Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 11, No. 2: 163-183
Democracy and Disorder
Impeachment of Governors and Political Development
in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic
Oarhe Osumah
Abstract
This essay, based on data derived from existing literature and reports,
examines the impeachment of state governors in Nigeria since the return to
civil rule in May 1999. It shows that six state governors have been impeached.
This number far exceeds the cases in Nigeria’s previous three democratic
experiments combined, the First Republic (1963-1966), the Second Republic
(1979-1983), and the botched Third Republic (1991-1993). Although, at face
value, the impeachment cases since May 1999 tend to portray the fulfilment of
the liberal democratic tradition, in fact, they demonstrate political disorder, or
garrison democracy.
Keywords: Impeachment, legislature, democracy, disorder, godfathers.
The question of impeachment has been much overlooked since the Nixon and
Clinton eras in the United States. In many instances, full and fair democratic
elections are the best way to end an unpopular or corrupt government. In Nigeria,
since the return to democratic rule in May 1999 after long years of military
authoritarianism, impeachment has been a recurrent feature, one ostensibly
designed to check abuse of political power. Threats of impeachment and a
number of impeachment proceedings have been raised or initiated since the
inauguration of the Fourth Republic. The number during the Fourth Republic
far exceeds the impeachments, or threats of it, during Nigeria’s previous three
democratic experiments combined; the First Republic (1963-1966), the Second
Republic (1979-1983), and the botched Third Republic (1991-1993).
Indeed, impeachment has been more regularly deployed during the current
period of Nigeria’s constitutional history than in the historical experiences of the
most advanced democracies, such as the United States and Britain. However,
Oarhe Osumah lectures in the Department of Public Administration, Ambrose Alli University,
Ekpoma, Nigeria. <[email protected]>
December 2015 | 163
a number of countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines,
share a similar experience of functional impeachment gridlock with Nigeria’s
Fourth Republic, a fact that deserves research attention. This essay examines
varying implications of the impeachment of a number of state governors as
well as the legislative assemblies’ impeachment proceedings, in the light of
democratic requirements, traditions, values, and principles. In pursuit of these
objectives, this essay holds that impeachments and impeachment proceedings
should be consistent with liberal democratic tenets, such as the rule of law,
separation of powers, and respect for human rights as expressed through
fair hearings and judicial independence. In contrast, impeachments and
impeachment proceedings that do not reflect liberal democratic requirements
as constitutionally specified, engender disorder, or what has been characterized
as “garrison democracy.”1 The essay also seeks to illuminate the factors
underpinning the tendency toward disorder in the impeachment experiences in
Nigeria since the return to civil rule in 1999.
Methodologically, the essay relies on data derived from existing literature
on legislative studies, Hansards, and newspaper reports. Analytically, it
compares Nigeria’s impeachment experiences with those of some other
countries. Having set the context for this discourse, it is imperative to consider
the conceptual and theoretical issues.
Conceptual and Theoretical Issues: Democracy, Disorder, and
Impeachment
The three major concepts central to an appreciation of this discourse are
democracy, disorder, and impeachment. The attempt to define and theorize
about democracy defies precision, with the result that there are a number of
disagreements about its conceptualization.2 This is because democracy, by its
nature, evolves and is dynamic.3 Regardless of contentions about the definition
and theorization of democracy, there is seeming agreement that democracy is
not personal rule and that it is markedly different from tyranny or dictatorship.
The major ingredients of democracy, from the liberal perspective, include
a constitution, which defines the scope and limits of the various organs of
government; rule of law, which emphasizes due process and procedure;
separation of powers, intended to cure arbitrariness and personal or tyrannical
rule; independence of the judiciary, enabling the courts to control and declare
1Chris
Uchenna Agbedo, “Pragmatics of Garrison Democracy as a Metaphor in Nigerian Media
Political Discourse,” Awka Journal of Linguistics and Languages 3, no. 1 (2007): 1-16.
2David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovations in
Comparative Research,” World Politics 49, no. 1 (1997): 1320-1346.
3Olu Okotoni, “The Bureaucracy in Democracy,” in Beyond the Transition to Civil Rule:
Consolidating Democracy in Post-Military Nigeria, ed. W. Fawole Alade (Lagos, Nigeria:
Amkra Books, 2001), 77-94.
164 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 11, No. 2
the actions of any administrative organ that are inconsistent with the constitution
illegal, invalid, unconstitutional, and of no effect; and protection of the civil
liberties of individuals against arbitrariness in the exercise of power.4
The attributes of democracy are intended to serve political order.5 To Billy
John Dudley, political order is synonymous with political stability. He argues
that a political system is stable or orderly “if structural changes within can
be seen to proceed from the rules governing organizational processes in the
society; and such structural changes are endogenously generated.”6 A system
of order has the following attributes: (a) rules for guiding and conducting a
stable structure of exchange in the political market; (b) operative institutions
that truly commit the state to reform political rule and enforce the reforms in
order to protect actors; and (c) conformity as a result of norm internalization
and external enforcement.7
There are various formulations regarding the factors that are conducive to
order in a political system. John Michael Lee maintained that the recognition of
rules of political interaction as prescribed by the state is vital to ensuring civil
order. Lee also held that the condition of civil order presupposes an adequate
number of persons who recognize the authority of a government, and have
established communication channels within their society to uphold respect for
the limit to violence as an instrument of politics.8
According to Samuel Huntington, political order is functionally related
to the structure of social action in a particular society. That is, the social
precondition for the construction of order is the return of politics to the
dominance of social forces in a country.9 Dudley also advanced conditions for
the establishment of political order in society. He held that political order can
prevail if the constitutive rules mirror the social structure of society and the
patterns of behavior, shaped by the constitutive rules, find expression in the
regulative rules of the system.10
In contrast to order, disorder in this discourse means noncommitment of
operative institutions to a set of political rules, or nonconformity of actors
due to poor norm internalization and external enforcement. Disorder involves
4Ibid.
5
Thomas
M. Magstadst, Understanding Politics: Ideas, Institutions and Issues (Boston:
Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009), 87-88.
6Billy John Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria (Ibadan,
Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1973), 243.
7Carole Rakodi, “Order and Disorder in African Cities: The Roots and Contemporary Outcomes
to Governance and Land Management,” paper presented to the UN-WIDER Project Workshop,
Beyond the Tipping Point: Development in the Urban World, Cape Town, June 26-28, 2008.
8John Michael Lee, African Armies and Civil Order (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969), 2.
9Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1968), 79.
10Dudley, Instability and Political Order, 245.
December 2015 | 165
disruptive and destructive conflict that is rooted in the struggles and disputes
over the exercise of authority.11
Disorder and democracy can be viewed as interwoven rather than
mutually exclusive or dichotomous. In a democracy, disorder manifests itself
in the erosion of traditional values, the crisis of legitimacy, instability, personal
rule, unguarded or irresponsible utterances, the lack of cordiality, heightened
suspicion and anxiety, quarrelsomeness, tension, and the inclination toward
violent confrontation.12 In this essay, an attempt is made to demonstrate how
these elements of disorder as well as traits of democracy are embodied and
interwoven in the impeachment of state governors in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
The concept of impeachment, which is widely used in democracies, has
been variously defined. Seymour Martin Lipset described impeachment as a
legislative and political mechanism to remove a public official from office who
has been found guilty of involvement in gross misconduct in the discharge
of his assignment. He identified the stages involved in impeachment to
include accusation of gross misconduct, trial, and sometimes conviction by
legislators.13
In Nigeria, as in most democracies, the descriptions of impeachable
officials and impeachable offenses are embodied in the Constitution. Section
188 of the 1999 Constitution states that an act of gross misconduct constitutes
an impeachable offense for a Governor or Deputy Governor of a State. An
impeachable offense is defined in Section 188 (11) as “a grave violation or
breach of the provisions of this Constitution or a misconduct of such nature as
amounts in the opinion of the House of Assembly to misconduct.”14
Subsections 2 through 8 of Section 188 of the Nigerian Constitution
specify the stages, framework, and time-scale of the impeachment process.
The first stage is notification, wherein notice of an allegation is promulgated
in writing and signed by no less than one-third of the legislative members. The
second stage is receipt of notice. Within seven days of receipt of notice from
the legislative signatories, the Speaker of the House of Assembly of the State,
as the presiding officer, must ensure that the charged officeholder and every
member of the legislature is informed. In addition, the reply of the accused
officeholder to the allegation must be issued to every member of the legislature.
The third stage of the impeachment process involves making a motion.
Within fourteen days of the presentation of the notice to the Speaker of the
House of Assembly of the State (regardless of whether a statement has been
made by the defendant in reply to the allegation presented in the notice), the
11Rakodi,
12Ibid.
“Order and Disorder in African Cities,” 3.
13Seymour
Martin Lipset, The Encyclopaedia of Democracy (London: Routledge, 1995), 817821.
141999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Lagos: Government Printing Press,
1999).
166 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 11, No. 2
legislature is expected to resolve by motion, without any debate, whether the
allegation should be investigated. The fourth stage is passage of the motion.
A motion of the legislature that the allegation should be investigated must be
passed by not less than a two-thirds majority of all members.
The fifth stage is the appointment of a seven-person investigative
committee by the Chief Judge of the State, at the request of the Speaker of
the House of Assembly of the State. In the sixth stage, the officeholder under
investigation is permitted to defend himself in person or through his elected
representative before the investigative panel. The investigative committee
report constitutes the seventh stage. Within three months of its appointment,
the committee is to report its findings to the legislature. The final stage of the
impeachment process is consideration of the investigative panel’s report. If the
report has not proved the allegation against the officeholder, no further action
is taken. But when an allegation has been proved, within fourteen days of its
receipt, the legislature must consider the report. If the report is adopted by
a two-thirds majority of the legislature’s members, the accused officeholder
stands removed from office from the date of the adoption of the report.
The nature of impeachment proceedings has implications for the quality
of democracy in a country and the prospects for disorder. In a democracy,
impeachment is a legal instrument of the legislature to check gross misconduct,
identify betrayal of public trust, and ensure the effectiveness, efficiency,
transparency, and accountability of the other arms of government.15 However,
impeachment results in disorder when it is activated as an instrument of first
resort rather than one of last resort, and when its proceedings are conducted
without due regard for the scope and limits of power as embodied in a nation’s
constitution.
Commenting on the implication of impeachment, James Bryce noted:
Impeachment is the heaviest piece of artillery in the
Congressional arsenal, but because it is so heavy it is unfit
for ordinary use. It is like a hundred ton gun which needs
complex machinery to bring it into position, an enormous
charge of power to fire it, and a large mark to aim at.16
15Adeoye Akinsanya,
“Impeachment of Governor Abdul Kadir Balarabe Musa of Kaduna State,”
in Nigerian Government and Politics, 1979-1983, ed. Adeoye Akinsanya and Gordon I. Idang
(Calabar, Nigeria: Wosen Publishers, 2002), 203-223. See also, Remi Aiyede, “LegislativeExecutive Relations in Nigeria’s Democracy,” in Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in
Nigeria, ed. Emmanuel Ojo (Ibadan, Nigeria: John Archer, 2006), 141.
16Quoted in Ross H. Garber, Erik H. Zwicker, and Swan Patel, The Constitutional Standard
for Impeachment of the Governor of South Carolina, Prepared on Behalf of the Office of
the Governor of South Carolina (November 2009), 16-17, http://scstatehouse.gov/archives/
citizensinterestpage/EthicsCommissionReport/Summary.pdf (accessed October 10, 2015).
December 2015 | 167
Lending credence to this view, Justice Sylvester Ogwuta remarked during a
ruling on an impeachment case:
Impeachment of elected politicians is a very serious matter
and should not be conducted as a matter of course. The
purpose is to step aside the will of the electorate as expressed
at the polls. It has implications for the impeached and the
electorate, who bestowed the mandate on him. Whether it
takes one day or the three months prescribed by law, the rules
of due process must be strictly followed. If the matter is left
at the whims and caprices of politicians and their panels, a
state or even the entire country could be reduced to a status
of banana republic.17
This presupposes that rash impeachment constitutes disorder and a threat
to democracy and that the misuse of impeachment can overthrow the results of
a democratically held election. Used inappropriately, impeachment also could
disrupt the balance of power between the legislature and the executive branch
and create a dangerous precedent that could permanently weaken the future of
the office of the accused official.18
Certain models have been developed that highlight the nature and
character of disorderly democracy in the post-colonial Nigerian state. Among
these models are those depicting capitalist rentierism,19 patrimonialism, and
prebendalism.20 These factors conflate in dynamic ways to shape the tendencies
of operative institutions and actors in the performance of their duties. In Nigeria,
state power means everything. The control of state power yields wealth, status,
protection, and privilege, but also ought to require social accountability.21 The
representatives in government, however, have personalized and privatized
public offices and resources for self-enrichment, and the state remains the
surest gateway to the accumulation of stupendous wealth. These contradictions
underpin the politics of warfare rather than welfare incentive. In the midst of
economic recession in Nigeria, as Attahiru Jega noted, “elite contestation for
power and capture of state power is characterized by cut throat competition
17 Quoted in Augustine Osayande, “Taraba’s New Acting Gov Assumes Duty, Annuls Appointments
Made by His Predecessor since Nov. 2012,” Metro Watch, November 22, 2014, 1.
Zwicker, and Patel, The Constitutional Standard for Impeachment of the Governor of
South Carolina, 3.
19William D. Graf, The Nigerian State: Political Economy, State, Class and Political System in
Nigeria (London: Heinemann, 1988).
20Joseph Richard, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second
Republic (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
21Attahiru Jega, Democracy, Good Governance and Development in Nigeria (Ibadan, Nigeria:
Spectrum Books, 2007), 120.
18Garber,
168 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 11, No. 2
in a zero-sum game manner.”22 The fallout of such politics is manifested in
election rigging and garrison impeachments.
The Evolution and Development of Impeachment in Nigeria
The tale of the removal of public authorities from office (impeachment) in
Nigeria is arguably not new. In most of the precolonial societies that make up
present-day Nigeria, there were various weapons or mechanisms for dealing
with the irresponsible use of political power by incumbents. The people, as
the locus and fountainhead of power and authority in various communities,
expressed loss of confidence in the reigning government through practices
or actions. Some of the actions included removal of chiefs from the palace,
refusal to perform certain rituals, presentation of symbolic gifts such as an
empty calabash, the singing of anti-solidarity songs, invocation of deities’
spirits, and outright rebellion.23
With the imposition of colonialism, the practices of checking flagrant abuse
of power by incumbent political officeholders were swept into oblivion. Under
colonialism, the removal of erring political officers was executed by colonial
fiat. The clearest evidence was the humiliation, subjugation, deposition, and
hustling into exile of some traditional rulers, such as Nana Olomu of Itsekiri,
Oba Ovonramen Nogbasi of Benin, Jide Kosoko of Lagos, King Jaja of Opobo,
and William Pepple of Bonny.24 These deposed former rulers suffered this fate
because of their resistance to the introduction of colonial rule or owed to their
obnoxious policies against their subjects.
In post-colonial Nigeria, the colonial measures for removal of elected
public officeholders was modified and replaced to suit the new independent
status of the country. This was reflected in the constitutional provision for
impeachment as a legal and political weapon for checking irresponsible use of
power. The 1960, 1963, 1979, and 1999 constitutions of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria recognized and provided for impeachment of elected public
officeholders who were found guilty of involvement in gross abuse of office.
Instructively, although there was provision for the impeachment of erring
elected public officeholders in the 1960 Independence Constitution and in
the 1963 Republican Constitution, it was not invoked.25 This was not because
incumbents in elective public offices were never involved in gross misconduct
22Ibid.
23Anthony
O. Okoh, “Politics and Government in Pre-Colonial Nigeria,” in Politics and
Government: An Introductory and Comparative Perspective, ed. Augustine O. Ikelegbe (Benin
City, Nigeria: Uri Publishing, 1995), 161-176.
24Bona Chizea and Oarhe Osumah, “Two Sides of a Coin: Traditional Rulership and Mitigation of
Nonstate Security Threats in Nigeria,” African Security 8, no. 2 (2015): 80.
25Peter M. Lewis, Nigeria Country Report (Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research,
University of Cape Town, 2011), 4.
December 2015 | 169
which warranted impeachment; indeed, the military junta that ended the first
phase of civilian rule in 1966 identified political profiteers as the main target
of the military coup. The first parliament, beyond being at its threshold of
existence, was an insipid political institution, which never sat more than fiftyfour days in any year. The parliament was docile toward the executive and
rarely initiated action, including impeachment.26
Under military rule, between 1966 and October 1979, there was no case
of impeachment in the formal sense. This was due to the nature of military
rule, which jettisoned and subordinated the Constitution to decrees and edicts,
suspended the legislature, and emasculated the judiciary. As Mamman Lawan
noted, “military rule by its very nature is legal disorder incarnate.” The military
exercised “absolute power free from legislative and judicial check, a scenario
of monopoly and discretion without accountability.”27
However, with the return to electoral politics after thirteen years of
military rule, the echoes of impeachment again resurfaced in the constitutional
history of Nigeria. As mentioned earlier, the 1979 Constitution, which was
the legal framework for the Second Republic, provided for impeachment as a
legal and political mechanism to check the abuse of power by elected political
officeholders at the state and federal levels. Specifically, the legal provisions
were encapsulated in Sections 132 and 170.
Unlike the experience under the first phase of civil rule (1960-1966), threats
of, as well cases of, impeachment were recorded in the Second Republic. The
first impeachment of a state governor in the formal sense in the constitutional
history of post-colonial Nigeria was on June 18, 1981, when Alhaji Balarabe
Musa, the governor of Kaduna State, was removed from office by the State
House of Assembly. The impeachment process was initiated on May 13, 1981,
with a notice served on the governor. This was followed by the composition
of an impeachment panel on May 21, 1981, with a mandate to conduct an
investigation into the allegations. This was in keeping with Section 170 (3)
of the 1979 Constitution. On June 10, 1981, the impeachment proceeding
was commenced. It was marked by a huge turnover of litigation and counterlitigation affidavits, which pertained mainly to the integrity of the members
of the impeachment panel and the impropriety of the impeachment charges.28
Also during the Second Republic, Alhaji Ibrahim Bibi Farouk was
impeached as deputy governor of Kano State on the grounds of his refusal to
discharge assignments to him from the governor.29 The impeachments of Musa
26Ibid.
See also, John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1966), 113.
27Mamman Lawan, “Underdevelopment, Corruption and Legal Disorder in Nigeria: Exploring a
Nexus,” NIALS Journal of Law and Public Policy 1, no. 1 (2012): 74-109.
28Ibid.
29Michael Abiodun Oni, “Judicial Review of Governors’ Ladoja and Obi Impeachment in
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic,” Singaporean Journal of Business Economics and Management
170 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 11, No. 2
and Farouk reflected legal disorder. According to the Political Bureau Report
of 1986, the impeachment procedures used against Musa and Farouk violated
the spirit of the Constitution because the impeachments were activated for
political calculation rather than to punish misconduct.30 The National Party of
Nigeria (NPN) dominated the State House of Assembly and pressed its majority
to impeach Governor Musa, who was a member of the People’s Redemption
Party (PRP). The NPN and PRP were enmeshed in deep rivalry and a legal
battle.31 Also, although its intervention was sought during the impeachment,
the court held that the issue was purely a Legislative Act.32 In the case of Alhaji
Ibrahim Bibi Farouk, although when he died in 2014 Governor Musa paid
tribute to him, Musa confessed that he and Governor Abubakar had conspired
against Farouk with members of the State House of Assembly. According to
Musa,
I know he was very loyal to late Abubakar Rimi up to the
time he was impeached. He was impeached as revenge for
my impeachment. Late Rimi and I rebelled against the party
leadership. So as we discovered the ploy to impeach Rimi,
we conspired with members of the Michael Imoudu faction
of the PRP at the Kano House of Assembly to impeach him.
We believed that my impeachment was influenced by the
Mallam Aminu faction of the PRP because late Rimi and I
rebelled against the party leadership. We rebelled against
them because we suspected that they aligned themselves to
the NPN which we considered as betrayal to the “talakawa”
ideology that the party stood for.33
Besides the impeachment cases in Kaduna and Kano States, before the
1983 general elections, there was the impeachment of Chief Richard Jolowo,
then the Ondo State House of Assembly Speaker, on the grounds of dishonesty,
high handedness, and gross misconduct.34 In addition to the actual cases of
impeachment, before the 1983 general elections, there were threats and tabled
motions of impeachment. The Houses of Assembly of the then Bendel, Cross
Studies 1, no. 6 (2013): 117-131.
“Impeachment of Governor Abdul Kadir Balarabe Musa of Kaduna State.”
31Lawan, “Underdevelopment, Corruption and Legal Disorder in Nigeria.”
32Ibrahim Imam, A. O. Sambo, Wahab Olapuso Egbewole, and Abdilkadir Bolaji Abdilkadir,
“Judicial Activism and Intervention in the Doctrine of Political Questions in Nigeria: An
Exposition,” African Journal of Law and Criminology 1, no. 2 (2011): 50-69.
33Ismail Mudashir, “How We Conspired to Impeach Bibi Farouk-Balarabe Musa,” Daily Trust,
September 5, 2014, 1.
34Oni, “Judicial Review of Governors’ Ladoja and Obi Impeachment in Nigeria’s Fourth
Republic.”
30Akinsanya,
December 2015 | 171
River, Gongola, and Ondo States threatened to impeach their governors.35
These threats were frustrated before the end of the governors’ tenure in October
1983. If not for the military intervention in December 1983, which scuttled the
lifespan of the Second Republic, the chain of impeachments perhaps would
have continued.
The cases and politics of impeachment and threats of impeachment in the
Second Republic were defined and shaped by the character of the institutions
and the political party alignment. The Second Republic adopted the American
model of presidential democracy, in contrast to the British Westminster model
of parliamentary democracy with which the First Republic experimented.
The legislature at various levels had greater prerogatives than the previous
legislatures in the passage of bills. Also, during the Second Republic, the
dominant NPN had a good measure of success “in forging a coalition of elite
for the purposes of electoral competition and rent distribution.”36 Yet, the
legislature was relatively weak. During its lifespan, the National Assembly did
not initiate any significant action to check the abuse of power and corruption
in government operations. Two major reasons identified by the military junta,
which ended the Second Republic, were widespread corruption and indiscipline
in the operations of government.
Following the collapse of the Second Republic by military coup and the
consequent dominance of administration and governance by “militicians” and
their dubious political transitions, the tales of impeachment were few during the
aborted Third Republic, which operated as a diarchy. In Lagos State, Governor
Michael Otedola was threatened by the House of Assembly with impeachment
for revoking land that had been allocated to members of the House. In Cross
River State, the governor was threatened with impeachment by the House of
Assembly for daring to ask the basis for fixing N25,000.00 per annum as salary
and allowances for each legislator’s personal assistant.37 The smaller number
of impeachment cases during the aborted Third Republic was largely due to
the legal restraint on the legislature to subject the executive branch to scrutiny.
Based on Decree 50 of 1991, chief executives were shielded from legislative
scrutiny.38
Democracy and Disorder in the Impeachment of Governors since 1999
A number of actual impeachments of governors or threats of impeachment
have been executed by state legislative bodies or loomed since the return to
35Ibid.
See also, Eghosa Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence (Ibadan, Nigeria:
John Archer, 2002), 39.
36Lewis, Nigeria Country Report.
37Samuel Oni, “Governance and Legislature-Executive Relations at the State Government Level
of Nigeria’s Presidential System,” Politicke Vedy 17, no. 4 (2014): 142-156.
38Ibid.
172 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 11, No. 2
civil rule in May 1999. In aggregate, six governors have been impeached or
forced to resign under threats of impeachment.
Table 1. Impeached Governors in Nigeria since May 1999
S/N
Date
State
Governor
1.
12/9/2005
Bayelsa
2.
1/12/2006
Oyo
Rasheed Ladoja
3.
10/26/2006
Ekiti
Ayo Fayose
4.
11/2/2006
Anambra
5.
11/25/2006
6.
7/14/2014
Plateau
D.S.P Alameyeseigha
Peter Obi
Joshua Dariye
Adamawa Murtala Nyako
Reason Advanced
Money laundering
Estranged relationship with his
political godfather
Financial impropriety
Award of contract to loyalists
at inflated cost
Financial impropriety
Maladministration
Sources: Extracted by this author from various sources, including Oni, “Judicial Review
of Governors’ Ladoja and Obi Impeachment in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic”; Charles
Kumolu, “Impeachment as a Crude Weapon: The Nigerian Experience,” Vanguard,
July 13, 2014, 12; Tobi Soniyi and Wole Ayodele, “Reinstated Taraba Deputy Governor
Takes Charge,” This Day, November 22, 2014; and Bayo Akinloye, “My Impeachment
Illegal, Says Niger Speaker,” Punch, May 10, 2015.
At face value, the number of and reasons for most of the impeachment
cases suggest concern for ensuring public accountability, probity, good
governance, and thus the advancement of democratic principles. Indeed, issues
such as money laundering, financial impropriety, award of contract at inflated
cost, and maladministration can be rated as impeachable offenses. However,
the failure to deploy impeachment proceedings against some elected public
officeholders under similar allegations and charges nullifies the democratic
values of equality and nondiscriminatory treatment in the application of law.
A significant indicator of such discriminatory treatment is suggested in the
impeachment of the first five governors listed in table 1. Although about the
same time (between 2005 and 2006) the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC) accused thirty-two governors of corruption, only five
governors were impeached.39 The trend to level charges and impeach smacks
of arbitrariness and disorder.
As shown in table 1, the history of Nigeria since the return to civil rule
in 1999 indicates persistent deployment of impeachment proceedings in the
political process in a manner that nullifies democratic possibilities, with
little or no care. The prevailing impeachment wave in the country is hardly
suitable for building democracy, as the requirements, values, and principles
39 Oarhe Osumah, “Corruption Complex and the Challenges of Anticorruption Policy Effectiveness
in Nigeria” (Ph.D. diss. submitted to the University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria, 2012).
December 2015 | 173
of democracy are either subverted or completely undermined. Ordinarily,
the building of institutions and democracy requires politicking. However, no
viable institution can evolve in rancorous situations, such as the climate of
impeachment proceedings in Nigeria. In the wake of impeachments, or botched
impeachments in various states, many legislative assemblies in the country
have become factionalized, and the various groups are at each other’s throatsor the assemblies have been virtually shut down. Examples of such legislative
assemblies are the Ekiti and Enugu State Houses of Assembly following the
2015 general election.40
The impeachment of governors in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic also has
implications for another vital attribute of liberal democracy: respect for
constitutionality and the rule of law. A country’s constitution is a charter and
the fundamental law of the land. The rule of law emphasizes the supremacy
or predominance of the constitution as opposed to the influence of arbitrary
powers or even broad discretionary authority on the part of government
institutions. Since Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999, the most common
assault on the Constitution and the rule of law by the impeachment trend is
nonadherence to due process as constitutionally specified. For example, of
the six governors impeached, the courts declared the impeachment of three of
them, Ladoja of Oyo State, Dariye of Plateau State, and Obi of Anambra State,
to be illegal and consequently reinstated them.41 Although these landmark
decisions of the courts symbolize an elevation of democracy with the tendency
to serve as a restraint against the inclination of legislators to use impeachment
to settle political scores, they also reflect the trend of disorder through the
overuse of impeachment.
An illustration of the disorder in the impeachment of the governors is in
the manner of execution which did not adhere to due process and procedures
as specified in the 1999 Constitution. Apart from the impeachment of Fayose,
the impeachment proceedings against other governors, Peter Obi, D. S. P.
Alamieyeseigha, Joshua Dariye, and Rasheed Ladoja, were executed by less
than a two-thirds majority of the legislators.42 The impeachment of Governor
Rasheed Ladoja on December 12, 2005, by the Oyo State House Assembly,
was executed by only eighteen of the thirty-two members of the Assembly,
even though at least twenty-one members were required by law.43 Dariye was
impeached by six of the twenty-four members of the Plateau State House
40Nnamdi
Mbawike, “Enugu State House of Assembly Serves Governor Chime Impeachment
Notice,” Leadership, May 4, 2014, 1.
41Kumolu, “Impeachment as a Crude Weapon.” See also, Augustine Osayande, “Taraba’s New
Acting Gov Assumes Duty, Annuls Appointments Made by His Predecessor since Nov. 2012,”
Metro Watch, November 23, 2014.
42Oni, “Judicial Review of Governors’ Ladoja and Obi Impeachment in Nigeria’s Fourth
Republic.”
43Kumolu, “Impeachment as a Crude Weapon.”
174 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 11, No. 2
of Assembly. The impeachment proceedings against Alamieyeseigha were
initiated by only fifteen of the twenty-four members of the Bayelsa State
House of Assembly.44
The conduct of impeachment proceedings outside legislative premises also
has been incompatible with constitutional provisions. The impeachment cases
of governors Ladoja of Oyo State and Obi of Anambra State between 2005 and
2006 are clear examples. The adoption of the report of the investigative panel
on the allegation brought against Governor Ladoja was made by a legislator
at a hotel in Ibadan. Similarly, the impeachment proceedings against Obi were
conducted outside the state assembly complex at 5:00 A. M., under the cover
of darkness.45
The various impeachment proceedings since Nigeria returned to civil rule
in 1999 also have violated the right to a fair hearing. In broad outline, liberal
democracy guarantees the right to a fair hearing so that an accused person
can defend him- or herself. Sadly, during various impeachment proceedings of
governors, the right to a fair hearing has been refused or denied. In reaction to his
impeachment, Alamieyeseigha, for example, strongly complained that he was
not given a fair hearing by the probe panel that was established to investigate
allegations against him. He said lamentably: “This is unconstitutional, this is
against due process, even if I am to be crucified, I should be heard.”46
Nigeria’s climate of impeachment and its trend toward disorder is further
manifested in the intolerance for political opposition, expression of divergent
individual interests, and freedom of association. A significant indicator of such
disdain is the report that Peter Obi of Anambra State was impeached the day
after President Obasanjo told him that he would not support his re-election if he
refused to join the PDP.47 Another illustration of the intolerance of dissenting
views is found in the impeachment of Alamieyeseigha. Alamieyeseigha
claimed that he was a victim of impeachment because of his political ties to
then Vice President Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, who indicated interest in running
for president, despite the purported ambition of President Obasanjo for a third
term. Alamieyeseigha also played a leading role in organizing opposition
against government contentions in the on-shore/off-shore dichotomy,
subsequently backed by a Supreme Court ruling.48 The federal government
maintained that it was not obligated to pay revenue derived from off-shore
oil fields to coastal states, while the coastal states vigorously disagreed. In
44Solomon
Kehinde, “The Abuse of the Impeachment Process under the 1999 Nigerian
Constitution,” Lawyers Chronicle, November 12, 2014, 20.
45Oni, “Governance and Legislature-Executive Relations at the State Government Level of
Nigeria’s Presidential System.”
46Anthonia Oyinloye Oyinlola, “Roles of the Legislature in Impeachment Proceedings under the
1999 Constitution,” essay submitted to the University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria, 2013, 61.
47Kumolu, “Impeachment as a Crude Weapon.”
48Uchenna Awom, “Impeachment as Weapon against Opposition,” Leadership, July 20, 2014, 13.
December 2015 | 175
April 2002, the Supreme Court held that the seaward boundaries of Nigeria’s
littoral states (Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo,
and Rivers) terminated at their low-water marks and did not extend into
Nigeria’s territorial waters, essentially giving the federal government control
over off-shore oil and gas resources. Because a large percentage of Nigeria’s
oil was produced off-shore, this ruling meant that oil payments to the coastal
states from the Federation Account would be sharply decreased.49 Although
claims such as those of Peter Obi and Alamieyeseigha cannot be confirmed,
they reflect the disorder and threat to, or erosion of, civil liberties, which are
of political and moral essence to democratic government and a stable state.
According to Sinatra O. J. Ojo, “As a rule, it takes politics or politicking to
build democratic institutions. No virile democratic institution can evolve in
a situation in which dissenting views or contrary opinions and interest are
cajoled, blackmailed, coerced, intimidated or suppressed.”50
Another attribute of the liberal democratic tradition-recognition of and
respect for judicial independence-has been affected by the impeachment
of governors in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. Judicial independence promotes
effective review of the activities of government agencies, in line with the
provisions of the law, and permits the courts to declare null and void any act of
a government institution that is incompatible or inconsistent with the law. As
mentioned earlier, various courts declared some of the impeachment cases to
be illegal and ordered the reinstatement of the impeached governors. Although,
the courts have been quite robust in their rulings regarding some impeachment
cases, there has been a significant tendency to emasculate the judiciary and
limit its independence. This is evident in the effort by legislators in some states
to usurp the power of the National Judicial Council by ordering the dismissal
of state chief judges. Legislators in Ekiti State and Plateau State, for instance,
sacked their chief judges without the recommendations of the National Judicial
Council, which is constitutionally empowered to discipline chief judges.51
Frustration of the doctrine of separation of powers also has contributed
to disorder and the subversion of democratic principles in Nigeria since
1999. In most of the impeachment cases, legislative independence has been
subverted by the undue influence of political parties, political godfathers,
chief executives, the EFCC, and the police. These nonparliamentary bodies
49Sanyalu
Kunle, “Legal Limits of Resource Control,” Guardian, April 7, 2002, 14. See also,
Oma Djebah, “Resource Control: Anenih Panel Seeks Constitutional Amendment, New Laws,”
This Day, June 21, 2002, 1, 6.
50Sinatra O. J. Ojo, “Military Rule and the Crisis of Democracy in Nigeria,” Ekpoma Political
Review 2, nos. 1-2 (1994): 49-66.
51Fatai Ayisa Olasupo, “Voice of Jacob Hand of Esau: Appraising the Role of Chief Executives
and Party Leaders in Impeachment Processes in Nigeria,” Beijing Law Review 5, no. 1 (2014):
7-21.
176 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 11, No. 2
often arm-twist, blackmail, harass, intimidate, or even torture lawmakers
during the impeachment processes. The impeachments of Obi and Ladoja by
state lawmakers were allegedly fostered by godfather politics, with the tacit
support of the presidency. The two impeachment cases came in the wake
of the state lawmakers’ meeting with representatives of the presidency.52
The impeachments of Fayose, Alamieyeseigha, and Dariye were arguably
stage-managed by the presidency through the EFCC,53 which is statutorily
charged with investigating economic and financial crimes, including money
laundering. The resolution passed by the 5th Senate of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria before endorsing Obasanjo’s emergency rule in Ekiti serves as
confirmation of the involvement of the presidential office. The resolution
condemned the use of the EFCC and other security agencies to intimidate the
State Houses of Assembly of Oyo, Anambra, and Plateau in impeachment
proceedings.54 Similarly, Simeon Lalong, then Speaker of the Plateau State
House of Assembly, noted: “The EFCC is no more investigating economic
crimes but political enemies of the president. You see, [the] EFCC has gone
hay-wire and they are just an instrument of oppression and hostility.”55 He
further held that the six legislators who sought the impeachment of Dariye
had the firm support of federal authorities. Lending credence, a Guardian
editorial asserted that the EFCC facilitated Alamieyeseigha’s impeachment:
“The EFCC reportedly arm-twisted, tortured and induced the Bayelsa
legislators” to impeach Alamieyeseigha.56 Political observers contend that the
Federal Government also breathes down the necks of lawmakers through the
deployment of the military in addition to regular and special police forces.57
According to Nwabueze,
the action of the EFCC was clearly a violation of the cardinal
principles of federalism that the Federal Government, while
keeping within the limits of powers under the division of
powers in the constitution, should not exercise them in a
manner that in its practical effect, impedes, frustrates, stultifies
or otherwise unduly interferes with a state government’s
management of its affairs or its meaningful functioning as
a government e.g., ... the exercise of other governmental
52Oni,
“Governance and Legislature-Executive Relations at the State Government Level of
Nigeria’s Presidential System.”
53Ibid.
54Daniel Alifa, “Row in Senate over Dariye,” Guardian, November 15, 2006, 1.
55Sat A. Obiyan and Kunle Amuwo, Nigeria’s Democratic Experience in the Fourth Republic
since 1999: Policies and Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), 99.
56Ibid.
57Imam et al., “Judicial Activism and Intervention in the Doctrine of Political Questions in
Nigeria.”
December 2015 | 177
functions like that of law making or execution of laws so
made to impeachment and removal of Governor ... .58
Additional manifestation of disorder is the use of police to prevent
legislators from gaining entrance into the premises of the legislative complex.
After the 2015 general election, the police prevented a factional group of
legislators in Enugu State from gaining access to the state house assembly
complex to try to table the impeachment of the state governor.59
Disorderly impeachment is not peculiar to Nigeria. In the Philippines, the
impeachment and conviction of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona represents a
dangerous threat to the independence of the judiciary. Corona is one of the three
officials that the Philippines House of Representatives, to date, has impeached
successfully. As of now, Corona is the only one who has been convicted by the
Senate under the allegation of betrayal of public trust, as specified by Article II
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. He was impeached by twenty to twentythree votes among the Senator Judges.60 There is the belief among most
Philippine critics and political analysts, and even among some supporters of
President Benigno Aquino III, that the president overstepped his constitutional
jurisdiction by employing unnecessarily bruising tactics, such as marshaling
his allies in the Congress to impeach Corona.61
Similarly, in Thailand, the move to impeach former Prime Minister
Yingluck Shinawatra represents a power play and is not a demonstration of
rule of law. The move to impeach her is retroactive, as she was deposed in a
military coup before impeachment proceedings were commenced.62
Explanations for the Disorderly Impeachment Trend since 1999
Several explanatory factors can be adduced for the disorderly impeachment
cases in Nigeria since its return to civil rule in 1999. These factors are conditioned
by the large stakes in political power. The phenomenon of godfatherism, the
prolonged military monopoly over governance in post-colonial Nigeria, the
personality cult and influence of the president, and inadequacies in the law all
have promoted garrison democracy and authoritarian reversals and obstructed
a desirable political culture that strives for democratic stability.
58Quoted
in Obiyan and Amuwo, Nigeria’s Democratic Experience in the Fourth Republic since
1999, 102.
59Mbawike, “Enugu State House of Assembly Serves Governor Chime Impeachment Notice.”
60Maila Ager, “Historical Impeachment Trial Starts: Prosecution, Defense Present Cases,” Agence
France-Presse, InquirerNet (January 16, 2012), http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/129063/historicimpeachment-trial-starts-prosecution-defense-present-cases (accessed October 10, 2015).
61Ibid.
62Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Yingluck’s Impeachment Is a Side Show for Thailand,” Nekkei Asian
Review (January 24, 2015), http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Yinglucks-impeachment-is-a-sideshow-for-Thailand (accessed October 10, 2015).
178 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 11, No. 2
In Nigeria, state power is a sure guarantor of material benefit, privilege,
personal economic progress, influence, and ascendancy to egocentric status.
Those who have had the opportunity to hold privileged positions in the state
use the state’s resources to realize their personal interests at the expense of the
collective well-being.63 Indeed, the state has become a constant factor in class
formation and all the attendant ontological contradictions that this creates.
Apart from the control of state powers in Nigeria, the prospects for individuals
and groups to attain the good things of life are extremely limited due to a
crisis in development. Society in Nigeria has been manipulated to rely on state
power and the capacity of officials to appropriate resources, such as contracts,
funds, and jobs.64
The vast opportunities that abound with access to and control of state power
and resources make them irresistibly attractive and prone to abuse.65 Contests
among the elite to capture and control state power often assume the character
of a do-or-die battle. Sentiment is whipped up, and set rules of engagement are
nefariously manipulated to achieve selfish interests. Arguably, the disorderly
impeachment of state governors in the Fourth Republic is prompted by the
motivation to gain access to state power and resources and the desire to use the
power and resources as means to perpetuate control. The flagrant disregard for
due process in the impeachments of Governors Peter Obi of Anambra State,
Joshua Dariye of Plateau State, and Ayo Fayose of Ekiti State are inexorably
bound to and dependent on transferring and acquiring parts of the social surplus
through the exercise of political power and the influence of public office. When
one of the dominant parties, the PDP, substituted “PDP, Share the Money” for
its previous slogan, “PDP, Power to the People,” it signaled the true selfish
objectives of the Fourth Republic’s ruling elite.66
A corollary to the high premium placed on political power in Nigeria is
the phenomenon of godfather politics and the expectation of kickbacks, in
part attributable to the rascally impeachment of state governors. The cost of
campaigning for elective public office is so expensive in Nigeria that only
the rich, or those who depend on the rich political merchants or entrepreneurs
(godfathers), can run. Such political financiers anticipate a return on their
investment. They deploy various means to secure a return from their godsons,
whom they have helped to fund or purchase their electoral victory.67 A good
63Oarhe
Osumah, Fundamentals of Government and Politics: Concepts, Issues and Analysis
(Benin City, Nigeria: Amfitop Books, 2010), 15-16. See also, Jega, Democracy, Good
Governance and Development in Nigeria, 119-120.
64Morris Szeftel, “Between Governance and Underdevelopment: Accumulation and Africa’s
Catastrophic Corruption,” Review of African Political Economy 27, no. 84 (2000): 287-306.
65 Claude Ake, Is Africa Democratising? (Lagos, Nigeria: Malthouse Press, 1996), 7.
66Oarhe Osumah, “Responsibility and Rascality: The Nigerian National Assembly, 1999-2013,”
Taiwan Journal of Democracy 10, no. 2 (2014): 115-140.
67Oarhe Osumah, “Patron-Client Politics: Democracy and Governance in Nigeria, 1999-2007,”
Africana 4, no. 2 (2010): 39-64.
December 2015 | 179
illustration of godfather politics was evident in the impeachment of Ladoja
in Oyo State, during which Chief Lamidi Adedibu (the godfather) claimed to
have negotiated and renegotiated a share of security votes with his godson,
Governor Ladoja, who reneged. Reportedly, Adedibu had complained about
Ladoja:
He was collecting N65 million as security vote every month.
You know that governors don’t account for security votes. He
was to give me N15 million of that every month. He reneged.
Later it was reduced to N10 million, yet he did not give [it
to] me.68
The failure of the godson to meet the godfather’s “business” expectation
triggered his impeachment. Adedibu was reported to have presented a gift of a
brand new Peugeot to each of the eighteen legislators who acted on his behalf
by facilitating the impeachment of Ladoja.69
The noncommitment of the political actors to constitutional provisions in
the deployment of impeachment proceedings also can be linked to the military’s
prolonged dominance and monopoly over politics and governance in Nigeria’s
post-colonial history. For about thirty years, apart from the Alhaji Shehu Shagari
four-year interregnum between military regimes, the military dominated
politics and governance in Nigeria. This prolonged dominance activated and
reinforced military-brand authoritarianism, absolutism, repression, hostility,
and intolerance for opposition.70 The various government institutions were
influenced by the military’s command mentality and undemocratic attitudes,
as well as by its contempt for constitutionalism and popular sovereignty.
Under military rule, violence as an instrument of governance was greatly
romanticized and regularly employed. Utter puffery and bravado became
major characteristics of governance. Threats, violence, mindless profligacy,
corruption, the lack of accountability in public life, the denial of fairness,
equity, and justice, and utter disregard for the supremacy of the Constitution
were commonplace.71 The political orientation of the military and the conduct
of affairs under military rule are reflected in the lawlessness and banditry that
characterize the plethora of impeachments in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.
The legacy of prolonged military rule was mirrored in the sense of imperial
68Kumolu,
“Impeachment as a Crude Weapon.”
See also, Osumah, “Patron-Client Politics”; Kumolu, “Impeachment as a Crude Weapon”;
and Smah O. Smah, “Money Politics and Electoral Violence in Nigeria,” in Money and Politics
in Nigeria, ed. V. A. O. Adetula (Abuja, Nigeria: Petra Digital Press, 2008), 65-84.
70Ojo, “Military Rule and the Crisis of Democracy in Nigeria.”
71William Alade Fawole, “The Nigerian Military and Prospects for Democratic Rule,” in Beyond
the Transition to Civil Rule: Consolidating Democracy in Post-Military Nigeria, ed. W. Alade
Fawole (Lagos, Nigeria: Amkra Books, 2001), 57-76.
69Ibid.
180 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 11, No. 2
rights exhibited by Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military head of state, who
was elected as Nigeria’s civilian president in 1999 amid disenchantment
with military rule. As a military head of state, Obasanjo ruled Nigeria from
February 13, 1976, to October 1, 1979. On assumption of office as an elected
president, Obasanjo proved no less authoritarian than past military rulers.
The elected civilian regime, which was supposed to have ended military
authoritarianism in Nigeria, brought more of the same. Under Obasanjo’s
civilian administration, a personality cult prevailed over the country and his
party, the PDP. He portrayed himself as the father of the nation and the ruling
PDP. Legal and formal guarantees of political competition were undermined
by the imperial president. He used state institutions such as the police, the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the Independent Corrupt
Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), and the EFCC, as
well as his party, the PDP, as instruments to cow opposition into submission.72
In the 2003 nationwide elections, through active collusion with the INEC
and the security agents, the PDP claimed a landslide victory, despite a flurry of
irregularities that signaled to many critics that Obasanjo was trying to build a
one-party state. Although Obasanjo and some top members of the PDP denied
this, the sign was obvious that Obasanjo was doing everything possible to
render the opposition impotent. Members of leading channels of opposition
were hounded by police, and their expressions of difference were likened to an
attempted coup.73
Obasanjo’s sense of imperial rights was discernible as well in his remarks
concerning the mode of selection of his successor. He was reported to have
said he did not know who would succeed him, but he knew the people who
would never succeed him.74 Within the PDP, Obasanjo ignored the processes
of engaging public participation and opinion. On account of his imperial
tactics, there was strong speculation, even within the ruling PDP, that Obasanjo
was building a political structure to advance his personal desire for a third
term as Nigeria’s civilian leader. The main sources of opposition to Obasanjo’s
purported third-term bid were sidelined and rendered impotent, or coerced into
silence or compliance. Many top members of the PDP were so alienated that
they were compelled to leave the party. In fact, Obasanjo openly excoriated his
deputy, Atiku Abubakar, for acts of disloyalty.75
An interesting aspect of Obasanjo’s sense of imperial rights was his
forthright and unprecedented declaration of war against corrupt top government
72Adefemi
Isumonah, “Imperial Presidency and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria,” Africa
Today 59, no. 1 (2012): 43-68.
73Osumah, Fundamentals of Government and Politics, 197.
74Nuhu Shuaib, “Obasanjo, Allow Nigerians to Elect Their Leaders,” Ngex, March 14, 2007, 3.
75Lindsay Barret, “Nigeria: Project Obasanjo in Full Swing,” New African, special edition (March
2006): https://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-143440150/nigeria-project-obasanjo-in-fullswing (accessed November 24, 2015).
December 2015 | 181
officials. With anticorruption efforts as a centerpiece of Obasanjo’s second
term, a number of important political figures were indicted, arrested, tried,
and convicted. As indicated in table 1, between 2005 and 2006, five of the
six governors were impeached for acts of corruption. The Code of Conduct
Bureau, the ICPC, and the EFCC had been conceived as political weapons
in the hands of the president, which singled out political opposition-while
leaving loyalists to escape with their loot. According to the former chairman of
the Senate Committee on Appropriation, Alhaji Idris Abubakar, “The president
knows quite a number of corrupt officials in the three arms of government.
But rather than prosecute them, he is using the dossier collected on them to
blackmail them to support his government.”76
Instructively, the appetite for authoritarianism evident in the manipulation
of state institutions against opposition politicians is not idiosyncratic to Nigeria’s
Fourth Republic. This symptom or tendency has roots in the political history
of Nigeria. Strong evidence can be found in the Second Republic, in which the
ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) allegedly manipulated the police, the
National Security Organization (NSO), and the Federal Electoral Commission
(FEDECO) against opposition politicians and parties. The opposition parties,
especially the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and the Nigerian People’s Party
(NPP), alleged that the ruling NPN colluded with the FEDECO and Nigerian
security forces to rig the general elections held in 1983 as it wanted.77 Thus,
the disorder of the impeachment proceedings against state governors during
the period under review is part of the activities associated with the intense
struggle for power and the consolidation of it. The case of Peter Obi provides
evidence of the appetite for dominance. As noted earlier, President Obasanjo
reportedly told Obi during an official visit to Anambra State that he would
not support his re-election if he (Obi) did not decamp from his party, the All
Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), to join the PDP, which controlled the
federal government.78
An additional explanatory factor for the disorder in the impeachment of state
governors in the period under review is the inadequacies of the law. Legislators
leverage the inadequacies to pursue their selfish interests and ambitions. For
example, Section 143 and 188 of the 1999 Constitution, which provide for the
removal of elected officers if found guilty of gross misconduct, are not explicit
about what constitutes gross misconduct. These vague and elastic clauses have
placed state governors at the mercy of overzealous legislators and provide
room for the latter to concoct what constitutes misconduct and recklessly
organize impeachment proceedings on frivolous grounds.
76Osumah,
Corruption Complex and the Challenges of Anticorruption Policy Effectiveness in
Nigeria, 200.
77Osaghae, Crippled Giant, 113.
78Kumolu, “Impeachment as a Crude Weapon.”
182 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 11, No. 2
Conclusion
This article has examined the democratic posture of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic
as well as the indicators of its tendency toward disorder or garrison democracy
by means of impeachment proceedings against state governors. It was revealed
that, at first glance, the activation of impeachment proceedings tends to suggest
the pursuit of democratic requirements and the values of public accountability,
transparency, effectiveness, efficiency, and honorable discharge of public
office. However, the events of various impeachment proceedings in Nigeria,
as in some other countries across the world, smack of the tendency toward
disorder or garrison democracy. Furthermore, it was observed that the events
and behaviors witnessed in the impeachment proceedings of governors have
been underpinned by the high premium placed on holding political office; the
consequences of many uninterrupted years of military rule; godfatherism;
the personality cult of President Obasanjo; and the inadequacies of the legal
provisions for the removal of elected officers.
To cure the many irregularities in the impeachment processes against state
governors, a number of measures are critical. First, there is the need to reduce
the material benefits that accrue to those who hold public office. This can be
achieved through the advocacy and mobilization of vibrant groups in civil
society. Second, there is the need to re-educate elected public officeholders so
that they develop a new mindset and consciousness about the exercise of power.
Power should be exercised to advance collective interests rather than selfserving ones. Third, the funding of candidates’ electioneering activities must be
controlled in order to check the excesses of political godfathers and their sense
of their right to financial payback in politics and governance. Finally, there
is the need to amend the Constitution to correct existing inadequacies, which
are leveraged by reckless legislatures to conduct impeachment on frivolous
grounds. Specifically, the Constitution should be amended to define in explicit
terms those acts of gross misconduct that constitute impeachable offenses.
December 2015 | 183