C o m p e t i n g Wo r l d Vi e w s o n N u c l e a r P o w e r :
An Application of Cultural Theory
1. INTRODUCTION
Nuclear power has long been one of the most controversial political issues. For more than half a decade,
nuclear power has come under fire from those who view it as a threat to the safety and security of
people, society and the environment. While nuclear advocates – such as pro-nuclear politicians and
nuclear industry representatives – try to educate citizens about the benefits of nuclear power, not
everyone is convinced by this polemic. The ongoing controversy surrounding nuclear power was most
recently highlighted by the rhetoric depicting a ‘nuclear renaissance’ that gained momentum throughout
the 2000s. Nuclear advocates argued that the stagnation and decline afflicting many of the world’s
longest-standing nuclear industries would be cast off and replaced by a rapid upsurge in nuclear new
build. This expectation came to be shared by political leaders across the globe, many of whom displayed
a previously unforeseen level of ‘gung-ho’ enthusiasm for nuclear power.
The newfound enthusiasm for nuclear energy emerged from a belief that the logic underpinning why
nuclear power plants should be built had fundamentally changed. In particular, nuclear advocates
presented two key arguments for why a resurgence of nuclear power was necessary for meeting the
challenges of contemporary society. Firstly, the growing importance of climate change as a policy
problem meant that governments were in need of an affordable energy solution that could help to reduce
carbon emissions. The nuclear industry capitalised on this by actively reframing nuclear power as a
‘green’ energy technology. Public information campaigns and lobbying efforts were undertaken to
advertise nuclear power as one of the lowest greenhouse gas emitters of any method of electricity
generation. Secondly, increasing geopolitical instability in Russia and the Middle East raised concerns
about an over-reliance on fossil fuel imports, prompting policymakers to seek alternative energy
solutions that would improve their energy security. Nuclear power appeared to pose an ideal solution
for countries seeking to improve their energy independence. The combination of these two compelling
arguments – environment and energy security – were meant to be ‘game changers’ in the nuclear debate
that would convince sceptics of the need for nuclear energy.
However, an examination of global nuclear development since 2000 reveals little evidence of a nuclear
renaissance taking place, particularly in Western Europe and North America. Political enthusiasm for
nuclear power in these regions has waned, and the deep divide in public opinion over nuclear power
remains. The apparent failure of the nuclear renaissance has commonly been attributed to the Fukushima
nuclear disaster, which reignited public concerns over nuclear safety, raising the political transaction
1
costs that are required to convince voters that a nuclear renaissance is beneficial for society. However,
solely attributing the failure of the nuclear renaissance to Fukushima obscures the fact that there was
little evidence of a nuclear renaissance taking place prior to March 2011. Opinion polling demonstrates
that the long-standing divide in public opinion over nuclear power remained firmly entrenched even
when the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance began to gain momentum. Even the ‘game changer’
arguments presented by the nuclear industry were not compelling enough to convince large segments
of the public of the benefits and need for nuclear power.
This paper uses Cultural Theory as a heuristic to examine why the debate over nuclear power remains
entrenched. Why does public opinion continue to remain divided over the use of nuclear power? Why
has the controversy surrounding nuclear power not been resolved? In order to answer these questions,
this paper uses the four “cultural types” identified by Cultural Theory as a lens through which to
examine the major arguments that have dominated the nuclear debate over time. In doing so, this paper
builds upon a growing recognition of the contribution that social science research can make to
understanding public acceptance of energy choices.
Three conclusions are drawn from this analysis. Firstly, there is a ‘ground-hog’ element to the nuclear
debate. The arguments that dominated the nuclear debate during the renaissance period have changed
little from the arguments that have historically been drawn upon to support or oppose nuclear power.
Rather than being a turning point in the troubled fortunes of nuclear power, the debate that occurred
during the renaissance period played out much the way it always has, polarising public opinion.
Secondly, little progress has been made in the nuclear debate because of the degree to which advocates
and opponents of nuclear power are embedded in their own particular cultural worldview. In particular,
the arguments which are typically used to promote nuclear power have been highly reflective of the
beliefs and values underpinning a hierarchicalist rationality. This leads to the third and final conclusion,
which is that little progress has been made in the nuclear debate because of the hierarchicalist nature of
pro-nuclear arguments. Arguments that are grounded in a hierarchicalist world-view will be ineffective
in convincing alternative cultural types – egalitarians, individualists, and fatalists – of the benefits of
nuclear power. Consequently, the nuclear debate remains entrenched.
2. CULTURAL THEORY
Cultural Theory was developed in order to better understand the way in which individuals form
perceptions of risks. The theory was first developed by Mary Douglas (1992, 1999, 1982, 1970), and
then advanced by key authors such as Aaron Wildavsky and Michael Thompson (Douglas and
Wildavsky, 1982, Thompson et al., 1990, Thompson, 1997, Wildavsky and Dake, 1990, Wildavsky,
1987). The theory is based upon two core ideas. First, Cultural Theorists argue that “culture matters” –
that every aspect of human thought and action is influenced by culture (Mamadouh, 1999: 396). Second,
2
Cultural Theorists argue that there are a limited number of “cultural types” within which each individual
can be categorised (Mamadouh, 1999: 396). Cultural Theorists have constructed a “grid-group”
typology which provides an overview of four possible cultural types. This typology is based on two
coordinates – ‘grid’ and ‘group’. The group coordinate refers to who it is that an individual interacts
with. That is, the degree to which an individual is incorporated into or connected within a social
grouping. The grid coordinate refers to how an individual interacts within a group. That is, the extent to
which an individual’s actions and relationships are restricted and regulated within that particular social
context.
The grid-group typology allows for four possible combinations of these coordinates in order to identify
four possible cultural types. The first cultural type, ‘hierarchicalists’ (high grid/high group) place their
faith in government and authority structures, which they see as necessary for maintaining social order
and preventing the outbreak of chaos. Expert decision-making is trusted and recommendations put
forward by authority figures should be followed (Oltedal et al., 2004: 20). Hierarchicalists are sceptical
of any kind of self-organising or community-driven process (Hood, 1998: 73). They view structures
and rules as the obvious solution to managing any kind of societal problem (van Rensburg, 2013: 35).
In contrast to hierarchicalists, egalitarians (low grid/high group) distrust bureaucrats and any kind of
‘expert’ decision-makers. They tend to perceive bureaucrats and industry officials as inherently greedy
and corrupt, misusing their positions of power to advance their own interests rather than the interests of
others (Oltedal et al., 2004: 20). They are suspicious of large organisations and institutions, and will be
unwilling to accept risks that are imposed on them by government or expert authorities (Rippl, 2002:
150). Instead, egalitarians have a strong sense of social solidarity, and prefer authority to be placed in
the hands of the common people rather than “externally defined experts” (Ripberger et al., 2012: 715).
Consequently, egalitarians favour more participatory, democratic and community-driven decisionmaking processes. Individualists (low grid/low group) prioritise the preservation of individual freedom
above all else, and therefore want to minimise government interference in the market and society
(Grendstad, 1995: 225). They tend to perceive any kind of hierarchical intervention as limiting
individual creativity, enterprise and progress (van Rensburg, 2013: 36). Individualists are most
concerned about risks that pose a threat to their individual freedoms. Fatalists (high grid/low group)
believe that they have only limited agency and control over their own life and the outcomes that they
will face (Ripberger et al., 2012: 715, Michaud et al., 2009: 29). They believe that crises are inevitable,
unpredictable and uncontrollable (Hood, 1998: 146). Consequently, fatalists are sceptical of any policy
solution that promises to prevent future crises from occurring. Fatalists believe that there is no point
trying to implement solutions to better society as such initiatives will only be counterproductive, and
can serve to exacerbate the problems that will inevitably emerge. Policy failures will happen, and there
is nothing that the government can, or should, do about it.
3
Each individual in society fits into one of the four distinctive and mutually exclusive categories of
cultural type. A person cannot be both a hierarchicalist and an egalitarian, for example. Each individual
associates with one particular rationality in all aspects of their life. Moreover, the four categories of
cultural types are constantly “at war with each other” (Douglas, 1999: 411). They each operate within
a fundamentally different “cultural bias” or worldview – a particular set of values, attitudes and beliefs
about society and how the world works. The differences and contradictions between these four separate
worldviews makes it difficult for each cultural type to engage in constructive dialogue with another, or
to understand the different perspectives held by the other cultural types. As Boholm (1996: 73)
explains, “since people will live in 'worlds apart' in their own society, they cannot be expected to be
able to communicate or understand each other”. Furthermore, these cultural biases heavily influence
the way in which individuals perceive and prioritise risks. Cultural theorists argue that the position of
each individual on the grid and group axes will determine “who fears what and why” (Wildavsky and
Dake, 1990). Recent applications of cultural theory have been used to better understand why new
technologies are embraced by some and feared by others (Dake, 1991), or why some people care more
than others about risks to the environment, such as climate change, than others (van Rensburg, 2013).
Cultural Theory emphasises the socially constructed nature of risks. In doing so, Cultural Theory
challenges ‘technical’ approaches to risk which rely upon calculations of the magnitude and probability
of exposure to an event or phenomenon. Instead, Cultural Theory argues that perceptions of risk are
informed by the social context within which an individual is located. As a result, different people will
respond to the same risk in different ways. The implication of this is that the idea of ‘risk’ cannot be
solely equated with the idea of ‘safety’. Instead, the socially constructed nature of risk means that
individuals vary in the way that they conceptualise, prioritise and respond to different threats or dangers.
Cultural Theory is therefore an appropriate lens through which the long-standing nuclear power debate
can be studied, as it “provides an explanation of the consistency and persistence of diverse reactions to
controversial societal issues” (van Rensburg, 2013: 36).
The application of Cultural Theory has been subject to certain criticisms. Cultural Theory has been
criticised on the grounds that the concepts of ‘grid’ and ‘group’ are not clearly defined, and that a
sufficient theoretical justification has not been provided for why only two variables are considered
(Oldroyd, 1986: 157-8). Cultural Theory has also been criticised for its limited explanatory power and
lack of empirical applications and validity (Boholm, 1996: 66, Tansey and O'Riordan, 1999: 84).
However, Mamadouh (1999: 405) challenges this critique by highlighting the growing body of
empirical research that has tested the validity and assumptions of cultural theory, and demonstrated the
existence of the four different ‘cultural types’. Extensive survey research has confirmed the existence
of the hierarchical, individual, and egalitarian cultural biases upon which the core arguments of cultural
theory are based (Wildavsky and Dake, 1990, Dake, 1991, Dake, 1992: 30, Grendstad, 1995, Ripberger
et al., 2012). This can involve asking research participants to assess how much they agree with certain
4
statements that are used as predicates for each cultural type. For example, Grendstad (1995) investigated
seventeen different variables potentially associated with the grid and group dimensions in order to detect
the proportion of hierarchicalist, egalitarian, individualist and fatalist worldviews amongst Norwegian
voters between 1982 and 1990. Swedlow (2011: 706) also counters the critique that cultural theory lacks
explanatory power by highlighting the wide range of disciplines and fields of study within which
cultural theory has been applied – including literature, popular culture, sexuality, identity, civil society,
nationality, science, and many more. Cultural Theory has been used as an interpretative framework to
better understand issues as diverse as the global financial crisis (Hindmoor, 2010), water management
in India and Germany (Gyawali, 1999, Verweij, 1999), risk perception (Brenot et al., 1998), and climate
change and environmental policy (Thompson, 2003).
3. THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE
The development of civil nuclear power began with an initial period of expansion, marked by the
construction of the first civil nuclear power plant in the early 1950s and lasting for almost two decades.
From the mid-1970s, however, the emergence of problems such as rising construction costs, increasing
public opposition, and the growth of the anti-nuclear movement caused many of the leading nuclear
industries to enter an enduring period of stagnation and decline. Consequently, when the rhetoric of a
‘nuclear renaissance’ began to emerge and gain momentum from 2000 onwards, it appeared that a
fundamental turning point in the history of nuclear power was taking place. Journalists, government
officials, and nuclear industry representatives began predicting an imminent revival of the global
nuclear industry. They suggested that nuclear energy was on the precipice of a new era of development,
characterised by widespread construction of new nuclear reactors and a concomitant increase in global
nuclear capacity. The expectation of a nuclear renaissance was driven by its potential to address two of
the most pressing policy problems faced by governments across the globe – the need to ensure a secure
supply of energy in in the face of rising demand and growing geopolitical tensions, and the need for
governments to reduce their country’s greenhouse gas emissions in the face of global warming. These
two arguments were meant to be ‘game changers’ in the nuclear debate, whereby the importance of
these political issues was so immense that they would generate widespread acceptance amongst the
public of the need for nuclear power and overcome the technology’s long-standing controversy.
At first, it appeared that the advocates of a nuclear renaissance were correct in their predictions.
Throughout the regions of Western Europe and North America in particular, numerous political leaders,
industry representatives, and even some notable environmental activists, made public statements in
support of increased nuclear energy development. UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated he was
“convinced that we need a renaissance of nuclear power” (World Nuclear News, 2008: 1). US President
George W. Bush described nuclear energy as “one of the safest, cleanest sources of power in the world
and we need more of it in America” (Gawenda, 2005). The chief executive of France’s AREVA Nuclear
5
Plants, asserted that “we are convinced about the nuclear renaissance” (Pagnamenta, 2009: 1). The
Director General of the World Nuclear Association declared that a “nuclear renaissance is now gearing
up everywhere in the world” (Tagliabue, 2007: 1). Prominent environmentalist James Lovelock
described nuclear power as the “only green solution” to global warming, and criticised opposition to
nuclear power as being based on “irrational fear” (Lovelock, 2004). Ambitious growth targets and
expansion plans were set for countries with existing civil nuclear power programmes in Asia, Europe
and North America. In Western Europe, several countries which had policies in place to phase-out
existing nuclear power plants, or which opposed the development of nuclear power in the country
altogether, showed signs of re-evaluating their policy positions. Figures from the World Nuclear
Association (2013a) indicated that over forty-five countries that did not use nuclear energy were
seriously considering establishing a nuclear industry.
While members of the nuclear industry continue to assert the inevitability of a nuclear renaissance,
political enthusiasm for nuclear energy has waned in recent years. Several countries which had initially
showed signs of reversing their anti-nuclear policy positions have chosen not to do so. Germany,
Switzerland, and Italy have reconfirmed their decisions to ban construction of any new nuclear power
plants (Breidthardt, 2011, Stuart, 2011, WNA 2013c). Belgium has abandoned plans to expand its
nuclear industry (WNA 2013b). Political leaders have become less willing to publically endorse nuclear
power. This is evident in the US State of the Union (SOTU) addresses, wherein the incumbent President
provides a keynote speech outlining the government’s political and legislative agenda for the upcoming
year. The SOTU addresses made by President George W. Bush in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, as well
as the SOTU addresses made by President Barack Obama in 2010 and 2011 all contained positive
statements about the continued use of nuclear energy for civil purposes (Bush, 2005, Bush, 2006, Bush,
2007, Bush, 2008, Obama, 2010, Obama, 2011). However, civil nuclear energy has received no mention
whatsoever in the SOTU address from 2012 onwards.
Over time, it has become increasingly clear that the reality of nuclear development since 2000 was not
reflecting the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance. While there has been some limited increase in the
amount of electricity generated by nuclear power since 2000, this increase has mainly been caused by
technical alterations, productivity improvements and lifetime extensions at existing nuclear power
plants, rather than as a result of new reactors entering operation (Schneider et al., 2012: 10, 13, Heffron,
2013: 255). The total number of nuclear reactors that have been connected to the grid worldwide from
the mid-1980s onwards has been only slightly larger than the number of reactors being retired (Walls,
2011: 13). Moreover, the growth in nuclear power generating capacity has been far less than the growth
experienced by other energy sources. Nuclear energy as a share of global electricity production has been
steadily decreasing from its peak of 17.6 percent in 1996 through to 10.8 percent in 2014 (Schneider et
al., 2015: 23).
6
Journalists and energy analysts alike have reported on the failure of the nuclear renaissance. Headlines
describe the nuclear renaissance as a “myth” (Financial Chronicle, 2010: 1) and as having “failed to
materialize” (Wald, 2010: 1). An article in The Economist (2012: 1) branded nuclear energy as “the
dream that failed”, concluding that “the promise of a global [nuclear] transformation is gone”. Several
high-profile international energy reports concluded that the nuclear renaissance has failed. The World
Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013 described the nuclear renaissance as “all in ruins now” (Schneider
et al., 2013: 4). A presentation by the International Energy Agency on the World Energy Outlook 2014
stated that there is “no nuclear renaissance in sight” (IEA 2014: 11). The World Energy Resources 2013
Survey reported that “globally, the nuclear industry is in decline” (World Energy Council, 2013: 4.6).
Clearly, there is little evidence to suggest that the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has become a
reality. This is particularly surprising given that the foremost argument for a nuclear renaissance – that
nuclear power was the ideal solution to meet the growing need for low-carbon energy solutions that
would reduce dependence on foreign fuel imports - appeared to be a game changer in the nuclear debate.
These were major policy problems facing almost all the countries of the world. The nuclear industry
effectively positioned themselves as being ready to provide the most cost-effective, secure, and
environmentally-friendly energy solution. Moreover, the level of political rhetoric in support of nuclear
power was far beyond anything that had been seen for the past thirty years, particularly in the regions
of North America and Western Europe, where political leaders at the highest level of government
publically declared the need for nuclear power for reasons of environmental and energy security. This
again indicated that the arguments for nuclear power were indeed convincing. Even environmentalists
– some of the most vocal and long-standing opponents of nuclear power – appeared to be changing their
minds and ‘seeing the light’ on nuclear power.
Furthermore, the arguments for a nuclear renaissance have done little to heal the long-standing divide
in public opinion over the use of nuclear energy. Opinion polls demonstrate that, even as the rhetoric
of a nuclear renaissance gained momentum, public opinion on nuclear power throughout Western
Europe and North America continued to be deeply divided. This divide was present even before the
2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster. In the US, a Gallup poll found that in 1994, 57 percent of respondents
favoured the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity while 37 percent opposed
it (Bowman et al., 2015: 124). Gallup recorded a similar divide in March 2015, with 51 percent
favouring nuclear energy and 43 percent opposing (Bowman et al., 2015: 124). A 2008 Eurobarometer
poll found that an almost identical number of respondents supported nuclear energy (44 percent) as
opposed it (45 percent) (European Commission, 2008: 5). A study on public perceptions of nuclear
power in Britain conducted in 2011 found that 23 percent of respondents believed that the number of
nuclear power stations in Britain should be increased, 21 percent believed that the existing number of
nuclear power stations should be maintained, 21 percent believed that nuclear power should be phased
out, and 11 percent believed that Britain’s existing nuclear power stations should be immediately shut
7
down (Poortinga et al., 2013: 1209). Clearly, nuclear power has continued to be a highly divisive issue
throughout the period when a nuclear renaissance was expected to take place. These studies demonstrate
that, even prior to the Fukushima nuclear disaster, public support for nuclear power has not become
more widespread in the way that the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance suggested. Throughout Western
Europe and North America, the use of nuclear power continues to be a controversial and polarising
political issue. The following section uses Cultural Theory as an interpretive framework to better
understand why the nuclear debate remains so entrenched, and why the arguments for a nuclear
renaissance have failed to convince sceptics of the need for nuclear power.
4. APPLYING CULTURAL THEORY TO THE NUCLEAR
DEBATE
In recent years there has been a growing recognition of the valuable contribution that social science
theories and methodologies can make to energy research and policy (see Sovacool, 2014, Stern, 2014,
Sovacool et al., 2015, Rochlin, 2014, Ryan et al., 2014, Spreng, 2014). This paper builds upon this
recognition by arguing that one particular social science theory, Cultural Theory, offers useful insights
into better understanding the reasons why nuclear power continues to be controversial, and why the
nuclear debate remains entrenched. Despite the expectation that the nuclear renaissance represented a
fundamental shift in the history of nuclear power, little has changed in the nuclear debate. This is
particularly evident in the regions of Western Europe and North America, where public opinion over
nuclear power continues to remain deeply divided. Clearly, much of society remains unconvinced by
the arguments put forth by those advocating a nuclear renaissance. This ongoing public opposition to
nuclear power means that significant political capital would need to be invested by governments if they
are to convince their citizens of the benefits of nuclear power, making the prospect of a nuclear
renaissance a far less politically attractive option.
This section uses each of the four cultural types identified by Cultural Theory as a lens through which
to examine the historical and contemporary arguments invoked to support and oppose nuclear power.
It seeks to explain why there is an entrenched division in public opinion on nuclear power. In doing so,
it highlights the way in which each cultural type – hierarchicalists, egalitarians, individualists and
fatalists – tends to hold a particular view on nuclear power that is inherently linked to their underlying
beliefs, views and rationalities. It demonstrates that the arguments which have historically been used to
advocate for nuclear power have been dominated by a hierarchicalist perspective, and that this is
problematic as it alienates individuals who associate with alternative cultural types. It illustrates the
way in which the particular values that characterise an egalitarian, individualist and fatalist worldview
means that they will be unconvinced by a hierarchicalist-centric argument for nuclear power.
8
4.1 HIERARCHICALISTS
Hierarchicalist individuals tend to hold a specific view on the use of nuclear power that is influenced
by their underlying values and beliefs. The inherent trust that hierarchicalists hold for government and
authority figures means that they are willing to accept the use of nuclear power, provided that it is
endorsed by government officials. Similarly, the high levels of trust that hierarchicalists place in expert
decision makers makes them inclined to believe the claims made by nuclear scientists and engineers
about the benefits of nuclear power. Hierarchicalists believe that government action can solve any kind
of societal problem, and as such, are confident that effective regulation can ensure that nuclear power
plants are operated safely and without incident. Hierarchicalists assume that any risks associated with
nuclear power can be effectively managed through regulation. Nuclear accidents are dismissed as a case
of insufficient regulation – a problem that can easily be fixed through the implementation of more
rigorous regulatory regimes. Hierarchicalists prioritise scientific reasoning and ‘rational’ thinking, and
therefore assume that public scepticism towards nuclear power is simply a result of a lack of knowledge
and education about the technology. They try to educate the public on the ‘facts’ of nuclear power and
dispel the ‘myths’ put forward by nuclear opponents. Advocates of nuclear power tend to draw upon
four key arguments to highlight the benefits of nuclear energy. That is, that nuclear power is a secure,
affordable, safe and low-carbon source of electricity production. These arguments have dominated the
nuclear debate in both the historical and contemporary period. These arguments are now examined in
further detail in order to illustrate that they are grounded in a hierarchicalist rationality.
The development of nuclear power has long been justified on the grounds that it provides a secure form
of energy generation. In the aftermath of World War II, political and industry leaders in the UK, France
and Germany advocated for the construction of a nuclear energy programme because it could guarantee
their energy security (The New York Times, 1954: 5, Winnacker and Wirtz, 1979: 44, Ministry of Fuel
and Power, 1955). All three countries were heavily dependent on coal as a fuel source, but were faced
with rapidly dwindling domestic coal supplies which had been depleted by both wartime efforts as well
as the reconstruction programme afterwards. Energy security fears were exacerbated by the 1973-74
OPEC oil crisis which highlighted the extent of each country’s dependence on fossil fuel imports. For
countries with limited indigenous energy reserves, such as France and Japan, the oil crises were
fundamental to the rapid development of their nuclear industries (Walls, 2011: 10).
When talk of a nuclear renaissance emerged in the early 2000s, energy security was once again one of
the key arguments drawn upon by advocates of a nuclear revival. Geo-political instability in Russia –
the largest natural gas supplier in Europe – prompted countries to revisit nuclear power as an alternative,
more secure form of energy. Growing concerns over dependence on Russian gas supplies prompted
countries such as Lithuania, the Ukraine, Turkey and Belarus to consider diversifying their energy
portfolios by developing their nuclear industries (The Baltic Times, 2012, WNA 2014, Peker, 2011,
9
Ram, 2007). In Finland, fears of over-reliance on Russian gas imports led the government to consider
plans to double the country’s nuclear capacity (Pohjanpalo and ben-Aaron, 2010). The British
Government’s long-term nuclear energy strategy described nuclear power as “vital for our energy
security” (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2013: 18). US President George W. Bush stated
that “for the sake of economic security and national security, the United States must aggressively move
forward with construction of nuclear power plants” (Baker and Mufson, 2006).
Secondly, advocates of nuclear power argue that it is an affordable source of electricity production.
When civil nuclear energy programmes were first established in the 1950s and 1960s, the production
of nuclear-generated power was expected to be highly cost-competitive with alternative sources of
energy. In 1957, the Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission promised that nuclear power
would produce “electrical energy too cheap to meter” (IAEA 2004: 1). In Britain, early parliamentary
discussions on nuclear investment focused heavily on the cost benefits provided by domesticallyproduced nuclear energy versus imported fossil fuels. The same argument – that nuclear power is a
cheaper source of electricity generation than alternative fuel supplies – again formed a key basis of the
pro-nuclear arguments advocating a nuclear renaissance. Advocates of nuclear power argued that the
development of new reactor designs and technologies would make the construction of nuclear power
plants cheaper and simpler than ever before, while also offering improved economic performance
(Thomas, 2012). Representatives of the nuclear industry made public statements guaranteeing that they
would be able to fully fund the construction of new nuclear build, rather than relying on the high levels
of state support that had historically been necessary for the development of nuclear power anywhere in
the world.
Another of the major arguments that have been used to promote nuclear power is that it is a highly safe
form of electricity generation. In the 1950s and 1960s the scientific community campaigned to reassure
the public that the problems associated with radioactive materials could be safely managed through
technical and engineering solutions, and that nuclear power did threaten human or environmental safety
(North, 1998: 123). Any potential risks posed by nuclear power posed were dismissed on the grounds
that the statistical probability of a nuclear incident occurring was minimal (Scurlock, 2010: 31). When
the first large-scale nuclear accidents took place at Three Mile Island in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986,
they were dismissed as anomalies. Nuclear industry officials remained adamant that differences in
Soviet and Western reactor designs and safety standards meant that it was impossible for a disaster like
Chernobyl to take place elsewhere (Thorson, 1986, Wilson, 1986: A21). Similarly, when the rhetoric
of a nuclear renaissance emerged, advocates of the nuclear revival once again argued that nuclear power
was one of the safest of all energy sources. For example, nuclear regulatory bodies argued that stronger
regulatory requirements had made the risks posed by nuclear power plants “very small” (US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 2014), or “extremely low” (Office for Nuclear Regulation, 2014: 23).
10
One of the more recent arguments that has been used to promote nuclear power is that it produces almost
zero carbon emissions, making it one of the most environmentally-friendly sources of electricity
production. Nuclear advocates have capitalised on the international community’s growing awareness
that greenhouse gas emissions need to be rapidly reduced in order to address threats posed by climate
change. They emphasise the low carbon emissions resulting from nuclear generated electricity, which
can assist governments with meeting their emissions targets in the context of climate change. As early
as 1992, nuclear industry organisations framed nuclear power plants as environmentally friendly
because they “produce no greenhouse gases” (Farseta, 2008: 39). In 1998 and 1999, the Nuclear Energy
Institute ran newspaper advertisements which described nuclear power as an “environmentally clean”
energy source (Farseta, 2008: 39). The World Nuclear Association describes nuclear power as “the
single most significant means of limiting the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations while enabling
access to abundant electricity” (World Nuclear Association, 2015). Westinghouse (2015), one of the
major suppliers of nuclear technology, advertises nuclear power as having “no adverse effects to water,
land, habitat, wildlife, or air resources”.
Each of the four major arguments used by advocates to promote nuclear power – cost, energy security,
safety, and low-carbon emissions – reflect the rationality of a hierarchicalist. They are grounded in the
hierarchicalist belief that experts “know best” and that expert knowledge and scientific reasoning should
be trusted. They assume that the provision of quantitative data and technical reports on the safety, cost,
energy production or environmental impact of nuclear power will convince the public that nuclear
development is inherently beneficial to society, and will reassure the public that any risks posed by
nuclear power can be safely contained through regulation. They assume that any public scepticism over
nuclear power can be mitigated through the provision of greater education on the ‘facts’ of nuclear
power. This is achieved by producing information booklets and campaigns detailing the scientific
evidence which ‘proves’ the benefits of nuclear power.
4.2 EGALITARIANS
The beliefs which underpin an egalitarian worldview makes this particular cultural type highly critical
of the use of nuclear power. Egalitarians are inherently distrustful of bureaucrats and any kind of
‘expert’ decision-makers. This means that they are unlikely to accept the promises made by government
and industry officials in regards to the benefits and safety of nuclear power. They are unconvinced by
the hierarchicalist arguments that nuclear power is necessary for ensuring energy security. Instead,
egalitarians argue that there are better alternative solutions to meeting the interrelated challenges of
climate change and energy security. For example, an egalitarian would typically argue that the use of
renewable energy technologies is a more moral, safer and environmentally-friendly solution to meeting
energy demands. Moreover, egalitarians are concerned with the moral and ethical impacts of technology
11
and industrial development, and typically object to nuclear power over issues of societal, environmental,
transnational and intergenerational injustice. For example, they are concerned about the potential for
civil nuclear energy programmes to encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This focus on
ethical considerations means that the cost-benefit analyses and heavily quantitative technical reports
produced by nuclear advocates to sway public opinion in favour of nuclear power will have little effect
on an egalitarian. They argue that it is the broader impacts on society that result from the use of nuclear
power that make the technology an unacceptable risk. These core features that define an egalitarian
worldview is reflected in one of the major criticism made about the use of nuclear power – that it poses
unacceptable risks to the safety of humans, society and the environment.
A common criticism of nuclear power is that there are unpredictable, unpreventable and uncontrollable
risks inherent to its use. This is an argument that is fundamentally grounded in an egalitarian worldview,
and has long been the major claim made by long-standing opponents of nuclear power, such as
environmental organisations, ‘green’ political parties, and localised protest movements. Since
opposition to nuclear power first began to gain momentum in the 1970s, each of these traditionally antinuclear stakeholders have drawn attention to the risks posed by accidents at nuclear power plants and
the potential for radioactive particles to be released into the environment. Anti-nuclear grass-roots
networks, organisations and action groups attempted to educate the public on the dangers of nuclear
power by staging protests, producing leaflets, and publically lobbying the government end their use of
nuclear power. When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance began to emerge in the early 2000s, critics
once again drew upon the argument that nuclear power is inherently unsafe and an unacceptable danger
to society, and challenged the hierarchical argument that new reactor designs made the technology safer
than ever before. This again demonstrates the ‘groundhog’ element of the nuclear debate – the same
arguments are consistently being drawn upon by critics of nuclear power. There is little that is new in
the debate. Greenpeace International (2014) argued that “safe reactors are a myth”, while continuing to
assert that nuclear power is “inherently dangerous”. Friends of the Earth (2013) argued that nuclear
power should not be pursued as it is one of the “most dangerous” sources of energy production. The
United States Green Party (2012) advocated for a complete phase-out of nuclear power, rather than a
nuclear revival, because “all processes associated with nuclear power are dangerous”.
The argument that nuclear power should not be used as it is unsafe reflects an egalitarian rationality.
Egalitarians’ concern over the risks posed by nuclear power stems partly from their inherent distrust of
bureaucrats and government officials, which causes them to believe that government and industry
leaders cannot be trusted to prevent a nuclear disaster from occurring. They do not accept the
hierarchicalist argument that sufficient government regulation can ensure that nuclear power plants are
operated safely. An egalitarian account of nuclear power highlights the disasters at Three Mile Island
in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986 as evidence of the dangers associated with nuclear power and the
inability of government regulation to prevent nuclear accidents from occurring. Egalitarians are also
12
highly sensitive to any risk that could pose dangers to society or the natural environment (Jones, 2011:
720), particularly if the impacts could be irreversible or long-lasting (Rippl, 2002: 150). Consequently,
the storage, transportation and disposal of nuclear waste is a major concern for egalitarians, given that
radioactive waste remains toxic for thousands of years.
4.3 INDIVIDUALISTS
The individualist cultural type is the most ambivalent about the use of nuclear power. Individualists
prioritise market freedom above all else, and are therefore willing to accept the use of nuclear power
provided that it can compete in a free market. Individualists oppose government intervention being
undertaken to support nuclear energy, and are therefore critical of the high levels of state aid that have
historically been necessary for the construction of nuclear power plants. They believe that if nuclear
power is to be used, it should be entirely funded by the private sector. Individualists can be either
supportive of nuclear power or critical of its use, depending on whether or not they are convinced that
it can compete in the free market. However, the history of cost-overruns at nuclear power plants means
that individualists are distrustful of the private sector’s ability to independently fund nuclear power
development. Nuclear power’s track record suggests that it is unable to compete in a free market, and
as such, individualists are similar to egalitarians in that they are inherently sceptical of government
promises justifying the need for a nuclear renaissance.
One of the major arguments that have been drawn upon by advocates of nuclear energy is that it is one
of the most cost-competitive forms of electricity generation. This is an argument that should appeal to
an individualist rationality. As discussed in Section 4.1, hierarchicalists make bold promises about the
affordability of nuclear power. This is an argument that featured heavily in the rhetoric of a nuclear
renaissance. However, the reality of nuclear power construction costs to date suggests that individualists
will remain unconvinced of the cost argument for nuclear power. Throughout the history of civil nuclear
power, nuclear construction projects have frequently exceeded their original cost estimates. One of the
most high-profile examples is the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, which was initially estimated to cost
$75 million when the project was announced in 1966, but ended up costing approximately $5.5 billion
by the time the project was abandoned (Ross and Staw, 1993: 708). The Clinch River Breeder Reactor
Project, estimated in 1973 to cost $700 million, was still being constructed at an eventual cost of $3.5
billion in 1982, at which point Congress decided to stop funding the project (Joppke, 1993: 62). In the
UK, construction began on the Dungeness B nuclear reactor in the mid-1960s with an estimated cost of
£89 million, but by 1982 the project was still under construction at an estimated cost of £530 million
(Dickson, 1982: 24). An investigation by Grubler (2010) into the projected and actual costs of the
French PWR nuclear power programme demonstrated that the costs of constructing new nuclear
13
reactors in France steadily escalated from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, although these costs were
consistently underestimated in formal cost projections.
Another argument underpinning the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was that technological
advancements and new reactor designs, such as Generation III+, would overcome the financial
problems that had plagued nuclear construction projects. In 2002, the US government launched its
Nuclear 2010 programme on the basis that Generation III+ reactor designs would “result in lower and
more predictable construction and operating costs” (Thomas, 2012: 52). British policymakers asserted
that the economic competitiveness of nuclear power meant that no state funds would be allocated for
the construction of new nuclear reactors. This decision was supported by the nuclear industry who were
adamant that nuclear new build could be funded entirely by the private sector. For example, E.ON UK
(2008) stated in a press release that “there is no requirement for either government subsidies or for a
guaranteed long-term cost of carbon to make new nuclear power stations economic”.
However, the rhetoric of a more financially competitive nuclear power industry failed to become a
reality. The same financial problems that had plagued nuclear power in the past continued to persist
during the nuclear renaissance, when there continued to be a deep divide between the estimated and
actual costs of constructing nuclear power plants. The nuclear industry had predicted that a Generation
III+ nuclear reactor could be built at an overnight cost of approximately $1000/kW, but more recent
cost estimates have placed this figure at five to six times higher than its original estimate (Thomas,
2012: 52). The Generation III+ reactors that have begun construction in Finland and France are both
evidence of the ongoing financial problems faced during the renaissance period. Construction approval
was granted for a new reactor at the Finnish Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant in 2002, with an estimated
construction time of four years at a cost of €3 billion (Schneider et al., 2013: 49). By 2015, however,
construction was still not complete, and the revised cost estimate has almost tripled (YLE, 2014). This
was the same nuclear reactor that had previously been praised by the CEO of AREVA SA for making
“into reality the nuclear renaissance” (Erkheikki, 2005: 1). Similarly, the Flamanville Nuclear Power
Plant in France was originally expected to be completed by 2012 at a cost of €3.3 billion (World Nuclear
News, 2007), but has since been revised to completion in 2016, at an estimated cost of €8 billion (World
Nuclear News, 2012).
The ongoing financial problems faced by new reactor construction projects means that individualists
are likely to remain unconvinced by the hierarchicalist argument that nuclear power is a cost effective
source of energy production. Individualists remain distrustful of government promises about the
economic competitiveness of nuclear power. Until these financial problems are overcome, and nuclear
power becomes able to compete in a free market system, individualists will remain unconvinced about
the need for nuclear power.
14
4.4 FATALISTS
The beliefs and values which underpin a fatalist worldview means that this particular cultural type tends
not to participate in the nuclear debate. Fatalists believe they have only limited control over their own
life and the outcomes that they will face. They believe that crises are inevitable, unpredictable and
uncontrollable, and this belief informs their view of nuclear power. Fatalists focus on the remote chance
of nuclear risks become a reality, and are certain that nuclear disasters will occur. They tend not to
participate in the nuclear debate as they believe that there is little that they could do to influence nuclear
energy development. Consequently, fatalists tend to be the “non-actors” in policy debates as they
believe that their voice will not be heard (Thompson, 2003: 5108), and this holds true for the nuclear
debate as well.
Fatalists are unconvinced by the hierarchicalist argument that nuclear power is a safe form of electricity
production. Their belief that disasters are inevitable means that fatalists are deeply sceptical of any
government or industry promise that nuclear accidents can be prevented. Consequently, fatalists remain
unconvinced by a hierarchicalist explanation of why nuclear power plants should be built. However, as
fatalists believe that they have little influence over the outcome of whether nuclear power plants are
built or not, they tend not to actively voice their concerns about the inevitably of nuclear disasters and
the inadequacy of regulation to prevent such incidents from occurring.
5. CONCLUSION
The application of Cultural Theory as a heuristic to examine the debate over nuclear power reveals three
key conclusions. Firstly, little has changed in the historical and contemporary arguments used to justify
nuclear power. The nuclear renaissance was meant to be a turning point in the nuclear debate, whereby
acceptance of nuclear power would become more widespread. One of the main reasons for this
expectation is that one of the major arguments used to justify nuclear new build – that it provided an
ideal solution to the challenges of both climate change and energy security – was meant to be a ‘game
changer’ in the nuclear debate. These issues were represented as emerging policy problems which
offered a new platform for nuclear development, and presented a new public image for nuclear power
that was far removed from the controversy that had surrounded nuclear power especially since the
Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986.
However, the arguments that were used to promote a nuclear renaissance were much the same as the
arguments that had been used to justify nuclear power since the first civil nuclear energy programmes
were constructed in the 1950s. This is particular the case for the arguments that nuclear power is a costcompetitive source of energy production, that nuclear power is a highly safe form of energy production,
and that nuclear power provides an effective solution to ensuring a country’s energy security by
reducing its dependence on fossil fuel imports. However, even the argument that nuclear power is
15
necessary to help reduce carbon emissions in the fight against climate change is not especially new,
with the nuclear industry actively reframing nuclear power as an environmentally-friendly, low carbon
source of electricity production since the early 1990s. In her examination of public relations campaigns
conducted by the nuclear industry over time, Farseta (2008: 41) concludes that “the most striking thing
about campaigns to promote nuclear energy is how little the tactics and messages have changed over
the decades”.
Secondly, an application of Cultural Theory to the nuclear debate reveals that the arguments used to
promote nuclear power are highly reflective of the beliefs and values underpinning a hierarchicalist
worldview. Each of the four cultural types identified by Cultural Theory tend to have a particular
perspective on nuclear power that is influenced by their underlying beliefs, values and rationalities.
Hierarchicalists tend to be the greatest supporters of nuclear power. The major arguments that have
been used to advocate for nuclear power – cost, safety, energy security, and low carbon emissions –
each reflect a hierarchicalist rationality. This is evident in the way that each of these arguments are
constructed by drawing upon expert knowledge, technical reports and quantitative data as evidence of
the benefits of nuclear power and its superiority over other forms of energy generation.
However, a third and final conclusion that can be drawn from an application of Cultural Theory to the
nuclear debate is that the domination of a hierarchicalist rationality in the arguments used to justify
nuclear power makes them ineffective in convincing other cultural types of the need for nuclear power.
Cultural Theory illustrates the way in which each of the four cultural types present in society are in
constant conflict with one another. An argument that is grounded in the rationality of one particular
cultural type is unlikely to convince those of the remaining three cultural types. In the case of the debate
over nuclear power, this means that while the arguments used by nuclear advocates continue to remain
grounded in a hierarchicalist rationality, they are unlikely to succeed in convincing members of the
public who associate with an egalitarian, individualist, or fatalist worldview that nuclear power is indeed
beneficial for society. Consequently, the debate over nuclear power continues to remain entrenched.
Little progress will be made in moving the nuclear debate forward until advocates of nuclear power
begin to seriously engage with a broader range of cultural rationalities. This means moving beyond a
reliance on scientific data and cost-benefit analyses in order to better educate the public on the benefits
of nuclear power.
Clearly, the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance has failed to generate a more widespread acceptance of
nuclear power. Nuclear power continues to be a highly controversial political issue, dividing public
opinion. Cultural Theory provides a useful framework to understand why this is the case. For as long
as public opinion on nuclear power remains divided, government leaders, wary of a voter backlash, are
unlikely to expend their limited political capital in an attempt to heal this divide and convince voters of
the benefits of nuclear power. Recycled attempts by the nuclear industry to better educate the public on
16
the benefits of nuclear power are unlikely to succeed. A new approach to the nuclear debate is needed
that better recognises the presence of multiple and conflicting cultural types in society. Until then, the
debate over nuclear power will continue to remain entrenched.
17
References
BAKER, P. & MUFSON, S. 2006. Bush Calls For New Nuclear Plants [Online]. Available:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/24/AR2006052402072.html
[Accessed 29 September 2015.
BOHOLM, Å. 1996. Risk perception and social anthropology: Critique of cultural theory. Ethnos:
Journal of Anthropology, 61, 64-84.
BOWMAN, K., O'NEIL, E. & SIMS, H. 2015. Polls on the Environment, Energy, Global Warming,
and Nuclear Power [Online]. Available: https://www.aei.org/publication/aei-public-opinionstudy-polls-on-the-environment-energy-global-warming-and-nuclear-power/ [Accessed 26
October 2015.
BREIDTHARDT, A. 2011. German government wants nuclear exit by 2022 at latest [Online].
Available:
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/05/30/us-germany-nuclearidUKTRE74Q2P120110530 [Accessed 13 June 2011.
BRENOT, J., BONNEFOUS, S. & MARRIS, C. 1998. Testing the Cultural Theory of Risk in France.
Risk Analysis, 18, 729-739.
BUSH, G. W. 2005. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union [Online].
Available: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58746 [Accessed 12 December
2014.
BUSH, G. W. 2006. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union [Online].
Available: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65090 [Accessed 12 December
2014.
BUSH, G. W. 2007. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union [Online].
Available: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=24446 [Accessed 12 December
2014.
BUSH, G. W. 2008. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union [Online].
Available: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=76301 [Accessed 12 December
2014.
DAKE, K. 1991. Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary
Worldviews and Cultural Biases. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 22, 61-82.
DAKE, K. 1992. Myths of Nature: Culture and the Social Construction of Risk. Journal of Social Issues,
48, 21-37.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE. 2013. Long-term Nuclear Energy Strategy
[Online].
Available:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/168047/bis-13630-long-term-nuclear-energy-strategy.pdf [Accessed 29 September 2015.
DICKSON, M. 1982. Four stations to boost power. Financial Times, 2 Jan 1982.
DOUGLAS, M. 1970. Natural Symbols, Explorations in Cosmology, London, Barrie and Rockliff.
DOUGLAS, M. 1982. In the Active Voice, New York, Routledge.
DOUGLAS, M. 1992. Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory, New York, Routledge.
DOUGLAS, M. 1999. Four cultures: the evolution of a parsimonious model. GeoJournal, 47, 411-415.
DOUGLAS, M. & WILDAVSKY, A. 1982. Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of
Technological and Environmental Dangers, Berkeley, University of California Press.
E.ON UK. 2008. E.ON welcomes new nuclear to UK power mix [Online]. Available:
http://pressreleases.eon-uk.com/blogs/eonukpressreleases/archive/2008/01/10/1165.aspx
[Accessed 16 Jan 2015.
ERKHEIKKI, J. 2005. Finnish Nuclear Wine, 'Wild Idea', Angers Sommeliers, Greens [Online].
Available: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aWm.YbSSOjLc
[Accessed 25 Feb 2014.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2008. Eurobarometer: Attitudes towards radioactive waste [Online].
Available: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_297_en.pdf [Accessed 26
October 2015.
FARSETA, D. 2008. The Campaign to Sell Nuclear. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 68, 38-56.
18
FINANCIAL CHRONICLE. 2010. Nuclear renaissance a myth [Online]. Available:
http://www.mydigitalfc.com/knowledge/nuclear-renaissance-myth-242 [Accessed 25 Feb
2014.
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH. 2013. Friends of the Earth Fact Sheet: Dangers of nuclear reactors
[Online]. Available: http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/93/cc/9/3609/Nuke_factsheet-final.pdf
[Accessed 1 Feb 2015.
GAWENDA, M. 2005. Bush goes nuclear for US energy fix [Online]. Available:
http://www.theage.com.au/news/World/Bush-goes-nuclear-for-US-energyfix/2005/04/28/1114635688585.html?from=moreStories [Accessed 30 May 2014.
GREEN
PARTY.
2012.
2012
Green
Party
Platform
[Online].
Available:
http://www.gp.org/committees/platform/2012/ecological-sustainability.php
[Accessed
7
March 2015.
GREENPEACE
INTERNATIONAL.
2014.
Safety
[Online].
Available:
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/nuclear/safety/ [Accessed 1 Feb 2015.
GRENDSTAD, G. 1995. Party Followership and Leadership in Norway: A Political Culture Approach.
Party Politics, 1, 221-243.
GRUBLER, A. 2010. The costs of the French nuclear scale-up: A case of negative learning by doing.
Energy Policy, 38, 5174-5188.
GYAWALI, D. 1999. Institutional forces behind water conflict in the Ganga plains. GeoJournal, 47,
443-452.
HEFFRON, R. J. 2013. Nuclear energy policy in the United States 1990-2010: A federal or state
responsibility? Energy Policy, 62, 254-266.
HINDMOOR, A. 2010. The Banking Crisis: Grid, Group and the State of the Debate. Australian
Journal of Public Administration, 69, 442-456.
HOOD, C. 1998. The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public Management, Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA]. 2004. 50 Years of Nuclear Energy
[Online].
Available:
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48inf4_ftn3.pdf [Accessed 17 Sep 2013.
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY [IEA]. 2014. World Energy Outlook 2014 [Online].
Available: http://www.slideshare.net/internationalenergyagency/world-energy-outlook-2014london-november?ref=http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/ [Accessed 1 December 2014.
JONES, M. D. 2011. Leading the Way to Compromise? Cultural Theory and Climate Change Opinion.
PS: Political Science & Politics, 44, 720-725.
JOPPKE, C. 1993. Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy: A Comparison of Germany and the United
States, Los Angeles, California, University of California Press.
LOVELOCK, J. 2004. James Lovelock: Nuclear power is the only green solution [Online]. Available:
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/james-lovelock-nuclear-power-is-theonly-green-solution-6169341.html [Accessed 7 September 2015.
MAMADOUH, V. 1999. Grid-group cultural theory: an introduction. GeoJournal, 47, 395-409.
MICHAUD, K. E. H., CARLISLE, J. E. & SMITH, E. R. A. N. 2009. The Relationship between
Cultural Values and Political Ideology, and the Role of Political Knowledge.
MINISTRY OF FUEL AND POWER. 1955. A programme of nuclear power [Online]. HMSO.
Available:
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-129-73-c-55-31-31.pdf
[Accessed 7 March 2014.
NORTH, D. W. 1998. Nuclear waste management: shifting the paradigm. Reliability Engineering and
System Safety, 59, 123-128.
OBAMA, B. 2010. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union [Online].
Available: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=87433 [Accessed 12 December
2014.
OBAMA, B. 2011. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union [Online].
Available: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=88928 [Accessed 12 December
2014.
19
OFFICE FOR NUCLEAR REGULATION. 2014. A guide to nuclear regulation in the UK [Online].
Available:
http://www.onr.org.uk/documents/a-guide-to-nuclear-regulation-in-the-uk.pdf
[Accessed 11 June 2015.
OLDROYD, D. R. 1986. Grid/Group Analysis for Historians of Science? History of Science, 24, 145171.
OLTEDAL, S., MOEN, B.-E., KLEMPE, H. & RUNDMO, T. 2004. Explaining risk perception. An
evaluation
of
cultural
theory
[Online].
Available:
http://www.svt.ntnu.no/psy/Torbjorn.Rundmo/Cultural_theory.pdf [Accessed 14 August 2015.
PAGNAMENTA, R. 2009. Areva rushes to hire workers as demand for nuclear reactors explodes
[Online].
The
Times.
Available:
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/engineering/article2170577.ece [Accessed
15 May 2013.
PEKER, E. 2011. Turkish Nuclear Plants to Reduce Russia Dependence, Cut Gas Cost [Online].
Available:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-15/turkish-nuclear-plants-to-reducerussia-dependence-cut-gas-cost.html [Accessed 26 Feb 2014.
POHJANPALO, K. & BEN-AARON, D. 2010. Finland may double nuclear capacity to reduce reliance
on Russian imports [Online]. Available: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0414/finland-may-double-nuclear-capacity-to-reduce-reliance-on-russian-imports.html
[Accessed 26 Feb 2014.
POORTINGA, W., AOYAGI, M. & PIDGEON, N. F. 2013. Public perceptions of climate change and
energy futures before and after the Fukushima accident: A comparison between Britain and
Japan. Energy Policy, 62, 1204-1211.
RAM, V. 2007. Belarus' Lukashenko Sees a Nuclear Future [Online]. Available:
http://www.forbes.com/2007/10/11/alexander-lukashenko-belarus-facecx_vr_1011autofacescan01.html [Accessed 26 Feb 2014.
RIPBERGER, J. T., SONG, G., NOWLIN, M. C., JONES, M. D. & JENKINS-SMITH, H. C. 2012.
Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cultural Theory, Political Ideology, and Political
Knowledge. Social Science Quarterly, 93, 713-731.
RIPPL, S. 2002. Cultural theory and risk perception: A proposal for a better measurement. Journal of
Risk Research, 5, 147-165.
ROCHLIN, G. I. 2014. Energy research and the contributions of the social sciences: A retrospective
examination. Energy Research & Social Science, 3, 178-185.
ROSS, J. & STAW, B. M. 1993. Organizational Escalation and Exit: Lessons from the Shoreham
Nuclear Power Plant. The Academy of Management Journal, 36, 701-732.
RYAN, S. E., HEBDON, C. & DAFOE, J. 2014. Energy research and the contributions of the social
sciences: A contemporary examination. Energy Research & Social Science, 3, 186-197.
SCHNEIDER, M., FROGGATT, A. & HAZEMANN, J. 2012. World Nuclear Industry Status Report
2012
[Online].
Available:
http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/2012MSCWorldNuclearReport-EN-V2-LQ.pdf [Accessed 15 May 2013.
SCHNEIDER, M., FROGGATT, A., HAZEMANN, J., KATSUTA, T., RAMANA, M. V. &
THOMAS, S. 2015. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2015 [Online]. Available:
http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/20150727MSC-WNISR2015-v3-LR.pdf
[Accessed 25 September 2015.
SCHNEIDER, M., FROGGATT, A., HOSOKAWA, K., THOMAS, S., YAMAGUCHI, Y. &
HAZEMANN, J. 2013. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013 [Online]. Available:
http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/20130716msc-worldnuclearreport2013-hrv4.pdf [Accessed 6 March 2014.
SCURLOCK, J. 2010. A Concise History of the Nuclear Industry Worldwide. In: ELLIOTT, D. (ed.)
Nuclear or Not? Does Nuclear Power Have a Place in a Sustainable Energy Future? New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
SOVACOOL, B. K. 2014. What are we doing here? Analyzing fifteen years of energy scholarship and
proposing a social science research agenda. Energy Research & Social Science, 1, 1-29.
SOVACOOL, B. K., RYAN, S. E., STERN, P. C., JANDA, K., ROCHLIN, G., SPRENG, D.,
PASQUALETTI, M. J., WILHITE, H. & LUTZENHISER, L. 2015. Integrating social science
in energy research. Energy Research & Social Science, 6, 95-99.
20
SPRENG, D. 2014. Transdisciplinary energy research - Reflecting the context. Energy Research &
Social Science, 1, 65-73.
STERN, P. C. 2014. Individual and household interactions with energy systems: Toward integrated
understanding. Energy Research & Social Science, 1, 41-48.
STUART, B. 2011. Italy dumps nuclear; renewable energy stocks rise [Online]. Available:
http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/italy-dumps-nuclear-renewable-energystocks-rise_100003351/#axzz2W4PLlNTe [Accessed 13 June 2013.
SWEDLOW, B. 2011. A Cultural Theory of Politics. PS: Political Science & Politics, 44, 703-710.
TAGLIABUE, J. 2007. China Deal Gives Lift to Revival of Fision [Online]. Available:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/27/business/worldbusiness/27nuke.html?pagewanted=print
&_r=0 [Accessed 11 June 2013.
TANSEY, J. & O'RIORDAN, T. 1999. Cultural theory and risk: a review. Health, Risk & Society, 1,
71-90.
THE BALTIC TIMES. 2012. Russia's agenda behind the Belarusian nuclear plant [Online]. Available:
http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/31601/ [Accessed 26 Feb 2014.
THE
ECONOMIST.
2012.
The
dream
that
failed
[Online].
Available:
http://www.economist.com/node/21549936 [Accessed 13 June 2013.
THE NEW YORK TIMES. 1954. French display new atomic pile. The New York Times, 19 Mar 1954.
THOMAS, S. 2012. Economics of nuclear energy. Focus: The Journal of the Helen Suzman
Foundation, 64, 49-54.
THOMPSON, M. 1997. Cultural Theory and integrated assessment. Environmental Modeling and
Assessment, 2, 139-150.
THOMPSON, M. 2003. Cultural Theory, Climate Change and Clumsiness. Economic and Political
Weekly, 38, 5107-5112.
THOMPSON, M., ELLIS, R. J. & WILDAVSKY, A. 1990. Cultural Theory, Colorado, Westview
Press.
THORSON, L. 1986. Environmentalists: Chernobyl-Type Accident Possible in Britain. The Associated
Press, 7 May 1986.
US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. 2014. Fact Sheet on Nuclear Reactor Risk [Online].
Available:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/reactor-risk.html
[Accessed 11 June 2015.
VAN RENSBURG, W. 2013. Climate Change Sceptics Revisited: Creatures of Culture. Melbourne
Journal of Politics, 36, 31-50.
VERWEIJ, M. 1999. A watershed on the Rhine: Changing approaches to international environmental
cooperation. GeoJournal, 47.
WALD,
M.
L.
2010.
Giant
holes
in
the
ground
[Online].
Available:
http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/421399/giant-holes-in-the-ground/
[Accessed 25 Feb 2014.
WALLS, J. 2011. Nuclear Power Generation - Past, Present and Future. In: HESTER, R. E. &
HARRISON, R. M. (eds.) Nuclear Power and the Environment. Cambridge: Royal Society of
Chemistry.
WESTINGHOUSE.
2015.
Environment
[Online].
Available:
http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/Why-Nuclear/Environment [Accessed 7 September
2015.
WILDAVSKY, A. 1987. Choosing Preferences By Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of
Preference Formation. American Political Science Review, 81, 4-21.
WILDAVSKY, A. & DAKE, K. 1990. Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?
Daedalus, 119, 41-60.
WILSON, I. 1986. Could Chernobyl happen here? NO 'Different approach to safety...(means) CANDY
reactor poses no life-threatening risk'. The Toronto Star, 15 May 1986.
WINNACKER, K. & WIRTZ, K. 1979. Nuclear Energy in Germany, La Grange Park, American
Nuclear Society.
WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL. 2013. World Energy Resources 2013 Survey [Online]. Available:
http://www.worldenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Complete_WER_2013_Survey.pdf
[Accessed 1 December 2014.
21
WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION. 2015. Policy Responses to Climate Change [Online]. Available:
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Energy-and-Environment/Policy-Responses-to-ClimateChange/ [Accessed 7 September 2015.
WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION [WNA]. 2013a. Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries [Online].
Available: http://world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Others/Emerging-Nuclear-EnergyCountries/#.UZ2TuLWnBvA [Accessed 23 May 2013.
WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION [WNA]. 2013b. Nuclear Power in Belgium [Online]. Available:
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-AF/Belgium/#.UaLY5kCnBvA [Accessed 27 May 2013.
WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION [WNA]. 2013c. Nuclear Power in Switzerland [Online].
Available:
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-OS/Switzerland/#.UblWOfmnBvA [Accessed 13 June 2013.
WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION [WNA]. 2014. Nuclear power in Ukraine [Online]. Available:
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-TZ/Ukraine/#.UXyWM7WnAuE [Accessed 25 Feb 2014.
WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS. 2007. Construction of Flamaville EPR begins [Online]. Available:
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=14496 [Accessed 6 March 2014.
WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS. 2008. Club Med hears support for nuclear [Online]. Available:
http://www.world-nuclearnews.org/NP_Club_Med_hears_support_for_nuclear_1507082.html [Accessed 11 June 2013.
WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS. 2012. Flamanville costs up €2 billion [Online]. Available:
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Flamanville_costs_up_2_billion_Euros0412127.html [Accessed 6 March 2014.
YLE. 2014. TVO: We don't know when Olkiluoto 3 will be ready [Online]. Available:
http://yle.fi/uutiset/tvo_we_dont_know_when_olkiluoto_3_will_be_ready/7111614 [Accessed
6 March 2014.
22