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8-1-1962
American policy toward nationalist China since
1945
Kenneth Kuo-Kuang Yang
Atlanta University
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Yang, Kenneth Kuo-Kuang, "American policy toward nationalist China since 1945" (1962). ETD Collection for AUC Robert W.
Woodruff Library. Paper 757.
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CT: lEER
I
-r
srii’g
onion
of
orld lan II, ~llicd leaders en risione
ina~c~t Ia
~oald be a-na do
nant poorer~
a pcst’~rar Ian East in.
hi~h ahe surrender
anon, hanover, civil nan bet~ean ~he lati~c~]Ls+ EanennrneT t a~’cL One
oc’~di~t~ to C~ina ~anti~’ie’1 on an enlargea scae and it, becane anoarent
that Chica ‘in ~ot ansoess One uno~y nansosarl be enable 1~ ~ boone a
s~abilizio— anroc in fhe Ian Ees.
En. his rolich snatan~an ~f Cecenter 16,
1O~, ~esidant lannan ~ejteranea the rrenican oos~t~on that a united a~
doaoora-to Chin~ ~as essential to ‘nrld nea~e,
Ee sa~a that
The Govonranat of the Enined States holds ~ho reane and pros—
periL” o~ h~ nrrbd in l’ts an end ~nen2~red era ~b’~ad dose :d.
‘ip. a h~ abilir:r of rh~ soverei;n flat cn. so conbne for cc’ lecrlvc
oani~ in ~ Edilod T~-rr C’rJa ~izanian~ It is tne finn b~—
li~2 o~’ this Go:e~n a” than a stranJ, -niired, and denoo”a~ic
±~a is ore
the otanst i’oeontance so the soccess cE his Jnised
ations Erganza-rion and for norlo. peaco~
China nisanga-’ized and
di. tided ein~r o~’ fo~ign e;giessian, such as tn~t ondentahza OF
Japanese, or violent i~terral strife is an. urderdi:oh’b ~nl1nense to
mid srrb~ ~ty and peace, now arc in One fuhvre~
Di~-il ;ar in China T’ab imc”erj shed the ca’nt~’ ann oran ted
robians
that aopeo.~an to Icfp all effants to soD~m then ni~bin the franan rk of tho
“nited Statss~ ‘bjan~da’es of so]icy~
oolitica~:- stable an
ooonostsail~ prosperous China night have re~
tiaced Japan as the sGabilizin; ~enter of i-he Far East a’w~ aigh~ ha-re rlayed
an ~ff~otirr sari, as one of ih~ n’ajor oomrs in th” Unite-1 Fattens,
I’~f~
~{arr3r Trr~an, “Uni~ed States P~)ian beard Ohina,~ 3ec~nt ~ae~can
Foreign Thliob (eds,), Francis O~ ~i1can and Ihorsteo U~ Fali~a~~G!en York,
1
would ~ia7~ been in keepjn~ with U~ itch States
nost~ar aims end ~ith
its 2one~terrn noiic~r of friendliness end co~openation wi~h Cnfna,
the crumbling
to the
f the effenfi~o resisten~e uf the Ianfonallum So~e:nmont
inesc Con omists, the situntiop had changen entireThr not unly
ru Carua out onroushout ~ast
sia,
The Unlteu otates Sorurnment was,
thernfore, Laced with the task of ~ashaning its policy t ward China in
condi5ions of great confusion,
This conolicated the problem of reasses~
sing thn l~n~temm interests ~$ China enf of the tnioad States,
Sur~h n
~-k men made ci] the more diLL ic~l~ oy the wider imo~icatjens of th~
Chinese situation, ~specially thoso that touched on S viet~United States
relatiens,2
:~
~ IS ~ renognised that a number nf facumis oumrated not merely
t~, im~ede recorery in Chin~ after the Second dortd
ar but to nause
sieao~ aeter1orat~or of one s~teat~cn, cuilirutang in tn~ C~iuese ~
enmi~tst n~eep
~o souto Cnana,
~ne infernal
i~cai a_n n~
umone ott in cival war, rae ~aased ~r soening~ 1ruon~ncnfaoIe
nffferernes between the hatio~ cli si Co~e
mr-n ont the Chine~ Zomnemists,
ran~ of whose isaderu were ruo—ed narn~snf and fo~ ~-ears had been exercis~
Thg independent cortrcl umer -~ido areas in ro~tiruest China,
horeorer,
intermittent negotiabi me ~et~ con the t- ~o pare ics failed to settle their
diferenceb,
hnother i~aoortan, niemer~ in the Chinese sihiation bad been the
ip~ Interr~ati~al Stunies ~rcup ~f the Bred Thgs Irstitanion, ~nira,~
1~or brc olums of ThreeS n-ba bes lore irn bonfci
9)a9~C (1 ~ash~’ r gton, I9Li9),
p,
~
~Io2a,~ 3m,
3
eanivo~aI eoliey of the Sothet Snic:o~
~s a
reseht cf the lalha
;:eenenv~
and Sino~Soviet Irea4~y of l9~5,~ the ~owiet Unicn asanired substantialy
OjiC sane no~iiion in :bnchrrja that Czarist hussia held evior to l9C~
In return for the athantage tnus acguired, the 3ovi~t Union agreed to sue~
~~ra only the :~ationa1 Governuent of China and re gi~e it gall nossibte
econovic assistance,t~
ha abe hascow O~nference in Decether, ~ the
CniteJ States, Dreha Bidtain, and me Soviet Ucion areovnced that they
were in agratrie’ S ~ri She need for a uni vi and denooratto Chine and for
the cessation of civil smr~fe, and then reaffiraed tneir aduerance So a
~ of the rice and
Crear ~rthain anrane on Cebruare 11, l9Li~, that in two or three ~aontth
aften the srrrender ft Sewaan-r end the termination of tha war in 2ur~’fe,
one Soviet union sbmhad enter the ran against Japan on c:ndition that:
~‘l. has riatus q~o Sn itherehongofta shall be preserund; ft The former
~hoa of thosi a~°Llaand by one at uaci: of Jacan in 193L ~hahl be re~
stored, viz:
(b) the cannerciei pore of ]airen aball be intcrna~
tiormljzft,
China snall retain full soaeeeignty in
noir’ria.
hat: inloff, Sotict ‘olicy in the ar ~ast (London~
l9~3~, o.
It was ci ned on hagusm l~, 9)a5~—mhe day on Chach Janan surrendered,
Ith first of oI’e agreenents ~as a treaty of friendship and alliance di
rected against tne Possibility of a rere:rnl of Japanese agaression, In
an e- change of notes relative to the treaty, the Soviet loverenent pledged
itself rto rendc r to China nerd support and aid in nih ary supolies and
other nacerial resources, such supoort and cia to be ent~ rely given to the
~a1oral Co’ere Cpi as ten ccrtenl Coveuneno of Oh~re,” It also reaftrr e~
“its resocct for C1nna~s full severeiuntr over the Three ~aste~ brevinces
(hanchuria) and recoguized their tereitorial and adrinistrative integrity.”
Ibict.~ p. 32.
0
coamonjone was issued am the close of the hascow Cofterence,
It
contains the following statement renardine thina: “The three Doreign
encretanles enchanged views vith regard cc the sibuation in China. They
were Sn agreement as to thr need for a anified and denocratic Cnina under
She haoeonal roverament, for Dread participatron cy deriocram~c anenents
in all branches vi the IZati onal tcverraTent, and for a cessation of civil
strife, They reaffirand their adherence to +.he tolicy of noninterference
in tee internal affairs of China,
•
ft Ibm,, p.
ooIicv of noninterference in the internal affairs of China~~
Toe Soviet Government
nevereheless, fafls~. ~o ilve
of these assurances arct cmnmitnnn~-s,
i~
to the spiri~
Tne tatlonalist Gcvernre~c charged
that the Stvjet Crime hat rumeet over to the Dninese Communists -riroual;
all the vast atounts of nar narerial taken fren~ the Japanese forces that
surrendered in :taurhuria, ann that this boot;,
ogether rith bubsequert
aid from fessia, ~ias responsible for the signal milita~ gains of the Com~
nenists agai ~t the Cationalists forces ii.
ancnuria mud elsewhere
count mist asc be talen, hoverer, of the off~se-tting factors of United
States
aid to the liationalist Covemiment and of the Janarese arns receivet
by the Uaofamaiist Greemi~ent from the Japanese troops in Thina proper.~
rthemnore, i
masuraole damage mis done to the Chinese at~noer ly
~he Soviet surioping of Jaranese factorIes in ~auchuria,
The ~as+ agni—
culteral ant mineral rotentialities of kanchuria, as tell as its strategic
position, gave it special sgnificarce in the far East,
hanehuria is the
eastern ooerlaod gateway to Chira punter and lies aceoss the oath ~ar of
So-met access to warm—water ports in ~sia,
control and Sovte~ f~rces eunrencmed at rorr
~atn ~ortn Korea under ocv~et
rthur,9 hunchuria was ahuost
~The Intemua+ional Shidies Group of the Prockirigs Institution, op. cit.~
p. 179.
0
‘Tort dmihur is a fortified seaport at the sour’ ves-~rn end of the
Liactung peninsula in Soonurru ‘~uchurIa. I~ is a terminus of the SiberIan
railma:, thstem, and has a hatbor free from ice throughuu’ the year. Jaoan
took ?ort ‘nthur from China in lf9~, but was compelled by European pressure
to return it tc Ohina, In ~ it was leased to Pussia, Under the Sine—
ooure’o ageee’rea~ of ~:agust lii., ~9L~5, Port unthur cecame a na’~a]. ease for the
use of both nowers, ~Port mrthur,~ Grolier Enc;clooedia, 9~5 edition, VIII,
-J
encircled by Soviet~held territory,
South China was sin;uarl— noor in
man~; essential inustrial resources, esoecially coal and irons
It could
offer little effective resistance to the Comn’ranists once the natural wealth
o
a”c’n.ria aum anrth Cnna rae ~n tter banns
~1~~
The generally unsettled conditices disco~inged the resumption of pro
ductive effort in Onina, while the duversion of 80 per cent ox the national
badget to military expenditure left little margin for governmental pro—
notion of eccncmio cenablljtation,
Twalve years of devastating warfare,
during eight of Ynich Japan was in occupation of the prthcipal indcetnial
and commercial areas, destroyed duo economic edifice that China had built
in the rcewar ~jears end forced the Nationalist G~eunmeno to fall back on
ike
a!!d tax foo a larger proportion of its revenue,
°ontinuing ant mount
ing inflation was an important factor in the stagnation of industry end
trade, and tho periodic efforts of the kationaltst Government to bring it
under control had no noticeable success,
The deterioratinp economic situa
tion, on the other hand, pla~nd its newt in inc llwering of morale that
finally broke the resistance of troops and civilians alike to the ad~rancipg
Coouuu~ist armies from the nordu,~
yeanwhile, no genuine political settlerwnb was achieved hiuneen the
Nationalist Government and the Chinese Comxmists,
Ike ~omnunists wanted
a coalition government of all maior oolltical oar~-ies, and they crofessed
wiilin~iess to plewe their military forces under the control of a coalition
government,
The Nationalists proposed that the CommunIsts be taken into
~The International Studies Group of the Brookings Institution, op. ott,,
p. ~9,
Ibid., p~
6
the ewisting Dational G
~iirary Ccunc~l,
ernnent and be accorded ne~ershir in the ~Tational
There was no corprocase setwee
ferences were ~idened~
‘2 Dif
these p~sIntons,~
~ar bez~een the Uationaljs:s ann the Communists
became inevitable,
The absence of peace and scabillcy in Dnina affects anversely the
conditions of security throughout East
sia and indeed the whole world,
ThereThre, the prog~ssive e~ension of Communist ccntrc 1 over China was
fraught 1b~bs grave imulicatiams for ~he United States,~
The ~esent stuay seeks to pra sent the Dierican mulicy towart Hation
alist China since l9~,
~Paul H, Clyde, The ~
p. 732.
‘3 The :ntemmationai Studies Gxu’ip of the Brookings Institution,
op. cit., p. 131.
C:U?T:R :1
~ ~
o~ ~ ~o~io:
1~i.
~ ~
FCL:C; TOJ
:~o
rJ~ ~
umerican interest,—~o was on China that
far ~ast had chieflf been centered,
menican interest in the
It eas in CdTha that, after l9L~,
the United Ztaies ernenienced one of the grearest defeats in ins historj,~9
fraditionally,
ward China,
norican iftorest in the Far Thst was directed 1cainl~ to~
In China livan aepro;:jmatg1-~r one~fourtn of the human race,
Here, it was believea, ~as the largest potential andaneicred nar~cet on
the face of the earth,2
It was ostensibly no insure equal onportunit~x
for Theftcans ~ nationeic of other anuntries in tno riark~ts and the
developnert ~f the resources 0f China
hat the Open Door~ tolicy ~as
fo~ulated and
~oranver, it had been, in oawt, to defend China against daoanese
~enrotn Scoot ~atourette, The ~e~ca
0>51 (eer York, i~2), n,
Pecora in the Far ~ast:
]9145~
~,
3The unen foor, a tern of dipThmatic significance, anolied to the un~
restricted naintenance of international conwercini relations, It came in~
to general use in one late 19th centorf with resneco to China, ftere najnr
European powers and the United ntates secured freedom of trade on a basis
of equa~it~. The pninciele was recoonizod also no the ~erThn Conference
of 1~2~ ~th respect to oonpoting international interests in the basin of
tan Congo firer, The growing inflrence of Russia in anchuria at the end
of the cefturl and of Japan early in the 20th centanr, threatened the Open
Door stutus of Chinese territories, bun it was reaffirmed in the Hfte~Power
Conference of l921~1922, “The epen door,~’ The Thcyciooedia nericana,
9
~9pL~ ealblan, ~, c99.
~eaneth Scott Rutourette, oe~ cii,, p~ 82~
7
8
aggression chat she Suited States had eucered woos the road ~hich led to
Pearl darbor~
To hedve the Japrnese out of China and give she Chinese
an oPportunity for indopendence, the Suited States had e~r~ended unsold
~reasures
Is
as iaThsl~ thucugh the effort so hep China chat the
Suited States had been saddled ~ith the unv~elconed r3sporisibility of the
~ccupasion and renakiwo of Jarian ann the occupesion of Soutn ~orea; and
to that the Suited States owed its ccsi]n involveuens is the 5oreari rar
which broke out in l9~C,~
Three altexmativ3s,~Then ;crld
ar Th was over, the Snitch States
was confronted ijth three po~sjble altexuatives in Cnina:
(1) it could
have nulled out lock, stock and barrel; (2) is co-’ld have intereened
militarily on a major scale to assist nbc lationaliss so destroy she
flcmsus1sts; (3) i~ could, unile assisting the Jamionalisss to assert their
autboriak over or rr:ch of Thira as possible, endeavor so avod a civil war
b~ workiss for a compromise between the i~o sides,~
The ft ~st altareanive would have rePresented an abaudorirwut of Snitch
States
int~rsationai responsibilities and of ins sradsjoral ooThc~- of
friendsbCr for China.
The second al~;crnatjvr policy, while it might look
attractive theoroticai1~- and in retrospect, was wholly impracticable,
The
Susionalists ~ad beep unuble to destror toe Corwunists durire th~ ten poars
before tae ~econd fond ~ar,
bcwever, after the ~ar, the Lanionalists were
weakened, derioralized, amo unnonular,
The Communisss erobably could have
Oeeir a~sloctgea only cy imer~can ares,
ts sac ooveous tha~ she
merecen
5 Ibid., p. 89.
6Sean ucheson, ~Snited Stases Pelatiors with China, ~ Suadings in Pserican
Foreign Policy (eds.), Pobert ~. Thidwin, Sulob Thuner anc~.~ald3t~rzn
~~TSonI~, 19 9), o. 2C9,
9
aec’-’le would not have sanctioned such a colossal ccnmitrmnt of its armies
in I~i~5 or later~
cnierica, iherofure, came to the third alternatice pol
icy and attenotcd to assist in workinC out a andus civencti thica would
a~ert civil war but nevertheless aresorue and ever increase Ghe influence
of the hational~ st Goveamneet~
s nbc record shows, it ;:as the Chicose dationalist Toveramert itself
which, orior to Ceneral PacrieP J~ hariew~s mission, had taken steps to
arrive at a norkian agreer ant aith the Oninese Con~onists~
These nego’ ia—
tions, in whica anfoassador :‘urD~e:~ later particioaiod at the invitation of
both rarties between angust l91J~ and Seotenber leL~5, continued interuittentle
for a year and a half ~rifhora producing conclasive results an
culminated
in a ccmorehe’~sivc series of agreements on basic points an October lL i9)~5,
after 4n~assthor hurle~r~s departure from China and before General °eorge
c~
rarshalits axuival at the end of 1 ~
Tho policy objectives~~~tmerlcan ool~cy at that time was inspiref by
the two objectives of bringing peace to China under cor’~itions ahich would
oernit stable -~cvorrrent and oranreso along democratic lines, and of assist
ing tao Jationalist Tovernuent to establish its athhorit~r ov~r as wide arePs
of China as oossihle~9
• s events orovod, the first objectiiros was unreatizable, because neither
side desirea it to succeed~
The second objeciiv~ of bnited States oolicy,
Ibian, p0. 239—290.
0Dean cheson, “ bb and Tlou in China,” lerents of mierican Jorei~
Thlicv (ad.), L. Larry Leonard (:~e~: Thrk, ~
9Thea.
10
that of assisting the National Government, was pursued vigorously from
l9L~ to l9I~9.
The Nationalist Governrnnt was recognized by the United
States as a friendly noser,
Hence. American friendship, its ideolcgical
comndtments and its foreian policy alike, called for aid to the Nationalist
Government instead of to the Chinese Coneaunists who were seeking to sub~
vert and overthrow the Chinese Nationalist Hovernment,~0
The Nission of General Marshall,—~Before the end of l9L~, strife be
tween the Nationalist Government ano the Cormunists began gi~?irg the United
States grave concern.
internal peace,
It was clear that China needed nothing so much as
Years of foreig~ invasion and civil war left China impcv
erished and crippled,
It ~as clearly to the best interest of the United
I\ai-iors, the United States, which had borne ti-c main burden of foreign aid
to China, and, above all, of the Chinese people themselves, that a long
period of peace be achieved,
To that end President Truman sent General
George C~ i~mrshafl to China as his personal representative with tne rank
of ambassador in order to exert the influence of the United States for the
Uunification of China by peaceful, democratic methods as soon as possible
and for the ending of nostilities, especially in North China,”1~
In January, l9L~6, only a short time after General marshall ‘s arrival
in China, a committee of three convened, composed of nkrshall himself as
chairman, a representative of the Nationalist Government, and a rnoresent—
ative of the Communists,
dithin three days of its formal meeting it had
agreed upon a cessation of hostilitias,
xcert that the troops of the
Nationalist Government were to be permitted to continue to move into
Ibid.
mmyenneth Scott Latourette, on. cit., o. 106.
ii
thnchuria to restore Chinese soreroirntp in tnft area, both Chian~ Hai~
shek~2 anc~
~ae Cs
ten~3 oronised to send out a ceaso~fjre orae~ to their
resreotive forces, effective on Jenuar~ 13.
To suuervis
the carr~~i~
out
of h’e other ar Crecutive Ceadcuarters was set no in cetoing (~eiking) con—
zisting of three cournissioners, one fran the Coonaneist Carry, one fran the
NaGionaliso invsrnwent, and one fran the UniLed etates,~
That sane :uont2, in nursuanco of a elan adoeted before
arshall reached
China, a “olitinal Consuleatine Conference net ut Chun;kin; in uhich the
~uointar~,1~ the Cooornist 2ain~. and several other elenonts were repre—
sorted,
fter three weeks cC work, the Conference reachen that wan osten
sibly a con~lcte accord on the ranrganization of the governueno, eke cafline
of a herional
sserble and the setelog “p of a inate Council on thIck the
°2Coun on Cetiner 31,
L7,Cthaeg lai—shek is a Chinese statesoan
and reneral, -‘e ;raduabed free the bokyo bilitarp Onilece in Caoan, par—
i~ tIe Thi are Thvointlo9 cC thin ann b e esra l1sinen~ of tee
Chinese 2e~ubllc, He broke relations with the Counuwisbe in China in 1927,
Th wan president of Cbinn’s Thtionalist roverenert in 1928—12in, On thy
20, 19~8, Chiane nas swore in as Chirans first corsintutional orecidert,
~Chiane ~ai—shek,’~ The Zncyc]epedia thericana, 1957 ecition, VI, )j35,
~Sere in 1J93, ~ao Tse~ann2 is the chairnan of the Chinese Connunist
thrt~, Ce was one of the founders of tIe Chinese Conuunisr ?anfy in uhane~
hai in 1921, and ~as chairnon of tee first 111-China Con:ress of Soviets on
Deceaber 1931. ~Jao Tse—oung. ~ ~nopc1opedia Critannice, 195 enition, CIV,
thgenneth Scott Latour~tte, op. cit., p. 107.
Thuo~ drtanq (Cational People s erty) is tee rare of a Chinese polit~
ical parry, It had ins origin in tne late l9en century, then in. our fat
sen, founder of tan Republic of China, founded the Cepenerare China Society,
The party chan2e~ its rare several tines and in 1919 Sun reolCanized his
parts into the Cuo~iinfan~, lbs ideology is based or Sun ~s Three Pnircithee
of the People: nationalise:, deuocrsc:i, and people s livelihoon,
fter
Sun ~s death in 1925, Chiare :ai-she’: becare the leader of the inowintang.
‘Thionintang,” 2ro1icrthcyc1cpcg~e, 1955 edition, 71, 395.
12
Huomintang and non~uomiatang elements were to be equally reoresentod,
The Conference also agreea an a merger of the trooPs of the fabionalist
Government and the Corumnists and on deromiization ~‘f the majority of the
forces~16
To see that the merger and the deinobiLzation were effected, a nilitar~
committee was acrointed; arid, as its ewecutive agent, a miii~ary subcanmittee
was corsrltnmea, corsistirg of a represeotatian of ~
at~o”aiisn Go;ern~
ment, and a representative of the Comrfrenist Party, with General yarshall
as adiisor~
Cr FeL~ary 2~, 19~6, this subcommittee reached an accord for
the drastic reduction of both the Gatiopalist and the Communist armies, and
the rudistribution of both armies in such a way tha~ they would be integrated
into one military structure with the Communists in the m5nority in each
regiorn
On ~orshailTs strong advice, the national army thus consticuted was
to be purely nonpoliticaL17
However, these encouraging beginnings ~iickiy net difficulties vhicp
e—entually brought frustration~
In the Hationalist Government, there were
those ‘tho orposed the rirogran, presumably because they feared the curtail~
nent of their own power and because they dtstrusted the Communists~
hore—
over, the Communists did not wholeheartedly accept the arrangement~
Thej,
too, were critical and suspicious~
~rsha1l suggested that the
wecutive
Headquarters send field teams to yanchuria, where Communist~Nationalist
tensicn was acute, to stop possible conflicts and to aid in demobilization,
reorganization, and integrationJ8
~nnethScottLatourette,~.cit,,op~1Q~
~Ibid~, p~ lO~
‘a
~Ibid~
13
:~
the meantime, conflict between the Jarionalist Go~’emment ‘s forces
and ~hose of the Communists was developing in ‘~mnchuria, which was in the
hands of the ~rcssian ariun at the end of Japan~s suriander,
deferred remov:ng tneir trocos Thom
The Russians
anchuria and loudly’ dnnoimced the
±~rnericans for not recalling their troops from China,~-9
The Kationaljst
Ganecmnent, handicapped by a lack of rolling stock ant poor organization,
and also by the Russian refusal to Permit it to use the port of Dairen,20
did not move its troops into the evacuated areas at a pace equal rith the
Russian withdrawal,
The Communists nook the oo~crtunity to step in and
were aided by Japanese military supplies which, either directly or in~
directly, contrary to the Russian promise at the Yalta Conference of l9)j~,
rere ‘nace avaiRuble to them by h~”~ Pussiaris,21
Thus throughout the spring of I9LL6, to the accomparinent of pacific
cunversation in 3~neral Rurshal] ~s Yanking mansion, friction sharpened an~
clashes increased in nunber and seriousness,
In June, l)L~6, General
~~mrshal1 succeeded, in bringing both sides to assent to a truce,
During the
0
~0n T~ Day the United States dad about 60,000 troops in China, It
deployed Lhese troops in such fashion as to assist the Nationalisb Doveun~
mcmi, not to fight the Communists, but to reoccuny the regions recently
ruled by the Japanebe~ ft the request of the kationalist Govermnient, 50,
000 !cuerican marines were landed in :Torth China and occupied PeIping,
Tientsin, the coal mines of tha north, and the essential connecting rail
ways~ Kenneth Scott Latourette, op,cit~, p, l0L~~
20flairen, a treaty port in the Liaotung Peninsula, Yanchuria, is the
headquarters of the South i~anchuria ~ailway, Leased to Russia in 1898, it
was ceded to Janan by the Treaty of Portsmouth in l935~ Dairen has a good
harbor protected by a breakwater of 1,003 yards long, and has railway
connection with Port arthur, ~Dairen, ~ Grolier Encyclopedia, 1955 edition,
IV, 3-a,
2~enneth Scott Latourotte, op. cite,
p.
109.
truce, negotiations went on, both over ~nchunia and over Shantung, for
severe fighting had broken out in that orovince,
fighting again on a considerable scale,
In July, tnere vas
By auounn, civil var was on.
General I~rshall sought to call a halt to hostilities.
in ~ain,
His efforts were
Sirco tto Nationalists were t~cing the offensi ie, he tried to
out pressure on them by shutting off the supnly of
been continuing to core to them.
~erican ama which had
~cting according to thair rationale, the
Nationalists did not think he meant what he said.
The Communists ay that
time were opediy bitter at General ~arshal1 and. the United States, narty
because of the military help to the Nationalists and partly because they
were faithfully echoing Ane voice of Anscow.
~t an~ ran?, a ~ar tom the
control of China was going ~
Both the Nationalists and the Communists were crtojcal of Narshall
and the UniteG ‘ta as.
~any among the Nationalists resented what they
held to be ~merican favoritism to~ard the Communists,
The Communists d~
nouncea even more strongly what they claimed was undue ‘anerican assistance
to the Nationalists.
They cooplained of the aid to the Nationalists in
military eouiprent and di ~N’~t they ailegea to be a dis~rcoortionate alloca~
tion of UNRRA (~thited Nations Relief and RehabIlitation ~dLinistranion) re~
lief to areas under the LIdtionan~sns,
They also objected to the aresence
di !m~r~C~ forces in China,43
The relations between the Nationalist Go~eriu cdi cud
went from had to curse,
22
23
c Communists
diremots cc Lmrsnaal to brIng the two narties to
Nathaniel Peffer, The Far East (Ann arbor, Nichigan, l9~8’~, p. L~29,
Nenneth ~cott Latourette, op. cit., po. lO9allC,
l~
agreement failed, and the Hationaliet Government angered the Comnunists
by pushing its forees into what they considered in be their terrlto~r~
They were especially stirred by the Naticnalist advance against the snrr~
tegic city of Halgan~an iitoortant C~mm~nist—held city northwest of
~1ng~
ei~
Generat ‘arsnal~ celieved the rove on dalgan to be unrecessartmy
pr~ccative and recommended that his mission as mediator be tereiinated~
2)
He, by then, oecame conrinced that both parties were merely sparring for
time and 4ocheying for miliia~r positionm
He finally corclrded that there
was no nope of accomplisaing nue objective of his miss~an,25
On danuary 1,
l9)~j7, as he lefb China, General Marsha’l issued a public statement condemn~
ing both aides for their failure ~o coolDexute in bringing peace and order
to China~
He criticized the Communists for their unwillingness to corpro~
rise ana deolored the attitude 0f what he called ~‘irreconcilable group&’
within the Naticnaliais Gomernnent,
He said that
the greatest obstacle to neace has been the ocmolete, ahtost
omerahelining suspicion with thich the Chinese Communist Party and
the luomintang regard cach other
• Sincere efforts to achieve
seinlerant cave been fxustrated time and again by extremist elements
o~ both sides
The reactionaries in thw Government hane
evident_y counted on substantial therican suoport regardless of their
acoi~ns~ Tan Connuiclsts by thetr unwillingness to coc2pronlse in the
natiecal interest are evidently counting on an econoric collapse in
bring about the fall of the Government
•
The salmetion of the
situation would be the assimnotior of leadershio nu the liberals in
the Covecmment and in the minority parties, a splendid group of men,
Snmcessful action on their part under the leadership of Gener~
aalssirco Ch~ng Kai~shth would lead to the unity thrcugh g~od
gsuernrnent,~°
2~
Ibid~, p~ lll~
~2Oean ~cheson, “United States Relations with China,” Reaalr~s in
‘Lerican_moreign Policy, op~ cir~, p. 292
262eorge C. thrshall, ~Tbe rituation in China,” Recent mnm ricer Foreign
Policy (eds.), Francis 0. ~ilcox and Thorsten ~. Cal~a~riI~ewYort,l952),
pp. L~734~.
J~’o
On January 7. 19)47, President Truman announced the nomination of General
Marshall as Secretary of State,
Snortly after General Narshall’s assumption
of office the decisIon ~Tas reached no acuminate the connection of the United
States with the Cormdttee of Three and to withdraw fmerican personnel from
Ixeoutite Headquarters,
Th.s actIon made in possible to withdraw all United
States marines from North Chifla, except fcr a guard contingent at Tsingtao,
the location of the United States N~val Training Groan engaged in training
Chinese naval personnel,
The termination of the Uterican mediation effort
did not change the traditional attitude of the United States toward China,2~
The Mission wiGeneral__edemeyer.—~s the signs of im~pending disaster
multiplied, President Truman, ifl Jul3 19)47, acting on the recommendation
of the Secretary of S~aae George marsnall, instructnk Ut, General ~1oert C.
~enemeyer to survey the Chinese scene and make recommendations,
General
edemeyer bad euperience in China during Morld ear Ii and was deemed espe~
cially competent,
Me was, with the help of a staff, to study both China
and Threa,
General Iedemeyer was officiafl~r welcomed by the Chinese Government,
~e spent about a month in that country,
During the time that General
Vedeueyer and his staff remained in China, they visited the orircioal
centers of the country and talked wink a large number of people, both in
and out of the Government, and representing all shades of opinion and in~
teresas, as well as with Rmerican and other non~Chinese businessmen and
officials,2d
Before leaving China, General ~edemeyer frankly said in public
2lDepartment of State Thblication 3573, Jnited States Relations_with
China, (sashington, 19)49), p. 219.
2°
rybid,, p. 256,
17
that he was discouraged to find apathy and defeatism among many Chinese,
but that there were many honorable officials who sho ~ed efficiency and
devotiom,
He said he belie red that the existing central government could
yin if it would ren~ene inoomnetent and corrupt officials, not only fr~tn
abe national but more especially from the Provincial and municipal strno~
tures, and if it would irseediately effect drastic, far~reaching political
and ecoromjc reforms,29
In his afiicial rnport of September 19, i9!~7,~~ Beneral Uedeeeyer rec~
ommended in general that the UnIted inates provine military and economic
aid to China under a program of assistance over a period of at
gears requiring Congressional authorization,
east fi:e
It also prnvided for finan
cial assistance to China for rae nstnactiop pro~ec~s and eurutually for
curinucy stabilization,
The reccrt 4ndicated that improrement of the eco
nomic situation through
‘~rioan aid should open the way for further
constxwctive support in the futu~e from existing agencies, such as the
inoont-Is~port Bank, the International Bank and :~onetary Fund and private
Chinese and foreign capital,
In ins militarej phases the report recommended
that military ad~rice and suPervision cc extended in scope to include field
forces, training centers and particullrly logistical a~encies, but it ran—
ognized the desirabilIty of avoiding direct United States Involvement in
the civil war,3’
2
9Henneph ocott Latourette, op,cit,, pp~ ll~-ll~,
30Thio reoort was not released ±o tam aublic in America until ~ugust,
l9~9, when the Chinese Government reproduced the ~edeneyan Reoort which
appeared in the so-called Jhite Book on China issued by the United Stapes
~ aae Department,
~Department of State ~blication 3~73, United States Relaticns with
18
The Nedemeyer Peoort further stated that a United States program of
assistance could best be imulemented under the superoisten of inenican
adtjsors in spccified economic and military fields,
Such a program cou1r~
be undertaken coly if China requested athisory aid as well as material
assistance,
Besides, all aid and assistance to the Nationalist China,
according to toe report, shomld include inc foinowing stipaiations:
That China infove the United ~Jations promptly of her recuest
to the Jnited States for increased material and advisory assistance,
That China rocuest the United !Iations to make immediate action
to bring about a cessation of hostilities in ~anchunia and request
that ~anchuria be placed under a Five~Power Guardianshin or,
failing that, ironer a frusteeshio in accordance with the United
Nations Charter,
That China make effective use of her o~n reso~rcec in a program
for economic reconstraction and initiate sound fiscal oolicies
leading to reduction of budgetary deficits,
That China give continuing evidance that the urgently requ~ red
political and miii bary reforms are being implemented,
That China accept beerican advisove as responsible represent~
atives of the United Stares Government in specified military and
economic fields to assist Coma in utilizing United States aim in
the manner for wnlch it is intended,32
wedemever was not very hopeful,
idl’- de~eriorating,
He repcrted a situation inich was rap~
His recommendations were obviously offered ~ith full
realizaAon that the odds were against their amootion,
UoiteaStates~idtoChina,~Since ~T~J Day, the United States lovern~
ment has authorized aid to the ~~ationalist Government in the form of grants
and credits totaling approximately tan billinn dollars, an amount equiva~
lent in value to morn than ~O per cent of the monetary exoenditures of the
Chinese Government ann of proportionately greater magnitude in relation in
the budget of that Government than the United States had provided to an;
32
~loert C. Nedemeyer, ~Fact~Finding :~ssicn to China,~t Recent ~iericam
Foreign Policy (eds.), Francis C. ~ilco:: and Thorsten V. Pal~arvi~New
~ L8~.
19
nation of ~Jestemo
urooe since the end of the war,33
In addition to these grants and credits, the United States Jorenmment
has sold the Chinese Coverrunent large quantities of military and civilian
war surplus property with a total procurement cost of over a billion
dollars, for which the agreed realization to the Unitea States was two
hundred and thirty~two million dollars,
‘~
large proportion of the military
supolies furnished the Chinese armies by the United States since V~J Day,
had, however, fallen into the hands of the Chinese Communists through the
military ineptitude of the Fationalist leaders, and the absence among their
forces of the will to fight,3~
~ s was aLmost inevitable in the handing of such larle sums through
machinery which had to be hastily devised under the urgent and disorderly
conditions of the times, much of this was unwisely spent.
into equipment wnich was quite unadantea to Chinese needs.
Some of It went
Some was ad~
ministered by Uiierlcans who were unfamiliar wi~,h China or were in other
days incompetent,
Hocever, much of it was soent efficiently.
For ewample,
it helped to keep alive the population of some of China Es coastal cities,
The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, set up on October 1, l9)~8,
was run by Chinese and imerican exoerts and gave promise of success which
~Et is a strange commentary on United Stvies policy toward China that
in the postwar years 19~wi9~9, the ~merican Roveunment ~contributed about
two billion dollars in grants and credits to the Chinese, ehile at the
same time the Russians before their retirement from Manchuria took two
billion dollars worth of machine tools and other booty, saripoing man;’
factories bare, mauling off to Siberia ever~rohing that was portable,Et
Robert U. Ferrell, american_Diplomacy (Mew York, l9~9), p~ L~76.
3~
Dean ~cheson, EEjnited States Re1at~ons wtth Cnlna,$E r~eaa1nIs ln
Maerican Foreign Policy, op. cit., ~. 29g.
20
ECOUO~lC AND J~i~ITAR! ~ID UTHORIZED
FOR CHINS SINCE V~J DAY
Grants
l~1lions of U.S. Dollars
~nd~lease
a
•
a
a,,,
a,
a
a
a
a
a
Milita~j aid under Sino~inerjcan Cooperative
Organization Agreement
•
•
a
a
a a
a
a
a
U.S. contribution to UNRR. China program
a
U.S. share of UNRIL conoribution to BOTR
a
a
a
17.7
a
~7L~,Oa
3,6b
.
Anawjni~ion abandoned and transferred by U.S.
i~rines in North China (over 6,~OO tons) (no
estimate of value available’ a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
Transfer of HaSa Navy vessels (P.L. ~l2)
(valced at rrocuremen~ cost)
.
.
a
a
,
U.S. foreign relief program
~CA program
a
a
a
a
aaaa,a
aa,aa~,,,
Grant under China mid Act of l9Lj~3
Total Grants
aa
lbl.3
,
a,,
a
a
a
a
a
a
,
,
,
aaaa~a
.
.
a
a
a
27~,O
l25,O~
~
UNRRA (United Natloos Relief and ~habilitation A~inistration)
program for China was estimatan on December 31, l9L~7, ~o involve the pro~
curement of goods valued at aonrox~nately ~17.5 mi_lion, Department of
State Publicatiom 3~73, op. cit., p. lOIj.6.
bBOTRI: ~ million of UNR~ funds were allocated to the Board of
Trusiecs for Rehabilitation ~ff airs (DOTER), an international body estab~
lished by the Chinese Government to control the use of UURR~ supplies
and funds remaining after the conclusion of its China program. Ibid.
9China Aid ct of i9~8 was passed by tne Cnngress on ~pri1 2, l9~6,
and was inco~orated as Title IV of Public Law )~72 entitled the Foreign
Assistance Act of l9Li~8. Ibid., pp. 388~389,
21
Credits
millions of U.S. Dollars
aend~le ace
~
Lend~1ease ~pipeline~ credit
Export~Import Bank credits
,
•
181.0
•
.
..•..
.
82.2
.
Surplus property sales for credit:
Sale of excess stocks of U.S. ~rmzr in :Zest China
OFID dockyard facilities saks
.
20.0
,
.
.
Civilian surplus property transfers (under ~ugust
30, 19L~6, bulk sale agreement)
.
.
.
.
d
MaritimeConn’ission8hir~ales,,,,,,,,,,,,,
Total Creatts
lord
...~,,,
Grants and Creatus
,
.
•
.
!~1l.0
.
2,307,7~~
dydnd~1ease ~Pipeline11 Credit was an agreement betneen the United
States and China, dated June 1)3, 19)36, authorizing the delivery on credit
terms of civi1ian~tyue equipment and supplies contracted for but undeliv~
ered on V~J ~ay determined the 1end~lease program. It was subs~quently
determined that a total of 351.7 million in ecuiprent and supulies could
be furnished under contracts covered by this agreement. The CI’irese
Govererent had bsen billed for ~pipe1ine” shipments totalling ~p50,3
million in value as of hovember 30, 19)38. Ibid., p. 10)36,
bcm ~Iay 15, 19)36, OFLC agreed tc funnish the Chinese Government
surplus supplies and equionenu for dcckyards al Shanghi and Tsingtao,
with payment to be made in thirty annual installments, Ibid., p. 10)39,
°The sale to China of United States surplus fixed installations and
mou able property located in India and China under an agreement between the
two governments dated .i.ugust 30, l91t6, Ibid., p. 10)38,
since V~J Day the ~aritime Commission man sold the Chinese Go~eur~
ment )33 vessels with a total sales price of 306.2 million under the
h~erchant Ship act of l9)~6. Ibid., p. 10)39,
35Ibid., pp. )3054~06,
22
might have been realizea but for th~ worsening of the position of the
Nationalist Govemumeni,
In its brIef neriod of operation on the mainland,
and later in ?cmnosa, it coul~ poin-o to a very considerable achievemenn,36
ross of Aainland China and Its Si~nificance,~The Chinese Communist
forces, aided by the Soviet Union, advanced steadily southward until, by
the summer of l91j9, they were in control of all north and central China,
including danchuria,
On Pu~ust
~,
l9L~9, the United States made clear in
a ~Thite Paoer~ that it would give no f’~ther active support or substantial
aid to the Nationalist Government,
of the Nationalist militar
It was e~lained tha~a the ineptitude
leaders and the absence of a will to fight had
rendered dmerican aid ineffective; that the strategic areas of China were
now in abe hands of the Coniammists, who had acknowledged Soviet leadership;
and that althoueh the Urited States had in the east assisted China to resist
foreign ag~ression, in this case the attempt at foreign domination had been
masked as an indigenous crusading movement,
The intention was affirmed, however, of encouraging the development of
China as an ind:pendent and stable nation, end of giming suppout to the
ci~eation of conditions than would safeguard basic rights and promote the
well~being of the Chinese oecple,
There also was an affirmation against
the dis’nemnbemnent or subjugation of China by a foreign oc’ier, and of con~
tinued consultation ~ith other powers to oromote Lhe welfare and security
of the people of the Far
ast,
On that and subsequent occasions the Sec~
retary of State gave warning of the possibility that the Chinese Communist
regime might lend itself to the aims of Soviet imperialism ann engage in
°:cenneth Scott Latourette, op~cit,, p. 117.
23
aggression against the neignbcrs of China~3?
On October i, 19b9, the Communists, who har~ non extended their power
to south China, announced the establishment of the People ~s Republic of
China and invited international recognitior~38
it the rext day, October 2~
The Soviet Union recognized
The ::a:icnaust Government severed relations
with the USSR on October 3, ama the following day the Thited otates an—
nounced that it would continue to recognize the Nationalist Government,
Pp the end of inc year the Nationalist Government transferred its seat to
Founosa,
U~or gamin; power, the Chinese Communist leaderonic, in carrying out
its internal nolicies, constantly shifted tactics within the frnmewci~ of
the doctrines of karn, Lenin, and inc Tse—tung~
In foreign policies, it
followed the sace flexible procedures always in accord with the require
ments of the world—wide struggle of communism for power~~9
Thiring the strryg~Le for power, Comr’unist doctrine permitted relations,
coalitions, or alliances with “bourgeois” and “capitalist” nations in
certain circumstances, provided that these further the Co~munist cause and
that the identity of the Communists would be preseruec,
But regardless of
the nature of the temoorary conproraise, the final goal must forever be kept
in mind; that is, policy must always tend toward run presexmation of the
Soviet Union, a united front must be established against the “imperialists,”
~Tbe International Studies Group of the Broolcings Institution, injor
Thoolems of dnrte~ S~ates Poreicn Polrc~
l95O—l9~l ( ~asbrngror, l9~T~
~29-297,~”
~8Robert H. Ferruli, op. cit., o. ~77~
39Claude
Buss, The Far East (Hew Yc~c, l95~), p. ~i.
2)4
and the struggle against ~irnnerialis:d’ must be an aggressive one.14°
~ith “imperiaiisn~ itself according to the Communists, there can nevel
be any conproriise, for it is the irmutable enemy of communism and repre~
sents smei~rthing ~hat Communists must fight.
On this point the law was
laid doru very clearly by Mao Tse~tirng in his On the Peoole ‘s Democratic
Dictatorshio, which mas written in 19b9.
:de said:
You lean to one side, That is right. The forty years’ experience
of Sun Yat~sen and the twenty~eight years’ experience of the Chinese
Communist party have convinced us that in order to attain victory and
consolidate it we must incline to one side, ~ccording to these ex~
penances the Chinese people must either incline toward the side of
imponialism or toward that of socialism, There can be no exceotion
to this rule, It is impossible to sit on the fence; bhere is no third
roads ,.. . iieutrality is merely a camouflage; a third road does not
exjst,~1
The Corimurists rejectea isolationism and recognized that they could
not consolidate their revolution without outside help.
They admitted that
their accomplishments owed much to the victories over the Fascist nations
in ~orld ~ar II, the liberation movenents among other oppressed peoples,
and the struggles cf the proletariat in capitalistic countries,
They in~
sisted noon full and complete sovercignty for China, ann they regarded
themselees as the staunchest and the best-equipped leaders for other in~
dependence movements
Furtheiniore, the Chinese Communists promised to refrain from the
oppression of national minorities in China and to assist unconditionally
all “liberation” movements, particularly in Southeast ~sia,bT
~erner Levi, redernCh1na’sfore~gnPoltcy (Minneapohs, l9~3), p. 277,
~2Claude
~°Ibid,
fuss, op. cit., p. ~)4l.
2~
The
onaizom Program” of the People ~s Consultative Conference of Sep
te~iber l91~9 outlined the projected role of the Chinese Communists in ~onld
affairs,
Their “orinciple of principies,~ contained in ~~nt±~Th 11 of the
Common Program, stated:
The People ~s fepublic of China shall unite wIth all peaceloving and freedom-loving countries end oeoples throughout the
enrld, first of all, with the USDR, all People ~s Democracies and
all oppressed nations. It shall take its stand in the camp of
international peace and democracy, to oppopp jointly imperialist
aggression and defend lasting world peace.~
:~eenwhile, it is important to know the historical background of the
communist movements in the Tar East as well as in Southeost tsia,
Soon after the founding of the Comintem~ in Moscow, Communist agents
went to inc ~ar ~asu to organize panties.
The impact oi the lolsnevim
Rovolution and Communist literature had been strong enough in many areas
to pave the way for Communist penetration,
In June 1920, Voitineky, a
Comintern agent, went to China where he got in contact with a group of
Chinese intellectuals who nad already shomn an interest in the theories
of :~rn and Lenin,
Lenin ~s book on imperialism had mad a particularly
strong appeal to some Chinese.~6
Voitinsky carefully and painstakingly taught Communist doctrine and
L~Lk~
erner ~vi, op.
~
p.
~~Tne Comintern, a Communist international organizat~~n was establisned
in i~rch, 1919, at an international conference called in Moscow by the
Soviet Government, Prom the outset the Comintern was an instrument, in the
hands of the Russian leadership, for the establishment of CommunIst parties
all over the world, It held occasional congresses, and was dissolved in
l9~3. The Comintern was reborn in l9~7 under a different name, the Comin
form, or Communist Infommation Service, Franz H. Michael and George 5,
Taylor, The Far last in the Modern world (New York, l9~6), p. 338.
~6Ibtd,, p. 3~l.
discioline to a small group of Chinese, the most prominent o
Professor Ct ~en Tu~hsiu of Peking University.
whom was
Under Voitinsky ~s direction
this group accented the authority of the Cominteun, and by the summer of
192, a Chinese Communist party was organized,
In the meantime, another
Comir~terr agent, Janson, was working in Japan, where a group of &~udents
with radical leaninas had already been deeply impressed cith the Bolshevik
Pevolut~on,
Inc Japanese Co~nun~st Party was sormea in l922,~~
~fter the es;ablispnmnp of the Chinese Communist part;, Conintern
agents in China also organized forean and Vietnamese Conmunist parties,
Ho
Chi dint, who was secretary tO dichael Throdin, the ~nssian Comintem agent
zn uhina, ear up a laernamese douth
aroy rn Canton, China
in l92~,
The
Viet~ar’ese Corwrunisp ParS y mae organ iz~d b; do Chi iUnh in Hong don; in
1930 and was admitted to the Comintern a year later,
r’unist Parta ace formed b; the Cornintern in 1920.
The Indonesian Cori~
In 1931. a Communist
party ~as founded in the Thiliopines bat was dissolved the same year.~8
~1thou;h the Valayan Communist rarty was not founded until 1931, Corn—
rmunists were active in labor organization and agitation for ten years prior
to that date,
In ~hailand, communism was outlawed and effectively contained
from 1933 until late l9~6.
Goth in dala;a and in Thailand, the communist
organizations failed to achieve a national character,
Thther for that
reason on oecause they were relatively weak, neither organization was ad
mitted to the Cow~ntern as a separate national section,~~
)4p
~Iranz H. dichael and George B, Taylor, op. cit., pp. 35-3~3.
~John T~erry ding, Southeast ~sia in perspective (New York, l9~6),
pp. 81—82.
27
In
1926, the Chinese D~xrsmnist Party organized a doutn Peas ~rrnittee,
later renaned the South Seas Cor~nunist ~arty, to organizo
munist acti~ity in S~ett east ~sia~
and direct coro~
Pan~Pac±fio Trade Union also was
organized in Chtna in I9~6 to pay spesial attention to the indostrination
ant organization -~f the Southeos~ ~sian proletariate,
To orovide a cen~
oralized clearing house for coanunist diroctimes and intelligence, a Pan~
Pacific Trade Union Secretariat was ~staoljshed~
~s tin center ~f authority
~s the area, a far Easte~n Burean was set up in dhanghai.~0
~ agents Cf ~ntematicnal crsm ~nisr wero ~bpecIally acti
~a~t ~s~a during the years from 1926 to l93O~
is t~uth~
They sen up lines of co1rnnn~
toation, conboladated isolated ccnmonist activity, and brouzht ~he national
cor’riurist oart~es iran contact rtth the ran Eastern
ureau~
It was is these
years that th~ sade a vitol start toward noordisating communism in Southeast
sia,~
lTith a Commuist regime estoblished on mainland China, it was no be
expeotef that Peking ~s communism ac+dvities muld be greatly expanded in
surrounding countries, and its threats no Southeass usia muld inst on
opportunities for overt internatinnal aggression, for subversion of rniional
institutions, and for civil war or insurrecnion,~2
distorisally, China ha~ l~ois towara connonental ununneast ~sia as a
loaioai extension of its tar”itorial sphere of interess,
In tue post, China
had suzerainty at ore time or an~juher orer parts of northern Some and Vjet~
Under the Communists, China had once more takon up this rnand is
°°ibid,, p~ 33,
p~ 8~,
52Ibic~, pp, 98~1CL,
pp,
7O~71~
28
Chinese history and had giver ~.o it the charactertanics ~f Communist
•
-
1nperea~isri.
Trem the airne that Mao Tse~tur’g Publicly s”pported the re oival of
tne “left strategy” of the Coniniorn (Seotenber, l9L~7), ~hines~ Co~rjjnists
kept alive an incessant political campaign against the leadership and
governments of newly independent thin,
D~’ing this reriod, the Chinese
Communists added Tibet, North Korea and North Vietnam to their area of
control end infkenco,~
::
C~mnuniet China gains contre. of Southeast thia, where most of the
world’s natural rubber and tin and more than two~thjrds of the rice enter~
ing the world ma~cet are produced, India gould surely In unreatened and ~he
strength of ~ustralia would be partially neutralizec.~6
The seour~ ty of
the Jest ~toald be in grave danger.
In order to deter conmuniso aggression and expansion, teerica, the
leader of the “Free World,” gave primary consideration in Southeast
sic,
frc~L the oertoo of the Korean tar to the hanila ~ to the read for
~ryrarflc N. Tracer, ‘~Co2eo~nist ~hina:
History, MIPPI (thznst, 1961). 136.
The New Imperial~ sx,~ Current
~Ibid,, p. l36~l39,
Vand€nboscn and In hard But~ll, Southeast ‘sia
Powors (Imxington, Kentucky, l9~7), pp. 2~3.
tong ~o~ld
57Th~ Sothheas~ cia Inthen thvc Defense Treaty was formally signed an
~mnila, the Philippines, an ~entembe~ 8. l95~, by the agents of the hS~,
Brimain, France, !ustralia, Ken Zealand, Thktatar, Thailand, and the thilip~
pines. The signacories pledgcd themuelves “separately and joirthy to rain~
thin and develop their individual and oollecti—e capacity to resist armed
ettack and ~o prevent and counter sub~rerbiwe activit4 as directed from with~
out against their ternithrial integrity and poIntical stthiiity.” ‘ggres~
sion by means ~f armed attack in the ireany area” was to be met by eanh
party ~in accordaane with ins constitutional processes,” Frederick B.
Schuman, International Politics (New York, 1958), p. 6IC,
29
building a protective bulvarm agains~ external coenunist aggression,~8
In doing sc, tne United Si~ates based its policy in the area on fcur
cornerstones,
securIty,
(~
The were:
(I) ceterrence of ~g~ression,
economic and technIcal aid orograms, and
(~)
~
collective
support of non~
corrai~nist South 7ietnam,~9
:~
recent ~~ars, cold~war strategists have contended that Southeast
~sia is ~he last barricade against coimlunisa in ~‘sia, end that, if cor~
Trunism mere to sweep through Southeast ~sia, it would barjket the entire
continant and tip the bala-xe ~f world power to the Comuuoist Olcc,60
Because of China ~s vast area and population, its presuned potentian,
and Its geographical position in last
sic, the international nosition of
Thira has long been a key taint in the Par Eastern oclicy of the bnited
Stat~s,
Todny, the source of concern is Conmiurist China~s military
strepgih61_~rcst animates g~ ~e the strength of the ~hinese donsunist army
as two and a half million men62~and nh~ aggressiveness of the Coununist
Jr~hr lerry King, on. cit., o, 1~8.
~~Ibmd,
DOlbid,, o. 2.
~Concerning Conwarnist China~s military strength and its potentiality
of being able ±o traduce nuclear weapcns, Under Secretary Chester Bomles
said: ~‘Nc lisnurament plan can have meaning without Red Ch1na~s paroic~
ioation, It possesses nor only the wor1d~s largest anay but a potential
caPacity for the production of naclear weapons.” Chester Sowies, “The
China Problem Recensidered,” Foreign 4ffairs, X~lUTiIi (April, 1960),
~76~77,
62$llep S. Wanes, “Conre~nist China~s Wilitary Strength,” Current
History, Rl~XI (rugust, 1961), 173.
regiime tha± rui~s ~he Chinese mP~iand,6~
~ether the ~onter:porary civi~
lization ~as peace and security or uar and in~curIty d~erd, in no sna~i
reasure, roan the foreign policies of C”nounist China~
63 The Int~rnationa1 Studies Crouo ~f th~ Brookings Institution,
~ior Crobiens of the Unite~~taoes Fcreian ?oiicy~
i052~953
(~ashington,
c~.rz~
1:1
~ DD~CNT o~
~
Dari~ ~r
9~O, Crear
he ~hei’~ ~eotioo
~e~re~ Deo~bi~
~
~f Dr~
~‘t
r±t~’~, a fe~ o~her ~es~ern ~~ers -~d I~d~a
h~ :~tiota:is± ‘oterxree~t ~nd recogni cod the
tebrna~’, of id’e care -ea’~,
-~
a Drea—:
Dtina;
~ith
:iD~ :~
i~i~ :5T ~
he ~ ~
sl’~r, ~lliareo, erd ~-tcC
id ~th
i’i~~
t~c tvo ‘a’~e red~ erveal a.~ r rio aer~eren~sa
ThO
Urited zhata.~ ~a.titted, hc~~ver, t~ recogriire the ~aLionali~z 3o~ere—
~ero~
:e~hj:e,
~re ;~e~-e~;
ar1~hcr~ ~iez
~ d am~, crr
a. d
reerican re~lic ouiolo~~, ~r1irage~ at
~
a.~rta~ ocs a. d ci~i,’
o’~e~ b~
he
rld~u~de
~he
‘
th~.
ci~ eer
r:festa~jor~
~; ocp~r~cL ar!c ou;:esilon 0o recognire t ~
adreoff~ftoN,~re~r~ ft; the
iDi~t~eatme-~
f Do
~r’ua
et rethcJ~
cone !s N
iftc’a:-al ft the i’eriora4ft
I~ ahe ~ift ~ ft l9~, the Chi, ~ Corertjsf
~ftder ft ftrft’ria, regoc ~ard, cod hitand kert fte~
ft ro~ ~ ofte~ ~ ~ld for sL:
Lad ftftoiall; closed the co ~
In Oonoftr, l9~9,
~aft ~nd Thur s’d~ord~ erer and b~l~ t1~em 1~r anro
releaand then onl;~ after stcon; preos’~re~
onroft
~j, crjcamc ?ec~~ft ft t~o ftr ~cost (New ~[“~f~
19~ft,
confired tho olorioan
~ off ft ft~ir ccrnp’re~d
cofths aft~r ~aftir~gtor
Oft Coreonists orrefted
Dot’- tan’
coD
Socit cor ‘-retre, Tho
1 ~)
-~
‘~
2
The :ntecoa-ft,a: 3; dies Ircop of ch~ Drechin;s ~ ‘Zt~ o,~’
(ftsbingdon,
n~
~
—~
32
Gor~rnment to F~rncsa,3 the Chinese Coanunists demand~d tontrol of that
island on the ground that they were the legal government of China,
~an—
~hile, many strong voi can in the Pr4 ted Stumes insisted tha+ Jmerica ohoult
c~n~.inue to suouo”t the IFationalist Cowerunewi,
gainet ~his banmgrcund,
Precidenu Truman ism’ed a tolicy btateirent ~n January
Formosa,
5,
2350, regarding
Fe Lecan with a reference to traditional United States polic’~
to ~awi China and narticularlu uj ~1’e principle of resneci frr th~ terri~
tonal integrity of China, which, he pointed out, had been reaffinmed in
the United Nations General ~ssemb1y resolution of December 8, l9)~9~
That
resolution had ca23ed ~n all states ~ refrain f rem (a) seeking ~o acquire
spheres of influence or to create foreign controllcd regines within the
terr1r~ wi Chita, ~nt (b’ anekeng to ootarn suecial nigums w~ubin tue
terr1tor~r of Cnina,”
President Truman said that these principles had a speciwic application
en Formosa, wiich, in keening with the Cairo and lotsdar i~eclarations,~4 had
3
Formosa, which is cal~ed Taiwan by th~ Chinese and the Japanese, is
an island between the philippines on the south and Japan to the norbh with
the China sea on the west and the Pacific Ocean an the east, Its area is
13,800 square miles and the population (l9~9) is tore than 7,000,000,
Formosa u~s cedec. by China (1895) to Japan after the Sino~Japanese Dar end
was returuod to China as a province (l9L~5) after the surrender of Japan in
horlt ~ar TI, Harry Hansen (ed.), The 2 orld ~naaac and Book of Facts for
/
1951 (:Fea lo~c, 2351), 0, 3~o,
joint statement by Roosevelt, Chiang Kai~shek, and Cnurohil2 at
Cairn on December 1, l9~3 said: ~‘, ,
it is their (China, Great Britain
and U.3.~.) purpose that all the territories Japan has stolen from inc
Chinese, such as ~nchunia, Formosa, and the rescadores shall be restored
to the Republic of China
,“
In the Berlin (Potsdaxr) Conference,
July 123c.ugust2, l9~5~ ~he Big Three (u~S~ ~, Great Britain and Soviet
Thassia) declared: “, ,
the terms of the Cain’r Declaration shall be
carried out
.
•
Francis 0. t’ilccx and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi (eds.),
Recent menican Foreign Polic~- (Pew Ycin, l952~, an. l2~38.
,~
beer turfled orer to Generalissimo Chiang Kai~sh~k ~hen Janan surrendered~
He said that the subseqeent exercise of Chincee authority in Ferrrosa had
teen accepted 0;- the United States anc the uther flied po-~mro~
U~sident
Truman merit on to say:
The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any
other Chirese territory~ The United States hat no ~anLre ~o
h~ai~ s,~ecial rights or privileges or to establish military
~ases ~m. formosa at this time. Hcr does it hare any intention
of urihizing its armed forces to interfere in the oresent stb~
uation. Tue U~ jbed States Gornunment mill nob oursue a course
nhinh nI lead to involreoient in the ~inii conflict in ChTha.
~imiiariy, tho Un~t~d S~ ares
rurument nI not ~rovide mil~
ita~y aid um advice to Chinese forces on formcsa, In in’ ~e:i
n inc United States Government, tue resources on Formosa are
adequate to enable them to obtain the items ~rhich they consider
neressa-~v for the defense of the island, The United Tn’tes
Co~ erument nroposss to continue und’r existing legislai inc
autncnity tho oresent O~ program ~f econcicic assistance,
Tnis “hands~off~ pohicy~ h~m’ver, did not last lang, because o~’ the out~
break of tue r’k~rean confllcb.
euinahisanjop”__oltcy.~Tne eutoreaic of mar in Horea an June 2~,
lf~O, lea to further ‘orion by inc United States,
On June 2~, rrnsldent
Truman issued a statement rhich herulied a significant shift in :nerican
policy.
He ordered the Seventu elect to resist any Comunisr attack um
Thruosa, cut also ashed the Habionalists to cease their air attacks on the
mainland end their fockade f the Communist~held coast of China,
He said
tuat ins disposition of Formosa, taken from Japan during ~orld ~ar II,
Trend avait a peace treaty mith that country um action by the Unitet.
Hations,°
Tue pare of che statement that bore um Formosa reads as follors:
The aLtac1~ upon Uorca makes it plain cefeud all doubt that
conannie7 has passed in~rond the use of subversion to conquer
~enne~n Scott Labourotte, o. cit., p. I3~.
inderenf~nt nations ard thU now use arn~ed invasion ~nd ~‘ar,
It has defied the orders of the Secrthty Council of the Unitea
Nations issaed to preserve international reace and s~cu~i~y,
In these circunstances the occupation of Formosa by Conannisa
forces would “e a direct threat to the secunit~r of the Pacific
area and to The Unitea states forces peri~oroing their lawful
and neceosary functions in that area.
ocordingly I nave
ordered the Seventh Freet ~o prevent any attack on Formosa
7
Then the Cemcmnist attack on South Vorea gave rise to the conviction
that corwunism ban passed from the use of subversion to the use of arcien
force, the 1ong~range political considera~ion that had led to the adoption
of The “hands~off~ policy rae outweighed by annsiae ounion~ of
of
he necessity
~ing an iireediate military tnreat.~
Jaly 31, l9~0, Ge~eral Fac~rthur arvi1~ed in Taipei,9 where he held
confer~nce ~rith President Chiang
ai~sheic and other Naticnalist leaders.
Cm the follomina day, Ceneral LaCmrthur said That plans had been made to
co~ordinate steps by the United atates and the Chinese forces no meet any
attack that a hostile force might launch againot the island, and he oz~
pressed confidence that such an attack would ha~re lit~lo chance of success.’°
President Chiang, for his part. announced that an agreement had been reached
on all oroblems disc’:ssea and chat the founathions had been laid for joint
defense of Formosa and for Sino~lrnerican military co~operarion,~
Parsuant to a recoilnendation made by General :4acArthur, a group of
~
/
(C~icago, l9~o),
op. lll2~rll3,
S
8
Josepn r, CalCmntine, an. cit., p. 130.
0
‘Taipei Cs the capital of Formosa.
80~?Text
Cm Nacl~hnr’s ~ New YCmc Times, :u~st I, l9~0, p.
1l~Cbiarg is Jubilama on ~accrth~~ Paot,~ New Noth Tires, ~ugust 2,
l9~0, p. 6,
k.
of ~icers, led by Brigad ar Geacral
Coazo C. far, Cepat~r Chief of Staff
for the Far East Coarand, was sent to formosa, where in comptied a coite
orvhensi~re report on local military
aeacities and needs,
Cr accordance
-m~tn one re~,oreeerdat:ons of this reocro, oasnington argan to ship minitary
srpnlies to formosa in December l9~O~ after the Chinese Oo~rnist s bad
intervened in Oc-o’rer of that year in the Threat conflirtJ2
On January 30, l9~1, the United States formally notified Taioei that
it would provide assiaranco onder the
~otual tefen~e ~ssistance frngram
ohich migvi be used by the Gationalist Governmert
securi~ an its aegrrinate se1~defense,
te
maintain its internal
The te~ms of th~ proposed assist~
ance arrangerert ou~r~ accepted by Taioe~ on Februar1 9.
±~ajor General
~llirn C, Obas~ ~as chosan to head a military assIstance advisory group
which arvived in Corroca on
~ay -,l3
This advIso~r group copsiseed of 116
officers and aen~ and operated as a part of the United States ~mDassy at
Taipvi
Its prie any duties were to help reorgan~ ze the Chinese r2il~ tai~
forces and to assiin them in using their eonipment and surm1ies,~
year larer
one dnited States Nilitary ~sinstence ~daIsorv Grout
rersonnel in Fort osa ban increaand to ~CO, composed in about canal nunbers
of officers and enlisted wet,
and, according to General Chase, the nunber
of the ~U 0 persannel would be doubled and thus reach the fu]Z Projected
~orength mitbin three months,
General Chase was ~anted as eapressing the
view that the combat efficiency, morale, and phrnical condition of the
~Fted in fi:g~, Formosa Under Chinese Nationalist inle (Uev Yo~c,
l9~2), p. 16,
13_,
~Joseph ~ Ballantine,
‘.cit., pp. ~
36
Ilationalist army hod imprc~ed considerably during ~he past veor.~
;~ea~hile, during the presidential election of 1952, there was much
criticism of the order restrainirg Chiang Pai~shet.
The criticism ~ent
on to soy riot if Chiang were 1un1eashed~ me might reconauer China,
The
leading membe~s of the Republican Party in ~ne United States were deter~
mined to free Chiang for the mainland invasion,’6
The anvent ~2 inn RepublIcans to ~cntrol ri rie government in ~ash~
4naton initiated a ncr phase in the Formosan affair.
f~sChiang”Unleashed?”,~Tp 1953, President Eisenimn~e~ conceled that
part of the earlier Truman dfrective which called on the Seventh Fleet ~o
prevent militany ~peraticns from Formosa against the mainland,~
In mis
anate of the Uninn message tO the United Utates Congress on February 2,
953, President Eisenhower declamad that “+he (u,s,~ Seventh Fleet wi’l no
ijn~er in erpLyed to shield Communist Chino,”—8
Fan a while, Chiang Kai~hek was believed to have been “unleashed,”
and there was ridespread talk of a possible Nationalist invasion of inc
mainland,
Fe! iry, as usual, charg~d the United States with interfering
in “internal affairs,~
nd the Fationalists, for thnir po~t, pin on a
snow of real acrivity in the ensuing months, conducting nmuerous raidn,
Fl some cases ther nerelT aossemonatan leninans publ~cozing toe ~1sennower
~d~iser Praises the Forumsan trmy~~ New York Tires, May 2,
1952, p. 1.
°Robein F, Ferrell,
1lCiaude
10
~.
merlcan finlomnny (ITan Yori, 1959), p. b77.
Buss, The Far East (Nem Yori, 1955), p. 708.
lenry B, Vizeteil:- (ed.j, The Ue~ international Year Book (hem Yor~c,
l95L~), p. 185,
37
orcer. with the iwolication that one lcng~awaited moment had now come; in
others, they executed sururise captures of minor islus, from which wisp
OUlCmJgr
retreatea,
In ~u;ust
19~3, rresident Cnian; mas announcing that tue real invasion
~s dranin1 near, although the Pisenhoxer administration, pressed op the
renocratic opposition, revealed that it had a secret pact with Chiang
bareing any attack by his forces witwiut orior consultation,20
On their side, the Chinese Ccmzunists han not ceased their efforts
to mobilize the neople of the counixtr for the ~‘liberation~ of Fcrncsa,
Put
they went further in l9~3~LL, buildina np their coastal defenses cc a state
of readiness with measures ranging from the fonuation of so~ n two and a
half milniom miout~a to t5e sioctluzation of thu subxar~nes glean tten cy
•
~2l
tue t~nm,
fy September, 1956, the Chincse Co~iwsnists launched a diplomatic (but
only a token mi2iLary~ offensivo against the ::ationalists on Formosa and
the outlyin~ islands,
Thee heartly shelled one ~aemoy islands,22 killing
t~To officers of the Unitea States ~ilitary
suistance ld’-icorp froap,
President ~isenhouer rsoortudl~ had to veto a :croposed Pationalist bombing
—
29
Peter
.
P~ Taun, Coreunist China Today (Pew lcrk, 1957), p. 530,
-
LbzcL,
21
223uemov consists of several small islands, It is two miles ama~
from lcd China at one closost ooint, It is about the size of Tantucket,
wissachussetis, Its miuitar~ role is t~ blockado the Coununist port of
mop and to gi—c actvance warring if the Corsuanis ~s build up to invade
Formosa, ~uexoy ann atsu-~the O1itar~j wacts,9 T.t.Pewsand[orld
Pepor~, Octooer 3i, 1960, -c, 75,
38
of the muinland by US~supo1ied aircraft frem Fomuosa~2~
firefly l~tashington decided to sign a mutual defense treaty with the
Nationalist Government~
hutual Defense Treain~—On December 2, l9~h, the United States and
trm Nepublic of China signed a Mutual Defense Treaty in Washiagton~
This
treaty was defensive and mutual in character, and ;~as designed to deter
any attemot by Commimist China to bring its aggressive military ambitions
to bear against the treaty area.2~
both the United States and the Nationalist China guaranteed each other ~s
security, pledged alliance, and promised that either coun~;ry, before taking
antion tov~d Cozoiunist China, would concert its measures ~th those of the
other country,2~
The main points of toe operatire clauses of the Sino~buerican Xutual
Defense Treaty are as follo~s:
~rtic~e II, The parties pledge themselves b~ such amians to main~
tam and develon their individual and collective caPacity to resist
armed attach ama Communist sucverst-je acti—~taes directed Iron without
against thoir tmrritorial integrity and political sin’oility.
~rmicle V. Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the dest
PacIfic area directed against the territories of either party would be
dangerous to its omu peace and safety and declares that it would act
to meet the cormion danger in accordance rith its constitutional
processes.
The territories in question were defined in ~r~icle VI as (for China)
Pe~er S. ii, Tang, op._cit., p.
2i,~.
L.80.
The Department of State Bufletln 81.3. Thtual Defensa Treaty with
~blicofCrin~smittedtoSenate, (~ton,l9,p,l5Q,
2~
Robert H, ferrell, op. cit.,
p,
39
Taiwan and the Pescadores,2° and (for ~he United States) the island terri~
tories in the vest °acific under its jurisdiction; and also ‘~such other
terr~oories as nay be determined by mutual agreeirnnt,~27
Thus the Nation~
alist~held ~oZfshore islandsr along the China coast -~ere not included,28
Concluded fcr an indefinite period but subject to termination by
either ~ar~y on one year~s notice, the treaty irc~uded the customa~r pro~
visions relating to ceaceful settlement of inteunaiional disputes, self~
help and mutual aid, free institutions and economic progress, consultation)
reports to ice Gecurity Cou~ cii, and consistency with the Unied hations
Charter,29
In Januaiy, 1955, Chinese Communist planes by the hundreds ruided the
Tachen Islands,3° which nare soon enacuated under United States air cover,
Coin unist amphibious attack similarly resulted in the capture of
Yikiungshan,31
~Jith the fall of the island of Yikiangsban in January, 1955, the sit~
uation looked dangerous.
President Eisenhower obtained from Lhe Congress
Pescacores is an ~s~ana group. ±t has a rotan area of ouny 2~ sauare
miles, That makes the Pescadores important is its hocat~on, it mies about
30 miles from Formosa and about 100 miles from the Chinese naithand, ~ There
Yew ~cr Could Start,” ~S,UenandTanlc Report, ugust 27, ‘95k, o, 23,
27
The Department of Giate Th1le~in S~3, on._do,, p~ 151.
28Richard P, Stebtins (ed,), ~
(hen York, 1956), p~ 279,
Ibid.
30lachen Islands are located outside the Chinese nainlanc and are close
to ±he coastal province of Chekiang,
~~Yikiangshan is a tiny island,
Islands,
Its location is ve~ rear Tachen
140
an eztracrftnary resolution giring him aurhority to employ the armed forces
of the United States as he deemed necessary for the specific purpose of
securing and protecting Founosa and the Pescadores against armed attack.32
This authority was ~to include the security and the protection of such
related positions and terrItories of that area now ft friethl~ hands and
the taking of such other measures as he jud;es to be recuired or aPnropri~
ate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.~33
However, Tuanoy and thtsu~ re~ retained by the Nat Lonalists.
Nhether the United States would support the Naticnalist China in defendi~g
these islands was never made clear at the time or thereafter by the Imerican
Corernnent, on tue theory that it was a good policy to karp the Corrunist
government th Onina ~essing.~5
ri any rate, both
meuoy and :~nfsu were
deemed important to the Nationalists and the Communists,
32
0n January 214, l9~, President Eisenhower defined ifierica~s interest
in protectftg Formosa and the Pescadores as follows: ~In unfriendly hands,
Formosa and the Pescadores would seriously dislocate the euistirg, evon if
unstable, balance of moral, economic, and military forces upon which the
peace of the Pacific depends, It would crea~e a breach in the island cNain
of the hTestern Pacific that constitutes, for the Unitea States and other
free nations, the geographical backbone of their security structure in that
ocean, In addition, this breach would interrupt north~south communications
between other important elements of that barrier, and damage the economic
life of countries friendly to us,~ t. DoeR Barnett, Communist_China and
usia (New York, 1960), p~ 1418.
33
Robert H. Ferrari, op~ cit., p. 1478.
Natsu is a tiny island groun uhich has a land area of 2 square
miles~-about the size of Block Island, Reode Island, It is ten miles away
iron Red China at the closest point, Its military role was to blockade tne
Communist port of Foochow, ~‘~uemoy and ~atsu~The rilitary Pacts)~ U.S. News
and dbrld Report, op. cit., p. 7~.
~~Robert H. Ferrell, op.ci~., p. ~78.
fefendThenoyandThtsU?~In nilitar~ ter~Ls, ~uenog and ~atsu islands
ore iopor~ant to the Co:~annisws, for coastal shiocien fro~ ho
hc~g eas
reluctant to use the nainiand p~’rss of doochow and ~Oo; as long as the
;Tationalists were ilteraiTh “sitting in the harbor mouths,~
resides, the
hatioralist garrisons on toe off shore islands were a constant reninder to
the Ceinese on the rainland that Chiang ~ai~shek had not been elininated,38
~in
the other hand, toe holding of Thano-r and ~tsu was even nore
inwortant to the hationalists, for these islands Provided a certain arount
of Intelligence about~and so~eillance of~Coweunist eiilitarg activit~ on
the uninl~nd,
In adfition, the possession of The islanos eas asec~ bg the
~tionalists to hole swetnfn The idea that, so:eefag, tne:r would ret~wr an
the Chinese rainlanf,
rThanat I ron the islan~s would be a crinoling
blow to bationalist ~dorago,
Thus the offshore ~ slands constituted a
~thorn~ ir The sine of Ceneunjet China,
The second Offshore Islands crisis, in ~epterber and Cctober, l9~O,
once none enised certain bas~ anestionc about United utatcnf policy,
particularly in regard to the offshore islands where coo ienediate threat
of conflict ~as arair centered,
un Seoteivbe~ 11, a~ the height of doe
crisis, Iresident ~isenho~Ter iuplie~ that, despite toe absence of any
specific cconitneno, the United States was full~ oreoared to help defend
the offshore islands as well as Porrosa end the Pescadores,—8
In an address ~o the Therican oeople over radio and television on
and ~datsu~The ::ilicory fOcts)’~ U.S
o~. cit., p. 75•
~Ibid.
38
~.
Doak 3aenett, op. cit., o. hl2,
rows and ~orld Thnort,
b2
Seoterber 11, l9~8, President Eisenhower said:
Today. the Chinese Cormunists announce, repeatedly and
officially, that their military operations a;ainst ~aeuoy are
orelininary to attack on Pcuncsa~ So it is clear thet the
Formosan Straits resoluOton of l95~ applies to the present
situation~~9
He further imolied that failure to help defend tne off~rtre islands
un~ld cons0i0 lie dangerous ~anpeasenent0 in the face of aggression,~
Luring the forty~four day crisis, beginning on fugusi 23, l9~8, tun
Chinese Communists runoed t~7!~,SCo shells Into ~ueoc;r island:,
son ~bsoroea nba
The garni~
oroba~ly was the mo~t concentrated, ircens~ve b~nbard~
nei~~ in nis~cry.~
~n Ocuober 23, l9~8, Secretary of D~aie John Poster f”lle~ 1ssue~ in
Tniuni a join0 staTemuli ~th fresid~n-t Chi~’g Kai~snek,
Tbis connunioce
declared t~ at uh~ lifshore iqiP~ds T-e: a ~closely rela0ed~ to the dcfense
of 0orresa~a statemunO which appeared to give furtuer roeric an hocking
to the hatmnnalisfs’ dci erninaticn rt defend then but anoided arer ezpllijt
:c1~men~ o~
~ne b~ates ~ta~es
o par~ croa e in uneir sefense, ~
Trt cornunique also declares that the use of force ~ould no0 ‘cc the
orinoipol means of restolins frandon to the pe-’ole of the ~hIna mailanJ~
a statenerh which seemed to olace further resrraints upon bhe litionallsts,
and yet it ascids asp explihit renunciation b:’~ thei~, of whe “an 0: ferco ~c
‘~Text of Tiserthowor Doceli on Taiwan Stuaticn,” ~:e~ Tori: Tines,
Seotonher 12, l9~8, p. 2.
ho
Ibid.
‘~‘3uenoy and Matsu~The :zrtary Facts,” U. S. Hers and ~o~d Report,
~o. ott., o. 7~.
Posh Bar-iett,
r~p,
cli., p. L.1f.
ethic—a theL~ cmi of returning ‘~c the e
~is sequence of events and anateannbe during 1958 ~‘igh Thghaed the
eieriinias, anbi~ai+ies, and noce
onard the fcrnosa arean
i
ainties inherent in the Uni~ed Scares
lh~. Uni~ed Starer
~Thiaanc purposes and
ob~ectiver in the n,rnosa area ~ere, tharefo~e, still cuen be varying in-~
ternretations,1~~~
h~ ~ever, d~ie You oban beraic has been nathan qufar si~iar
djno~kcae ‘lear, TLe~~ R__ffirued,~Irvited b~r fre~ithnt Kerine,,,r, the
qiee President ~f the Penubila ~f thina, Yr. beer Dberg, “3ad~ a tbeee~daY
of EThial ut’~it be ~n~e~ica, beginning ~n Thp o~, D~96i.
darn of discussion
jbert cc”rbec~e
hashi~ngben bebecer. KennedY and
‘I the end of two
ben, than
rsaed a
aan’~rbeg tIe ‘Yrse uien bben’een are govar~er~ a ~d the
rerebes of tiw Republic of China and the Unbeed States of
The ~oununic~ue said the ~uThs baa been
erina,be
haracacr~z~d bY n soibet of
nude r~i-anding and nutnar interest core ~uant ‘nab the Reap ~ud bearing
fbeerdbeLip tctwuer the run countries, ~ 6
res~der~ Ken—adY reiteratec finn
ar”tabeon of the ~eoublie c
a founding rier2berbe
“U,
su”porC for cannoned aepre~
ChIna in the ~JReLed fabetons, of which she is
beorcop and ~beer bese niarossed U:ited SLabes assistance
Ibid.
15
Yang $h~a~neI, beino—U. be Ties Reaffirned
(ingust, 1961’, 7.
free Thixe Review,
46cText of KennedThCben CoracniqnsU~ New Yoth Tires,
~ugust 3, 1961
j:
~PT4I
PTqI
-~
~ ~tTJ~C~
tZC~Iu~’O Ji9t~L 2u~a~e~je ~ tr set~zq~urLoo ~oq ~o .~D~u~pJOO~
;c
i~dc~ ~sc~ ~a
ue~ze~zq~s ~
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P~ZTU~CDaI ~U~PT~I~ eD~ ~ P~ ~
c~ ‘~~~0C UI
~PT~D
U~~Z~LI
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T~Z~Z~C~ ~
ur3~c~zd ~r~dO~eL~p ~pxou c~
UT ~1T~$ Zo oqnc~ aL~. c~ e~u~
-c~zcI o~. pt~. ~ j~
U~
~zIo~ op~
a~ ~c UO~1UeqJrç eU~.
~
ii~t~. ~ en;~r~ c~
w~~uo~
p~e~z~ ~
~_UUT~z Jo o~~q~Ld~ e~ç To t~oic~iT cpiouc~e :enu~~oo ~qo
~H~’U? IV
COXTUDZON
luring V’orl’i tar Ii, time s224ea leaders envision d a pnstrar rar ast
Sr ~hich cliii a ooule be the dcmiimat+ power.
‘flat Japar s str’.cendet’,
ii n ‘er. nivil vae ‘-‘et”een ~be Chiiree IT:’tionaiisr Cc n~~ttap
L’ China continued oz’ cr exprded rale.
Chin
rd ‘he ~ior
It ‘tas a at tha’
id not possess the n’±tw nacossal; t’~ e-iaola it to beoore a ~t.a.
:i~i~ °~rce in tl’e Way St.
~e
The se ican 3ren’nert he.ieve’S ‘wa~ a
‘-sited and democratic Chira ~as eboerm-ia]. to ‘lorid stabiltty ard peace.
BeZ,re Vie rd of 19k53,
gsa
bt.fj fe bat ~eec the Oliine ~e Fationtist
iaei”nen ~ and ‘he Chinese 9wsmmists began gi”fng the lJnitei
a’cezr.
12 Jam’ar~,.
191.6, ‘resiaeS Trumat~ sent Gener2 ~.irshsfl to
Chira !n or’er tc exert tim.. inZtanne
zieg
d
+,“
hates gra.e
‘~rf.ng a”out ‘A e
,,“ ,,½c
tail ficatf.
U4 itod Ste ca.
~,
n. l’n’tili
V Chin.
£u~. Qarerel It” hail did Let s’rwa ii bringing race tt. China. His
fission as a mediator fs*iled,
~ .-ertad to ‘ta
3,p.~yga
‘~j~g~c~ the NatLna1~sts act V... Coin
a gntre trw’e,
~
both s~des wag’,ed ~
)‘a
9 turn
5”... :crtnl nf China. Bcth ooi’t,encje”g f’r po-’er ~td oo-r”rol “era critical
of General .4”s”aU ard tke United States.
s “he izpetding disaster muthtp4ed, .ha tfr.4ed S’ates, in J-’24-. 19!t7,
sen’- Gene ea]. i’e,e’a~q” to ~ my the China scene and w4ce recosrendatLon,.
lu his off~c±a1 .p.rt. to .‘ash~rgtc’1 “cit~Jer recounended that the Un~ ted
Sta4es ccntinoe tc. ~gi”s 1i; av ati ecotonic aid’
Chira ‘eqiested tt.
China, pr’s tided tJ~”
h4
in The s~rn~er of ]9~9, the (Thinese ~nunisus controI~’ed nost of the
terricorins on C.he China nainlar~.
In higust,
9~9, the United States
issued a ‘h~hine ?aoer~’ innicating that it ~ oula not give any further ~~cttve
suoocrt ~r sUbsTantial aiP no ane hationalist Uanernrenn.
The China situation gcmw worse,
On October 1, I9)~i9, the Chinese Ccm~
nunists announced the establishment cf the People ~s Repanlic of China.
The Sonfet Union recognized it the following day.
ober I
Two days later, on Oct~
the Uniind States announced that i~ would continua to recognize
the hatinralirt Poveroment,
ly the end of the year, the datiunalist 3overn~
e~L~ trannferred its seat to Formosa (Taiwan)~
Pith an angressive and totalitarian connunist regime ruling the China
nainlard, j+5 threan to
balance o~ a~er b
sia, esnecially to Southeast ~sia, is great.
T~c
aeon the Frme :‘orld and the ColanunicC bloc in in deer
p~ri~,
The erurcan policy from
9I~ to 1919, aiming at a united and deao~
cra~ic China,was a failurm,
Follcnfry the withdrawal ~f the haticna~ is~ Govenamer~t to Uornwsa,
the Uni-ed ~atec nfopL~d a ~hands~off~ policy toward that Uovernnent,
In spite of the Chiun se Coanun5 etc’ demand for controllin~ that island
and the strong ueerlcan open’ on cc contenueng to supromi the !ta-~ionamist
Pcvermncat, the United inates a~ourcad In January, l9~, that it would
nnf pursue a course leading in in—olunnent in the cml conflict in China,
Nor ruuld in provide military aid or advice to the hatianalist foroe~ un
Formosa,
This nolicy, howerer, aid act last lang, incause of ~ne oatbre~c
of the Forean conflict,
in June 27, l9~O, ino days after the horean War, the United States
pursued a Theutrallzationt~ policy tovard the Nationalist Povernaient,
This
147
ncflo~ mc? :dcd the ~se of rhe U~3~ S~irenth Fleet coil tO ~‘esis- ~rp °or~
n~nist a:taek on F~rn~sa, a~d to stop the ~atioralists ~~cc attechi~g the
end ?and Ip aic sod
Chinese Co~inenjsts
cLadin~, the Clii ~ce eoa~ns by so~.
te~e~od in the horean ccnflint in Dotober, 1950
Uninad States resnrni~d chinning ~i1i ac:r
In Febr”ar;~
f~er ~le
SUD~i1CS
the
to F~enosa,
1 1953, the UnIted Stares canceled the dIrective which
~a11ed on the Se7enth Freet to prerent nu1itar~ operations f:~ri P~rnosa
against
‘ie Isainiand,
Ic ~ug~’st of -~ec sarn~ ;~e’~, tc~ Fnthon~linr G~’~enr~
~eni ~nri
~ea
it nec rerealsd in hashiegi
~o the China nainlane rae ~ear~
n
Su~
mat the Unitea States cad a secret path wth
Cbthng tai~ehek ha~thn~ snp atthch by his ~orces wItco~’t other oc~~s1ltetioen
r
~:auiona~ ~
in ~ oen t nec net penparen no la’3~on an~ eucee-eth]. in ~
S the ri~iafld anyenr~
1
0ptether, 1951) ole )thi
held Cueco~ Isthnds,
e D~c~ i ~0c totharend ene Fationrilint
Th~e ~onchs ~ater, ole United ina~s,
then realleca
the cthat’~gie poc±th~ri ~f thmn~oa, s~~ed a ‘‘eth rieinnse treat; ~n.0h the
‘~athooththt 3ovorninect~
This thermy was d~fecsine ant irthu~i in
harncrer,
art ~ac cesiened th de~or ari~r atth’ar- by Conienist Zhthn to bring ins ~‘g—
gres-Ice nilithry eabitions in tear ages ~st, trio treal7 areas
thoen~’ and ta~su
hone nr,
tin :Tabio’saljst hold off athen itha~ris) wore art stipu] a~in
in ti~
tar arcond Offbinre islands crisis in Septertee and Pincher,
1950, inc Chinese Corc~unists rareatedly and thficith]; arararced tha~ troth
ni1ina~r
peratiocs againet the
on thrnosa,
neri~; Islands ~een pre?irdarry to ainach
th the hoigh~ of the crisis. fresldenm ‘isenncner inpiled ar
Sectenber th, thin, deepite the absence cf any specific coee’iinent, the
United States ras fully p~epareh to hep ~efend ole of fsho~e Islands as
Well as ?o~irea and ~te 2escadores~
j~in~ ooanuZj~i e I
“n October 21,
Chireg l I~snek and Se~re~au; D~ites In Ta~-ej
9~S, declarea t~a~- the offshore isanas ~sere
ro the defense ~t F~roosa~
The ccn~~ s~’o ~Lre dan~ ~red thac
use ni Soree ~o ~ nor cc the ~rianioan n~ a ~f rest r.
~eorle on the ChIre w inlan~
I:;
e
reedoic to ole
There uas no oolioy change in srerioa t~uard
the lationalist China after the second offshore Islands osioi~
Ii ~ ~re
rae nnd~
~eo~an policy toi~arC the hationaliso China since l9~O
n a s ~rt~iem~’ ~a-j~~
fcr~’-~ fron
Its nrjnan
aInc~ “are t~ h~ic noreect
all~g into C~osan~i~t var~s, ant lo ren~rnco using force ~
~ ~ Stroi~
I~ ~
~r~ior,
clang~ ~th e~ en~an
I~ a, ~
t~os. one Un~od ~tate
‘ere: s2~poed its ecooor~c aid to Ta~ei~
re~’staj:ed 1 s fn~en1 v
~,
an this Iur~ reacoc,
‘~
~bd:a~a
fran ~he CCt~ a an~n1and,
he point of fins, in ~ raring dags of
~f :962, thane are ann stirrings ~f hostilffy and ~elligonance
hatI~na1iot Chine and Coaroni at Ohioan
oth
IT haT
ailooshlo ~th the Ia~ ionali~ Ch~ cane loan re~
o For~re erer oi~c~ toe lattan’s
~un~
of “~;greasicn” and ~‘inp~rializan”
ihe~aiian~”
f
etvee~
Snob pare;, as of ~d, acoures the
Soil. anoclain the pollcg of
There are anpo~is that ~he C’s~oeae TatiTnalist~ are prrear~
~o invade the na~siland,
There are equally glcan~r reoorts of a anonuniar
build~re li invad~ For~sa~
Tan reaction of the Untied 2~ares loanarnept
han been to state ann: the poltcy of none than a decade of a~roiding ~he
a evils of a TaticralisO attack on the nainland and of a Coreaunlst ir~
vasion of Toanosa and the Tescadorcs Islands,
acco:ding f~ I.
Thus the UniCed
nones,
‘~eoont’o-, ~nas named led Oblia it ~ili defend
ITationalist Chine againan any attach on Tore sa and the Thacadores Islinds,
uf it o~1so info~ed the
‘eioin; regthe that it :~ri~J not supeort any
atte~tot to land forces on the nainlanrt”1
‘Thfense of Chiang yrcuised by the TJ~ Se,” ~tlen~a_Coostitution,
June 27,1962, o. 1~ ~The vie~cs, disclosed in ~asnington Thesday, xere
ccn~eyed by John ~oors Cabot, U~ S~ Thoassador in ~arsaw, ~o ang~Ping~
nan, the artassadr of Cocceunist China, in an extended conversation last
Saturday~ Ibian
3IBLIuOh?~’H;
Be eh S
Bailantire> Jc’s~eh
~ csa~
:isbir; Coo, 1952~
Bnr~ie ~t,
~uoak~
~ePeff~ Pet,
Cor
!‘ennrha,
jar Y:jra and
~ seers r:
& a,
So’. ict Pohi~— in the Far Fast,
3eorge Banta Pnh’~
Pen Perk:
London:
:-Iaroer & ~ro~he’~e,
Dxfc~d University
~ SS~
B~s—, Olaudo
~lvde
Thr Ear East,
~‘au1 F. Per’ Far Fear,
Ire,, 1953~~~
Ee~”re1I, ?ake~’r 4,
den leak:
Tee
adJ~ilar Cr’,, 1055,
ErgPeT~oJd ~i±Ffs, Uo’~ ~ersoy:
n~’r5n’an rioT__a~p,
hen Peak:
,
~,
~‘rentice—F”1
Norton & ‘~o,, Pec~,
C ilr’~r, hoherr ~,, Lt~r~’, Faloh, and Btour~h, CeraPe (en )~
r’icanF~rr’i;r~cIj~,
~ York: CrEord Unicersi ~r
‘4nrsau, ~ara— \e~)
4r’~ Peak
Thg, JPe” PerrPe
~o,, 19~,
The
T0,,ln
Coutheabt
headings in
~Pea”ec ann Boau di ~“acts for 1~5~
aPe in ~ersreotPee,
For Yeah:
The
Latorre~ee, ernetB Scr’tt, The nerican Record i” the P~ Easa,
The Facilhlauro,, ~
~nr’nard, Ear”y (eB,~, ilener~a di hrcri”an ?,,‘~5Ic~r Thile~”.
ibGran~Hih1 Bank ~
erner~ Fc’iern Chirans ForeIgn policy,
T~r~cr~iry di Nannr’sana r~s, l9~3,
Niediel, Franz F, and Ta~Per, George P.,
ran Peak: Herry Haut ~ ~
PeEPer, LTaihanie. The Per East,
Fiehigar ~
Riggs, Fred Pe
Faehdhl an
~‘rin
is
a~E~11an
New Per~
Fan
~irneapoils, Minansdin:
The~arEastirtnoj:ader~,~Tnid
rbor, Nichdgan:
Formosa Under Chinese Hationadist Pele~
o,, 1952,
TLz Universi-~y ~
Pew Perk’
The
~H
e~r~
~ ‘€~i~JJ
~
~
~L: ‘~:9et ~ ~
-c~m~ s~nx
L~~9~t
~≠96
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ze~ ~ej~ ‘~e~o~
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~[vz~’~-
/
— —
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~
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.~
r~
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L~o ~Oflqr~ ~ ~o ~
.
4J~ ~UOi
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~ ~~-LL~
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~3~g ~ ~ ne’~ OOJ
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ej~ ~Uoti
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miu~ 9~XOOj
:u’s~os-~,
0~oQ;~: :SJ~roa t~t~Jc- Oeoi~~ Pe;Tnn J ow~rq~ ~
u
o~toou~ ~~up~oc~j c~ JO ct~cn~ se~pr~~
on~~iooo~
‘t~:w~
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~ s~up~ ncj oqo ~c dLLOj~ oeJpn~ ~i~to
~
‘Sl~uE~
~oI~J1~6J
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52
“Communist China:
The New Imperialism,” Current
History, X~Q~i (August, 1961), 136—37,
Trager, Frank N.
Yang, Shou—mei. “Sino—U.S. Ties Reaffirmed,”
(August, 1961), 7.
______________
Free
China Review, XI
Weekly Magazines
“Where New War Could Start,”
U. S. News & World Report, August 27, 1954,
p. 23.
“Quemoy and Matsu--The Military Facts,” U. S. News and World Report,
October 31, 1960, pp. 75—76.
Encyclopedias
“The Open Door,”
“Dairen,tt
The Encyclopedia kuericana, 1954 ed.
Grolier Encyclopedia, 1955 ed.
“Kuoruintang,”
“Port Arthur,”
Grolier Encyclopedia.
Grolier Encyclopedia.
“Chiang Kai—shek,”
“Mao Tse—tung,”
1955 ed.
1955 ed.
The Encyclopedia ~nericana.
Encyclopedia Britannica.
Daily Newspapers
New York Times, August
1, 1950.
New York Times, August 2, 1950.
New York Times, May
Vol. IV.
2, 1952.
New York Times, September 12, 1958.
New York Times, August 3, 1961.
Atlanta Constitution, June
27, 1962.
1958 od. Vol. XIV.