JOES 0. G H B EWAT AED THE BULL MOOSE MOVBMIII
IE A M Z O E A
By
George Hunter
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the
B1PAETMBIT OF BISTORT
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In the Graduate College
THE UHIVSRSITT OF ARIZOHA
1966
SI1T3MMT IT 1UTI0H
This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment
of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of
Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be
made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.
Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable with­
out special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment
of source is made. Requests for permission for extended
quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or
in part may be granted by the head of the major department or
the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the
proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholar­
ship. In all other Instances, however, permission must be
obtained from the author.
SIGHED:.
APPROVAL IT THESIS DIRECTOR
This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:
-2-s ./9^ 5T
Harwood P. Hinton
Assistant Professor of History
date
PREFACE
The Progressive movement in Arizona was but part of
a larger political phenomenon which existed precariously in
the United States between 1910 and 1916.
Revolt against the
conservative leadership of the two older parties— Democratic
and Republican-brought a third party into existance.
Led
nationally by Theodore Roosevelt, the new party lacked
machinery and depended heavily upon its state organizations
for support.
A newcomer to Arizona, John Campbell Greenway,
played a quiet but important part in sustaining the movement
in that state.
No professional politician, he was attracted
to the movement by his admiration for its leader, under whom
he had served in the Spanish-American War.
Even when the
Progressive blossom was brightest in 1912, the Arizona off­
shoot was not healthy.
Its root soon proved shallow, and
its strength was drawn away by the stronger organization of
the Republican party and the competing progressivism of the
Democratic party.
Barely able to retain its identity in
the state election of 1914, the Progressive party of
Arizona had few supporters remaining in its ranks by 1916.
As the party died on the national level that year, so did
it perish in Arizona.
Throughout, however, the movement
iii
iv
in Arizona was nourished by Greenway's friendship with
Roosevelt which, while hitherto unacknowledged, was the
distinguishing feature of his own political thinking and
personal life.
The author is indebted to Prof. J. A. Carroll, in
whose seminar at the University of Arizona this study was
undertaken, for his assistance in the preparation of the
final manuscript, and to Prof. Herman E. Bateman for
suggestions toward the improvement of the first draft.
The
author is grateful to Mrs. Edith S. Kltt, secretary emeritus
of the Arizona Pioneers* Historical Society, for allowing
access to the Greenway Collection under her care at that
institution, and to Totsy Belle Beatson and Nell B. Hand
for their valuable advice and criticism.
ABSTRACT
The Progressive movement in Arizona was tied to the
national leadership of Theodore Roosevelt.
At its inception,
the state organization led by John 0. Greenway and Dwight B.
Heard showed promise.
Roosevelt’s successor to the White
House, William Howard Taft, had by his action on the Arizona
Enabling Act split the Republican party in the ’’baby" state,
thus promoting the early successes of the Bull Moose Move­
ment in Arizona.
At the same time Taft had unwittingly
provided Arizona Democrats with an issue on which to further
establish their progresslvlsm.
of the new party.
This proved to be the undoing
Unable to win increased Democratic support
and to maintain a strong organization against the encroach­
ments of the Republican party, the Arizona Progressive Move­
ment was all but dead by 1916.
In that year Roosevelt,
Greenway, and Heard decided to abandon the movement in the
face of the European upheaval.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
PAGE
PREFACE...................................
ill
I
BIRTH
OF A FRIENDSHIP.....................
1
II
BIRTH
OF A PARTY..........................
12
III
IV
V
THE SPIRIT
OF BUNKERHILL..................
NO COMPROMISE,
DEATH
38
NO AMALGAMATION...............
OF A PARTY..........................
BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................
vi
6?
93
125
CHAPTER I
BIRTH OP 1 PRIEHDSHIP
On Sunday morning, July 10, 1910, John Campbell
Greenway, thirty-eight years old, arrived in Bisbee as the
new superintendent of the Calumet and Arizona mine,*
His
coming had been preceded by rumors in financial and mining
circles, which had been given currency by the local press
late in January.*
2
One local resident reflected this unrest
in a letter to a friends
“Things in Bisbee are almost dog­
gone quiet . . . everybody is wondering what is going to
happen next.
There is evidently a great shake-up in the
Calumet and Arizona c i r c l e s . S i x months later such rumors
^Bisbee Dally Review. July 12, 1910, p. 1.
2Ibid.. January 30, 1910, p. 6. The occasion for the
rumors was a sudden drop in the Calumet and Arizona stock.
The Review pointed out that Thomas P. Cole, a director, and
I. W. Powell, the superintendent, were to retire following a
quarrel between themselves and the vice-presidents, James and
Thomas Hbatson. A second rumor credited underground mining
conditions as the reason for the impending change. ,
^Will E. Tester to Charles V. Hicks, January 28, 1910.
Papers of Charles W. Hicks, Arizona Historical Pioneers’
Society, Tucson, Arizona. Tester was apparently quite alarmed
as his informer, one Arnold, claimed that they were all
“scared stiff over their jobs.” To the writer the inference
seems warranted that Greenway’s arrival was no accident.
Thomas Ho at son denied any imminent changes in the management
of the Calumet and Arizona. Por Hbatson* s denial see the
Bisbee Dally Review. February 13, 1910, p. 8 .
1
2
were confirmed when Colonel 1. W. Powell resigned and
announced Greenway's a p p o i n t m e n t T h e choice of Greenway
no doubt was made because of the outstanding ability he had
shown in the development of the mining property of the
Calumet and Arizona on Minnesota's Iron Ridge and in the
construction of the nearby towns of Coleraine, Marvel, and
c
Taconite.
This appointment meant that he, like Powell,
would be expected to exercise the political and economic
prerogative of copper, to which he was no stranger, having
served his apprenticeship as a monitor in Coleraine.
He
would now serve as prince, for in Arizona copper was king
and suffered no equal.^
Position had come naturally to Greenway not by travel
across the difficult terrain of experience, a course pursued
by most men, but along the gentler slopes eased by a prepara­
tory education at St. Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachu­
setts, which his father, John Ohrlstain Greenway, a prominent
^Bisbee Daily Review. July 1, 1910, p. 1.
5James H. McOlintock, Arizona: Prehistoric. Aboriginal.
Pioneer. M o d e m . 3 vols. (Chicago, I916), v. 3, pp. 48-50.
65. E. Williams, "Arizona's Territorial Governors:
Governor Sloan," unpublished manuscript at Arizona Pioneers'
Historical Society, p. 162. Powell had taken part in the
Republican Territorial Convention and was selected as a
delegate to the Republican Rational Convention in 1908. For
the statement about copper, see 0. P. Tolaan, "Copper in
Arizona in 1901," Mining and Scientific Press. January 1.
1910, p. 72.
3
physician of Huntsville, Alabama, had been able to provide.
At Andover, Greenway continued the military tradition begun
by the famed Colonel William Campbell on King's Mountain in
1780 and passed on to him by his father, who had been a
second lieutenant in the Confederate Army.
Greenway's
further education at the University of Virginia enhanced
this heritage, as did the family removal to Hot Springs,
Arkansas, where the young man moved readily into polite
southern society and into increased contact with the new
masters of the North and South.?
A new spirit and a new energy was transforming the
South, and it was natural that its post-war generation would
turn to scientific arid technical persuits to restore its
land and to open up new avenues to wealth and prestige.®
Greenway reflected this change by enrolling in Sheffield
Scientific School of Tale University.
At Yale the young man
soon came to occupy a conspiclous place.
Harvard and
7James T. White to Mrs. Isabella Greenway, January 1,
1926. "Revision of Biographical Copy of General John
Campbell Greenway as submitted to the National Cyclopedia
of American Biography," Papers of John Campbell Greenway,
Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society. See also The National
Cyclopedia of American Biography (New York, 1922], p . 140.
All Greenway correspondence cited in this thesis, unless
otherwise indicated, is from the Greenway Collection.
®Paul H. Buck. The Road to Reunion 1865-1900
(New York, 1959), P. 1B3:
4
Princeton were perhaps the first to know of his great
prowess on the gridiron and diamond.
Greenway's position
as right end on the famous "Dutch" Garter football team
while also catcher at Yale, won him high acclaim.
He was
elected president of his class and voted the most popular
man on campus.
When Greenway left Yale in 1895 to begin his
professional career in the machine shops of the Carnegie
Steel Company in Duquesne, Pennsylvania, as a laborer at
#2.50 a day, it was understood that this would be only tem­
porary, for a man of his background would soon advance.9
Three years later, when the Spanish-American War
broke out in the spring of I898, Greenway was the foreman
of the mechanical department.^
Like many other young men
"believing in the justness of our war," he was determined to
offer his services to his country.
He jumped the train for
San Antonio and reported directly to Colonel Leonard Wood
because he felt that the regiment of cavalry being organized
there by Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt was
the one to his taste.
Wood looked the young man over and
assigned him to Company I, 1st United States Volunteer*
0
1
^Greenway, "Business Record." This scrap of paper
states that Greenway's salary at this time was #2.50 a day.
McOlintock, o£. cit., v. 3, p. 49., states that his salary
was even lower — #1.32 a day.
10McClintock, op. cit., 3, p. 49.
5
Cavalry, as a private.^
While In San Antonio, as Wood and
Roosevelt undertook to get the regiment in order, Greenway
met the dynamic lieutenant-Colonel.
Although almost fifteen
years separated the two, each captivated the other, and
suddenly Greenway was commissioned a second lieutenant.
Roosevelt delighted in "the football player," as he called
him: Greenway, on his part, found the colorful New Yorker to
be a "most enthusiastic man and very . . .
companiable.’A 2
On May 29, 1898, the regiment set out for Tampa,
Florida.
By the time the train had reached Tampa, Roosevelt
and Greenway were fast friends.
At Tampa, Greenway managed
to secure a transfer from Troop I, which was to be left
behind, to Troop G, a New Mexico unit, and slipped aboard
the Yucatan as a temporary first lieutenant directly under
R o o s e v e l t . I n Cuba, during what Roosevelt called the
"worst days of the fighting and surge," Roosevelt's faith
in Greenway1s ability did not diminish.
Greenway and
another rough rider, Dave Goodrich, were Roosevelt's "right
llGreenway, "Synopsis of Speech Before long Island
Yale Alumni Association," March 3, I899.
12Theodore Roosevelt to Mrs. Tilden R. Selmes,
July 31, 1898; Greenway to Mrs. Alice White Greenway (undated);
Greenway's "Military Record". Theodore Roosevelt, The Rough
Riders and Men of Action (New York, 1926), pp. 27-251
l^Greenway'g "Military Record."
6
and left bowers."
Greenway became an "invaluable officer"
and one of the two or three to whom Roosevelt naturally
turned when a duty of "peculiar hazard or • • • responsibility
came up."*^
It the close of the war Roosevelt returned to politics
as governor of New York and Greenway to the United States
Steel Corporation as assistant superintendent of the Oliver
Mining Company. 15
While their paths separated, their personal
friendship was to grow and broaden.
In September of 1898 they
attended a football game together at New Haven, and early in
1899 they complimented each other publicly at a meeting of the
long Island Yale Alumni Association.
On that occasion Greenway
spoke of "the gallant Wood and Roosevelt," while Roosevelt
assured the audience that Greenway could go without sleep for
"three days and three nights."I**
A year later, when Greenway
underwent surgery at the Presbyterian Hospital in New York
^Roosevelt to Mrs. Tilden R. Selmes, July 31, I898;
Robert 0. Davis to Mrs. Isabella Greenway, June 12. 1926.
Davis searched the records of the Adjutant General*s office
and sent Mrs. Greenway an extract from a letter written by
Roosevelt on September 15, I898.
■^Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography
(New York, 1931), p. 201. Greenway to A. B. Kenoshing,
January 13, 1916.
l6(jreenway to Gilbert Greenway, September 23, 1898;
Greenway, "Synopsis of Speech Before long Island, Yale Alumni
Association," March 3» 1899• Roosevelt, "Yale Men in the
Rough Riders," An address at the Yale Alumni dinner, March 3,
1899, contained in The Rough Riders, pp. 171-172.
7
City, the Roosevelt children sent flowers and Roosevelt
inquired after his friend's health.^7
operation Roosevelt wrote:
The day after the
"I trust that it was only trifling
and . . . you are on the road to recovery."^®
Soon after,
Greenway inquired as to the political health of the President
McKinley's new running mate.
"How is Teddy . . .
these days?"
he asked a friend, "Getting toughened up for the next two
months, I hope I
Following the Republican landslide of 1900, Greenway
wired his congratulations to the vice-president elect, who
warmly replied:
"Not only was there no man who sent me a
telegram which was more sincere on the part of the sender,
but also there was no telegram which gave more pleasure to
me and the family than did yours." 20
Within ten months
McKinley was dead and Roosevelt was President of the United
States.
In October of 1901 Greenway was asked to come to
the White House on his way to Yale. 21
JL year later he was
ITRoosevelt to Greenway, March 17 and March 29, 1900.
^Roosevelt to Greenway, April 4, 1900; Roosevelt to
Greenway, April 14, 1900. Greenway's brother Gil was appar­
ently ill. Roosevelt sent letters from the oldest children
to Greenway and wrote: "Poor Gill What a siege he has had . . .
I guess the whole Greenway family is of good stuff."
Roosevelt to.Greenway, May 1 , 1900. "I am awfully glad you
are getting along so well, and Gil, too."
•^Greenway to Robert H. M. Ferguson, August 19, 1900.
20Roosevelt to Greenway, November 9 , 1900.
SlRoosevelt to Greenway, October 18, 1901.
8
advised to bring both his frock coat and dress suit with him
to Washington, since he was to lunch with the President and
CO
to attend an evening banquet.
As Roosevelt's first term of office slipped by,
Greenway visited him often.
In 1904 he went riding with his
old colonel, and in the fall of the next year Roosevelt
arranged for Greenway to accompany him on his southern tour.
"I had a great time in the South," the President wrote to
his son Kermit.
"it was very nice, indeed, having . • •
Mr. John Greenway with me."23
in a letter to Greenway in
1906, probably in reply to an inquiry as to the likelihood
that the President would be a candidate to succeed himself,
Roosevelt told his friend:
"No, John.
You will have to
vote for someone else in 1908, and while you must not quote
me, I have exactly your view . . .
Taft is the man."
Teddy
then characteristically added, "Do you know h i m ? " ^
late in 1906 the President, dissatisfied with the way
the Department of the Interior had been operating, determined*
2
22Nelson P. Rulet to Greenway, September 23, 1902.
23Will Irwin (ed.), Letters to Kermit from Theodore
Roosevelt (New York, 1946),“pp. 56, 119. There is also a
copy of the invitation to Greenway, "Tour of the President
Through the South, October 18, 1905 to October 28, 1905,"
in the Greenway Papers.
^Roosevelt to Greenway, October 19, 1906.
9
to remodel It and offered Greenway the position of Commissioner
of the General land Office.
Roosevelt felt that his friend
could do the work " . . , right up to the handle,” but never­
theless expressed his own personal misgivings as to the wisdom
of Greenway's accepting the p o s i t i o n . B e c a u s e Roosevelt
felt certain that Greenway would want to see him, he asked
his friend to come to Washington.
"Unless we are unusually
crowded, I shall expect you to stay at the White House,” the
President wrote.
"The board is still good.”2^
Greenway was
obviously flattered by the President's request but declined
the position.27
At the end of January, 1907, Roosevelt
notified Greenway that he had secured an able man for the
i
General land Office In Richard A. Ballinger of Washington,
but in the President's opinion the appointee "can't be
25Roosevelt to Greenway, November 5, 1906.
^Roosevelt to Greenway, November 5, 1906.
27jhere is no evidence that Greenway consulted
Roosevelt. Probably actuated by financial considerations,
he thought it best not to accept the position. Thomas ?•
Cole to Greenway, December 27, 1906. Cole's letter shows
that Greenway* s salary at that time was $6,600 while the
land office paid only #5,000. Moreover, in addition,
either in 1905 or in 1906, Greenway was promoted to Super­
intendent of the Oliver Mining Company. Greenway to
Kenoshlng, January 13, 1916, dates the year of his promotion
as 1905, while the "Revision of Biographical Copy" dates
it as 1906.
10
quite so good as the individual to whom I first offered
it.1,28
Later that year Roosevelt determined that William
Howard Taft would be his successor.
Acting in line with
other Republicans, Greenway now sent Roosevelt a highly
complimentary letter in which he supported the choice of
Taft.
Roosevelt apparently showed it to Taft, for Taft
replied the same day:
MIt is a great comfort to feel that
I have the support of such a man as you.M
The next year
Greenway went to the Republican convention at Chicago as a
Taft supporter.
convention:
He wired Roosevelt during the course of the
"Danger to Taft's candidacy now lies in
stampede to you.
Strongly suggest your giving permanent
chairman your final renunciation to reach him not later than
twelve o'clock.
Make it strong."*
2#
Following Taft's inaug­
uration in March, 1909, Roosevelt sailed for Africa, not to
return until June of 1910, one month before Greenway arrived
xn
in Arizona.
28Roosevelt to Greenway, January 30, 1907• See also
Roosevelt to Hermit, August 31, 1907, Irwin (ed.), op. oit.,
p. 207.
29RooeeTelt to Greenway, May 7, 1907; William Howard
Taft to Greenway, May 28, 1908.
30Henry ?. Pringle, The Life and Times of William
.Howard Taft. (Hew York), 1, p. 399.
11
The Spanish-American War had been a turning point in
the life of John Campbell Greenway, just as it was in that
of Theodore Roosevelt.
In the twelve years between the war
and Greenway1s arrival in Arizona, he had advanced in mining
circles and had formed a strong friendship with a "strong
friend."51
in the ensuing years this friendship would
dominate Greenway's political thought to the point where he
became almost a Roosevelt in cameo.
31vance McCormick to Greenway, March 27, 1902.
CHAPTER II
BIRTH OP A PARTY
"l have received some very painful injuries due to an
accident yesterday . . . .
My shoulder is dislocated and I
am badly bruised and cut up," wrote George ¥. P. Hunt, the
rotund Democratic politician serving as president of the
Arizona Constitutional Convention, to Eugene V. Ives, a
Tucson attorney who aspired to be one of Arizona's first
United States Senators.
Prom the vantage point of his large
bed. Hunt feared that all his plans would be "frustrated,"
particularly just at a time when he was so "very anxious to
get ahold of the w h e e l . H u n t ' s rest would have been more
secure had he known that within the year he would be the
first governor of the new state and Arizona Democrats every­
where triumphant.
But this was 1911 and the political
horizon was not yet clear.
It was even more obscure in
July, 1910, when Greenway arrived in Arizona.
Greenway's first few days in Bisbee were probably
spent in looking over the plant of the Calumet and Arizona, and
iGeorge Vf. P. Hunt to Ives, January 21, 1911. Papers
of Eugene V. Ives, Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society,
Tucson, Arizona.
12
13
doing the thousand and one things required of a mining super­
intendent.
Greenway directed Mike Curly, an employee of the
Oliver Mining Company, to send his saddle horse, a pregnant
cow, and six dogs to Bisbee.
If there was not enough room
for all the dogs in the box oar, Greenway wanted Jeff, a
black and white pointer, Julia, the English setter, and a
white and tan puppy shipped.
Greenway probably had a good
laugh when his collection arrived increased by one.
had a calf," he wrote Curly.
"My cow
"I beat the railroad."2*
4
On more important matters Greenway was perhaps not
quite so amused.
"The political pot is boiling and will be
boiling stronger," he wrote to his friend Alexander 0. Brodle,
a major of the Bough Riders and Roosevelt's appointee as
territorial governor.3
Arizona had been waiting for statehood
since the mid-eighties.
An enabling bill had passed the 67th
Congress on June 16, just two days before Roosevelt returned
to Hew York and not quite three weeks before Greenway's
arrival in Arizona.4
with the signing of the enabling act.
President Taft had provided Arizona Democrats with an issue
2Greenway to Mike Curly, July 18, 1910.
^Greenway to Alexander 0. Brodle, August 2, 1910;
Greenway to Dann M. Gunn, July 29, 1910.
4
^Congressional Record. 61 Cong., 2 sess., 15, 8,
8225-37; Hew York Times. June 19, 1910, p. 1.
14
powerful enough to ensure their almost complete control of
the state government for the next decade.
Even before the
passage of the bill, 0. ¥. Hicks, the city treasurer of
Tombstone, pointed out to Bassett Watkins, then campaigning
for city marshal of Bisbee, that "the coming campaign,
especially if we get statehood . . .
is going to be a fight
to the finish for the political control of the new state."5
In February the Douglas Republican Club had warned the terri­
torial delegate, Ralph Cameron, that if statehood were denied
until the President and Congress had passed upon Arizona1s
constitution it would "greatly endanger" Republican chances
and would alienate thousands of voters.
The Bisbee Daily
Review went even further by pointing out that it would sound
the "death knell" of the Republican party in Arizona.^
Just twelve days after the passage of the enabling
act. Governor Richard E. Sloan acted quickly to carry out
its provisions.
Sloan and the Territorial Secretary, George
U. Young, apportioned the delegates for the several counties
and three days later issued a proclamation setting September
10, 1910, as the date for the election of delegates to the
SRlcks to Bassett Watkins, January 13, 1910, Hicks
Papers, APHS,
^Bisbee Daily Review. February 12, 1910, p. 1:
February io, 1910, p. 4.
15
Constitutional Convention.^
Evan before Sloan*s proclama­
tion, Democratic and Republican politicians, aware of Taft's
attitude toward the proposed constitution, began conversations
hoping for a non-partisan constitutional convention.®
H. W.
Aiken, secretary of the lisbee Republican Campaign Committee,
pointed this out to 0. V. Hicks, but Nthe ring,” according to
Aiken, wanted "party lines drawn . . .
tion that Taft won't stand for.”
and . . .
a constitu­
The purpose of all this,
Aiken thought, was to "get the national government in dis­
favor with the rank and file.”9
Aiken's concern was justified.
When the Democratic Central Committee met in Prescott, all
hope for a non-partisan constitutional convention vanished.
The Democrats chose rather to make it a party contest.10
Shortly before the Democratic leadership had vetoed
the non-partisan idea, Will E. Tester, a lisbee stockbroker,
feeling a little uneasy about Republican prospects, began
closing his letters "God help the state."
At the same time,*
0
1
9
7Arizona Republic. June 29, 1910, Sec. 2, p. 2.
^Presidential Addresses and State Papers of William
Howard Taft. 5 v o l s Z ( l e w York, 1910), v. 1, pp. 552-355;
Arizona Republic. October 14, 1909, p. 1. in his address
at the Phoenix City Hall, Taft had called the Oklahoma
Constitution a "zoological garden of cranks•"
APIS •
9H. W. Aiken to Hicks, June 22, 1910, Hicks Papers,
10P. W. O'Sullivan to Ives, June 23, 1910; Ives to
J. H. Langston (undated) Ives Papers, APES. Arizona
Republic. July 18, 1910, p. 1.
-------
16
0. W. Hicks, taking his cue from the national headquarters,
pointed out that he "stood solid" with the Republican party
organization.11
By August it was apparent that the enabling
act had clearly forced divisions within both parties, as
county convention after county convention showed signs of
dissension.
Greenway found the political atmosphere "very
interesting."1^
He had probably noticed that the Republican
party in Cochise County had developed a liberal and a con­
servative wing.
The liberal faction, led by the Bisbee
attorney J. W. Ross, and E. J. Flanigan, City attorney and
chairman of the Bisbee Republican committee, hoped to commit
the Cochise convention to the "Oregon Plan" of the initiative,
referendum, and direct primary.
After a series of conferences,
the Cochise convention accepted the direct primary but qual­
ified its endorsement of the initiative and referendum in a
manner which would prevent its "misuse by special interests."
During the debate on the platform, one Republican warned that
such a qualification would lead Cochise Republicans to a
"slaughter," and Flanigan predicted that failure to adopt
liberal measures would lead the party to defeat.1^*
2
1
1;LWill E. Tester to Hicks, July 16, 1910; Hicks to
Tester, June 7, 1910, Hicks Papers, APES.
12Greenway to Clarence B. Miller, August 24, 1910.
l^Bisbee Daily Review. August 14, 1910, p. 1;
August 16, 1910, p. 1; August 21, 1910, p. 1.
17
If the Republicans would, not adopt liberal measures,
the Democrats would.
When the Cochise Democratic convention
met, rather than commend Taft for securing legislation of
the "most vital interest" to the people— as the Republican
platform had done— the Democrats condemned him for an
"uncalled for and unjust" enabling act which was a "slander"
to Arizona citizens.
This act, according to the Democratic
platform, declared Arizona voters to be "incompetent and
unworthy" and was a "subterfuge to deprive us . . • of our
inherent right to statehood."
The Democratic platform con­
cluded by endorsing the initiative and referendum, but
limited the application to the recall to state officials.1*
Arizona had now divided itself into two opposing
camps, reflected Henry Fountain Ashurst, the silver-tongued
orator from Coconino County.
One, said Ashurst, "urges that
our constitution be framed so as to Insure its approval at
Washington . . . the other . . .
urges that the constitution
be an expression of the people. "15
other Democrats like
Moses Drachman, a Tucson city councilman, banker, and real*
i^Ibid.. August 21, 1910, p. 1.
ISoeorge F. Sparks (ed.). A Many Colored Toga. The
Diary of Henry Fountain Ashurst. (Tucson, I962), p. 2.
18
estate dealer, felt that even the Initiative and referendum
would give Taft an excuse to veto Arizona statehood.
Eugene V. Ives thought that the constitution should contain
the initiative, referendum, and "nothing else."I?
Charles
F. Hoff, a close friend of Drachman, then residing in
Rockport, Texas, believed that Taft "dare not veto" the
statehood measure because "Roosevelt and the insurgents
would not let him."
Leading Republicans in Arizona, as well
as most progressive platforms, Hoff reassured Drachman, now
endorsed the initiative and referendum.^
Republicans were as much in the dark as the Democrats.
In late August, F. D. Smith, president of the Gila Republican
Club, in an effort to secure unity in his home county, wired
President Taft asking if the initiative and referendum would
mitigate against executive approval.
Taft refused to comment
at first, and then later replied vaguely that his attitude
had been shown by his speeches in the territory.6
7
1
l6Drachman to Charles F. Hoff, July 8, 1910. Papers
of Moses Drachman, Arizona Pioneers* Historical Society.
17Ives to J. F. Ross, August 15, 1910, Ives Papers,
APRS.
X8
Hoff to Drachman, August 16, 1910, Drachman Papers,
APHS •
l9Bisbee Daily Review. August 18, 1910, p. 2. Gila
County Republicans were divided into two camps, one of which
was the Globe Young Men's Republican Club, reported to have
284 members, had endorsed the initiative, referendum, and
recall.
19
Earlier the territorial governor, Richard E. Sloan, certainly
no lover of the initiative, referendum, and recall, held
numerous conferences with Republican leaders, such as
Ex-Governor Joseph 1. Kibbey, Thomas Armstrong, a Phoenix
attorney, Robert E. Morrison of Prescott, and Hovel E. Smith
of Blsbee.
All counseled opposition to the initiative,
referendum, and recall.
Dwight 5. Heard, the Phoenix
financier later to be the guiding light of the Bull Moose
movement in Arizona counseled opposition to the initiative
and recall, but exempted the referendum from his condemna­
tion.^0
On top of this general feeling of animosity on the
part of most Republicans toward the initiative, referendum,
and recall was the political unknown— the attitude of
Theodore Roosevelt, who, in the words of a local Blsbee paper,
was a Msmouldering volcano" ready to blow the Republican
Party to "Kingdom Come".2^
When the election returns were complete, Arizona
Republicans found to their dismay that the destiny of the
Constitutional Convention had been placed in other hands.
Republicans had succeeded in electing only eleven of the
20Richard E. Sloan, Memories of an Arizona Judge.
(Palo Alto, 1932), pp. 234-535%
21Bisbee Daily Review. August 25, 1910, p. 4.
20
fifty-two delegates and controlled only two county delegaCO
tions, Pima and Coconino.
The election had been a Repub­
lican disaster.
Henry Fountain Ashurst, noting in his diary
that the Democrats had secured a majority, felt that the
"insurgent” revolt had "swollen to such an extent" that the
Republicans might not carry the congressional elections in
November.23
Greenway was in Hot Springs, Arkansas, probably seated
on a speakers' platform with Roosevelt, when the Constitu­
tional Convention convened in Phoenix on October 11, 1910.^
By the time of his return, the magnitude of the Democratic
victory was as obvious to him as to most political observers.
Ashurst happily noted that the Republican party was "torn with
dissension" and that "its prospects looked gloomy."^5
way was much concerned.
Green­
He asked Roosevelt what he though
about the election returns, and tried to bolster Roosevelt's
feelings by telling him that the election returns did not
mean that the common people,had lost confidence in him as*
2
^ Arizona Republic. September 29, 1910, p. 4. The
Democrats had carried Apache 1-0, Graham 5-0, Maricopa 9-0,
Mohave 1-0, Pinal 2-0, Yuma 5-1, Yavapai 5-1, Cochise 10-0,
Gila 4-1. Republicans controlled only Pima 5-0, and
Coconino 2-0. Both parties divided Navajo and Santa Cruz's
delegation, each receiving one delegate.
23fl.shurst, o£. cit., p. 3.
q
c Greenway to Roosevelt, September 28, and November 30,
^Ashurst,
ojd.
cit.. p. 3-4.
21
they had in Taft.
To Greenway the issue had become "clean
cut" and the time ripe for a new party with Roosevelt at
its head.
Greenway assured Roosevelt that he could count
on him for "support of any nature.
If the national scene looked menacing to Republicans
like Greenway, state prospects now looked equally bad.
0. W.
Hicks thought that the constitutional convention had "rather
put a crimp into any state aspirations."
soled himself, " . . .
"Anyway," he con­
the present constitutions as those
cranks is putting up, will not go through."
Hicks felt that
the constitution would be "killed" by the people and, if not,
the President "surely will" kill it.^?
Ives warned Mulford
Winsor, the Democratic chairman of the rules committee of the
rules committee of the Constitutional Convention, that Taft
had always been "sensitive as far as the judiciary was con­
cerned," and that to place the recall in the constitution
would give Taft an opportunity to veto it simply to place
"such an issue" between himself and Roosevelt.
"We know,"
Ives pointed out, "that a contest between Roosevelt and
Taft is inevitable."28
in reply Winsor expressed his belief
26Qreenway to Roosevelt, November 30, 1910. Two
weeks later Greenway mailed Roosevelt a letter from Chester
A. Cogsden, a member of the Minnesota legislature, whose
remarks on the political situation Greenway felt would
interest you. Greenway to Roosevelt, December 6, 1910.
27Hicks to Bill ?, Nov. 27, 1910, Hicks Papers, APHS.
28jves to Mulford Winsor, Nov. 1, 1910, Ives Papers,
APHS
22
that the constitution would be ratified by the people.
Congress, and President.
Ives* advice was disregarded, and
the Constitutional Convention held its last session on
December 11, 1910, and all eleven Republicans refused to
sign a constitution which contained the recall of judges.^9
Greenway, who was en route to Hew York as the Con­
stitutional Convention ended, saw Roosevelt between
December 15* and the 1st of January.
Greenway was given the
impression that while Roosevelt "did not care for the job in
the same way," he would make the race if there was a "big
feeling" on the part of the voters that he should do so.
Greenway came home more convinced than ever that the country
needed a Roosevelt, rather than a Taft, in the White House. 30
The day after his return, Greenway confided to an
Eastern friend that Arizona had adopted a constitution that
he was certain would not be accepted by Congress.
Greenway
felt the recall provision was its "most objectionable
feature."
"I am a radical," Greenway wrote, "but I cannot
stand for this."31
The measure also went hard with some2
29Winsor to Ives, November 28, 1910, Ives Papers,
APRS.
30(2,376enway to John A. Melllheny, January 1, 1910.
3lGreenway to Gunn, January 2, 1910.
23
Democrats.
D. L. DeVane, a Yuma probate judge, wrote Ives
that the Mulford Kinsor* s "bunch" had objected when he
declared such a sweeping provision unwise,
"in as much as
hell has already been played," DeVane wrote, "the best thing
to do would be to pile up an overwhelming majority for the
c o n s t i t u t i o n . D e m o c r a t s moved to do just that by estab­
lishing a Statehood League in early December.33
Prank
DeSouza, secretary of the new league, predicted that the
constitution would be endorsed by seventy-five or eight
per cent of the people, but he felt that nothing should be
left undone to ensure "this or even a greater percentage."3^
Hunt was actively campaigning.
"The all-absorbing
topic of conversation," Ashurst noted, is:
"Shall the
proposed Arizona constitution be ratified."35
Ives, during
the heat of the campaign for the ratification of the con­
stitution wrote Hunt that the action of the convention had
made Arizona's "fitness" for statehood a national issue and3
32D. L. DeVane to Ives, January 7, 1911. Ives Papers,
APRS.
33Arizona Republic. December 11, 1910, p. 1.
•^Frank DeSouza to Ives, March 27, 1911, Ives Papers,
APHS e
35jLshurst, og. cit., pp. 4-5.
24
had forced a division between Mthose who support . . . and
those who oppose— “and that the latter, whether they were in
the House, Senate, or in the White House itself, would
"superinduce their own political destruction."-^
The reason
for Democratic activity was that opposition to the constitution
stemmed from the Democratic party itself as well as from the
Republican.
Conservative Democrats had come to believe that
ratification of the constitution, particularly a constitution
with the recall embedded in it, was to invite Taft*s veto. 57
Nevertheless, the “enthusiasm for progressive ideas," accord­
ing to Governor Sloan, accounted for the overwhelming majority
of 12,187 votes to 3,302 for the ratification of the constitu­
tion on February 12, 1911.58
While the campaign for ratification was in progress,
Greenway intensified his efforts to persuade Roosevelt to
visit the Bisbee area while in Arizona to dedicate the
Roosevelt Dam on March* 18.
Greenway wrote a former Rough
56Ives to Hunt, February 1, 1911, Ives Papers, A.PHS.
57por an extended list of Arizona Democrats who
opposed the recall of the judiciary, see the Arizona Republic.
February 1, 1911, p. 1, and the Bisbee Daily Review.
January 31, 1910, p. 1.
38Sloan, oj>. cit., pp. 237- 238.
25
Eider asking him to use his influence to induce Roosevelt
to come to Bisbee to dispel the feeling of a "certain element
. . . that is unfriendly to him and • . • influences others."39
Greenway was "horribly" disappointed at Roosevelt*s inability
to visit Bisbee.
El Paso.
Roosevelt asked Greenway to join him in
Greenway replied that he was afraid that he would
be unable to go, but would try.
A few days later Greenway
sadly told Roosevelt that he was "quite positive" that he
would be unable to come to El Paso or Albuquerque.^
Roosevelt arrived in Arizona at a critical period in
Arizona’s struggle for statehood.
Roosevelt traveled to the
Grand Canyon, then to Phoenix, where his major policy address,
even though unfavorable toward the recall, initiative, and
referendum, seemed to throw the issue squarely in Taft’s
face.
Roosevelt termed objections to the Arizona constitution
as "without warrant of justice," and pointed out to his
Phoenix audience that such objections were a matter for
Arizona’s own decision and not any "outsider.
39Greenway to Colton Reed, January 9, 1911.
^°Greenway to Roosevelt, August 10, 1910; Roosevelt
to Greenway, December 8, 1910. Roosevelt wrote Greenway:
I do not see how I can escape from going to Albuquerque, and
from there the wise thing is to go to the Grand Canyon, then
. . . to Phoenix." Roosevelt to Greenway, January 31, 1911;
Greenway to Roosevelt, January 31, 1911.
^Arizona Republic. March 21, 1911, p. 1.
26
Greenway was unable to come to Phoenix, but one month
later he wrote a long letter to Roosevelt describing a threeday battle In Agua Prieta between Mexican revolutionaries and
Pederals.
The "ugly undertones" which had worried Greenway
the previous January, had become a reality.
The military
situation along the Arizona border, joined with his growing
disenchantment with President Taft, further convinced him
ho
that the Taft administration was hopeless. ^
Greenway wrote
Roosevelt that he had, after "much persuasion," succeeded in
getting Governor Sloan to wire President Taft asking for
protection for Americans In Douglas.
weak and unsatisfactory."
The reply was "absolutely
Taft had in effect advised Ameri­
cans to "keep out of the way of Mexican bullets."
Greenway
complained that the entire situation left him "humiliated and
mortified,11 and he expected to vote for a Democratic President
unless something occurred to change his personal feelings.^3
Roosevelt hurriedly replied.
He, like Greenway, was
"absolutely unable to understand" what Taft meant by allowing
the killing of Americans.
He would have positioned the
troops in a threatening manner, and after "one unheeded
warning" would have taken Agua P r i e t a . G r e e n w a y felt that
^Greenway to T. E. House, January 30, 1911; Greenway
to Roosevelt, March 15, 1911.
^%reenway to Roosevelt, April 20, 1911.
^Roosevelt to Greenway, May 12, 1911.
27
Americans residing in foreign countries accepted a certain
risk, but this risk did not apply to Americans residing on
the American side of the international b o r d e r . Greenway
did not want war, but Congress and the President, he told
Senator James B. Clark, of Minnesota, should not be deterred
from keeping inviolate American t e r r i t o r y . T w o months
later Greenway had not yet cooled down.
He informed James P.
Hodgson, a manager of the Phelps Dodge Corporation, that the
entire incident had made him "hot" and that Taft should have
taken more "strenuous" measures.^?
Greenway was still
unhappy with Taft when he wrote Alden Smith, Clark's Minnesota
colleague in the Senate, that the people of Arizona were
"above average grade" and should have statehood without
further delay.
Greenway was quick to point out that "some
of us" do not approve of the recall provision, but our
desire for statehood "outweighs every other consideration."^-®
On July 14, 1911, Greenway left for Europe on vacation.
Before his departure, he had asked Roosevelt to have lunch
^Greenway to Roosevelt, April 20, 1911.
^Greenway to James B. Clark, May 8, 1911.
^7Greenway to Joseph P. Hoatson, June 13, 1911.
Greenway to Alden Smith, June 20, 1911.
28
with, him in New York, but they did not see each other there.*9
On August 15, while Greenway was in Europe, Taft vetoed the
Arizona Constitution.
A week later the President signed a
joint resolution which would confer statehood on Arizona
after the recall provision was voted out in a general
election.50
Democrats and Republicans marked time until
Governor Sloan*s proclamation, issued on September 21, 1911,
set the date for the primary election on October 24 and the
general election on December 1 2 . ^
When Greenway returned from Europe early in September,
he notified Roosevelt that he had about made up his mind to
vote for a Democrat in the next presidential election, but
that he was much pleased to see that Taft had vetoed the
statehood bill on account of the recall.
Greenway expressed
sympathy with the “feeling** which prompted the people of
Arizona to wish to recall judges, but felt that the provision
itself was “vicious.“52
within the next two weeks the
political situation, in Greenway*s eyes, had begun to get
warm, and he observed that there were candidates "galore.“53
*9Greenway to Bob Ferguson, July 11, 1911.
to Greenway, September 19, 1911.
Roosevelt
50oongreasignal Record. 62. Cong. 1 sess., 45, 4,
PP. 3964-60; 4118-4141; 4217-4242; 4381.
SlPapers of Governor Sloan, Department of Archives,
Phoenix, Arizona. Proclamation dated September 21, 1911.
52Qreenway to Roosevelt, September 13, 1911.
53(jreenway to Chester A. Cogsdon, September 25, 1911.
29
Republicans still lacked one candidate.
The Republi­
can state conference meeting in Prescott on September 20,
placed the names of Judge Edward ¥. Wells, an aging Prescott
banker, and ex-Govemor Joseph Kibbey in circulation as
possible nominees for the governorship.^
Pour days later,
more than one hundred Republicans met at the Odd Fellows'
Hall in Prescott, and chose a delegation to "wait” upon
Judge Wells.
Wells was non-committal; the committee reported
that he had taken the matter "under advisement."55
j. j.
Sauders, a Prescott Democrat, was amused by the whole affair.
He wrote Eugene V. Ives, now campaigning for the United States
Senate, that Wells "could not be dragged out to run for
Governor by all the powers that the Republican party could
bring to bear."
One lawyer had told the aging Judge that if
he ran "they would never be able to find him again, because
he would be buried so deep."*^
At the end of the month
Republicans were still working hard to get Wells to run, by
making him,believe that the Socialists were apt to capture
the state unless he agreed to carry the Republican banner .57
^ Arizona Republic. September 28, 1911, p. 1.
55Arlzona Journal Miner. September 24, 1911, p. 4.
56j. j. Sauders to Ives, September 26, 1911, Ives
Papers, APRS.
57sauders to Ives, September 28, 1911, Ives Papers,
APHS
30
Wells finally consented.
Judge Kibbey remained silent
until he had taken an eight day political sounding, and then
announced Wells to be the "ideal” candidate to oppose George U.
Young, the former territorial secretary who had announced his
candidacy without the support of the party organization.58
Wells' name at the head of the ticket would make the issue
between the Republicans and Democrats clear cut.
Is a member
of the Constitutional Convention, he had failed to sign a
constitution which included the recall of the judiciary. 59
Democrats had no trouble securing candidates.
By the
time Wells was safely in the field, George W. ?• Hunt, and
Thomas F. Weedin, owner of the Florence Weekly Blade, had
already announced their candidacies, and a third. Dr. Henry A..
Hughes of Maricopa was yet to enter the field.6°
While both
Weedin and Hunt campaigned on the constitution, Hughes cam­
paigned against both men personally.
Advocating prohibition
Tucson Citizen. September 28, 1911, p. 1; Arizona
Daily Star. October 4.1911, p. 4.
^ Arizona Journal Miner. September 29, 1911, p. 1.
^OWeedin announced his candidacy on September 2, while
George W. P. Hunt entered the race on September 21. Henry A.
Hughes declared his candidacy on October 1, and withdrew from
the race on October 19. See the Arizona Republic. September 5,
1911, p. 4., and October 1, 1911, p. 2. for Weedin's and
Hughes announcements. The Hunt candidacy dated from the
issuance of his proclamation "To the Voters of Arizona,11
dated September 21, 1911, Globe, Arizona. George W. P. Hunt
Scrapbook. University of Arizona Library.
31
and woman suffrage, he entered the Democratic contest with
an open letter to the press labeling Hunt as the candidate
of the Western Federation of Miners and Weedin as the candi­
date of the c o r p o r a t i o n s W e e d i n and Hunt paid little
attention to Hughes.
Weedin told a reporter from the
Tucson Citizen that he would demonstrate his advocacy of the
constitution along Jeffersonian lines, urge the recall,
promote conservation of state resources, and endorse a
stricter state economy as well as the fair control, but not
destruction, of the corporations.^
Hunt pointed out that
as president of the Constitutional Convention he had devoted
his "best energy toward securing the embodiment in our
constitution of those principles of self-government by which
the control of the government may really abide in and with
the people."
Hunt
recommended that the best way the people
could secure the "full effect" of the constitution would be
"to elect to the various offices of the state" not only
honest men, but men in full accord and sympathy with our
constitution.63
6ljLrizona Republic. October 1, 1911, p. 2.
62iuosoa Citizen. September 19, 1911, p. 1.
63 h $o the Voters of Arizona,"Proclamation of
George W. P. Hunt, loc. clt.
32
By October 1 every county and city had been turned
into a political battlefield.
George U. Young, the progress­
ive opponent of Judge Veils, had already announced his plat­
form as a "clean, square deal for every interest and every
man."6*
This contrasted sharply with the Judge's maiden
announcement which passed as his platform:
no theories . . .
"I am wedded to
I have no preconceived notions . . . .
What Arizona needs most at the present time is capital to
develop her immense resources."^5
Young concluded his
campaign on October 24 with a half-page announcement to the
voters of Tucson and Pima County.
He was the logical candidate
of the Republican party, he declared, since his opponent,
was not "a self-announced candidate" but only the "consented
to be announced" candidate of what may be termed the Republi­
can machine
.^
Young constantly represented himself to the
voters as the real representative of the Republicanism in
Arizona, which stood for the protective tariff doctrines of
Grant, Garfield, McKinley, and Roosevelt— "a tariff which
marks the difference in the cost between manufactured goods
at home and abroad."G?
^Arizona Republic. September 22, 1911, p. 7.
^Arizona Journal Miner. September 29, 1911, p. 1.
^Arizona Bally Star. October 18, 1911, p. 1.
67lbid., September 30, 1911, p. 2.
53
Weedin and George U. Young were eliminated in the
primary contest, and on November 10, both Democratic and
Republican leaders met in Phoenix to promulgate and ratify
their respective platforms and to plan the general election
c a m p a i g n . R e p u b l i c a n s made an effort at progressivism.
When compared with the Republican platform, which was twice
as long and contained twice as many promises, the Democratic
platform was remarkably simple.
The major differences lay
on the first few pages of each.
Both platforms pledged
allegiance to the Constitution of Arizona, but here the
resemblance ended.
The Democrats denounced President Taft
for "dictating . . . and compelling Arizona to eliminate
the recall," delegate Ralph Cameron for "aiding and abetting
the enemies of . . . the Constitution," and the "standpat"
element of the Republican party for their "determined
opposition" to progressive ideas.
The Republican platform,
on the other hand, paid glowing tribute to the administration
of President Taft for its "powerful aid and influence” in
furthering the enabling legislation which would make state­
hood possible.
The next paragraph congratulated Ralph
Cameron for his efforts to make good a 1908 platform which had
68weedin polled 3,532 votes against Hunt’s 5,24-1, while
Young polled 1,985 against Wells’ 3,059. Special Collection
Division University of Arizona Library.
34
promised statehood.
Republicans then concluded by endorsing
the administration of Richard E. Sloan for Its record of
efficiency.
6q
The state campaign which followed was an extension of
the primary.
Following the Democratic convention. Hunt held
an Interview with G. A. Martin, a reporter for the El Paso
Times.
"First of all," Hunt promised, "my administration
will be economical.
I have been giving much thought to the
subject of late, and have numerous plans for putting the
state's affairs on a business basis."
Hunt made it clear
that his conception of a "business" administration was
progressive:
"I want to have for the people surrounding me
in the conduct of state affairs, men who are thoroughly in
accord with this movement, but first of all they must be
capable, truly progressive, and honest men."
Hunt then went
on to outline a sweeping and comprehensive program which
included railroad and corporation regulation, conservation
of resources, as well as irrigation canals, damns, and a
canal system, the latter two being paid for out of the
national treasury.
In addition. Hunt advocated the extension
of the territorial highway from Globe through Solomonville
69Ibid., November 12, 1911, p. 7.
35
to El Paso, and promised to Improve sanitary conditions and
provide Arizona school children with free textbooks.^0
Wells did little to improve his prospects.
Speaking
in Tucson on November 22, the elderly judge admitted that he
had been asked by "many people and business interests" to
define his policy.
have no policy."
"My response," he stated, "has been:
I
The reason for his silence. Wells explained,
was that he did not wish to be handicapped by any conditions
in fulfilling the duties of the governorship.
About the
only thing the crowd learned from Wells was that he had a
"sort of policy."
This amounted to the pious declaration
that the state should provide free education and free text­
books.
Wells did point out that if elected governor he would
develop the resources of the state.
The key to the situation
he thought was to invite "men with capital to come to the
territory."71
The ebullient Hunt had several keys which he continued
to insert in the Arizona lock,
"if you believe in the
constitution," he told his audiences, "you can do nothing but
vote the Democratic ticket."
Hunt easily countered the Wells*
prosperity slogan with his own declaration:
"I believe in
TOArizona Daily Star. November 21, 1911, p. 10.
7lArizona Republic. November 4, 1911, p. 2.
36
holding the door open to Investment and inviting capital to
help develop Arizona."72
The citizens of Arizona went to the
polls on December 12, 1911 and elected a Democratic governor,
two senators, a representative, and all the lesser officials,
Including a Democratic house and senate.
Democrats had
carried majorities running from 500 to 3,500, over Republican
opponents.
Taft had achieved his victory at the expense
of the Republican party in Arizona.
Arizona voters cast
14,963 ballots in favor of the elimination of the recall,
while only 1,980 voted against its elimination and thus
against statehood.
It is significant that 5,766 signaled
their sympathy with the constitution by refusing to vote on
the elimination proposition.73
Ashurst* s fears that the
"opponents of any kind of statehood" would coalesce with
those who desire the "judicial recall or no statehood" had
failed to materialize.7^
In October, when the primary contest was in full swing,
Greenway had written Roosevelt that it seemed to him that the7
72Pouglas Daily International. November 22, 1911, p. 2.
73&rlzona Election Returns, 1911-58", loc. cit.,
Henry F. Ashurst and Mark A. Smith polled 10,575 and 10,598
respectively against Ralph H. Cameron and H. A. Smith's
9,640 and 9,228, for Senator. George ¥. P. Hunt defeated
Edward W. Wells 11,123 to 9,166 to become the first Governor
of the new state.
74ishurst, oj>. cit.. p. 8.
37
Democrats would win the next presidential election.
In this
case, Greenway reminded Roosevelt, it would be up to him to
lead the party back to victory four years hence. 75
But by
now Roosevelt had convinced himself that if the nomination
should come as the result of "a genuine popular movement"
he could not refuse it.
Roosevelt did not really believe that
it would come, and felt that he had done all that he could do
to discourage any such movement.
111 cannot make a promise
that I will not take it under any conceivable circumstance
just because there might come a circumstance where I should
have to."
Roosevelt felt that even to "admit the possibility"
would be interpreted by "a large number of gentlemen" that
such a nomination should come.76
Greenway was one of these
gentlemen, and there were other Arizona Republicans who were
ready to sacrifice President Taft as they felt they had been
sacrificed at Taft's whim on the altar of the enabling act.
75&reenway to Roosevelt, October 11, 1911.
76Roosevelt to R. H. M. Ferguson, January 12, 1912.
CHAPTER III
"THE SPIRIT OP BUNKER HILL #. *.
»
Poliowing the Democratic victory, a local Blsfcee paper
remarked that:
"On the surface of the Democratic party all
is serene • • • a covey of doves is flying over the peaceful
calm, and tender green sprouts of grass show on the meadow
surrounding the lake.
In the meadow cows are browsing and
the tinkling of the bells . . . banish bogies making a scene
of beatific, bromidic, and b l e s s e d n e s s . I n the Republican
party, there were no meadows, cows, or doves flying overhead.
Two weeks after the Republican defeat, the Roosevelt forces
had been at work to secure the Arizona delegation for
2
Roosevelt.
Warnings were heard that there would be need
of an extra police force in the city where the next Republiccan convention met.^
On January 26 the "biggest political news event • . .
in many a day" was announced when Dwight B. Heard and
Joseph A. Klbbey, Roosevelt*s former territorial governor,
iRisbee Daily Review. January 18, 1912, p. 8.
2Ibid.. December 28, 1911, p. 8.
^Douglas Daily International. January 10, 1911, p. 2.
38
39
raised the flag of revolt against Taft by the organization
of an Arizona Roosevelt Club.^
Prom the very beginning,
political leadership of the Arizona Progressive movement
seemed to lie in Heard*s hand.
In any case, five days before
the organization of the Phoenix club, Greenway had been
called to Hot Springs, Arkansas, to attend his father* s
funeral.5
Heard was perhaps the ideal man to head the state
organization.
His ancestors had crossed the Atlantic in
1638 to settle in Sudbury, Massachusetts. Combining their
Puritanism with commercial pursuits, they had early become
men of large public affairs.
Richard Heard had stood at
Concord against the British, another attended the sessions
of the Continental Congress.
Horace Heard, a member of the
Massachusetts legislature and administrator of the estate of
Ebenezer Hubbard, utilized the funds left by Hubbard to
commemorate the Battle of Concord.
The statue of the
Concord Minute Man enshrined for the ages his ancestor's
feeling for revolution in a righteous cause.
^Arizona Republic. January 26, 1912, p. 1.
Ssisbee Daily Review. January 21, 1912, p. 8. The
Review carried a notice that the Greenway's father died
suddenly. Greenway*s correspondence resumed on February 15,
1912. There is only one letter in the Greenway Collection
which indicates that he might have participated in conversa­
tions to aid Roosevelt politically before his return, and
even this letter was written shortly after his return. See
letter cited in text above footnote 14.
40
Business and reform, were bred in Dwight B. Heard*
At
seventeen, he had begun his career in the employee of an
eastern firm.
While assistant manager of credit, he had
become ill and had come to Arizona in 1895*
Shortly after­
ward he formed the Bartlett-Heard Land and Cattle Company,
and began to develop a 7,500 acre tract of land south of the
Salt River Valley.
An early supporter of conservation, he
favored the National Reclamation Act of 1902, and as one of
the water commissioners of Maricopa County he helped to work
out the preliminary plans for the Roosevelt Dam.
In 1907 and
1908, he led the fight against joint statehood with New Mexico.
In May of 1908 he attended the Conference on the Conservation
of Natural Resources, called by President Roosevelt.
Through­
out, he had remained a Republican, but when conditions
changed Heard changed with them.**
The day after its formation, the Phoenix club demanded
that the Republican party choose its delegates to the state
convention by the primary system.?
Following closely on the
heels of the Phoenix clarion call, a Roosevelt club was
formed in Globe, where William Sparks, a follower of Roosevelt
^Mc Clin took, oj>. cit., v. 3, p. 434-436.
7Arizona Republic. January 27, 1912, p. 1.
41
Q
in Cuba, collected almost immediately some 200 signatures.0
In Pima County, another Bough Rider and recent graduate of
the territorial prison, the rotund Ben Daniels, was currently
circulating a Roosevelt petition and Charles P. Jones of
Mesa, claimed over 200 members for the club in Mesa.9
Within
the month, Roosevelt clubs were to be formed elsewhere around
the state.
To keep the momentum derived from the formation of the
first few Roosevelt clubs, Heard issued a circular letter on
February 3, 1912 signed by "Some of the Bunch."
This letter
called on Republicans to unite behind Roosevelt, the "one
man" who could unite the party and end the "factional strife"
and "uncertainty" which had overtaken it.
The circular
concluded by announcing that a "Roosevelt to Win" rally would
be held in Phoenix on February 5 . ^
Following the Phoenix
rally, Heard left for a conference of third-term Roosevelt
boosters in Chicago.
On February 13 Heard telegraphed the
Arizona Republic that the Chicago conference was a "great
success" and that a complete organization had been perfected.^ 8
0
1
*
8Pouglas Daily International. January 31, 1912, p. 1.
9Blsbee Dally Review. February 1, 1912, p. 8;
Arizona Republic. February 1, 1912, p. 8.
10Blsbee Daily Review. February 3, 1912, p. 3.
^Arizona Republic. February 13, 1912, p. 8.
42
Before Heard had returned from Chicago, Greenway had
gone from Arkansas to New York to see Roosevelt.
On his
return to Arizona, Greenway wrote to a former Rough Rider,
Rock Channing of New York.
Channing had written that
Roosevelt was willing to wannounce” his acceptance of the
TO
nomination if the sentiment of the party demanded it.
Greenway replied that Roosevelt had told him, a few weeks
before, about the same thing but said nothing about making
an "announcement."
He then asked Channing about instructing
the delegates for Roosevelt.
Greenway believed that it would
be possible to instruct if Roosevelt would make the announce­
ment; but his silence, Greenway felt, had complicated the
effort to instruct delegates for him.
"What we had deter­
mined to do here," Greenway told Channing "was to fight any
attempt to instruct delegates for Mr. Taft and try to select
delegates who will be friendly to Colonel Roosevelt.
Two days later, Greenway wrote Roosevelt that he felt the
country needed him in the White House.
Greenway now thought
that if Roosevelt were convinced of a "general and universal"
demand he would make the race against Taft.^
ISRock Channing to Greenway, February 7, 1912.
l^Greenway to Channing, February 15, 1912.
Greenway to Roosevelt, February 15, 1912.
43
To make such a demand materialize in Arizona, Greenway
traveled to Phoenix on February 21 to attend a conference
of a select group of Progressives Including Heard, Kibbey,
and the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court, Judge
Edward Kent.
The consensus of opinion was that Roosevelt
would win in a primary election against Taft.
Greenway
informed George W. Perkins, formerly associated with the
banking house of J. P. Morgan and Company, and soon to use
his millions to support Roosevelt's national campaign, that
he had suggested to his conferes that they ask the chairman
of the Republican state committee to issue a call for a
primary to determine who would be the choice of the electors
in Arizona.^5
Following the Phoenix conference, Greenway began the
work of organizing the Bisbee and Douglas clubs.
On
February 23 he and James B. Speed, a Justice of the Peace
in Douglas, determined to form a Roosevelt club in that town
ISGreenway to George Perkins, February 22, 1912.
Perkins gained fame in financial circles for his work in
the formation of the International Harvester Company,
International Mercantile Marine Company, and the Northern
Securities Company. He believed that competition should be
replaced by cooperation in the business world; that great
corporations were more efficient than small competing units;
and that Industrial workers should receive retirement pen­
sions and a fair share in corporate profits. Perkins
philosophy "colored* the "new nationalism" of Roosevelt.
New York Times, June 19, 1920, p. 13.
44
the next a f t e r n o o n . O n Saturday morning, the 24th, some
sixty followers met In Douglas and elected Speed as presi­
dent and H. L. Nobel as secretary.
While the Douglas
meeting was In progress, Greenway called on Arizona Demo­
crats to turn to Roosevelt In the event that Champ Clark
of Missouri should fall to obtain the Democratic nomination.
That evening some forty Progressives formed a Roosevelt club
in Blsbee.
E. J. Evans, elected as president, promised that
within the week Roosevelt clubs would be formed In Tombstone,
Benson, Wilcox, and Courtland.
The next day Greenway left
for New York.
When Greenway returned from the East, he refused to
comment publicly whether he had seen Roosevelt but stated
that the Colonel would surely win if the people were allowed
to vote in primaries.
Greenway expressed his hope, when
informed that Arizona Democrats had espoused the direct
primary, that the Republicans would follow this "good
e x a m p l e . A
few days later Greenway wrote George A.
l^Douglas Daily International. February 24, 1912,
p. 5; February 26, 1912, p. 4.
l^Blsbee Daily Review. February 25, 1912, p. 5;
February 27, 1912, p. 6. The Tombstone club was not formerly
organized until March 27. The International stated that
clubs were being formed In Pearce, Gleeson, and Courtland,
while several others were contemplated in the Sulpher Springs
Valley. Douglas Daily International. March 27, 1912. p. 1.
IGsisbee Dally Review. March 14, 1912, p. 10.
45
He Carter of Red Bluffs, California, that he had visited
Oyster Bay and that the Colonel had all his "clothes" In
the ring and would win "hands down" If It were not for the
federal patronage which Taft controlled
The President’s control of the patronage meant that
Taft would hold the Arizona delegation if party ranks
remained firm.
Greenway, realizing this, wrote James T.
Williams, owner of the Tucson Citizen, that he hoped to see
it swing in line for Roosevelt.*
20* Greenway was now in charge
of the Roosevelt interests in Cochise County:
Heard, whom
he described as a "live wire . . . but who lacks system and
experience," had general responsibility for the state
campaign.
All the "bread and butter politicians," he thought
were lined up with the administration, but the rank and file
were for Roosevelt.
This was clearly shown by Greenway’s
postal card canvass of Cochise County, which gave Roosevelt
160 votes to Taft’s forty and thirty for the leader of the
insurgent Republicans, Senator Robert R. LaFollette of
Wisconsin.
Greenway was confident that Roosevelt would get
the LaFollette vote.2^
^Greenway to George McCarter, March 20, 1912.
20Greenway to A. 0. Brodie, March 28, 1912; Bisbee
Bally Review, March 30, 1916, p. 6; Douglas Daily Inter­
national.ICoril 17, 1912, p. 4.
------
46
Roosevelt was soon Informed that he had a lead of
four to one In Oochise County.
Greenway went on to describe
the political situation In Arizona and Arkansas, but he
thought that Roosevelt's continued silence was preventing
Republican leaders from coming to his support for fear of
"getting in wrong" with the Taft administration.
needed was a statement "direct" to the people.
What was
Greenway
was afraid that the will and desire of the voters would be
frustrated if this announcement was not soon forthcoming.
"Please let me hear from you," Greenway asked, "as the sit­
uation is fast coming to a head . . ."22
Greenway had come to feel that the disruption of the
party was imminent in Arizona unless Republican leaders
allowed the issue between Roosevelt and Taft to be settled
by a presidential primary.
He believed, too, that a political
realignment was underway between the forces of LaPolette and
those of Democratic elements still under the sway of William
Jennings Bryan.
The only hope of it all was Roosevelt, and
with the county committee of Cochise now committed to
Roosevelt by a count of forty-four to seventeen Greenway
thought that it might be possible to carry the state
convention.232
3
22Greenway to Roosevelt, April 3, 1912.
23Greenway to Williams, April 13, 1912; Greenway to
John A. Savage, April 13, 1912; Greenway to P. D. Ward,
April 13, 1912.
47
While Greenway labored to carry Cochise County for
Roosevelt, Heard at Phoenix issued a long statement addressed
to Arizona Republicans in general and to the executive
committee of the Republican state organization in particular.
Heard optimistically pointed to the results of the Illinois
and Pennsylvania primaries, which had shown the Hoverwhelming"
demand for Roosevelt.
He completed his argument by stating
that Roosevelt, in a series of "masterful addresses," had
placed the real issues of social and political justice before
the people.
"The spirit of Bunker Hill," Heard declared,
"would not allow the people of Arizona to suffer 'boss
dictation*."
Heard concluded:
"They demand a direct
primary."24
The "spirit of Bunker Hill" to which Heard alluded
was sadly lacking when the Republican executive committee
met in Phoenix on May 1 to set the date and consider the
method by which the delegates to the state convention would
be selected.
The committee announced that the convention
would be held in Tucson on June 3, 1912.
The call provided
for the meeting of the various county committees on May 15
to determine whether to adopt the primary system or whether
the county committees themselves would designate the
24jLrlzona Republic. April 21, 1912, p. 4.
48
delegates to the convention.^5
At the same time the
executive committee issued a resolution endorsing "without
reservation" the administration of William Howard Taft.*
2^
Thus had Chairman Lorenzo Hubbell, in the words of a Cochise
paper, "named the weapons of the game and the date of the
fight."27
The two resolutions adopted by the Taftites met with
scant approval on the part of most of the Progressive
Republicans in Arizona.
These resolutions certainly contra­
dicted those adopted the day before by Phoenix Progressives
endorsing Roosevelt and the direct primary.2®
25"Minutes of Republican State Convention, held
June 3, 1912, at Tucson, Arizona, to elect delegates to
National Republican Convention, June 18, 1912," Special
Collections Division of the University of Arizona
Library, pp. 1-3.
2^Arizona Republic. May 2, 1912, p. 5* Secretary
Hays according to the Republic recorded a vote of 9 for the
measure, although it was rumored that 13 votes had been
cast. The Elsbee Dally Review claimed that Taft had been
endorsed 9 to 3 with three delegates not voting. The Review
in addition claimed that 8 of 14 of those present were
present by proxy. Blabee Dally Review. May 12, 1912, p. 1.
27Greenway always attributed the action of the Executive
Committee to its "color" which he described as follows: J. L.
Hubbell of Apache County enjoying valuable store licenses on
the Indian Reservation; R. A. Franz of Greenlee • • • U. S.
Deputy Marshall; Allan T. Byrd of Santa Cruz . . . U. S.
Commissioner at Nogales; R. E. Morrison of Coconino, has a
brother on the Taft payroll as U. S. District Attorney in
Cochise County; Allen T. Jayne . . . Clerk of the Federal
Court; Robert Smith of Coconino County on the Taft payroll as
postmaster. Greenway to Roosevelt, June 4, 1912.
28Arlzona Republic. May 1, 1912, p. 5.
49
Greenway was disconcerted.
He still believed Roosevelt
would carry Arizona but victory was "not certain by any
means," because the "element in control of organization"
was for Taft.
On the morning of May 15 Greenway wired
George W. Perkins that "we are doing all possible . . .
here . . .
expect to carry county committee tonight."^9
Roosevelt boosters had indeed not been idle.
The Bisbee
Daily Review reported that they had been campaigning through­
out Cochise County by automobile to secure proxies for the
committee meeting.
The editor was also quick to point out
that if the Roosevelt men could control the committee there
would be no need for a primary.-^
Of the sixty-nine Cochise committeemen who met in
Benson on the evening of May 15, thirty-three were Roosevelt
men who controlled thirteen proxies while the 9 Taft men
held 14 proxies.
After an unsuccessful attempt to exclude
nine of Roosevelt's supporters. Chairman A. H. Gardner with­
drew, taking with him the records of the meeting.
Progressives
went ahead to effect a temporary organization and selected
Bisbee as the site for the county convention.^
Following
the Benson meeting, Greenway wrote James T. Williams of the
Tucson Citizen that he hoped the newspaper man was now2
29Greenway to Perkins, May 14, 1912; Perkins to
Greenway, May 14, 1912; Greenway to Perkins, May 15, 1912.
SORisbee Daily Review. May 12, 1912, p. 2.
31ibid., May 16, 1912, p. 1.
50
satisfied that Taft's chances were "nil."
Williams should
now come back where he belonged— to the “decent" Progressive
element of the party.
Between the Benson meeting and the Bisbee meeting,
rumors were circulated that a compromise was in the offing
with ten Roosevelt delegates and six Taft delegates to be
seated at the forthcoming Tucson convention.^3
The night
before Progressive Republicans met in Bisbee, Greenway wired
Perkins that the situation did not look very good as the
Taft forces were contesting Roosevelt delegations throughout
the state without "justification.“
Greenway thought that
Roosevelt forces would control the state convention, fiftythree to forty-three, if they received fair treatment,
"if
we do not," Greenway declared, "we will send a contesting
delegation."3^
On Saturday evening May 25, two conventions met in
Cochise county.
At Douglas the regular Republicans assembled
and endorsed Taft, while in Bisbee the Roosevelt faction
selected their delegates to the state convention.
George Jay
of Waco was elected chairman of the central committee, and
32(jreenway to Williams, May 23, 1912.
33Blsbee Daily Review. May 21, 1912, p. 1; May 24,
1912j P# Oe
34creenway to Perkins, May 24, 1912; Perkins to
Greenway, May 24, 1912.
51
E. 0. Hicks of Bisbee chosen as secretary.
late and made a short speech.
Greenway arrived
NSocialism is the worst thing
In this country,11 he told his fellow delegates, “but if the
people are not allowed to run the government through the
presidential primary, socialism is what will happen.
I
believe in giving all an equal chance and an equal opportun­
ity, and we must guarantee these to every generation.“35
Three days after the Bisbee convention, David Benshimol,
a former Rough Rider, asked Greenway to send him a list of
committee members of 1908 and a signed statement that the
majority repudiated the action at Douglas.36
were also preparing their plans.
The Taft leaders
Three days before the state
convention met in Tucson, Greenway wired Perkins that the
Roosevelt forces controlled some sixty-five votes out of
ninety-six.
These included Maricopa* a twenty, Cochise*s
sixteen, Yavapai’s eleven, Greenlee’s five, Pinal’s four.
35Blsbee Dally Review. May 26, 1912, p. 3.
^^Davld Benshimol to Greenway, May 28, 1912. There
is no evidence that Greenway complied with the request.
What happened in Cochise County was that JL. H. Gardner,
chairman of the central committee both in 1908 and 1911,
assembled the 1908 members after losing control of the 1911
committee. This committee elected Taft delegates to the
Tucson convention. Gardner justified his action on the
grounds that the 1911 committee had no legal existence
whatever as it was in the same category as precinct officers
for whom no election had been held in the last territorial
election. Consequently the 1908 committee was a hold-over
committee. Bisbee Daily Review. May 26, 1912, p. 1.
52
Gila's three and Santa Cruz's two*
Greenway again told
Perkins that the Progressives planned to hold a separate
convention if their delegates were excluded.3?
promptly wired hack:
Roosevelt
"Heartiest congratulations.
If our
delegates are unseated, I hope they will hold a separate
convention.M28
This decision was wise, for the Tucson Citizen
reported that the Taft forces controlled the nine votes of
Pima, four of Gila, two of Santa Cruz, four of Havajo, two
of Mohave, and four of Coconino, making a total of twentynine, while the Roosevelt forces had the three votes of
Gila, four of Yuma, five of Greenlee, and three of Pinal—
a total of fifteen.
The allegiance of forty-seven delegates
was said to be questionable— Maricopa's twenty, Cochise's
sixteen, and Yavapai's e l e v e n . The Citizen report did not
agree with Greenway*s estimates.
The two seats from Santa
Cruz were claimed by Greenway, as the voters of that county
had elected two Roosevelt delegates at the primaries; and
Pinal, awarded to the Roosevelt faction, was entitled to
27sreenway to Perkins, May 31, 1912. Greenway forgot
to include Yuma's 4 votes in the Progressive totals, and his
report to Perkins seems in error. Greenway himself later
corrected this estimate.
28Roosevelt to Greenway, May 31, 1912.
29Tucson Citizen. May 29, 1912, p. 1.
53
four delegates, not t h r e e . G r e e n w a y realized that the
contested delegation from Maricopa County would decide the
fate of the state convention.
While Greenway did battle for
Roosevelt in Cochise, P. H. Hays, secretary of the Maricopa
Central Committee, packed the credentials committee with
Roosevelt supporters.
This committee seated forty-one
delegates plus two proxies held by the Roosevelt men, exclud­
ing eight proxies held by Taft delegates.
The Maricopa
convention then declared for a primary where Roosevelt
received 950 votes against twenty-five for Taft.^
On Sunday morning, June 2, 1912, Greenway left for
the Tucson convention.
The chairman of the Republican
executive committee, Lorenzo Hubbell, had issued a call on
May 28 for the executive committee to meet on June 1 to
decide all contests in the county delegations.
Rather than
have this happen, Greenway saw Hubbell, shortly after his
arrival, and proposed a compromise.
Greenway*s compromise
would have allowed a committee of three from each side to
select a seventh; this committee would then make up the
temporary roll call.
Hubbell declined the proposal, and at
*°Greenway to Roosevelt. June 4, 1912; "Minutes of
the Republic State Convention," loc. clt., p. 5.
^ Arizona Republic, May 16, 1912, p. 1; May 24, 1912,
P* 2e
54
this juncture the Roosevelt forces decided to place only the
Cochise contest before the executive committee.
It decided
to seat both delegations, giving each a half vote.
In
making up the temporary roll call, the committee excluded
the Roosevelt delegates from Maricopa, Greenlee, Pinal, and
Santa Cruz.
When the temporary roll call was read, Klbbey
vigorously protested but was overruled.
Thus two conventions
took place at the same time, the regular Republicans endors­
ing "the Cato of American politics," William Howard Taft,
while the Progressives pledged themselves to Roosevelt.
The day after the convention, Greenway wrote Roosevelt
that Republicans had tried to put the "road roller" over the
Progressives but it "wouldn* t roll."
To Greenway the exclusion
of the Roosevelt delegations was without "precedent" or
"authority" as the Maricopa and Cochise delegations were
"absolutely incontestable."
Greenway considered the Yavapai
delegation questionable while Pima, raised by Ben Daniels,
was illegal.
"l repudiated this act,” Greenway stated.
Greenway then told Roosevelt that he would leave for Chicago
on the 15th, and could go sooner if "absolutely advisable";
but he had insisted on Heard being named chairman of the
42"Mi%utes of the Republican State Convention,"
loc* cit., Greenway gave an account of his compromise
proposal to Roosevelt. Greenway to Roosevelt, June 4, 1912.
55
delegation because, while “Inexperienced,M he was a great
Mhustler" and could go at
once
Heard was already preparing for the Chicago battle.
He had assembled a brief sustaining the validity of the
Cochise, Maricopa, and Yavapai delegations as well as the
44
validity of the Roosevelt convention.
Armed with this
brief, the Roosevelt delegation left to contest the Tucson
results in Chicago— but to no avail.
The Rational Republi­
can Committee accomplished on the national level what the
Arizona Executive Committee had done on the state level:
the wholesale exclusion of Roosevelt’s delegates.
Heard,
Greenway, Kibbey, Tom Molloy of Yuma, and MoRedman of Pinal
were only spectators when Roosevelt allowed Henry J. Allen
of Kansas to read a message to his pledged delegates asking
them to participate no longer in the deliberations of the
Republican party
On the evening of June 22 Theodore Roosevelt entered
Orchestra Hall in Chicago, escorted by Greenway, and other
^^Greenway to Roosevelt, June 4, 1912. Greenway told
Roosevelt that 9 votes out of 14 were cast by men receiving
pecuniary benefits from Mr. Taft.
^ J . 1. B. Alexander to Greenway, June 4, 1912.
^George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the
Progressive Movement (Madison, 1946), pp. £157-239.
56
f r i e n d s . F o u r days later the Arizona Progressive delega­
tion announced its official position to the citizens of the
state and asked for their support in the "uprising" against
the reactionary elements in the two older parties.^7
Greenway returned from Chicago believing that Taft* s support­
ers had accomplished the "assassination" of the Republican
party, and that it could count on its repudiation by the
people.
He told a reporter of the Blsbee Dally Review that
a new party, based on "sound" and "sane" Progressive prin­
ciples, would arise out of the great moral question, "Shall
JN O
the people rule?"
That afternoon Greenway sent J. L. B.
Alexander a copy of his interview, declaring that he was
through with the Republican party for the "stealing of a
nomination . . .
is something I will not stand for."
Greenway
then advised Alexander to work on Kibbey and Judge Kent, who
were apparently wavering, as the Progressive cause depended
upon an "absolutely" new party."^9*
4
^^World Today, July 15, 1912. This reference is drawn
from a source in the Greenway papers. Greenway never referred
to the matter.
^ Blsbee Daily Review. June 26, 1912, p. 4.
48Ibid., July 2, 1912, p. 5.
49Greenway to Alexander, July 2, 1912.
57
The Arizona Progressives “crossed the river” in
mid-July when some thirty-eight Tucsonans signed a call
asking all interested people to meet in Phoenix on July 30
to form a state party.50
As it happened Graham, Greenlee,
Apache, and Navajo counties did not send representatives.
Undaunted, the organizers of this first state convention
declared that the time had come for a "national Progressive
movement on nonsectional lines" since the "sordid" interests
which controlled the Republican convention at Chicago were
equally present in the Democratic convention at Baltimore;
and both had shown the need for a new party based on the
"actual right and capacity of the people to rule themselves."
The Progressives capped their resolutions with a twenty
point platform and two special resolutions; one of which
condemned Taft's "weak" and "vacillating" policy while the
other endorsed Roosevelt.
The convention concluded by
selecting Heard, Greenway, and E. S. Clark, a Prescott
attorney, as presidential electors and named a fifteen-man
delegation to attend the National Progressive convention
scheduled to meet in Chicago in the first week of August.5^5
50Arizona Republic. July 21, 1912, p. 12.
was dated July 18, 1912.
51lbid., July 31, 1912, pp. 1, 3.
The call
58
The delegation left without Greenway.
Development
of the new smelter for the Calumet and Arizona mine kept him
from attending the Chicago convention, but soon he was able
to report a "great improvement" in Progressive affairs in
Arizona.52
This was an option to purchase the Phoenix
Gazette which he had taken in response to a telegraphic
request from Heard,
"it will help us greatly to have a
Progressive paper at the State Capitol," Greenway wrote
George W. Perkins, now the chairman of the National Executive
Committee. 55
$he next day Greenway wrote David Goodrich, a
former Rough Rider, that Roosevelt's National advisors had
foolishly routed Colonel Roosevelt through Arizona by way of
Tucson, Phoenix, and Ashfork— and then on to Albuquerque—
rather than through Bisbee.
On September 9 Greenway came to
Tucson to meet Roosevelt and continued with him to Albuquerque
before leaving for the East on business.5^
Citizens of Arizona were able to hear the promises of
Roosevelt's "New Nationalism" from the Bull Moose himself.
52Bisbee Daily Review. July 30, 1912, p. 3. There is
a gap in the Greenway correspondence between the Progressive
State Convention and August 14, 1912. Greenway was not
named a delegate to the National Convention; the presumption
is that Greenway was preoccupied with the Calumet and
Arizona mine.
S^Greenway to Perkins, August 30, 1912.
later purchased was the Arizona Republic.
The paper
_5
54Greenway to David Goodrich, August 31, 1912; Bisbee
*
2
Daily Review, September 9, 1912, p. 2.
------
59
Roosevelt* s major policy address came at Phoenix on
September 18, here he devoted a major portion of his speech
to the recall of the judiciary, which illustrated what he
meant by the right of the people to rule.
When he was in
Arizona some eighteen months before he reminded his
audience he had opposed the recall of the judiciary, but
if the people of Arizona wanted it they had a right to have
it.
Had he been in Arizona after Taft had demanded that the
recall provision be stricken from the constitution "we would
have put it in as soon as we had the chance. "55
As Roosevelt labored to convert Arizona citizens to
the Progressive cause. Heard, spurred by his candidate*s
visit, offered S. M. Elgley #20,000 for the Arizona Republic.5^
Two days later the arrangements were complete, and Heard
wired Greenway that the Republic was now giving the Progres­
sive cause statewide support.
mission was twofold:
Heard*s idea of the Republic*s
the championing of Progressive prin­
ciples and the development of the state*s resources.
Heard
wrote a close friend that the "wretched” and "vacillating"
policies of the paper were now ended, and that as publisher
he would uphold decency, good government, and justice, and
55jLrlzona Republic. September 19, 1912, p. 1 .
56]), B. Heard to S. W. HLgley, October 5, 1912;
George B. Wilkinson to Greenway, October 7 , 1912.
60
would run the paper In the Interests of the public welfare.57
The purchase of the Republic^ Heard felt, had put the local
situation In "splendid shape."58
These private assurances of Heard were publicly
printed on October 6, 1912, when in a signed statement he
told Arizona readers that the Republic, which had just
announced itself as an "independent Progressive Journal,"
would support Roosevelt and Hiram If. Johnson of California,
the vice-presidential candidate, because of their ability,
efficiency, integrity, and high purpose and the "great
constructive platform” on which they stood.
The next day
the Republic began its campaign of education.
Heard almost
daily printed the Progressive platform and attempted to
explain it through the columns of his editorial page.59
With the Arizona Republic now in the Progressive
field, Greenway was no doubt happy on his return to Arizona.
He wrote Prank Knox, a former comrade in arms, that the
paper was a "live one," and while the race would be close
he expected Roosevelt to carry Arizona.^
Greenway had
earlier stated to a reporter from the Blsbee Daily Review
57Heard to Greenway, October 7, 1912; Heard to
A. 0. Bartlett, October 8, 1912.
SSneard to Greenway, October 9, 1912.
59Arizona Republic. October 6, 1912, p. 1 ; October 7 ,
1912; pe 4e
6°Greenway to Prank Knox, October 14, 1912.
61
that Roosevelt was the popular candidate in Hew York whereas
Taft and Wilson were in favor in the offices of the banks
and the big manufacturing h o u s e s . H i s eastern trip had
led Greenway to believe that Roosevelt would carry Hew York,
Pennsylvania, and Illinois, which would give him the
election.62
Arizona Progressives began their campaign for
Roosevelt and Johnson and their lone candidate for repre­
sentative in Congress, Robert S. Fisher, a Phoenix attorney,
by establishing a local headquarters in Phoenix where they
received contributions and sold certificates showing a
picture of Roosevelt and Johnson.
The Republic was quick
to call on women to join the cause since only by cooperation
with Progressives could women hope to achieve suffrage.63
Heard offered to send one copy of the Arizona Republic,
containing the Progressive platform, to citizens who were
not subscribers to the paper.
His circulation department
offered, as well, a special "campaign rate" to all new
subscribers.646
61Bisbee Daily Review. October 10, 1912, p. 1.
62Greenway to E. R. Helson, October 14, 1912.
^Arizona Republic. October 9, 1912, p. 4; October 9 ,
1912, p. 1 .
64lbid.. October 13, 1912, p. 8 .
62
Progressive speakers conducted an extensive campaign
throughout the state while the Arizona Republic was attempt­
ing to spread Progressive doctrine while increasing circula­
tion.
The same night that Heard, and J. L. B. Alexander,
the State campaign chairman, spoke in Osbom, Fisher spoke
in Nogales, after having addressed an audience in Yuma the
night before.
Fisher was scheduled to swing through to
Bisbee and Douglas.^5
in the middle of their state campaign,
Progressives received a shock.
On October 15 Roosevelt was
shot while speaking in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
immediately wired the candidate:
worse.
Greenway
"Thank God it wasn*t
Your conduct was splendid. "66
At a rally in Phoenix
that very night the Progressives made the most of the
"assassin's bullet" and the vigor of their candidate, who
though wounded had remained to finish his speech.
Voters
were told also that Roosevelt was personally responsible for
the new dam bearing his name and for the increase of land
values in the Salt River Valley.
Fisher, in an open letter
to the Arizona Republic, reminded voters of "the silvery
flow" that "by the chemistry of his courage" was making
"golden harvests for this valley" Such a man deserved the*
6
65lbid., October 10, 1912, p. 1; October 15, 1912,
p. 12.
66Greenway to Roosevelt, October 15, 1912.
63
vote of Arizonians.67
Although Greenway did not speak
publicly for Roosevelt, his private letters expressed deep
concern for the candidate.
Greenway felt that the Milwaukee
shooting would convince many who were "wavering" of his
absolute sincerity if not of his great physical courage.
"My admiration deepens for him every day," he wrote one friend,
and to another he declared:
"Take it from me, Ed, that you
need not hesitate in your allegiance . . .
I am supporting
Roosevelt, after fourteen years close acquaintanceship, with
purse, voice, heart, and action,' I think more of him today
than I have at any time during my acquaintance with him."
Greenway was concerned with the campaign of slander and
character assassination directed against Roosevelt.
The only
argument, Greenway thought, that his opponents had was that
Roosevelt was "too big" with "too much honor. "^8
Late in October Greenway conducted a poll at his
country club which gave Roosevelt twenty-five votes, Wilson
nineteen, Taft seven, and the Socialist candidate, Eugene V.
Debs, one.
To one newspaper this poll was nothing more than
a "personal compliment," but to the Arizona Republic it was
a "striking illustration" of the progress the Progressive
^ Arizona Republic. October 16, 1912, pp. 1, 8 ;
October 15, 1912, p. 5.
^Greenway to Fred Ekman, October 21, 1912; Greenway
to Edward B. Ryan, October 24, 1912.
'1
64
movement was making •^9
on November 2 Greenway sent telegrams
to Roosevelt, Perkins, and Heard expressing the traditional
hope for victory.
Later that day Greenway wrote Goodrich
that he expected Arizona and Cochise to vote for Roosevelt,
and that every friend of Roosevelt was working overtime.70
The Arizona Republic reminded Its readers on Novem­
ber 4 that within a day It would be known just how many
Arizona voters were truly Progressive.
The test was simple.
There would be as many Progressives In Arizona as there were
votes for Roosevelt and Johnson and no more.71
The next day
the Republic hit the streets with Its front page headline
screaming "Progressives of Arizona See Victory Today," and
Its columns filled with Inspired telegrams.
Alexander pre­
dicted victory for the Progressive party since
great silent vote will go our way."
UG0% of
the
Perhaps the most inspired
forecast, however, was made by Charles E. Arnold, the campaign
chairman of the Republican party, who beginning with Apache
County went alphabetically through the Arizona counties
predicting either victory or second place for William
^ Blsbee Dally Review. October 26, 1912, p. 3;
Arizona Republic, October 27, 1912, p. 4.
7°Greenway to Perkins, November 2, 1912; Greenway to
Roosevelt, November 1, 1912; Greenway to Heard, November 2,
1912; Greenway to Goodrich, November 2, 1912.
7lArizona Republic. November 4, 1912, p. 4.
65
Howard Taft.72
Such sanguine expectations had no substan­
tiation on the national level.
Taft finished a bad third In
1912, ending with only eight electoral votes to Roosevelt's
eighty-eight and Woodrow Wilson's record-breaking majority of
435.
In point of the popular vote, however, the victorious
Wilson was a minority President, since his 6,286,214 votes
were not in excess of Roosevelt's 4,126,020 plus Taft's
3,483,922.
When the results became clear, Greenway wired Roose­
velt:
"You made a great fight . . .
you."
Greenway could at least tell Roosevelt that his town
of Warren had voted for him.^'*
the honors must go to
Heard told his readers that
the results proved that the Progressive party would soon
absorb the faltering Republican party.
Heard was gratified
that in Arizona the Progressives had received three times as
many votes as did the "reactionary" Republicans.
Els editorial
page termed the defeat a Progressive "triumph" for it spelled
the end of the Republican party and it insured the ascendancy
of the people.7^
Greenway told a reporter from the Bisbee
72ibid.. November 5, 1912, pp. 1, 7, 8.
7%reenway to Roosevelt, November 6, 1912.
^ Arizona Republic. November 6, 1912, pp. 1, 3.
Roosevelt electors B. S.Clark, Greenway and Heard polled
6,949, 6,849 and 6,873 votes respectively. Republican
electors received 2,986, 3,021, and 2,975. Socialists
electors outpolled the Republicans, securing 3,163, 3,139,
and 3,132. Democratic electors received 10,324, 10,174,
and 10,130 for their candidate, Woodrow Wilson.
66
Daily Review that he was not disappointed but was satisfied
to look to the future.
He reminded the reporter that at
least one good thing had happened:
"The . . .
Barnes, Root,
Penrose, and Guggenheim ring has gone to a most crushing
defeat."75
He accepted the results with a "cheerful mind,"
hoping that Wilson would make good on his campaign promises.76
75Bisbee Dally Review. November 8, 1912, p. 2.
7^Greenway to W. W. Heffelfinger, November 9 , 1912.
OHA.PIER IV
NO OOMPROECSB, NO 1MA.LG1MA.TION l
Six days after the election of 1912, Heard pointed
the Progressive party of Arizona on a course of Independent
political action, the objective of which was to achieve a
three fold program outlined In the Arizona Republic.
Characterizing partisan politics divisive. Heard wished to
purge the Progressive program from partisan considerations.
MAs a matter of fact," declared his editor, "no question can
possibly arise within the next eighteen months into which a
question of party politics can be legitimately Introduced.
Toward the middle of November, leading Progressives assembled
at Gunther* s Cafe in Phoenix for a "victory" celebration.
Greenway had been billed as the chief speaker but was unable
to attend, and instead J. Fred Cleveland and Robert S. Fisher
made short speeches.
Heard read a telegram from Joseph M.
Dixon, Montana* s State Senator and head of the Roosevelt
national campaign, congratulating Arizona Progressives for
^Arizona Republic. November 10, 1912, p. 4. The
program called for an extension of time for the reservoir
payments, a transcontinental main line railroad to Phoenix,
and improvement in the methods of city, state, and county
administration.
6?
68
their Msplendid fight'* and exhorting them to even "greater
accomplishments" in the next campaign.2
Shortly after this
meeting, Heard* s papexj in an editorial entitled "After Two
Weeks," declared that the Progressive party, which had begun
its state campaign without an organization, had captured the
Republican seats on election boards.
The Republic promised a
full organization for the next campaign.^
Greenway now turned his attention again to his business.
When Alexander, the state chairman, asked Greenway to attend
the Progressive National Committee conferences in Chicago in
December, Greenway replied that he was not at all certain he
would be able to come.*
Alexander also sent Greenway a bill
for the state campaign which had been calculated as $368, of
which Greenway*s share would be $100.5
George Perkins, in
the dying days of November, wrote Greenway asking "somebody"
to raise the question why the Republican National Committee
^ibid., November 12, 1912, p. 1; November 13, 1912,
p. 5; November 14, 1912, p. 1.
^Ibld., November 21, 1912, p. 4; November 13, 1912,
p. 4. The Republic explained to its readers that only the
party with the highest and next highest number of votes at
the recent election was entitled to representation on
election boards.
^Alexander to Greenway, November 26, 1912; Joseph
M. Dixon to Alexander, November 21, 1912; Greenway to
Alexander, November 29, 1912.
^Alexander to Greenway, December 6, 1912.
69
had refused to allow the Arizona delegates to go to Roosevelt,
but Greenway did no thing. ^
The Arizona Republic was silent
until January 10, 1913, when quoting Roosevelt, it announced
that there could be no unity between the Progressives and
regular Republicans until the latter* s managers learn that
“theft and fraud and swindling people" was not the way to
achieve a triumph.
The next day the Republic, applying the
doctrine of independent action, announced its policy of nonpartisanship in the forthcoming May election of Phoenix
municipal officers, while at the same time calling upon
Progressives to build up their local organizations.
As Heard pursued this contradictory line, Greenway
told a reporter in Tucson that he was through with politics
but that he hoped Wilson would "make good."?
He proceeded
to Sonora to investigate some mining properties; and on his
return he answered a letter from Captain Richard W. Walker,
an Army officer stationed on the border, who had written to
ask if Greenway might raise a volunteer regiment in the event
of trouble with Mexico.
Greenway replied that he had no such
plans, but left the question open when he told Walker:
"If
^Perkins to Greenway, Movember 30, 1912.
^Arizona Republic. January 10, 1913, p. 1; January 11,
1913, p. 4; Greenway to Roosevelt, December 3, 1912.
70
things turn out as you suggest, your proposition would be
most a g r e e a b l e . G r e e n w a y actually hoped that things would
“liven up" under Wilson, and that the new President would
protect the lives of Americans along the border by using
American troops.
After seeing the fighting at Cananea,
Greenway was convinced that the revolution would continue .
unabated as the Mexican people unfortunately had no apprecia­
tion of strong government.9
As the Mexican situation darkened in Greenway's eyes,
merger with the Progressives loomed larger in the thoughts
of Arizona Republicans.
In April the Bisbee Daily Review
reported that Dwight B. Heard had been approached by
Republican leaders looking toward unity between the two
parties."*"®
The report was true.
The first overtures were
made by Lorenzo Hubbell, the Indian trader of Navajo County,
who saw Heard on April 22.
Hubbell proposed that the
executive committees of both parties meet in Phoenix to
discuss unity.
As the basis of a merger, Hubbell outlined a
plan whereby the Republican party would accept the Progressive*
0
1
^Richard W. Walker to Greenway, February 1, 1913;
Greenway to Walker, March 1, 1913.
^Qreenway to Margaret Gunn, March 23, 1913; Greenway
to W. 0. Gilbert, April 7, 1913.
10Blsbee Daily Review. April 24, 1913, p. 1.
71
platform and would submit to whatever leadership both parties
might select at a joint primary election to be held for that
purpose.
In return, Hubbell wanted the Republican name
maintained and the reorganized party called the ProgressiveRepublican party.
Hubbell than admitted to Heard that he
had made a serious mistake, and now wished that he had yielded
to the progressive demand for primaries which would have made
the Republican party "progressive* before the election.
Heard told Greenway that he had made it "very clear" that
such a plan was "not desirable," and had suggested to Hubbell
that the Progressive party would welcome any Republicans as
"individuals" who wished to join it.
Hubbell declined the
invitation.11
Greenway felt that Heard*s reply was "exactly right,"
since in Oochise the feelings of the Progressives against
the Hubbell faction were still very strong.
Greenway told
Heard that he would never align himself with the Republican
party as "now constituted" but would join the Democratic if
he had to choose between the two.
Greenway doubted if
Hubbell*s allegiance would help the Progressive cause,
"it
would be more hurtful than otherwise," he wrote, and asked
that his letter be destroyed.12
^ H eard to Greenway, April 23, 1913.
12Greenway to Heard, April 28, 1913.
72
Progressives in Arizona were treated to much the same
news:
there would be no merger.
Heard's paper took the
opportunity to reply to the intimation of the Arizona Record
that independent political action on the part of Progressives
might destroy the Democratic party in Arizona.
The Arizona
Republic felt this insinuation was unfounded, and quickly
stated that the Progressive party was not the "Cave of Adullan"
and that its leaders did not expect any "professional politic­
ian, spoilsman, or any disappointed partisan" to join its
ranks.
In May of 1913 the Progressives of Arizona welcomed
the famous editor of the Emporia Gazette. William Allen
White, whose message that the "Progressives have no thought
of merging" was prominently displayed on page one of the
Arizona Republic.
In its editorial column the next day the
paper even more bluntly declared:
no amalgamation."1^
"There can be no compromise,
Heard, possibly prompted by White's
visit, wrote Greenway asking about a proposed "plan of organ­
ized work" for Progressives.1^
In July Greenway finally
replied that he thought Progressives should not delay in
^ Arizona Republic. April 25, 1913, p. 4.
l^ibld.. May 31, 1913, p. 1; June 1, 1913, p. 4.
^Heard to Greenway, June 3, 1915, and June 25, 1913.
73
perfecting an organization.
“Hew is the time to get organ­
ized,M he wrote, so that the party might he strengthened
and broadened for the state campaign of 1914.
loth Heard
and Greenway were disappointed in their state chairman,
J. 1. B. Alexander, and Greenway suggested Mwe should appoint
a successor" if Alexander did not show greater interest in
his joh.
Greenway thought that the replacement should he
hy a "good, live, active young man, preferably an ex-Democrat."
He could foresee the possible defeat of Governor Hunt, and
it was possible that Hunt and his followers might come to
the Progressive party.
"We . . .
should welcome Mr. Hunt
and his friends to the Party" wrote Greenway, "but not the
Party to Mr. Hunt."1^
In September Greenway asked Heard what the Progres­
sives were going to do for a candidate for governor.
Greenway suggested the former territorial governor, Alexander
0. Prodie, as one who would make a "strong race."
Regardless
of whom the nominee might be, Greenway wanted to be in
agreement with Heard in case the party even had a candidate.^*7
In October, Greenway left for the Orient with Heard* s reply
unanswered.
The publisher felt that the Progressives
l^Greenway to Heard, July 16, 1913.
^Greenway to Heard, September 4, 1913.
74
should put all the "ginger" possible in the next campaign,
and the Republic soon announced that a recent address by
Roosevelt in New York had brought discouragement and dismay
-i Q
to those who hoped that a merger could be effected.
To
the true Progressive, Roosevelt had declared, more was at
stake than the success of the party; the principles of the
Progressive party were far more important and must not be
temporarily compromised or a b a n d o n e d . T h e Republic.
Heard insisted, stood for Progressive principles and the
promotion of legitimate enterprise and industry in Arizona.
Specifically, he told his readers that his paper would support
both Wilson and Governor Hunt in national and state matters
when their policies were based on "justice and common sense,"
The Republic stood for the "square deal" for every interest
"big or little" in Arizona.1
20
*
8
While Greenway was in the Orient, Phoenix Progressives—
under the leadership of Heard and stimulated by a visit of
William E. Cadmus, National Progressive organizer— raised some
$500 for the initial expense of opening a Progressive Head­
quarters and employing of a full-time organizer.
This group
passed a series of resolutions endorsing the local club
18Heard to Greenway, October 13, 1913.
^ Arizona Republic. October 5, 1913, p. 4.
20Ibid., October 6, 1913, p. 1.
75
movement, as well as a plan of thorough organization of the
party in all the counties and precincts through the appoint­
ment of precinct committeemen.
The meeting concluded with
resolutions endorsing National Progressive principles and a
denial of amalgamation.^
While the Progressives were still
trying to promote something in the way of organization for
the state campaign of 1914, a small group of regular Repub­
licans assembled in Phoenix.
The genesis of this meeting,
according to a Bisbee paper, was a small business card bear­
ing the name "Ralph Cameron, Governor of Arizona."
With the
well-known former territorial delegate on the ticket, the
Republicans hoped to recoup their losses.*
22
In the middle of December, 1913* the chairmen of the
several Progressive county committees met in Phoenix under
the chairmanship of J. Fred Brackett of Mesa.
Vacancies
among the county committeemen were filled, and the precinct
committeemen were authorized to appoint deputies and to hold
conferences with women so that they might name representatives
to cooperate with the county committee.
An executive
committee was appointed to cooperate with J. F. Cleveland,
the national committeeman, and J. L. B. Alexander, state
21lbld.. October 23, 1913, p. 2.
22Bisbee Daily Review, November 12, 1913, p. 1.
76
chairman.25
In the closing days of December, the Republic
critized the leading Democratic orga^ the Arizona Dally Star
of Tucson, for publicizing rumors of the merger of Progres­
sives with Republicans.
The Progressive party. Heard
declared, could not effect a combination with any faction,
Democratic or Republican.
Office was sought only to give
effect to party principles; compromise accordingly could
never be undertaken, since compromise meant surrender of
these principles.
"Progressivism must be wholly merged into
Republicanism," Heard reiterated, "or Republicanism . . .
merged into Progressivism . . • or each party must work out
its own course alone.
When Greenway returned from the Orient in December,
Progressive prospects was not much better than they had been
in October.
Progressives had yet to perfect an organization
and the rumor of amalgamation would not lie
down.25
Almost
as soon as Greenway had returned, Heard made an unsuccessful
effort to try to see him.
Heard asked Greenway to come to
Tucson but Greenway could not make It.26
Finally on*
6
2
2^Arizona Republic. December 17, 1913, p. 4.
24ibid., January 11, 1914, p. 4.
25Greenway to W. B. Mershorn, December 22, 1913;
Greenway to Eugene Meyer, December 24, 1913.
26Heard to Greenway, December 29, 1913; and December 30,
1913; Greenway to Heard, January 6, 1914.
77
January 9, 1914, Heard wrote Greenway that he must see him
within the next ten days.
While he was in Tucson, Heard
said, he had met with a "good live bunch of Progressives"
who were "strong" to go ahead with "our flag nailed to the
mast."
The next day Heard wrote that he had just talked to
#
David Henshaw of the Progressive National Committee, and that
it was decided to organize at once and open a headquarters in
Phoenix.27
on February 11 George B. Wilcox, a former Rough
Rider who had been appointed secretary and organizer of the
state office, sent out a form letter announcing the estab­
lishment of a permanent office in Phoenix.
Thus by February,
a little more than two years after the first Roosevelt club
had been formed, Arizona Progressives had made their first
step toward a permanent organization.
OQ
Heard* s policy of independent political action received
a mild setback in February when George U. Young narrowly
defeated Judge E. W. Lewis in a primary election for mayor of
Phoenix, polling 1,729 votes to the Judge's 1,594.
The
Arizona Republic had denied Young its active support in his
race against Lewis.
Nonetheless, it praised him lavishly as
an "eminent" Progressive surely destined to receive "high
^
27Heard to Greenway, January 9, 1914, and January 10,
28
George B. Wilcox to Greenway, February 11, 1914.
78
honors" from his party.
The Republic gave as its reasons
for not supporting Young his lack of legal training, and the
argument that such support might be construed as "partisan"
since there were two Progressives on the Good Government
League.
On March 19, Young successfully defeated Lewis,
2,336 to 1,825, in the only municipal victory that Progres­
sives had to show between 1912 and 1914.
Joseph Cope, a
local druggist and a Democrat, was the only member of the
Good-Government League to be elected, while two Progressives
went down in defeat.^9
Along with Progressive efforts to revitalize and
reform their ranks came new efforts to put their policies
before the public.
Secretary George B. Wilcox began a series
of articles on Progressivism in the Republic in March.
His
first effort was devoted to the cause of Arizona women seeking
to obtain the suffrage.
Wilcox pointed out that the Progres­
sive party was the only political party that had consistently
worked for nationwide suffrage.
He invited all women to
attend Progressive meetings to criticize and to condemn all
Progressives who were not living up to party principles.
On the first day of April, Greenway was notified by
David Benshimol that there would be a conference of Progressives
^ Arizona Republic. February 5, 1914, p. 4; March 20,
1914, p. T.
30ibid., March 14, 1914, p. 1.
79
in Phoenix on April 20.51
A few days later Wilcox publicly
issued the call, which had been widened to include women.
Wilcox took this opportunity to remind the prospective
Progressives that now was the time to "get off the fencd'and
into the Progressive Blysian fields where "the sun shines
brightly and the cool and refreshing waters are running in
abundance for all."^2
Wilcox then asked Greenway what he
thought about the idea of securing an outside speaker for
the conference.
As far as he was able to ascertain, Wilcox
said, "all who were with us in 1912 are still with us," and
the Progressive party was gaining in strength.v
L. L. Hayden, a Globe Republican, felt quite the same.
The Republicans should "get busy," he wrote John H. Campbell,
formerly an associate Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court,
since the only chance that his party had was to make some
arrangement to win back the Bull Moosers.
Hayden stated
that he could answer for "every Bull Moose in Gila," and
that "a very small concession will make them Republicans."
Peeling that the same conditions existed all over the state,
Hayden suggested as a possible solution of ProgressiveRepublican difficulties a unified stand on "one side or
^ Dav i d Benshimol to Greenway, April 1, 1914;
Greenway to Benshimol, April 2, 1914.
32Arizona Republic. April 3, 1914, p. 4.
33wilcox to Greenway, April 2, 1914.
80
another11 of the prohibition question.
Hayden advised that
something be done before the Hfanatics" in the Progressive
party start something in the way of an organization.^
On April 3 the Republic declared that all except
"office-seekers" were invited to the Phoenix conference,
and that the call was to be construed as an open invitation
to all who had not heretofore been Progressives.
Five days
later Heard* s newspaper took another opportunity to declare
that there would be no step taken toward merger, but still
the conference met under this onus .^
On the day that the
conference convened the Republic asserted again that there
was no basis for merger except what some Republicans and
Progressives regarded as "our common desire to secure the
offices."
The Republic maintained that "offices mean
nothing to the real Progressive except as they give oppor­
tunity to carry out Progressive principles," and that the
new party would gain strength from "accretion" rather than
from "combination."3^
As the conference convened, it was clear from the
start that there would be no merger.
J. L. B. Alexander
^I». L. Hayden to Campbell, papers of John H. Campbell,
Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society, April 2, 1914.
^ Arizona Republic. April 3, 1914, p. 4; April 8,
1914, p. 4.
36rbid., April 20, 1914, p. 1
81
opened with a short speech warning Progressives that they
would lose their "identity, respect, and strength" if the
Republican proposal of merger was adopted.
When Wilcox
introduced a resolution against merger, however, one delegate
attempted to amend it to permit amalgamation in the counties
"when practicable or desirable."
Thomas D. Molloy and
Charles W. Allen, both of Yuma, thought an restrictive
amendment unnecessary.
Heard supported Wilcox's resolution
because it provided a "definite answer to an inquiry gener­
ally being made."
As the resolution was finally read into
the minutes, however, it was far from definite.
Weak as it
was, Heard was pleased.
The conference went on to promulgate a platform which
condemned the non-exemption of American vessels from the
Panama Canal, called for a constitutional amendment to the
Arizona constitution which would effectuate the initiative
and referendum, and demanded the maintenance of the American
rights in matters of border diplomacy.
The platform con­
cluded with resolutions favoring a protective tariff, trust
37ibid.. April 21, 1914, p. 5. The full text of the
resolution read: "Be it resolved that we the members . . .
hereby declare that it is the purpose and intent of the
Progressive party of Arizona to nominate true Progressive
party men for all State and United States offices to be
filled at the next general election, pledged to enact and
support Progressive platforms. And further, we earnestly
recommend to Progressives of the several counties that they
put full county and precinct tickets in the field at the
coming elections."
82
legislation, and an eight hour law in industrial labor as
well as legislation to improve labor conditions and to permit
teq
the suffrage to all citizens regardless of sex.''
While the Progressives were in conference, Arizona
Republicans made strenuous efforts at amalgamation.
Greenway
reported to George W. Perkins that they had offered "all the
offices" in exchange for the name Progressive-Republican.^
Had Greenway waited five days, he might have told Perkins
that when local Progressives entered the Bisbee primary on
a separate ticket they had been disastrously defeated.
Their candidate for mayor received only seventy-two votes
out of 1,005 cast.
The Republican State Committee now
claimed that the Progressives membership had shrunk to only
twenty-nine per cent of the Roosevelt vote seventeen months
earlier.*
*0
Progressive prospects, regardless of what the Republic
might maintain, were not bright.
John 1. Campbell thought
that the herd of lull Moo sera was rapidly thinning out.*^Greenway, on the other hand, could see little future for the
38ibld.. April 21, 1914, p. 5.
39Greenway to Perkins, April 21, 1914.
*Qllsbee Dally Review..
April 26, 1914, p. 4.
April 25, 1914, p. 5?
^Campbell to Hayden, May 2, 1914, Campbell papers,
APIS.
83
Republican party.
"Perhaps with Barnes, Penrose, Root,
Devine, Guggenheim and others out of control," Greenway
informed a friend, "there might be some hope for the
Republican platform, but I doubt even that."*2
In mid-Hay Perkins asked Greenway to inform Roosevelt
on Progressive affairs in Arizona.
On the 21st he sent a
long letter which dealt almost exclusively with the Mexican
situation and foreign affairs.
Greenway1s first objection
was to the Democratic policy of "loving everybody" and the
offer of "blackmail" to Columbia.
As far as he could tell,
Greenway said, the Mexican policy was being handled without
any "tangible plans" and its only purpose was to "moDify"
the Latin Americans.
In the end, he thought, "we must take
Mexico," since the only way to end the chaos there was to
take the capitol and put in a "strong right-minded Mexican"
with a constabulary behind him.
Turning to Progressive
politics, Greenway predicted that he felt industrial con­
ditions, "now bad," would soon be "so much worse" that the
rank and file of the Republican party would turn to Roosevelt
in 1 9 1 6 . ^
In a letter on the same day to Heard, Greenway
^Greenway to H. 0. Dudley, May 5, 1914.
^Perkins to Greenway, May 13, 1914; Greenway to
Perkins, May 18, 1914; Greenway to Roosevelt, May 21, 1914.
84
suggested that the Republic take some stand on the Panama
Canal question and above all attack Wilson*s policy of
"denationalization."
Greenway also added to his forecast
that the rank and file of the Republican party would
nominate Roosevelt in 1916 rather than allow the Democrats
to stay in power under Wilson.
This would probably work
out with the Progressives first nominating Roosevelt and
the Republicans later ratifying this action.
In June Roosevelt refused a request from Heard to
advise in local matters, but he did suggest that Heard take
his public utterances and apply them "as far as possible" to
the local situation.
Roosevelt then counseled a policy which
would make it easier for Republicans to act with the Progres­
sives separately or as independent Republicans.
In any case.
Heard was to oppose the Wilson administration and to stand
like "flint" against amalgamation.^
Storm clouds were already on the horizon for the
Progressive party in Arizona.
Republican leaders had
scheduled a conference in Prescott on July 4 to take advantage
of the Frontier Days celebration in that city.
The object
^Greenway to Heard, May 21, 1914.
^Roosevelt to Heard, June 26, 1914. 11 ting 1.
Morison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vole.
(Massachusetts,^1954), 7, p. 767.
85
of this meeting, the Republic charged catagorically, was
amalgamation.
His paper, Heard said, did not speak for
Progressives around the state but only for itself, and it
would not support a Republican-Progressive fusion ticket.
If Heard and the Arizona Republic were concerned, Greenway
had become doubly worried over the prospect of merger.
"It
would be suicide for us to consider this at this time," he
wrote J. L. B. Alexander, and suggested that perhaps a non­
partisan ticket could be secured.
Greenway wished for "a
good fair Democrat at the head for Governor, a Republican
like Kibbey for Senator, and a man like Tom Molloy or some
other good Progressive for Congressman."
This could be done
only if both the Republicans and Progressives refrained from
putting up a state ticket under their respective banners.
Then at least the Progressive party would not have compromised
itself and would be free to take any measures it wished in
1916.
That same day he wrote Tom Molloy of Yuma his plan for
a non-partisan ticket if the "proper timber" could not be
secured for a strong Progressive campaign.2^
Perhaps Greenway had just realized how dangerously
close to merger the Progressives and Republicans were coming,
^Arizona Republic, June 24, 1914, p. 4.
^Greenway to Alexander, June 30, 1914; Greenway
to Tom Molloy, June 30, 1914.
86
for he now wrote also to David Benshimol, the Oochise
County chairman, demanding that the Progressives get
together immediately to put up a strong county ticket.^8
Two days before the Republican meeting In Prescott,
Heard1s paper carried on its front pages a telegram which
evidently had just arrived from the Bull Moose himself.
"Only by fighting under the Progressive banner for the
principles enunciated,M Roosevelt declared, " . . . will it
be possible for the people to come to their own."
Roosevelt
told wavering Progressives that the Democratic policy had
reduced the Uhlted States to "impotence" abroad and
"disaster" at home. ^9
At Prescott the Republicans immediately appointed
Robert E. Morrison of Yavapai to confer with Alexander,
Molloy, and E. S. Clark.
Morrison was instructed to extend
an invitation to the Progressives to aid the Republicans
at the primaries.
Morrison conferred with the Progressive
leaders, but his efforts were in vain because the Progressives
would not accept the hyphenated name "Progressive-Republican"
and Republicans would not accept the "unreasonable" plan
concocted by Greenway. 50
48Greenway to Benshimol, June 30, 1914.
49Arizona Republic. July 2, 1914, p. 1.
5°Ibid.t July 6, 1914, pp. 1, 3,
87
Shortly after the Prescott fiasco, Heard left for
Hew York to see Roosevelt.
Prom there he wired local
Progressives that Roosevelt wished them "Godspeed In their
fight for the principles for which the Progressive party
stands."
Heard also held out "strong hopes" that Roosevelt
would visit Arizona.
While Heard made his way back to
Arizona, Hubbell and Morrison were touring the state to see
if they could make further inroads into the Progressive
organization and to promote merger at the county level.
traveled through Yuma, Pima, Pinal, and Santa Cruz.51
Yuma, Hubbell and Morrison seemed to meet success.
Both
At
Molloy
wired Greenway to report that the "Progressive-Republican"
Yuma committee had agreed upon "progressive platform,
republican principles," and Roosevelt for President.
Molloy
wanted "immediate concurrence" by all county committees.
Greenway replied the next day that the Republican action in
Prescott had rendered any such merger impossible.
amalgamation," he declared, "would be fatal."
"Any
Greenway
advised that there was only one line of action— a straight
out and out state ticket and, wherever possible, a county
ticket.52
51lbid.t July 9, 1914, p. 1; July 18, 1914, p. 4;
Blsbee Daily Review. July 23, 1914, p. 1.
52Molloy to Greenway, July 22, 1914; Greenway to
Molloy, July 22, 1914.
88
Even in Greenway*s home county of Cochise there was
almost a merger.
Heard, Greenway, and others issued a
call for the Progressive Central Committee to meet in
Douglas on July 29.
Two days before this meeting, Hubbell
and Morrison arrived in Bisbee.
but achieved nothing.*^
Hubbell talked with Greenway
The Progressive Central Committee
declared for a "straight Progressive state and county
ticket."
However, at a later meeting in Bisbee, local
Progressives and Republicans decided on a fusion ticket.
This fell through when Cochise Republicans repudiated the
compromise, but both later agreed to a "non-conflict, twoone party ticket" where both parties agreed not to run an
opposing candidate against each other.^
On August 3, Hubbell reported that his and Morrison's
trip, which included almost every county, had assured local
Republicans of success.
Both were convinced that most
Progressives had already realigned themselves with the
Republican party.
Hubbell charged that "a few" leaders in
Phoenix were still trying to place a state ticket in the
field, but predicted that it would attract little support.55
^ Douglas pally International. July 27, 1914, p. l.
54Bisbee Daily Review, July 30, 1914, p. 1; August 7,
1914, p. 1; August 9, 1914, p. 1; August 13, 1914, p. 1;
September 23, 1914, p. 2; Douglas Daily International.
September 23, 1914, p. 1.
55ibid., August 3, 1914, p. 2.
89
Hubbell was probably right, as Progressives had adopted the
"Yuma plan" in Yuma, Santa Cruz, Gila, and Graham.
had agreed to open tickets.
Cochise
Only Pima and Maricopa nomin­
ated full straight county tickets.5^
The Progressives meeting in Phoenix, nominated
George U. Young for Governor, Dr. J. Bernard Nelson for
United States Senator, J. 1. B. Alexander for Attorney
General, Frank P. Moore, for Corporation Commissioner,
Frank P. Parker and J. B. Suits for Tax Commissioner, and
J. H. Marcia, Norman McKenzie, and R. L. Stallings for
Mine Inspector.
Progressives promised to name, in the
near future, candidates for Secretary of State, Treasurer,
Auditor, and Superintendent of Public Instruction. 57
Progressives began their state campaign in a weakened
condition.
"Our flag is nailed to the mast," Heard reiterated
in a speech to Gila Progressives, declaring that he would
fight every effort at amalgamation to the "last ditch."
He was a Progressive^ Heard told his audience because he had
watched the "wretched" manipulation of the 1912 Chicago
convention and because the Progressive candidate polled
four million votes.58
But regardless of how much Progressives
-^Douglas Daily International. August 1, 1914, p. 1.
57Arlzona Republic. August 2, 1914, p. 1.
58ibld.. August 2, 1914, p. 1.
90
might resist amalgamation, Republicans kept the issue before
them and particularly before the voter#
In September, both
of the major Progressive candidates. Young and Nelson, were
forced to deny the charge of the Tucson Citizen that they
favored merger.
Nelson replied that he did not seek
"amalgamation" with "any party or parts of parties."
Young
took this opportunity to state his belief that "politics
should be of no moment" in Arizona, for capital was vanishing
from the state and labor stood "helpless, wasted . . .
fused."
con­
The "greatest and wealthiest state" lay prostrate,
and all of this was due to the present Democratic Adminis­
tration.^
Ralph H. Cameron, the Republican nominee for Governor,
had not been idle:
Cameron claimed that he had conducted a
canvass and the results showed that seventy-five per cent
of the state's 10,000 dissatisfied Democrats, would vote for
him, only five per cent would vote for the candidate of the
Progressives, and twenty per cent would remain indifferent.
A vote for either the Progressive party or the Socialist
party, Cameron said, would be an indirect vote for Hunt.^
59ibld.. September 15, 1914, p. 1.
6oBlsbee Dally Review. October 27, 1914, p. 1.
91
In September both the Progressives and the Republicans
met In Phoenix to promulgate their platforms.
The Progres­
sive party proclaimed a twenty-four point platform.
Its
most notable feature was an attack upon Governor Hunt* s sus­
pension of capital punishment and upon his administration for
"scandal in mismanagement" and extravagance.
The Progressives
also adopted a "dry" plank and endorsed woman suffrage.
The
Republican platform likewise endorsed equal suffrage and also
charged that the history of Democratic control of the govern­
ment was one of "inefficiency, mismanagement, and extrava­
gance"
The Republicans pointed directly to the Governor* s
"luxurious" automobile, and the increase of one million
dollars in the state expenditures by the addition of unnec­
essary officers.
The whole document was capped with a charge
against the Democrats for its expensive special sessions.^1
Regardless of what Republicans and Progressives might
say. Governor Hunt effectively neutralized the hue and cry
with the publication of a pamphlet containing a "partial
record" of his administration which was designed to refute
"erroneous" and "distorted" reports.
Hunt wisely concluded
his campaign for a second term on the capital punishment
issue, to the excluding of every other issue except economy. 62
Glirizona Republic. September 30, 1914, p. 6 .
62(jeorge W. P, Hunt, "Partial Record of the First
State Administration; Winsor to Ives, October 15, 1914;
92
Before the ballots had been counted, It was apparent
that the Democrats had made a complete sweep.
Hunt had
failed to carry his amendment abolishing capital punishment,
but had defeated Cameron by 7,624 votes.
Cameron in turn
had polled 12,396 votes more than the Progressive candidate,
George U. Young.
Republicans had averaged 7,000 votes more
than Progressives, who in turn had generally outpolled the
Socialists.
Where Progressives and Socialists had run
candidates for the same office, however. Progressives
averaged only 200 votes more than the Socialists.
Progres­
sives had failed to run candidates for United States
Representative, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor, or
Superintendent of Education.
Republicans, on the other
hand, would have had to have the combined vote of both the
Socialist party and the Progressive party to have elected
any candidate.^3
Ives* papers, APRS. See also the Arizona Republic.
August 25, 1914, p. 1 .
63*»Arizona Election Returns, 1911-1958.H
loc cit.
CHAPTER V
DEATH OP A PARTY
Even though Victor Murdoch, a Kansas Progressive,
might declare his party far from dead at the national level,
in the new state of Arizona it had run its best candidates
and had gone down to defeat.12 The Republican party had
replaced the Progressive with the second largest constituency
in the state while the votes had returned the Democratic
candidates in one of the most solid sweeps anywhere in the
country, electing a Democratic House and a Senate marred by
the presence of only one Republican, D. D. Crabb of Navajo.
2
Prom the standpoint of Republican prospects for the future,
unity with the Progressives was imperative— and unity could
be achieved only after dealing with Theodore Roosevelt and
<
the several state leaders.
In January of 1915 Heard moved to clear up the debts
of the abortive campaign and to ascertain Roosevelt* s view
as to the future policy Arizona Progressives should pursue.^
1Arizona Republic. November 7, 1914, p. 1.
2Ibid.. November 11, 1914, p. 7.
^Heard to Greenway, January 15, 1915; Greenway to
Heard, January 20, 1915.
93
94
Heard suggested a "do nothing" policy, and Roosevelt agreed
with him that It would he mere "silliness" to try another
straight ticket unless there was a "complete change" In the
political situation.
At this time, Roosevelt thought the
country simply was not ready to accept, since the voters
felt that Progressives had presented "reform as an alterna­
tive to prosperity."
In any case, Roosevelt advised Heard
to sit "tight" and "await events."4
Even before Heard*s letter, Greenway had seen Roosevelt
early In January.5
What took place at this meeting Is uncer­
tain, but both probably discussed Arizona politics and more
than likely the European and Mexican situations.
Roosevelt
had come to feel that Germany was at fault in the European
conflagration, and that a strong policy would be necessary
to curb German military pretentions.
A strong policy might
serve to unite the Progressives and Republicans under his
leadership in 1916; or, failing this, with the party organ­
ization still intact, Roosevelt could bargain to secure a
candidate acceptable to him and the rank and file of the
Progressive party.^*
6
4Roosevelt to Heard, January 29, 1915.
op. clt.. v. 7 , pp. 884-885.
^Greenway to Heard, January 20, 1915.
6Mowry, o£. clt., pp. 305, 311, 312.
Morison,
95
In April of 1915 Greenway prematurely tried to find
out how the call for the election of delegates to the State
Republican Convention would be made in the next year.
Greenway hoped, if possible, to be able to select delegates
favorable to Roosevelt or to enter his name in the primaries.?
At almost the same time, Heard tried to promote Roosevelt's
availability by holding him out to the voters as a leader
who would have avoided the trouble with Mexico and Germany.
On the local level. Heard seized an opportunity to call for
a non-partisan organization of good citizens to combat
Republican control of Phoenix.
When this failed to material­
ize, Heard doubtless began to realize that reform stood no
chance unless both parties could get together on a Progres­
sive candidate and platform.®
Heard soon requested a conference with Greenway,
suggesting that it would be a good idea for both of them to
see Roosevelt together.
Heard felt that nationally there was
danger that James R. Mann, a regular Republican from Illinois,
would be nominated for the presidency on the Republican
ticket; Mann, according to Heard, had "no sympathy" with
Progressive principles and was being boomed by the PalrbanksCannon crowd.
Heard warned Greenway that Roosevelt had
?Greenway to Williams, April 20, 1915, p. 4.
®Arizona Republic. April 8 , 1915, p. 4.
96
described the situation as a "hair trigger," and that
Governor Hiram Johnson of California felt it "equally
delicate."9
Heard hastened to enclose his letter to Roosevelt
asking him to hold a conference of Western Progressives.
The purpose of this, according to Heard, would be to make
clear to Republican leaders— as well as half-hearted
Progressives— that there would be "no earthly use . . .
slip over . . .
to
a reactionary candidate or . . . platform."
Such a move, Heard felt, would be "suicidal" and would drive
him and others into the Democratic fold even though they
opposed Wilson’s foreign policy, particularly with Mexico.
Even though there was a great deal of Western interest in the
possible candidacy of Senator William E. Borah of Idaho,
Heard had never been convinced of his "complete sincerity"
but favored Charles Evans Hughes and Johnson running together
on a Progressive platform.3,0
Greenway agreed completely.
He had come to feel that
Wilson’s recent action in the Lusitania crisis had indicated
that he was basically "sound and patriotic," and with the
removal of one cabinet member, Secretary of State William
Jennings Bryan, better things could be expected.
9Heard to Greenway, June 8 , 1915.
10Heard to Greenway, June 5, 1915.
Greenway*
0
1
97
did not think that he would he able to go to New York for
the launching of the battleship Arizona because he was in
the process of awarding the contract for the construction
of the Tucson, Cornelia, and Gila Bend Railroad.^
What
Greenway thought about a Progressive platform or candidate
for 1916 he never revealed to Heard, but he did tell another
friend that he was still a great believer in Roosevelt.
What the United States needed most, he thought, was a strong
hand in Mexico, as both the Taft and Wilson policies were
"intangible" and "ridiculous.
Heard might privately keep the faith, but the policy
of the Arizona Republic was coming under criticism from
Tom Molloy of Yuma.
Molloy asked Heard why his paper was as
"quiet as a mouse."
Molloy particularly wanted to know if
the Progressives intended to "lie down" and be devoured by
the reactionary Republicans.^
■^Greenway to Heard (undated) Greenway‘s change of
heart toward Wilson is supported when he indicated to Wendell
McCormick that he would not care to join a call for volun­
teers, as he felt the Mexican and European situation "until
a few days ago," would lead to War. Greenway to Wendell
McCormick, June 11, 1915.
-^Greenway to G. P. Sawyer, September 2, 1915;
Greenway to Walter Wakefield, August 10, 1915.
l^Molloy to Heard, October 10, 1915•
98
Molloy* a criticism was well founded.
Heard had
failed to publish his yearly report to Arizona Progressives,
traditionally due on October 6, the date of Heard's purchase
of the paper.
Moreover, the editorial columns of the
Arizona Republic were now given over almost exclusively to
the European war.1*
The truth of the matter was that Heard* s Progressivism was wavering; the European War had forced him, like
other publishers, to forsake domestic objectives in the face
of foreign realities.
Heard wrote that he had seen Theodore
Saal, the Arizona organizer of the Naval league, in Phoenix,
and Saal had passed along Greenway* s idea that the league
hold a "good sized" meeting in Phoenix while the State Pair
was in progress.
Heard was glad that Greenway was "so
thoroughly interested" in the league.
"I am becoming more
and more Independent politically and am more interested in
what a man stands for," Heard wrote Greenway, and then went
on to outline what he thought would be good Progressive
strategy.
Heard felt that Progressives, by working together
l4prom the outbreak of war in 1914 to the end of 1915,
the Arizona Republic was favorable to defense, favorable to
Wilson's European policy, but anti-Wilson on his Mexican
policy. At no time during 1915 did the Republic call for
war with Germany; rather it always believed that there would
be no war. For examples see the Arizona Republic, May 9 ,
13, 16; June 6, 21; July 11, 15, 10; August 20, 22; Septem­
ber 2, 4; October 9, 10, 28; December 18, 1915.
99
at both the state and national levels "whether they put up
a separate ticket or not" would be able to exert a "deciding
influence" in favor of a genuine American policy which would
include national preparedness and the elimination of the
tariff from politics.
In local politics, Heard thought,
there was altogether too much partisanship; what was really
needed was "level headed" leadership and an "independent
movement," since there seemed to be no chance of securing
improvements from the old Republican ring.
Heard then asked
Greenway to come to Phoenix to discuss state politics.^5
Greenway, replying that he would be in Phoenix for the
State Fair in November, remarked that Governor Hunt seemed
a "distinct drawback" to the development of the state.^
When Greenway came to Phoenix late in November, he spoke at
a banquet launching the Arizona Naval league.17
While in
Phoenix, perhaps Heard and Greenway conferred on state
politics and made the decision to abandon the Progressive
party in favor of a non-partisan independent movement to
champion the nomination of Roosevelt on the regular Republi­
can ticket.
From the beginning of 1916, in any case the
actions of John 0. Greenway and Dwight B. Heard, were directed
to these ends.
ISHeard to Greenway, October 2$, 1915.
l^Greenway to Heard, October 29, 1915.
•^Arizona Republic. November 17, 1915.
100
In an editorial on January 1, 1916, the Arizona
Republic publicly professed what Heard had written Greenway
the previous October:
that the policy of his paper in
state and county affairs would be a thoroughly independent
one which called for the formation of an independent move­
ment based on the needs of a "thoroughly efficient, econom­
ical, clear-headed, business-like government."
In national
matters the paper professed the old Progressive hope that the
Republican party may become "really" Progressive with a plat­
form which recognized the economic, social, and industrial
needs of the United States.
If such objectives were to be
attained— and, most important of all, the Republican leader­
ship was to be in the hands of men such as Roosevelt or
Hughes— then the Republican party would have the "vigorous
support" of Heard*s paper.
Otherwise, the editorial was
quick to point out, some four million Progressives who had
supported Roosevelt would certainly not endorse a reactionary
platform and would again be forced to put up their own
candidate."*"®
Some four days later Heard*s paper backed away from
the name "progressive" by declaring that "Progressive lead­
ers are not insistent upon the name of their party."
X8
Ibid.. January 1, 1916, p. 1.
Heard
101
almost, but not quite, asked for an understanding with the
Republican party.
Such an understanding must not sacrifice
progressive p r i n c i p l e s . ^
Greenway felt the same way.
He
believed that it would take "every ounce" of combined
Republican and Progressive strength to defeat Wilson.
The
younger element of the Republican party, Greenway hoped,
would be able to straighten out the "old timers" in time for
the Chicago convention.20
By January of 1916, therefore, it was evident that
the Progressive party was dying and the only thing that
remained was to set the date of its burial.
When the Progres­
sive Central Committee met in Phoenix during the early days
of January, it recommended that the state organization be
kept intact "to await" the action taken by Republican leaders
in Chicago.
That same day Heard*s paper began a further
retreat by distinguishing between policies and underlying
principles as embodied in the 1912 platform.
As long as
Progressive principles were maintained in the Republican
platform, regardless of the language used, "we will not
stick at details," the Republic stated; and Progressives
would consent to hold certain policies in abeyance.21
19lbid., January 5, 1916, p. 1.
SOGreenway to Prank Hitchcock, January 13, 1916.
2lArizona Republic. January 13, 1916, p. 4.
102
Early in February Greenway tried to advise Roosevelt
on a specific course of action.
Since the voters felt that
he was not seeking the presidency, he could consent to run
again only at the entreaty of the people.
Greenway explained
that by "people" he meant the "anti-Wilson forces."
Greenway
then proposed that Roosevelt should allow the Progressives
to go ahead and nominate him, but that after this had been
accomplished he should notify the Progressive convention that
he would accept the nomination only at the hands of all the
"anti-Wilson forces."
Greenway felt that such a course
would reinforce his supporters at the Republican convention
to overthrow the "Old Guard" elements.
In any case,
Roosevelt should not accept the nomination solely from either
party.22
Toward the end of the month Heard moved to ascertain
the remaining strength of the party in Arizona.
On Febru­
ary 21 he sent out a call for a general meeting of Progres­
sive leaders around the state.
ing.
The response was discourag­
W. R. Chambers wrote to say that a Progressive organ­
ization no longer existed in Graham County, and that he
himself was going to vote the Republican ticket.*
2^
22Greenway to Roosevelt, February 9 , 1916.
23w. R. Chambers to Heard, February 24, 1916.
From
103
Pinal came the news that most Progressives were ready to
merge with the Republicans.
0. J. Baugh blamed the general
drift throughout the country for the forthcoming merger in
his county; but he felt that to Heard that merger was
necessary to "accomplish anything," and therefore the only
thing to do was to join forces and attempt to "purify" the
Republican party from the inside.
o
/l
Eli Hilty in Oatman,
Arizona, wrote Heard that he had "no time for politics" and
that Mohave County did not have a representative of the
Progressive party even in 1914.25
p. Lathrop, another
Graham resident, thought that "the continuance of the
Progressive party . . .
can have but one result • • • the
continuance in power of the Democratic party."
Lathrop felt
that it might be possible, "if we are a majority," to remain
in the Republican party and ultimately triumph.
Heard forwarded these letters to Greenway, commenting
that he had seen Tom Molloy of Yuma on February 28, who was
now leaning toward the Republican bandwagon though still
loyal to Roosevelt.
Heard also had talked with H. B.
Wilkinson of Phoenix and Thomas Marshall of Tucson, and
both felt that the thing to do was send a representative
2^0. J. Baugh to Heard, February 26, 1916.
25e i i Hilty to Heard, February 25, 1916.
26W. P. Lathrop to Heard, February 26, 1916. Other
letters came from Fred 0. Backett and David Benshimol on
the 23rd.
104
delegation to the Progressive convention.
"If we do,"
Heard remarked, "you and I will have a great deal of hard
work ahead of us."
Heard then informed Greenway that he
had told Judge Klhbey frankly that the Progressives were
not going to Chicago with any "antagonistic" spirit toward
Republicans, but rather with the firm determination to
secure Roosevelt as the candidate on a liberal platform.
Heard further assured Kibbey that Progressives would cooperate
with Republicans of his "type," and intimated that the Pro­
gressives would not run a state ticket in 1916.27
By the second week of March, Greenway had already
determined to remain in the Progressive party until the
Republicans nominated Roosevelt.
He recognized, however,
that there was a "question of doubt" on the wisdom of remain­
ing in the Progressive ranks, and advised Tom Molloy that
perhaps as much good could be done by working within the
pQ
Republican party.
Two days later Heard moved to make
public what had already been discussed privately with Kibbey
as he sent Greenway a copy of a general letter dated March 13
which would make it "very clear" that there would be no state
Progressive ticket and that Arizona Progressives were prepared
to unite with Progressive-Republicans and Independent Democrats,
27Heard to Greenway, February 29, 1916.
Z^Greenway to Molloy, March 11, 1916; Greenway to
John A. Stuart, March 11, 1916.
105
but Heard remarked that the "national situation presents an
entirely different aspect."^9
On the 13th of March Heard released a general letter
to Arizona Progressives.
The letter carried a dual message.
The party. Heard declared, had only one first choice—
Colonel Roosevelt— but if the Republicans nominated another
man whose record was unquestionably Progressive, the party
would consider such a candidate favorably.
Secondly, there
was a "general" inclination among Progressives not to put a
state ticket in the field.
On March 15 some thirty of the Progressive faithful
met in Tucson and nominated Greenway, who was absent, as
the state chairman to replace George McBean, who had resigned
The chairman*s sole responsibility was to call a state conven
tion to select delegates to attend the Progressive National
Convention.
Paul P. Feraald, chairman of the Pima Progres­
sives, recommended that Bisbee be chosen for the convention
as a statewide reunion of Elks would be meeting at the same
time and it would be possible to secure attendance from all
2^Heard to Greenway, March 13, 1916.
3°Heard to Greenway, March 13, 1916. Republicans
could have read almost the same thing in the editorial
columns of the Arizona Republic on March 3, 1916, some ten
days before the general letter of Heard. Arizona Republic.
March 3, 1916, p. 4.
106
parts of the state.51
on March 21 Greenway declined, giving
as a reason his duties at the mine, to accept the state
chairmanship and recommended J. L. B. Alexander for the
position.52
Alexander accepted and Issued the call for the
Progressive convention to he held In Bisbee on April 8 .
On the 18th of March the Republican State Committee
met In Phoenix in an atmosphere, according to the Arizona
Republic, where the word "harmony" was so earnestly spoken
that it lost its triteness.
Republican leaders selected
May 5 as the date and Tucson as the site of this convention.
That night at a smoker the former Republican state chairman,
Lorenzo Hubbell, moved to narrow the breach between Republi­
cans and Progressives by guaranteeing that any "good man"
would be certain to receive his support and suggested Joseph
H. Kibbey and Dwight B. Heard as possible candidates for the
regular nomination for governor.5^
The Arizona Republic remarked that the Republicans
had made a "good beginning," but whether or not they would be
successful would depend on their state convention.55
5lArlzona Republic. March 16, 1916; Bisbee Dally Review.
March 18, 1916, p. 1. Paul P. Feraald to Heard, March 16, 1916.
F e m a l d suggested Alexander in case Greenway could not accept.
52Greenway to Femald, March 18, 1916.
55"To the Progressives of Arizona," a copy of which is
in the Greenway Papers.
3^Arlzona Republic. March 19, 1916, p. 8 .
55lbid., March 20, 1916, p. 4.
107
With the aid of the like convention the Progressive
State Convention opened at lisbee with some fifty delegates
present, and like the Republicans, the Progressives now spoke
of harmony.
Greenway believed that the Progressives would
"talk" if the Republicans would meet them half way, and that
diplomacy should be used to make it easy for the Republicans
to make advances.
"What we want," Greenway said, "is a
Progressive nominee on the Republican ticket."
Heard read
a telegram from Roosevelt stating that he had withdrawn his
name from the Michigan primaries.
He would stand "straight"
for what the country needed, Roosevelt declared, for while
he did not believe that the nation would turn to him, it
would turn to his principles.
The convention then went on
record as favoring the nomination of Roosevelt, but Charles
Thomas, the sponsor of the resolution, explained that it was
not intended as binding the delegates but merely as an
expression of esteem.
H. B. Wilkinson of Phoenix then intro­
duced a resolution endorsing "preparedness and efficiency."36
SSllsbee Daily Review. April 8, 1916, p. 1. The dele­
gates present by counties were Cochise 30, Pima 6, Maricopa 9,
luma 1, Graham 1. Heard, Greenway, Alexander, John 0. Compton
and Thomas K. Marshall were selected to attend the national
convention. Ibid.. April 9, 1916, p. 1. Roosevelt endorsed
the Progressive action at lisbee. "I am very glad you limited
your resolutions to Americanism, preparedness, and efficiency,
we must not let our Progressives at Chicago go off on a mass
of resolutions . . * about social and industrial justice to
which no human being will pay the slightest attention."
Roosevelt to Heard, April 17, 1916. Morrison, op. cit.,
v. 7, p. 1033.
---
108
Following the Blsbee convention, David Benshimol, the
county chairman, raised the question which was uppermost in
some Progressive minds.
What would the party do in the event
Roosevelt was not nominated in Ohioago?
In that case,
Benshimol felt that the Progressive organization should
remain intact and either Heard, Frank P. Moore, or himself
should run for governor as a "sacrifice" to keep the party
alive.37
Heard counseled a "wait and see" attitude, replying
to Benshimol that "it was a good policy not to cross bridges
until we come to them."
Heard hoped simply that the Repub­
lican party would nominate a Progressive candidate and adopt
a liberal platform.
He felt that each passing day made this
more probable; and if Progressives and Republicans could
unite in Chicago it would be an "easy matter" in Arizona to
unite on a man whose "character, ability and record" would
cause him to lead a successful fight for a "progressive,
clear-headed, economical government"^®
in Heard1s position.
Greenway concurred
"The whole thing," he wrote, hinges
on the action in Chicago . . . .
There is a tremendous trend
of sentiment toward preparedness and incidentally toward
Mr. Roosevelt.39
37Benshimol to Heard, April 10, 1916.
38neard to Benshimol, April 11, 1916.
39areenway to Heard, April 14, 1916 .
109
Toward the end of April Greenway notified both
Roosevelt and Perkins that he was chairman of the Arizona
delegation and would make every effort to have the Repub­
licans send a delegation to Chicago which would support
Roosevelt.
To Perkins he confided that he had friends in
the Republican party, whose assurances had led him to believe
that Arizona Republicans would be for Roosevelt, though not
instructed.
Several days later, Tom Molloy wrote Greenway that he
had carried Yuma County for Roosevelt by five to one.
Molloy,
who had re-entered the Republican party, justified his stand
by reminding the Progressives that his proposed course of
action might have been possible to carry all the county
delegations for Roosevelt.
Molloy doubted the wisdom of the
course pursued by Greenway, Heard, and Alexander.
"Your
influence and energy were missing from the Roosevelt fight
within the Republican ranks,"
Molloy wrote, and as a result
"many counties . . . have been carried . . .
gang of reactionaries."
by the old
He felt that Ralph Cameron's control
in Maricopa, and his winning the nomination for National
Committeeman from that county, had made it impossible for
the Progressives to secure a single delegate.
^°Greenway to Roosevelt, April 21, 1916; Greenway to
Perkins, April 21, 1916.
^-Molloy to Greenway, April 25, 1916.
110
Greenway admitted that as much work could be done
from within the Republican ranks, "possibly more" inside
than out, but nevertheless, he would not re-enter the fold
until its leadership was "cleansed."
Greenway advised
Molloy to try to work for an "uninstructed" but pro-Roosevelt
delegation.
The men slated to go to Chicago, he thought,
were Kent of Maricopa, Breen of Coconino, Richey of Pima,
Overlook of Cochise, Molloy of Yuma, and one other.
He
thought that Kent would do, but Overlook was a "standpatter."
Greenway hoped that Molloy and John Gatti, the other liberal
Republican from Morenci, would combine to send Ralph Zeisemer
of Oochise, a strong Roosevelt man, in place of Overlook.
While Ralph Cameron and Michael B. Cassidy were the two
candidates for national committeemen, Greenway personally
preferred Judge Kent or Molloy.
As the Republican State Convention met, assembling in
Tucson on May 5, Greenway received news from J. B. Speed of
Kingman.
He was "falling in line with the better element"
in Mohave County, Speed wrote, and he and another good
Roosevelt man would pay Ban Worth's way to Tucson as he was
^2Greenway to Molloy, May 2, 1916. Greenway did not
trust Cameron. Cecil A. Lyon had written that he had seen
Cameron "drunk making a perfect ass out of himself," but
regarded him as "straight out" for Roosevelt. Lyon to
Greenway, February 24, 1916; Greenway replied: "I have no
confidence in him whatsoever . . . his word is no good."
Letter to Lyon, March 13, 1916.
Ill
the Republican "bull cow" of Mohave County and could
possibly hold the other delegates in line.
Mohave Republi­
cans were not of the "standpat variety" and would support
Roosevelt if he were nominated.^3
Greenway thought that
Worth should contact Molloy, Gatti, Zeisemer of Cochise, and
Abbott of Maricopa as well as Allen Jaynes of Tucson.
Green­
way wrote that he was not certain of Jaynes' loyalty but was
sure "he will be all right if he says he will be."
Greenway
preferred to see Ralph Zeisemer, Kent, Gatti, Jaynes and
Judge Smith of Prescott selected as delegates to the Repub­
lican Convention.
He was only interested in the election of
a president who would stand for Americanism and constructive
statesmanship, and therefore was willing to sacrifice all
the state offices to the Republicans provided they nominate
a "courageous" man.44
Arizona Republicans were as interested in the presi­
dential nomination as Greenway.
When the state convention
met in Tucson, the proceedings were dominated by predictions
of what would happen in Chicago.
Ralph Cameron lost his
place as national committeeman as the convention decided to
allow the delegates to the Chicago convention to select the
43j.
b
. Speed to Greenway, May 3, 1916.
44Greenway to Speed, May 5, 1916.
112
committeeman after the designation of a presidential can­
didate.
Thus Arizona Republicans, as well as Progressives,
preferred to await the verdict of the Chicago convention.^
After the state convention, John Gattl wrote Greenway
that the six delegates to Chicago were progressively
inclined.
Five of them were Hughes men but four would vote
for Roosevelt "at the drop of a hat."
The other man was not
anti-Roosevelt, but would vote with the majority.
Gattl
then went on to give a long account of the state convention.
Allen B. Jaynes had toured the state to secure delegates for
Hughes or Roosevelt and to defeat Robert E. Morrison, an;.
"old guard” leader in the North.
Gattl had worked with
Jaynes and other liberals to effect the overthrow of Cameron
as national committeeman.
Cameron, Gattl stated, had
described himself as "anti-Roosevelt," even while trying to
make a combination with the Roosevelt forces. "As the situa­
tion now stands," Gattl wrote, "if the Colonel is nominated.
Senator Hubbell or some other prominent Roosevelt man can
be selected as National Committeeman.
It would have been
inconsistent, to say the least, to have Cameron for National
^ Arizona Republic. May 6, 1916. pp. 1, 5. According
to the Republic. Cameron seemed to be representing the Pro­
gressive wing of the Republican party as it appears that he
tried to form a coalition with Conservative Republicans.
113
Committeeman with Roosevelt our c a n d i d a t e . G r e e n w a y
replied to Gattl by asking If it would be possible for him
to go to Chicago to help some of the Arizona delegates
"make a decision at the crucial moment."^?
In a letter to
George W. Perkins he assessed the six delegates— Judge
Edward Kent of Phoenix the chairman, C. A. Overlook of
Douglas, John B. Wright of Tucson, P. H. Freund&nthal of
Solomonville, P. S. Breen of Flagstaff, and Leroy Anderson
of Jerome.
None were strong Roosevelt men, but at least
they were not violently opposed to him.
Greenway felt that
Kent, already a firm friend of the Colonel, would support
him, as would Freundenthal and Wright without much work.
"We will attempt," Greenway said, "to do what we can with
the other three."4#
A few days later he wrote Guy Emerson,
secretary of the Roosevelt Non-Partisan League, to suggest
that Judge Kent be invited to membership in the league since
he had "leanings" toward Roosevelt but "has not made up his
mind."
Failing this, Greenway suggested John B. Wright of
Tucson for membership.^9
The next day Greenway reported to
46Gatti to Greenway, May 9, 1916; Arizona Republic.
May 30, 1916, p. 1 . The Republic stated that the Republican
delegation contained only two Roosevelt supporters.
^Greenway to Gattl, May 9, 1916.
^Greenway to Perkins, May 8 , 1916.
49Greenway to Guy Emerson, May 10, 1916; Emerson
replied: "We are not disposed to excuse you either and are
going to ask the men you mention to serve . . . also."
Emerson to Greenway, May 10, 1916.
114
Perkins that Kent was still “cautious," Kent and ex-Governor
Kibbey could do more to get Roosevelt votes in Arizona than
all other supporters for the Colonel.
Greenway now persuaded a close friend, Doctor ?. E.
Shine, a great-great grandson of Thomas Jefferson, to write
a letter to Guy Emerson in support of Roosevelt.
Such a
letter released by Emerson to the New York dailies, would
have great effect.^
Shortly before his own departure Green­
way sent George Curry $100 to travel from Minnesota to Chicago
to help in lining up the Arizona delegation for Roosevelt.
The last time he saw Curry, Greenway said, he was trying to
start a war with Mexico over the dead body of a Britisher.
"I approve of your sentiment" Greenway remarked, "but if you
start something please be careful to do it over the dead body
of an American."52
On June 7» 1916, the Republican and Progressive conven­
tions opened in Chicago, and from the start it was clear that
Roosevelt would not be acceptable to Republican leaders.
nomination went to Charles Evans Hughes.
The
Greenway wrote a
very close friend that Senators Reed Smoot of Utah and Murry
Crane of Maine had stopped Roosevelt by telling the delegates
50(}reenway to Perkins, May 11, 1916.
SlGreenway to Fred E. Shine, May 19, 1916; Greenway
to Emerson, May 23, 1916; Shine to Greenway, May 23, 1916.
SlGreenway to Curry, May 14, 1916; June 1, 1916.
115
that if they would nominate a progressive like Hughes they
could ignore Roosevelt.55
After Roosevelt had declined the
Progressive nomination, Greenway traveled to New York to see
him.
Roosevelt, Greenway felt, was ”harder hit" than he
would let his friends know, but he justified his withdrawal
on the belief that he was acting for his country.
Greenway
then told John M. Parker, of Louisiana, the Progressive
Democrat who had been chosen as Roosevelt's Vice-presidential
running mate, could not vote the Democratic ticket because
Wilson was "hopeless."
"I have seen his intangible policy
on Mexico at too close range for four years to support him,"
Greenway wrote Parker.5^
To an old friend of the Spanish
American War he commented acidly that it looked funny to see
Wilson "shouting his head off now for preparedness when a
few months ago he was talking about 'being too proud to
fight*, 'hysterical to prepare*."55
While Greenway was not yet ready to vote for Charles
Evans Hughes, Heard moved quickly to his support.
Heard had
remained in Chicago to attend a session of the Progressive
National Committee on June 26, to decide the fate of the party.56
53&reenway to Dave Goodrich, June 22, 1916.
S^Greenway to John M. Parker, June 22, 1916; New
York Times. October 10, 1916, p. 8 .
55(jreenway to Channing, June 22, 1916.
56ifowry, o£. cit., pp. 358-359.
116
The committee session pledged the party to Hughes, and
Heard wired Greenway that Roosevelt would support Hughes.
If he had to decide "at this moment," Greenway replied, he
would vote for Hughes.5?
Roosevelt*s endorsement of Hughes
certainly proved that the Colonel was no "self-seeking
egotist."58
one day after the Progressive party had been
formally pledged to Hughes, Roosevelt notified Greenway to
proceed with plans for a regiment of volunteer Cavalry on
the Rough Rider model.59
On July 7» the Republicans of Arizona met in conven­
tion at Prescott.
The Republic had predicted that Heard
would be offered the chairmanship of the Republican State
Committee and Greenway was to serve as a presidential
elector.80
$he delegates elected Thomas Maddox as state
chairman and Greenway as one of the three presidential electors.
57Heard to Greenway, June 26, 1916; Greenway to
Heard, June 27, 1916.
5®Greenway to Allen B. Jaynes, June 28, 1916.
59Roosevelt to Greenway, June 27, 1916; Mo wry, ojd. cit.,
pp. 355-357. Mowry fails to point out that Roosevelt had an
additional reason to support Hughes. Greenway wrote Roosevelt:
"Once Mr. Hughes is elected, I think you can then proceed with
the organization of a division with almost certainty that it
will be accepted and given the opportunity for real service."
Greenway to Roosevelt, July 7, 1916.
60Arizona Republic. July 5, 1916, p. 4.
117
An olive branch was extended to Arizona Progressives with a
resolution to send this message to Theodore Roosevelt:
"For
his constant advocacy of advanced ideas in respect of the
common people of the nation, which has materially affected
the policies of both the great parties of our nation and that
we assure him of our full appreciation of the unqualified
support he has extended to Charles Evans Hughes?^
While the Prescott convention was in session, John
Gatti wired Greenway asking him to accept the Republican
chairmanship.
Greenway refused, but Gatti went ahead after
waiting until the last moment and presented his name as a
presidential elector.^2
had been presented.
Greenway did not know that his name
On August 24 Greenway wrote Maddox, the
new state chairman, that he had just received a nomination
petition for presidential elector and that there must be
some misunderstanding.
He asked Maddox to have his name
withdrawn, and so notified he was sending a copy of this
letter to the Secretary of State Sidney P. Osborn.
But
Greenway*s request had reached Osborn two days after the
names of the candidates had been certified.
Osborn told
6lIbid., July 7, 1916, p. 1.
62Gatti to Greenway, July 5, 1916; Greenway to Gatti,
July 6, 1916; Gatti to Greenway, July 6, 1916.
118
Greenway that it was not impossible to comply with his
request, but he could resign any time after the primary.
Almost from the beginning, Greenway was placed under
pressure to remain on the ticket.
Allen B. Jaynes urged him
to do so, and that "it would have a very bad effect for the
p a r t y . G a t t i asked Greenway to "reconsider" since his
resignation would be "misinterpreted" by the Democrats and
would "embarrass us. "^5
Heard had the strongest argument.
Roosevelt had suggested that he see Hughes, Heard told
Greenway, and in a "straight-forward" conversation the
Republican candidate had convinced him that he was sound on
"Americanism and Preparedness" and would give the country a
"clean progressive administration."
Heard, therefore, had
decided to accept the state leadership of the Hughes Alliance,
and now asked for Greenway's support.
He hoped that there
might be "some way in which the present embarrassing situation
may be adjusted . . .
without handicapping the Hughes campaign."
Heard warned Greenway that his refusal would hurt Hughes
nationally as Vance McCormick, Wilson's campaign manager,
would not hesitate to advertise the matter.
G^Greenway to Maddox, August 24, 1916; Osborn to
Greenway, September 2, 1916.
Jaynes to Greenway, August 29, 1916.
GSGatti to Greenway, September 14, 1916.
G^Heard to Greenway, September 10, 1916.
119
Greenway replied that he would withdraw his resigna­
tion, even though he felt that his friends were taking
advantage of him and asked Heard to convey this information
to Maddox. ^7
Greenway1s anguish was partly eased when
James T. Williams of the Tucson Citizen flattered him with
this remark:
“As you no doubt are aware, there have been
numerous instances where one or two popular electors have
been elected where the remainder from the same state have
been d e f e a t e d . G r e e n w a y had already told Allen B. Jaynes,
the Republican National Committeeman, that he would try to
get Roosevelt to speak in behalf of Hughes in Arizona. ^9
That same day he wrote Roosevelt that things were going
"swimmingly" and asked the Colonel to speak in Douglas,
Bisbee, and Phoenix.
Things were quiet in Mexico since
Wilson's show of force, but Greenway thought that "we must
ultimately intervene."
Declining the invitation to speak
in Arizona, Roosevelt commented that the Wilson's use of some
150,000 troops on the border was like a "chief of police"
placing some six men in a house to sit up all night to prevent
burglaries.
Such action was hardly "a satisfactory permanent
arrangement•"70
^Greenway to Heard, September 14, 1916.
^Williams to Greenway, September 29, 1916.
69Greenway to Jaynes, August 23, 1916.
TOGreenway to Roosevelt, August 23, 1916; Roosevelt to
Greenway, September 7, 1916.
120
In the early days of October Heard wrote Greenway
that he was now president of the Hughes Alliance and was
working to get Democrats to vote for Hughes.71
Jaynes, on
the other hand, was working to secure a victory for Thomas
E. Campbell over Governor Hunt.
Republicans had organized
the "hundred club," which would be composed of individuals
who felt it worth one hundred dollars each to get rid of
Hunt.
Greenway enrolled.72
Like Heard, he had "pocketed"
his disappointment over the failure of the Republican party
to accept Roosevelt, and was now "heart and soul" in the
Hughes movement.73
With unity thus achieved in Republican ranks, Thomas
E. Campbell almost unseated Hunt in the election of 1916.
On the first count of the ballots, Campbell had 27,976 to
Hunt's 27,946; but on a recount and a decision by the Arizona
Supreme Court, Governor Hunt retained his office by fortythree votes.
In the national contest Charles Evans Hughes
had lost in Arizona by a substantially wider margin.
Woodrow
Wilson polled 12,654 more votes than the Republican candidate.74*
7
7lHeard to Greenway, October 3, 1916.
72Jaynes to Greenway, October 10, 1916.
of the "hundred club" contained some 32 names.
Jaynefs list
73(jreenway to Heard, October 10, 1916.
7411Arizona Election Returns 1911-1958." loc. cit.
121
Even unity could not "bring victory to the Republican
party.
In July, after the decision had been made to abandon
the Progressive party, Roosevelt had written Heard a long
letter in which he had depreciated the efforts of the
Progressives in the South, and the Eastern States of Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, Hew York, and Hew Jersey.
In those
states, Roosevelt declared, the Progressives had only *small
derelict political organizations* which had become, a Hgrave
detriment to the country.N75
it was natural to ask that they
be abolished, and Roosevelt was at least kind by not includ­
ing Arizona in his list, but the Progressive movement in the
"baby state" had traveled the same road.
been the time of high tide.
The year 1912 had
With Roosevelt as their candi­
date, Arizona Progressives had made a good showing.
Even
their lone candidate for Congress, Robert S. Fisher, had
secured more votes than the Republican, Socialist, or
Prohibition candidates.
Without Roosevelt in 1914, the
Arizona Progressives polled barely more votes than did the
Socialists,
ly 1916 all that remained was a "strict
Roosevelt following."76
Roosevelt was indeed kind to let
the Progressive party die a natural death in Arizona.
75Roosevelt to Heard, July 3, 1916.
v. 8, pp. 1083-1084.
Mbrison, op. clt.,
---
76(jreenway to Harold L. Ickes, October 3, 1916.
122
The Progressive movement in Arizona from its birth
was stillborn.
Roosevelt might conclude that the people
were not sufficiently advanced to follow the lead of the
Progressives and his reasoning may have had some validity
at the national level, but in Arizona, the Progressive party
had been only one of four political parties.??
Further, it
was an off-shoot from a party which had traditionally failed
to secure offices by the ballot.
For almost fifty years
Republicans had secured their offices largely by appointment.
Democrats had traditionally controlled the territorial legis­
latures.?®
In 1908, Republicans had succeeded in electing
Ralph Cameron as delegate to Congress.
Cameron had promised
statehood, but when statehood came it came only with a condi­
tion attached.
This was that Arizona make a constitution
which did not contain the recall of the judiciary.
enabling act proved a Republican nightmare.
The
It ruined any
Republican chances by giving the Democrats an issue on which
??Roosevelt to Heard, July 3, 1916.
op cit., v. 8, pp. 1083-84.
Morrison,
?®George H. Kelley, legislative History of Arizona.
1864-1912,:(Phoenix, 1926), pp. 262-263, 247, 147. Kelley
claims that the 25th, 24th, 23rd, 17th, 16th, l4th territor­
ial legislatures were dominated by the Democrats, while the
Republicans controlled only the 15th and both parties equally
divided the Council and House in the 13th. In addition, the
22nd, 21st, 20th, and 11th legislatures, were controlled by
the Democrats. The 10th had a Republican Speaker and a
Democratic President of the Council. See the Arizona
Republic, January 15, 1901, p. 1; January 15, 1899, p. 4;
Arizona Miner. January 12, 1881, p. 4; January 6, 1879, p. 2.
123
to advertise their progress!visa.
When the Progressives
launched their movement in Arizona the logic of the situa­
tion demanded that they control the Republican organization.
This they could not do.
Progressives, led by Heard and
Greenway, chose to set up a rival organization.
Thus the
Progressive party from the start was forced into a position
where it was not progressive.
It became merely another right
wing party taking its place beside the Republican party,
out-distanced in liberalism by the Democrats.
Heard*s
doctrine of Independent action seemed the only way out of a
dilemma, for only by accretions of voting strength from the
Democratic, Socialist, Prohibition, and Republican parties
could the Progressive party hope to win in any political
campaign at the state level.
When independent action failed
to bring increased voting strength to the Progressive party,
it faltered.
Greenway, Heard, and Roosevelt had no medicine
strong enough to revive it short of amalgamation with the
Republican party, and even such unity left the Arizona
balance of power temporarily with the Socialists.^9
79Morlson. op. oit., v. 7, p. 767. Mori son maintains
that in Arizona "the Republican-Progressive schism in 1914,
as in 1912, insured Democratic victory.M nothing could be
further from the truth. In the first state election, held
in 1911, Republicans would have had to have the entire
Socialist vote to have elected any state official. In 1912,
with the Progressive-Republican schism. Republicans still
needed about half of the Socialist vote and the total Pro­
gressive vote to have carried their candidates. In 1914,
124
Republicans would have needed the combined total vote of the
Progressive, Socialist, and Prohibition parties to carry even
a few offices in the general election. ’’Arizona Election
Returns, 1911-1958." loc. cit.
I.
UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS
Papers of John H. Campbell. Arizona Pioneers* Historical
Society, Tucson, Arizona.
Papers of Moses E. Drachman. Arizona Pioneers’ Historical
Society, Tucson, Arizona.
Papers of John Campbell Greenway. Arizona Pioneers’
Historical Society, Tucson, Arizona.
Papers of Charles W. Hicks. Arizona Pioneers' Historical
Society, Tucson, Arizona.
Papers of Eugene V. Ives. Arizona Pioneers' Historical
Society, Tucson, Arizona. Letterbooks of Eugene V.
Ives, Spedial Collection Division of the University
of Arizona Library, Tucson, Arizona.
Papers of Richard B. Sloan. Department of Library and
Archives, Phoenix, Arizona.
William, E. E. "Arizona's Territorial Governors: Governor
Sloan." Typescripts, Arizona Pioneers' Historical
Society, Tucson, Arizona.
"Arizona Election Returns, 1911-1958." Collected Miscellany.
Department of Library and Archives, Phoenix, Arizona.
II.
NEWSPAPERS
Arizona Dally Star (Tucson)
Arizona Journal Miner (Prescott)
Arizona Republic (Phoenix)
Bisbee Daily Review
Douglas Daily International
New York Times
Tucson Citizen
125
126
III.
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Minutes of Republican State Convention, 1912, Held June 3«
“
1912, at Tucson. Arizona to klect Delegates to
National Republican Convention June l8T l9l^.
Special Collection Division o£ the University of
Arizona Library, Tucson, Arizona.
U. S. Congressional Record.
IV.
Vol. 45, Vol. 47.
PUBLISHED PRIMARY MATERIALS
Ashurst, Henry Fountain. A Many Colored Toga, The Diary of
Henry Fountain Ashurst. edited by George F. Sparks.
Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962.
Morison, Siting E. and John M. Blum (eds.). The Letters of
Theodore Roosevelt. 8 vols. Harvard University Press,
1951-54.
Roosevelt, Kermit. Letters to Hermit from Theodore Roosevelt.
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946.
Roosevelt, Theodore. The Rough Riders and Men of Action.
Vol. 11. National Editor. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1926.
Sloan, Richard E. Memories of an Arizona Judge.
Stanford University Press, 1932.
Palo Alto:
Taft, William Howard. Presidential Addresses and State
Papers of William Howard Taft. 3 Vols. New York:
Doubleday, Page and Company, 1910.
V.
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Buck, Paul H. The Road to Reunion. New York:
Little, Brown and Company,1934.
Boston,
Kelley, George H. Legislative History, Arizona 1864-1912.
Phoenix: The Manufacturing Stationers, Inc., 1926.
127
McGlintock, James H. Arizona: Prehistoric. Aboriginal.
M o d e m , 3 Vols, Chicago: The S, J. Clarke
Publishing Co., 1916.
Mowry, George E.
Movement.
1946.
Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
Pringle, Henry 3?. The Life and Times of William Howard
Taft. 2 VollTI Hew York: Farrar and Rhlnehart,
Inc., 1939.
Pringle, Henry F. Theodore Roosevelt. A. Biography.
Hew York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931.
Sloan, Richard E., and Ward R. Adams. History of Arizona:
4 Vols. Phoenix: Record Publishing Company, 1930.