Canadian Journal of Philosophy
The Charitable Perspective: Forgiveness and Toleration as Supererogatory
Author(s): Hagit Benbaji and David Heyd
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Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Dec., 2001), pp. 567-586
Published by: Canadian Journal of Philosophy
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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume 31, Number 4, December 2001, pp. 567-586
567
TheCharitable
Perspective:
and
as
Forgiveness Toleration
Supererogatory
HAGITBENBAJIand DAVIDHEYD
The Hebrew University
Jerusalem
Israel 91905
'Mayone be pardon'dand retainthe offence?'asks KingClaudiusin his
tormented monologue in Hamlet.Forgiveness appears incompatible
with the retention of the offence, both in the sense of enjoying its
consequences(Claudius'sarrogationof the Queen and the Kingdomof
Denmark) and in the sense of the subsistence of the attitude which
underlay the offensive act (his cold-heartednessand ambition).There
are,however,views which allow for,even admire,an attitudeof forgiveness towardspeople who have 'retained'theiroffensein some way. This
idea of forgivenessis harderto justify,since no change (like repentance)
has taken place in the agent. We suggest that the concept of toleration
canserveas an illuminatingclue in such an analysis.Thetolerantattitude
involves a certainkind of reconciliationwith people who not only have
done something wrong in the past, but insist on sticking to their objectionableconductin the presentand the future.Tolerance,in otherwords,
is not conditionedby repentanceor by commitmentto behavioraltransformation;it is a kind of unconditional'forgiveness'in advance.
Nevertheless,we oftenwant to attributeto forgivenessa specialmoral
value by viewing it as supererogatory,indeed a paradigmcase of supererogation.Again, the analogy between forgiveness and tolerationmay
prove illuminating:like forgivenessaccordedto the unrepentingparty,
toleranceof the persistentviolatorof some standardof behaviorcannot
be regardedas a duty;like such 'undeserved'forgiveness,tolerancemay
be viewed as supererogatory.
The threeconceptsof supererogation,forgivenessand tolerationhave
separatelyreceived substantialphilosophicalattentionin the past few
568 Hagit Benbajiand David Heyd
decades. The connectionbetween forgiveness and supererogationhas
oftenbeen noted. In this paperwe wish to develop the analogybetween
forgivenessand toleration,which has been almostentirelyignored.This
analogy will lead to the characterizationof tolerationin some typical
contextsas supererogatory,which too has hardlybeen noticed or elaboratedin the literature.
A note of methodologicalcaution should be made before embarking
on the detailed analysis.Unlike the conceptof supererogation,which is
theoreticaland typically confined to philosophicaldiscourse,the ideas
of forgiveness and toleranceare widely appealed to in everyday discourse. Thus, the concept of supererogationis well defined, often in a
theory-dependentway, while forgiveness and tolerance suffer from
blurredconceptualcontoursand theirscope of applicationis controversial. By suggesting an analogy between toleranceand forgiveness and
by arguingfor the supererogatorynatureof both, we by no means wish
to deny contextsin which our analysis does not fit everyday usage. We
shall, accordingly, mention the contexts and views which hold both
forgivenessand toleranceas obligatoryor forbidden.Butit is hoped that
the analogy will capture some important dimension in their deontic
characterizationand source of moralvalue.
1. TheParadoxof Forgivenessand Toleration
The fundamentalsimilaritybetween forgiveness and tolerationlies in
theirapparentlyparadoxicalnature.Genuineforgivenesscan be shown
only when real offense has taken place. Similarly,tolerancein the strict
sense is granted only to people whose behavior is held as objectively
wrong. Though the paradoxical nature of toleration has often been
noted, that of forgiveness has not received much attention.Partof the
reasonmay be due to the slogan Tout comprendre,c'est tout pardonner'
(To understandall is to forgive all'). This catch phrase is misleading.
Strawsonreports:'Incidentally,the best commenton this familiarslogan
I ever heard was made by J.L.Austin. He said: "That'squite wrong;
understandingmight just add contempt to hatred.'"1The analogy between forgivenessand tolerationsupportsthe intuitionof Strawsonand
Austin.
But if this is so, what could be the basis of forgivenessand tolerance?
Afterall, the wrong involved in the offensive act gives good reasonsfor
resentment (in the former) and for active intervention (in the latter).
1 P.F. Strawson, Skepticismand Naturalism (London: Methuen 1985), 37 n.5
The CharitablePerspective 569
Thesereasonsmay even be seen as imposing a dutyof adoptinga hostile
attitudeor takingpreventivemeasures.On the otherhand, we all seem
to believe in the generalsuperiorityof the conciliatoryalternativethatis
associated with forgiveness and toleration.Strictly speaking, then, it
seems thatthe duty to tolerateapplies only when thereare good reasons
not to tolerate;and true forgiveness can be shown only when there are
good reasonsfor maintaininga hostile attitude.In that sense, toleration
and forgiveness seem to be 'impossiblevirtues/ in BernardWilliams's
terminology.2
Therearetwo commonstrategiesfor dispellingthe paradoxin the two
cases: one can either deny the existence of good reasons for continued
resentmentor interferencein the behaviorof others,on the one hand;or
rejectthe value (even the legitimacy)of the moralindulgenceassociated
with forgiving and tolerant restraint,on the other. The first strategy
appeals to a wide rangeof possible considerationsthat might justifythe
tolerant and forgiving reaction, that is to say, the overcoming of the
originalgood reasonsfor a negative attitude:mitigatingcircumstances,
the ideal of public peace, moral skepticism and value relativism, or
pragmaticconsiderationsrelatingto the price of continued resentment
and persecution.The general idea would be that the conflict between
justiceon the one hand and forgivenessand toleranceon the otheris only
apparent,since the latterare appropriateonly in those circumstancesin
which they are required
by justice.Thus,for example,the just reactionto
a one-time offense by a friend calls for condonation;or the rights of
minoritiesto maintaintheirculturalidentity demands that the majority
respectthem. This strategyreduces forgivenessand tolerationto justice,
thus missing theiruniqueness.Bybypassing the air of paradoxinvolved
in the two concepts,it ignores a kind of tension that we find inherentto
them.
The second strategyperhapsappeals less to our contemporarymoral
sensibilities.Butin the firststages of its troubledhistoryin the sixteenth
and seventeenthcenturiesthe idea of tolerationwas commonlycriticized
as a manifestationof moral infirmity,indulgence, and lack of commitment to values. In our own days, politicalculturesthat do not belong to
the liberaltraditionoftenfind the idea of tolerancealien,even repugnant.
Forgivenessis less open to such systematiccriticism,but neverthelessis
often consideredto be a sign of a morallysoft personality,a lackof moral
backbone. Nietzsche holds an explicit negative view of forgiveness,
2 Bernard Williams, Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?' D. Heyd, ed., Toleration:An
Elusive Virtue (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996), 18-27
570 Hagit Benbajiand David Heyd
which he considersas nothing more than impotenthatred.3TaraSmith,
in a recentarticle,offersa radicalcritiqueof both tolerationand forgiveness as 'well-intentioned compromises/ and argues that they 'often
sabotagejustice/4
In the presentarticlewe wish to takean intermediarypath.Unlike the
first strategy,which involves widening the scope of the two concepts,
we take forgiveness as analyticallydistinct from condonation, mere
indulgence, or overlooking;and toleranceas distinguished from compromise, indifference and respect for rights. Contraryto the second
strategy,that leaves a very narrow range for the legitimateapplication
of them, we argue for their unique moralvalue. In other words, by
narrowingdown the scope of applicationof the conceptsof forgiveness
and tolerance,we wish to highlighttheirvirtuousnature.Butthis canbe
done only by abandoning the territoryof duty and justice, that is, by
focusing on the particularsupererogatorycharacterof both concepts.
The rest of this paper is accordingly devoted to two complementary
endeavors: first, a conceptualanalysis of forgiveness and tolerance as
analogous forms of reactiveattitudesto morallyobjectionableconduct;
and secondly, a normativeanalysis of theirdeontic status and value. It is
hoped that in this double enterprise the paradox of toleration and
forgivenessmay be explained,though not necessarilyresolved.
2. FromActs to Persons
Forgiveness and toleranceare reactive attitudes in Strawson'ssense:5
they are responses to forms of behavior considered morally wrong or
offensive. Being typically indulgent, i.e. deviating from the deserved
negativeor criticalreaction,they callforrestraint.Forthe offendedparty,
the natural and morally justified response is resentment, anger and
dissociation.Forthe witness of a morallywrongbehavior,the reasonable
response is criticism or active interference.Forgiveness demands the
overcomingof resentment,an effortto avoid continuedvindictiveness.
Tolerancecalls for a similar inner struggle against the moralisticten-
3 Avishai Margalit, 'Vergeben und Vergessen/ W. Edelstein and G. Nunner-Winkler,
edsv Moral im Sozialen Kontext(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp 2000), 489. F. Nietzsche, Thus
SpokeZarathustra,II, 3
4 Tara Smith, Tolerance & Forgiveness: Virtues or Vices?' Journalof AppliedPhilosophy
14 (1997), 31
5 P.F. Strawson, 'Freedom and Resentment/ P.F. Strawson, ed., Freedomand Resentment (London: Methuen 1974)
The CharitablePerspective 571
dency of imposing one's standards on others, even when others are
correctlyheld to be in the wrong.
The restraintcommon to forgivenessand toleranceshould be understood as clearlydistinct from other forms of forbearancefrom negative
response. Forgettingwhat you have done to me does not mean that I
have forgiven you. Feeling utter equanimityregardingpeople's sexual
conduct does not amount to sexual tolerance.The restraintmust have a
price,be associatedwith some effort(psychologicalor moral),or involve
suffering(as impliedby the etymology of the word 'toleration').Forgiveness and tolerationare intentionalattitudesratherthanmerepsychological dispositions.Individualsmighthave a forgivingor tolerantcharacter,
but these arejustpersonalqualitieswhich makethe intentionalresponse
of restrainteasierfor them.In otherwords, forgivenessand toleranceare
not automaticor 'natural'responses but requiresome sort of deliberation, a mental process guided by reasoning and decision. Alyosha
Karamazov,who in a way is blind to evil, both as done to others and
particularlyas done to himself, cannotbe consideredeither tolerantor
forgiving in the strict sense. The restraintwe are interestedin must be
principled,supportedby reason,and hence intentionallychosen.
As some contemporarytheoristsof tolerationhave shown, the object
of tolerationmust be objectivelywrong, thatis to say, theremust be good
reasonsto oppose the toleratedbehavior.6Thus though we may appreciate the psychologicaleffortinvolved in the racist'srestraininghimself
from suppressing what seems to him obnoxious behavior or life style,
we would hardly want to describe this as tolerance.It is merely the
overcomingof a prejudicethatshould not have existed in the firstplace.
A similarcondition applies to forgiveness:when an individual erroneously believes thatshe was maltreated,therecanbe no room for forgiveness. Forgivenesscannottakeplacewhen thereis nothingto forgive,and
once the subjectrealizesthat she was not reallywronged, we expect her
to revise her attitude from that of forgiveness to that of apology (a
revision equally appropriateto the 'tolerant'party who becomes aware
of the groundlessnessof his initial objection).
This stringentconditionof the wrongness of the forgiven or tolerated
behaviorunderscoresthe paradoxicalnatureof the indulgent response:
why should a genuinely bad act be forgiven or tolerated?The solution
we would like to offerinvolves the separationof acts from persons.The
literatureon forgiveness is replete with referencesto this distinction.
Thus, for example, Trudy Govier writes that 'forgivenessis something
6 John Horton, Toleration as Virtue/ D. Heyd, ed., Toleration:An Elusive Virtue
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996), 33
572 Hagit Benbajiand David Heyd
we extend or do not extend towardspersons;it fundamentallyaffectsthe
relationshipsbetween persons. And yet, it is deedswhich are said to be
unforgivable/7JoramHaberalso holds that the separationbetween the
wrong act and its agent is centralto the understandingof the possibility
of forgiveness,as well as thatof regretand remorsewhich areconditions
of forgiveness.8JeffrieMurphy quotes the Augustinian distinctionbetween sin and sinner as the basis for both repentanceand forgiveness.9
Since forgiveness consists of the re-establishmentof personalrelations,
the possibility of the separationbetween the deed and the agent is a
natural assumption. However, we would like to use the analogous
structureof forgivenessand tolerationand argue that the same distinction is crucialin the analysisof the latter.We toleratepeople, not actions.
A promisingnew way to understandthe distinctionbetween acts and
We may
persons operative in forgiveness and tolerationis perceptual.10
takeour lead fromthe very commonvisual metaphorused in the context
of forgiveness:'seeing in a differentlight/ We often urge vindictive or
intolerantpeople to try and look at the situationthat gave rise to their
resentment or indignation from a different perspective. We usually
mean to encourage the offended party to shift her attention from the
judgmentof the offensive act to the judgmentof the offender.A change
in judgment may emerge either out of the replacement
of a wrong judgment by the right one, or by the shiftfrom one.perspectiveto another.
Theformerconcernsthe judgmentitself;the latterapplies to what might
be called 'the medium' of the judgment, the lens through which it is
formed. For instance,we might look through the window pane at the
landscape,eitherfocusing on the landscape,hardly perceivingthe glass
through which we see it, or focusing on the window itself, seeing the
landscapeat most as blurredspecks of colors and contours.
The visual metaphor highlights an important factor in the kind of
changewe are tryingto describe.On the one hand, thereis the compatibility of the two judgmentsin the sense thatboth arepossible,legitimate,
or valid; on the other, the impossibility of holding the two judgments
and acting on them simultaneously.Forgivenessand toleranceinvolve,
7 Trudy Govier, 'Forgiveness and the Unforgivable/ AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly
36 (1999), 65
8 Joram Graf Haber, Forgiveness(Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1991), 104
9 Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgivenessand Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1988), ch. 1
10 This idea was first suggested by David Heyd in his introduction to D. Heyd, ed.,
Toleration:An Elusive Virtue, 10-17.
The CharitablePerspective 573
we suggest, a Gestaltswitchof the kind illustratedby the rabbit-duck
image or by other examples in standardtextbooksof psychology, like
that of the window pane.
The perceptualanalogy fits some fundamentalqualities of both forgiveness and tolerance.Pardonand tolerantrestraintby no meansimply
that the originalnegative objectionto the offense or wrong action was
overcome in the sense of being overridden by stronger reasons. The
whole point of forgiveness,which to our mind equally applies to tolerance, is that it does not reduce the commitmentto those values on the
basis of which the initial negative response was made. Tolerancedoes
not express any consent or acceptanceof the toleratedbehavior.On the
contrary,it implies a negative judgment.It consists merely of a shift in
focus fromthe act to the actor,froma legitimatejudgmentalperspective
to an indulgent charitableone. Both forgiveness and tolerancemay be
easier for a person of kind and lenient disposition, but a decision is
necessarily required to adopt one perspective ratherthan the equally
valid other. Similarly in forgiveness, as long as one focuses on the
wrongness of the act, the forgivingattitudecannotoccur;it is ratherthe
harboringof resentment.This does not mean that once forgiveness is
granted,the offense is completelyobliterated.The agent can in principle
always switch back to the judgmental perspective, that is call forth
awarenessof the iniquity of the act.
The perceptualmodel of a Gestalt switch, which we are suggesting
here, characterizesthe tension between acts and agents as objects of
moralevaluation.Thereis of course a close link between the evaluation
of actionsand of theiragents, the one reflectingthe other.Virtuousacts
are only those performedby virtuous individuals, says Aristotle,but a
virtuous charactercan only be formed through the performanceof
virtuousacts.However,despite this circularity,phenomenalike forgiveness and tolerancesupport the need for separatingthe two, at least up
to a certain point, as we shall see. Moral judgment may be either
impersonalor personal;it takesas its objectsactionsand statesof affairs,
on the one hand,and humanagents,on the other.Actionsmay be judged
as rightor wrong irrespectiveof theiragents;they areevaluatedin terms
of impersonalnorms and rules.Human subjectsare virtuous or vicious,
trustworthyor disloyal, in their character,that is in their dispositions,
patterns of deliberation,the integrity with which they adhere to their
beliefs and principles, etc. The perspectival analysis suggested here
enablesus to evaluatea given moralprincipleeitherin theabstract,i.e. in
itself, or in the way it has been adopted by an individual,the mannerin
which it coheres with the individual's overall system of beliefs and
principlesand the weight given to it by the subject.
The idea of a perceptual shift of attention is different from John
McDowell'sperceptualanalysis of virtue. In McDowell'sanalysisthere
574 Hagit Benbajiand David Heyd
is only onecorrectmoralreadingof a given situation,and in the virtuous
mind this perception silencesall its alternatives.11
This means that the
situationcalls for eithera negative reactionor, all things considered,for
toleration(or forgiveness).No room is left for the paradoxicalnatureof
the two virtues.Oursuggestion,based on the analogyto the rabbit-duck
case, holds that in forgivenessand tolerancewe can and should be able
to freely switch from the impersonalperspectiveto the personal.There
arecontexts,like the exerciseof judicialpower by the court,in which the
impersonalview should dominate.Thereare othercontexts,such as the
exerciseof legal pardonby the king, in which the personalperspective
becomes relevant. But as in the Gestalt examples, there is no ultimate
way of fully integratingthe two perspectives.There is no general and
systematicway of combiningthe impersonalnegative judgment of the
offensive act with the personal acceptanceof its agent as a friend or
fellow-citizen.
Thus, forgiveness and tolerationdo not silencethe judgmental attitudes of resentment and criticismbut rathersuspendthem. Like Coleridge's 'willing suspension of disbelief/ they involve putting aside one
perspective without denying its legitimacy and without blocking the
way to revertto it at any time (by a simple act of will). Moving fromthe
'realistic'perspective to the 'fictional' is grounded in good aesthetic
reasons(withoutit therecan be no theatricalexperience),but it does not
reduce the validity of the realizationthat 'this is only fiction,' that the
characterson stage are 'just'actors.Realityand fictioncannotbe simultaneouslyexperienced,but they aremutuallydependent.So areforgiveness and tolerance, whose point and value derive exactly from the
'willing suspension'of the otherwisevalid judgmentalpoint of view.
The separationof the personal from the impersonalperspective applies to the forgivingand tolerantsubjecttoo, not merely to the forgiven
and tolerated party. This is a separationbetween action and mental
attitude.But it is interestingto note that this separationtakes opposite
forms in the two cases. While in forgiveness,one can act in a negative
manner toward the wrongdoer (e.g. punish him) and simultaneously
adopt a forgivingattitudeto him, in tolerationone objectsto the other's
practicebut refrainsfrom acting in a hostile way. Whereas toleration
involves practicalacceptance(on the level of action) combined with a
negativejudgment,forgivenessadopts a positive attitudewhich is compatiblewith some form of punitive action.
11 John McDowell, 'Virtue and Reason/ Monist 62 (1979), 335
The CharitablePerspective 575
Finally, forgiveness applies exclusively to actions done in the past
(thereis no forgiveness,not even a promise for forgiveness,for actions
which one plans or intends to carryout in the future).Tolerance,however, is exercised towards actions both present and future. The whole
point of a tolerantattitudeis that it is declarativewith regardto future
responsesto certainpractices(otherwiseit would not have much political value in managingon-goingsocialrelations).Thedifferencebetween
the two kinds of restraintis due to the ad hoc nature of forgiveness,
which operateson an individualone-timebasis,and toleration,the objects
of which are typesof actionor practices.Thus I forgive my neighborfor
the noisy party which she held last night, but I tolerate her repeated
attemptsto enlist me to her wrong-headedpoliticalcause.
The Deontic Status of Forgivenessand Toleration
The analogy between forgiveness and toleranceexposes the variety of
normative evaluations in various contexts. Deploying the traditional
three-fold deontic classification,the two attitudes may be viewed as
eitherobligatory,permissible,or prohibited.The difficultphilosophical
problem is how to draw the lines between the three. Our argumentin
this articleis that although both toleranceand forgiveness may sometimesbe seen as a duty and both have limitsbeyond which they not only
lose theirparticularvalue but become plainly forbidden,they areessennature. That is to say, they are permissible
tially of a supererogatory
admirableattitudesbased on personal discretion,and as such are of a
special moralvalue.
I
Prohibition
As we have shown the most typical cases of both forgiveness and
tolerancetake as theirobjectbehaviorthat is objectivelyoffensive,bad,
or unjust. If that is the case, then the borderlinebetween the tolerable
and the intolerable,the forgivableand the unforgivable,might alternatively be drawn in terms of the degree of 'badness' of the behavior in
question:practiceswhich are socially harmful in a way which makes
them criminalaretypicallyintolerable;the behaviorof Nazi officerswas
so atrociousthat it can never be forgiven.12
12 See Govier for a comprehensive discussion of unforgivability, referring to Martin
Golding and to Jean Hampton.
576 Hagit Benbajiand David Heyd
Theremay be all kinds of reasons for treatingan act as unforgivable
or intolerable.But one reason that is particularlypertinentto the view
presented in this article is that some acts so intimately reflect on the
badness of their agent that the separationof act from agent cannottake
place.13Systematictortureof childrenis not only a monstrouspractice,
but reflectson the overallpathology and corruptionof the perpetrator's
soul. We do not forgive our friendswhen theiroffensive deed makes us
realizethat they are completelydifferentpeople from what we thought
they were. On the social and political level we find that behaviorintolerablewhich manifestsa personalitywith whom we do not wish to live
in the same community.
The ultimate case of the inseparabilityof agent from action, which
makes forgiveness and toleranceimpossible (ratherthan forbidden),is
the reflexiveattitude:the reasonwhy we find it difficultto apply tolerance
and forgiveness to ourselves is due to our identificationof what we do
with what we are. I cannottoleratemy own behaviorwhen I judge it to
be wrong, becauseby so judging it I sincerelycommit myself to change
my ways.
Finally,there is the interestingissue of the prohibitionof forgiveness
in the name of others. In the standard case, the forgiver must be the
offended party, the one who suffered the harm. One is not in a moral
position to forgive another for an injuryperpetratedon a third party.
However, there are controversialcases in which, for example, children
of the victims may exercise the power of forgiveness. These can be
treated as 'secondary'victims, close enough to the primary victim to
claim to have been harmed and hence be in a position to forgive.
Although this condition is not usually mentioned in the context of
toleration,it seems to have an analogousapplication.Toleranceis shown
only by those who stand to lose something by restrainingthemselves
from intervening,those who 'suffer'from the behaviorof the tolerated
party. Theirsufferingis a function of theirbeing membersof the same
community as those who directly suffer from the wrong. Thus people
who believe that abortionshould be allowed in theirsociety, and might
even one day need one, can be said to suffer from pro-lifers'aggressive
behavior, although not as directly as women whose entrance to an
abortionclinicis obstructed.Itis only too easy to show tolerancetowards
others with whom we have no contact,no common social interestsor
mutual relations.
13 We fully adopt Trudy Govier's formulation of this inseparability condition of the
unforgivable in Govier, 69.
The CharitablePerspective 577
II
Obligation
The second, more common ethical view of forgiveness and toleration
goes to the other extreme on the deontic spectrum, treating them as
obligatory.One typical argumentin this line is of a 'corrective'nature:
forgiveness and toleration, like equity in the Aristotelian sense, are
fine-tuningdevices, in which the distortionsof the applicationof general
rules are rectified.Thus, the process of repentanceand expression of
remorsecreatea duty of forgiveness;the recognitionof the autonomyof
individuals imposes a duty of tolerantrestraint.Withholdingforgiveness or toleranceis judged as morallywrong and condemnable.
Christianmorality has raised forgiveness to the status of supreme,
even constitutive value, as liberal democracy has done for tolerance.
Divine forgivenessis the model for imitationby human beings, and the
unforgiving human being cannot expect to be forgiven by God. Similarly, in the liberalview the separationof the political from the moral
requires,as a fundamentalprinciple,mutual tolerationby citizens in a
heterogeneoussociety. The feeling is that forgivenessand tolerationare
not merelyvirtuousdispositions,but positive requirementsforChristian
moralityand the liberalview, respectively.
III
Supererogation
We have so far examined contexts in which tolerationand forgiveness
are either obligatory or prohibited. We have also mentioned ethical
approacheswhich considertolerationand forgivenessas wrong in generalor as a duty in general.However, these contextsand approachesare
exceptions ratherthan the rule. Tolerationand forgiveness are usually
thought of as permissions, i.e. as containing an optional element. But
they are not permissible in the neutral sense: in most cases they are
treatedas morallyvaluable.In being good and permissiblethey belong
We would like to argue that the
to the category of the supererogatory.
special moral value of forgiveness and tolerance lies exactly in their
supererogatorynature,the factthat they lie beyond the call of duty. The
categorizationof forgiveness as supererogatoryhas already been suggested in the past.14Buttolerancehas rarelybeen viewed in those terms.15
14 David Heyd, Supererogation:Its Status in Ethical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1982), ch. 7
15 An important exception, to which we shall refer shortly, is Glen Newey, Virtue,
Reasonand Toleration(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1999), ch. 2.
578 Hagit Benbajiand David Heyd
One possible reasonis that unlike forgiveness,tolerancehas been traditionally understood as a politicalvirtue or attitude,primarilyexercised
by governments and institutions. But once toleranceis interpretedas
consistingof a change of perspective,a kind of Gestaltswitch, it comes
much closer to forgiveness in being personal in nature. Individuals,
unlike institutionswhich are committedto justiceand fairness,may go
beyond the universalizableand impersonallyapplied rules of duty, that
is to say, act supererogatorily.
An intermediatesolution of the deontic classificationof forgiveness
and toleranceconsists in treatingthem as requirementsthough not as
duties associatedwith both Kant
strictduties. Thisis the idea of imperfect
and Mill. One common characterizationof these duties relatesto them
as duties which have no correlativerights. Thus, I am under a general
duty to forgive and tolerate(in certaincircumstances),but no particular
individual holds a right against me to be forgiven or tolerated.In more
Kantianterms,I retaindiscretionconcerningthe particularinstancesin
which I show forgiveness or tolerance,although it would be morally
wrong for me to consistentlyavoid forgiving or toleratingothers.This
intermediatesolutionfits well with the idea of forgivenessand tolerance
as essentiallyof a corrective
nature,i.e. as a kind of equity. And indeed,
as we have seen, there is a sense in which amnesty and pardon, some
formsof leniencyand turninga blind eye aremorallyrequiredpositions.
However, they do not form the main core of forgivenessand tolerance.
Themoving and noble aspectof supererogatorybehaviorin generaland
of forgivenessand tolerancein particularhas to do exactlywith its lying
beyond any kind of requirement.
Haber is attractedto this deontic classificationof forgiveness as an
imperfectduty. In his view, if the wrongdoer does not repent,forgiveness is completely out of place, but if he does, although the wronged
partyhas strongmoralreasonsto forgive,the wrongdoerhas no rightto
be forgiven. There is thus an imperfect duty to develop a forgiving
character,but there is no duty to forgive in any particularcase.16In the
case of toleration,D.D. Raphaelappealsto the same distinctionbetween
perfectand imperfectduties,but relatesit to the criterionof corresponding rights in a slightly different way. The intolerable is that which
involves the infringementof the rightsof others.If the behaviorof which
we morallydisapprovedoes not involve such an infringement,then we
16 Joram Graf Haber, ch. 4
The CharitablePerspective 579
maytolerateit (and under some conditionsshoulddo so).17The common
purpose of all these appeals to the idea of imperfectduty (oftenreferred
to by the oxymoron 'supererogatoryduty') is the resolution of the
paradox of both forgiveness and toleration:why should we restrain
ourselves from a negative response to a morally wrong behavior?The
intermediatedeonticstatusattemptsto do justiceboth to the desirability
of such restraintand to the negative judgment of the behavior which
justifiesresentmentor interference.
Accordingto the analysis we propose in this article,forgivenessand
toleranceare (at least in their most typical manifestations)supererogasense, thatis to say, fully optionaland unboundby
tory in an unqualified
a
moral
kind
of
duty.
They consist of a radicalshift in the way one
any
views a situationwhich is due neitherto any problem in the judgment
of the case (as the correctiveanalysisholds) nor to any fault in the judge
herself (as, for instance,the lack of any personalexperienceof the kind
of conditions which made the wrongdoer commit his offense). We
suggest that thereis a generalmoralreasonfor the shift from the impersonal, 'judgmental'point of view to the personal, 'understanding'perspective.Sucha shift is good and valuable,both for the recipientand for
the forgiving and tolerantsubject.Furthermore,it is good for the interpersonalrelationsbetween the forgiverand the forgivenperson and no
less for the social relationsbetween individuals and groups that show
each other tolerance.The receiverclearly stands to benefit in being left
to behave as she wishes or in being readmittedinto the previousfriendly
relationship.The subjectis given a chance to show magnanimity,patience and self-control.Interpersonalrelationsare made smoother,and
both forgivenessand tolerancepromotemutual trustand friendshipon
the individual level and solidarityand confidenceon the social.
Since forgiveness and tolerationconsist of the substitutionof a sympatheticperspectivefor the impersonal,judgmentalone, the reason for
the substitutioncannot logically create a duty. The whole point of the
perspectivalshift lies in the suspension of the 'just' assessment of the
case for the sake of a higher ideal (the restorationof friendship,respect
for individualautonomy,the creationof trust).It is a personalattitudein
that only the offended or 'suffering'party is in a position to show it
without violating the principles of justice. Forgiveness and tolerance
involve personalsacrifice,restraint,renouncementof rights.These can-
17 D.D. Raphael, 'The Intolerable/ S. Mendus, ed., Justifying Toleration(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1988), 146-7. Raphael himself admits that the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is not easy to draw and rests on moral
intuition.
580 Hagit Benbajiand David Heyd
not be exercised by 'third parties/ like uninvolved individuals or the
state. The shift to the forgiving and tolerantmode is thereforepurely
supererogatory,and its exercisemay be comparedto a gift.As in giving,
forgiving may be more or less deserved, but it is never due (as a right,
as a matterof justice).This is why both forgiveness and tolerationare
never requiredby law and can never be forced. They are by definition
free, optional, at the discretionof the donor. It is controversialwhether
tolerating others who are themselves tolerant is obligatory or supererogatory,but toleratingthe intolerantgoes definitelybeyond the call of
duty. Similarly,forgivingthe repentantis oftenconsideredas a duty, but
forgiving someone who has not shown signs of remorse must be regardedas supererogatory.By repenting,the offenderexpresseshis wish
to separate his act from his character;by granting forgiveness to the
unrepenting,it is we who projectthe separationonto the offender.
Goingbeyond the call of duty is often denied by the virtuousagent of
the supererogatoryact, who modestly declares that she 'only did her
duty/ But such expressions of modesty, typical of heroic actions and
sacrifices,cannotoccurin the contextof the supererogatoryattitudesof
forgiveness and toleration. The reason is that both assume that the
forgivenor toleratedactionwas offensiveor unacceptableand hence the
restraintfromresentmentor interferencecannotbe viewed as obligatory.
This is why forgiving or tolerant forbearanceare pure examples of
supererogation,in which, unlike heroic actions, no controversy can
occuraboutthe borderlinebetween duty and gift and no moralmodesty
(genuine or false) can be exhibited.Similarly,they cannotbe 'virtuesof
ignorance/ manifestationsof innocenceor expressionsof blessed blindness to human evil. It should also be noted that while forgiveness
deserves gratitude (from the forgiven), tolerationcannot expect gratitude. This is because the forgiven offender usually acknowledges the
wrong he has done, while the toleratedparty does not share the tolerator's view of the wrongness of his action (and hence in the long run
expects full acceptanceratherthan mere toleration).
We would like to emphasize that the recognitionof forgiveness and
tolerationas supererogatoryin nature does not mean that the deontic
frameworkmust be abandoned in order to sustain the analysis. Glen
Newey, in his carefuland comprehensiveaccountof toleranceas supererogatory argues for an 'aretaic'analysis (which he contrasts to the
'deontic').In his view, tolerationshould be understood in terms of the
virtueof the tolerator,the characterof the person who shows tolerance,
and this means superseding the deontic characterizationwhich does
not solve the paradox of toleration. Our account of supererogation,
however, holds that the crucial point in the value of supererogatory
behavior (forgiveness and toleranceincluded) inheres in its lying beyond the call of duty, that is to say, being permissible yet admirable
The CharitablePerspective 581
conduct.18Charactertraits, like patience or kindness, may indeed be
instrumental in enabling the subject to make the necessary shift of
perspectives,but are not constitutiveof it. Unlike Newey, who believes
that tolerationcan be shown even without the awarenessof the subject,
let alone a deliberativeprocess, we claim that toleration(and forgiveness) involve a cognitive and intentionalelement.19
Forgiveness
Toleration
The intolerable,
supreme danger to
society
Prohibition
The unforgivable,
extremeevil or
corruptcharacter
Obligation
The religious duty to The necessity of
forgive;correctionof politicaltolerationin
undeserved
pluralisticsociety
resentment
Supererogation
The restorationof
friendship,the free
giving of personal
credit
The creationof
communal
solidarity,the
charitableview of
fellow-citizens
ThePrincipleof Charity
Toleranceand forgivenessare kinds of gifts. The gift consists primarily
of a generousattitude,a sympatheticinterpretationof the circumstances
of an action which could equally be judged as wrong and deserving a
negative response. We would accordinglylike to referto the forgiving
and tolerantattitudes as charitable
perspectives.They ignore the offensive aspects of the action and focus on the way it can be understood,
interpretedand explainedagainstthe backgroundof the overallscheme
of behavior,the life plan of the agent. Forgivenessand toleranceinvoke
a principle of charity which is not dissimilar to its famous semantic
counterpart.In the same way as Davidson's Principleof Charityis the
18 Cf. Heyd, Supererogation,5 & 163.
19 Newey, 54
582 Hagit Benbajiand David Heyd
condition for a linguistic community in which the utterancesof others
can be interpretedby us, so is tolerationnecessaryfor a community of
citizens in a liberal-pluralistsociety in which solidarity and peaceful
coexistence is made possible, and so does forgiveness express (even
create)personalrelationshipsof friendshipand trust.
Now, if we adopt the more restricted version of the Principle of
Charity,the point of which is to make the interpretedbelief true(which
is Quine's understandingof the principle),then of course the analogy
with forgivenessand tolerationbreaksdown. For,the forgivenor tolerated actionis typicallyconsideredwrongand the toleratedbelief - false.
ThePrincipleof Charity,accordingto some of Davidson'searlierformulations,also attemptsto interpretalien sentencesin a way which would
make their speakersright, or 'truebelievers,'whereas forgiveness and
tolerationdo not try to assign any moral truth or justificationto the
practiceswhich have raised the initialnegative response.However, the
Principleof Charitycan be given a wider sense accordingto which its
aim is not merely to 'interpretso that the objectsof interpretationare
generally true believers, but rathera collection of all those principles
which together regulate the ways in which beliefs, desires and actions
rationallyconnect with each other.'20Here we are getting closer to the
analogy between the semanticand the moral versions of the charitable
perspective.Whatcountsis the rationalityof the beliefs or practices,that
is to say theirinternalvalidity, ratherthan theirtruth.And thatrequires
a shift fromthe 'atomistic'(abstract)judgmentof the particularbelief or
actionto the holisticinterpretationand understandingof the agent.Both
in Davidson and in our view of tolerationand forgivenessthe objectof
this personalapproachis the agent as the source of intentionalaction.
This wider view of the Principleof Charity(adoptedby Davidson in
his later writings) is closer to what we are discussing here, since it is
compatible with the wrongness of the 'tolerated' object. 'If we can
recognizehow we, in certaincircumstances,would have a certainbelief
which, in our role as interpreterwe thinkis mistaken,we can, according
to the new Principleof Charity,attributeto the interpreteethis mistaken
belief.'21This ability of putting oneself in the other's shoes is equally
typical of tolerance and forgiveness, which require imagination and
20 Simon Evnine, DonaldDavidson(Cambridge:Polity Press 1991), 110. Davidson
himselfdeclaresthat'theaimof interpretationis not agreementbut understanding'
and thatthis amountsto recognizing'whatconstitutesa good reasonforholdinga
intoTruthandInterpretation
(Oxford:Clarenparticularbelief/ D. Davidson,Inquiries
don Press1984),xvii.
21 Evnine,109
The CharitablePerspective 583
sympathyand enablethe toleratorto test the innercoherence,authenticity and sense of the toleratedbehavior.The charitableperspectiveis in
its essence holistic. It does not require the truth or correctnessof any
particularvalue orbelief,althoughit does assume thatsomeof the other's
beliefs and values are true and correct(e.g. ascribingto the tolerated
person the intention of doing good, acting in her own interests, or
promoting well-being in the world). A satanically malicious person
cannot,for exactly that reason,be forgiven or tolerated,because such a
person cannotbe creditedwith any valuable principleor intention;this
would be analogous to a baby whose babbling cannot be given any
meaning. Indeed, Davidson's point in his version of the Principle of
Charityis to insist on there being a sharedbelief in some fundamental
truths(primarilyof a perceptualkind or, in the interpretationof action,
the belief thatone is actingon one's betterjudgment).Butcharityapplies
to that part of the belief system which is not shared by the interpreter
and the interpretee,or analogously by the toleratorand the tolerated.
Here, understandingratherthan agreementshould be operative.
But instructive differences remain between the two poles of this
analogy.Whilethe Principleof Charityis necessaryforinterpretationand
translation,since without it we have no reason to treat the other as a
rationalsubjectholding beliefs or saying anything,the moraljudgment
of other people's behavior does not require a tolerant or forgiving
attitude.We can hold agents morallyreprehensibleand responsiblefor
theirdeeds by judging theiractionsimpersonally.Thisjudgmentindeed
calls for a Davidsonianprincipleof charityin the sense that the agents'
acts must be interpretedas intentionalor voluntary.But our argument
was that tolerationand forgiveness, beyond their correctivefunction,
amountto morethanexemptingthe agentfromresponsibilityforthe act.
Tolerationand forgivenessare, therefore,purely optionalNevertheless,
in the sameway as charityis constitutiveof the possibilityof a community
of interpretersand rationalbelievers,so is it constitutiveof the possibility
of a community of citizens in a variegated society (toleration)and of
friendshipand love (forgiveness).And the limits of the applicationof the
principle are also analogous:robots and babies are not candidates for
interpretationas rationalagents, since the scope of theirbehavioris too
narrowand restricted;similarly,people in alien culturesare not candidates for our tolerant restraint,since we do not share with them a
minimal communalinterestor feeling. Forinstance,Americansmay be
indifferentto customs such as female circumcisionas long as they are
practicedin Africancountries,but once these practicesareperformedby
Africanimmigrantsin Americansocietyand territory,the issue typically
becomes that of toleration(and its limits).
The analogy to the Principle of Charity accordingly suggests the
following conclusion:taking the agent as a rationalbeing is a necessary
584 Hagit Benbajiand David Heyd
conditionfor interpretingher utterances.It is in this sense necessaryor
'obligatory/ But adopting the personal perspective of the agent of a
repugnantor offensive act is not obligatoryor necessaryto being able to
interpret and judge the action in question; it is supererogatory.The
differencebetween the two is due to the fact that while interpretation
takes place in a universal community of interlocutors,tolerationand
forgiveness are shown only within a narrowergroup of fellow-citizens
and friends. And the whole point of the morality of supererogationis
that there is no duty to expand the borders of these restrictedgroups
based on personalrelations.In otherwords, I have no choicein applying
the Principleof Charityto speakersin alienand remotecultures(if I wish
to understandwhat they are saying),but I have full discretionto decide
whether I want to include someone in the group of people to whom I
want to relate personally, in a particularisticway, as a friend or as a
member of a community with which I feel solidarity. This discretion
makes forgivenessand toleration,unlike the semanticanalogue,supererogatory.
Furthermore,since the Principleof Charityis necessary,or constitutive of interpretationin its Davidsonianversion,it is not strictlyspeaking
a matterof charitylWe do no one (but ourselves) a favorby applying it.
Its benefitlies in our abilityto make sense of the speech of others.Butin
the moral counterpart,it is the other who stands to benefit from the
charitableperspectivewe adopt in judging his behavior.He gets something he does not strictlydeserve.As in bank loans, giving creditalways
involves risk;but the riskin grantingcharityis differentin the two cases:
in the linguistic context we may fail to interpretthe other or even turn
out to be wrong in ascribingto 'it' the status of a rationalcreature;in
tolerationand forgivenessour attitudemay be frustratedor undermined
by reciprocalhostility, intolerance,or indifferenceto our gestures of
friendship. In the former case, we are proved plainly wrong in our
charity.In the latter,our charitableattitude does not lose its sense and
value; it is still vindicated in some way even when it turns out to be
painful and disappointing.On the contrary,such unreciprocatedacts of
giving expressthe noblestformof supererogatorybehavior.And beyond
that,interpretingan alien speakerin the light of the Principleof Charity
does not make'it' rationalif as a matterof fact it is not, but the forgiving
and tolerantattitude may often actively transformthe other and make
her more friendly,gratefuland equally tolerant.
Thus,the perspectivalanalysiswe have suggested for forgivenessand
tolerationmaintainsratherthan resolves the tension between the two
incompatiblejudgments of the act and the agent; that is to say, the
paradox that has been associated with both attitudes is not simply
dispelled. This, in our view, is a clear merit of our account. On the
conceptual level, it captures the duality of the impersonal and the
The CharitablePerspective 585
personal aspects of moral judgment, granting the two equal standing.
On the normativelevel, it maintainsthe duality of the two perspectives
by avoiding the deontic reductionof forgivenessand toleranceto either
a requirement or a prohibition. By according them supererogatory
status, the two attitudescan on the one hand be given the special value
we wish them to have, at least in some contexts and conditions,yet on
the other hand we can still be committed to the moral justificationof
resentmentand active strugglefor the good. If, as we believe is the case,
the supererogatorycannot be reduced to any form of obligation,there
aretwo parallellevels of moraljudgment:thatof justiceand duty, on the
one hand, and that of free giving and charity,on the other. Neither is
reducibleto the otheror underminesits validity.Althoughgoing beyond
the call of duty (andjustice)is admirablein many cases, it is not always
so (forinstancein the way a courtof justiceoperatesor distributionsby
state institutionsare carriedout), and even when it is, it never revokes
the forceof justice.
This duality between duty and supererogationis exemplifiedin both
forgivenessand toleration.Forgivenessmakes sense only when resentment is justified, when retributionwould be a justified response. It is
moving only because the subjectforgoes the negative response which
could be both expected and justified. Interpersonalrelationshipsare
governedby the complementarydualism of universalizablerules determining the just and the due and discretionarychoices to transcendthe
rules for the sake of restoringprevious personal associations.On the
more social and group level, we wish to maintainthe duality between
thejudgmentalperspective,which involves activecriticismand interference, and principledrestraintfrom doing so on the basis of respect for
individual autonomy.This duality is essential to the liberalconception
which acknowledges the distinctionbetween the evaluation of actions
and that of persons. If tolerationis to be distinguished from relativism
and indifference,the judgmentalpoint of view must be retainedeven
when it is suspended in favor of the recognitionof the value of personal
freedomin the formationof a life plan.
Isabellain Measurefor Measureis pleading for mercy for her brother,
who in her view too has committeda grievous offense. She is wavering
between the two perspectiveswe have been discussing throughoutthis
article:
There is a vice that most I do abhor,
And most desire should meet the blow of justice,
For which I would not plead, but that I must;
For which I must not plead, but that I am
At war 'twixt will and will not. (II, ii)
586 Hagit Benbajiand David Heyd
After she asks the duke's deputy to consider the fault ratherthan her
brotherwho has committedit, Angelo responds:
Condemn the fault, and not the actor of it?
Why, every fault's condemn'd ere it be done.
Mine were the very cipher of a function,
To fine the faults whose fine stands in record,
And let go by the actor.
Angelo prefersthe strictapplicationof the law and to judge the act on
its abstractmerits.He is committedto an impersonalperspectivewhich
mightbe appropriateto the politicalmanagementof a community.Only
the development of circumstancesin the course of the play teacheshim
the moral lesson of forgiveness and the limits of justice. Having been
manipulated to become himself a candidate for forgiveness, Angelo
comes to acknowledge the distinctionbetween act and agent and the
intrinsicsupererogatoryvalue of forgiveness.
Received:February,2001
Revised:June, 2001