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Crisis Narratives and the Role of Government: Comparing
Ronald Reagan’s and Barack Obama’s National
Convention Addresses
James T. Petre
The U.S. American elections of 1980 and 2008 both occurred during times of
crisis and often drew comparisons to one another during the 2008 campaign.
As candidates delivering their respective National Convention Nomination
Acceptance Addresses, Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama constructed crisis
narratives that blamed the ongoing crisis on the opposing party, and
presented a vision of how, as president, each would lead the nation out of the
crisis. Explored here is how both candidates’ construction of crisis
narratives worked to situate campaign issues in favorable terms and invited
a reconsideration of the relationship between citizens and their government.
You never want a serious crisis to go to waste; and what I mean by that is it’s
an opportunity to do things that you think you could not do before.
-Rahm Emanuel
T
he U.S. American elections of 1980 and 2008 occurred
during times of crisis and often drew comparisons to one
another throughout the 2008 campaign and its aftermath (Chait,
2008; Harwood, 2008; Klein, 2008; Vanden Heuvel, 2008; Will,
2008). There are a number of similarities between the two elections.
Each took place while an unpopular president held office, economic
conditions were unfavorable, and U.S. standing in the world had
diminished compared to years past. In 1980, former Governor Ronald
Reagan defeated President Jimmy Carter, an unpopular incumbent. In
2008, Senator Barack Obama defeated Senator John McCain, whom
he often tied to the unpopular President George W. Bush.1
According to Dionne (2008), “a good politician triumphs by
adapting to the times and taking advantage of opportunities as they
come. A great politician anticipates openings others don’t see and
creates opportunities that were not there” (p. 1). Stuckey (2008)
claims “presidents who recreate coalitions—who fundamentally alter
the ways in which voters understand the political process—are those
who are most likely to be remembered as ‘great,’” and elections of
such presidents will later be seen as realigning (p. 321). These
elections “are marked by the exhaustion of one set of issues and the
rise of another” (p. 321). Reagan and Obama are able to create
opportunities for realignment by presenting views different from the
James T. Petre (Ph.D. Southern Illinois University Carbondale) is an
Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication Studies at
Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania. Correspondence should be
addressed to [email protected].
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prevailing assumptions of their respective political contexts. 2 The
elections of 1980 and 2008 were ideological bookends: 1980 signaled
the end of the New Deal coalition, and the 2008 election ushered in
the end of Reaganism. While it is early to tell whether or not
Obama’s presidency will be realigning, it is significant to note that
Obama is the first Democratic president since Franklin Delano
Roosevelt to be elected and re-elected with over fifty percent of the
vote. In an interesting historical twist of fate, Reagan was the last
Republican president to accomplish this achievement.
In convention addresses to their party’s membership, candidates
Reagan and Obama construct crisis narratives attributing causes of
ongoing crises to the opposing party, and argue that as president each
would respectively lead the nation out of crisis. Reagan declares that
the “American spirit” is threatened by the Carter administration.
Obama, the first African American presidential candidate to claim a
major party nomination, states the “American promise” is in danger
due to the Bush administration’s policies. Both candidates’ crisis
narratives invite a reconsideration of the relationship between
government and the people. The main source of these crises is
economic, but foreign policy and an unbalanced tension between
energy production and environmental conservation are also factors in
both cases.
In this essay, I consider how these rhetors use the rhetorical
structures of crisis narratives to advocate a transformation of the role
of government. I argue that the candidates construct crisis narratives
based on three specific themes: providing evidence of the existence
of a crisis, identifying the causes of the crisis, and presenting a vision
for solving the crisis. In what follows, I discuss the critical moves
and assumptions necessary for narrative-based rhetorical criticism of
political speeches, explain the rhetorical structures of crisis
narratives, investigate the candidate’s speeches as crisis narratives,
and reflect on the implications of these findings. This comparison
fosters a stronger understanding of how presidential candidates use
crisis narratives to influence perceptions of what the proper role of
government should be.
Elections of 1980 and 2008
In order to understand the context of the 1980 election, it is
important to study previous election years and the coalitions that
emerged. The New Deal, which began under the Franklin Delano
Roosevelt administration and continued in the years to follow, was
often (though not always) rooted in a Keynesian approach to
economics, with a greater role for government in shaping economic
policy (Phillips, 2006; Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998). This so-called
New Deal coalition existed throughout the 1930s until the 1970s. It
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began to break apart when Southern Democrats left the party as
“Dixiecrats” between the 1940s and 1960s, and emerged as
Republicans by the time Richard Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” of
1968 took shape (Stout, 2007, p. 1). Although he voted for Roosevelt
each of the four times he ran for president (Emery, 2009), Reagan
became a Republican in 1962, stating “I didn’t leave the Democratic
Party…the party left me” (Milbank, 2011, p. 1). Reagan (1964)
famously delivered a speech (officially called “A Time for
Choosing”) in support of Republican presidential nominee Barry
Goldwater during the 1964 campaign, taking aim at what he
perceived to be a shift toward socialism and appeasement by Lyndon
Johnson’s administration.3 The popularity of Reagan’s speech made
him “a hero to conservatives” and helped propel him to California’s
governorship in 1966 (Broder, 2008, p. 2).
Concurrently, a group of former Democratic intellectuals,
identified as “neoconservatives” (Vaïsse, 2009, p. 2) left the
Democratic Party during the 1960s and 1970s.4 Many
neoconservatives were “Cold War liberals” who believed the “New
Left” had seized control of the Democratic Party with George
McGovern’s nomination in 1972 (Vaïsse, 2009, pp. 1-2). After the
neoconservatives’ chosen candidate Henry “Scoop” Jackson lost the
nomination again, to Carter in 1976, the die was cast: Democrats had
lost the once-strong support of the South as well as the “Old Left”
intellectuals (Vaïsse, 2009). This brewing realignment came to a
head in 1980 when southerners, neoconservatives, and other “Reagan
Democrats” joined Republicans to support Reagan’s bid for the
White House.
By the time of the 1980 election Carter was unpopular with
conservatives, newly-emergent neoconservatives, and even many
liberals. The long-held assumptions of Keynesian economics were
challenged as the country experienced stagflation (i.e., simultaneous
economic recession and inflation). By this point, the economic
structure undergirding the New Deal had ruptured. A “backlash”
against the liberalism of the past generation brewed, and then
overflowed with an electoral victory for Reagan (and for supply-side
economics) (Uchitelle, 2008). A new coalition supporting low taxes,
limited government, and an aggressive national defense took shape.
As the economic boom of the 1990s continued, more and more
Democrats (including Bill Clinton) joined Republicans and supported
supply-side measures such as tax cuts for corporations, increased
privatization, and expansive deregulation.5 In effect, “Reaganomics”
had become basic economics. Cuts in government programs and
privatization continued throughout the 1990s and into the George W.
Bush administration.
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The Bush administration expanded Reagan’s assumptions
regarding economic and foreign policy by throwing them into
overdrive. However, by 2008 Reagan’s call for low taxes, a limited
government, and strong national defense became harder to support in
the face of an unpopular war, economic recession, and the largest
disparity between rich and poor since the 1920s (Krugman, 2007).
The unraveling of Reaganism during the Bush administration
mimicked the disbanding of the New Deal coalition during the Carter
administration. A new candidate—who also launched his national
political career with a rousing presidential campaign endorsement
speech (Obama, 2004)—advocated a fundamental rethinking of the
prevailing economic and political paradigm. As Reagan did in 1980,
Obama presented an alternative to the underlying sociopolitical
assumptions of 2008. He rejected deregulation and privatization, and
supported a greater role for diplomacy in foreign affairs. Some
pundits saw Obama’s 2008 campaign as a referendum on
conservatism (Chait, 2008; Vanden Heuvel, 2008) and, more
specifically, on Reaganism itself (Harwood, 2008; Klein, 2008).
Obama’s campaign began as a movement against the entrenched
thinking within both political parties, and gained support from
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents, just as Reagan did in
1980 (Klein, 2008). In both election years, Reagan and Obama
emphasize that the issue is not just changing leaders, but challenging
fundamental assumptions regarding the role of government. Each of
their speeches is explored as political crisis narratives.
Rhetorical Criticism of Political Narratives
According to Foss (2004), “narratives organize the stimuli of
our experience so that we can make sense of the people, places,
events, and actions of our lives” (p. 333). Within communication
research, narrative criticism is often identified as a form of rhetorical
criticism in which a critic approaches a text as narrative, and
narrative as text. Hart and Daughton (2005) present five assumptions
regarding narratives: “1. Narrative occurs in a natural timeline...2.
Narrative includes characterization...3. Narrative presents detail...4.
Narrative is primitive...5. Narrative doesn't argue...obviously” (p.
89). In other words, stories have an order, and involve characters and
details; narrative serves a basic need within us as humans. Finally,
and most importantly, narrative has immanent rhetorical power
precisely because audiences often do not expect it to be persuasive. A
rhetorical critic investigating a narrative assumes humans perceive
social reality through narrative, thus illuminating the rhetorical power
narratives hold in shaping, and being shaped by, our shared realities.
A narrative-based approach to rhetorical criticism is often
associated with Fisher’s (1984) “narrative paradigm.” According to
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Fisher, “the narrative paradigm…can be considered [as] a dialectical
synthesis of two traditional strands in the history of rhetoric: the
argumentative, persuasive theme, and the literary, aesthetic theme”
(p. 2). Fisher’s description of the narrative paradigm assumes:
(1) humans are essentially storytellers; (2) the paradigmatic
mode of human decision-making and communication is “good
reasons” which vary in form among communication situations,
genres, and media; (3) the production and practice of good
reasons is ruled by matters of history, biography, culture, and
character along with the kinds of forces identified in the Frentz
and Farrell language action paradigm; (4) rationality is
determined by the nature of persons as narrative beings—their
inherent awareness of narrative probability, what constitutes a
coherent story, and their constant habit of testing narrative
fidelity, whether the stories they experience ring true with the
stories they know to be true in their lives...; and (5) the world is
a set of stories which must be chosen among to live the good
life in a process of continual recreation. (Fisher, 1984, pp. 7-8)
The narrative paradigm stands in marked contrast to the “rational
world paradigm” (p. 4), which is based on decontextualized forms of
rationality. The narrative paradigm is rooted in “[t]he idea of human
beings as storytellers” and suggests “symbols are created and
communicated ultimately as stories” designed to “give order to
human experience and to induce others to dwell in them to establish
ways of living in common, in communities in which there is sanction
for the story that constitutes one's life” (p. 6). Fisher’s argument
constituted an important turn for the study of rhetoric; using the
narrative paradigm, a critic is interested in how rhetors make use of
stories to create “good reasons” for accepting a situated point of
view.
Critics exploring the rhetoric of narratives see narratives as
more than just a story. Narratives provide a backdrop for our
experiences and lead us to identify with particular narratives more
than others. Our lives are shaped in and through those narratives with
which we choose to identify. Narrative critics focus on narratives to
gain insight into broader cultural understandings by investigating
stories a rhetor tells. In other words, analyzing how a narrative is
situated provides insight into how a particular rhetor sees and
presents the world to others.
Rhetorical critics using narrative criticism have focused on
narratives presented in texts to explore diverse topics (e.g., Atkinson,
2003; Callahan, 2005; Smith, 1988). Importantly, many rhetorical
critics explore narrative components of political speeches (Lewis,
1987; Rushing, 1986; West & Carey, 2006) as well as campaign
videos (Novak, 1997; Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 1996). For
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example, Lewis (1987) argued Reagan himself makes use of
narrative form in his rhetoric. Rushing (1986) explored Reagan’s
“Star Wars” speech and argued that it “encapsulates technical
reasoning within a myth which creates the illusion of both preserving
science and transcending its transgressions” (p. 416). Rushing’s work
also provides a link between mythic and narrative criticism.
Novak (1997) examined the narrative of Bill Clinton’s 1996
biography video in contrast to “the man from Hope,” his biography
from the 1992 campaign. Rowland and Jones (2007) considered how
Obama's 2004 Democratic National Convention Keynote Address
functions as a romantic narrative. Darsey (2009) discussed how
Obama’s campaign rhetoric invites audiences to join him on a
journey. Exploring political texts as narratives invites new
possibilities for understanding how rhetorical situations call for
particular narratives that both constitute and respond to various
political and social contexts.
In sum, rhetorical critics investigating narrative explore how
narratives carry rhetorical weight, or indicate broader assumptions
within a particular culture. Critics may also examine how texts fall
into narrative categories or follow narrative genres. Investigating the
rhetoric of political narratives, Reagan’s and Obama’s respective
presidential nomination acceptance addresses are approached as
stories of a nation in crisis, and reveal each candidate provided a
hopeful vision for the future. The existence of crisis in both occasions
calls forth further discussion on the rhetorical uses of crisis
narratives.
Crisis Narratives
“Crisis” is a focus of study for scholars throughout the
communication discipline. With regard to rhetorical studies, Dow
(1989) argued:
1) study of crisis discourse should be informed by an
understanding of the differing exigencies that give rise to it, 2)
different crisis situations call for different rhetorical responses,
and 3) the most fruitful way for critics to analyze crisis rhetoric
is to begin with an understanding of how the rhetoric functions
to respond to the exigence created by the situation. (p. 295)
Dow contended that Windt’s (1983) foundational study of crisis
rhetoric only considers crises “as rhetorical creations” (p. 296). Dow
suggested critics also explore “situations in which the President
responds to events already seen as serious, even critical, as well as
those in which the President attempts to create a crisis to gain support
for policy” (p. 296).
Scholarship on crisis rhetoric often centers on how presidents
rhetorically construct and/or respond to crisis situations (Bostdorff,
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1994; Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986; Dow, 1989; Griffin, 1994; Windt,
1983; Wolfe, 2007). For example, Bostdorff (1994) investigated
presidential responses to crisis specifically in relation to foreign
policy. Dow (1989) argued that presidential crisis rhetoric takes the
form of epideictic or deliberative rhetoric, in differing degrees based
on the situation and context. Wolfe (2007) analyzed how George W.
Bush used a rhetoric of foreign policy crisis to enact a rhetoric of
security for environmental policy. Although these authors focused on
crisis rhetoric presented by a rhetor who is currently president, the
current work extends this conversation by exploring how presidential
candidates rhetorically construct and respond to crisis situations
through the use of crisis narratives. Narrative is an effective way to
rhetorically construct a crisis because “the public in crisis situations
may well feel disoriented and frightened,” and thus “since every
story has an ending as well as a beginning, to begin a story is to
imply that it will come to an end” (Griffin, 1994, p. 139).
Heath (2004), in arguing for a rhetorical approach to crisis
communication, identified the importance of “telling a story” as an
effective public relations response to crisis situations. Heath argued
that crisis narratives involve an explanation of “why the narrative has
changed from routine to crisis, who or what is responsible for that
change, and what will be done to resolve the narrative” (p. 168). In
other words, a respondent to a crisis situation presents evidence that a
crisis exists, gives reasons for the crisis, and offers solutions to the
crisis. Heath’s three-part formulation provides the basis for analysis
here of crisis narratives present in Reagan’s and Obama’s speeches.
Ideally, a response to a crisis should flow from “routine narrative, to
crisis narrative, and back to routine narrative” (Heath, 2004, p. 168).
Crisis narratives are important because they “[set] into place [an
organization’s] past, its present, and perhaps most important its
future” (Heath, p. 168). Thus, although narratives may not appear to
be rhetorical (Hart & Daughton, 2005), this is precisely what allows a
rhetor to use narrative to set a context for past, present, and future
actions. While a presidential candidate differs from a public relations
spokesperson, he or she acts as a spokesperson for his or her party’s
point of view. In this way, Reagan and Obama each speak for
alternative ways of governing.
Milligan and Binns’s (2007) definition of crisis narratives in
relation to environmental communication connects with Heath’s
(2004) approach. They described crisis narratives as “accounts of an
existing or impending disaster that have a somewhat predetermined
beginning, middle, and conclusion, and that involve individuals or
groups which are either unable or unwilling to influence the direction
of events” (Milligan & Binns, 2007, p. 144). In the cases of Reagan
and Obama, both candidates argue the current president and his party
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are “unable” as well as “unwilling to influence the direction of
events.” The characterization of crisis narratives Heath (2004) and
Milligan and Binns (2007) provide are evident in both candidates’
speeches and these crisis narratives work to invite audiences to
reconsider the relationship between citizens and their government.
Ronald Reagan, Barack Obama, and the
Role of Government
A presidential nomination address provides a unique rhetorical
opportunity for a political candidate. He or she introduces him or
herself officially to the nation as a major party candidate, and has an
opportunity to explain his or her “campaign themes and issues”
(Trent & Friedenberg, 2012, p. 62). The nomination speech is a story
of where the country is now, where it has been, and where it is going.
The elections of 1980 and 2008 both occurred during times of
economic crisis, and the convention speeches given by the major
party candidates reflect it. How Reagan and Obama use crisis
narratives as a rhetorical structure to “[set] into place” the nation’s
past, present, and future (Heath, 2004, p. 168) are explored.
In their respective convention speeches, Reagan and Obama tell
a similar story of a nation in crisis. Reagan situates his crisis
narrative by warning that an entrepreneurial “American spirit” is in
danger of being extinguished by Carter’s bureaucratic policies.
Obama’s narrative focuses on how a social contract known as the
“American promise” is being threatened by Bush’s “ownership
society.” Reagan (1980) says “let us pledge to restore, in our time,
the American spirit of voluntary service, of cooperation, of private
and community initiative; a spirit that flows like a deep and mighty
river through the history of our nation” (p. 4). Obama (2008)
describes the “American promise” as “a promise that says each of us
has the freedom to make of our own lives what we will, but that we
also have obligations to treat each other with dignity and respect” (p.
5).6 Reagan’s and Obama’s addresses follow the rhetorical structure
of crisis narratives discussed above: they provide evidence of a crisis,
present causes of the crisis, and offer solutions to the crisis.
Evidence of a Crisis: An “Unprecedented Calamity” vs. a
“Failure to Respond”
Each candidate acknowledges the existence of crisis early on.
For example, Reagan states:
Never before in our history have Americans been called upon to
face three grave threats to our very existence, any one of which
could destroy us. We face a disintegrating economy, a
weakened defense, and an energy policy based on the sharing of
scarcity. (p. 2)
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Such a statement clearly sets a context for crisis. Despite having
faced crises such as a Civil War, two World Wars and a Great
Depression, the policies of the Carter administration are presented as
an unprecedented threat to the nation. While both candidates blame
their political opponents as the cause of a crisis, this is especially true
in Reagan’s speech. Shortly following the above passage, Reagan
declares “the major issue of this campaign is the direct political,
personal, and moral responsibility of Democratic Party leadership, in
the White House and in the Congress, for this unprecedented
calamity which has befallen us” (pp. 2-3). Reagan’s narrative
placement of himself as the “hero” (and Carter and his fellow
Democrats as “villains”) involves a clear combination of the first two
themes of crisis narratives: stating that a crisis exists, and providing a
rationale for the cause. Since audiences often do not universally
acknowledge the causes (or even the existence) of a crisis, Reagan
has an opportunity to present his view of the crisis as the sole,
legitimate way to understand it. Yet, his narrative also needs to
demonstrate narrative probability and narrative fidelity (Fisher,
1984). Had Reagan been the only person criticizing Carter for “this
unprecedented calamity,” audiences might not have found his story
believable. However, a majority of citizens were unhappy with the
Carter administration by July 1980,7 and Reagan’s characterization of
Carter’s response to the crisis invites audiences to join Reagan in
viewing the crisis from such a vantage point.
One difference between Reagan and Obama is that Reagan’s
narrative presents the crisis of 1980 as an “unprecedented calamity”
threatening the “American spirit” while Obama’s narrative presents
the crisis of 2008 as another “defining moment”: an opportunity to
restore the “American promise.” For example, Obama states “for two
hundred and thirty two years” U.S. Americans have “found the
courage” to preserve and extend this promise (p. 2). Obama goes on
to argue that “we meet at one of those defining moments, a moment
when our nation is at war, our economy is in turmoil, and the
American promise has been threatened once more” (p. 2). While
Reagan always ties any reference of the crisis to Carter and outside
forces, Obama’s speech differs in how he blames his opponents in a
more nuanced manner:
Tonight, more Americans are out of work and are working
harder for less. More of you have lost your homes and even
more are watching your home values plummet. More of you
have cars you can’t afford to drive, credit cards, bills you can’t
afford to pay, and tuition that’s beyond your reach.
These challenges are not all of government’s making. But the
failure to respond is a direct result of a broken politics in
Washington and the failed policies of George W. Bush. (p. 2)
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The difference between Reagan and Obama is subtle, but important.
Reagan does not qualify his blame for Carter or Democrats; blame
lies squarely on their shoulders. Obama, on the other hand, qualifies
his charge by blaming the “broken politics in Washington,” but he
still holds Bush accountable for his “failure to respond” to these
challenges (i.e., the current crisis). In Reagan’s narrative, Carter and
the Democrats are the clear villains; in Obama’s narrative, George
W. Bush (and his fellow Republicans) play the role of the villain, but
by implication rather than direct accusation.
Another difference between the two narratives lies in how
Obama offers descriptive examples of a nation in crisis. After
proclaiming “America, we are better than these last eight years” (p.
2), Obama states:
This country is more decent than one where a woman in Ohio,
on the brink of retirement, finds herself one illness away from
disaster after a lifetime of hard work.
We’re a better country than one where a man in Indiana has to
pack up the equipment that he’s worked on for twenty years and
watch as it’s shipped off to China, and then chokes up as he
explains how he felt like a failure when he went home to tell his
family the news.
We are more compassionate than a government that lets
veterans sleep on our streets and families slide into
poverty…that sits on its hands while a major American city
drowns before our eyes. (pp. 2-3)
Obama’s narrative focuses on the struggles of everyday heroes,
indicting the government as a villain for doing nothing (i.e., failing to
respond) as these struggles continue. This passage is important
because Reagan was also known to use examples of everyday heroes
in his speeches, although he does not do so in the present analysis.
This is also an instance in which Obama and Reagan both share
something in common: the rhetorical presentation of the government
as the villain. An important difference between the two presentations,
as previously noted, is that Reagan places blame squarely on Carter’s
shoulders, while Obama often blames Bush by implication. Obama’s
use of “We are a better country” clearly indicts the Bush
administration, but it also calls on all citizens to work to make the
country better. Obama’s descriptive examples also assist in narrative
probability and narrative fidelity (Fisher, 1984) because it is likely
that audiences will identify with at least one of the situations he
describes, finding it to be a coherent and believable contextualization
of the crisis.
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Causes of a Crisis: (Carter’s) “Economic Stew” vs.
(Bush’s) “Ownership Society”
In addition to providing evidence that a crisis exists, Reagan
and Obama both offer their interpretation of the causes of the crisis.
Reagan quotes Abraham Lincoln’s speculation that “no
Administration…can seriously injure the Government in the short
space of four years” and opines “If Mr. Lincoln could see what’s
happened in the last three and a half years, he might hedge a little on
that statement” (p. 4). Here, again, Reagan blames Carter for the
current crisis to the degree that Carter’s alleged failings are
unprecedented in the history of presidential leadership. While Reagan
charges Carter with unprecedented failure, he argues that “we still
have time to use our renewed compact to overcome the injuries that
have been done to America these past three and a half years” (p. 4).
Reagan thus presents the Carter administration as the cause of these
“injuries” (i.e., an enemy within). Although both Reagan and Obama
present the government (specifically, the opposing party) as the
“villain,” Reagan is much more direct in his placing of blame: it is
not only that Carter failed to respond to the crisis effectively, but he
himself is the crisis.
Reagan further explains his views of the major cause of crisis:
…we must overcome something the present Administration has
cooked up—a new and altogether indigestible economic stew:
one part inflation, one part high unemployment, one part
recession, one part runaway taxes, one part deficit spending,
seasoned with an energy crisis. It’s an economic stew that has
turned the national stomach. (p. 4)
Reagan once again combines his description of the crisis with blame
for Carter. Accusing Carter of “cooking up” inflation, high
unemployment, recession, etc. implies that Carter caused these
problems (i.e., such things would not be happening if Carter were not
president), and suggests Carter somehow takes pleasure in “feeding”
Americans this stew. In Reagan’s story, the U.S. had been going
strong since its founding and was only interrupted in 1977—when
Carter became president—and now the nation faces possible
destruction.
Not only does Reagan identify Carter as the cause of the crisis,
he states “all we hear from those in positions of leadership are the
same tired proposals for more Government tinkering, more meddling,
and more control—all of which led us to this sorry state in the first
place” (p. 5). In this way, Reagan’s positioning fits with Milligan and
Binns’s (2007) description of crisis narratives, as the Carter
administration is portrayed as both “unable” and “unwilling to
effectively respond to the crisis” (p. 144). Carter’s perceived failures
(not to mention his low approval numbers at the time Reagan gave
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his address) allow Reagan to usurp Carter’s leadership role and
present himself as “responder in chief.” Reagan implies that Carter is
not really interested in helping the country as a whole, but just wants
to “play” with more programs—tinkering and meddling in other
people’s business. Reagan’s use of “tinkering” and “meddling” is
also an implicit reference to his repeated criticism of New Deal
liberalism as central planning.8
Obama presents more examples indicating that a crisis exists,
but he makes far fewer direct arguments as to what the causes of the
crisis are. One reason could be the fact that Reagan ran directly
against Carter, so identifying Carter as a cause of crisis would be
more important. Obama ran against John McCain, not Bush, and so
Obama had the added step of tying McCain to Bush. In Obama’s
narrative, Bush is at fault for not responding effectively and thus is
worsening the crisis. While Obama does not blame McCain for
causing the crisis, Obama implies that McCain will not be able to
effectively lead the nation forward.
Another reason for this difference in explaining the causes of
the crisis could be the imbalances in popularity between Carter and
Bush. In the summer of 1980, Carter was not a popular president, but
he did not have the lengthy and widespread unpopularity George W.
Bush had from 2005-2008, in which his approval rating never topped
fifty percent after May 2005 (“Presidential Approval Ratings—
George W. Bush,” 2013). Thus, Obama has less of a need to blame
Bush as a cause of the crisis; he just needs to invoke Bush’s name. A
case in point is when Obama asks of John McCain “what does it say
about your judgment when you think George Bush has been right
ninety percent of the time” (p. 3)? While less direct and polemical
than Reagan, Obama constructs his political opposition as an implicit
threat to the “American promise.” For example, Obama states “this
moment, this election is our chance to keep, in the 21st century, the
American promise alive” (p. 3), a “promise” threatened because the
Republicans who “brought you two terms of George Bush and Dick
Cheney will ask this country for a third. And we are here…because
we love this country too much to let the next four years look just like
the last eight” (p. 3). As with Reagan’s indictment of Carter’s
failures, Bush’s low approval numbers and perceived failure to
effectively respond to the crisis provides an opportunity for Obama to
supplant Bush as “responder in chief.” Obama is not directly
portraying Bush and Cheney as causing the crisis, but implies it: the
“American promise” will continue to be threatened if another
Republican is elected president.
Obama also ties McCain to the legacy of Reaganism when he
states: “for over two decades, he’s [McCain’s] subscribed to that old,
discredited Republican philosophy: Give more and more to those
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Petre 191
with the most and hope that prosperity trickles down to everyone
else” (p. 4). This reference to supply-side economics establishes a
link between Reagan, Bush, and McCain. While Bush is the sitting
president, Obama broadens his criticism to include the basic
economic assumptions shared by the three men. Obama continues
this critique of government philosophy:
In Washington, they call this the “Ownership Society,” but what
it really means is that you’re on your own. Out of work? Tough
luck, you’re on your own. No health care? The market will fix
it. You’re on your own. Born into poverty? Pull yourself up by
your own bootstraps, even if you don’t have boots. You are on
your own. Well, it’s time for them to own their failure. It’s time
for us to change America. And that is why I’m running for
president of the United States. (p. 4)
Obama’s statements are a direct insult against the idea of the
“ownership society,” a phrase Bush used frequently in his second
term when referring to the benefits of home ownership. With the
2008 collapse of the housing market, his ideology had been largely
criticized. Obama turns the phrase “ownership” on its head by
switching it to “you’re on your own,” which portrays U.S. American
society perpetuated by Bush as heartless, uncaring, and unresponsive
with his examples of people losing jobs, not having health care, or
living in poverty. Obama invites audiences to see the flaws in this
ideology because they are not on their own—they push forward on
the “American promise” together. He declares this entire way of
thinking as a massive “failure” because citizens know they are
connected with one another. The final turn of the word “own” implies
that if “they” want to espouse the benefits of ownership, “they” have
to recognize this way of thinking has failed and own up to it—the
nation is moving on. In positioning his interpretation of the causes of
the crisis, Obama creates a space to suggest an alternative paradigm
to the prevailing assumptions that had been accepted (although not
without criticism) by a majority of political leaders and media elites.
Solutions to a Crisis: Reagan’s “American Spirit” vs. Obama’s
“American Promise”
In constructing their respective crisis narratives, Reagan and
Obama each demonstrate narrative probability and narrative fidelity
(Fisher, 1984), thus, audiences are invited to believe Reagan’s and
Obama’s claims that a crisis exists and the reasons why. Doing so
sets the stage for each candidate’s solutions to be considered
acceptable. Reagan and Obama both spend a great deal of time
discussing solutions to the crisis contextualized within optimism for
the future. They each argue that their respective candidacies can be
restorative—a form of national “rebirth.” These characterizations add
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substance to the arguments that 1980 was a realigning election, and
that 2008 can be considered another such election.
Reagan asks “can anyone look at the record of this
Administration and say ‘well done’” (p. 5)? As the audience shouts
“NO,” Reagan responds: “I believe the American people are going to
answer these questions, as you’ve answered them, in the first week of
November and their answer will be, ‘No—we’ve had enough’” (p. 5).
“We’ve had enough” begins his turn toward the future, and what he
will do if elected president—the ultimate solution to the crisis:
…it will be up to us, beginning next January 20th, to offer an
administration and congressional leadership of competence and
more than a little courage. We must have the clarity of vision to
see the difference between what is essential and what is merely
desirable, and then the courage to bring our government back
under control.
…I believe it is clear our federal government is overgrown and
overweight. Indeed, it is time our government should go on a
diet. (p. 5)
Comments such as offering “more than a little courage” and having
the vision to see “the difference between what is essential and what is
merely desirable” again assigns blame for the crisis to the Carter
administration. Carter and his administration are portrayed as too
irresponsible and indecisive to lead the nation effectively.
Interestingly, Reagan offers few specific policy suggestions; his
major policy recommendations are a thirty percent tax cut (p. 7), and
to increase military pay and benefits (p. 8). Reagan focuses on an
overall reduction of government and a more aggressive approach to
foreign policy.
After proclaiming that his first act would be a “freeze on federal
hiring” (p. 5), Reagan declares “we’re going to enlist the very best
minds from business, labor, and…whatever quarter to conduct a
detailed review of every department, bureau, and agency that lives by
federal appropriations” (p. 6). He argues “we will simply apply to
government the common sense that we all use in our daily lives” (p.
6). This implies the current government is wasteful and comprised of
a group of disconnected elites who are unconcerned with “common”
people, or “common” sense for that matter. Reagan’s call for
common sense suggests the solutions to the crisis are “simple”—it is
Carter’s “meddling” that makes it complicated.
Reagan’s proposed solutions are couched within optimism for
the future. Reagan states “I would regard my election as proof that
we have renewed our resolve to preserve world peace and freedom—
that this nation will once again be strong enough to do that” (p. 10).
In his optimistic tone of renewal, Reagan’s statement also implies
that if Carter is re-elected, it will be a sign of weakness. Reagan’s
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Petre 193
optimism grows as he turns his focus back to the “American spirit” as
he ends his story. Rather than Carter’s “trust me” government, he
asks audiences to trust the “American spirit which knows no ethnic,
religious, social, political, regional, or economic boundaries; the
spirit that burned with zeal in the hearts of millions of immigrants
from every corner of the earth who came here in search of freedom”
(p. 10). He implies that it does not belong to any one group or
political party, but unites U.S. Americans to give them hope for
freedom in the future. Ironically, his critique of Carter’s “trust me”
government is an implicit appeal to voters to trust Reagan. Thus, it is
not too late to fix the crisis, but only if voters “do what has to be
done” (i.e., elect Reagan): Reagan can be the manifestation of all
hope for America; he can be the “hero” in this narrative.9
While Reagan connects his candidacy with a restoration of the
“American spirit,” Obama presents his election as an opportunity to
preserve and extend the “American promise.” Obama argues that the
“essence” of this promise is “individual responsibility and mutual
responsibility” (pp. 6-7) and if elected, he pledges to “keep our
promise alive” (p. 5). Thus, restoring the “American promise”
involves strengthening both responsibilities, and not seeing them as
mutually exclusive. In contrast to Reagan, Obama outlines a greater
number of specific policies he will implement as president to solve
the crisis, such as investing in renewable energy, equal access to
education, health care, and other programs as a means to strengthen
the economy and restore the “American promise” (pp. 5-7).
However, the implication is still similar: in order to restore the
“American promise,” Obama must be elected.
As with the previous aspects of Obama’s crisis narrative,
Obama offers descriptive examples for his solutions and even makes
them a part of his personal story, and so, his solutions are more
nuanced. For example, Obama states:
America, now is not the time for small plans. Now is the time to
finally meet our moral obligation to provide every child a
world-class education, because it will take nothing less to
compete in the global economy.
You know, Michelle and I are only here tonight because we
were given a chance at an education. And I will not settle for an
America where some kids don’t have that chance. (p. 6)
After presenting education as a “moral obligation,” he personalizes
the importance of equal access to education and invites audiences to
consider how government programs can make a difference in access
to education. Obama’s personal narrative presents the American
promise as a social contract: if such programs had not been available,
Obama would not be standing before the audience as a candidate for
president. In fact, Obama’s characterization of education assistance
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positions government programs as necessary parts of an “up-by-yourbootstraps” success story. A “world-class” education makes the U.S.
competitive, and when U.S. Americans are able to compete in a
global economy, it benefits the nation as a whole.
Obama also draws a close personal connection to the issue of
health care when he states “as someone who watched my mother
argue with insurance companies while she lay in bed dying of cancer,
I will make certain those companies stop discriminating against those
who are sick and need care the most” (p. 6). His story invites
audiences to consider how frustrating it must have felt to witness a
loved one struggling with insurance companies. Thus, Obama’s
solutions to the economic crisis are descriptive, personal, and
interconnected: if government provides more people with
opportunities and ensures a level playing field, there is more potential
for success for all citizens. Obama emphasizes the importance of
acting “now” to solve this crisis (p. 6). He repeats the phrase “now is
the time” to propose several initiatives, including health care. It is
important to note that Obama’s speech took place on the 45th
anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s (1963) famous “I Have a
Dream” speech, which included the repetition of the phrase “now is
the time.” Obama’s invocation of this phrase draws a connection
between King’s speech and his, inviting audiences to see the election
of 2008 as another step in the progression of social justice.
In a manner similar to Reagan, Obama presents his solutions
within a context of optimism for the future in the face of present
doubts. Obama emphasizes the significance of his 2008 campaign
and how it signals a change from the “politics of the past” (p. 8). Like
Reagan, Obama positions himself against “naysayers” who are
cynical of the idea that the U.S. can do better (p. 8). Instead, Obama
is on the side of “change…because I’ve seen it, because I’ve lived it”
(p. 9). According to Obama, the power behind this “change” is
“you,” (pp. 8-9) and this is what ensures the “American promise” is
kept (by “you” [the voters] electing Obama). This “American
promise” links the past with the future, and binds the government
with the people.
Reagan and Obama present speeches that follow the rhetorical
structure of crisis narratives: each provides evidence that a crisis
exists, describes the causes of the crisis, and offers solutions to the
crisis. Reagan briefly reviews evidence indicating that a crisis exists,
and spends more time blaming Carter as the cause. Obama provides
descriptive evidence of a crisis, and blames Bush and McCain in a
more nuanced way for failing to respond. Both candidates focus
significant portions of their addresses on presenting solutions and
creating a sense of optimism for the future, albeit in different ways.
Volume 46, Number 2, Spring, 2014 pp.179-201
Petre 195
Implications
Understanding national convention addresses as crisis narratives
offers an additional way to explore how “differing exigencies” give
rise to a rhetorical situation, and how a rhetor responds to “the
exigence created by the situation” (Dow, 1989, p. 295). While
presidential candidates are in a unique position to declare that a crisis
exists, they lack the authoritative power of the presidency. However,
in the elections of 1980 and 2008, the sitting president’s unpopularity
shattered the credibility (and gravitas) necessary to declare or
respond to a crisis. Reagan’s and Obama’s status as candidates called
forth the importance of constructing crisis narratives to persuade
voters that a crisis exists, the crisis is due to the failures of the
opposing party, and Reagan and Obama (respectively) know how to
solve the crisis. Presidents clearly construct narratives, as Rushing
(1986), Lewis (1987), and Wolfe (2007) note. However, since
presidential candidates do not hold the same implicit authority as
seated presidents, their demonstration of narrative probability and
narrative fidelity (Fisher, 1984) becomes all the more important.
Furthermore, each candidate must invite audiences to agree that a
crisis exists and a change of leadership is necessary, but still provide
them with enough hope for the future to see the crisis as solvable.
Exploring how crisis narratives are constructed in each speech
provides a richer context for understanding political convention
speeches during times of crisis.
Reagan’s and Obama’s use of crisis narratives allows them to
define the terms of their political situation: to invite audiences to
consider where the United States is as a nation, where it was, and
where it is going. In doing so, they “[set] into place” the nation’s
past, present, and future (Heath, 2004, p. 168). Reagan and Obama
use the exigency created by the crisis to advocate a fundamental
rethinking of the role of government in the lives of citizens. For
example, Reagan states “the federal government exists to serve the
American people” (p. 6). In this case, the “people” are positioned as
individuals who are separate from a “government” consisting of
elected leaders and bureaucrats. Rather than trusting Carter, Reagan
asks audiences to “trust your values” and to trust the “American
spirit” (p. 10). It is interesting that Reagan urges audiences to “trust”
their “values” rather than a leader, considering how he constructs
himself as a hero. In positioning himself as a hero, Reagan is in fact
asking audiences to trust him over Carter, but to do so because he
shares their values. Reagan’s urging also suggests that Carter does
not hold the same values, and has not lived up to the responsibility he
has as president. According to Reagan, the federal government has
become the enemy of the people (i.e., the “villain”). He implies that
Carter and other Democrats only view U.S. citizens as sources of
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funding for the federal government, not as thinking individuals or
human beings. Reagan constructs the federal government as a cold,
unfeeling, inhuman bureaucracy that has grown too powerful and
smothers the “American spirit,” inviting audiences to be wary of the
government and oppose any increases in taxes and/or regulations.
On the other hand, Obama’s views on government are evident
in his description of the “American promise.” Rather than unleashing
a “spirit,” Obama seeks to restore a “promise” in the form of a
human-constructed social contract rooted in mutual and individual
responsibility (p. 9). In contrast to Reagan, Obama positions the
government as a partner in the lives of the people by acknowledging
“government cannot solve all our problems,” but “it should do…that
which we cannot do for ourselves” (p. 6). Rather than hindering
economic growth, the government can ensure corporations are living
up to their obligations, protect citizens from harm, and create new
opportunities. Obama does not reject individualism, as he promotes
personal responsibility, but he also emphasizes that everyone is
connected.10 Therefore, Obama suggests that the “government” and
“the people” are not separate entities which invites audiences to
consider how the government can benefit the people and vice-versa,
encouraging them to feel they have a stake in the success of the
country as a whole.
Reagan’s “American spirit” is individualistic, entrepreneurial,
and ever-present. Even though it is threatened in Reagan’s narrative,
U.S. Americans can be optimistic that it will emerge again—with a
leader who understands the value of this spirit. Obama’s “American
promise” is a human-constructed social contract that takes continued
effort to preserve. The “American spirit” needs only to be unleashed
from the cold bureaucracy of the Carter administration, while the
“American promise” can only be restored by citizens and government
acting responsibly and looking out for one another. After all,
promises can be broken if one side neglects the needs of the other.
In their convention speeches, Reagan and Obama present crisis
narratives to the nation. They argue that a crisis exists, and portray
the policies of their political opponents as the cause. While Reagan
focuses blame squarely on his opponent, Obama provides a more
detailed, nuanced account of evidence indicating that a crisis exists.
Constructing crisis narratives allows them to characterize the current
crisis and its causes, but they must demonstrate narrative probability
and narrative fidelity (Fisher, 1984), otherwise audiences may not
accept the presented solutions. Reagan and Obama both offer
optimism for the future, but with opposing views of the relationship
between government and the people. Reagan’s suggestion that
government programs do more harm than good dominated the
politics of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Obama’s invitation to
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Petre 197
reconsider such assumptions points toward a possible paradigm shift
in U.S. American politics for the years ahead.
Notes
¹Bush’s approval rating in August 2008 was 30%
(CNN/Opinion Research poll, 2008).
2
This phenomenon has been referred to as a “realignment of
doxa” (Petre, 2012).
3
Reagan would go on to reiterate many of these claims against
Carter in the 1980 election.
4
See Irving Kristol (1983, 1995) and Gary Dorrien (1993,
2004) for a detailed account of the evolution of neoconservatism.
5
When he was a candidate, Obama himself noted that “Reagan
changed the trajectory of America in a way that…Nixon did not,
and…Clinton did not” (Baker, 2009, p. 47). John Podesta, former
Clinton Chief of Staff and former Co-Chair of the Obama/Biden
Transition Project states that “Clinton lived at the back of a
conservative cycle, and Obama is living at the front end of what
could be a profoundly progressive cycle” (Baker, p. 47).
6
All further references to Reagan and Obama correspond with
these sources.
7
Carter’s approval rating was 22% in July 1980 (“Bush’s
Lowest Rating Tops Worst Marks for Nixon, Carter,” 2007).
8
This is similar to Reagan’s (1964) criticism of economic
“planning” by liberals in his “A Time for Choosing” speech.
9
Fisher (1982) noted the construction of Reagan as “hero” and
Carter as “anti-hero” in Reagan’s Convention Address, and
throughout the 1980 campaign.
10
See Rowland and Jones (2007) for a thorough description of
how Obama combines individual and community values in his
political rhetoric.
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