Book Reviews 293 often unclear what those convictions were. C ads

Book Reviews
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often unclear what those convictions were. C a d s disposition to segregate moral concerns from practical politics, while sometimes an
asset, was certainly also his greatest weakness. Statesmanship does
not reside only in political expediency. Many in C a d s own party
who looked for forthright principled stands on issues from banking
to slavery despised and distrusted him. Lewis Cass went along to
get along. Whether that best fits him for obscurity or renown, praise
or obloquy, is something readers can judge for themselves.
DANIELFELLER is associate professor of history, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. He is the author o f The Jacksonian Promise: America, 1815-1840 (1995).
James Buchanan and the Political Crisis of the 1850s. Edited by
Michael J. Birkner. (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1996. Pp. 215. Illustrations, notes, select bibliography, index. $29.50.)
This monograph emerged from a symposium held at Franklin
and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, marking the bicentennial of James Buchanan’s birth. It contains several articles and
a panel discussion exploring the career of Pennsylvania’s only president. It will appeal almost exclusively to political historians who
study the 1850s. There are, for example, only fleeting references to
contemporary Indianians such as Jesse D. Bright.
Michael J . Birkner introduces the historical debate swirling
around Buchanan’s presidency. He notes that Philip S. Klein’s sympathetic biography (President James Buchanan: A Biography, 1962)
stands in stark contrast to the assessment of most historians, including the contributors to this volume. Setting the stage, Birkner castigates Buchanan for his mismanagement of the Dred Scott case and
“Bleeding Kansas” and concludes that he was “a canny wheelerdealer” (p. 25) undone by the pressures of the White House.
Michael F. Holt, influential author of The Political Crisis of the
1850s (1978), surveys the election of 1856 and claims that it could
have been much closer. Holt argues that John C. Fremont, the first
Republican presidential candidate, was irreparably damaged in the
three-way race by rumors that he was a Catholic. The American
party or “Know-Nothing”nominee, Millard Fillmore, failed spectacularly in his effort t o gain the votes of conservative Whigs and
Democrats. The heated national debates over the Lecompton (Kansas)
Constitution and the nomination of Buchanan, who drew the united
support of southern and northern Democrats, scuttled Fillmore. This
pivotal canvass was the last for both the Whigs and Know-Nothings
and presaged the Republican triumph of 1860.
Peter B. Knupfer depicts Buchanan as “a typical member of the
Jacksonian political generation’’ (p. 152) who was morally obtuse
regarding slavery. Buchanan’s ostracism of fellow Democrat Stephen
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A. Douglas and his heavy-handed patronage policies further alienated
“young, new voters’’ (p. 164). Although readers may quibble about
whether Republicans employed “new techniques” (p. 165) in their
probes of Democratic corruption, Knupfer forcefully contends that
the election of 1860 was a repudiation of “old fogyism” (p. 166).
Mark W. Summers and Robert E. May investigate distinct issues
relating to Buchanan’s administration. Summers portrays a bumbling president unable to control the Democratic press, which turned
increasingly toward Douglas during the Kansas controversy. May
contrastingly commends Buchanan’s diplomacy, particularly his handling of southern filibusterers such as William Walker, the erstwhile
conqueror of Nicaragua. May convincingly asserts that, in this case
at least, Buchanan did not take the proslavery path.
Buchanan and his successor, Abraham Lincoln, are the focus
of the article by William E. Gienapp. In every category Lincoln’s leadership skills are judged superior. Gienapp dismisses Buchanan’s
“reckless foreign policy” (p. 105) and declares that “few presidents
have done more in four years to bring the opposing party to power”
(p. 120). It is not surprising that Lincoln has outshone Buchanan; a
more apt comparison would have been between Buchanan and his
predecessor, Franklin Pierce.
The discussion featuring Don E. Fehrenbacher, Robert W.
Johannsen, Elbert B. Smith, and Kenneth M. Stampp manifests the
disparate opinions held within the historical discipline regarding
Buchanan. Fehrenbacher emphasizes Buchanan’s meddling in the
Dred Scott decision, which exacerbated the schism among Democrats.
Significantly, he also credits the Buchanan administration with
actively suppressing the African slave trade. Johannsen questions
the efficacy of studies confined to narrow aspects of Buchanan’s career
and calls for further research into the president’s motivations and
ideology. He cogently places Buchanan within the context of his times;
the Pennsylvanian was a constitutional unionist who believed that
moralistic agitation of the slavery issue would destroy the Union.
Johannsen also stresses that President Buchanan ultimately stood
firm during the secession crisis, a stand that allowed for a smooth transition with the Lincoln administration despite the creation of the
Confederacy. Smith censures Buchanan for failing to comprehend
the significance of the free-soil movement, thus indirectly bolstering
Republican chances in 1860. Stampp retells Buchanan’s bungling
regarding patronage and Kansas but joins Johannsen in praising his
conduct during the secession crisis.
This slim volume will not rehabilitate Buchanan’s political reputation-nor was it intended t o do so. It does, however, add modestly to an understanding of his presidency and underscores the need
for further study.
WILLARD
CARL KLUNDER,
associate professor of history at Wichita State University,
Wichita, Kansas, is the author of Lewis Cuss and the Politics ofModerution (1996).