability) referredto a dynamic politico-geographicrelationship,one which
could employthe metaphorof heart and arteries.What was intendedwas not
a mysticalidea such as latter-daywritershave conceived while using similar
terms,but simplythe necessityto keep the heartstrong.That meant a concentrationon all such questions as naturalization,citizenship,immigrationand
emigration.If merchantswere the "gate-vein" of the state, the citizenswere
the arteries.Sparta had weak arteries;Spain, a nation "thin-sewn,"must also
have had weak arteries,to mix the metaphor.But Rome, whose naturalization
policyBacon admired,and triedto recommend,withmoderntwistsin the case
of the Post-Nati (those born afterthe union of Scotland and England), had
Taken togetherthe firsttwo requirementsfora large empire
strongarteries.A0
mean that the parentcountrymustfindcoloniesthat are accessiblewithouttoo
great a struggle,and must keep themaccessibleby continuedstrengthening
of
the citizenpopulationin one way or another.
The thirdrequirementfollowsalmost necessarilyfromthese; forcitizenship
and "breed" are not thingsreadilyseparated. Extend citizenship,and an empiremustextendits breedand disposition.A naturalizedRoman belongsto the
stoutand warlike;sedentaryand "withindoorarts" are fitforaliens,allies,and
slaves. Yet even Rome saw the dispositionof its people change, and a once
stout people foundempiretoo burdensomefortheiradvanced age to carry.
30 Works,XIII, 238-9; "True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates," 125-6; "Post-Nati"
Works, XV, 194 ff;"Plantation in Ireland;" cf. Machiavelli, Discourses, I, 6; II, 3; III, 49.
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The fourthrequirementwas the absence of an unprofitablepart. At first
glance, it seems relativelyunimportant,especiallyas he applies it to Britain,
which was not withoutbarrenrocks and moors chieflyuseful for novels and
prisons.But the meaningis clear: an empireis not forglory.The danger of a
large empire,includingthe Roman empire,is that
of twenty thousand men
That for a fantasy and trick of fame
Go to their graves like beds, fightfor a plot
Whereon the numbers cannot try the cause,
Which is not tomb enough and continent
To hide the slain.3'
If Rome fulfilledthe firsttwo requirements,it is most unlikelythat she fulfilledthe last. Even if she did, the Europe which Bacon knew seemed an inappropriatesettingforthe huge Roman empire,if the firsttwo requirements
were demanded. The possibilityof compactnessand of a large empiresupporting branches by means of a strong stem, in the Stuart England following
Elizabeth, was relativelyslender.And the objectionsto English power in Calais, and to Spanish power in the Low Countries,could certainlybe applied
to French or Spanish powerin Italy or to Imperialpowerin Germany.Remembering that these requirementsfor large empire were intended to serve as
modelsforBritain,that the verytitle of the paper in whichtheyappear refers
to the greatnessof the Kingdom of Britain, we must also recall that Bacon
neverrecommendedBritishcontinentalexpansion.His potentialopponentwas
nearly always Spain.32He preferredto contrastthe "rootless" forcesof the
"thin-sewn"nation withthe compact Britainwhich could showerits benefits
on Scotland and Ireland (how ferventlyBurke was to urge the same conduct
towards Ireland almost 200 years later),33and which could strengthenitself
by a "spring and seminaryof militarypeople as in England, Scotland, and
The Low CounIreland,and ofseamenin thisisland and the Low Countries."34
tries,no asset to Spain, who could not hold them,became Britain's greatest
ally; but Britaintoo shouldnot conquerthem,and Elizabeth was rightin refusing them.These conditionsof territorialexpansionwould be prerequisiteto an
empireinternallyand externallysecure. Britain's compact and insular situation, her position frontingthe ocean, not unlike that which (Bacon finds)
Egypt once so favorablyenjoyed, her possibilityof added internalstrength
fromScotland and Ireland, and the very dose of avarice in her gloryall contributedto give herthe fitsituationforimperialism.This musthave been what
Machiavellifailedto see, and this seems to be what makes Bacon's own discussion of national greatnessand the duties of expansionunique, fillinga gap in
learning,whichhad remainedemptyduringcenturiesof philosophicquest.
3' Hamlet, IV, 4.
Lettersand Life, VII, 463.
Lettersand Life, VII, 463; Plantation in Ireland, Lettersand Life, IV, 116 ff.Burke,
Works (Boston, 1865), II, 247 if; IV, 217 if, 241 if.
34 Lettersand Life, VII, 463, 469.
32
33
BACON'S
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481
VI
If, indeed, Bacon's radical departure from Machiavellian thought, and,
indeed,his own contributionto the problemofimperialismin politicalthought
can be so simplyput, is it reallya major change?It seems small enoughuntil
we considerthat naval power means much more than a transitorycommand
of the sea. It means much of the modernworld. It means the merchantwho
conducts stout and warlike enterpriseswithoutleaving Lombard or Beacon
Street,like Sir Joseph Porter, whose only ship was a junior partnership.It
means the serviceof valor as an instrumentof avarice and ambition.It means
the substitutionof mercantilehonorformonarchicalhonor,of the adventure
shoresforthe adventureof the chivalricgesture.It
of the visitorto far-flung
means that the virtuesof the community-wisdom,justice,friendship,moderation-are to he replaced by the virtues of the private man-abstemious,
than self-sufficient.
thrifty,
countinggains and losses,and ratherself-contained
Carried to an absurdityit means what I once heard a clergyman'swife say:
that the renunciationof alcohol fora successfulcareerin insurancewas a perfectinstance of visible grace. It means, in short,the aggrandizementof wellbeing and the diminutionof goodness. It means a world in which virtuous
people are neithergreat-soulednor merelynice, but cautious.
That it meant most of these thingsto the Lord Verulam is not too hard to
see. A naval empireis particularlyappropriateto an atomisticsociety.According to Thucydides,Pericles praised the pleasantnessof private lifein Athens,
wheremen could do as they chose. The same Pericles called Athenian naval
power its great strength.Athens,however,found remote territorieshard to
hold.5 A centuryof explorationand discoveryhad made an advantage of remoteness.The naval power available to Britainfar transcendedthe Athenian.
Yet Bacon knew very well, and the Athenian experiencehelped to bear it
out, that the dispositionto acquire and the dispositionto hold an empire
were not always the same; there was no assurance that a people who were
disposed to take empire would be disposed, throughthe centuriesthat followed, to hold it. This too pointedin the directionof naval power,fora naval
empire may be more easily held absentmindedly than a land empire. Yet
we have seen that it was not Bacon's way to rely solely on absent-mindedness. A public spirithad to be created. That public spiritcan be describedas
healthyadversity-a dispositionhungrybut not starving.The stout and warlike people are also a people whose gentlemendo not multiplytoo fast,whose
taxes are not too burdensome,whoseland is distributedin "convenientplenty,"
who are not ruinedby enclosures,and who are encouragedby sufficient
largess
to take to the sea.36Treasure, like territory,is a burden unless joined with
Bacon sharedthat disvalor,mediocrityand distribution,and serviceability.37
35Thucydides,II, 37, 62; V, 99; VI, 11; Isocrates,On thePeace, 29 ff.But compare
Sallust,Jugurtha,
Speech of Sylla at 103.
3& "True Greatnessof Kingdomsand Estates."
37 "True Greatnessof the Kingdomof Britain,"
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likeforostentatiousliberalitythat accompaniesthe spiritof capitalism,but his
imperialismobligedhim to seek a contentedyeomanry.
The requirementof serviceabilitysuggeststhe depositofwealthin the hands
which are quick to move it-the merchantclass. In that, as in much else,
Bacon was clearlya forerunner
of Locke, and of the kind of naval imperialism
we associate withHalifax. But, whileit is easy to fancythat Locke mightsympathize with the deploymentof wealth in the hands of "merchants,burghers,
tradesmen,freeholders,
farmersin the countryand the like," or the succinct
sentencethat "The Low Countrieshave the best mines,above ground,in the
world,"or withthe polemicagainstthe Suttonwill,it is muchharderto understandhis sympathizingwiththefamousBacon remarkthat moneyis likemuck,
"not good if it be not well spread." Yet Locke, like Bacon, a hedonist,was to
see the originof rightsin pain and suffering,
just as Bacon saw the roots of
imperialpowerin adversity.38
If the originalityof the Twenty-Ninthessay, on
whichBacon emphaticallyinsisted,lay in its discussionof "population," that
population must be seen chieflyin three terms: its actual and potential size,
its capacity for soldiering,and its capacity for mercantilepower. In the first
two Bacon followedMachiavelli, althoughin the New Atlantishe was to make
a criticalchange in both. The thirdwas his own. And it meant a substitution
of the Britishregimeforthe Roman.
The substitutionof British greatnessfor Roman greatnessmeant among
otherthings,a new kind of colonialism.That in turnmeant,as we have seen,
leaving the continentalone. Colonialismmeant an opportunityfornew beginnings,for constitutionmaking,forwhat is sometimesconsideredthe highest
act of statesmanship.It is thereforeall the moresurprisingthat the discussion
of new beginningsin Bacon is rare and thin. Bacon puts the foundersof commonwealthsand kingdomsin the firstcategoryof "sovereignhonor."39Yet
his own "prince," Henry VII, "The English Solomon" belongs only in the
thirdcategory.That Bacon did not discuss the problemof new beginningsin a
systematicway indicatesthat, forwhateverreason,the discussionof new beginningswas eitherunnecessaryforpropercolonialismor was unavailable.
Baconian imperialismwas new; it was a long neglected duty. Yet Bacon
himselfdid not spell out the characterofthat duty.It was not therefore
part of
his provisionalteaching,and the most serious reasons forhis reticencerelate
ratherto his definitiveteaching.Apparently,forBritishcolonialism,the British politicalway was sufficient.
It was not like the Roman Empire, conquering
a civilizedand cultivatedGreece. It involvedbringingwhat Bacon would have
considereda superiorto an inferiorcivilization.Yet even that assurance must
be modifiedin the light of the incompletedialogue on the "Holy War." It is
not possible to identifywith assurance the opinionof Bacon with the opinion
38 "True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates," True Greatness of the Kingdom of Britain," Essay 15 "Of Seditions and Troubles," Essay 5 "Of Adversity;" compare Leo
Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 250-1 and citations from Locke therein.
39 Essay 55, "Of Honour and Reputation." See Howard B. White, "The English Solomon," 24 Social Research (Winter, 1957), pp. 457-481.
BACON'S
IMPERIALISM
483
of any of the speakersin this unresolveddebate. Yet we must take note of the
fact that Martius, the militaryman, points out that-the bringingof Christendom to Peru and Mexico was not the "adamant" of the discovery;rather,the
Spaniards went forprofitand glory.Martius also testifiesto the high level of
the Aztec and Inca civilizations,which of course was widely recognized.Yet
Bacon seems to have accepted the prevailingspiritof imperialism.The union
of England and Scotland was fortuitous,but the developmentof Britishpower
in Ireland and overseaswas somethingthat could be soughtand planned. Emigrationwas encouraged,and, in Ireland, the "carryingof an even course betweenthe English and the Irish." Colonialismwas moderate,mutuallyadvantageous, a jump above the European continent,where England's potential
rivals had been tornby wars.40
VII
Navigation, however,was not simply an instrument;it was an allegory.
Command over the sea meant command over the mysteriousunknown.And
naval powermeant,at the highestlevel, the powerover the human mind. Unless we milk this allegory,we can never draw the rich Baconian sustenanceof
the New Atlantis.To show,however,that the allegoryis part ofthe provisional
teaching,whichis our presentpurpose,we must square Baconian imperialism
withhis professedlove of peace. For Bacon, however,the primaryinstrument
of peace is science,a panacea that is slow but certain,demandingthat we wait
forits miraculouscure. The secondaryinstrumentis diplomacy,a precarious
but omnipresentreality.It is on this secondaryinstrumentthat Bacon, in his
provisionalpolitical teaching,relied. Diplomacy can restrainhostile nations,
but it cannot eliminatethem. There are fourprincipal,and fluid,impediments
to hostility:the situation of full hands (aliud agere), the want of a way to
and a "dull huapproach near to the enemy,the apprehensionof difficulty,
mour."'41The fourthis, at least in the Baconian universe,vicious; the second
is largelynatural. The first,to some extent,and the third,moredecisively,are
mattersof diplomacy.We may be mistaken,however,if we push too far the
reportof a speech which Spedding considersinaccurate and fragmentary.Indeed, we cannot say whether,in context,these impedimentsare general, or
onlyimpedimentsofa state that has alreadydecided on hostility.If the former,
the lack of a virtuouslove of peace as an impedimentto hostilityis significant.
If the latter,the whole passage is much less meaningful.In eithercase, however, the enumerationtells us somethingof the role of diplomacyin restraincan certainlybe apprehended,
inga hostileadversary.By diplomacy,difficulties
and theirapprehensioncan be clarified;the want of an approach to the enemy
can be pointed out; and the full hands of an enemy can sometimesbe made
fullerby conspiracy.Diplomacy demands, however,a show of strength.It
operates,as is generallyrecognized,to balance, or at timesto unbalance power.
40 Lettersand Life, I, 160-61; III, 45 if, 235; IV, 116, 120; Essay 33 "Of Plantations."
"Holy War," Works, XIII, 191 ff.
41
"Speech on Matter of Subsidy" (1597), Lettersand Life, II, 87.
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We see this in Bacon's treatmentof Henry VII, and we see it in his essays,
whereHenry VIII, Francis I of France and the EmperorCharles V are said to
have kept such a watch over one another as to preventeach otherfromaggressiveconquest.42The balance betweenthese monarchsdepended,however,
on mutual strengthand mutual skill. The very nature of diplomacyrendered
this balance precarious.A treatymight be expected to retain or redressthe
balance of power,but treatiesare handled by Bacon withmorethan his customary cynicism.
In the interpretationof the fable of the riverStyx,forinstance,Bacon says
that the Styx stands fornecessity.The oath taken by the riverwas the dread
far transcendingin majesty,accordingto Bacon, all other
oath of antiquity,43
oaths. Bacon applies this fable to treaties,which are held only by necessity,
and not by pledges. The idea that necessityis the highestand most effective
political pledge, particularlyin mattersof foreignpolicy,where the law is at
is neitherstartlingnor shocking.But Bacon goes farther
its most ineffective,
than that. In effecthe denies the dependenceon an oath, or on a religioustradition, altogether.Even Machiavelli, not unaware of the political value of
necessity,praises Rome for its piety, and points out that a fidelityeven to
And in the Chrisoaths exactedunderduresscontributedto Roman greatness.44
offoreignpolicy.
instrument
and
effective
tian tradition,the oath was a serious
Bacon could not have known the admirable discussionof oath-takingas an
instrumentof peace in Grotius.45He could, however,have known most of
Grotius'sources,and the fact that fidelityto one's pledged wordwas regarded
as an impedimentto hostilitycould not altogetherhave escaped him.
Bacon's denial of a significanceto oaths in foreignpolicyis not a merematterofmoralinsensitivity.
He names the statementattributedto Lysander,that
"childrenare to be deceived with comfits,men with oaths," among the evil
Ancientoath-takingand oatharts whichshould not be taught or practised.46
keepingis a part of heroicvirtue.Cicero discussesthe oath of Regulus,and his
returnto Carthage and torture,as an instance of fortitude.The discussionof
oaths among juristicwritersin later timeswas part of the Christianeffortto
humanizeforeignpolicy.47 Bacon, who certainlysaw the importanceof oaths
in the constitutionalpolicy of Elizabeth and James, seems here to have accepted that distinctionbetweenthe extremesituation,wherethe law does not
operate,and the situationwithinthe political order,wherethe law is compel42 History of the Reign of Henry VII,
in Works, XI, 104-6, 126, 166-67, 170; Essay 19,
"Of Empire."
41 Wisdom of the Ancients, V, Styx, in Works, XII, 439-41.
44 Discourses, I, 11; cf. Plato, Laws, 948 C; Polybius, VI, 56, 13-15; Livy, VII,
v. I
have discussed some aspects of this problem in an article on "The Loyalty Oath," 21
Social Research (Autumn, 1954), pp. 314-38.
46 De Jure Belli et Pacis, II, xiii.
46 Advancementof Learning, Vol. 2, XXIII,
45. According to Plutarch, Lysander said
"dice," but Bacon substitutes the word comfitss."
47 Cicero, De Officiis,III,
99 ff;Suarez: Defense of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith, VI,
9 (In Carnegie Endowment edition, translation, Volume II, 712); Grotius, toe cit.
BACON'S IMPERIALISM
485
ling.He speaks,in the fable of the Styx,ofthe fact,not ofthe right,that treaare littleto be
ties,whateverthe solemnityand sanctityof theirconfirmation,
depended on, and belong ratherto the realm of ceremonythan to the instrumentalityof security.Bacon wrote little of the developmentof international
law. He does, however,speak occasionallyof the just war, and shows some familiaritywith discussionsof this problemamong the schoolmen,occasionally
quotingAugustine,Thomas Aquinas, Vitoria,and Suarez by name.48He menwith their doctrine,but my firstquestion is
tions certainexplicit differences
whetherthe role ofnecessityin Bacon's doctrinedoes not itselfsuggestimplicit
It is necessitythat compels peace; the diplomaticcounterpartof
differences.
national greatnessmust be the impositionof necessityupon others.If that is
the case, what happens to the wholeconceptofthe just war?
VIII
In the SixteenthCentury,the conceptof the just war was subjected to very
carefulscrutiny,and jurists were "modernizing"the concept of the just war
just as philosopherswere "modernizing"the concept of nature. Among the
schoolmen,as Erich Hula pointsout, that modernizationincludedthe enlargementofthe rightsofsovereignstates to wage war,without,however,"also cuttingthroughthe universalhuman ties." Moreover,the concernof Vitoriaand
Suarez withthe lawfuldegreeof stressalso tended to equalize the belligerents
and whilethe problemofthe just war was not abandoned,the humanizationof
war itselfdemanded an accent ratheron just conduct than on just causes.49
That meant that there were more "just wars" than formerly.It also meant
that, while defensivewar was not consideredthe only kind of just war, there
would be morewars styledas defensive.A ratherstrictconceptofmoralvirtue
tends to narrowthe possibilitiesof a just war. The attemptto substitute"humaneness" forvirtue,on the otherhand, tends to broaden the conceptof justice in the causes of war and to demand just restraintson the part of all belligerents.Yet, even ifthe conceptof the just war, and even of defense,is more
comprehensiveamong the Sixteenth Century Schoolmen than among their
predecessors,it was not comprehensiveenough to suit Bacon. It is possible
that Bacon also contributedto the "humanization" of warfare,though he
does not plead forthat. It is certainthat he claimed his own concept of the
just war to be broaderthan that of Vitoria and Suarez.
Leaving aside all problemsof the rightsand wrongsof forcibleconversion,
of just warfare,we can
and confiningourselvesto purelycivil interpretations
findtraditionallyat least three primarycauses of the just war: defense,indemnity,and vengeance.Bacon adds a fourth:apprehension.And,whileBacon
of the justnessof apprehensionhas been followed
insiststhat his interpretation
in antiquity,his insistenceon the idea that a war on fear of war is defensive,
48
Especially Lettersand Life, V, 9-10, 119, 387; VII, 478.
49 See Erich Hula, "The Revival of the Idea of Punitive War," in Thought, Vol. 21,
No. 82 (1946), pp. 405 ff.,especially 432-3.
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and the peculiartwistthat he gives to this doctrine,lend it the colorof originality.
The idea that an apprehensivewar, or what we shouldperhapscall a preventive war (and, in fact, Bacon does speak of "preventivewar"), is a just war,
and even a defensivewar, is developed by Bacon in several contexts.In the
essay, "Of Empire," he says that,in dealing with one's neighbors,thereis but
one generalruleforprinces,to "keep due sentinel,that none of theirneighbors
do overgrowso . . . as theybecomemoreable to annoythemthantheywere."50
In such a context,all that seems to be impliedis that good counsel watches
over the balance of power-certainly a tried and tested principleof foreign
policy.And ifBacon adds that a "just fearofan imminentdanger" is a "lawful
cause of war," it seems to suggestthat a commonwealthseeingone nation add
bit by bit to its empire,must finallystand and deny. Few would questionthat.
It means much more than that, however,forwe must not evade Bacon's doctrinesof national greatnessand necessity.Those who want national greatness
(and, as we have seen, that is a duty) must have just causes for theirwars.
Somehowor other,just causes mustbe made available. Since men are reluctant
to fightbut on quarrelsthat are at least specious,the brave and warlikepeople
must have the specious quarrelsat hand.
To be a nation eager to quarrel,to seize upon the just occasion, a people
must be in adversityand act fromnecessity.But a nation that has acquired
national greatnessis, emphatically,a prosperousnation. How does one reconcile the prosperitythat comes of empirewith the adversitynecessaryto preserve it, or with the spiritthat accepts and is faithfulto the grim goddess,
Necessity?I can thinkonlyof Britain,whichis urgedto reconcilethe necessity
of the continent,where expansionis virtuallyimpossible,with the expansive
imperialismof naval power. Britain seems to represent,to Bacon, the reconciliationof prosperousand expansive naval power with the hungryvigilance
that peers into the windows of Europe. Coupling the potentialityof British
greatnesswith the need of man for at least a specious quarrel,we are faced
withthe problemof what would be, forBritain,a just war.
That Bacon differentiated
betweenwar in Europe and colonial war is abundantlyclear. He thoughtthat European monarchsshouldrespectone another's
internalsituations.5'Even in his attack on his arch-enemy,Spain, he precluded
any attempt to remove the Spanish monarchy.Bacon's policy was imperial,
and he sharplydistinguishedimperialismfromthe conquest of the "civilized"
or westernworld.To set the balance ofEurope arightwas one thing.To disrupt
that balance by creatinga grave imbalancewas quite another.Unless necessity
compelledBritainto act on the continent,it was betterforherto act elsewhere.
"You must make a great difference,"he said, "between Hercules' labors by
land and Jason's voyage by sea forthe golden fleece."52In contextthis differ50
51
52
Essay 19, "Of Empire."
Lettersand Life, I, 146.
Lettersand Life, VII, 477, 499.
BACON' S IMPERIALISM
487
To see that it amountsto a moral
enceappearsto be an instrumentaldifference.
we must returnto the problemof apprehensivewar.
difference,
Some nationshave wars that are always available, teeththat are permanently set on edge. Among these nations, two, Turkey and Spain, are the most
obvious fountainheadsof permanentquarrels,for both have apostolic misIf that is the case, eitherTurkeyor Spain may make war at
sions in warfare.53
any time; and a war against either,made out of fear,must be just. From the
very doubtfulcharacterof a crusadingwar, it followsthat a war against a
potentialcrusaderis just. Bacon certainlydid not considera war against any
Catholic powerwhateveras a just war, or as a politicwar. On the contrary,he
urged an alliance with France, that politicsmightunite what religiondivided.
But Bacon did considera war againstSpain a just war,and it seems clearin his
discussionof thisproblem,that he consideredit moreor less permanentlyjust.
In his "ConsiderationsTouching a War with Spain"54Bacon gives three
reasonsforregardinga war withSpain as a just war. The firstis "upon plaint,"
the others"upon defence."Regardingthe first,I do not deal withthe historical
problem. But it is here that Bacon offershis tellingjudgmentthat wars for
revengeare legitimate,though"revengesare not infinite,but accordingto the
measure of the firstwrongor damage." That means, in effect,as Bacon says,
that a voluntaryoffensivewar may be turnedinto a necessarydefensivewar.
Such a war may be both just and unjust; or, more exactly,it may be just on
both sides thoughpossiblyat different
stages. The argumentthat a war may
be begun as a just war and continuedas an unjust war, or viceversa,is a clear
argumentforlimitingwar.
Bacon does not resthis case fora Spanishwar,however,chieflyon the ground
of apprehensivewar
of the recoveryof the Palatinate, but on his identification
men
. .. and as long
as
men
are
withdefensivewar. For, says Bacon, "as long
will
a
as reasonis reason,a just fear
be a just cause of preventivewar." Bacon
triesto illustratethis claim by historicalinstances,but most of these relate to
the kind offeardiscussedin the essay "Of Empire," mentionedabove. Bacon's
own fearsare of quite anotherstamp. They relatenot simplyto a disruptionof
the balance of power,but to the fact that Spain, like Turkey,is a crusading
nation. If its veryproselytismwill findcauses of war forSpain, the apprehension of proselytismmust findcauses of war forBritain. Spanish disruptionof
the European balance is, of course,a factor,but an equal factoris the "just
fear of the subversionof our churchand religion."From the fact that Spain,
like Turkey,has always a speciousquarrel,we may derivethe factthat Britain,
apprehensiveof Spain as Christendomis apprehensiveof Turkey,has always a
just quarrel.Bacon attacks those schoolmenwho insistthat one must wait for
the initial attack beforeconsideringa war a defensivewar. He raises the doctrineof apprehensiveor preventivewar to a new level by insistingon the indifference
betweenjust defenceand just fear.In so doing he makes the culprit
03
54
Ibid., 476 ff.
Ibid., 470 ff.
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the leading Catholic power,Spain. In "The Holy War" he discussesthe arguments for legitimatinga holy war against the Turks. It is clear fromother
Baconian passages, that what is true of the Turks is true, mutatismutandis,
of the Spaniards. As long as Spain is what it is, England has a permanentquarrel.55
Ix
In more generalterms,what does all this mean? It means, certainly,that it
is possiblefora nation to have a permanentlyjust quarrel.For example,population problems,accordingto Bacon, mighthave to be faced by some "honorable" wars.56But how can one assume the availability of the just quarrel for
the "honorable war?" Bacon's answer is, in effect,that there will always be
honorablewars: simplybecause therewill always be hostilenations. The just
nation does not fightunjust wars; but it is part of the obligationof national
greatnessnot onlyto accept but also to seek the just war. As the prudentmonarch or the prudentcommonwealthwill encourage a public spiritwhich will
seek occasions for a just war, a state which aims at national greatnessmust
have laws and customswhich encourage impatience.Such regimesmust not
As Bacon seemsto have concludedthat there
"sit too longupon provocation."57
must always be hostilenations,so theremust always be opponentsof hostile
nations; or,in otherwords,theremust always be just wars. So far,that seems
reasonableenough.It is anotherstep, however,to say that theremust always
be incentivesto just wars, which is substantiallywhat Bacon says. The just
nationmay, presumably,providesuch incentives.We are drawnto the doubtful conclusionthat, while it is unjust fora nation unjustlyto provokewar, it
is quite just fora nationto provokeanothernationunjustlyto provokea war,
can win the war. If such a doctrinedoes not
especiallyif the firstprovocateur
end the doctrineof the just war, it furnishes,at least, a body blow. For, how
can we troubleourselvesabout unjust wars,ifjust wars are so easilyhad?
If the qualities of national greatnessrelatedin an almostpeculiarway to his
own Britain,Britain too was ripe forthe just war. She was strongerthan ever
before; she had the finestsoldiers,the most warlike breed of men. She was
wedded to the sea. She had a greaternatural courage than that of Spain. Her
were not vast but compact,exemptfromthe firstcause of disunion,
territories
the confusionof tongues. No enemy,whateverhis intentions,had power to
offendher. And Britainhad, apparentlyin perpetuity,just "fear of overthrow
fromSpain."58As forSpain, the strengthofSpain lay in treasure,wheretruenational greatnessneverlay, and her treasurewas the treasureofthe Indies. And
the wealth ofthe Indies, "if it be well weighed,are an accessionto such as command the sea."59A patentinvitationto impetuous,insurgentBritain!The mus56
57
58
59
W
Works, XIII, 198; Lettersand Life, VII, 26, 461-2, 475.
Lettersand Life, III, 313.
"True Greatnessof Kingdomsand Estates."
Lettersand Life, VII, 22; VI, 20; VII, 483; III, 236; I, 223; I, 168; VII, 478.
Ibid., VII, 499 and 464.
BACON'S
IMPERIALISM
489
tard seed was a Britishmustardseed, and the leadershipofthe crusadeagainst
proselytizingSpain was emphatically British leadership. It was to Prince
Charles that Bacon wrote in high hopes that an English Charles mightbring
an empireas a French Charles and a Spanish Charles had done. This Charles
did not,in fact,do as Bacon had hoped.60But othergenerationsof Englishmen
took very seriouslythe advice that Bacon gave, so much so that the habit of
Spanish wars became a boon to France.6'
In Machiavelli, the scene of national greatnessdoes not change. It was a
Rome that ruled the world; and it was anotherItalian who, like Columbus,
discovered a continent-the continentof Machiavellian political science. In
Bacon, the scene of national greatnessassuredlydoes change. It moves northwest,fromthe ancient seats of learningand civilization,to modernBritain.It
is sea powerand the dispositionof sea powerthat makes this change.But, just
as in Machiavelli, imperialismis also (and chiefly)the imperialismof Machiavelli's political science,so in Bacon, imperialismis also (and chiefly)the imperialismof Baconian science. The openingof the ocean was itselfone of the
advantages of the third "visitation" of learningover its Greek and Roman
forebears.Added to that, the leisurewhichmonarchygave the best minds,the
satiationof religiousquarrels,and the peace of Europe, gave Bacon highhopes
forthe settingof learningitself.The peace, even with Spain, that learningrequired,had to face up to the need to preventthe Spanish Catholicizationofthe
new world.For such a conquest,or ratherfora "defensive"apprehensivewar,
somethingmoreuniversalthan the Anglicanchurchwas required.To see what
that was, we should have to turnfromthe provisionalteachingwhich Bacon
addressed principallyto Englishmento the definitiveteaching which he addressed emphaticallyto mankind.62
60
Ibid., 469.
61
See Hume on "Balance of Power," Essays (London and Edinburgh, 1767), 1, 367-
62
De Augmentis Scientarum, Bk. VIII in fine, in Works, III, 172-3.
76.