Four Physicists and the Bomb: The Early Years, 1945-1950
Author(s): Barton J. Bernstein
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1988), pp. 231263
Published by: University of California Press
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BARTON J.BERNSTEIN*
Four physicists and the bomb:
The
early years, 1945-1950
I recommend you toGod, Who alone can judge you morally.
Maria Fermi to Enrico Fermi, August 1945
Seek therefore to find of what and how theworld ismade that
you may learn a better way of life.
Ascribed to Pythagoras, and quoted by Arthur H. Compton, 1956
Even now, more
than four decades beyond the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima
and Nagasaki,
the A-bomb
still debate whether
many
should have been dropped on Japan, whether its combat use in August
1945 lowered or raised the moral
in
threshold for its employment
future wars, whether scientists who built the bomb had a unique ethi
cal responsibility to seek to control and even oppose its use inWorld
War
II, and whether the atomic bombing spurred the postwar nuclear
arms
race.
Immediately afterWorld War II, there was surprisingly little public
Most Americans
discussion
of these questions.
enthusiastically wel
comed the combat use of the atomic bomb on Japan, and only a few
notable scientists, including emigres Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard,
94305.
Stanford, California
and other
Bernstein,
Philip Farley, David
Hamerton-Kelly,
J. Sherwin, Her
members
of the "Arms Race and Ethics"
group for criticism; to Martin
bert York, Daniel
J.L. Heilbron,
Alice K. and Cyril Smith, Peter Galison,
and
Kevles,
and the Center
for
for various
Sidney Drell,
Gregg Herken
insights; to John Lewis,
of History,
*Department
to Robert
I am indebted
Stanford University,
and
International
support; and to the Values,
Science,
Security for generous
Technology,
for assistance.
Society (VTSS) Program
are used: ACP,
The
Arthur Compton
abbreviations
Papers, Washington
following
St. Louis;
BAS, Bulletin
AEC, Atomic
Energy Commission;
University,
of the atomic
Record Group, NA; GAC, General
of OSRD,
scientists', BC, Bush-Conant
files, Records
NA; HB, Harrison-Bundy
Lawrence
Bancroft Library, University
Papers,
tan Engineer District; NA, National
Archives;
Mili
GP, Groves
Papers, Modern
RG
77, NA; LP, Ernest O.
files, MED,
Manhat
of California,
Berkeley; MED,
J. Robert Oppenheimer
Li
OP,
Papers,
brary of Congress;
File, Harry
Committee,
Advisory
tary Records
Branch,
dence,
Missouri;
Atomic
PSA,
RG,
Energy
President's
Record
Group;
Commission;
Secretary's
UP,
Urey
Papers,
S. Truman
University
Library, Indepen
San
of California,
Diego.
HSPS,
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18:2 (1988)
232
BERNSTEIN
as immoral.
and Nagasaki
publicly decried the bombing of Hiroshima
the
well-known
of
nation's
Nobel
scientists, including
prize
Many
as
and Arthur H. Compton,
winning physicists Ernest O. Lawrence
all of whom served as high
well as physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer,
level government advisers, publicly endorsed the use of the weapons
in 1945. More
the
often behind the scenes than publicly, however,
bomb both before and especially after Hiroshima
created moral prob
lems for these three men and for Nobel prize-winning physicist Enrico
Fermi, their associate on the special Scientific Advisory Panel that the
four of them constituted.1
In early 1945, because
of their prestige and intellectual achieve
were
the
scientist-leaders of the far-flung A-bomb
among
ments, they
the
the Italian-born Fermi, who had fled
of
With
exception
project.
were
and chief directors of key
native-born
Americans
Italy, they
laboratories in the A-bomb project.
Fifty-two-year old Arthur H. Compton, winner of the 1927 Nobel
Prize for experimental work on x-ray scattering, was the director of
theManhattan
laboratory, code-named Metallurgical
Project's Chicago
son
an
The
Ohio
of
(Met) Laboratory.
small-college philosophy pro
and one of three successful
fessor who was an ordained minister,
an
in academia,
had
Arthur Compton
brothers
early displayed
in science. Briefly during World War
enthusiasm for administration
as
he
served
both
the physics department and dean of
of
chairman
II,
A sincerely religious
at
the
of Chicago.
science
physical
University
was
to
he
and
reconcile
eager
science, believed
Presbyterian,
religion
he was doing the Lord's work by pursuing science, and often appraised
wartime and postwar activities by his religious principles.
a
Ernest
O.
old
Lawrence,
Forty-three-year
hard-driving,
of Califor
entrepreneur of physics, created and headed the University
was
at raising
He
Lab.
nia Radiation
skillful
(Rad)
remarkably
money, organizing big-machine physics, and directing the energies of
1. The
O. Lawrence
chief biographies
(New York,
are: Herbert
1968),
a good
Childs, An American
genius: The life of Ernest
enthusiastically
admiring; Emilio
Segre, Enrico Fermi,
account by a close colleague;
Philip Stern, with Harold
(New York,
1969), useful on the early Oppenheimer;
physicist (Chicago,
1970),
case
The Oppenheimer
Green,
James Kunetka,
The years of risk (Englewood
Cliffs, 1983), a sympathetic
Oppenheimer:
and Nuel
Atomic quest (New York,
1956), a partial memoir;
study; Arthur H. Compton,
P. Davis,
Lawrence
and Oppenheimer
indeed ima
(New York,
1968), quite unreliable,
there are
ginative and fanciful. On scientists and the arms race in general for 1945-50,
four useful studies: Alice K. Smith, A peril and a hope (Chicago,
1965); Robert Gilpin,
and the two
American
scientists and nuclear weapons
(Princeton,
1962), 3-138;
policy
official histories
Hewlett
Richard
of The Atomic
Energy Comission,
1939-1946
son, Jr., The new world,
Park, PA,
(University
1962),
Francis Duncan,
Atomic shield (University Park, PA, 1969).
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and Oscar
and
Ander
Hewlett
and
THE ATOMIC BOMB
233
school superintendent,
scientific teams. The son of a South Dakota
Ernest Lawrence
had won the 1939 Nobel Prize for his development
of the cyclotron. He was respectful of authority and deeply suspicious
of liberal politics.
He comfortably courted industrialists, financiers,
as well as university regents, to support the big
and foundations,
machine physics that he was promoting.
Forty-three-year old Enrico Fermi, winner of the 1938 Nobel Prize
for his research on artificial radioactivity produced by neutron bom
bardment, was a brilliant experimentalist and theoretician. The son of
an Italian railroad administrator, Fermi admired order and discipline,
conflict, and was reserved about most political and
usually avoided
In Italy, he had patterned his life, according to an
personal matters.
admiring colleague, "on that of an efficient, loyal civil servant." Had
Italian fascism not turned more ugly in 1938, when Mussolini
issued
laws that threatened Fermi's
anti-semitic
Jewish wife, they would
probably have remained in Italy. In America, he struggled, unsuccess
in 1944, to
fully, to lose his accent and applied as soon as possible,
become a naturalized
citizen. That summer, he left Compton's Met
an associate
to become
at Los
Lab
director, under Oppenheimer,
Alamos.2
born into an affluent New
Forty-year old J. Robert Oppenheimer,
York City German-Jewish
family but raised in the Ethical Culture
in the 1930s America's
first internationally
tradition, had created
respected school of theoretical physics. He had briefly supported left
Pro
wing political causes until shortly before joining the Manhattan
and
Lawrence
by Berkeley colleague
by Compton
ject. Recommended
to work on the project, Oppenheimer,
though having no previous
was
Director
of the Los Alamos A
named
administrative
experience,
bomb laboratory in 1942. By the early 1940s, it was clear that he had
failed to do the great physics expected from him. Admired
by many
of the Los Alamos
inspired enthusiasm and
physicists, Oppenheimer
at his quickness
and intellectual range. He
loyalty. They marveled
most
later
"the
Hans
Bethe
was,
declared,
intelligent of all of us" at
Los Alamos.3 Charismatic,
and
de
mercurial, Oppenheimer
arrogant,
was
most
in
He
the
elusive
seeming enigmatic.
probably
lighted
of the four. A skilled prose craftsman and a master of
psychologically
was the de facto head of the panel
elliptical eloquence, Oppenheimer
and the author of most of their joint statements. He was the youngest
and most urbane of the four.
2.
3.
Segre (ref. 1), 94-97,
Interview with Hans
101,
Bethe,
151 (quote).
1987.
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BERNSTEIN
234
By 1945, the wartime experience had given all four men a new
sense of relevance and brought them and American
science into a new
state.
to
the
with
had
learned
secrecy and to
accept
relationship
They
work as efficient members
of a large project, and they had become
to the handsome wartime government funding for physics.
accustomed
The achievements
of the Manhattan
could
Project, they understood,
new
to
the
value
the
and
confirm
of
nation
open
dramatically
physics
vistas to the physicists and their science.
The developments
of late 1944 and early 1945 were key in spawn
Lawrence's
hopes and plans illustrate this shift.
ing great optimism.
in early 1944 for the postwar period, Lawrence
expected a
Planning
a year, plus some war surplus
laboratory budget of about $85,000
from the government.
But by March
1945, amid mushrooming
opti
mism, he anticipated a $7-10 million annual budget, most of it com
ing from the federal government. He hoped to spend in the first year
after the war more than his laboratory had received during the whole
decade before the war.
Some form of wartime partnership with the
so beneficial
to physics and defense, was to be
federal government,
maintained
in the aftermath of victory.4
1.DOUBTS
AND DECISIONS
BEFORE
HIROSHIMA
During World War II, all four scientists devoted their energies and
talents to the top-secret Manhattan
into
Project in what they believed,
race to develop
the weapon
before Germany.
1944, was a desperate
By late 1944 they knew that America would win this race, that Ger
the A-bomb,
and that Japan was the likely
many would not develop
In
1944 and early 1945, none of them challenged
target for the bomb.
this emerging assumption
that the A-bomb
should be used against
Japan.5
Soon after the high-level Interim Committee was created in early
to define postwar American
nuclear
1945 primarily
May
policy,
Bush urged that
James Conant and Vannevar
scientist-administrators
these four eminent Manhattan
Project physicists should constitute a
to
to
The appointment
counsel
of
the committee.
special body
give
a
the Scientific Advisory Panel
both
from
sincere
desire
for
sprang
their advice and the hope
tists on the Manhattan
of stifling discontent
Project who would
4. J.L. Heilbron,
Robert
Seidel,
Lawrence
1981), 46-47;
(Berkeley,
9 Mar
K.D. Nichols,
1945, LP.
and
Bruce
to Robert
5. Henry L. Stimson Diary,
13 Dec
to author.
and Joseph Rotblat
G.
Wheaton,
Sproul,
1944, Yale
among working scien
have
otherwise
felt
Lawrence
17 Jan
University;
and
1944,
his laboratory
to
and Lawrence
interview with
Feld;
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Bernard
THE ATOMIC BOMB
235
as nuclear policies were being hammered
out in distant
with the men who were actually
without consultation
bomb.6
that others were considering
the implications
of the A
told an Interim Committee member,
"we who
bomb, Oppenheimer
have been intimately tied up in the technical struggles have often felt
a profound concern that what we were doing should come to a good
end..., and I can assure you that we will all be grateful for any help
that you can give in seeing that things do not turn out too badly."7
disregarded
Washington
making the
Pleased
That spring, Oppenheimer
and Compton,
and probably Lawrence
and Fermi too, were receiving occasional
advice, especially from Leo
should not be used against Japan. At first,
Szilard, that the A-bomb
reasons but international
Szilard did not raise moral-humanitarian
a Soviet
use
of the bomb would unleash
political arguments: The
race
a
arms
and the United
American
year behind
States, already
schedule in producing plutonium, might soon be eclipsed.8
In the ten weeks before Hiroshima,
both Lawrence
and Compton,
as members
of the Scientific Advisory
Panel, did briefly suggest a
to give the Japanese an
non-combat
of the A-bomb
demonstration
to
and surrender. On
witness the power of the weapon
opportunity
31, 1945, during a meeting,
May
possibly during a lunch, with the
on the A-bomb, Lawrence
and Comp
blue-ribbon Interim Committee
a non-combat
ton proposed
This
demonstration.
idea was quickly
dismissed on various grounds: the weapon might be a dud; a failure
would
the bomb's power might not be
strengthen Japanese morale;
the
from
distinguishable
deadly firebombings; and the Japanese might
move allied POW's
into the test area. At this session, as Lawrence
"could
think of no
recalled, Oppenheimer
played a key role. He
to
that
would
be
demonstration
convince
the
sufficiently spectacular
Japs that further resistance was useless."9
to Oppenheimer,
to George
6. Karl
10 May
James Conant
Compton
1945, OP;
9 May
chemist Harold Urey,
Harrison,
1945, BC. Nobel
prize-winning
seemingly a log
ical candidate
for the panel, was kept off (Gen. Leslie Groves,
"Why Urey was not on
to Arthur Comp
the Scientific Panel
of the Interim Committee,"
and Urey
n.d., GP);
ton, 12 Jul 1945, UP.
to Karl Compton,
7. Oppenheimer
22 May
1945, OP.
to Oppenheimer,
8. Szilard
16May
1945, with "Atomic bombs and the postwar posi
tion of the United
in the world,"
to A.J.
States
15 Apr
1945, OP; Arthur Compton
to Lawrence,
18 Mar
3 Apr
Szilard
1946, ACP;
McCartney,
1945, LP; and Gertrud W.
Szilard
and Spencer Weart,
version of thefacts (Cambridge,
eds., Leo Szilard: His
1978),
of a conversation
includes a dubious
recollection
with Oppenheimer.
185-186, which
9. Lawrence
to Lawrence,
17 Aug
9 Aug
Darrow,
1945; Darrow
1945; and
19 Mar
1957, all in LP; and Arthur Compton
Cyril Smith,
(ref. 1),
one (New York,
238-239.
for views of Fermi
Cf., Peter Wyden,
170-171,
Day
1984),
in my interviews with Segre about Fermi
and Oppenheimer
and with Frank
disputed
about
his brother.
at
Lawrence
and Compton
been
have
may well
Oppenheimer
lunch tables on 31 May.
separate
Lawrence
to Karl
to Mrs.
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236
BERNSTEIN
a 42-page
In preparing for that meeting, Compton
had composed
In it, he stressed that the use of the A-bomb on Japan
memorandum.
was "more a political than.. .military question
[because] it introduces
the question
of mass
slaughter, really for the first time in histo
the question
of the new
of the use to be made
ry_Essentially,
more
serious implications than the introduction
carries much
weapon
of poison gas." America was, he suggested, at a moral crossroads.10
in early June, Compton
In thinking privately about the A-bomb
over
recent
that
mulled
Szilard's
idea
America
should conceal the fact
use
not
and
bomb
it. "By holding back
of developing
the
certainly
wrote
to
could
"it
be preserved for
this weapon,"
himself,
Compton
us
at that
next
conflict, giving
[the] important advantage
[the]
major
time. This would be militarily right if it can have little effect on this
war." Whereas
Szilard hoped to protect the postwar peace and avoid
an arms race by not pursuing the bomb, Compton was thinking of the
postwar military-political
advantages for the United States. "By refus
use
to
it," Compton noted, "we could cause considerable
delay in
ing
its knowledge by others. Results: We would advance
further before
[the] enemy would."11
in the late winter and early
had given consideration
Compton
to
about
the
value
notions
of the bomb to the United
related
spring
once
he
States in the postwar period.
had suggested that after
Indeed,
over
to use the
the
States
Axis
the
United
victory
might have
about
Russia?"to
force
access"
open
weapon?presumably
against
secret military preparations.
"It would be tragic to avoid such strong
measures
if they are. necessary," he had counseled Washington.12
On June 12, Compton
received the Franck report, signed by physi
cist James Franck, Szilard, and five other dissident
scientists at the
not be
Lab.
that
the
A-bomb
They pleaded
Chicago Metallurgical
used on Japan, suggested a non-combat demonstration,
and warned of
a postwar race if the weapon was used. Appraising
that report, Comp
ton
two important
told Washington,
incorrectly, that it neglected
issues about non-use of the bomb: It might prolong the war and cost
more lives, and "might make
it impossible to impress the world with
the need for national sacrifices in order to gain lasting security."13
to National
10. A. Compton,
"Statement
28 May
1945, BC.
Policy Committee,"
memo
to self, 10 June 1945, in Marjorie
11. Compton,
Johnston, ed., The cosmos
Arthur Holly Compton
1967), 260-262.
(New York,
to Gen. Leslie Groves,
12. Compton
5 Mar
1945,
1945, BC.
lace, 18 Feb
to Secretary
13. Compton
ofWar,
12 June
and Compton
1945, with Franck
to Henry
Report,
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in HB
A.
76.
Wal
of
THE ATOMIC BOMB
237
Compton,
perhaps spurred by Szilard, Franck, and others at the
secret Chicago
laboratory that Compton headed, soon raised the possi
a
of
non-combat
demonstration.14
bility
Partly as a result, the four
man Scientific Advisory Panel briefly considered
this issue on a busy
in mid-June.
was the last
weekend
to
Lawrence
Compton,
According
one at their meeting "to give up hope for finding such a solution."15
Despite Compton's
suggestions and Lawrence's
vigorous hopes, as well
as the pleas of the Franck report, the four physicists on June 16 finally
in a statement drafted by Oppenheimer,
that the weapon
concluded,
should be dropped on Japan. They explained
to Washington,
"We
our
our
use
to
to
to
nation
the
weapons
recognize
obligation
help save
American
lives [and] we can see no acceptable
alternative to military
can propose no technical demonstration
use?We
[non-combat use]
to
likely
bring an end to the war."16
Whereas
the Franck group had opposed combat use of the A-bomb
to prevent a postwar Soviet-American
because
nuclear
they hoped
arms race, the panel seized on the Franck report's related proposal of
an early approach
to the Soviets to establish international control of
thus avoid the feared arms race. Accordingly,
the
to
inform
the
the
Soviets
of
A-bomb
before
urged Washington
dropping it on Japan, and spoke vaguely of international control. Tell
the Soviets, the panel said, "we would welcome
suggestions as to how
we can cooperate
in making this development
contribute to improved
international
relations." The panel stated that atomic energy could
mean "a bond between nations and not a new source of warfare," and
that failure to seek such a bond could mean
that America would no
longer retain "our present leadership in the field." The unstated, com
were that continued American
forting assumptions
primacy in this
field was compatible with international control, and that dropping the
bomb on Japan would enhance (not impair) the chances for interna
atomic
energy and
panel
tional agreement.17
A few years later, in fleshing out part of these assumptions
and
of June 12, Oppenheimer
memorandum
further
echoing Compton's
explained why the panel had endorsed the use of the bomb on Japan:
"We thought that since atomic weapons
could be realized, they must
be realized for the world to see, because
they were the best argument
that science could make
for a new and more
idea of
reasonable
14. Compton
15. Compton
16.
HB,
RG
17.
toMcCartney,
(ref. 1), 240.
on
"Recommendations
18Mar
1946.
the immediate
use
of nuclear
weapons,"
16 June
1945,
100.
Ibid.
the Soviets,
The
Interim Committee
but Truman
chose
the panel's
accepted
not to act on it.
recommendation
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of informing
238
BERNSTEIN
The
that many
between nations."
cruel implication was
at
Hiroshima
and Nagasaki
their mass
Japanese died
partly because
the
horror
the
of
deaths, stressing
bomb, might
inspire a postwar
on
built
atomic
fear.18
peace
The issue of a non-combat
had been added belat
demonstration
to
and
the
mid-June
this
panel's
edly
agenda,
subject was not the
concern
as
on
weekend
the
that
four
scientists
concentrated
major
relations
later described
the question of
postwar nuclear policy. Oppenheimer
a non-combat
as of secondary importance during the
demonstration
and admitted
that "we didn't know beans"
about
the
weekend
on
situation?the
the
reports
Japanese morale,
plans for
Japanese
more fire-bombings of Japanese cities, and the date for the scheduled
American
invasion.19
as these four physicists
did know,
several key
By mid-June,
as
the
selected
for
A-bombs.
cities
had
been
Japanese
targets
already
on
the
had
served
himself
committee
that
had
proposed
Oppenheimer
target cities. And the four men had attended the secret meeting of
from other
31 where Secretary Stimson, with general approval
May
Interim Committee members, had stipulated that the bomb should be
aimed at "a vital war plant [in the city] employing a large number of
workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses_We
should seek
on
as
to make a profound psychological
the inha
of
many
impression
bitants as possible."20 That was the doctrine of terror bombing.
a petition
in early July, Oppenheimer
At Los Alamos
opposed
drafted by Szilard pleading against the combat use of the A-bomb on
is said to have argued, among other points, that
Japan. Oppenheimer
scientists had no unique responsibility in this matter, that they should
not try to impose their will on elected and appointed
policymakers,
and that the government was already receiving advice from a handful
of elite scientists, including Oppenheimer
himself.21
test of July 16, the four
Even after the powerful Alamogordo
to drop the
scientific advisers did not reconsider the basic decision
bomb on Japanese cities. As the mushroom
cloud soared over the
later
New Mexico
desert, Oppenheimer
thought to himself, he
Gita, "I am become death,
claimed, of the words from the Bhagavad
the destroyer of worlds."
18. Oppenheimer,
Oct 1949), 133.
quoted
An hour
in Lincoln
later, cheered by the magnitude
Barnett,
"J. Robert
Oppenheimer,"
Life,
of
77(10
In the matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer
19. Atomic
Energy Commission,
(Washing
ton, 1954), 34.
20. Interim Committee
31 May
100.
Minutes,
1945, HB, RG
21. Edward
The legacy of Hiroshima
Teller, with Allen Brown,
(New York,
1962),
to Szilard, 2 Jul 1945, OP.
13-14; interview with Teller; and Teller
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THE ATOMIC BOMB
239
the successful experiment, he said to an associate,
"My faith in the
human mind has been somewhat restored."22
Years
would
later, Oppenheimer
speculate that, after the tremen
dous light-flash of the Trinity test, possibly a non-combat
demonstra
a bomb
tion in Japan should have been reconsidered.
"Perhaps
he explained
dropped
(in the
high over Japan by parachute,"
1957 paraphrase),
interviewer's
"might have lighted up all of Japan
and provided a convincing demonstration, but by that time itwas too
for use
late; there was no parachute and besides the whole mechanism
in
had been set in motion."23 He did not question that "mechanism"
1945.
At Alamogordo,
also observing the test, Ernest Lawrence,
excited,
It works!"24 Fermi, known for his exceptional
had shouted, "It works.
the blast, and
small pieces of paper to measure
calm, had dropped
was
to
tons
about
TNT.
that
of
After
it
concluded
10,000
equivalent
so
was
the
the
of
drained
Fermi
test,
ward, however,
experience
by
with its unleashing of such great power, that he, in a rare decision,
asked someone else to drive his car back.25 All knew that the A-bomb
would be dropped within a few weeks on a Japanese city and that it
kill thousands of civilians there.
still agreed with his
Compton
Though not present at Alamogordo,
Soon after Alamo
that the bomb should be used.
three colleagues
in
when
arrived
from
scientists opposing
petitions
gordo,
Washington
He told
reaffirmed his decision.
combat use of the bomb, Compton
war
stands
bomb
should
be
"as
the
the
used, but no
Washington,
more drastically than needed to bring surrender."26
would
2. IMPACT OF THE BOMB
on August 6, speedily
firstA-bomb was dropped on Hiroshima
at
Hours
least
after
this
attack, Oppenheimer
70,000 Japanese.
killing
Gen
received a phone call from General Leslie Groves, Commanding
was
suc
the
eral of theManhattan
who
weapon's
Project,
delighted by
The
cess. When
Groves
22. Jack Hubbard,
Jw/ce (Albuquerque,
23.
Alice
K.
said,
diary,
"I'm
16 Jul
proud
1945, quoted
of you and
in Ferenc
1984), 89.
Smith, notes of interview with Oppenheimer,
all your people,"
Szasc,
The
11 Nov
day
1957,
the sun rose
courtesy
of
Smith.
24.
25.
in Childs
Lawrence,
quoted
(ref. 1), 358.
or reactors," BAS,
Laura Fermi, "Bombs
mi, "My observations
Los Alamos National
26.
Compton
during
the explosion
26 (June 1970), 28-29;
and Enrico Fer
at Trinity on July 16, 1945," Records
of the
of Gregg Herken.
courtesy
Laboratory,
See also Compton,
(ref. 1), 247.
"The
birth of atomic
(Feb 1953), 10-12.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
power,"
BAS,
9
BERNSTEIN
240
is feeling reason
replied, "Everybody
[at Los Alamos]
Oppenheimer
went on to
ably good about it [the use of the bomb]." Oppenheimer
say, "I extend my heartiest congratulations."27
as usual on such matters,
After Hiroshima,
Fermi, "tight-lipped"
on
On August
the bombing.
did not comment
15, when celebrating
or Nagasaki.28
V-J Day with Segre, Fermi never mentioned Hiroshima
silent about his justification for the
remained characteristically
bombing, even when his sister Maria, writing from Italy, stated "All
[here] are perplexed and bewildered by its dreadful effects, and with
increases_For
time the bewilderment
my part I recommend you to
can
God, Who alone
judge you morally."29
and Lawrence made
both Compton
clear that
After Hiroshima,
on
to
bomb
the
the
atomic
decision
Japanese
drop
they approved
cities. On August
17, replying to physicist Karl Darrow who con
demned the bombing, Lawrence, by temperament usually unwilling to
any regrets after an event, wrote, "In view of the fact
acknowledge
that two bombs ended the war, I am inclined to feel [the Interim
lives were
made
the right decision.
Surely many more
Committee]
saved by shortening the war than were sacrificed as a result of the
He
bombs."30
even found great value in the atomic bombing:
It had
Lawrence
made war too terrible to recur. Echoing
the pre-Hiroshima
argument
and possibly Fermi, Ernest
that had beguiled Compton, Oppenheimer,
"I am
Lawrence
told his former college physics teacher in mid-August,
sure the whole world will realize that war is no longer possible
in
human affairs, and human affairs will go ahead with the progress of
science."31 Publicly, Lawrence declared that "the harnessing of atomic
energy in a weapon of war will come to be regarded in the future not
as a mark of the doom of mankind,
but rather as.. .a first step in
man's
and
conquest
of a new realm of the universe
for his own betterment
welfare."32
who decried the A-bomb
Compton,
responding to an acquaintance
use
"I
the
the
favored
of
bomb, substantially as itwas
decision, stated,
was
now
and
He went on to declare that
this
believe
that
wise."
used,
I say that
the bomb's use "was in the long-term interest of humanity.
on telephone,
27. Transcript
6 Aug
of Groves-Oppenheimer
Records.
mer) files, MED
28. Interview of Emilio Segre by the author.
29. Laura Fermi, Atoms in thefamily
1954), 245.
(Chicago,
to Darrow,
17 Aug
30. Lawrence
See also Lawrence
1945, LP.
30 Dec
31.
1946, Karl Compton
Papers, MIT.
to Dean
Lawrence
16 Aug
Lewis Akeley,
32.
Lawrence
to Fitch Robertson,
Mayor
1945, LP.
22 Aug
of Berkeley,
1945,
201
to Karl
1945, LP.
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(Oppenhei
T. Compton,
THE ATOMIC BOMB
241
are clear. We made
the best choice for
before God our consciences
man's future that we knew how to make."33 Obliquely
acknowledging
that the use of the A-bomb was morally
argued
troubling, Compton
that it was no worse
than large-scale conventional
The
bombing.
chief value, he maintained,
"was the psychological
atomic bomb's
as a
effect of its surprise use. It was of about the same destructiveness
raid by a fleet of B-29s using ordinary bombs."34
were military targets," he asserted.
"Both Hiroshima
and Nagasaki
II had been total war and that the long
He stressed that World War
cherished moral distinction between combatants
and non-combatants
was no longer meaningful, because people on the home front in Japan,
as well as in America, had made weapons
or produced
the sustenance
for soldiers.
"Civilians were no less dangerous
than soldiers, and [in
Japan] were equally responsible for starting and keeping the war."35
the use of what he called this
Oppenheimer
publicly defended
even though, as he openly admitted in mid
"most terrible weapon"
it "is an evil thing.. .by all standards of the world we grew
November,
up in." In the same address, he said the bomb "raised again the ques
tion of whether it is good to learn about the world, to try to under
stand it, to try to control it, to help give to the world..
.increased
insight, increased power." His firm answer: "Because we are scientists,
we must say an unalterable yes to these questions." Knowledge
"is a
good
in itself."36
Moral
concerns
or to
Those who
listened to such statements of Oppenheimer,
and Lawrence,
could not know how profoundly the use of
Compton
the A-bomb,
and the spectre of far more powerful nuclear weapons,
had morally affected all four men. Asked to give counsel toWashing
ton a week after Hiroshima,
they urged in a then-secret report that
America avoid a nuclear arms race by seeking international control of
nuclear weapons and, somehow, the barring of war itself.
Of the four advisers, Lawrence
seemed the most willing to con
tinue building and improving nuclear weapons,
and
and Oppenheimer
the most dispirited. While
Compton
stressing the need for interna
to say to
tional control of atomic energy, Lawrence
had wanted
33.
to McCartney,
Compton
For Compton's
1945, p. 4D.
1947. All in ACP.
Oct
34.
35.
Compton
Ibid.
toMcCartney,
36. Oppenheimer,
"Atomic
18 Mar
in St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
1
1946; Compton
later modifications,
17 Apr
press release,
Compton
18 Mar
weapons,"
1946.
paper
read on
16 Nov
1945, OP.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
242
BERNSTEIN
"as long as our nation requires strong armed forces we
Washington,
must
and
of atomic
continue
intensive
stockpile
development
are
In contrast, Compton
weapons."
developments
argued, "Such
likely to lead only to an armament race."37
17 skillfully
Crafted by Oppenheimer,
their secret report of August
papered over these differences and stressed, as all agreed, the need for
seemed to have thought carefully about
international control. None
how such a system might work, when and with what safeguards, when
and whether the A-bomb would
America would give up its weapons,
or the United Nations
to
would have nuclear bombs
be abolished
the peace.38
maintain
The panel, echoing both the hopes and fears of the time, warned,
will be found which will be adequately
"no military countermeasures
in
the
effective
believe
delivery of atomic weapons_We
preventing
to its ability to inflict dam
that the safety of this nation?as
opposed
lie in.. .its scientific or technological
age on an enemy power?cannot
wars
in
It was a noble goal,
future
prowess [but]
impossible."
making
inspired by great fear.39
in Washington
in mid-August,
learned that Secre
Oppenheimer,
was
not
in
State
James
F.
of
interested
international con
tary
Byrnes
"In the present situa
trol but wanted a larger, better nuclear arsenal.
was
informed by War
Department
tion," Oppenheimer
officials,
to pushing the nuclear program full steam
"there is no alternative
that he had "emphasized
ahead." He reported to Lawrence
of course
that all of us would earnestly do whatever was really in the national
or disagreeable;
but that we felt
interest, no matter how desperate
reluctant to promise that much real good could come of continuing
bomb work just like poison gases after the last war."
told Lawrence
of his own "profound grief.. .and a pro
Oppenheimer
found perplexity about the course we should be following."40
this atomic
at another meeting
all four
of the panel,
By late September,
on moral grounds to oppose
the quest for
scientific advisers decided
or Super, and they found military arguments to support
the H-bomb
their positions.
This superweapon would not be militarily necessary
or morally
the United
justifiable, they argued, for within a decade
to item 5, no title and n.d. (about
15 Aug
37. Lawrence
and Compton
modifications
1945), LP.
to Secretary of War,
17 Aug 1945, LP. At the meet
38. Oppenheimer
(for the Panel)
the quest for the H-bomb
ing, the four advisers may have agreed informally to oppose
for the record,"
"Memorandum
18 Aug
1945, HB file 98. The sub
(George Harrison,
ject is not explicitly
39. Ibid.
40.
Oppenheimer
treated
in their report of 17 Aug).
to Lawrence,
30 Aug
1945, LP.
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THE ATOMIC BOMB
243
States, by spending perhaps a billion dollars annually, could develop
to destroy "all major
industrial and mili
weapons
enough A-bomb
tary facilities throughout the world."41
on the same weekend
in mid-June,
when
Whereas
they had
a
non-combat
demonstration
of the A-bomb,
rejected
they had
to try to develop
the Super,42
advised Washington
now, after
overcame
fear of this still undeveloped
them.
weapon
Hiroshima,
There was, they thought, "a reasonable
chance" that the Super could
be constructed and they feared that itmight well be 250 times more
destructive than the atomic bomb. The biggest A-bomb ofWorld War
II could completely destroy a few square miles; an H-bomb
could des
1000
One
thousand
H-bombs
miles.
could destroy all the
square
troy
in
the
world.
cities
large
In their secret official report of September
28, written by
Oppenheimer,
they stated their position without any clear expression
"No
such effort [on the H-bomb]
should be
of ethical reasons.
invested at the present time," they advised, "but.. .the evidence of the
such a weapon]
should not be forgotten,
possibility
[of developing
and.. .interest in the fundamental questions
involved should be main
tained."43
advisers deeply interested in the progress of science, they even
that could be
briefly sketched some work, essential to the H-bomb,
numerous
of
the
reactions
invol
very
"Study
safely pursued:
neutrons
of
of
.conduction
very high energy;..
ved;.. .properties
in ionized gases; problems
of the assembly
of large
phenomena
amounts of fissionable materials;
[and] integral experiments
[such] as
the production
of an incipient deuterium
reaction by an ordinary
As
explosion."44
So horrible was the prospect
that, contrary to Oppenheimer's
of killing millions of non-combatants
about not halting
public declarations
want
to
block
the quest for
these
four
science,
physicists did, indeed,
the H-bomb.
Their official advice of September 28 had omitted moral
feelings. But in a letter written the day before, Compton
unofficially
to Washington,
"We feel that this development
explained
[the H
we
not
be
because
should
undertaken
should
primarily
bomb]
prefer
were
to Henry Wallace,
27 Sep
sent to Fermi,
41.
1945, LP.
Copies
Compton
to
and Vannevar
Bush.
Lawrence,
Groves, Oppenheimer,
George Harrison,
According
the files, the other three advisers did not dispute Compton's
summary of their views.
on future policy,"
"Recommendations
42. Oppenheimer
16 June
(for the Panel),
1945, BC.
43.
nology"
Panel's
(ms.,
report,
28 Sep
1955),
13-17,
in AEC,
chro
"Thermonuclear
weapons
1945, excerpted
in AEC
of Energy, Germantown,
Records,
Department
Maryland.
44.
Ibid.
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244
BERNSTEIN
defeat in war to victory obtained at the expense of the enormous human
disaster that would be caused by its determined use" (emphasis added).
For the four advisers, such words were the counsel of humanity above
patriotism, of life above nationalism.45
Such moral concerns, inspired by revulsion at the mass killings of
Hiroshima
and Nagasaki,
pushed these key scientific advisers to hope
to block the postwar American
It was not a
quest for the Super.
or
in 1945 that American
weapon
any others, knew how to
scientists,
were
because
basic
scientific
It was a
still unsolved.
make,
problems
as well as the
these four leading scientists believed America,
weapon
rest of the world,
should not seek. For them, some science had
become too dangerous.
But, as both the official report and Compton
indicated, they were
not necessarily opposing development
of the Super for all time. "Ten
the
years from now," Compton
explained, "the question of developing
an
there
be
then
super bomb can be assessed
may
Perhaps
again.
to make
international government adequate
the development
under
world auspices
safe or perhaps unnecessary
for further considera
tion."46 In 1945, he did not anticipate that this new bomb would soon
for American
seem, for him and Lawrence,
necessary and desirable
could Compton
foresee that Fermi and an uneasy
security. Nor
soon briefly reverse themselves to endorse the
would
Oppenheimer
quest for the Super when the Cold War became more frightening and
America's
effort at international control of atomic energy failed.
The
failure of international control
In the same secret report of September
for a
28, in pleading
prompt effort at international control of atomic energy, the four panel
in General
members
stressed their recurrent hope that the A-bomb,
into
public words, "might blackmail mankind
Dwight D. Eisenhower's
nuclear threats?the
"atomic
peace."
They did not mean American
had briefly considered
in the spring
diplomacy"
policy that Compton
and that Secretary of State Byrnes was following?but
the common
fear of this terrible weapon.47 The panel wrote, "Scientists who have
on the development
collaborated
of atomic weapons
believe that they
have made
the technical preconditions
of war."
for the avoidance
toWallace,
27 Sep 1945, Washington
St. Louis, Missouri.
Compton
University,
on talk given by Comdr.
N.E.
report, 28 Sep
Ibid.; Panel's
1945; cf., "Notes
1 Oct
and Ralph C. Smith, Manhattan
Bradbury,
1945, in Edith Truslow
Project Y, The
45.
46.
II (LAMS
Alamos Project,
the Super is feasible.
47. AEC(ref.
43), 13.
Los
report,
1947),
120-121,
on seeking
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to determine
whether
THE ATOMIC BOMB
245
as Oppenheimer
Atomic weapons,
would soon assert, could be a great
a great peril.48
hope?or
to a
the public of the peril in response
warned
Oppenheimer
"If you ask: 'can we we make
reporter's query about nuclear weapons.
them more terrible?' the answer is yes. If you ask: 'can we make a lot
of them?' the answer is yes. If you ask: 'can we make
them terribly
more terrible?' the answer is probably."49 Americans
had no way of
was obliquely warning in part against the
knowing that Oppenheimer
of
Super, which might
destroy a whole
city and kill hundreds
thousands and possibly millions with a single bomb.
seem in despair
about
could sometimes
Privately Oppenheimer
atomic energy. In the late autumn, as Truman unsympathetically
later
"came
into my office...and
recalled, Oppenheimer
spent most of his
time [w]ringing his hands and telling me they had blood on them
because of the discovery of atomic energy."50
secret report, Oppenheimer
Seven weeks after the panel's
publicly
could be either a great or small trouble."51
stated, "atomic weapons
soon became a "great trouble." During
For all four men, the A-bomb
their hopes for international
Cold War,
1946, amid the developing
control of atomic energy and possibly the prevention of war itself were
dashed?first
for Lawrence and probably last for Oppenheimer.
In early 1946, a still-optimistic Oppenheimer,
recently catapulted
into fame as the "father" of the A-bomb, proudly served as the chief
for what became
the Acheson-Lilienthal
scientist-adviser
nuclear
He
had great hopes that it could prevent a nuclear-arms
control plan.
race. He never seemed to understand
that this plan was fatally flawed
the American
nuclear monopoly,
the
because
it protected
placed
on
them dependent
and made
Soviets at a profound disadvantage,
American
Fermi,
goodwill. Nor did his former colleagues?Lawrence,
and Compton?recognize
these problems.52
perhaps chastened by disap
Only much later would Oppenheimer,
the
Baruch
that
1946
plan (which was similar
pointment, acknowledge
was
to the
to the Acheson-Lilienthal
proposal)
inherently unacceptable
Soviets because
them to roll back
it compelled
at Los Alamos,
address
48.
Oppenheimer,
of Chicago.
University
in Time, 46 (29 Oct
49. Oppenheimer,
quoted
to Acheson,
7 May
50. Truman
1946, PSA.
51. Oppenheimer
(ref. 36).
"The
52. Barton J. Bernstein,
2 Nov
1945),
secrecy.
1945,
James
"It is doubtful
Franck
Papers,
30.
for security: American
foreign policy and inter
Journal
1942-1946,"
history, 60 (Mar
of American
14 (Dec
than a thousand
1030-1038;
cf., Bethe,
suns," BAS,
1958),
1974),
"Brighter
and editorial, "Atomic
and debit, 1946," ibid., 3 (Jan 1947),
426-428,
1,
energy?credit
27.
national
control
of atomic
quest
energy,
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BERNSTEIN
246
the.. .apparatus of the Iron Curtain, a government
whether, without
said.53
like the Soviet Government
could exist," Oppenheimer
Ernest Lawrence, unlike Oppenheimer,
would not serve in 1946 as
on international control. He was more
a major adviser toWashington
the
and
of
Soviets
of illness, to take
wary
reluctant, partly because
time away from restructuring his laboratory. He believed
that Amer
in order to keep the
ica had to keep building
its nuclear arsenal
peace.54
on interna
Compton,
though more willing to serve Washington
and moving
tional control, was
fearful of the Soviets
closer to
Lawrence on international political matters. Like Lawrence, Compton
"It [is] an
production of nuclear weapons.
urged continued American
we
to
that
that
ourselves
with
goes
keep
prepared
obligation
victory
our own
freedom and that of the world."55
By mid-1946,
of international control as a way of protecting the
conceived
Compton
United States if the Soviets committed aggression. He wanted control
over the bomb vested in the United Nations
and assumed
that the
world organization would act to defend American
interests. He com
preserve
interest with the needs of international
fortably identified America's
ism and humankind.56
Not until autumn 1946 did Oppenheimer
accede, albeit reluctantly,
to the nuclear arms race when the Soviets rejected the Baruch plan.
Soon he was warning against continued negotiations on atomic energy
with the Soviets lest the United States make dangerous concessions.57
Disputes
over domestic control
The failed quest for international control of atomic energy, as well
as the Cold War
federal funding
itself, virtually guaranteed handsome
for physics and especially for research on nuclear weapons.
Oppenhei
mer, Lawrence,
Fermi, and Compton, while often pleading for even
control
53. AEC
"International
(ref. 19), 42, 45, and Oppenheimer,
48. For his mid-1946
criticisms, which
gy," BAS, 4 (Jan 1948), 39-43,
stand the liabilities of the Acheson-Lilienthal
Lilienthal
plan, see David
of atomic
failed
ener
to under
journal, 24 Jul
1946, Lilienthal
Papers,
Seeley Mudd
Library, Princeton University.
to Bernard Baruch,
11 June 1946,
54. Childs
John Francis Neylan
(ref. 1), 392-393;
to Richard
20 Mar
1946 and 8 June 1946, Files of the Spe
LP; and Lawrence
Tolman,
to the Secretary of State for Atomic
box 41, Department
cial Assistant
Energy Matters,
RG
of State Records,
59, NA.
55. Compton
56. Compton
1945, BC.
57. Frederic
to Groves,
13Mar
to Richard
Tolman,
1946, GP.
31 May
1946, ACP;
cf., Compton
to Lyle Borst,
5
Nov
Feb
Osborn
1948, Truman
in AEC
(ref. 19), 344; Bethe
in ibid.,
327;
Library.
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and Osborn
diary,
18
THE ATOMIC BOMB
247
more
federal money, knew that American physics would not return to
the poverty days of the 1930s and earlier.58
After Hiroshima,
theWar
partly at the behest of General Groves,
to
had
about
ordered
scientists
silent
Department
keep
project
came
The
order
down
apparently
through the
atomic-energy policy.
to
trust
had
directors.
The
scientists
tried
their
wartime
laboratory
at
Los
where
Alamos,
leaders?especially
Oppenheimer
inspired deep
in contrast, Compton was not especially well
affection. At Chicago,
liked and thus he was less able to contain discontent.59 It burst open
at both labs, as well as elsewhere on the Manhattan
Project, when, on
launched the May-Johnson
October
bill.
3, 1945, theWar Department
on military control and harsh secrecy outraged many
Its emphasis
rank-and-file physicists.
Unlike
the rank and file, the four members
of the Scientific
on the funding
not
Panel
did
fear
influence
postwar
military
Advisory
of research on atomic energy. All four had gotten along with General
Groves, and they viewed the military as generally benevolent despite
the harsh wartime
secrecy. Like other scientists, however, the four
had preferred civilian control of atomic energy and of science funding
in general. Yet, they were willing to rely heavily upon military fund
and the Truman Administra
ing and direction if theWar Department
tion so determined.
The intimate relationship of the four with the
bill for postwar mil
Army, and their support of theWar Department's
itary control of atomic energy, strained the relationship between them
and many working physicists in late 1945 and early 1946.
Physicist Herbert Anderson, a former Met Lab member assigned to
Los Alamos
and a former collaborator of Fermi's, was furious about
the May-Johnson
bill. Echoing the thoughts of others, he wrote to a
colleague in early October, "I must confess that my confidence in our
leaders Oppenheimer,
and Fermi..
.who enjoined
Lawrence, Compton,
us to have faith in them and not influence this legislation, is shaken. I
that these worthy men were duped?that
believe
they never had a
chance to read the bill."60
Anderson's
generous
interpretation of the four was undoubtedly
the
correct.61 They had received
skimpy briefings that minimized
amount of military control and secrecy in research. Pressed by many
as they themselves were
to return to
other matters,
preparing
58. Hewlett
and Anderson
(ref. 1), 20.
to General
John Manley
26 Sep 1945; Robert
Groves,
26 Sep 1945, both in OP.
Commerce
Henry A. Wallace,
to W.A.
11 Oct
Anderson
60. Herbert
Higginbotham,
59.
of Chicago.
Committee,
University
Hewlett
and Anderson
(ref. 1), 432; Childs
R. Wilson
1945, Records
Scientists
61.
to Secretary
(ref. 1), 368.
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of
of Atomic
BERNSTEIN
248
peacetime positions, they had trusted and not probed. They were also
to the
that they deemed
necessary
eager to secure the legislation
prompt seeking of international control. None of the four was likely
to repudiate
the Army, complain
of having been misled,
and risk
impairing his own relationship and that of physics with the federal
government.
told his
the rank-and-file dissent, Arthur Compton
Deploring
in early October,
brother Karl, the physicist-president
"Some
of MIT,
of our scientific boys helped to muddy the waters by insisting on air
Arthur Compton
did not want a
ing their views with Congressmen."
or
a
enactment
He wanted
of the
debate in Congress.
speedy
delay
War Department's
bill.62
At Los Alamos, Oppenheimer,
using his great powers of persua
to the measure.63 Reaching
sion, briefly stifled objections
beyond the
at
Lawrence
and
the
War
lab,
Department's
urging, he enlisted both
11 backing the
of October
Fermi as signatories of a public message
bill. Any delay, their statement warned, would
impede
May-Johnson
as presented
research.
that "the
They
legislation
guaranteed
represents
the fruits of well-informed
and
experienced
considera
tion."64
It was a statement that would quickly unravel. Oppenheimer
and
as
as
soon
well
in
the
and
found
curious
themselves
Fermi,
Compton,
sometimes contradictory position of backing the measure,
admitting
and
the need
for some
revisions,
exhorting working
physicists
to
and
themselves
from
it.
support it,
Congress
sliding away
Caught
between the Army and many working physicists, these four men, as
that
leaders of physics, hoped for a compromise
recognized national
would offend no one, guarantee both legislation and funding, enable
the government promptly to seek international control, and leave their
own reputations untarnished.
On October
17, pursuing his uneasy strategy in open congressional
hearings, Oppenheimer
skillfully slipped away from this earlier strong
the
for
bill. He did not repudiate
public support
it;
May-Johnson
as
one
he
offered an "oblique
attack."65
newspaper
instead,
reported,
"The Johnson bill, I don't know much
about," he lamely said.66
to K. Compton,
62. A. Compton
8 Oct
63. Smith (ref. 1), 140-141.
64. Oppenheimer,
Fermi, and Lawrence
1945, ACP.
to Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson,
11
11 Oct
1945 entry, and Oppenheimer-Harrison
1945, OP; George
Harrison,
phone
transcript, 11 Oct
1945, both in Interim Committee
Log, HB 98.
Oct
65. PM (NewYork), 18Oct 1945,quoted in Smith (ref. 1), 154.
66.
Oppenheimer
Mobilization,
Hearings
on Military
in Senate, Committee
Affairs, Subcommittee
on science legislation, 79th Congress,
1st session, 306.
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on War
THE ATOMIC BOMB
249
the scenes, however, Oppenheimer
privately promised theWar
see
that
he
would
Szilard, Anderson, and Harold Urey to
Department
a
to
"head
off
try
public wrangle with them at the [Congressional]
were
"If
not possible
to secure a relatively united front
it
Hearing."
with these scientists, Secretary [ofWar Robert P.] Patterson felt that
Dr. Oppenheimer
should be prepared to testify."67
also tried to prevent the public battle. At
and
Fermi
Compton
lunch on October
18, they met a handful of dissenting scientists to try
to bring them into line behind the legislation. As historian Alice K.
Smith describes the session, "Compton
put himself at one end [of the
Behind
at the other with instructions to give those near him
they were bad boys but would be forgiven if their
behavior
Fermi's heart was not in the task, and those at
improved.
the end of the table did not get the full message."68
Lawrence,
staying
in California, managed
to distance
himself from this campaign
bill.
though he did support theWar Department
to the War
The quest continued
for a compromise
acceptable
In congressional
hear
and to many dissenting scientists.
Department
for
18, Compton
ings on October
urged that the harsh provisions
of General
secrecy, so offensive to scientists and so reminiscent
Groves' heavy-handed
rules inWorld War
II, be relaxed. Oppenhei
mer explained, "Scientists
are not used to being controlled; they are
not used to regimentation,
and there are good reasons why they
should be averse to it, because
it is the nature of science that the indi
vidual is to be given a certain amount of freedom to invent, to think,
and to carry on the best he knows how."69
table] and Fermi
'the word'...that
But Oppenheimer
refused to attack the concept of military control
of atomic energy. "I think it is a matter, not [of] what uniform a man
wears but [of] what kind of man he is."70 That was, characteristically,
both profound and naive. He was correct in theory but not in actual
representatives of powerful bureaucra
ity, for, as he knew, appointed
interests.
cies, like the Army, usually do act upon the organization's
At
heated.
For
times, the rhetoric became
example,
Urey,
from the Scientific Advisory Panel, pub
excluded earlier by Groves
bill the "first totalitarian bill ever written
licly called theMay-Johnson
can call it either a Communist
bill or a Nazi bill,
by Congress_You
whichever you think is the worse."71
67. Harrison,
Interim Committee
Smith (ref. 1), 164.
Log,
17 Oct
1945, H-B
98.
68.
on Military
69. House,
Committee
Affairs,
107-126
128-129
(Compton),
(Oppenheimer).
in ibid., 128-129.
70. Oppenheimer,
71. Urey
in New
York Times,
31 Oct
Atomic
1945, clipping
energy,
79th Cong.,
in UP.
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1st Sess.,
BERNSTEIN
250
The issues reached to the distrust of the Army itself. Most work
ing scientists feared the resurgence of the Army's wartime regimenta
tion. The four scientific leaders were more optimistic.
They were
more comfortable working with the War Department,
keeping issues
about the organization
of atomic-energy
research out of the public
forum, and relying upon advising Washington.
Many working scien
tists, in contrast, wanted public dialogue, a chance to air their views,
and careful scrutiny of the legislation.
It would be too simple to say
the dispute was simply between "insiders," who felt valued, and "out
siders," who felt excluded, but that was a powerful part of the dispute.
It was also a dispute, at times, about democratic
scrutiny, the roles of
scientists, and elitism. The four were wary of public scrutiny of the
program and fearful of rank-and-file scientists overstepping the bounds
of science and expressing political views as scientists rather than sim
ply as citizens.
scientists who
put the matter bluntly when he advised
Compton
statements
the
bill that their
should "be
opposed
May-Johnson
are
.as
the
that
with
clear
indication
their
presented
expressions..
they
citizens and not specifically [as scientists]."72 His critics replied that
demand placed
lawyers did not have the same burden, that Compton's
scientists under suspicion as a self-serving pressure group, and, of
and the other scientific leaders often used their
course, that Compton
own prestige as scientists, without disclaimers,
to push for particular
not
or
and
entailed
scientific
"facts"
policies
legislation
by
was
a
the
There
double
for
standard?one
leaders
knowledge.73
lurking
of physics and another for the others, including the younger men who
might be doing the most creative work in physics.
Most
A-bomb
"insiders"
like Oppenheimer
physicists?whether
or "outsiders"
and Compton,
that they had a spe
like Szilard?agreed
cial responsibility, and burden, because
they had helped build the
to
to some
bomb.
wanted
restrict
this "franchise"
Oppenheimer
scientist leaders. Szilard and other dissenters wanted to expand it to
include themselves and their fellows. In a public letter, "The Atomic
three of these dissenters argued their position:
Scientists Speak Up,"
"Scientists
do not aspire to political
leadership but, having helped
man to make this first step into this new world, they have the respon
sibility of warning and advising him until he has become aware of its
perils as well as its wonders."74
to Paul Henshaw
Compton
to Compton,
Brues
Austin
Smith (ref. 1), 180-181.
72.
73.
74.
Quoted
in Smith
and
n.d.
22 Oct
John Simpson,
late October
(about
1945, ACP.
1945),
(ref. 1), 179.
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ACP,
discussed
in
THE ATOMIC BOMB
2 51
Under
and dissenting
growing pressure from liberal congressmen
some
Truman
and
President
advisers
became
scientists,
suspicious of
the Army's proposal
and retreated from the May-Johnson
In
bill.
Truman
backed
the
McMahon
bill
for
civilian
control
February 1946,
of atomic energy, which became law in August
1946.75 It was heralded
as
a
scientists
the McMahon
Act
many
great victory. Actually,
by
granted the form of civilian control, not the substance.
The struggle over the May-Johnson
bill did impair the reputations
of Oppenheimer,
and Compton?but
Lawrence,
probably not Fermi's,
who was seen, accurately, as far less political?with
many rank-and-file
scientists. But the enthusiastic quest by Oppenheimer
in 1946 for
international control regained for him considerable
in the
acceptance
in contrast, as the entrepreneur-leader
physics community. Lawrence,
of big-machine physics, had great support in his Berkeley community
of physicists but evoked more
suspicion
elsewhere, and Compton,
moving to a university presidency and worrying about the relationship
of science
to religion, had moved
to the periphery of the physics
com
munity.
3. KEEPING
AMERICA
AHEAD
In 1947, Oppenheimer
and Fermi began service on the General
Committee
of the newly formed Atomic
Advisory
(GAC)
Energy
Commission.
There they found themselves primarily giving counsel
on the development
of nuclear weapons.
Speaking later for himself,
and probably Fermi, Oppenheimer
to having felt "some
admitted
that the principal job of the Com
melancholy
[when] we concluded
mission was to provide atomic weapons
and good atomic weapons
and many atomic weapons."76
On February 2, at the second meeting
of the General Advisory
called for an emphasis on reactor develop
Committee, Oppenheimer
ment.
It would have a triple purpose, he explained
(in the words of
the minutes):
"To advance
the international aspects of atomic energy
of its peaceful utility, to affect public opin
through the demonstration
ion in a similar fashion in this country, and to provide
sufficient
so that questions of allocation become
fissionable material
relatively
in effect, choosing
both nuclear
was,
unimportant."
Oppenheimer
and the peaceful atom, hoping to produce more weapons
and
weapons
to sanitize the image of the atom while producing benefits for human
kind.77
see comments
and Anderson
490-491.
Also
(ref. 1), 432-448,
on each bill, in Bills file, Truman
departments
Library.
76. Oppenheimer
in AEC
(ref. 19), 69.
77. "Draft minutes
of the GAC,"
DOE.
2-3 Feb
1947, AEC Records,
(GAC),
75.
Hewlett
ous cabinet
are no other minutes
for this meeting.
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by vari
There
BERNSTEIN
252
Fermi, less uneasy about the arms race amid the developing Cold
on nuclear weapons.
He wanted
favored a direct emphasis
War,
of
and
materials
of
production,
testing
expansion
existing weapons,
of the super bomb." He had shifted from his oppo
"the development
and Oppenheimer
sition to the H-bomb,
uneasily went along after first
to
block
the
for
this
quest
powerful weapon. At the meeting,
trying
"It is
had
Oppenheimer
argued, briefly, in the words of the minutes,
our
col
conceivable
because of the prejudice against weapons
among
to
steer
and
clear
of
be
wiser
this
it
subject [the Super]
might
leagues,
not ask to have the super bomb pushed at Los Alamos."78
Some themes of lament emerged at the meeting, as disclosed by the
words: "The making of atomic
summary of Oppenheimer's
we
now committed_It
are
must be
to
which
is
weapons
something
we
our
will
world
hearts
have
within
been
the
that
hoping
recognized
be the world it was ten years ago. This is no longer possible and we
to find some
[scientists] must try in ourselves and in our colleagues
minutes'
way of [being of] public service."79
both Lawrence and Compton more comfort
Unlike Oppenheimer,
in the arms race.
American
efforts to stay far ahead
ably supported
As Compton
later
the quest for the H-bomb.80
Each soon endorsed
a
or
more
to
in
1947
1948
he
support
recalled,
urged Oppenheimer
was reluctant on
but Oppenheimer
vigorous program for the H-bomb,
In contrast, Compton,
had
distressed
that Russia
moral
grounds.
offers for international control of atomic energy,
rejected American
had come to believe that an American H-bomb was desirable and a
He
seemed no longer to
Soviet H-bomb
unacceptable.
monopoly
at least he minimized?the
worry about?or
likely "enormous disaster"
in September
that he had stressed to Washington
from the H-bomb
1945.81
Lawrence
large
eagerly sought large federal grants and directed
to keep America
in Berkeley
scale research
(frequently classified)
served
ahead in nuclear physics and in the arms race. He occasionally
on weaponry.
on Washington's
In 1948, for example,
committees
Lawrence was a member of a special committee (the Noyes Panel) that
recommended
continued work on radiological warfare?a
subject that
and Fermi had flirted with in 1943, when Oppenheimer
Oppenheimer
78.
Ibid.
79.
Ibid.
80.
Childs
Compton
interviews with Luis Alvarez
(ref. 1), 411-414;
to Gordon
21 Apr
1954, Gray Papers, Dwight
Gray,
Kansas.
Abilene,
81. Compton
to Gray,
21 Apr
1954, Gray
Papers
and Wolfgang
D. Eisenhower
(ref. 80).
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Panofsky;
Library,
THE ATOMIC BOMB
253
had discussed
killing a half-million of the enemy with radioactive
wastes.
1948 report left unclear whether radiological weapons
The
would be tactical or strategic, or both, and whether
these weapons
as well. Resolution
of
could be used on noncombatant
populations
those matters awaited further research and actual testing, programs
that Fermi and Oppenheimer
also endorsed.82
All four men, though often differing in judgments of the Soviets,
were among the architects of the emerging edifice of American nuclear
and expand its
deterrence: the need for the United States to maintain
to be
to offset Soviet
nuclear
conventional
arsenal
forces, and
to use atomic bombs
in war.
Lawrence
and Compton,
prepared
because
postwar advisers on weaponry,
they were only occasionally
of
usually did not have to face directly and in depth the questions
what nuclear weapons
should be created for which situations, what
levels of spending were appropriate, and how to enhance deterrence.
In contrast, both Oppenheimer
and Fermi, as members
of the
focused on such matters.
GAC,
By about late 1947, they began to
great reliance upon strategic nuclear
recognize the perils of America's
"We had
bombing as both a deterrent and a weapon for fightingwars.
more and more
to devote ourselves," Oppenheimer
later explained,
"to finding ways of adapting our atomic potential to offset the Soviet
threat."83 He and Fermi urged a shift to a more diversified arsenal
and a more
supple doctrine to deal with different kinds of crises
wars
as
small
well as large ones, those in Europe as well as elsewhere.
To avoid all-out war and to make the bomb more credible, they coun
and preparation
seled development
of tactical nuclear weapons
for
wars.
To
and
limited
its allies, Fermi and Oppenhei
protect America
mer risked lowering the threshold for the military use of nuclear
weapons.84
to the Joint
82.
1948 presented
Warfare
Staff Study June-August
"Radiological
NME-AEC
Panel on Radiological
29 Aug
28 Apr
Warfare,
1948;" GAC Minutes,
1948,
both in AEC Records,
On the 1943 "plan,"
DOE.
Barton J. Bernstein,
"Oppenheimer
and the Radioactive
Poison
For
review, 88 (May-June
Plan," Technology
1985), 14-17.
RW program,
see Lawrence
Lawrence's
to Brig. General
later support for an expanded
James McCormack,
Jr., 20 Sep 1950, LP.
83. AEC(ref.
19), 17.
84. AEC,
Hewlett
(ref. 19), 344, 47-48;
21-23
Minutes,
of the A-bomb
and Duncan
(ref.
1),
Nov
DOE.
For Oppenheimer's
1947, AEC Records,
as useful primarily against cities, see Oppenheimer
1946, PSF.
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154-184;
earlier
and GAC
(1946)
to Truman,
view
3 May
254
Peaceful
BERNSTEIN
nuclear power
For many Americans,
the fear of the atomic bomb was allayed by
the promises of the peaceful atom?medicine
and cheap power. The
abounded
with
of
atomic
popular press
predictions
pills, atomic cars,
and atomic planes.
Such uneasy optimism was consistent with the
vague hopes, expressed often by all four physicists, that atomic energy
"The atomists hold before them,"
could, and would, benefit mankind.
in
the new advances
stated
"this
of
1946,
Compton
great goal...that
science and technology can bring.. .prosperity and a more complete
life." Yet, unlike the popular press, these four men understood
that
the prospect of cheap atomic power was, at best, far distant.
The
for
technology was still uncertain, uranium was scarce and needed
reactors were still unsolved,
the problems of "breeding"
the
weapons,
costs of nuclear fuel might be too high, and fossil fuels were cheap and
plentiful.85
as a shrewd entrepreneur eager to drama
In late 1946, Lawrence,
tize the benefits of the atom and raise more funds for research, pro
posed a demonstration
"Why don't you fel
atomic-energy project.
lows [visiting AEC commissioners]
get off your duffs and build a reac
tor that will just light a few bulbs? That's easy to do. Here's
all you
to do_"
As AEC
Lewis
Strauss
have
commissioner
recalled,
Lawrence
the method
"outlined
of doing it. But this seemed to us, I
suppose, a waste of time and money and there was no pressure upon
us to make any such experiment."86
the recently installed chancellor
of
By 1947, Arthur Compton,
was unhappy
on
about the AEC's
policies
Washington
University,
It was not that he believed
atomic power.
that such power was then
commercially feasible or imminent. Rather, he charged, the AEC was
dallying and refusing to encourage
industry in the quest for cheap
com
power and related research. As a college president, Compton
that private
that the result was
plained
industry's funding for his
school's nuclear
research program, up to then the chief financial
source for the program, was drying up. His concern, he maintained,
was chiefly national
security: "the great importance of the develop
ment of an active and large scale [atomic industry] in the United
States."87
and
crusade
in
85. Compton,
'The
its social
atomic
ACP,
printed
implication,"
Johnston (ref. 11), 285; Fermi, "The future of atomic energy," 27 May
1946, Fermi Pa
see Oppenheimer
IL. Also
to Harris
of Chicago,
pers, University
(for Panel)
Chicago,
on future policy,"
16 June 1945, BC.
on, "Recommendations
Oral History Office; David
86. Lewis Strauss, oral history, 172, Columbia
Lilienthal,
The journals
1965), 2, 108.
(New York,
of David E. Lilienthal
to Lawrence,
to Lilienthal,
11 Jul 1947; Compton
11 Jul 1947, LP.
87. Compton
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THE ATOMIC BOMB
As Compton
ing for military
crisis, America
private nuclear
If
tary needs.
gram has faded
told Lilienthal,
the great
atomic programs would
would have to depend
industry. "It can quickly
255
danger was that federal fund
soon decline, and thus, in a
of a
upon the development
be turned to supply our mili
this industry does not exist and the government pro
away, we shall be doubly vulnerable."88
Lawrence,
orbit, was dubious
though also outside the AEC-GAC
about Compton's
criticisms. Putting his finger on the basic problem,
Lawrence
replied, correctly, "I have gained the distinct impression
that one of the problems of the Commission
is to devise incentives
in the program on the part of
that will enlist vigorous participation
industry."89 Industry itself, he knew, was reluctant to get involved.90
"You probably know of Arthur Compton's
letter to Dave
[AEC
even
more violent notes
and his related,
Chairman David Lilienthal]
to the big shots of American
to
science," Oppenheimer
complained
an
Robert
AEC
in
fellow physicist
mid-1947
Bacher,
Commissioner,
in explaining why the GAC and the AEC should issue a realistic state
ment on peaceful nuclear power.
Others, Oppenheimer
lamented,
were foolishly optimistic about speedily solving the scientific and tech
and AEC
nological problems, and therefore were criticizing the GAC
as incompetent
To
for neglecting
the
protect
peaceful
power.91
to
and
atomic
this
energy program
puncture
optimism,
government's
in July 1947 offered his own bleak assessment, which he
Oppenheimer
issue as its public pronouncement.
hoped the GAC would
According
to Oppenheimer,
it would take at least a decade before "very difficult
can be solved;"
metallurgical,
engineering, and chemical problems
be
then
nuclear
and
would elapse
decades
power
profitable,
might
only
as
source
a
of energy
before nuclear power would become
significant
in the industrialized world.92
bleak estimate disappointed most of the AEC and
Oppenheimer's
GAC members.
Lilienthal
feared that his report, if issued, would be
mean
to
atomic
that
energy is actually just a matter of
"interpreted
and
AEC
Strauss wor
little
more."93
commissioner
weapons
military
"so pessimistic"
lead to a sharp
ried that it was
that it might
88.
Compton
Jeffries, "Future
89. Lawrence
see Arthur H.
to Lilienthal,
11 Jul 1947, LP. Also
of atomic energy,"
18 June 1946, ACP.
to Compton,
18 Jul 1947, LP.
to Groves,
(ref. 86), 172; Strauss
Iowa.
Library, West Branch,
to Robert Bacher,
91. Oppenheimer
6 Aug
RG 326, NA.
90.
Strauss
30 June
Compton
1950, Strauss
Papers,
and Zey
Herbert
Hoover
to the Commissioners,
92. Draft
submitted
Jul 1947, AEC Records, DOE.
93. Lilienthal
(ref. 86), 2, 228.
1947, Bacher
attached
files, Records
to GAC
Draft
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of the AEC,
Minutes,
28-29
BERNSTEIN
256
in rejoinder, argued
reduction in the AEC's
budget. Oppenheimer,
that the AEC's
substantial military program would
guarantee heavy
for a
pushed
funding. Fermi and others, overriding Oppenheimer,
revised statement.94
Fermi, joined by metallurgist
Cyril Smith, phrased a competing
"moderate
what
called
"Within a
estimate, offering
optimism."
they
two years we expect to see atomic power pro
short time?perhaps
our short life
duced from experimental small capacity units_Within
time we expect to see the beginning of a new major
industry." In
effect they had placed such an industry somewhere in the next two or
three decades and, thus, carved away at some of Oppenheimer's
pessi
mism.95
aided by physicist I.I. Rabi, edged in their direction
Oppenheimer,
in a new draft by focusing on costs and softening earlier conclusions.
is known to us today," the Oppenheimer-Rabi
draft stated,
"Nothing
that these [costs] can
"which makes
it unlikely, or even improbable,
be reduced to the point where power from atomic energy can compete
with that from conventional
fuels; but history suggests that itwill take
us some time to realize
these hopes."96
Striking a compromise
end-of
between these two drafts, Oppenheimer
stated, in the GAC's
reactors "may,
Truman
that atomic
the-year report to President
within a time which will probably not be short, and which is difficult
to provide general industrial power,
to estimate reliably, be developed
to our whole technological and
and so make
important contributions
economic life."97
In early 1948, in an article despairing of recent proposals for inter
national control of atomic energy, Oppenheimer
publicly summarized
the situation for peaceful nuclear power: "Although the generation of
useful power from atomic sources would assuredly be a soluble prob
lem and would under favorable circumstances make decisive progress
within a decade, the question of the usefulness of this power, the scale
on which
and the costs and economic
it could be made
available,
In effect, the AEC
and
take a long time to answer."
values, would
scientists like Oppenheimer,
Fermi, and Lawrence would continue to
focus on the arms race.98 As Lilienthal had rued, "atomic energy is
and little more."99
actually just a matter of military weapons
94. GAC
95.
Fermi
Lilienthal
96.
97.
Draft Minutes,
and Smith,
files, box
28-29
"What
Jul
is
1947, AEC
the future
DOE.
Records,
of atomic
power?,"
5, AEC Records, NA.
and Rabi,
"Draft note on atomic
Oppenheimer
to President
GAC
Truman,
31 Dec
23 Oct
power,"
files, box
1947, Lilienthal
NA.
98.
99.
Oppenheimer
(ref. 53), 40.
Lilienthal
(ref. 86), 2, 228.
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17 Nov
1947,
1947, OP.
5, AEC Records,
THE ATOMIC BOMB
New
decisions
257
on the H-bomb
the H-bomb
effort to develop
limped along into late
the formal support of Fermi and Oppenheimer,
but was
a
at
when
the
time
Soviet
A-bomb
still
seemed
easily subordinated,
to
fruitful
efforts
of
and
distant,
producing
predictably
improving
The H-bomb, which no one knew how to make,
American A-bombs.
foundered on shortages of scarce scientific personnel, critical materi
America's
1949. It had
als, and limited funds.100
Not until late October
1949, shortly after the Soviet explosion of
its first atomic bomb, did Oppenheimer
and Fermi, returning to their
ethical questions of September
1945, directly confront the moral issue
some science was too dangerous
and whether America
of whether
should make an "all-out" push for the Super. That month, galvanized
fearful of Soviet gains and
by the Soviet A-bomb, Ernest Lawrence,
in the arms race, campaigned
in
far ahead
eager to keep America
new
He
the
for
this
that
weapon.
Washington
actually suspected
the H-bomb,
Soviets might be close to developing
and feared that
under guidance
whom he mistrusted,
from Oppenheimer
America,
might soon be dramatically behind in the arms race.101
Lawrence was eager to enroll his laboratory in a speeded-up quest
for the Super. He wanted to construct a heavy-water reactor to pro
duce the neutrons to make
the tritium required for the new weapon.
"It is certainly good to
Nobel
laureate I.I. Rabi welcomed
the plan.
see the first team back in. You
fellows have been playing with your
cyclotron and nuclei for four years and it is certainly time you got
back to work."102 In contrast, AEC chairman David Lilienthal bitterly
in his diary, "Ernest Lawrence
complained
[is] drooling over [the H
termed Lawrence
and Edward
bomb]."103
Sneeringly, Oppenheimer
ardent H-bomb
"two
both
pro
Teller,
advocates,
experienced
moters."104
wondered whether the Super ("the miserable
Oppenheimer
thing,"
to
he called it) would work and whether it would be too cumbersome
be carried by plane. But he was prepared, reluctantly, to accede to the
for it. "We have always
growing political pressures from Congress
21 to his friend and
known it had to be done," he wrote on October
fellow GAC
member,
100. AEC(ref.
43),
101. Memorandum
James Conant,
the president
of Harvard.
"It
1-18.
on Lawrence-Alvarez
10 Oct
in Joint
luncheon,
1949, quoted
and progress and the H-bomb
Energy, "Policy
(ms.,
program"
on Atomic Energy, RG
of the Joint Committee
128, N.A.
1953), Records
in AEC
102. Luis Alvarez
Rabi,
(ref. 19), 778.
paraphrasing
Committee
103.
on Atomic
Lilienthal
104. Oppenheimer
(ref. 86), 576.
to Conant,
21 Oct
1949,
in AEC
(ref. 19), 242.
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BERNSTEIN
258
.it does have
would be folly to oppose the exploration of this weapon..
to be done, though it appears to be singularly proof against any form
The quest for the Super, Oppenheimer
of experimental
approach."
of our present
lamented, would "even further.. .worsen the unbalance
on
war plans," with what he deemed
their excessive
dependence
nuclear
weapons.105
came before the
The
issue of a crash program for the H-bomb
1949. The discussion quickly
GAC on the weekend of October 28-30,
Should America
seek to
to the more fundamental
moved
question:
At an all-day Saturday session, Fermi indicated
develop this weapon?
must explore it and do it," according to
his own line of thought?"one
a notetaker's paraphrase,
"and that doesn't
foreclose the question:
seemed inclined
should it be made use of?" That day, Oppenheimer
against the quest for the Super.106
By early Sunday, some views had changed and most had crystal
and Fermi, as
lized. Fermi had shifted significantly. Oppenheimer
as
at
the
the other six GAC members
well
meeting, agreed to oppose
In their state
on
moral
the Super
scientific, technical, and
grounds.
some
about the
doubts
ment, drafted by Oppenheimer,
they expressed
it
that
chances
of
the
the
of
weapon,
developing
estimating
feasibility
uses
one
"if
were
50
five
above
within
percent. They wondered,
years
.whether the super will
the strict criteria of damage area per dollar,..
be cheaper or more expensive than the fission bomb." The implication
was that A-bombs were a better bet.107
"The use of this weapon will
They raised deep moral objections.
human
of
innumerable
the
about
destruction
lives,"
they
bring
"It is not a weapon which can be used exclusively for the
asserted.
installations of military or semi-military pur
destruction of material
Its use therefore carries much further than the atomic bomb
poses.
itself the policy of exterminating civilian populations."108
The Super was evil and potentially genocidal,
they said?though,
that
acknowledged
Fermi, with Nobel
prize-winning
physicist Rabi,
Soviets
did
America would have to try to develop the weapon
z/the
so. Unilateral American
renunciation of the Super was too dangerous,
Fermi and Rabi
thought. Strangely, Fermi and Rabi never explained
it. Perhaps
why America needed the bomb if the Soviets developed
like some generals, the two physicists worried about the diplomatic
and psychological
effects, and not the military problems, of a Soviet
H-bomb monopoly.109
105.
106.
Ibid.
Lilienthal
107. GAC
108.
Ibid.
109.
Ibid.
(ref. 86),
report
581; manuscript
30 Oct
(with annexes),
Papers.
journal, Lilienthal
349, AEC
1949, AEC Doc.
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Records,
DOE.
THE ATOMIC BOMB
259
Fermi and Rabi did boldly suggest the possibility of seeking a
agreement, even without any control or inspection
of the weapon.
Since the Super could
against development
a test, and that test could be
without
probably not be developed
detected by the other power, Fermi and Rabi
believed
they were
offering a partial way out of the impasse on international control?at
In a chilling sentence, they also stressed that
least to block H-bombs.
America already had sufficient A-bombs
for military retaliation if the
or used a Super.110 Oppenheimer,
in contrast to
Soviets produced
1945 and argued
Fermi, returned fully to his position of September
that the H-bomb was both immoral and militarily unnecessary.
He
was joined by five other GAC
members
For
including Conant.
was
in late 1949, unilateral American
renunciation
Oppenheimer,
and desirable.111 Oppenheimer's
both appropriate
stated position on
Soviet-American
provisions,
the Super had shifted abruptly between October
21, when he told
Conant
it would be "folly" to oppose exploration of the bomb, and
to it.
October 30, when he joined Conant
in unconditional
opposition
At the weekend GAC meeting, Conant's hostility to the weapon
("over
my dead body," he had said earlier) probably liberated Oppenheimer
to take a firmmoral stand and to believe, briefly, in the possibility of
as Oppenheimer
In the GAC
the bomb.
deliberations,
blocking
an
recalled (in
interviewer's words), Conant had stressed "that a firm
could
be
stand
expected to meet with the approval of various groups,
churches."112
30
later, when looking back upon that October
Nearly a decade
a
in
that
had
GAC
said
mistake
he
made
report, Oppenheimer
going
lost his security clearance
along with it. By then, having
partly
to the H-bomb,
because
of his opposition
he remembered
that his
confidential secretary had been surprised by his position on October
30 and had (in the interviewer's words) "correctly predicted that this
would get him in a lot of trouble."113
was
But in late October
and early November
1949, Oppenheimer
was
a
was
about
James
So
Conant,
optimistic
powerful ally.
winning.
the usually
110.
Ibid.
111.
Ibid.
that it was
cautious
Well
Fermi,
after this
an unconditional
Conant
who
1949 report,
renunciation.
continued
to campaign
against
the
some
it, denying
"reinterpreted"
signatories
to Vannevar
26 Mar
Conant
Bush,
1954,
See Barton
J. Bernstein,
"The H-bomb
deci
Papers,
Pusey Library, Harvard.
et al., National
in Bernard
sions: Were
Brodie
they inevitable?,"
security and interna
tional stability (Cambridge,
Herbert York, The advisers
1983), 330-336;
(San Francisco,
to stop the H
and McGeorge
"The missed
chance
94-120;
1975), 41-75,
Bundy,
bomb," New York Review
112. Warner
Schilling,
113.
of Books, 29 (13 May
1982), 13.
"Interview with J. Robert Oppenheimer,"
Ibid.
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12 June
1957, OP.
BERNSTEIN
260
even scolding Teller for joining a "fascist like Lawrence"
in
H-bomb,
the push for the bomb.114 For Fermi, who as a recent immigrant
sometimes felt like a second-class citizen, such a campaign in the phy
sics community on a volatile political issue was unique and inspiring
to anti-H-bomb allies.115
and some of the H-bomb
have
opponents would
Oppenheimer
liked to carry their argument to the people, but Truman
imposed a
all public discussion.
As loyal advisers close to
not violate
and risk
the president's
directive
"gag-order" barring
power,
they would
recriminations.116
race and
and Fermi, hopeful of averting an H-bomb
Oppenheimer
a
for
the
did
Soviet-American
weapon,
eager
agreement prohibiting
a
rest
the
the
with
of
nuclear
American
propose,
GAC,
general
the development
of
buildup?the
production of more scarce materials,
atomic weapons,
and the creation of large atomic weapons.
to find a way out of the nuclear arms race, these men, unlike
were hoping to shift American
Lawrence,
strategy to counterforce,
rather than counter-city, targeting to make nuclear war less terrible.
they also thought that such a shift would enhance deter
Undoubtedly
rence by making the use of nuclear weapons more credible.117
that nuclear war was
Ironically, in 1945, all four men had believed
so terrible that itwould "blackmail"
nations into seeking peace. Now,
and Fermi were thinking
of such beliefs, Oppenheimer
despairing
about ways to manage war, to protect cities, and to make nuclear war
tactical
Unable
not apocalyptic.
in further building up
possible?but
They succeeded
and diversifying the nuclear arsenal, but they lost on the H-bomb.
When Truman publicly declared on January 31, 1950 that the United
States would vigorously seek to develop
the H-bomb,
Fermi and a
the new policy.
fell into line behind
very uneasy Oppenheimer
soon offered to resign, not in petulance or for principle,
Oppenheimer
but because
the administration might no longer want him. He was
encouraged to stay, and chose to remain.118
A year later, when Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam conceived of
a workable design for the Super, Oppenheimer
(according to his later
"When you see something
endorsed the quest.
claim) enthusiastically
114. Interview with Teller,
1975, who quoted Fermi;
1987.
terview with Teller,
as an immigrant,
115. On Fermi and his uneasiness
15 Apr 1954, OP.
mer,
116. On Oppenheimer's
NBC
program,
Roosevelt,
117.
GAC
43), 64-65.
118. AEC
report,
later muted
public
confirmed
see Berenice
statements,
see
in Peter Galison's
Brode
transcript
in
to Oppenhei
of Eleanor
12 Feb
30 Oct
1950, Lilienthal
Papers
(ref. 53).
to Oppenheimer,
3 Dec
1949; Fermi
(ref. 19), 83.
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1949,
in AEC
(ref.
THE ATOMIC BOMB
261
that is technically sweet, you go ahead and do it," he explained, "and
you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your
technical success."119 Under pressure from the Cold War and wanting
to retain influence in Washington,120
had been pushed
Oppenheimer
Science
should not be
into returning to the scientific imperative:
halted; knowledge is inherently good.
some H-bomb
with
But
uneasy
advocates,
Oppenheimer's
that
doubted
after Truman's
ambivalence
decision,
sincerely
even
Teller
the
for
after
the
the
quest
Super
supported
Oppenheimer
never helped
Ulam
breakthrough.
They knew that Oppenheimer
that Los Alamos
and
recruit the physicists
needed,
they even
him
Harold
Edward
of
Teller,
Urey,
suspected
impeding recruiting.
to the
not reappoint Oppenheimer
and others urged that Truman
in 1952 because
that he was still trying to block
GAC
they believed
development of the weapon.121
Enrico Fermi never evoked political
Unlike Oppenheimer,
suspi
H-bomb
cion or hostility. After Truman's
decision, Fermi seemed
to advise Los
He
continued
quietly to accept the official policy.
even providing valuable
counsel on thermonuclear
research,
Alamos,
of the
about the development
raise moral
questions
the questions
ceased for him soon after President
Perhaps
as the nation's highest authority, defined American
Truman,
policy.
later of the Korean
the onslaught five months
war, which
Probably
was widely interpreted as a Soviet-instigated
challenge to the West,
and
did
not
weapon.
made it easier for him to support the Super.122
more
removed from Washington,
In contrast, Arthur Compton,
even before
the H-bomb
had publicly endorsed the effort to develop
nor admitted great
never wavered
Truman's
decision.123 Compton
in other statements, Compton
"mass
condemned
uneasiness.
Yet,
destruction which
is aimed primarily at the lives of civilians
[and]
In offering this judgment, he was, unintentionally,
their morale."124
19), 81.
with Frank Oppenheimer.
to Truman,
2 June 1952, UP;
119. AEC(ref.
120. Interviews
to Sidney Sovers,
18 June
J. Edgar Hoover
121. Urey
J. Edgar Hoover
DC;
Files, FBI Records,
1952, Oppenheimer
Building, Washington,
See
Conant
9 May
1952, Conant
Papers,
Pusey Library, Harvard
University.
Diary,
12 (1982),
"In the matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer,"
J. Bernstein,
also Barton
HSPS,
231-236.
122.
L.A.-1150
17 Dec
123.
6 (Mar
124.
Fermi
and Ulam,
(still classified),
on
"Considerations
Los
Alamos,
1985, copy, courtesy of Segre.
the people decide,"
"Let
Compton,
1950), 74-75.
thermonuclear
summarized
briefly
his 29 Jan
1950
26
reactions,"
in E.M.
Sandoval
statement
1950,
Sep
to Segre,
reprinted
in BAS,
of Christ press release,
of the Churches
Council
(signatory), Federated
in
"How
see Compton,
Also
1950, ACP.
peace with the hydrogen
bomb?,"
to use the A-bomb
in the
For Compton's
ed.
wanting
Johnston,
(ref. 11), 323-328;
see K.D. Nichols, Road
to Trinity (New York,
Korean War,
1987), on 291.
Compton
27 Nov
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BERNSTEIN
262
as well as
the atomic bombings of 1945 (terror bombings)
opposing
what then seemed the most likely military purpose of the H-bomb
(kil
in a moral quandary
that he had long
ling non-combatants).
Caught
in ways
sought to avoid, he was undercutting his own earlier positions
that he himself failed to recognize.
It was a dilemma
that would also
ensnare others in the strange new world of nuclear weapons.
4. DECISIONS
AND DILEMMAS
to save their world
the Manhattan
for
Project
Having
joined
humane values and to demonstrate
the value of science to the state,
the use of
and Oppenheimer
endorsed
Fermi, Lawrence,
Compton,
on Japan to save American
to
the world
make
atomic weapons
lives,
and to compel people and
face the "facts" of this horrible weapon,
nations to seek peace. As leaders and physicists, they helped establish
the new relationship between science and the state. As the quest for
international control of atomic energy collapsed,
they became archi
tects of deterrence?sometimes
with different hopes for arms control,
the arms race, and different judg
different views on how to manage
ments on what nuclear weapons America needed in the Cold War.
They were decidedly different men, and they sometimes responded
differently to the postwar challenges, but all endorsed the postwar alli
ance between physics and the state. Fermi, though opposing
the H
bomb in late 1949, was usually not given to open reflection and was
even more
Lawrence,
perhaps
normally quiet on moral matters.
than was Fermi, came comfortably in the
intolerant of ambivalence
effort to stay far ahead in the
postwar years to support the American
nuclear arms race and ultimately to push for the Super. Compton,
a religious Presbyterian,
his
struggled to harmonize
self-consciously
and ended in moral quan
Christianity with his counsel on weapons,
that he did not recognize.
often the most
Oppenheimer,
ambivalent, was in these years also the most politically powerful of the
for a course that he neither
four, serving as an adviser toWashington
he hinted at his agony but he
liked nor could forsake. Periodically,
was reluctant to abandon power and unable to resolve the problem.
the scientists had created they could not ultimately control.
What
in his rhythmic, elliptical
best
Perhaps
Oppenheimer,
language,
expressed their plight when he said in 1947, "In some sort of crude
sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no overstatement can quite extin
guish, the physicists have known sin; and this is a knowledge which
daries
they cannot
lose."125 Lawrence
125. Oppenheimer,
"Physics
1947
copy of speech of 25 Nov
characteristically
in the contemporary
world,"
of the article), in GP.
dismissed
BAS,
(source
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Oppenhei
4 (March
1948),
66;
THE ATOMIC BOMB
263
"I am a physicist and I have no knowledge
to lose in
which physics has caused me to know sin."126
Oppenheimer
angered some of his fellow physicists with his words
about sin.127 Seeming to suggest by those words a guilt that he never
for the many thousands killed at Hiroshima
explicitly acknowledged
and Nagasaki,
years later explained what he had meant:
Oppenheimer
"I didn't mean by [sin] the deaths that were caused as a result of our
work. I meant that we had known the sin of pride. We had turned to
mer's words:
effect in what proved to be a [major] way the course of man's history.
We had the pride of thinking we knew what was good for man, and I
do think it had left a mark on many of those who were responsibly
engaged. This is not the natural business of a scientist ,"128
well knew, it had indeed become
the cus
But, as Oppenheimer
would
say, "the natural business"?for
many
tomary activity?some
elite and rank-and-file physicists in the post-Hiroshima
years. Their
work and advice on weapons were essential to the growth, improve
nuclear arsenal.129 They would be
ment, and legitimation of America's
condemned or celebrated as a "new priesthood" with great power, but
as men whose
perhaps more
correctly they should be viewed
a
sense
and
them
of power but little capacity
expertise gave
knowledge
to alter the direction of the postwar arms race. They shaped the menu
some
of technological-scientific
from which policymakers,
possibilities
times including the president himself, selected the weapons
deemed
necessary for American
foreign policy.
Some would view this new arrangement for science as a "Faustian
and others as science and scientists rightly serving demo
bargain,"
Some would
and nuclear weaponry,
argue that deterrence
were
a
their
lamentable
despite
liabilities,
necessity, and others that
both the strategy and the bomb were evil. Such arguments were a pro
found part of the experience of Oppenheimer,
and
Fermi, Lawrence,
course
in
who
charted
their
the
"new
world"
of
uneasy
Compton,
some
What
nuclear weaponry.
would
celebrate,
they helped create,
some would condemn, many would rue, and perhaps some would both
rue and celebrate.
cracy.
126. Childs
(ref. 1), 405.
127.
Freman
128.
Transcript
Dyson, Disturbing
of CBS
evening
the universe
(New York,
1979), 52-53.
interview with Oppenheimer,
5 Aug
1965, OP;
8 Aug
"Com
Magazine,
1965, 8; and Groves,
news
in New York Times
cf., Oppenheimer
ments on the Oppenheimer
in the New York Times,"
10 Mar
obituary
1967, GP.
129. For fears about the future of Los Alamos
if new nuclear weapons
were not being
see N.E.
to T.H.
Lawrence
21 Nov
and Herbert
devised,
Johnson,
1955, LP;
York,
weapons,
Making
talking peace
(New York,
1987), 75-78.
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