Judicial Policy Implementation in Mexico City and Mérida
Author(s): Jeffrey K. Staton
Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Oct., 2004), pp. 41-60
Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York
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JudicialPolicy Implementationin Mexico City and
M6rida
JeffreyK. Staton
Why do some of the world's constitutionalcourts challenge governmentalauthority
over many kinds of policies, while others avoid conflict over particularlysensitive or
salient political issues? Why do some elected officials immediately obey judicial
resolutions that challenge their authority,while others find ways not to implement
judicial decisions? These questions are importantin understandingthe role constitutional courts play in ensuring that elected officials respect a state's fundamental
political rules.1 If constitutional courts are unwilling to challenge governmental
authority,or if public officials are unwilling to implement politically unfavorable
decisions, the degree to which constitutionalcourts can serve as effective horizontal
mechanisms of accountabilitywill be considerablyconstrained.Despite the importance of both questions, much of the growing comparativescholarshipon law and
courts has sought to explain judicial behavior without addressing the reactions of
governmentofficials to adversejudicial decisions.2 Consequently,scholars are left
with a largely one-sided account of judicial politics that provides much empirical
supportfor theories of judicial decision makingbut little supportfor theoreticalconclusions aboutthe implementationof judicial policy.
In contrastto this trend,recentworkby GeorgVanbergintegratesdiversestudiesof
judicialactivismandpolicy implementationby specifyingwhatmightbe calleda public
enforcementmechanismfor judicial orders,in which public supportfor courtsand the
relatedpressureconstituentscan place on theirrepresentativesmay induce compliance
with adversejudicial resolutions.3On this account,public supportalso can providethe
political cover courts requireto take on sensitive political conflicts. Of course, this
mechanismworksonly if people are sufficientlyinformedaboutthe natureof the conflicts they are purportedto enforce.Accordingly,Vanbergconsidershow the relative
transparencyofjudicializedconflictsinfluencesinterbranchconflict.4
DespiteVanberg'simportanttheoreticaladvancein simplifyingdiverseyet connected
This articleaddressestwo.
studies,his model leaves a numberof issues underdeveloped.
and public capacity to
resolutions
to
enforce
First, public willingness help
judicial
of
for
instances
costs
on
their
noncomplianceare disrepresentatives
impose significant
tinctconcepts.They shouldbe treatedas such in boththeoreticaland empiricalanalysis.
Second,if the kind of informationconcerninginterbranchconflictto whichpeople have
41
ComparativePolitics
October2004
access affectstheirabilityto enforcejudicialdecisions,both courtsand elected officials
might be expectedto try to influencethe way informationis transmittedto the public.
The informationsurroundingjudicialized conflicts could thus be endogenous to the
interactionsbetweenjudges and political officials. This possibility complicatesunidirectionalcausalargumentsaboutthe effect of informationon the willingnessof judges
to challengepolitical authorityand the willingness of public authoritiesto comply. It
also suggeststhatpoliticalcommunicationmay permeatethe politics of law in many of
the sameways as it does politicsin general.
These concerns can be developed througha comparativecase study of the reactions of two Mexican executives to two highly visible resolutions of the Mexican
supremecourt. In the first case, PresidentErnestoZedillo complied with a supreme
court order within hours of its release. In the second, Yucatin Governor Victor
Cerveradefied the court for nearly a month. The difference in their reactions captures precisely the kind of noncompliant governmental behavior thought to be a
problem in Mexico. When there is a compliance problem, it is not that authorities
never comply. Rather,authoritiesresist and delay.Their behaviordistortsthe rule of
law and results in wastedjudicial resourcesallocatedto ensurecompliance.5
Theories of Judicial Policy Implementation
There are three general explanationsof compliance.Proponentsof legitimacytheory
arguethat,because the coercive sources of judicial power are minimal,courtsheavily
rely on societalbeliefs in theirlegitimacyin orderto inducethe properimplementation
of theirmost dislikeddecisions.6Judiciallegitimacyis typicallyconceptualizedas diffuse public support,or the degree to which people are committedto the institutional
structureof the judiciary.7Judicialdecisionsare followedto the extentthatthose asked
to complyfundamentallysupportthe institutionalpowersof the courtresolvingthe conflict.
Scholarsinvokingcommunicationstheory highlightthe ways judicial decisions are
craftedandultimatelyinterpretedby those requiredto implementthem.The most interesting propositionderivedfrom this perspectiveis that specificity in the languageused
to describea holding can constrainpublicauthorityreactions.In particular,unambiguous languagedecreasesthe degree to which public officials can developcreativeinterpretationsofjudicial resolutionsthatundercutthe spiritof the court'sintent.8
Otherresearchershave appealedto rationalchoice theory to explain compliance.
The general proposition forwardedby these studies is that implementationcan be
best explainedby consideringthe political costs and benefits associatedwith alternative choices over compliance.9Specifically, these models have typically been decision theoretic.The authorsdo not consider the interdependencyof choice, but rather
evaluate how a single individual'sdecision changes as a function of a set of exoge42
JeffreyK. Staton
nous parameters;that is, the individual under analysis makes a decision in a social
vacuum. Such a model simply posits that compliance is a function of the relative
costs and benefits associated with implementingan unfavorabledecision. A testable
hypothesis consistent with this approach is that public officials ought to be more
willing to implement changes in relatively unimportantpolicies than in policies of
significant importance.In otherwords, the propensityto comply with an unfavorable
resolutionought to decreasewith the benefits derived fromthe challengedpolicy.
Vanbergintegrates these approaches in three ways. First, he recognizes that, if
courts enjoy wide public support,then the public might be expected to help enforce
their decisions. If people trust their courts to make good decisions and are committed to their institutionalstructure,they may be willing to punish their representatives
for evading a judicial resolution. Second, Vanberg suggests that for the public to
enforce judicial resolutions people need to be informed about and understandthe
substance of the conflicts courts resolve. A confused public or one that is entirely
uninformedabout a judicial holding can not be an effective source of enforcement.
Thus, the transparencyof the conflict-the amount of informationavailable to the
public and the clarity of the legal issue at stake-ought to increase the likelihood of
judicial activism and compliance. Finally, Vanberg specifies a game-theoretic
account of compliance that includes the normativeconcept of legitimacy.This addition both allows for courts to avoid noncomplianceby strategicallyavoiding conflict
and clearly demonstratesthat a political theory can recognize the importanceof normative constraintson humanbehaviorand rationalitywithin the same framework.'l
As empiricalevidence in supportof his claims over implementation,Vanbergprovides a detailed case study of an interaction between German Chancellor Konrad
Adenauerand the federalconstitutionalcourt.The analysissuggests that strongpublic
supportfor the courtinducedAdenauerto acceptan unusuallyunfavorableresolution.1"
While otherstudieshave consideredthe impactof constituencyinterestson implementation,this articleis the first attemptto testVanberg'smodel outsideGermany.12
Despite Vanberg'simportantcontribution,his model raises at least two issues.
First,Vanbergconditionshis expectationsoverjudicial policy implementationon the
costs of a public backlash for defiance, as perceived by elected officials. Of course,
the public backlashparametermight be operationallydefined in all of the following
ways: the degree of trustpeople place in their constitutionalcourts;constituentopinion over the court'sdecision; the numberof voters dissatisfied with their representative's response;the proximity and level of competition of a pending election; public
protests or the threatthereof; and the public official's personal interest in maintaining an image as a supporterof the rule of law. While includinga single cost parameter is an appropriatesimplifying assumption for a general model, it conflates two
distinct concepts in ways that might cloud an empirical test. In particular,distinct
levels of public supportmay measure the willingness of constituentsto defend their
courts;however,they may not capturethe capacity of citizens to impose the kinds of
43
ComparativePolitics
October2004
costs on elected officials that will induce compliance. Even if a majority of constituentsbelieve that the resolutionsof their constitutionalcourt ought to be immediately implemented,this majority may not be in a position meaningfully to punish
noncompliance. Clearly,it can not if elections are rigged. Also, representativesare
likely to be judged over multiple issue dimensionsaside from the rule of law. In sum,
public support and public capacity to impose significant costs on defiant officials
are related but distinct concepts. Below, the willingness to punish, in addition to
other factors, is controlled for, and it is shown how the expected difference in publicly imposed costs of defiance can affect implementation.
Second,Vanbergassumesthatinformation,specificallythe transparencyof the question being consideredby the court,is exogenousto the interactionhe analyzes.However,
since informationis purportedto be so importantto the choices politicalofficials make
overcompliance,shouldthey not be expectedto try to influencethatinformation?13
This
issue is critical.If elected officials are able to frametheirlegal conflictseffectively,they
may be able to reduce the constituencycosts associatedwith noncompliance.On the
otherhand,it is certainlypossiblefor an officialto raisethe costs of noncomplianceinadvertentlyby spinninga conflict in a particularway. In fact, Vanberg'sown accountof
Adenauer'sbattlewith the federalconstitutionalcourtdetailseffortsby him to convince
his constituentsthatparticularcourtdecisionscould be disobeyed,an effortthatseemed
to increase ratherthan decrease opposition to his position.14The spin Cerveraand
Zedilloplacedon theirrespectiveconflictscouldhaveinfluencedtheirrespectivecosts of
noncompliance,albeitin entirelydifferentways. It is importantto considerinformation
as likelybeing endogenousto judicial-executiverelations.
The Zedilloand Cerveracases are analyzedthroughfourhypotheseson implementation, all qualifiedby a ceterisparibus condition.The immediateimplementationof a
judicial resolutionis more likely when, first, the issue'stransparencyis relativelyhigh,
second, the political importanceofficials assign to the issue underreview is relatively
low, third,public supportfor the courtis relativelyhigh, and fourth,the particularcosts
constituentscan impose on theirrepresentatives
are relativelyhigh. These two cases are
similaralongall but one of the key theoreticaldimensions:the costs Zedilloand Cervera
couldhaveplausiblyexpectedto be associatedwith defyingthe supremecourt.15The difference in these costs can explain the variancein their reactions.Also, Cerveraand
Zedillo influencedthe informationsurroundingtheir conflicts, and their efforts likely
affectedthe politicalramificationsof alternativeresponsesto the court'sdecisions.
The Zedillo Case
In the wake of the 1994 peso crisis the Mexican economy was strengthenedby fiftytwo billion dollars in loan commitments made by the United States, Canada, and
44
JeffreyK. Staton
several internationallending agencies. Using these funds, the secretary of finance
and public credit, primarily through the National Banking and Securities
Commission, attemptedto ensure the viability of the country'sbanks.16The secretary of finance and public credit'smost politically controversialpolicy involved the
assumptionof debt from certainbanks incapableof meeting their obligations.It did
so through the Fund for the Protection of Bank Savings, a federal trust created in
1990. What made this policy controversialwas that a numberof the loans assumed
under the fund were grantedunder questionablerisk managementstandardsand in
some cases were illegal, made by bank managersto family members, friends, and
themselves.17Some of these loans were unrecoverable,and in March 1998 Zedillo's
administrationproposedtransferringthem to Mexico's generalpublic debt.
As some of the irregularloans assumedunderthe fund involvedbankersand industrialistsclosely connectedto Zedillo'sPartidoRevolucionarioInstitucional(PRI), the
political oppositionin congress approachedthe proposalwith much skepticism.Over
the next year oppositionpartymembersin the chamberof deputiesrequestedinformation on the internal structureof the fund. These requests were denied by Zedillo's
which cited provisionsof the Law on Institutionsof Creditlimitingthe
administration,
releaseof financialinformationto thejudicialandexecutivebranchesonly.18
In September1998 a chambersubcommitteehired CanadianMichael Mackey to
audit the Zedillo administration'shandling of the bank crisis. Before Mackey could
complete his work, Carlos Cabal Peniche, the former president of Banco Uni6n, a
failed national bank, announcedthat he had helped illegally to channel twenty-five
million dollars into the 1994 PRI electoral campaignthrougha trust account opened
by membersof the PRI'sexecutive committeeand fundedprimarilyby loans granted
by Banco Uni6n to phantomcompanies affiliated with Cabal himself.19These loans
made up part of the unrecoverabledebt set to be assumedby the congress. Although
Zedillo denied knowledge of these transactions,Cabal claimed thatthe presidenthad
participatedin the scheme directly.Cabal'sallegations, true or not, lent a degree of
specificity to the chamber'ssearch for informationon the natureof the Fund for the
Protectionof Bank Savings.Although Mackey cited legal supportsupposedlyreleasing the secretaryof finance and public credit from its obligationto protectthe secrecy of financial transactions,his requestwas definitively denied on July 9, 1999.20
In response, the chamber moved a constitutional controversy claim against
Zedillo and membersof his cabinet.The court'sAugust 24, 2000, decision held that
"the interest safeguardedby the concept of fiduciary secrecy must not obstructthe
Congress's [aforementioned] faculties when private debt is converted into public
debt."21The court requiredthe presidentto compel the secretaryof finance to deliver the requesteddatato the chamberwithin thirtydays. Zedillo complied immediately, issuing an orderto thateffect within hoursof the announcement.22
45
ComparativePolitics
October2004
The Cervera Case
The YucatanState ElectoralCouncil is the primaryadministrativeauthorityresponsible for the state'selections. The council is comprisedof seven counselors, appointed
by the twenty-five member,unicameralstate legislatureundera four-fifthssupermajority voting rule. Officially registeredpolitical parties and nonprofit social organizations each may nominateup to three candidates.23
On August 31, 2000, the fifteen delegates affiliated with the PRI voted to extend
the current counselors' terms through the May 2001 election. The eight delegates
from the PartidoAcci6n Nacional (PAN) and two from the Partido de la Revoluci6n
Democrdtica (PRD) voted against the extension, leaving the PRI five votes shy of
the supermajorityrequirement.Disregardingthe voting rule, congress emitted a legislative decree approvingthe extension, and Victor CerveraPacheco, the state's PRI
governor,publishedit without objection. In response, the state PRD executive committee moved a constitutionalrevision claim before the superiorbench of the federal
electoral tribunalin Mexico City. On October 12, the tribunalinvalidatedthe decree
and orderedthe congress to ratify a list of candidatesfor a new election.
Insteadof endorsingthe fifty-ninenomineespreviouslyratifiedfor the first election,
a committeechairedby majorityleaderMyrnaHoyos votedto amendthe probativeevidence necessaryto satisfy the qualificationsfor State ElectoralCouncil membership.
Afterapplyingthe new standards,the numberof eligible candidatesdroppedfromfiftynine to fourteen,the exact numbernecessaryto fill the seven counselorpositions and
their seven substitutes.Curiously,the only nominees to survivethe cut were proposed
by the PRI or social organizationsaffiliatedwith the PRI.24 On October16 Governor
Cerverapublishedthe new standardsin the official YucatAnDiario, and Hoyos moved
thatthe congressvote on the proposedcandidates.In light of the fact thatthe governor's
publicationof the new rules and the congress'sfinal vote were set to take place on the
same day,the nominatingorganizationswere providedno opportunityto updatetheir
rejectedproposals.The PANandthe PRD membershipwalkedout of the legislativesession, and the remainingnomineeswere elected unanimouslyby fifteenpriistas, technically satisfying the supermajorityrequirement.In response, the PRD and the PAN
appealedto the federal electoraltribunal.On November 15 the tribunalagain struck
down the congress's procedures,requiringGovernorCervera to take all necessary
actionsto ensurethe resolution'sproperimplementation.
This time, neitherthe governornor the congress respondedto the tribunal.In fact,
Hoyos claimed that the tribunalhad itself violated the law.25For his part, Governor
Cervera argued that the tribunal had violated Yucatain'ssovereignty.26 In mid
Decemberthe tribunalselected its own electoralcouncil and requiredthe congress to
administeroaths of office. The congress again refused to implementthe decision.27
On January15 actuarieshiredby the tribunaltook the oaths of the federallyimposed
46
JeffreyK. Staton
counselors and demandedthat Cervera order the secretaryof finance to release to
them thirty-eightmillion pesos. Not only were the funds not released, but scores of
PRI activists denied the counselors access to the State Electoral Council's official
building. Effectively,Yucatanhad two electoralcouncils.
This state of affairs continued for nearly two months. On March 11 the congress
approveda proposal initiatedby GovernorCerveraseeking to combine the membership of the two councils. The resulting legislative decree clearly evaded the federal
electoral tribunal'sresolutions;however,it was not an administrativeact. Instead,it
establisheda new legal order.The conflict thus lay outside of the tribunal'sjurisdiction, and on March 14 it declareditself incompetent.28
Immediatelyfollowing the decision, the PRD, the PAN, and the LaborParty (PT)
all filed claims with the supremecourt seeking an orderdeclaringthe decree unconstitutional.On its face, the decree appearedto violate the federalconstitution'sprohibition of amendmentsto electorallaws within ninety days of an election. The supreme
court's decision striking down the decree went further.Among other holdings, the
court claimed that the decree itself, regardless of when it was passed, violated the
very structureof Mexican federalgovernmentby attemptingto evade a decision of a
judicial body properlyempoweredto rule on the matter.The courtrequiredthe governor to implementfully the previousfederalelectoraltribunalresolutions.
In response to a question about whetheror not he would defy the supremecourt,
GovernorCerveraresponded:"How am I going to comply with the terms of a resolution if I don't know the terms?"29Days later,the governorquestionedthe legitimacy of the court'sdecision, noting that "this resolutiondeserves to be studiedbecause
it contains more political ingredients than juridical."30However, he did promise
compliance.Yet by April 16, the deadline the court set for full implementation,the
funds had not been released, retardingthe new council's ability to prepareproperly
for the election. Cerveraeventuallyorderedthe funds released,but not until April 28,
one month following the court'soriginal decision, nearlytwo weeks aftertheir transfer had been required,and only one monthbefore the upcoming election.
Implementation
The Zedillo and Cerveracases were similar along all theoreticaldimensions except
the actual costs that their constituentscould have imposed in response to noncompliance. These costs can explain the varying responses of the two executives. Although
qualitativemethods do not provide the precise measures of uncertaintyoffered by
quantitativemethods, it is no less importantto address uncertaintyin a qualitative
study.31Accordingly,at the end of this section possible sources of uncertaintythat
might temperthe centralcausal inferencedrawnhere will be addressed.
47
ComparativePolitics
October2004
Transparency Both cases were highly coveredby the media. Nationalnewspapers,
magazines,radio,andtelevisionprogramsall reportedon the politicalconflictsunderlying the cases, the constitutionalissues to be resolvedby the court,the court'seventual
resolutions,and the subsequentreactionsof the governmentofficials whose authority
the court had challenged.32Undoubtedly,Zedillo and Cerveracould have reasonably
expected their actions to be reportedto their constituents.Additionally,the executive
actions requiredin both cases were similarin substance,and they could not have been
more easily comprehensible.The courtdid not provideeitherZedillo or Cerveramuch
room to evade compliancethroughsome sort of creativeinterpretation.
EitherZedillo
would orderhis secretaryof finance to turn over the information,or he would not.
EitherCerverawould orderhis secretaryof finance to release the funds, or he would
not.
Political Importance Politicalimportancemeasuresthe official'ssense of the policy
benefit derivedfrom the matterunderjudicial review.Here it describeswhat Zedillo
and Cerverastood to gain from eitherwinning a favorablejudicialresolutionor ignoring an unfavorableone. Both officials likelyperceivedthe issues to be highly important.
The chamberof deputiesdid not formallyaccuse Zedillo of directparticipationin
the scandal concerningthe Fund for the Protectionof Bank Savings, even after the
Banco Uni6n datawere released,so it mightbe askedwhetherZedillo caredat all about
the decision to deny Mackey access. Thereare at least two reasonswhy Zedillo could
have perceivedthe issue to be important.First,while he likely did not believe thatthe
data would directlyimplicatehim, it is likely thatthe presidentwould have ratherprevented the oppositionfrom digging througha new mountainof financial information.
Offeringthe oppositionmore information,even if Zedillo knew he was not involved,
could have presentedfurtheropportunityfor the constructionof theoriesabouthow the
presidentmight have helped illegally fund his own 1994 campaign.Given Zedillo's
stronginterestin developinga legacy as a committedreformer,he musthave wantedto
avoid a prolongedinvestigation.Second,as Zedillo argued,he could have significantly
disagreedwith the constitutionalclaim raisedby the chamber.The case raisedan important issue aboutthe separationof powers,and it is likely that Zedillo significantlyvalued the continuedstrengthof the presidencyover the legislature,especially in an area
wherethe law plausiblyempoweredthe executivebranchto denythe request.33
Clearly,this imputationof Zedillo's policy interestsis speculative.However,there
is an observablereason to believe that Zedillo put a great value on maintainingpossession of the information, whatever the particular rationale happened to be.
Zedillo's administrationfound increasingly creative ways to withhold the information from the chamberand did not release the data until compelled to by a supreme
court order.This withholding,if nothing else, suggests that the presidentcaredabout
maintainingcontrol. If there was no policy benefit in denying Mackey access, then
48
JeffreyK. Staton
Zedillo would have been expected to turnover the informationupon the first request.
Finally,it might be arguedthat, while Zedillo may have valued the databefore the
election, Labastida'sloss would have decreased his interest in maintainingcontrol.
Althoughthe interestsposited above would not be affectedby the electoralfortunesof
the PRI, if Zedillo was protectingthe informationin orderto shield his copartisansor
Labastidahimself from furtherscandal, it is possible that Fox's victory could have
reducedthe policy importanceof the denial.While plausible,the Banco Uni6n datadid
not implicateLabastida.Moreover,thereappearsto have been a debatewithin the PRI
about how Mackey'srequestshould have been handled,with some membersarguing
that failing to release the data was causing more harm to the PRI's alreadydamaged
image.The denialdamagedthe PRI'selectoralchancesby providingadditionalrhetorical fodderto reform-mindedcandidates.Unless Zedillo was attemptingto engineera
PRIloss, the policy benefit of the denialshouldnot havechangedafterthe election.
There are at least three clear reasonswhy GovernorCerverawas likely to perceive
the issue at staketo be important.First,the preelectoralcontroversyhad dominatedthe
governor'spublicappearancesand mediacoveragesince his initialconflictwith the federal electoraltribunal in October2000. He had alreadydefied the secondhighestcourt
in the federaljudiciaryfor six monthspriorto the supremecourt'sinvolvementin the
case, and this defiance itself, independentof the underlyingconflict, made the issue
important. Second, the governor, as he argued, could have sincerely believed that
Yucatan'ssovereigntywas underattack.Third,with a close election on May 27, votes
matteredin a way they probablyhad not duringthe previousyears of questionablyfair
electoralcompetition.While the federallyimposedelectoralcouncil containeda majority of PRI members,it was not uniformlyceverista.Thus, some have arguedthat, the
longer Cerveracould delay the new council'sabilityto carryout fully its mission, the
easierit wouldbe for him to frustrateits attemptsto ensurea fairelection.34
Public support Since the court decisions were issued within seven months of each
other,it is likely that the court enjoyed similarlevels of deep societal commitmentto
its institutionalstructurefollowing both of them. Nevertheless, diffuse public support for the court may have been lower in Yucatanthan in the republicas whole. The
difference in Zedillo's and Cervera'sreactions may be attributableto differences in
the court'ssupport.This conclusion would be consistent with expectations,but such
an effect could not be disentangledfrom the one hypothesizedto be associated with
the perceivedcosts of noncompliance.
Ideally,the supremecourt'snational diffuse supportshould be comparedwith its
diffuse support in Yucatan. Unfortunately, data for such a comparison were not
accessible. However,measures of how yucatecos judged the supremecourt'sbehavior in the Cervera case and of the supreme court's national approval rating only
months after the Zedillo decision are available.35Both are measures of the court's
specific support,a concept positively correlatedwith legitimacy.36Table 1 shows a
49
ComparativePolitics
October2004
Table 1 Public Supportfor the SupremeCourt
Percentage
Opinionof SupremeCourtin YucatAn
Courtnational
controversy/Supreme
approvalratingb
YucatAn
(May2001)
National
(December2000)
Good,Very Good /Approve
52
50
Fair/Neitherapprovenordisapprove
14
21
Poor,VeryPoor/Disapprove
17
7
Table 1. Comparisonof supportfor SupremeCourtin the Republicas a whole with
its supportin Yucatan.The tabledoes not show percentagesfor "don'tknow/no
response"forthe Yucatansurvey;,it does not show percentagesfor "noresponse"in
thenational
poll.
Courtof
'Thequestion
howtheSupreme
read,"Whatis youropinionconcerning
Justicebehavedduringthe pre-electoralconflictin Yucatan
bThe questionread,"Whatis
youropinionof the SupremeCourt?"
Sources:Reforma,"Encuestaestatalsobrelas eleccionesparagobernadorde
YucatAn,"
May 4-5, 2001. Reforma,"Monthlyseries."December2-3, 2000.
comparisonof public supportfor the supremecourt following the two decisions.37In
the Yucatin poll, 52 percentof respondentsjudged the court'sbehaviorto have been
good to very good during the preelectoral conflict. Comparatively,50 percent of
respondents in the national poll strictly approved of the court's job. While these
results do not representoverwhelmingpublic support,the court's supportwas relatively similar at the national and state levels. At the very least, if there is a difference, the supreme court might have enjoyed marginallymore public support in the
Cerveracase than in the Zedillo case, in contrastto the problemidentified above.
Public Costs of Noncompliance: Zedillo
In his December 1994 inaugural
speech, Ernesto Zedillo laid out a vision for a new kind of Mexican politics, in
which the republic'slaws would truly govern public policymaking.38Many Mexican
presidentsenteredoffice noting similar societal desires. What makes Zedillo unique
is that he actuallyproposeda set of fundamentalpolitical reforms supposedlyaimed
at creatingbetter formal institutionsto ensure the rule of law and dismantlinginformal institutionsthat overly concentratedpower in the presidency.39
The 2000 presidential election presented Zedillo with an opportunityto make
good on his commitment to the rule of law. Indeed, seconds after the Federal
Electoral Institute announced that Vicente Fox Quesada would likely be the next
president,Zedillo appearedlive from the presidentialresidence standingin front of a
portraitof Benito Juirez and proclaimedhis full supportfor the transition.The following day, Zedillo met with PRI state governorsand asked that they all recognize
50
JeffreyK. Staton
Fox's electoraltriumph,blamingthe loss on public fatigue with PRI governance.40
Both Zedillo's reaction to the initial election results and his appeal to the party's
state leaders were viewed disdainfully by many priistas, especially those who
believed the president was attemptingto build a personal democratic legacy at the
expense of the party.Representativeof this reaction, federal deputy Efr6nEnriquez
Ord6fiezarguedthat Zedillo preferredto "leave a legacy to his childrenas the great
democratizer"thanto remainfaithfulto his party.41
The intra-PRIoppositionto Zedillo continuedto build in the weeks following the
election. In fact, by July 21 five groups within the PRI were calling for the president's expulsion.42Zedillo lacked much of whatever party supporthe had enjoyed
over his sexenio. The time for him seriously to promotepolicy goals was over.
Whetheror not defying the court might have resulted in some sort of public turn
against a possible late term policy proposal, Zedillo would have been unable to promote one without party support.Additionally,by the time the court released its decision, Zedillo's candidatehad already lost the presidentialelection, the first electoral
defeat for a PRI presidential candidate in seventy-one years. Obviously, Zedillo
faced no meaningful electoral constraints;he was already a lame duck. Did Zedillo
face no public costs for defiance at all? Despite (or because of) his weakenedpolitical position resultingfrom the election, Zedillo continuedto promotehis message of
a new Mexico.43Indeed,he had been championingthe great transitionfor nearlytwo
months at the time of the resolution.Although it is unlikely that the president'spolicy or electoral goals could have been affected by a negative public reactionto whatever decision he took, had he defied the court, he would have undoubtedlyaffected
his legacy as a committeddemocrat.And this legacy was somethingthatZedillo valued greatly. Indeed, 50 percent of the president'spress releases between July and
September2000 explicitly make referenceto the accomplishmentsof his sexenio; 42
percentof those press releases are aboutMexico's new democracy.44
In the sense that a legacy is developed largely by public opinion, the presidentis
likely to have perceived the costs associated with a negative public reaction to noncomplianceto have been relativelylarge.An alternativeway of conceptualizingthese
costs is to think about what Zedillo's legacy had to gain from compliance. In other
words, by immediately issuing the order Zedillo could furtherdevelop his legacy.
Had he defied the court, he would have forgone this importantopportunity,and that
missed chance can be conceptualizedas a utility loss. Whetherconceptualizedas a
direct blow to his legacy or as a missed opportunityto develop it further,Zedillo
faced significant costs for failing to implement the decision. Zedillo's response
evinces an understandingof the likely incongruity of championing a transitionto
democracywhile defying the supremecourt.
Public Costs of Noncompliance: Cervera Unlike ErnestoZedillo, Victor Cervera
was in no dangerof affectingan image as a committeddemocrat.His legacy could not
51
ComparativePolitics
October2004
have been greatly damaged by defying the court, nor would his legacy be greatly
enhancedby complying.The governorwas widely viewedas a traditionalPRI dinosaur.
In contrast to Zedillo, he had significantly centralized power and thus polarized
Yucatin'spoliticallandscape.InYucatinone was eitherwith or againstthe governor.
In spite of havinglittle to lose in termsof a democraticlegacy,Cerveradid confront
possible electoralconstraints.At the time of the court'sresolution,the May 27 election
had yet to be contested by his chosen successor, and a majorityof his constituents
believedthatthe supremecourthad behavedappropriatelyduringthe conflict. Cervera
clearly caredaboutthe election. He had fought strongoppositioninside the state PRI
successfully to promote the gubernatorialcandidacyof his longtime friend Orlando
Paredes Lara. Also, the election was set to be the closest in Yucatin's history.45
Accordingly,Cerveramay have faced seriouselectoralcosts for defiance.
The real question is how much electoral supportwould Cerverahave likely lost as
a result of his delayedresponseto the supremecourt.The answeris, very little, for at
least two reasons. First, given the kind of politician Cerverawas and his five-month
defiance of the federal electoral tribunal,his reaction to the court's order was not
unexpectedby yucatecos. Cervera'sreactionwould probablyhave been perceived as
unacceptable mostly by voters already predisposed to vote against his candidate.
Cerverawould have been unlikely to perceive significant costs associated with noncompliance. Indeed, as suggested by the data in Table 2, party identification was
strongly related to opinion over Cervera'sbehavior in the preelectoral conflict.46
Among those respondentsin the Reformapoll who were likely to vote in the May
election,just over 73 percentof PRI identifiersratedthe governor'sbehavioras good
to very good; only 8 percent rated the governor'sbehavioras poor to very poor. In
contrast,just over 68 percent of panistas judged his behavior to have been poor to
very poor. The most interestingresult concerns the split in opinion among independent voters: 42 percent rated the governor'sbehavioras good to very good, and 36
percent rated it as poor to very poor. This result suggests a second reason why the
governorlikely viewed the costs associatedwith noncomplianceas negligible.
Because of the link between party identification and public opinion concerning
Cervera'sbehavior,the governor'sreactionwas likely neitherto lose him much support from his partisansnor to gain him opposition support.However,there was a significant numberof independentidentifiers, and supportfor Cerveraamong independents was split. Still, 65 percentof independentsspecified a preferencein the governor'srace. How did undecided,likely voters perceived Cervera'sbehavior?Cervera's
supportwas actually quite strong among those respondentswho were likely to vote
but who had not chosen a candidateby May 5. Of undecided likely respondents,59
percent rated the governor'sbehavior as fair to very good, while only 24 percent
ratedhis behavioras poor to very poor. Thus, the voters most likely to change their
minds largely approvedof Cervera'sbehavior.Unlike Zedillo, Cervera faced little
52
JeffreyK. Staton
Table 2 Public Supportfor Victor Cerveraby PartisanIdentification
Percentage
Opinion'
PRI
PAN
Good/Very good
73.5
12.0
42.4
Fair
11.0
13.5
10.6
Poor/Verypoor
8.1
68.4
36.4
Don't know/Noresponse
7.4
6.0
10.6
N
136
133
66
Independent
Table2. Distributionof responsesamonglikely votersto questionaskingfor
respondent'sopinionover the role of VictorCerverain the Yucat6npre-electoral
controversy.Since less than2%of respondentsidentifiedwith the PRD, these
observationsarenot reviewedhere.
'The questionread,"Whatis youropinionconcerninghow VictorCerverabehaved
duringthe pre-electoralconflictin Yucatsn?"
dPartyIdentification:"Ingeneral,do you consideryourselfpriista,panistaor
perredista?Veryor somewhat?"Measurereportedherecollapsesstrongandweak
identifiers.
Source:Reforma,"Encuestaestatalsobrelas eleccionesparagovernadorde
Yucatin."
May4-5,2001.
cost in defying the court. The electoral costs were marginal,and he could not have
seriously affected his democraticlegacy by ignoringthe order.
Uncertainty
Three possible causes of uncertaintyfor the inference over the impact of perceived
costs on compliance should be highlighted.First,the public supportdata for Cervera
reportedin Table 2 come from a poll taken a week after the governorhad delivered
the requested funds to the State Electoral Council. It is possible that respondents
would have reported lower levels of support had the poll been taken earlier.
However,the argumentis about the distributionof support for Cervera.Thus, it is
necessary to ask whetheror not the observed supportwould have been lower across
all respondentshad Reformaconductedthe survey before final implementation.For
example, undecidedvoters may have raised their supportfor the governorrelatively
more than other voters in response to his order to transferthe funds. In this case,
Cervera would surely have faced high costs for his continued noncompliance.
Additionally,the item used to measure support for the governor actually measures
respondentopinion about Cervera'sbehavior over the entire conflict, not just about
53
ComparativePolitics
October2004
his response to the supremecourt.Thus, it is not possible to disentanglepublic opinion on Cervera'sreaction to the federal electoral tribunalcompletely from opinion
about his reaction to the supreme court. Unfortunately,because of data restrictions,
neitherconcern can be fully addressed.
Second, the poll on national support for the supreme court was taken in early
December 2000, roughly three months after the decision. This timing raises a question about whether or not the responses reflected opinions over supreme court
behaviorin late August. Nevertheless, the Zedillo resolutionwas arguablythe court's
most significant, and it is reasonableto assume that December opinions were affected by it. More seriously,the poll was takentwo days afterFox's inauguration,and the
transitionlikely boosted opinions on all branches of Mexican government.There is
reason to believe that supportfor Fox and supportfor the supremecourt were correlated, since job approvalratings for the congress, the president, and the supreme
court fell at similarrates during2001-2002.47 Indeed,by February2002 only 39 percent of respondents to Reforma's national poll reported high to very high job
approvalratings for the supreme court. The crucial issue is whether or not support
for the court varied between the nation as a whole and YucatAn,and it is certainly
possible that the court'ssupportin Yucatanhad fallen, as well. Since there is no correspondingYucatanpoll in February2002, there is no way to tell.
Third,it might be arguedthat the real explanationfor the variancein executives'
responses is that Zedillo, and not Cervera,was personally committedto the rule of
law and never once considered delaying the implementationof the court's decision.
Clearly, evidence suggesting that Zedillo privately considered a delay but was dissuaded by a possible negative public reaction would be sufficient to dispel such a
concern. In the absence of such evidence, there still may be reason to believe that
defying the court was a theoretically possible action available to the president.
Indeed, respected experts on Mexican politics have argued that Zedillo, despite his
legacy, was not always fully committedto the rule of law. Reviewing his role in corruption investigations, Levy and Bruhn argue: "Even in the more sober Zedillo
administration...selection of anticorruptiontargetsappearsto follow the president's
own political logic (including maintaininglegitimacy internationally)more than the
independentlogic of a judiciary."48Although Zedillo had helped build the institutional structure of the new supreme court, the Fund for the Protection of Bank
Savings decision representedthe first time the court directly challenged the president's authority in a case of such significance. In the same way that Thomas
Jefferson might have considered defying John Marshall or Richard Nixon might
have considered defying Warren Burger, Zedillo could have at least considered
refusing to deliverthe data,especially if Levy and Bruhn'scontentionaboutthe president'srespect for the judiciary is correct.
54
JeffreyK. Staton
InfluencingInformation
In orderto consider how reasonableit is to assume that informationis exogenous to
the implementationprocess, it is necessary to describe how Zedillo and Cervera
framed their conflicts. Framingattemptsmay have different effects on the costs of
noncompliance.The discussion of these two cases makes this point clear. Zedillo's
effort to influence informationsurroundinghis case began long before the conflict
was judicialized. Interestingly,the argumenthe developed in the conflict with the
chamber could have served to increase the costs of defying the supreme court. In
contrast, Cervera'sattemptsto influence informationbegan in a case alreadyjudicialized, and his spin could have decreasedthe costs of noncompliance.
Zedillo and Information Fromthe chamberof deputies'first request,Zedillo and
his secretaryof finance claimed to be statutorilyconstrainedfrom releasingthe informationon the suspectedtrustaccounts.In particular,they arguedthatto meet the chamber's requeststhey would have to violate the privacyrights of all contributorsto the
trust,notjust CarlosCabal.AlthoughMackeycited a valid exceptionto the bankingprivacy statute,his requestswere not specific enoughto meet the statutorystandard.Thus,
Zedillo attemptedto framethe issue for his constituentsas a purelylegal conflictover a
distinctstatutoryconstruction.49
The president'srefusalto turnoverthe requesteddocumentsthereforehadnothingto do with the possibilitythatthe informationsoughtby the
congress might implicatehim in an electoralscandal;rather,it was aboutprotecting
investorconfidence in the Mexican bankingsector. In light of the recent collapse of
Mexico'sbanks,this argumentwas not implausible.
Once the decision was released, the president turned a clear setback into an
opportunityto highlight furtherhis commitmentto the rule of law. Within hours of
the court's announcement,Zedillo emitted a press release promising to comply in
full. Moreover, he characterized this promise as another step his administration
would take towarddeveloping a fully consolidateddemocracy.In additionto promising to turn over the requestedinformation,Zedillo expressed his long commitment
to the rule of law and the separationof powers.50
Zedillo's effort to influence the informationsurroundinghis case was aimed at
legitimatinghis decision within the existing legal structure.His argumentwas about
the law. This approachwas reasonablein the context of a conflict with the congress.
However, once the case became judicialized, this spin likely placed a serious constraint on Zedillo's set of possible reactions. Having already developed a position
that drew authorityfrom the republic'sown institutionalstructure,Zedillo could not
have easily arguedthat a decision of the supremecourt,the fundamentalauthorityon
interpretingMexican law, could be defied. In short, the spin he developed before the
judicialization of the conflict may have increased the costs of noncompliance by
55
ComparativePolitics
October2004
making anything but immediate compliance appear fantastically inconsistent with
the approachto the conflict he had alreadydeveloped.
Cervera and Information In contrastto Zedillo, Cerverabegan his public statements over the controversyin a fully judicialized conflict. Cerveramade no effort to
develop an argumentbased in the intricacies of the existing legal structure.Rather,
he challenged the very nature of Mexican federalism by arguing that the federal
electoral tribunallacked the power to install its own electoral council and later that
the supreme court's decision was influenced by political factors. The central public
relations strategypursued by the governorwas to frame the problem in terms of a
regional-centraldivide, a divide that was quite salient in Yucatin. Once the supreme
court issued its resolution, there was nothing particularly incongruous about his
argumentforYucatAnstate sovereigntyand defiance of the court.
From the beginning, Cervera contended that the federal electoral tribunal had
overreachedits jurisdictionby continuallyinterferingwith the local congress'swork.
In early January2001 he hosted eleven PRI governorsand PRI nationalleaderDulce
Maria Sauri in Merida to discuss the relationshipbetween the federal government
and the states and to win their supportfor his battle with the tribunal.At the close of
the meeting, he remindedhis guests that"it is the obligationof all state authoritiesto
This effort to frame the conflict in
keep watch over individual state sovereignty."51
terms of state sovereignty was calculated. Given his constituents' strong sense of
regional identity,the appealwas aimed at precisely the right people.52Indeed,nearly
50 percent of respondentsin the Reformapoll considered their personal identity to
be yucateco. Only 29 percent consideredthemselves mexicano. Moreover,nearly 38
percent of respondentsagreed with the statementthatYucatin ought to be an independent state. Among those respondents,71 percentjudged Cervera'sbehaviorduring the preelectoralconflict to have been fair to very good.
The governor'sattemptto framethe conflict in terms of the regional-centraldivide
likely helped lower the possible costs associatedwith noncompliance.Despite the fact
that manyyucatecos supportedthe supremecourt'sdecision, the governormay have
maintainedhis own supportby linking his position to the strong sense of regional
autonomysharedby his constituents.Thus, Cerveramay have communicatedhis way
out of muchof the constraintssupportivepublicscan imposeon recalcitrantexecutives.
Conclusion
Why do some elected officials immediatelyimplementthe decisions of theirconstitutional courts, while others delay and defy? While Vanberg'smodel nicely integrates
an importantset of insights from relatively diffuse studies, it leaves a number of
56
JeffreyK. Staton
issues unresolved. First,the willingness and capacityof the public to enforcejudicial
decisions are distinct concepts and might remain so analytically.While the supreme
court enjoyed significant supportin Yucatnn,the distributionof political supportfor
Cerverawas such that he had little to fear from a public backlashin response to his
defying the order.The same can not be said for Zedillo, who faced significantpublic
costs had he defied the court. In the end, because the theoreticalmodel is multivariate, additionaltests will likely requiremultipleobservationsin orderto get systematic
control over alternativecausal variables.However,operationalizingthe constituentbased costs of noncompliancewill be tricky in a large-nstudy.While data on diffuse
public supportor specific public supportfor individualdecisions are better than no
measure of the costs associated with noncompliance,they are probablynot enough,
nor would they accuratelyreflect the distinctionbetween willingness and capacity to
defend a court. Votersmake choices based on a numberof issues in additionto the
ways their representativesinteractwith their constitutionalcourt. Additionally,elections are not held every week. To the extent that memories are short,public enforcement may breakdown.Also, thereare costs associatedwith public backlashesthatare
not electoral. When elected officials actually care about how they are remembered,
even if voters can not directly affect their electoral or policy interests,they may be
able to exercise a measure of control over their behavior.Finally, elections do not
always work, and even when they do, elected officials have to believe that they will
lose supportin ways that matterin orderto perceive significantcosts associatedwith
any decision. While large data sets can be helpful, datarestrictionsmay make small-n
studies of public enforcementparticularlyuseful.
Second, informationmay be endogenous to interbranchrelations. Consideration
of information as exogenous may be helpful when asking particular kinds of
researchquestions, but it does not mean that informationis actually exogenous. In
fact, since framingissues is what good politicians do well, it should come as no surprise that they attemptto frame their legal conflicts and in some cases do so effectively. It is clear that both Ernesto Zedillo and Victor Cervera tried to control the
informationsurroundingtheir conflicts. Still, good politicians sometimes fail to spin
issues successfully or, as the Zedillo case suggests, choose a frame that suits one
conflict yet is ultimatelyill suited for another.Futuretheoreticalanalysis might consider the constraintsthat institutions,like judicial review, place on politicians when
they attemptto develop a coherent message. Further,judges, like politicians, have
incentives to use the media if informationreally is important.53Futureresearchalso
might considerthe conditionsunderwhichjudges themselves are likely to enterpublic relations battles. Moreover,scholars might consider what happens when judges
and politicians battle over how to frame a conflict. Are judges or politicians better
able to shape a political conflict? While the conclusions on political spin for these
two cases are only suggestive, they suggest a numberof fruitfulavenues of research.
57
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October2004
NOTES
I would like to thankAlejandroMoreno of Reformafor providingthe data used in this paper.I especially
thankJohnCarey,BarbaraGeddes,and severalanonymousreviewersfor helpfulcomments.
1. See GuillermoO'Donnell,"HorizontalAccountabilityin New Democracies,"Journal of Democracy,
9 (July 1998), 112-26.
2. Pilar Domingo, "JudicialIndependence:The Politics of the SupremeCourt in Mexico,"Journal of
LatinAmericanStudies, 32 (2000), 705-35; GretchenHelmke, "The Logic of StrategicDefection: CourtExecutiveRelationsin ArgentinaunderDictatorshipand Democracy,"AmericanPolitical ScienceReview,96
(June2002), 291-304; MatiasIaryczower,PabloT. Spiller,and MarianoTommasi,"JudicialDecision Making
in UnstableEnvironments:
Argentina1938-1998,"AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience, 46 (October2002),
699-716.
3. Georg Vanberg,"EstablishingJudicial Independence in West Germany:The Impact of Opinion
Leadershipand the Separationof Powers,"33 (April 2000), 333-53; Georg Vanberg,"Legislative-Judicial
Relations:A Game-TheoreticApproachto ConstitutionalReview,"AmericanJournalofPolitical Science,45
(April2001), 346-61.
4. Vanberg,"Legislative-Judicial
Relations,"p. 347.
5. ArturoVizcainoZamora,Mexico City,June 10, 2000. All but threeinstancesof noncomplianceinvestigatedby the supremecourtduringthe 1990s endedin the implementationof the decision.A summaryof the
data on noncomplianceclaims in amparosuits is availablefrom the authorupon request.Althoughthere is
considerablevariancein the time authoritiesdelay, all cases that were not dismissedby the court ended in
compliance.
6. See James L. Gibson, GregoryA. Caldeira,and VanessaA. Baird, "Onthe Legitimacyof National
PoliticalScienceReview,92 (June1998), 343-58.
High Courts,"American
7. DavidEaston,A SystemsAnalysisof PoliticalLife(New York:Wiley, 1965).
8. See JamesF Spriggs,"The SupremeCourtand FederalAdministrativeAgencies:A Resource-Based
Theory and Analysis of Judicial Impact,"AmericanJournal of Political Science, 40 (November 1996),
1122-51.
9. See RobertStoverand Don Brown, "Understanding
Complianceand Noncompliancewith the Law:
The Contributionsof UtilityTheory," Social Science Quarterly,56 (1975), 363-75; JohnA. Clarkand Kevin
T. McGuire,"Congress,the SupremeCourt,andthe Flag,"PoliticalResearchQuarterly,49 (1996), 771-81.
10. See RandallL. Calvert,"Rationality,Identity,and Expression,"in Ira Katznelsonand Helen Milner,
eds., Political Science: TheState of the Discipline, 3rd ed. (New York:W W Nortonand AmericanPolitical
ScienceAssociation,2002).
11. Vanberg,"EstablishingJudicialIndependence,"
pp. 341-48.
12. See Clarkand McGuire,p. 776; and RichardM. Johnson, The Dynamics of Compliance:Supreme
CourtDecision-Making
from a New Perspective(Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress, 1967).
13. Thomas E. Nelson and Donald R. Kinder,"Issue Framesand Group-Centrismin AmericanPublic
Opinion,"JournalofPolitics, 4 (November1996), 1055-78.
14. Vanberg,"EstablishingJudicialIndependence,"
pp. 344-45.
15. On qualitativedesigns for testing multivariatetheories,see Gary King, RobertKeohane,and Sidney
Verba,DesigningSocial Inquiry(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1994), pp. 140-41.
16. Isaac Katz, "The Crisis of the Mexican Banking System, " WesternCentrefor EconomicResearch
InformationBulletin,41 (October1996), 1-8.
17. MichaelW. Mackey,"Informede MichaelW. Mackeyen la evaluaci6nintegralde las operacionesy
funcionesdel FondoBancariode Proteccional Ahorro,FOBAPROAy la calidadde supervisi6nde los programasdel FOBAPROAde 1995 a 1998 (Juliode 1999),"GacetaParlamentaria,Cdmarade Diputados.
18. Ley de Institucionesde Credito,TituloSexto,Articulo117.
58
JeffreyK. Staton
19. Andres Oppenheimer,"BankerTells of Huge PRI Donations:FugitiveSays $25 Million Campaign
Gift 'Normal'in Mexico,"MiamiHerald,May 29, 1999,p. 16A.
20. Ley de Protecci6nal Ahorro Bancario,Articulo 7, transitorio.On the response of the secretaryof
finance and public credit, see Comunicadode prensa 71/99, Secretariade Hacienda y Credito Piblico,
Unidadde Comunicaci6nSocial.
21. SemanarioJudicialde la Federaci6ny su GacetaTomo: XII, Agosto de 2000, Tesis: P/J. 87/2000
Pigina: 980.
22. Comunicadode prensa0007/2000, Comisi6nNacionalBancariay de Valores.
23. Article90, Codigo Electoraldel EstadodeYucatAn(CEEY).
24. Juiciode Revisi6nConstitucional,SUP-JRC-440/2000and SUP-JRC-445/2000Acumulados(113).
25. Luis A. Boffil G6mez, "Legisladoresdel PRI pretenden prolongar los poderes en Yucatan,"La
Jornada,InternetEdition,Nov. 17, 2000.
26. Luis A. Boffil G6mez, "El Congresode YucatAndesafiaa tribunalfederal,"La Jornada,Internetedition, Nov. 18, 2000.
27. Luis A. Boffil G6mez, "Reinstalael Congresode Yucat6na consejerosinvalidadospor el Trife,"La
Jornada,Internetedition,Jan.5, 2001.
28. Acuerdo13/2001,Sala Superior14 March2001.
29. GustavoCastilloGarcia,"Invalidala SupremaCorteel superconsejoelectoralyucateco,"La Jornada,
Internetedition,Apr.8, 2001.
30. Luis A. Boffil G6mez, "DescartaCerveraun nuevo desacato; la fecha de comicios, inamovible:
Creel,"La Jornada,Internetedition,Apr. 10, 2001.
31. On addressinguncertaintyin qualitativestudies,see King, Keohane,andVerba,pp. 31-32.
32. It is beyondthe scope of this articleto providea comprehensivelist of citations.A searchfor articles
on the Fund for the Protectionof Bank Savingsduring2000 at La Jornada'sweb site under"FOBAPROA"
generated1,305 hits. A similarsearchunder"GobernadorCervera"during2001 generated587 hits. Even a
search under "Myrna Hoyos" generated seventy-five. In contrast, a search under "Anatocismo" or
"Capitalizaci6nde intereses,"terms used by the press to describeanotherpolitically salient supremecourt
decision,generatedat most twenty-ninehits duringthe time the case was covered.Fora list of frontpage articles on the cases, please contactthe author.
33. See Andrea Becerril, "El expediente,nuevo motivo de enojo para priistas,"La Jornada, Aug. 25,
2000.
34. Personalcommunicationwith Alfredo Rodriguezy Pacheco, presidentof the PAN State Executive
Committee,June26, 2001, and EfrainPoot,a politicalanthropologistin Merida,June27, 2001.
35. These dataare still not ideal. I would like to comparenationalsupportfor the court'sZedillo decision
with statesupportfor the court'sCerveradecision.Unfortunately,datarestrictionsobviatesuch a comparison.
Still,the resultssuggestthatthe courtwas moreor less equallysupportedin bothcases.
36. Gibson,Caldeira,andBaird,p. 355.
37. The datawere obtainedfrom surveysconductedby the newspaperReforma.Informationon the samor by contactingthe author.
pling design can be obtainedat www.reforma.com/encuestas
38. ErnestoZedillo Poncede Le6n," InauguralAddress,December1, 1994.
39. See Jeffrey Weldon, "PoliticalSources of Presidencialismoin Mexico," in Scott Mainwaringand
MatthewSoberg Shugart,eds., Presidentialismand Democracyin LatinAmerica (Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress, 1998); Luis Rubio, "Copingwith PoliticalChange,"in Susan KaufmanPurcelland Luis
Rubio,eds., MexicounderZedillo(Mexico City:CIDAC,1998).
40. FabiolaGuarneros,FranciscoArroyo,andJorgeTeherAn,
"Se cans6 la gente del PRI, dice EZ a gobernadores,"El Universal,Internetedition,July4, 2000.
41. Reportedin FranciscoArroyo,"'A la basura,'malos lideresdel tricolor,"El Universal,Internetedition,
July 9, 2000. It shouldbe noted thatthe PRI was clearlydividedover how to deal with Zedillo. JuanArvizu
Arrija,"DemandaZedillo civilidadpolitica,"El Universal,Internetedition,July26, 2000.
59
ComparativePolitics
October2004
42. This request was denied by the honor committee of the CEN. See Francisco Arroyo, "Rechaza
Comisi6nde Honorexpulsara Zedilloy Salinas,"El Universal,Internetedition,Aug. 3, 2000.
43 MarioTorres,"Hoyvivimos unanormidaddemocritica,"El Universal,Internetedition,July 13, 2000.
44. See http://zedillo.presidencia.gob.mx/pages/f_arch_comun.html.
45. Joseph L. Klesner,"The 1998 Mexican State Elections:Post-ElectionReport,"WesternHemisphere
Election Studies, 17 (Centerfor Strategicand InternationalStudies, 1998). Recent state electoralresultscan
be foundat http://www.pan.org.mx.
46. Undera varietyof multivariatespecifications,the differencesamong PRI, PAN, and PRD identifiers
are consistentlystatisticallysignificant.Since supportfor Cerverais not being tested,the resultsare not presentedhere.They areavailableuponrequest.
47. Data providedby Reformato the authorare derivedfrom the same series used to generatenational
supportfor supremecourtcited in the text above.
48. Daniel C. Levy and KathleenBruhn,Mexico: TheStrugglefor DemocraticDevelopment(Berkeley:
Universityof CaliforniaPress,2001), p. 137.
49. It is likely thatZedillo'sargumentwas intendedfor publicconsumption,ratherthanto convincefellow
priistas. After all, he was issuingpress releasesand giving speeches,ratherthansimplyholdinga meeting of
nationalleaders,which he did to help convincepartyleadersto respectthe election.
50. ComunicadoPresidencial2371.
51. LuisA. Boffil G6mez, "EnYucatan,11 gobernadorespriistasdan su respaldoa CerveraPacheco,"La
Jornada,Internetedition,Jan.8, 2001.
52. On Yucatecan identity, see Allison Greene, "Cablevision(nation)in Rural Yucatan:Performing
Modernityand Mexicandiadin the Early 1990s,"in JosephGilbert,Anne Rubenstein,and Eric Zolov,eds.,
Fragmentsof a GoldenAge: ThePolitics of Culturein Mexicosince 1940 (Durham:Duke UniversityPress,
2001).
53. See RichardDavis, Decisions and Images: The SupremeCourt and the Press (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall,1994).
60