Economic History Association
Fiscal News and Inflationary Expectations in Germany After World War I
Author(s): Steven B. Webb
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Sep., 1986), pp. 769-794
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association
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Fiscal News and Inflationary
Expectations in Germany After
World War I
STEVEN B. WEBB
Inflationin Germanyfrom 1919to 1923resulted from the accumulationand the
anticipationof governmentdeficits. Inflationaryexpectationsdependedtherefore
on fiscal news. Allied demandsfor reparations,the occupationof the Ruhr, and
domesticrevolts were importantnegativenews and led to increasedinflation.Tax
reforms and eventually the end to governmentdeficits were importantpositive
news and usheredin periodsof price stability.Politicalevents were fiscal news as
they changedthe chances for the governmentto balance the budget.
HE Germaninflation, already a frequent testing ground for monetary theory, offers the opportunity to gain new insight into the
connection between government deficits and inflationaryexpectations.
The gross correlationbetween governmentdeficits and rapidinflationis
obvious and importantto keep in mind. Every case of rapidinflationlike in Israel and many Latin American countries, and the industrial
countries in the 1970s-and every case of hyperinflationin Europe after
the world wars has been accompaniedby government spending well in
excess of revenues. The timing of the relationshipbetween deficits and
inflationhas not been consistent, however, which has led some economists to downplay the relationship.' For the German case, Figure 1
shows the wide fluctuations of the inflation rate. Real government
deficits had smaller fluctuations and followed a different time path.
Current inflation did not depend on current deficits, but rather on a
combinationof the accumulationof past deficits and the expectation of
future ones.
A theory of rational expectations of inflationbuilt upon an accurate
understandingof the historical policies leads directly to the hypothesis
that expected inflation should have depended on expected deficits. To
test the hypothesis, we must see how well fiscal news corresponded
with changes in indicatorsof inflationaryexpectations. Importantfiscal
T
Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLVI, No. 3 (Sept. 1986). ? The Economic History
Association. All rightsreserved. ISSN 0022-0507.
The authoris AssistantProfessorof Economicsat the Universityof Michigan.GeraldFeldman,
EdwardGramlich,CarlHoltfrerich,David Laidler,and two anonymousreferees deserve special
thanks for their suggestionsand exonerationfor any shortcomingsthat remain. Useful feedback
also came fromthe economic historyseminarsat Indiana,Northwestern,Chicago,Columbia,and
WesternOntarioand the money seminarat Michigan.John Brown and MarkBadalamentewere
researchassistants. The National Science Foundationand the VolkswagenFoundationprovided
financialsupport.
I RobertJ. Barro,Macroeconomics(New York, 1984),pp. 192-96, 383-85.
769
770
Webb
N
'-~~~~N
40
C
)
-,
0- _
5302050%
E
~~~LL Q
~~~
CD
NMETDB
o~~~~~~-nDEBT
GOVERNMENT
FLATCD
N
o~~~~~~~~~~~~D
X
c
10-
FIGURE I
REAL VALUES OF TOTALGOVERNMENTDEBT AND OF HIGH-POWEREDMONEY
AND THE INFLATIONRATE OF WHOLESALEPRICES
Note: Government Debt and Money are in billion marks, deflated to 1913 values with
wholesale prices. "Inflation"is the monthlyrate, continuouslycompounded.
Source: Tables 1 and 2.
news included not only mattersnarrowlyrelated to the budget, like tax
reforms and Allied reparation demands, but also challenges to the
government's authority-armed uprisingsand foreign invasions.
I. A THEORY OF INFLATIONARY EXPECTATIONS
To understandwhat shouldhave determinedinflationaryexpectations
we must combine the insights of economic theory with knowledge about
Inflationary Expectations in Germany
771
policy making during the German inflation. When an economist says
that his model incorporates rational expectations, he means that the
expectations variable is endogenous and dependent on the exogenous
variablesin a way thattakes accountof all the relationshipsassumedin the
model. While this assumption may imply that people have unrealistic
amounts of insight and computationalpower, it seems preferableto the
alternativeassumption-that people always neglect a variableor a relationshipwhichthe economistdeems importantenoughto put in his model.
Most models appliedto hyperinflationshave been simple. The level of
real money balances that people demand depends on the opportunity
cost, which is the expected inflation in the immediate future.2 Prices
adjust instantly to equate actual with desired real balances, it is usually
assumed, and therefore the price level depends on the current money
stock and inflationaryexpectations, 7r:
log (MIP) = f (ir), idfdsT < 0
or log P
=
(1)
log M - f(Ir)
Since futureprices will also depend on the money stock and inflationary
expectations in each future period, today's price level and expectations
of inflationshould depend on the expected path of the money stock into
the infinite future.3 Economists often close their models by assuming
that the money supply is exogenous and follows a time-series processfor instance, the growth rate of money equals the rate in the previous
period plus a random error.4
Duringthe inflationof 1919-1923,however, the money stock was not
exogenous. As some historians and economists have suggested, the
supply of money depended on the government debt.' The Reichsbank
2 The interestrate and income, argumentsin conventionalmoney demandequations,fluctuated
too little to noticeably affect real balances during the hyperinflations.Phillip Cagan, "The
MonetaryDynamicsof Hyperinflation,"in MiltonFriedman,ed., Studies in the QuantityTheory
of Money (Chicago, 1956),pp. 27-35; Steven B. Webb, "Money Demandand Expectationsin the
GermanHyperinflation:A Survey of the Models," in Nathan Schmuklerand Edward Marcus,
eds., InflationThroughthe Ages (New York, 1983).
3 The inflationaryexpectations term for each futureperiod is eliminatedby recursive substitutions of an expression with the money stock and expectationsone periodfurtherinto the future.
ThomasJ. Sargent,MacroeconomicTheory(New York, 1979),pp. 268-69;ThomasJ. Sargentand
Neil Wallace, "Rational Expectations and the Dynamics of Hyperinflations,"International
EconomicReview, 14 (June 1973),pp. 328-50.
4 RobertP. Flood and Peter M. Garber,"An EconomicTheory of MonetaryReform,"Journal
of Political Economy, 88 (Feb. 1980),pp. 24-58; Edwin Burmeisterand Kent D. Wall, "Kalman
Filtering Estimationof Unobserved Rational Expectations with an Applicationto the German
Hyperinflation,"Journalof Econometrics,20 (Nov. 1982),pp. 255-84.
5CostantinoBresciani-Turroni,TheEconomicsof Inflation:A Studyof CurrencyDepreciation
in Post-War Germany(London, 1931; trans. 1937), pp. 51-74; Frank D. Graham,Exchange,
Prices, and Productionin Hyperinflation:Germany,1920-1923(Princeton,1930),pp. 35-42; Heinz
Haller, "Die Rolle der Staatsfinanzenfur den Inflationsprozess,"in Deutsche Bundesbank,ed.,
Wahrungund Wirtschaftin Deutschland 1876-1975 (Frankfurtam Main, 1976); Carl-Ludwig
Holtfrerich,Die deutsche Inflation,1914-1923:Ursachenand Folgen in internationalerPerspektive (Berlin, 1980), pp. 97-178; Rodney L. Jacobs, "Hyperinflationand the Supply of Money,"
772
Webb
stood ready to buy or sell any amount of government debt at a fixed
discount rate.6Thus the privatesector could choose what fractionof the
governmentliabilityto hold as interest-bearingdebt and what fractionto
hold as high-poweredmoney-Reichsbank deposits and currency.
The chief influenceon the fractionof debt monetized was inflationary
expectations. With greater expected inflation, more of the debt was
monetized.7Let us see how this aggregateresult could have arisen from
the behavior of individuals. If a person expected very low or negative
inflationrates, she would wish to hold a substantialpartof her wealth in
government debt, paying a nominal return of 5 percent per year.
Suppose new information shifted her probability distribution of expected inflationupward. She would then wish to hold less of her wealth
in governmentdebt and more in real assets-stocks, steel, sausages. To
try to fulfill this wish, she would discount some of her T-bills at the
Reichsbank,take the cash, and go out to buy goods. But if everyone else
heardthe same news and interpretedit in a similarway, they would try
to do the same thing. Their behaviorwould, in the aggregate,monetize
more of the debt; bid up the nominalprices of real assets; decrease the
real value of government debt (monetized and unmonetized); and
decrease the real value of money balances. The Reichsbank knew that
the fraction of debt monetized was neither constant nor exogenous, but
depended on public confidence in Germangovernmentfinances.8Econometricanalysis shows that governmentdebt and inflationaryexpectations
explainthe money supplywell-better thanthe usualtime-seriesmodels.9
We can also estimatehow powerfullyinflationaryexpectationsaffectedthe
real value of governmentdebt:10
log (DEBTIWPI) = 4.79 - 3.33 DISCOUNT
(2.31) (.56)
(2)
May 1920-August 1923
A2 = .98 Durbin-Watson = 2.00 p = .99
Journalof Money, CreditandBanking,9 (May 1977),pp. 287-303;Sargentand Wallace,"Rational
Expectationsand the Dynamicsof Hyperinflations."
6 The Reichsbankkept the annualdiscountrateat 5 percentuntilraisingit to 6 percenton 28 July
1922, to 7 percent on 15 August 1922, to 8 percent on 21 September1922, to 10 percent on 13
November 1922, to 12 percent on 18 January1823,to 18 percenton 23 April, to 30 percent on 2
August,and to 90 percenton 15September1923.StatistischesReichsamt,WirtschaftundStatistik,
2-3 (1922-1923),passim.
Before May 1921a law restrictedthe shareof governmentdebt in the Reichsbankportfolio,but
creative accountingsidesteppedthe constraint;Steven B. Webb, "GovernmentDebt and InflationaryExpectationsas Determinantsof the Money Supplyin Germany,1919to 1923,"Journalof
Money, Credit,and Banking, 17 (Nov. 1985, part 1), pp. 479-92.
7Steven B. Webb, "The Supply of Money and Reichsbank Financing of Governmentand
CorporateDebt in Germany,1919-1923,"this JOURNAL, 44 (June 1984),pp. 499-507.
8Reichskanzlei, Aktender Reichskanzlei,WeimarerRepublik,Das KabinettBauer [henceforth,
ReichskanzleiKabinettBauer], KarlD. Erdmann,et al., eds. (Boppard-am-Rhein,
1968-1978),pp.
40-43.
9 Webb, "Determinantsof the Money Supply."
10Standarderrors are in parentheses. The equation is estimated with a recursive CochraneOrcuttprocedure.
Inflationary Expectations in Germany
773
DEBT is total government debt (includingwhat the Reichsbank held),
WPIis the wholesale price index, andDISCOUNTis the discount of the
mark in the forward exchange market (an indicator of inflationary
expectations, explained in the next section).11Changes in the forward
exchange discount explain most of the changes in the real value of the
debt. Conditionalon their expectations, firmsand households wanted to
hold a certain real value of government liabilities-money and debtand they bid exchange rates and prices up or down to make the total
debt have that real value.
If the deflated value of government debt depended on the expected
future changes in the deflator,it can be shown that rationalinflationary
expectations depended on the expectations of governmentdebt for all
future periods.12Two features of people's expectations about fiscal
policy remained constant throughout the first five postwar years.
Deficits would continue into the immediatefuture. And the government
would eventually balance its budgetand repay whatever real value of its
debt remained. How soon the reform would come and how much
inflation would occur in the meantime remained uncertain. Let us
consider two polar scenarios: one in which there is no inflationfrom the
currentperiod until the surpluses start, and anotherin which there is so
much inflationthat currentdebt holders get no real repayment.
In the stable-price scenario, the present value of future government
surpluses (net of interest and amortization) equals or exceeds the
current value of the debt.13 To compute values for that scenario,
consider an economy with D nominal marks of government debt
outstanding. People expect the government to run real annual (net)
surpluses S, which will pay interest and principalto the holders of debt
(other than the Reichsbank). The real demandfor high-poweredmoney
is H, which is also the real value of governmentdebt monetized by the
Reichsbankand therefore not requiringservice from the surplus.14 The
present value (p.v.) of the surpluses should equal the real value of the
debt held by the public:
(3)
p.v. (S) = DIP - H
If the interest rate r is constant, we can approximatep.v. (S) with Sir.
We do not directly know S, the future deficits people expected, but we
can compute the expected S that is impliedby actual values of debt, the
interest rate, and prices, and by the value of real high-poweredmoney
f observed duringperiods of price stability:
S = (DIP - H) r
(4)
" See Tables 1 and 2 for sources. All variablesare measuredat or interpolatedto the end of the
month.
12 See footnote 3.
13 Olivier J. Blanchard, "Current and Anticipated Deficits, Interest Rates and Economic
Activity," European Economic Review, 25 (June 1984), pp. 7-27.
14 High-poweredmoney equals currencyplus nongovernmentdeposits at the
Reichsbank.
774
Webb
At the time the fiscalreformto generatesurplusesS is announced,H
and DIP would probablynot be at their equilibriumvalues for the
stable-pricescenario.A one-timeadjustmentwouldfollow.The adjustment phase would changethe nominaldebt D and makes a precise
analysiscomplex.So the modelof a stable-pricescenariogives only an
order-of-magnitude
prediction.
In the pure-inflation
scenario,expectedgovernmentsurplusesaretoo
remote, and the intereston debt is too smallrelativeto inflationfor
eitherto matter.Thereforepeoplemonetizeall debt (M = D), and we
have simpleinflationaryfinance.Let G be the real gross government
deficitper month,includingdebt service:
G = bIP
(5)
whereb is the nominalgrossdeficit."5If the realvalueof the debtDIP
(= MIP)equalsflt), a negativefunctionof inflationary
expectationsX
as in equations1 and2, the rateof growthof debtdependson the real
deficitandinflationaryexpectations:
D
DIP
D
DIP
G
J(n
(6)
Althoughthe inflationratevariedwildlyin Germany,it is usefulto think
aboutwhat an inflationary-steady
state would have looked like. In a
steadystate,the expectedinflationwouldequalthe actual,whichwould
equalthe rateof growthof debt.
IT
=
PIP = D/D
G
(7)
Thus we have an equationin one unknownir, in which inflationary
expectationsare a positivefunctionof the realdeficit.16
A pure-inflationscenariomightbe unstable.As Caganshows, the
inflationtax raisesthe maximumrevenuein the steadystate when the
inflationrateis 1/a, wherea is the elasticityof demandforrealbalances
withrespectto inflationary
expectations.17Witha = 2.72, as estimated
in equation2, the revenue-maximizing
inflationrate is 30 percentper
month.Thatis the peakof the LafferCurve.Furtherincreasesin the
rate of debt growth and inflationproduce more than proportional
s Actuallythe nominaldeficitdependedon laggedratherthancurrentprices, makingthe nominal
deficit predetermined.Steven B. Webb, "Government Revenue and Spending in Germany,
1919-1923,"in GeraldFeldmanet al., eds., Inflationand Reconstructionin Germanyafter World
WarI (Berlin, 1986).
16The model here is not linear, and therefore there is no analytic solution for rational
expectations. Equation2 is linearin logs, but equation5 is linearwithoutlogs. See also OlivierJ.
Blanchardand Charles M. Kahn, "The Solution of Linear Difference Models under Rational
Expectations,"Econometrica,48 (July 1980),pp. 1305-11.
"7Cagan, "The MonetaryDynamicsof Hyperinflation,"pp. 80-81.
Inflationary Expectations in Germany
775
decreases in real debt, causing the real revenue from the inflationtax to
fall. If the governmentcontinuedto try to raise more than the maximum
revenue from the inflation tax, the process would explode. In the
Germancase, sticky wages of governmentemployees served as a safety
valve that kept the inflationrate from going instantly to infinity. Lags in
the indexation and payment of most government expenditures meant
that an accelerationof inflationlowered the real deficit.18 As employees
and suppliers caught on, the lags shortened in 1922 and 1923, but they
remained long enough to prevent an instantaneousexplosion.
The political economy of early Weimar fluctuated so widely that
people were never certainwhich scenarioto expect. Section III narrates
the events that changed the probabilities that people assigned to the
different scenarios. News that promised a long-run increase of real
revenues or decrease of real expenditures should have lowered inflationary expectations, and vice versa.
II. EXPECTATIONS INDICATORS
We can compare policy announcements with several indicators of
expectations. The real value of money and debt depended on inflationary expectations and, therefore, should also have reflected them.
Table 1 shows the real value of government debt, deflated with the
dollar exchange rate index and with wholesale prices. The exchange
rate reacted to news more quickly than wholesale prices, and for those
with international investment opportunities, the exchange rate was
probablythe more relevant deflatorfor their mark-denominatedportfolios. For households and smaller businesses, which usually had direct
links with only the domestic economy, wholesale prices were the more
relevant deflator. The purchasing power parity relationship kept the
wholesale-price and exchange-rate measures of real balances from
getting too far out of line with each other. As Figure 1 shows, real
money balances moved in the same direction as real debt-inflection
and turning points rarely differed by more than a month-but they
changed less dramatically.Bidding up prices to deflate the debt, when
inflationary expectations increased, entailed converting more of the
debt to money, whose real value thereforefell more slowly than the real
value of debt.
The forward discount on the mark in the foreign exchange market,
shown in Table 1, also indicates inflationary expectations.19 If the
expected spot rate at the end of the next month equals the current
18 This shows up in the monthly figuresfrom which Table 1 was calculated. Accelerations of
inflationalso lowered real revenue, but in absolute terms not by as much as spending;Webb,
"Revenue and Spending."
19Jacob A. Frenkel, "The ForwardExchangeRate, Expectations,and the Demandfor Money:
The GermanHyperinflation,"AmericanEconomicReview, 67 (Sept. 1977),pp. 653-70.
Webb
776
TABLE 1
INFLATIONAND INFLATIONARYEXPECTATIONS
Rate of Increase per Month
Month
Exchange
Rate
1919 Jan.
Feb.
March
April
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
-1%
12
16
11
5
8
15
23
18
23
28
26
Real Value of
GovernmentDebt
Deflatedwith
Wholesale Government Exchange
Rate Index
Debt
Prices
5%
2
3
4
4
7
16
19
14
16
18
31
Wholesale
Price Index
Forward
Exchange
Discount
2%
2
0
2
3
1
2
1
1
2
1
-0
72336
65115
55510
51109
49925
46617
41215
33014
27943
22543
17297
13257
55946
55537
54088
53132
52771
49956
43700
36672
32122
27880
23628
17263
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1920 Jan.
Feb.
March
April
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
50
10
-33
-23
-43
3
10
16
22
21
-8
4
37
15
-4
-6
-6
-5
2
5
1
0
-1
-2
2
1
0
2
3
4
5
3
3
1
3
1
8145
7433
10409
13330
21098
21348
20388
17948
14788
12148
13509
13176
12100
10468
10896
11806
12968
14239
14644
14422
14767
14858
15439
15994
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
-.6%
-.8
-.5
-.8
-.4
-.6
-.7
-.6
-.9
1921 Jan.
Feb.
March
April
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
-19
4
-1
6
-4
17
7
7
29
45
31
-29
-2
-4
-2
-1
1
4
17
18
12
25
17
4
2
1
-2
4
4
2
2
4
2
2
3
6
16335
15861
15687
15355
16763
14384
13675
13286
10170
6635
5016
7057
16700
17471
17480
18326
18853
18396
15851
13711
12399
9836
8473
8642
-1.2
-1.1
-.9
-.7
-.8
-.6
-.5
-.6
-.4
-.4
-.3
-.4
1922 Jan.
Feb.
March
April
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
9
12
29
-7
-2
30
58
95
-4
100
8
20
22
9
5
22
50
52
54
48
3
2
2
3
2
1
4
5
24
27
6659
5983
4542
5024
5249
3916
2271
928
1231
589
8224
6872
5616
5284
5139
4154
2608
1623
1200
973
-.3
-.2
-.0
-.0
-.0
.1
.3
2.3
4.1
12.0
Inflationary Expectations in Germany
TABLE
1-continued
Rate of Increase per Month
Month
Nov.
Dec.
1923 Jan.
Feb.
March
April
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
777
Real Value of
GovernmentDebt
Deflatedwith
Exchange Wholesale Government Exchange
Rate Index
Debt
Prices
Rate
Forward
Wholesale
Price Index
Exchange
Discount
53
-4
66
17
30
50
467
801
679
948
10.7
6.6
190
-77
-8
35
85
80
196
224
274
612
112
13
-7
21
58
103
181
247
342
592
35
54
62
25
18
75
97
284
352
510
170
628
1259
1134
585
555
207
378
821
296
436
653
1301
1345
902
680
295
430
472
208
14.8
20.9
4.6
10.2
12.2
18.1
46.2
35.6
n.a.
n.a.
Notes: Rates of Increaseare continuouslycompounded(logarithmic)rates of changefromthe end
of one monthto the next. For wholesaleprices the end of the monthvalues are usuallylog-linearly
interpolated.
GovernmentDebt includes T-bills and bonds, see note to Table 2.
ForwardExchange Discount is the one-monthforwarddiscount rate (negative means forward
premium)on the mark-dollarexchange rate, at a log monthlyrate.
Sources:Allied Powers, ReparationCommission,DeutschlandsWirtschaft,Wdhrungund Finanzen (Berlin, 1924),pp. 29, 62; StatistischesReichsamt,Zahlen zurGeldentwertungin Deutschland
1914 bis 1923, Sonderhefte 1 zu Wirtschaftund Statistik (Berlin, 1925), pp. 5-18, 45-51; John
MaynardKeynes, A Tract on MonetaryReform (London, 1923), pp. 119-20; Paul Einzig, The
Theoryof ForwardExchange (London, 1937), pp. 450-55.
forward exchange rate, E, (S,+,) = Ft, then the expected rate of
depreciationequals the forward exchange discount:
DISCOUNT = log (FtI,)
(8)
This indicatorhas the advantagethat it is explicitly an expectation, but
its disadvantageis the narrowerspectrumof participantsin the forward
market. The main forward market was in London, and exchange
controls restricted the access of Germans. A curious phenomenon,
addressed in Section III, is that expectations revealed by the (spot)
exchange rate value of the debt moved more closely with expectations
revealed by wholesale prices than with those revealed by the forward
exchange discount.
III. POLICY NEWS AND EXPECTATIONS
A narrative account of events from 1919 through 1923 provides a
frameworkto discuss whether and why changes of expectations corre-
778
Webb
sponded with fiscal news. Table 2 gives real expendituresand revenues
per quarter. Since net domestic product was 8 to 10 billion marks per
quarterin 1913prices, governmentoutlays were one-fifthto one-thirdof
national income in most of the period.20
Facing Defeat
After the Germanrevolutionended the war in November 1918,people
did not know what financial policy the new government would try to
follow, nor whether it would succeed in the face of domestic and
internationalopposition. The price level had more than doubled during
the war, while the supply of money had increasedalmost fivefold. From
6.5 billion marksbefore the war, the real value of money rose to over 15
billion at the war's end. Government debt had been under 5 billion
marks before the war, with none of it monetized. By the war's end the
public held about 40 billion marks worth of government debt, in 1913
prices, plus the high-powered money, which was mostly monetized
government debt.21 Although rationingand shortages had discouraged
spending, the increased real holdings of government liabilities also
reflectedhope that Germanymightreturnto the gold standardat prewar
parity and to the prewar price level. Prices in Germany had not risen
much more than in the United States and Britain, and less than in
France.22
In the first half of 1919 the value of the government debt fell by 12
percent in wholesale prices and by one-third in foreign exchange. In
winter 1919the defeat of radicalsocialist elements of the 1918revolution
created some optimism, but people recognized that "the further
progress of the mark depended substantially on the outcome of the
peace treaty negotiations."23In May 1919 the terms of the Versailles
Treaty became public, but the Germangovernmentrefused to accept it
without revisions and on June 20 resigned. A new government, formed
of ministerswho would not see Germanydismemberedand plungedinto
civil war, signed the treaty on June 28.
To an unexpected degree, the treaty took away from Germany
territorieswith valuable industriesand naturalresources. It demanded
substantial reparations in kind and laid down the principles for high
demands of cash reparations.24Although the reparations, particularly
those in kind that were due immediately,were not impossible in relation
20WaltherG. Hoffmann, Das Wachstumder deutschen Wirtschaftseit der Mitte des 19.
Jahrhunderts(Berlin, 1965), p. 455; Holtfrerich,Die deutsche Inflation, p. 221. Billion equals
milliardin Germannotation.
21 Sources to Tables 1 and 2.
22 Holtfrerich,Die deutsche Inflation, pp. 115-35; Jan Tinbergen,InternationalAbstracts of
EconomicStatistics, InternationalConferenceof Economic Services, ed. (London, 1934),pp. 72,
82, 105, 210.
23 Vossische Zeitung, May 1, 1919Finanz-und Handelsblatt.
24 The treaty requiredthe Allies to settle on a total reparationbill by May 1921.
Inflationary Expectations in Germany
779
TABLE 2
REAL GOVERNMENTDEFICITS,REVENUES, AND SPENDING
(millionmarksper quarterin 1913values)
Quarter
Deficit
Revenue
Spending
Cash
Reparations
1919
I
II
III
IV
1,501
3,394
1,977
780
n.a.
987
854
653
n.a.
4,381
2,831
1,432
0
0
0
0
1920
I
II
III
IV
348
1,188
1,648
743
397
542
843
1,389
745
1,730
2,490
2,132
0
0
0
0
1921
I
II
III
IV
196
1,816
1,230
916
1,904
1,819
1,410
1,103
2,100
3,635
2,640
2,019
0
319
451
460
1922
I
II
III
IV
499
297
585
826
1,205
1,293
888
646
1,703
1,590
1,473
1,472
347
177
92
149
1923
I
II
III
IV
1,054
1,091
2,645
1,928
628
743
415
803
1,682
1,798
3,062
2,730
99
30
6
0
1924
I
177
1,947
2,124
0
Notes: Each quarterlyentry was summedfrom monthlyfiguresthat had been deflatedwith the
monthlyaveragewholesale price index, 1913 = 1.
Deficit: The change in the government debt, which was figured as the bonds and T-bills
outstanding,not countingthose T-bills at the Reichsbankthat were backinggovernmentdeposits
there. Monthlybond totals were interpolatedlinearlyfrom the annualfigures.
Revenue: Tax revenue (includingforced loans-Zwangsanleihe) plus income of the state railroad
and post.
Spending:Revenue plus deficit.
Cash reparationexpenses: Monthlyoutlays for cash reparations.
Sources:Allied Powers, ReparationCommission,Deutschlands Wirtschaft,Wahrungund Finanzen (Berlin, 1924),pp. 29, 62; StatistischesReichsamt,Zahlenzur Geldentwertunqin Deutschland
1914bis 1923, Sonderhefte1 zu Wirtschaftund Statistik(Berlin, 1925),pp. 45-51; Wirtschaftund
Statistik, 1-4 (1921-1924), passim; ArmdJessen, Finanzen, Defizit und Notenpresse 1914-1922
(Berlin, 1923),Table6; Bundesarchiv,Koblenz [BAK]Reichsfinanzministerium
R2/2659,R2/2795;
BAK, ReichskanzleiR431/2357;ZentralesStaatsarchiv,Potsdam[ZSa] Reichsschatzministerium
22.01/3488.For furtherdetails, see Webb, "Revenue and Spending."
to Germany'stotal productivecapacity, they loomed large in relationto
the government'sability to raise revenue. The beginningof deliveries of
reparationsin kind to France in fall 1919 must have helped convince
people that at least some of the claims outlined in the treaty would be
exacted. In December the French rejected the Germanoffers to assist
directly in the reconstructionof northernFrance, which Trachtenberg
780
Webb
callsa "turningpoint"towarduncooperativestrategieson bothsides of
the Rhine.25
Althoughreal deficitswere decliningin the latterhalf of 1919(see
Table2), inflationincreasedandthe realvalueof totalgovernmentdebt
fell dramatically(see Figure 1 and Table 1). The conditionsof the
VersaillesTreatymadeit impossiblefor the Germangovernmentto run
largeenoughsurplusesto repaythe wardebt at prewarvalues. On the
otherhand,peopledidnot believethatGermanywas in a pure-inflation
scenario,whichis clearonce we see whathappensin the hyperinflation
in 1922. In 1919most people believed that the stable-pricescenario
wouldrequireonlya one-timeincreaseof thepricelevel to bringthe real
debt burdendown to a level compatiblewiththe feasiblesurpluses.
Stabilizingthe Republic
In the fall and winter of 1919-20the governmenttook steps to
enhanceits taxingpower. The declineof the real value of debt from
November1919to February1920suggeststhatpeoplehad countedon
tax increases and were disappointedby the reformsproposed.The
VossischeZeitung, a leadingmiddle-classpaper in Berlin, was exIn November,Ministerof
tremelycriticalof the new tax proposals.26
Finance MatthiasErzberger,optimisticabout the reforms he was
proposing,forecastthatrevenueswouldexceed expensesby about1.3
billionmarksper year, 0.2 billionin termsof 1913wholesaleprices.27
Althoughhis expenseestimatesomittedsome majoritems like reparationsandincludeddebtservice,theygiveat leastan orderof magnitude.
If peoplebelievedErzberger,they shouldhave expecteda stable-price
scenarioand adjustedprices to the level that made the real value of
governmentdebt consistentwith his forecast.The debtwas 172billion
marks(nominal)at the endof October1919,andthe marketinterestrate
was 3.8 percent.28In 1913, when prices had last been stable, (real)
high-poweredmoney was 6.5 billion,as mentionedearlier.The price
level of 6.2 (1913= 1) was, therefore,consistentwithannualsurpluses
of .81billionmarksin 1913values.29Thepricelevel in Octoberwas still
not highenoughto bringrealdebt downto a level commensuratewith
Erzberger'sforecast.Rapidinflationthroughthe winterbroughtwholesale pricesin Februaryto a peakof 17timesthe 1913level. This, along
with nominaldebt of 178 billion marksand an interest rate of 3.8
25 Marc Trachtenberg,Reparation in WorldPolitics: France and EuropeanEconomic Diplomacy, 1916-1923(New York, 1980),pp. 116-18.
26 Vossische Zeitung, Dec. 4, 1919, a.m., p. 1 Dec. 12, 1919, p.m., pp. 1-2.
27Reichskanzlei,KabinettBauer, pp. 389-93.
28Sources to Tables 1 and 2.
SOctober 1919 = (DIP - H) r = (172/6.2 - 6.5) .038 = 0.81.
Inflationary Expectations in Germany
781
percent, implied real surpluses of .15 billion marks-not far from
Erzberger's projection.30
Good fiscal news accounts for the improvedexpectations after March
1920. Opposition from the right had made passage of the tax package
uncertain. Karl Helfferich, a former minister of finance under the
Kaiser, led the opposition with vicious personal attacks on Erzberger.
Their intensity and publicity increased in January,as a libel suit against
Helfferich went to trial-a trial in which Erzberger was in effect the
defendant.3' On March 12 Helfferich more or less won the trial, and
Erzbergerresigned the same day, but the legislaturehad passed his tax
package the day before. So, althoughthe new taxes would not bring in
substantialrevenues for almost a year, there was positive fiscal news of
a direct sort.
From a broaderpolitical perspective, there was also good news. On
March 13 right-wingparamilitaryforces attempted a coup d'etat, the
Kapp Putsch, but it was defeated even before full news of it leaked to
the outside world.32The antirepublicanforces had played their trump
cards but lost anyway. In March the French occupation authorities in
the Rhineland finally permitted German customs officials to control
exports of raw materialsand to collect importduties there, thus closing
the "hole in the West." Political victories were essential complements
to the new taxes, for fiscal reform required a strong government.
Stabilizingthe government's authorityushered in a year and a quarter
without inflation (see Figure 1). Wholesale prices fell to 13.8 in June
1920 and were 13.7 a year later.
The stabilizationof the markreflectedmarketvaluation, not artificial
governmentsupport. Because the exchange rate fell faster than domestic prices in spring 1920, the Reichsbankworried that Germanindustry
would lose its export advantage. To slow the appreciationof the mark,
they intervened in the foreign exchange market against the mark.33
Liberal monetary policy kept the Germaneconomy growing and close
to full employment, at a time when contractionarymonetary policy in
the United States and Britain was causing severe depressions.34The
relative Germanprosperity furtherencouraged confidence in its financial future and in the prospects for the stable-price scenario.
SFebruary
1920 =
(178/17.0 - 6.5) .038 = 0.15.
31 John G. Williamson,KarlHeliferich,1872-1924:Economist,Financier,Politician (Princeton,
1971),pp. 291-327.
32 GeraldD. Feldman, "The PoliticalEconomy of Germany'sRelative Stabilizationduringthe
1920/21-Depression,"in Feldman et al., eds., The German Inflation: A PreliminaryBalance
(Berlin, 1982),p. 187.
33 Ibid, pp. 188-189;ZentralesStaatsarchiv-Potsdam
[henceforthZSa], ReichsbankRB/6435,Bl.
15-17.
34 Steven B. Webb, "The GermanInflationand Foreign Business Cycles, 1920-1922," forthcoming in Explorationsin Economic History.
782
Webb
Becausemostof the Erzbergertaxesdidnot haveto be paiduntilthe
yearafterthey were incurred,governmentdebtcontinuedto rise, from
179billionmarks(nominal)in March1920to 257billionin June 1921.35
Butthe stabilityof pricesindicatesthatpeoplethoughtthepresentvalue
of futuregovernmentsurpluseswas positive. Equation4 allows us to
estimatethe surplusesthey expected. From July 1920to June 1921
governmentdebtaveraged231billionmarks,wholesaleprices14.1,real
high-poweredmoney 6.4 billion, and the marketdiscount rate 3.4
percent,which impliesthat people expectedannualsurplusesaround
0.34 billionmarksin 1913prices.36How well does this implicitexpectationcorrespondto the actualprogressof the Reich'sfinances?
The year of actualpricestabilityafterJuly 1920providesa basis for
calculatingwhatthe budgetsurpluswouldhavebeenin a counterfactual
scenarioof continuingprice stability.The crucial question is what
wouldhavehappenedto receiptsfromtheincometax andthe wealthtax
(Reichsnotopfer)-thetwo most importantof the Erzbergertaxes. The
incometax was steeplygraduated,and payrolldeductionswere made
onlyat the minimumrate.Mostof the revenuecamefromthegraduated
assessmentsmade and paid after the close of the tax year. Inflation
resumed,however,beforethe governmentreceivedmostof the assessmentseven for 1920,andit left payrolldeductionsas the predominant
revenuesource in real terms.37Nevertheless,if prices had remained
stable,totalreal income-taxrevenuewouldbe aboutthe samemultiple
of the payrolldeductionas was the total nominalrevenue.Fromthe
time revenuesfrompayrolldeductionsplateauedin November1920to
the end of pricestabilityin June1921,theycamein at a realrateof 1.04
billionmarksperyear(deflatedwithwholesalepricesto 1913values).In
fiscalyear1920,payrolldeductionswere.34of totalnominalincome-tax
state
revenue.So total real income-taxrevenuesin a noninflationary
wouldhave been about3.06 billionmarksper year. FromFebruaryto
June 1921realrevenuefromthe wealthtax averaged1.35billionmarks
per year. (Thewealthtax broughtunusuallylargepaymentsin December 1920 and January1921). From July 1920 to June 1921 the real
revenuesfrom the other taxes, the railroad,and the post were 4.06
billion marks, makingthe total counterfactualrevenues 8.47 billion
marksper year.38
Real spendingnet of interestwas 9.78 billionmarksfor the yearJuly
1s Sources to Table 2.
36S = (DIP - R) r = (231/14.1- 6.4) .034 = .31 billion.
37Peter-ChristianWitt, "Tax Policies, Tax Assessment and Inflation:Toward a Sociology of
Public Finances in the GermanInflation 1914-1923,"in Schmuklerand Marcus, ed., Inflation
Throughthe Ages.
38Data from Witt, "Tax Policies, Tax Assessment," p. 466, and Webb, "Revenue and
Spending." In 1921and 1922the share of income-taxrevenue from assessments was higher,but
this may be partlybecause the inflationraisedpeople's nominalincomes faster than the Reichstag
indexed the brackets.
Inflationary Expectations in Germany
783
1920 to June 1921. This included 2.24 billion marks in reparationsand
other expenses of the Treaty. So if the real budget had remained as it
was in 1920/21, real surpluses would have been negative 1.31 billion
marks. To get to the expected real surplus of 0.34 billion marks
calculatedearlier,real revenue would need to rise 1.65 billion more than
expenses. In other words, the real debt in July 1920/June1921 implied
expectations that, holding expenses constant, the government would
raise 20 percent more revenue, plus a little extra to offset delays in
getting surpluses.
Even without additional taxes, Germany might have raised the
revenue throughgrowth in the real tax base. Net national output grew
11 percent from 1920 to 1922; by 1925-1929it was another 16 percent
above its level of 1922.39 Even those with much sympathy for
Germany's predicamenthave not realized that the financialreforms of
Erzbergerand Wirth came so close to success.40
The continuation of government deficits through the year of price
stability does not refute the hypothesis that they were the fundamental
cause of the German inflation. People were willing to hold increased
governmentdebt, shown in Figure 1, because they believed that future
surpluses would redeem it. Whether the stabilization of 1920 would
continue and lead to the surpluses depended upon how high the Allies
set the reparationburden.
Paying Reparations
The first half of 1921 brought bad news about German government
expenses. In January1921, the Allies set a schedule for reparations,but
German objections and counterproposals led to further conferences,
declarations of German default, and Allied imposition of trade sanctions. On April 27 the Reparation Commission announced a plan for
Germanyto pay reparationsof 132 billion goldmarksplus interest.41To
amortize the bill, the Germans had to pay 2 billion goldmarksin fixed
annual annuities plus 26 percent of the value of their exports, which
added another billion to the annual bill. Most of the reparationswould
39Peter-ChristianWitt, "Finanzpolitikund sozialerWandelin Kriegund Inflation1918-1924,"
in Hans Mommsen, Dietmar Petzina, and Bernd Weisbrod, eds., Industrielles System und
politische Entwicklungin der WeimarerRepublik(Dusseldorf, 1974),p. 424.
4 David Felix, WaltherRathenau and the WeimarRepublic: The Politics of Reparations
(Baltimore, 1971), p. 29; Peter-ChristianWitt, "Staatliche Wirtschaftspolitikin Deutschland
1918-1923: Entwicklungund Zerstorungeiner modernen wirtschaftspolitischenStrategie," in
Feldmanet al., eds., The GermanInflation.
41 The goldmarkwas a unit of account definedby the gold value of the prewarmark. Since the
United States stayed on the gold standard,4.2 goldmarksequalleda dollar. Except for inflationin
the United States and deviationsfrom purchasingpower parity, a goldmarkwas worth a markin
1913prices.
Although the interest rate was specified at 5 percent, the total interest charges remained
indefinite,because the ReparationCommissionretaineddiscretionto decide when interestcharges
would begin on a majorportionof the debt-the "C-bonds."
784
Webb
be in cash-foreign exchange-becausethe paymentsin kind(coal, and
so forth)hadbeenrunningless thana billiongoldmarksperyear.Ontop
of the 3 billion goldmarksof reparations,Germanyhad to continue
payingabout1 billionper yearfor occupationandothernonreparation
In 1921Germannationalincomewas 35 to 40
expensesof the Treaty.42
billion1913marks.43
Thus,the Allieswere demandingaboutone-tenth
of Germany'snationalincome,every year andfar into the future.
TheAlliesthreatenedto occupytheRuhrif the Germansdidnot agree
to their demands.After one Germangovernmentresigned,the new
chancellor,JosephWirth,acceptedthe LondonUltimatumon May 10.
He acceptedit in a formalsense andin the sense of adoptinga policyof
"fulfillment"thatintendedto demonstratehow a sincereeffortto make
the reparationpaymentswouldlead to economicdisasterfor Germany
and the worldeconomy.Paymentsbeganimmediately.The expenses
forcashreparations
wereat substantiallevelsfromMayuntilthe end of
1921(see Table2). In 1922Germanyfailedto keepup withthe London
Schedule,and in summer1922they virtuallyhaltedthe cash reparations.
Sucha briefepisodemay seem undeservingof the attentiondevoted
to the reparationproblem,but a closer look at the Reich's finances
revealshow crucialthe reparationswere. Untilthe LondonUltimatum
the realvalueof tax revenueshadbeengrowingsteadilyandat a faster
ratethanspending.Thewealthtax was the largestrevenuesourcein the
firsthalfof 1921.Payershadthe optionof amortizingtheirobligationat
5 percentinterest,but, with stablepricesanda marketinterestrateof
3.5 percent,manypeoplewantedto pay off theirobligationas soon as
possible.Wheninflationresumedin summer1921,however,even the
nominalreturnson the wealthtax fell. Real revenuefromthe income
taxes also shranksharply,instead of rising as it would have with
continuedprice stability.In early 1922new proceduresfor tax collectiontriedto reducethe paymentslag, buttheyfailedto takethe one step
that could have made the tax system reallyinflation-proof-indexing
liabilitiesin foreignexchange.
Althoughthe bad news on reparationshadbeen comingfor months,
thefallof the realvalueof governmentdebtandmoney,indicatinga rise
of inflationaryexpectations,did not startuntilJune 1921.Reparations
wouldleadto inflationonly if unmatchedby increasedrevenues.Wirth
tried to get the Reichstagto increasetaxes, but it adjournedin June
withouttakingaction."In Junethe inflationrestarted.Peoplelost faith
42Webb, "Revenue and Spending."
See footnote 20.
Wirthconsideredseveral plans for raisingmore revenue. The most specific proposalwas an
amendmentto the corporatetax, which he estimatedwouldbringin about 5 billionmarks,in 1913
values. Ernst Laubach, "Die Politik der Kabinette Wirth, 1921/22," Historische Studien, 402
(1968),p. 65.
43
4
Inflationary Expectations in Germany
785
that the economy was in a stable-pricescenario, with surplusesto come
before any furtherinflationwas necessary. But in the year of fulfillment,
from June 1921to June 1922, people did not yet believe that they were
in a pure-inflation scenario either. They continued to hope for a
compromiseon reparations,which would restore stable prices, albeit at
a higher level.
The Allies decided in October 1921 to take Upper Silesia, an
importantcoal-miningand industrialregion, from Germanyand give it
to Poland.4"This weakened the financial and political position of the
German government and explains the sharp increase of inflationary
expectations in October.
Duringthe year of fulfillment,the markremainedat a premiumin the
forward exchange market, even though the real values of debt and
money indicatedthat people expected more inflationand depreciationof
the mark. (See Table 1 and Figure 1). It is tempting to attribute this
discrepancy to differences in the information sets of Germans and
foreigners. But foreigners read German news.`6 A more plausible
explanation involves differences in attitudes toward risk. Wholesale
prices and the spot exchange rate reflectedthe decisions of businessmen
in activities that were the main part of their livelihood. They were
thereforerisk-aversein these activities and set their portfolios to match
a scenario with the German government running big deficits to pay
reparations.Foreign speculators, on the other hand, were well diversified elsewhere and would have seen the forwardmarkas an opportunity
to make a favorablebet. Althoughthe markwas most likely to continue
its decline, as Germany's financial picture was not likely to improve
soon, the risk-averse businessmen in the spot marketwere pushing the
mark's value there below the value that corresponded to the actual
probabilityof a successful fiscal reform. For risk-neutralspeculators,
therefore, there were favorable odds that the markwould recover as it
had in 1920.
Hyperinflating
The events of Summer 1922 taught speculators that things could get
worse in ways they had not considered.47Stoppingreparationpayments
did not reverse the effect of startingthem. France declared it would no
longer accept the judgment of the other Allies on the Reparation
Commission as to whether German payments were sufficient. France
1s The actual transfertook place a year later.
Holtfrerich,Die deutsche Inflation,p. 189.
We must rememberthat Europe had no experience with hyperinflationsince the French
Assignatsof the 1790s.As of spring1922,Austriaand the Soviet Union hadeach experiencedonly
a couple of monthsof inflationratesover 50 percentper month,andthe inflationratesthere seemed
headeddown again.The extremepartsof theirhyperinflationsdid not come untillate summer1922
in Austriaand late 1923in the Soviet Union.
46
47
786
Webb
would make its own judgment and would seize some of Germany's
productive assets-in particularthe Ruhr coal mines-to enforce its
claims if Germanydefaulted.48
The escalation of French insistence on reparationscoincided with a
decline in Germany's ability to pay. Table 2 shows how government
revenues continued to deterioratethrough1922. In June a committee of
American and British bankers, headed by J. P. Morgan, tabled indefinitely the consideration of a long-termloan to Germany, because the
Frenchwould not meet theirpreconditionof reducingreparationclaims.
Although the amount of the proposed loan was small, only 200 million
goldmarks, the denial signaled a lower credit rating for Germany and
discouraged short-term foreign lending, which had financed some of
Germany's debt and had made it unnecessary for the Reichsbank to
monetize much corporatedebt.49On June 24 right-wingassassins killed
Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau, the only Germanpolitician trusted
by Allied diplomatsas well as by a broad spectrumof his countrymen.
His death furtherundercutconfidencein the stabilityand accountability
of the Germangovernment.5S
The policy of fulfillmenthad aimed to follow an inflationary-finance
scenario in the short run in order to convince the Allies to reschedule
reparations. That would eventually allow Germany to run budget
surplusesand returnto a stable-pricescenario. The tactic failed in 1922.
Although the French refusal to grant a long-term moratoriumdid not
result in any increase of payment to them, it certainly dashed all hopes
for German budget surpluses. The reparationcrisis of summer 1922
convinced people that they were in a pure-inflationscenario.
From the end of June to autumn 1922 inflationary expectations
increased dramatically,as indicated by the real debt and the forward
exchange discount (see Table 1). Governmentdebt had typically grown
2 or 3 percent per month prior to July 1922, and never more than 6
percent-well below the 30 percent revenue-maximizingrate calculated
earlier. By December 1922the monthlygrowth rate of debt had risen to
50 percent, and it fluctuated in double-digit rates until August 1923.
Since the real value of deficits remained in the same range as in the
previous three years (see Table 2), it seems clear in retrospect that the
German government had been able to run those real deficits only
'8 Trachtenberg,Reparationin WorldPolitics, pp. 243-75; VossischeZeitung,Aug. 1, 1922,a.m.
and p.m., p. 1.
49FrankfurterZeitung, July 4, 1922, p. 1; Carl-LudwigHoltfrerich,"U.S. CapitalExports to
Germany1919-1923Comparedto 1924-1929,"Explorationsin EconomicHistory, 23 (Jan. 1986),
pp. 1-32; Webb, "Determinantsof the Money Supply." By fall 1922and thereafter,discounted
corporatedebt accounted for about one-thirdof the Reichsbank'smoney creation;Zahlen zur
Geldentwertung,p. 52. Hence in Figure 1 the value of high-poweredmoney exceeds the value of
governmentdebt after October 1922.
50 CharlesS. Maier,Recasting BourgeoisEurope:Stabilizationin France, Germany,and Italy
in the Decade after WorldWarI (Princeton,1975),pp. 293-94.
Inflationary Expectations in Germany
787
because people thoughtthat surplusesmightbe coming soon. Once they
believed they were in a pure-inflationscenario, however, the real value
of debt and money dropped to levels that made the unchanged real
deficit explosive.
Occupation and Resistance
As they had so often threatenedto do, the French with token Belgian
assistance began occupying the Ruhr in January1923. They hoped the
seizure of its primaryindustrialregion would force the Germangovernment to pay reparationsmore cooperatively. The Germangovernment
called on industry and labor in the Ruhr to passively resist the French
by refusingto produce for them. The governmentpaid compensationto
firmsand workers for the costs of resistance. Althoughthe invasion did
not have a clear impact on the deficits, it did immediately worsen
inflationaryexpectations (see Table 3).51
The unprecedented rates of inflation in Januarycaused the government to fear a total breakdown of the economy, as in the Austrian
hyperinflationof 1922.52On February 1, the Reischbank, under secret
government instructions, intervened to stop the foreign exchange depreciation of the mark. Loose as it was in the early 1920s, the
purchasingpower parityrelationshipwould not allow domestic prices to
hyperinflate while the exchange rate fell, so domestic prices also
stabilized, as Table 3 shows. At first even the Reichsbankexpected the
stabilizationto last no more than four weeks. It lasted twelve, despite
the absence of any good fiscal news.53
The stabilization lasted as long as people believed the Reichsbank
could defend the mark in the foreign exchange market. The
Reichsbank's task was not as hopeless as one might suppose, for the
dollar value of total governmentdebt at the end of Januaryhad fallen to
about one-sixth of the value of the Reichsbank's 1 billion goldmarksof
gold reserves. People quickly realized that the Reichsbankwas behind
the stabilization.54Also, exchange controls kept households and smaller
firms from buying any significantamount of foreign exchange. At first
the Reichsbank's efforts had easy success, because even a temporary
stabilizationcould bringprices down by increasingpeople's willingness
to keep marks in their pockets. The real value of money and debt rose
and the forward discount on the mark fell, although not to levels
correspondingwith stable prices.
Just as the French government was gamblingthat occupation would
make the Germanspay, the Germangovernmentwas also gamblingthat
51 The increaseddeficitin the firstquarterof 1923(see Table2) resultedfromthe stabilizationthat
began in February,not from the invasion in January.Webb, "Revenue and Spending."
52Reichskanzlei,KabinettCuno, pp. 139.
53 Ibid, p. 399.
5"
Vossische Zeitung, Feb. 11-15, Finanz-und Handelsblatt.
788
Webb
TABLE
3
REAL CURRENCY BALANCES AND INFLATION RATES WEEKLY IN 1923
Real Currency
(million
goldmarks)
Date
Percent Change (since previous date)
Exchange
Rate
Wholesale
Prices
Jan.
6
15
23
31
672.20
519.20
353.80
172.60
Feb.
7
15
23
28
262.10
589.60
584.50
657.00
-29
-63
15
0
25
-8
-2
-1
March 7
15
23
29
794.30
867.40
1003.70
1112.50
-10
1
0
0
-3
-6
1
0
April
7
15
23
30
1127.90
1168.70
937.00
932.10
0
0
26
8
1
3
11
7
May
7
15
23
31
758.10
713.80
580.30
522.70
23
12
27
22
7
10
19
22
June
7
15
23
30
496.50
428.90
455.90
472.80
13
30
12
24
21
28
27
27
July
7
14
23
31
485.50
575.10
383.90
167.50
13
8
61
115
33
25
35
88
Aug.
7
15
23
31
79.90
183.80
234.10
282.00
110
-20
63
71
97
41
63
46
Sept.
7
15
22
30
98.00
151.50
338.70
751.80
164
66
17
42
90
142
49
49
Oct.
6
15
23
31
337.40
141.10
47.60
300.30
130
172
270
26
110
164
277
52
15%
28
52
90
5%
22
35
41
Inflationary Expectations in Germany
TABLE
789
3-continued
REAL CURRENCY BALANCES AND INFLATION RATES WEEKLY IN 1923
Date
Percent Change (since previous date)
Real Currency
(million
Goldmarks)
Exchange
Rate
Wholesale
Prices
176
110
120
-2
Nov.
7
15
23
30
373.80
458.70
941.30
1487.80
216
139
49
0
Dec.
7
15
22
31
1810.70
1958.50
2131.10
2273.60
0
0
0
0
-7
-5
-2
-4
Notes: Currency includes official Notgeld and Rentenmarks, but is mostly Reichsbank notes until
late October.
Percent Changes are logarithmic.
Wholesale Prices are interpolated log-linearly from thrice-monthly and weekly averages.
Sources:Zahlen zur Geldentwertung,1923, pp. 10, 18, 47-49.
passive resistance and the stabilizationof the markwould demonstrate
to the other Allies and to the French public that the French government
had overplayed its hand. Then the French would evacuate the Ruhrand
agree to delays and reductions in the reparations. Although it was
always a long shot, for a while it seemed possible that Germanycould
win the showdown, and the French franc fell in the foreign exchange
market.55In April, however, a joint Belgian-French reaffirmationof
their determinationto outlast the Germans(along with the failure of an
issue of gold-indexed German government bonds) emboldened speculators against the mark.56Since deflation in February and March and
unchecked budget deficits had raised the real value of money above that
of the Reichsbank's gold stock, the speculators could force the
Reichsbank to abandon the stabilization on April 19 and let the
hyperinflationresume. (See Table 3.)
From the end of April through July 1923, inflationaryexpectations
rose, as France increased the economic sanctions, as the Ruhr industrialistsdemandedmore liberal subsidies for the passive resistance, and
as more transactions were conducted with alternative monies.57 In
summer 1923the Reichsbankintervenedsporadicallyand half-heartedly
on behalf of the mark in the foreign exchange market, which had no
discernible effect except to use up about half of the gold reserve.
ss GeraldD. Feldman,Iron and Steel in the GermanInflation,1916-1923(Princeton,1977),pp.
352-58; VossischeZeitung, March2, 20, 24, 28, 1923, p. 1.
56 Vossische Zeitung, April 16, 1923, p. 1; Reichskanzlei,KabinettCuno, pp. 399-400, 424-25.
57 Feldman,Iron and Steel, p. 371-79; Holtfrerich,Die deutsche Inflation,p. 309-10.
790
Webb
Anticipating Stabilization
Because the real government deficits were too large for inflationary
finance to be stable, a majorreformwith concessions from all sides was
essential. By summer 1923 all sides-the French and other Allies
abroad, labor and business at home-agreed on their distaste for
inflation in Germany, if nothing else. They would make concessions
only if the reformwould bringGermanyback to a stable-pricescenario.
Puttingtogether the reformand getting at least preliminaryassent from
all majorparties took time, from mid-Julyto mid-November 1923.
Monthly inflationrates rose to triple digits in August-continuously
compounded-but the real value of debt increased and the forward
exchange discount fell, indicatinglower expected inflation(see Tables 1
and 3). Cagan's adaptive expectations predict considerably lower real
money balances than those observed in the last three months of the
hyperinflation. He suggests that expectations of a currency reform
probably caused the discrepancy.58Real money balances probably
could never have fallen to the level Cagan's equation predicts, as long
as the government paid its expenses with paper marks and required
people to accept them as legal tender. From August to November, the
real value of money balances was typically about the same as the real
value of the governmentdeficit for one week.
Flood and Garberargue that extreme acceleration of money growth
made people believe stabilizationwas imminent, because if the acceleration had continued, rationalexpectations would have driven prices
to infinity so fast that the money would have become worth nothing.
With such an acceleration, the supply of money is not "process
consistent."59No doubt the extremity of hyperinflationin summer 1923
convinced people that it could not go on much longer, but their
expectations of reform did not fluctuate (positively) with the weekly
variationin the rate of acceleration of money growth.' Steady money
growth at 500 percent per week would be process-consistent, but not
politically tolerable, even by the standardsof Weimar Germany. Furthermore,the end of hyperinflationwould not necessarily take the form
of stabilizingprices in papermarksat a finite level, as Flood and Garber
assume. If a big political upheaval occurred, the new government (or
regionalgovernments)might simply repudiatethe old debt and money.
Expectations became optimistic only as political events increased the
58Cagaiq,"MonetaryDynamicsof Hyperinflation,"pp. 55-57.
s Flood and Garber,"MonetaryReform."
I From July 7 to November 15, changesin Flood and Garber'sindex of process consistency of
the currencyis correlated- .19 with changesin the log of the real value of currency.This relation
has the predicted sign but is statisticallyinsignificant(R2 = .037 for 18 observations).The real
currencyvalue was computedwith the exchangerate, because it is availablefor the same days as
the currencystock and because it reacted swiftly to expectations.Zahlen zur Geldentwertung,p.
47-49.
Inflationary Expectations in Germany
791
chances for the German government to survive and run surpluses in
terms of paper marks or some new currency linked to them.
August 1923broughtmajorfiscal news, some bad and some good. The
bad news was the large increase in real governmentoutlays, especially
for railroadsubsidies, emergency relief to the Ruhr, and unemployment
compensation. The good news pertained more to the government's
attitude toward the inflation. A new government came to power in
mid-August and took actions that raised real revenues in spite of the
dramaticaccelerationof inflation.61It indexed railroadrates and passed
several emergency levies, which accounted for the majority of all tax
revenues in fall 1923.It issued some small-denomination,dollar-indexed
debt, which circulated as currency. The treasurybegan to index firms'
tax liabilitiesin gold value as of the day the liabilitywas incurredand to
impose penalitiesfor delays in payment. At last the governmentput time
on its side in the tax collection game.
The Reichsbank also signaled the coming (although not yet the
arrival) of a new policy regime, which would not meet every credit
demand of big firms and the government. In August they refused to
discount commercial bills of more than a month in duration, and they
began pressuring firms to take only loans that were indexed in gold
values.62By this time there existed little if any private marketfor bills,
so the Reichsbank's limitations on what they would accept strictly
constrained the debt that firms could issue.
The most dramaticaction of the Reichsbankwas not publicly known.
A memorandumto the government on August 18 announced that the
Reichsbank would not accept any more governmentdebt after the end
of the year. 3 Since May 1922, at the insistence of the Allies, the
Reichsbankhad had legal autonomyfrom the government. Now for the
first time they threatened to use it. Although the newspapers never
reportedthat the Reichsbanktook this position, it was known at least in
the uppercircles of the business communitythat sat on the Direktorium
and Aufsichtsrat of the Reichsbank. These industrialistsand bankers
backed up Reichsbank President Rudolf Havenstein when Chancellor
Stresemanntried without success to force him out for his firmerstance
against government deficits.64 Havenstein's successor, Hjalmar
61
The new governmentwas headedfor the firsttimeby someonefromthe relativelyconservative
Deutsche Volks Partei, Gustav Stresemann,and was composed of parties that, also for the first
time, stretchedfrom the Social Democratsto the Deutsche NationalVolks Partei.The Reichstag
grantedemergencypowers to the new government.
62 Bundesarchiv,Koblenz (BAK), ReichskanzleiR 43 1/666, BI. 58; BAK, Finanzministerium
R2/1974;ZSa, Reichswirtschaftsministerium
RWM/711, B1. 55; ZSa, ReichsbankRB/ 6339, B1.
242-44.
63 BAK, ReichskanzleiR43 1/666,B1. 17-23; see also Reichskanzlei,KabinettFehrenbach,p.
449, for an early mentionof this deadline.
64 Heinz Habedank,Die Reichsbankin der WeimarerRepublik:ZurRolle der Zentralbankin der
Politik des deutschenImperialismus1919-1933(Berlin, 1981),pp. 20-21, 90-91.
792
Webb
Schacht, wrote, "There can be no doubt that this declarationstrengthened the pressure on the government to take in hand the financial
reforms.'"65
After mid-September,the news carried more immediate portents of
stabilization. On September 26 the government declared an end to
passive resistance. That lowered expendituresimmediatelyand opened
the way for compromises to cut the Gordian knot of reparation
demands, Ruhr occupation, and foreign credits. France would discuss
nothinguntil the passive resistance stopped. Table 3 shows the positive
response in the market's valuationof money balances in the last week
of September. On October 26 the French agreed to the formation of a
new committee of experts to reconsider reparations. The committee,
chaired by American general Charles Dawes, produced a plan in 1924
that gave Germany long-term loans and rescheduled reparation payments.66 Although the German policy of fulfillment had failed in
1921-1922 to reduce reparation demands to a level consistent with
stable prices, it ultimately succeeded.
Debate on currencyreformbecame more specific and more heated in
October. The backing for the new currency (Rentenmarks)would be
first mortgages on 5 percent of the value of all German business and
agriculture.The security induced by this arrangementwas not entirely
illusory, for the interest on the mortgageswas in effect a tax that would
help the government balance the budget. The government would get
only one loan of 1,200 millionRentenmarksto tide it over until it could
balance the budget.67On October 15the governmentannouncedits plan
to open the Rentenbank one month hence. The fall of real money
balances in mid-October (see Table 3) reflects either disappointment
that reform would not come sooner or fear that the government would
be unableto carrythroughany reform.In late Octoberrevolts broke out
in the Rhineland, Saxony, and Bavaria. The most serious revolt in
Bavaria,which culminatedin Hitler's abortivebeer-hallputsch, was not
suppressed until early November.
Until November 15 the governmentcontinued to borrow for most of
its expenses. Anticipatingthe end of deficit spending, some government
agencies tried to borrow extra to build themselves a cushion. But
Schacht, newly appointedas special CurrencyCommissioner, cooperated with the Reichsbankto veto most such efforts.68Even the deficits
to meet current expenses were enough to accelerate the growth of
money, because government wages and salaries were now indexed
HjalmarSchacht, The Stabilization of the Mark (London, 1927),p. 117.
1 Stephen A. Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924
and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan (Chapel Hill, 1976), pp. 181-86.
65
67 Of the 1,200 milliongoldmarks,300 were earmarkedto pay off the government'sdebt to the
Reichsbank.
I Schacht, Stabilization of the Mark, p. 118.
Inflationary Expectations in Germany
793
almost instantaneously. Because fiscal news created reform expectations, however, the higher inflation tax rate could raise more real
revenue.
Permanently Stabilizing
When the Rentenbank opened on November 15, the public did not
know what the new currency would be worth in paper marks, for the
Rentenbankcharter did not specify the relation. Schacht, who at that
point effectively controlled both the Rentenbankand the Reichsbank,
guided central bank policy according to his plan to establish a stablevalued fiat money.69On November 20 the Reichsbankpegged the paper
markat 4.2 trillion(1012) per dollar(a trillionthof prewarparity)and one
trillion per Rentenmark.Speculatorspushed the dollar price up to 11.7
trillion paper marks in French-occupiedCologne. But the Reichsbank
held the new par rate in Berlin and burned the speculators as the
Cologne price dropped to par by December 10.70 By December the
Rentenmarks were circulating alongside the paper marks, perfectly
substitutableat a trillion-to-oneratio, and they traded under moderate
exchange controls at prewar parity with the dollar.
In December 1923the treasurypetitioned the Rentenbankfor further
credit. With the enthusiastic support of Schacht, the bank denied the
request. With big tax increases and modest spending cuts the government balanced its budget and ran surpluses startingin March 1924.71In
any case, the Reichsbank (and the Rentenbank) would monetize no
more government debt, which ended the relevance of fiscal news for
predictinginflation.
Pegging the mark to the dollar, ending the monetization of government debt, and balancingthe governmentbudget were the largest steps
of the final stabilization,but the full change of the policy regimewas not
completed until summer 1924. At first the Reichsbank continued its
traditional practice of freely discounting bills from credit-worthy
firms.72By this means the nominal and real money balances grew
rapidlyin late November and December 1923, and more slowly in early
1924. Moderate inflation resumed in February and March, and on
markets abroad the mark fell to 10 percent below par. Rather than
counteract with higher discount rates, which he considered ineffective
69Havenstein was feeble and died on November20, 1923.
70Restrictions on foreignexchangeholdingby Germansmadethe arbitrageprocess sluggishand
saved the Reichsbankfrom needingto use much of its gold reserves.
71 BAK: Nachlass Luther/667;
ThomasJ. Sargent,"The Ends of Four Big Inflations,"in Robert
Hall, ed., Inflation:Causes and Effects (Chicago, 1982); Wirtschaftund Statistik, 4 (1924), pp.
56-57, 119-21, 180-82, 247-48.
72 Schacht, Stabilizationof the Mark, pp. 151-56; BAK, ReichskanzleiR43 1/640,Bl. 244-92;
Paul McGouldrick, "Operations of the German Central Bank and the Rules of the Game,
1879-1913,"in Michael D. Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz,eds., A Retrospectiveon the Classical
Gold Standard,1921-1931(Chicago, 1984).
794
Webb
against speculation on the resumption of a hyperinflation, new
Reichsbank president Schacht imposed quantity constraints on discounting.73After April 7 the Reichsbankwould only discount new bills
to the extent that old ones were paid off. The restrictionof credit caused
high unemployment, many bankruptcies,and deflationthat reached an
annual rate of 36 percent in June. In that same month the Reichsbank
could remove all foreign exchange controls, and the stabilization was
complete. The acceptance of depressionas a cost of stabilizationhelped
convince people that the Reichsbankwould not let inflationresume.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Because the expansion of liquidity in Germany in 1919-1923 depended primarilyon the previous and the anticipatedgrowth of government debt, it is not surprisingthat fiscal news was the main determinant
of inflationaryexpectations. Although the government ran deficits in
every quarter, political events repeatedly altered the likelihood that it
would soon run surpluses. When the surpluses seemed likely, as after
the tax reform and defeat of the Kapp Putsch in 1920, prices stabilized
at a level roughlyconsistent with the size of the debt outstandingand the
size of the projectedreal surpluses.When the chances of surpluses soon
were only about 50-50-as when Germany was paying and trying to
renegotiate reparations, from mid-1921 to mid-1922-prices rose and
reduced the real value of the debt. But they did not yet rise so fast as to
render the inflation tax ineffective. When surpluses were highly unlikely, as after mid-1922, people wanted to hold so little real value in
governmentliabilities that a steady inflationtax could not raise enough
real revenue to cover the real deficit. Ending the deficits was the most
importantpolicy change for makingthe stabilizationof November 1923
permanent.
Inflationary expectations were rational at least in that the major
turningpoints correspondedin the predicteddirection and with roughly
the right timing to the major news about Germany's fiscal future.
Expectations about the ability of the government to run surpluses
swung so widely in 1919-1923because widely opposing domestic forces
and foreign governments had great sway over German finances and
could even challenge the existence of the Germanstate. Putting down
those challenges was essential for stabilizing the mark in 1920 and in
1923. Fiscal news was political news, diplomaticnews, and especially
military news. Demands, promises, laws, agreements-words in
Weimar Germany became as worthless as the marks that filled the
wheelbarrows. Only the metallic backing of police pistols and French
bayonets could restore their real purchasingpower.
73 Schacht, Stabilizationof the Mark,pp. 156-59;see also HaroldJames, "Did the Reichsbank
Draw the Right Conclusionsfrom the GreatInflation?"(manuscript,CambridgeUniversity).