NORTHEAST AFRICA SERIES
Vol.XI
No.1
(General)
THE ARAB SUMMIT O F JANUARY 1964
Some Observations on I n t e r - A r a b Relations
by Alan W. Horton
The Arab kings and p r e s i d e n t s have come and gone. The flags
and the long s t r e t c h e s of bunting on i m p o r t a n t public buildings have
been taken down. Some 200 foreign journalists have filed t h e i r s t o r i e s
and packed t h e i r b a g s . C a i r o t r a f f i c , inhibited only slightly during the
s u m m i t conference and r e d i r e c t e d in tortuous ways during the c e r e m o n i a l t r i p s to and f r o m the a i r p o r t , has r e v e r t e d to n o r m a l . The Egyptian p r e s s h a s put away i t s s u p e r l a t i v e s for the t i m e being and c a r r i e s
non- s u m m i t news once again on i t s f r o n t page.
The Nile Hilton, in which a l l but a few of the 2 7 1 delegates we r e
housed and fed, h a s been r e t u r n e d to Hilton management a f t e r a week
of annexation and capacity payment by the A r a b League. The inconvenience s w e r e slight: s o m e employees of the hotel w e r e asked to decamp
(apparently f o r s e c u r i t y r e a s o n s ) , and the not inconsiderable number of
t o u r i s t s whose r e s e r v a t i o n s overlapped the period of the conference
w e r e told, and carefully helped, to find a l t e r n a t e lodging e l s e w h e r e in
a tourist-packed city. F o r the government, which pre-empted the hotel,
and the c o n f e r e e s , the Hilton worked out v e r y well. When the K a s r E l Nil b a r r a c k s , r e d and ugly, w e r e finally r a z e d in 1954, t h e i r location on
the Nile w a s taken i n p a r t by the hotel, i n p a r t by the new Arab League
building, and in p a r t by the governorate and municipality building. Sec u r i t y a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r the conference w e r e v a s t l y simplified by this
juxtaposition. A police p e r i m e t e r , established around the t h r e e buildings, admitted only those with s p e c i a l p a s s e s . The heads of s t a t e and
m e m b e r s of delegations w e r e thus not r e q u i r e d to leave the p e r i m e t e r
during the e n t i r e conference period and w e r e able, i n fact, to walk on
a specially constructed covered bridge between t h e i r housing a r e a in
the Hilton and the r e d - c a r p e t e d a t m o s p h e r e of the conference r o o m s i n
the A r a b League building.
J o u r n a l i s t s w e r e provided with facilitie s inside the p e r i m e t e r
Copyright 0 1964, American Universities Field Staff, Inc.
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on the f i r s t floor of the C a i r o governorate building. According to vete r a n s of s i m i l a r conferences in the non- Western world, the f a c i l i t i e s
we r e outstanding. The only difficulty w a s , expectably, the paucity of
r e l i a b l e information f r o m the conference r o o m s and the Hilton, both
of which w e r e out of bounds to j o u r n a l i s t s without a p e r s o n a l invitation
f r o m one of the delegations. The b r i e f i n g s a f t e r e a c h s e s s i o n w e r e
given by competent professionals i n touch with the UAR delegation and
w e r e r e m a r k a b l y good under the c r y p t i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s prevailing.
The briefings gave some indication of the all-important p a t t e r n of v i s iting between heads of s t a t e and gave s o m e d i r e c t i o n to journalistic
conjecture by suggesting s o m e of the new i n t e r - A r a b understandings
that w e r e being, o r that might be, reached during the conference. The
only o t h e r official s o u r c e s w e r e the p r e s s r e l e a s e s a f t e r e a c h full s e s sion, but except f o r the final r e l e a s e these w e r e m a s t e r p i e c e s of factual m i n i m u m .
As the conference moved toward i t s fifth and final day, the bits
and p i e c e s of information began to combine to f o r m a p i c t u r e of conside r a b l e accomplishment. By the end of the third day, in fact, Arab journ a l i s t s had in v a r i o u s ways e x t r a c t e d f r o m t h e i r national delegations
the g e n e r a l outlines of the final communiqu6, a s w e l l a s s o m e of the d e t a i l s of the s e v e r a l reconciliations. Some non-Arab c o r r e s p o n d e n t ~
had even been able to talk to l e s s e r delegates outside the conference
The l a t e evening briefing of the third day added the new s
perimeter
that a g r e e m e n t had been r e a c h e d on a unified m i l i t a r y command.
.
The f o u r t h day of the conference w a s the f i r s t day of the holy
month of Ramadan. That morning A1 A h r a m c a r r i e d a s e r i e s of five
p i c t u r e s of P r e s i d e n t N a s s e r and King Saud in harmonious c o n v e r s a tion, leaving l i t t l e doubt about the d i r e c t i o n of the "second-most-difficult" reconciliation effort. The "most difficult" was left i n little doubt
either-in the s e n s e that S y r i a and the UAR r e m a i n c l e a r l y a t odds.
Despite the a t m o s p h e r e of i n c r e a s i n g good will and euphoria, the UAR
succeeded i n avoiding reconciliation with Amin el-Hafez and the S y r i a n Baath, and S y r i a ' s isolation i n c r e a s e d a s the conference p r o g r e s s e d .
On the evening of the fourth day, a few h o u r s a f t e r breaking the d a y ' s
f a s t , S y r i a n isolation w a s reportedly t r a n s l a t e d into i n t r a n s i g e n c e a t
what i t was hoped would be the final meeting of the c o n f e r e n c e ; the
meeting began a t 9:50 p.m., continued unexpectedly until 4:15 the following morning, and r e s u m e d f o r a f u r t h e r two h o u r s a t 10:30 a.m.
Thus i t w a s not until 1:00 p.m. on the fifth day that the w e a r y kings and
p r e s i d e n t s p r e s e n t e d t h e m s e l v e s publicly f o r photographers and for a
h e a r i n g of the finally approved concluding s t a t e m e n t .
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J u s t a s he m e t t h e m on a r r i v a l a t the a i r p o r t , s o P r e s i d e n t
N a s s e r was on hand to s a y good-by to the kings and p r e s i d e n t s a s they
s e v e r a l l y d e p a r t e d . Upon a r r i v a l , the only ones to r e c e i v e the p r e s i dential e m b r a c e w e r e Ben Bella of A l g e r i a , Arif of I r a q , and ( s u r p r i s ingly) Bourguiba of T u n i s i a ; and i t i s a m e a s u r e of the p e r s o n a l f e e l i n g s
generated during the conference that a t d e p a r t u r e t i m e the only one who
m e r e l y shook hands with the UAR p r e s i d e n t w a s Amin el-Hafez. It i s
difficult to a s s e s s this kind of euphoria, to d e t e r m i n e the lasting qualit i e s of the exhilaration t h a t c o m e s naturally when a head of state m e e t s
his p e e r s . Do the good faith and the reconciliations p e r s i s t ? B e c a u s e
the conference r e p r e s e n t e d a peak of good r e l a t i o n s among m o s t A r a b
s t a t e s , the faith will p e r h a p s not be a s good again until the next s u m m i t
i s r e a c h e d . The sophisticated of C a i r o a r e now mildly mocking the exh i l a r a t i o n of the conference, but the new p e r s o n a l and political d e p a r t u r e s to which i t gave impetus a r e t h e r e f o r a l l to o b s e r v e .
P r e s i d e n t N a s s e r of the UAR w a s the one to propose the convening of a s u m m i t conference of A r a b kings and p r e s i d e n t s . The proposal
was made publicly a t a Victory Day speech in P o r t Said on D e c e m b e r 23,
1963, but w a s l a t e r conveyed i n writing to the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l of the
Arab League. The l a t t e r , undoubtedly pleased that the A r a b League,
a f t e r a long period o f f - stage, might once again b e a focus of attention,
i s s u e d invitations accordingly. With the exception of Saudi A r a b i a , each
s t a t e of the A r a b League quickly e x p r e s s e d i t s e n t h u s i a s m f o r a f i r s t
meeting on J a n u a r y 13. Saudi A r a b i a did finally respond in the a f f i r m a tive, but only a f t e r f u r t h e r m a n e u v e r s in the tense i n t e r n a l r i v a l r y that
s e p a r a t e s the reigning King Saud f r o m his ruling b r o t h e r , Crown P r i n c e
F a i s a l . The Egyptians would have p r e f e r r e d P r i n c e F a i s a l a s head of
the Saudi Arabian delegation but had eventually to b e satisfied with the
King.
At the l a s t moment P r e s i d e n t Fuad Chehab of Lebanon begged
off on account of i l l n e s s . T h e r e was s o m e speculation that the i l l n e s s
might be a diplomatic one, the theory being that f o r v a r i o u s r e a s o n s
Chehab would he sitate to be a C h r i s t i a n e m b a r r a s s m e n t to h i s fellow
Muslims, but this speculation proved to be fanciful. N a s s e r himself
was r e p o r t e d to be upset a t Chehab's projected absence, and the Leban e s e apparently had s o m e difficulty in persuading h i m that the P r e s i dent w a s in f a c t having a m o s t painful t i m e with his back. P r e s u m a bly n e u t r a l s o u r c e s c o n f i r m e d the t r u t h of Chehab's a i l m e n t , b e c a u s e
-though for protocol r e a s o n s he w a s not m e t by N a s s e r himself a t the
airport-Rashid K a r a m i , the Lebanese P r i m e M i n i s t e r (and only inci-
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dentally a M u s l i m ) , received a w a r m welcome. Another delegation
without a n accompanying head of s t a t e was that of Libya, but in this
instance t h e r e w a s no concern about i t whatsoever. The King of Libya
i s a n old and unwell man, and his place w a s quite sensibly taken by h i s
son, the Crown P r i n c e Has s a n el-Reda.
What prompted N a s s e r to propose a s u m m i t conference a t this
p a r t i c u l a r t i m e ? On the s u r f a c e the proposal a p p e a r e d to have been
provoked by a n exchange of e d i t o r i a l c o m m e n t between the UAR and
s o m e other A r a b s t a t e s . In D e c e m b e r t h e r e appeared in R o s e El Youssef, a C a i r o weekly of s o m e appeal
to Egyptian
and o t h e r A r a b intellec--tuals, a n a r t i c l e stating quite c l e a r l y that the Arab world should not a l low itself again to become m i l i t a r i l y e m b r o i l e d with I s r a e l until i t w a s
ready, and that r e a d i n e s s could be defined only in t e r m s of political union and a unified m i l i t a r y command. Only by political and m i l i t a r y union, the a r t i c l e said, could the UAR effectively u s e i t s m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h
to g u a r a n t e e o t h e r A r a b b o r d e r s ; only by this kind of union, the a r t i c l e
implied, could the UAR prevent i r r e s p o n s i b l e m i l i t a r y a d v e n t u r i s m i n
the f a c e of the I s r a e l i t h r e a t t o d i v e r t the w a t e r s of the J o r d a n R i v e r .
The a r t i c l e f u r t h e r said that anti-Egyptian r e g i m e s in D a m a s c u s , Amm a n , and R i y a d h w e r e e a g e r to have the UAR e m b r o i l e d in a w a r with I s r a e l in the hope of finding a n opportunity f o r a "stab i n the back."
T h e r e w e r e c r i e s of outrage f r o m the expected p l a c e s . J o r d a n
(in the p e r s o n of i t s r o y a l i s t P r i m e M i n i s t e r ) said angrily that i t could
defend i t s b o r d e r s a g a i n s t I s r a e l without Egyptian help and that a unified command w a s quite u n n e c e s s a r y i n view of the f a c t that J o r d a n
w a s apparently in a b e t t e r f r a m e of mind to c a r r y out i t s responsibili t i e s v i s - 8 - v i s I s r a e l than was the UAR. The S y r i a n r e a c t i o n w a s s i m i l a r but s t r o n g e r : a B a a t h i s t newspaper s a i d i n s o c i a l i s t and revolutiona r y satisfaction that "the people will punish a l l r u l e r s who f a i l to c a r r y
out t h e i r duties a g a i n s t I s r a e l . " P e r h a p s b e c a u s e Syrian governments
have i n r e c e n t y e a r s been unstable, the S y r i a n s m o r e than o t h e r A r a b s
have tended to be verbally b e l l i g e r e n t and physically provocative tow a r d Israel-and
i t i s , i n fact, t h i s S y r i a n b e l l i g e r e n c e (without the
m i l i t a r y h a r d w a r e to back it up) that in Egypt b r i n g s on n i g h t m a r e s of
unwanted e m b r o i l m e n t .
It was a f t e r t h e s e and s i m i l a r exchanges that N a s s e r i s s u e d his
c a l l to the s u m m i t , and i t w a s a c a l l f o r concerted action to d e a l with
the I s r a e l i plan to d i v e r t the w a t e r s of the J o r d a n R i v e r . Few A r a b
c o u n t r i e s could r e f u s e to show solidarity-refusal w a s c l e a r l y impossible f o r those countries whose n e w s p a p e r s had just been indulging i n
shows of paper courage-and b e c a u s e the a f f a i r had been put in the
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f r a m e w o r k of a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y s e s s i o n of the A r a b League, no Arab
country, no m a t t e r how e x a s p e r a t e d o r threatened by propaganda and
subversion f r o m C a i r o , could refuse on the grounds of pique. Once
the snowball of acceptance had begun to roll, those heads of s t a t e who
m a y s t i l l have had lingering doubts about the w i s d o m of attending found
they could not afford to be absent.
The I s r a e l i plan to d i v e r t the J o r d a n w a t e r s i s nothing new.
The whole p r o b l e m of equitable division of the w a t e r among the r i p a r ian s t a t e s ( I s r a e l and Jordan, principally, but a l s o S y r i a and Lebanon)
has been around f o r a long time. This i s not the place f o r d e t a i l s of
the whole t i r e s o m e a f f a i r , ' but a v e r y s h o r t account i s n e c e s s a r y .
Some t i m e before 1953, the United States b e c a m e a w a r e that on e i t h e r
side of the a r m i s t i c e line v a r i o u s plans f o r u s e of the J o r d a n w a t e r s
w e r e being developed along lines that w e r e likely to conflict a t some
future t i m e . In i t s u s u a l anguish about bringing "peace and stability"
to the a r e a of A r a b - I s r a e l i conflict, the United States in 1953 s e n t
E r i c Johnston to the Middle E a s t with a plan f o r joint use of the w a t e r s
by both s i d e s . Two y e a r s and s e v e r a l t r i p s l a t e r , this r e m a r k a b l e negotiator had developed a "Unified Development P l a n " that was accepted
a t the technical level by both s i d e s . B e c a u s e a g r e e m e n t a t the political
l e v e l would have implied recognition of I s r a e l , the P o l i t i c a l Committee
of the A r a b League did not e n d o r s e the plan but r e t u r n e d i t in 1955 to
the Technical C o m m i t t e e f o r "further consideration." T h e r e the m a t t e r of joint development h a s r e s t e d e v e r s i n c e .
The Unified P l a n gave the A r a b s t a t e s about three-fifths of the
annual flow of the r i v e r s y s t e m , and the s c h e m e ' s p r e m i s e was that
w a t e r allocations w e r e b a s e d on needs inside the J o r d a n b a s i n but could
be used outside i t . Since 1955, t h e r e have been u n i l a t e r a l p r o j e c t s , but
none h a s proposed to take m o r e w a t e r than allotted under Johnston's
final plan. The J o r d a n i a n s have built a p a r t of the E a s t Ghor Canal envisaged by Johnston. In 1953 the I s r a e l i s began construction a i m e d a t
c a r r y i n g w a t e r to the Negev f r o m an offtake in one of the d e m i l i t a r i z e d
zones, but this work was halted when S y r i a complained that the project
was in violation of the a r m i s t i c e a g r e e m e n t . The p r e s e n t I s r a e l i plan
i s a l m o s t identical with the e a r l i e r one: the chief d i f f e r e n c e s a r e t h a t
the offtake h a s been shifted south to Lake T i b e r i a s and i s not i n a d e -
Those i n t e r e s t e d should s t a r t by consulting Georgiana G. Stevens,
"The J o r d a n R i v e r Valley, " International Conciliation (No. 506, Janua r y 1956). See a l s o G. H . J a n s e n , "The P r o b l e m o f the J o r d a n W a t e r s , "
The World Today (London: Chatham House, F e b r u a r y 1964).
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m i l i t a r i z e d zone, and that the w a t e r i s l e s s useful b e c a u s e i t i s m o r e
saline. The expectation i s that the I s r a e l i s will have one pump in ope r a t i o n within a few months and two m o r e in ope ration in due c o u r s e
The I s r a e l i s contend that f u l l operation of the pumps will d r a w l e s s
w a t e r than allotted under the Unified P l a n .
.
Though the Unified P l a n w a s n e v e r adopted, i t continues to
have a useful life. More often than not, i t i s the c r i t e r i o n by which
o t h e r p r o p o s a l s a r e judged, a s d e m o n s t r a t e d by continuing d i r e c t o r
oblique r e f e r e n c e s to the "Johnston P l a n " i n the Middle E a s t p r e s s ,
and i t s r e a s o n a b l e n e s s h o v e r s over o t h e r , m o r e a g g r e s s i v e suggestions
f o r the J o r d a n w a t e r s . The plan's s t a t u s in Middle E a s t politics i s a t tributable not only to i t s h i s t o r y of s w e e t - r e a s o n a b l e n e s s , but a l s o to
the not-so-Italian hand of the United S t a t e s , which on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s
h a s made i t s position on the J o r d a n w a t e r s perfectly c l e a r . Since 1955
the United S t a t e s h a s continued to support the Unified P l a n i n the s e n s e
that i t h a s supported any u n i l a t e r a l project that could fit into the p l a n ' s
b a s i c p r e m i s e and allocations. J o r d a n h a s had A m e r i c a n support (and
financing) f o r i t s E a s t Ghor C a n a l ; I s r a e l has had A m e r i c a n approval
of i t s d i v e r s i o n a r y w o r k s on the s a m e grounds.
If the I s r a e l i plan f o r d i v e r s i o n i s within the f r a m e w o r k of Johns t o n ' s Unified Development P l a n (and a l l indications a r e t h a t the I s r a e l i s will be taking l e s s than half of the w a t e r allocated by the plan), why
a r e the A r a b s s o c o n c e r n e d ? The Johnston P l a n t r e a t e d the A r a b s t a t e s
v e r y f a i r l y and even elicited technical agreement-so why now the intense d i s c o m f o r t a t the thought of s m a l l e r withdrawals than the plan env i s a g e d ? It i s always possible, of c o u r s e , that the d i s c o m f o r t i s not a s
intense a s i t s e e m s , and c e r t a i n l y t h e r e w e r e a number of o t h e r good
r e a s o n s f o r the c a l l to the s u m m i t , but t h e r e do e x i s t s o m e v e r y genuine Arab f e a r s with r e s p e c t to anything that might s t r e n g t h e n the power
position of I s r a e l . Because the idea of new i r r i g a t i o n w o r k s , new land,
m o r e i m m i g r a n t s e t t l e r s , and g r e a t e r a g r i c u l t u r a l production in the
Negev f a l l s into the A r a b category of power politics, t h e A r a b s f e e l i m pelled to counter i t in s o m e way. The A r a b s t a t e s say t h a t they n e v e r
a g r e e d to J o h n s t o n ' s plan and that the I s r a e l i d i v e r s i o n a r y s c h e m e i s
a u n i l a t e r a l violation of the principle t h a t r i p a r i a n s t a t e s m u s t a g r e e
on the u s e of r i v e r w a t e r s ; the E a s t Ghor Canal i n J o r d a n , they say, i s
e n t i r e l y a n A r a b m a t t e r because i t i s f r o m the Yarmuk t r i b u t a r y , a n
e n t i r e l y A r a b r i v e r . These and o t h e r A r a b a r g u m e n t s a r e a s refutable
a s t h e i r I s r a e l i c o u n t e r p a r t s ; the f a c t i s that neither side w i s h e s the
o t h e r to have a n advantage in a cold-war situation.
One Egyptian purpose i n proposing the s u m m i t conference w a s
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to o r g a n i z e the A r a b reaction to this p a r t i c u l a r I s r a e l i t h r e a t . The
A r a b s w e r e i n considerable d i s a r r a y generally, and on the b a s i s of i t s
r e l a t i o n s with o t h e r A r a b s t a t e s , the UAR w a s i n n o position to bring
about a n a g r e e d r e s p o n s e t o the J o r d a n d i v e r s i o n p r o j e c t without the
help of an e x t r a o r d i n a r y platform f r o m which to launch s o m e new d e p a r t u r e s . The need f o r a n a g r e e d r e s p o n s e a r o s e a s much a s anything
e l s e f r o m the posture of belligerently unstable S y r i a , whose reaction
to the f i r s t working of the f i r s t I s r a e l i pump w a s likely to be r a s h .
Only i n the context of an A r a b s u m m i t could S y r i a be bound to a n a g r e e d
c o u r s e of action; and i n the opinion of the UAR, the w i s e s t c o u r s e of
action, b a s e d on a cool m i l i t a r y a s s e s s m e n t , w a s t e m p o r a r i l y a nonb e l l i g e r e n t one. But nonbelligerence toward I s r a e l h a s n e v e r beenpublicly popular in the A r a b world, and the UAR, r e p r e s e n t i n g both m i l i t a r y and revolutionary power, did not w i s h to a c c e p t the onus of r e f u s ing to fight. By m e a n s of a s u m m i t conference, it was hoped, the r e sponsibility f o r inaction in the face of the I s r a e l i t h r e a t could b e broadened to include S y r i a and the r e s t of the A r a b w o r l d . One o b s e r v e r put
i t t h i s way: " P r e s i d e n t N a s s e r no doubt reckons that i n making a l l the
A r a b s t a t e s equally and openly r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a final decision, he will
b r i n g the w a r m o n g e r s among t h e m face to f a c e with t h e i r moment of
tr~th."~
Even so, the p r o p o s a l of a n A r a b s u m m i t r e p r e s e n t e d c o n s i d e r ably m o r e than a n a t t e m p t to contain m i l i t a r y braggadocio. By taking
the initiative in proposing the conference, N a s s e r was c l e a r l y r e a s s e r t ing a l e a d e r s h i p t h a t had in s o m e r e s p e c t s been allowed to lapse-and
that no other A r a b l e a d e r could a s s u m e . In t e r m s of his p e r s o n a l p r e s tige and t h a t of the UAR, N a s s e r stood to gain a n i m m e n s e amount f r o m
a s u c c e s s f u l and d r a m a t i c meeting of heads of s t a t e . At a t i m e when
his r i v a l s f o r l e a d e r s h i p of the A r a b revolution-the
Baath P a r t y whose
g r e a t e s t s t r e n g t h i s i n Syria-were implying that he w a s soft on I s r a e l
b e c a u s e he w a s accepting A m e r i c a n wheat, N a s s e r m u s t have s e e n a n
opportunity to d e m o n s t r a t e again his e s s e n t i a l toughness The s a m e
display of toughness could a l s o s e r v e to disenchant those hopeful Weste r n e r s who had been listening to Zionist w h i s p e r s that a n unofficial
de'tente w a s i n being.
.
P e r h a p s the m a j o r purpose i n proposing a s u m m i t w a s , i n r e t r o spect, to c r e a t e a n o c c a s i o n f o r new d e p a r t u r e s . Before the conference,
many o b s e r v e r s f o r e s a w the possibility of one o r two shifts f r o m namecalling to m o d e r a t e reconciliation, but looking back, one r e a l i z e s that
The Economist ( p r e s u m a b l y P a t r i c k Seale), J a n u a r y 4, 1964.
-
-
A f o r m a l s e s s i o n w i t h full d e l e g a t i o n s .
A d i s c u s s i o n b e t w e e n B o u r g u i b a and H a s s a n 11.
H e a d s of s t a t e a t the c o n f e r e n c e t a b l e .
P r e s i d e n t Arif ( s e c o n d f r o m r i g h t ) w i t h the S y r i a n s .
urguiba being welcomed by N a s s e r .
Ben Bella a r r i v e s for the c o n f e r e n c e .
King Saud and P r e s i d e n t N a s s e r .
P r e s i dlent N a s s e r g r e e t s Hafez a t the a i r p o r t .
-
AWH- 1 '64
the s u m m i t proposal m a y have had a s p r i m a r y purpose the launching
of a new phase i n Egyptian r e l a t i o n s with the r e s t of the A r a b w o r l d .
The previous phase had begun i n September 196 1, when S y r i a
b r o k e away f r o m the United A r a b Republic, and w a s a t i m e of "antir e a c t i o n a r y " w o r d s and activities d i r e c t e d principally a g a i n s t the A r a b
m o n a r c h i e s and culminating in Egyptian support of republican r e b e l s
i n Yemen; i t w a s a t i m e when the f o r c e s of "antirevolutionary r e action" in J o r d a n and Saudi A r a b i a w e r e a l m o s t continually r e q u i r e d
to r e a c t t o the t h r e a t of subversion-if not d i r e c t l y f r o m the UAR, then
f r o m "revolutionary" e l e m e n t s within.
I t w a s a l s o a t i m e of struggle between the UAR and the Baath,
the revolutionary r i v a l s whose ideologies a r e a l m o s t identical. The
s t r u g g l e waxed a s the B a a t h a s s u m e d power (for the f i r s t t i m e anyw h e r e ) in I r a q and in S y r i a , and waned a s I r a q r e t u r n e d i n November
1963 to non-Baathist nationalist s y m p a t h i e s . The s t r u g g l e w a s exace r bated by a short-lived possibility of t r i p a r t i t e union: i n e a r l y 1963,
a f t e r changes to Baathist power i n I r a q and S y r i a , a heady a t m o s p h e r e
in f a v o r of union between t h e s e two c o u n t r i e s and the UAR e x i s t e d eve r y w h e r e , and in A p r i l t h e r e w e r e t a l k s i n C a i r o , the signing of a f e d e r a l c h a r t e r , and plans for a plebiscite i n S e p t e m b e r . But by June of
1963 i t w a s a l l o v e r , except f o r v a r i o u s m a t t e r s of f o r m , and Levantine
intellectuals o r d i n a r i l y proud of t h e i r c y n i c i s m w e r e feeling s h e e p i s h
about the e n t h u s i a s m they had felt. The defeating i s s u e , which w a s
found i n v a r i o u s d i s g u i s e s , was one of political c o n t r o l ; a s the Baath
felt itself m o r e f i r m l y in power i n S y r i a and I r a q , i t s b a s i c d i s t r u s t
and r e s e n t m e n t of N a s s e r b e c a m e m o r e obvious. The Baath wanted
c o n t r o l o v e r t h e i r own a r e a s ; N a s s e r wanted a monopoly. The UAR
c l a i m s that the Baath n e v e r had any intention of going through with e i t h e r a union o r a federation, and that the idea of union w a s m e r e l y a
B a a t h i s t device to give f a l s e hope to N a s s e r i t e e l e m e n t s while giving
itself t i m e t o consolidate i t s power. During the s u m m e r and e a r l y a u t u m n of 1963, the relations between Egypt and the B a a t h r o s e to new
heights of imaginative invective, which began to subside only when Abdul
S a l a m Arif of I r a q managed a bloodless switch and ousted B a a t h i s t
power f r o m the I r a q i cabinet.
According to s o m e Egyptian s o u r c e s , the new phase of UAR r e lations with i t s A r a b b r e t h r e n i s based on the recognition of two r e a l i t i e s . The f i r s t i s the fact of non-union: a n a n a l y s i s of the f a i l u r e of
1963 r e v e a l s that union i s not now feasible-and p e r h a p s not even d e s i r a b l e on the theory t h a t a union now would soon c o m e unstuck. The
second i s the f a c t that no effective substitute governments f o r the A r a b
AWH- 1-'64
m o n a r c h i e s a r e now available: i t would be u s e l e s s l y d e s t r u c t i v e to subv e r t t h e m a t t h i s stage of the A r a b revolution. The new phase, a c c o r d ing to these s o u r c e s , s e e k s to find the common denominators of feeling
and belief among A r a b governments and to e s t a b l i s h t h e r e b y a b a s i s
f o r common action; the Egyptian c e n t e r of the A r a b revolution b e c o m e s
a d e m o n s t r a t i o n of revolutionary advantages, a pilot p r o j e c t that o t h e r s
i m i t a t e b e c a u s e of i t s s u c c e s s r a t h e r than i t s p e r s u a s i v e talk. It i s finally possible t o introduce t h i s new phase, the s t o r y continues, because
with the d i s c r e d i t i n g of the Baath the capital of the A r a b revolution h a s
b e e n permanently established in C a i r o .
Whether o r not the preceding p a r a g r a p h provides a factual explanation of official thinking, i t i s beyond doubt that the s u m m i t conference
m a r k e d a turning point i n the UAR1s A r a b policy. A few days a f t e r N a s s e r ' s proposal in the P o r t Said speech, A1 A h r a m of D e c e m b e r 27 gave
a n indication of things to come by saying that Egyptian n e w s p a p e r s had
"decided" to c a l l a halt to a l l p r e s s campaigns a g a i n s t o t h e r A r a b s t a t e s .
This c e s s a t i o n , said A1 A h r a m , w a s to c r e a t e a "suitable a t m o s p h e r e "
for the d i s c u s s i o n s of the s u m m i t . More i m p o r t a n t to s e v e r a l A r a b
s t a t e s was a p a r a l l e l decision to stop a l l f o r m s of radio propaganda,
including s o m e p a r t i c u l a r l y vicious p e r sonal a t t a c k s on A r a b kings
Not only did t h e s e a t t a c k s c o m e t o a stop, but the Egyptian p r e s s and
radio contributed positively to the a t m o s p h e r e of the conference by publicizing i n a n a l m o s t affectionate way the biographies and p e r s o n a l i t i e s
of the kings and p r e s i d e n t s who would b e coming. The a t m o s p h e r e c r e a t e d
in C a i r o w a s , i n fact, one of highdecision, a n a t m o s p h e r e that N a s s e r h i m self had launched a t P o r t Said whenhe said of the conference: "What we
s a y inside we say outside. If we c a n fight, we come out and say s o . If we
cannot, we come out and s a y s o and a s k f o r the postponement of the battle . ' I
.
The f o r m a l meetings of the A r a b heads of s t a t e took place in
the Arab League building, and the i n f o r m a l meetings o c c u r r e d f o r the
m o s t p a r t in r o o m s of the Nile Hilton. Of the eight f o r m a l m e e t i n g s ,
t h r e e w e r e attended by the full delegations f r o m e a c h Arab s t a t e and
five w e r e r e s t r i c t e d to kings and p r e s i d e n t s ; the eight meetings, a c cording to a n a l e r t j o u r n a l i s t 1s timepiece, l a s t e d a total of 22 h o u r s
and 44 m i n u t e s . An Egyptian newspaper reckoned t h a t during the conf e r e n c e t h e r e w e r e 40 unofficial meetings, of which N a s s e r attended
21, Abdul S a l a m A r i f of I r a q 20, Ahmed Ben Bella of A l g e r i a 19, and
King Hussein of J o r d a n 13. The full meetings topk place around a n a l m o s t c i r c u l a r table with the heads of s t a t e s e a t e d alphabetically. Each
delegation had a single c h a i r a t the t a b l e ' s edge, except f o r the delega-
AWH- 1- ' 6 4
tion of P a l e s t i n e , which had no c h a i r a t that advanced rank and seated
i t s chief delegate (Ahmed El-Shukairy, who i s now p e r m a n e n t P a l e stini a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a t the League) i n the second row. The S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l of the League, Abdul Khaleq Hassouna, w a s s e a t e d i n f r o n t
alongside the s e s s i o n ' s C h a i r m a n . In a c c o r d a n c e with the rotation
s y s t e m of the League, the C h a i r m a n throughout the s u m m i t conference
was Abdul S a l a m Arif of I r a q .
The unofficial and i n f o r m a l meetings w e r e e a s i l y a s momentous
a s the f o r m a l ones because informality i s n e c e s s a r y to the p r o c e s s of
reconciliation. By m y count t h e r e w e r e s i x m a j o r changes in r e l a t i o n s
between A r a b s t a t e s ; although other changes took place, they w e r e dependent upon, and a "logical" i s s u e of, the key six. Significantly, the
UAR w a s involved in four of the six-three
reconciliations and one r a t ification of anticipated p a r t n e r ship-and S y r i a was involved in none.
T h r e e reconciliations involved H a s s a n I I of Morocco, twowith his fellow
North A f r i c a n s Ben Bella and Bourguiba, and one with N a s s e r . All s i x
a r e i m p o r t a n t t o a n understanding of the s u m m i t .
I can s a y little about the political i n t r i c a c i e s of North A f r i c a and
i t s reconciliations, but a few i m p r e s s i o n s a r e in o r d e r . Ben B e l l a w a s
p e r h a p s the b u s i e s t , though not n e c e s s a r i l y the m o s t s u c c e s sful, m e d i a t o r a t the c o n f e r e n c e ; m o r e than any other head of s t a t e , he w a s often
s e e n i n the company of N a s s e r and i n s o m e ways s e e m e d to have developed a n a l m o s t cousinly dependence on the Egyptian l e a d e r . Bourguiba,
t h a t r e m a r k a b l e man, had a g r e a t p e r s o n a l s u c c e s s a t the conference
and a t i m p o r t a n t m o m e n t s managed to e x p r e s s well what o t h e r s thought;
he had p r e p a r e d himself f o r the conference by reaching p r i o r understandings with both Ben Bella and N a s s e r , and many r e p o r t s c r e d i t h i m
with the role of a m a j o r conference c a t a l y s t . H a s s a n I I , whose diplomats
b e f o r e the conference w e r e saying that he w a s coming to C a i r o only bec a u s e i t happened to be the meeting place f o r a s e s s i o n of the A r a b
League, stayed for l e s s than two days but apparently accomplished a
g r e a t d e a l ; h i s new understandings with Ben Bella (who a g r e e d w i t h h i m
to give new impetus to the s e t t l e m e n t of t h e i r b o r d e r dispute) and with
N a s s e r (for whom little was involved beyond a c e s s a t i o n of propaganda)
provided the Moroccan king with a new position if he should choose to
a s s u m e i t . P e r h a p s the m o s t i m p o r t a n t thing about the North A f r i c a n s
a t the s u m m i t h a s to do with the v e r y f a c t of t h e i r p r e s e n c e : simply by
F o r c h a p t e r and v e r s e on h i s abilities, s e e The Tunisian Way
(CFG- 12- '63) by C h a r l e s F. Gallagher, A m e r i c a n U n i v e r s i t i e s Field
Staff, November 1963.
AWH- 1-'64
being t h e r e , they gave added i m p o r t a n c e to the position of the UAR,
which h a s b e c o m e the principal link, both c u l t u r a l and political, b e tween the A r a b E a s t and the Arab West. Then, too, t h e i r p r e s e n c e
f o r the f i r s t t i m e a t a n A r a b meeting dealing specifically with I s r a e l
added a subtle respectability and f r e s h n e s s to what might o t h e r w i s e
have had a s t a l e international i m p a c t .
T h e r e w a s no need a t the conference to apply the reconciliation
p r o c e s s to the relations between the UAR and I r a q . The groundwork
had a l r e a d y b e e n c a r e f u l l y laid. P r i o r to the events of November 1963,
when a n a r m y - b a c k e d coup bloodlessly broke the power of the Baath,
any under standing between the two c o u n t r i e s would have been i m p o s s i ble, but when P r e s i d e n t Abdul S a l a m A r i f , who had once risked h i s pol i t i c a l neck f o r a pro-UAR c a u s e , b e c a m e m o r e than a figurehead p r e s ident, a rebuilding of good relations w a s c l e a r l y in the i n t e r e s t s ofboth.
The C a i r o p r e s s welcomed the November 1963 coup with the g r e a t e s t
e n t h u s i a s m ; the Baath w a s in r e t r e a t (having in e a r l y November reached
the disturbing peak of i t s power by sending i t s international l e a d e r s h i p
f r o m D a m a s c u s to settle a n I r a q i government dispute), and Egypt no
longer needed t o contemplate the formation of a S y r i a n - I r a q i anti- UAR
coalition. P e r h a p s because of a long h i s t o r y of being w a r y of e a c h
o t h e r , the two c o u n t r i e s approached a possible understanding with caution; but once i t w a s understood i n Egypt that the new I r a q i government
w a s t r u l y anti-Baath and that i t w a s p r e p a r e d within l i m i t s to c o - o p e r ate on i n t e r - A r a b a f f a i r s , the UAR government felt f r e e to c o n s i d e r a
s u m m i t conference without f e a r that a revolutionary r i v a l might m a k e
difficulties and block Egyptian hegemony. After N a s s e r ' s proposal,
and before the conference, the UAR a m b a s s a d o r in I r a q , Amin ElHuwaidi, w a s r e p o r t e d a s having long c o n v e r s a t i o n s with Arif in Baghdad; a t the s a m e t i m e the C a i r o p r e s s was engaged in d e s c r i b i n g A r i f
a s a staunch A r a b patriot and a friend of Egypt. In a n obvious but effective anti-Syrian way, in fact, the UAR s e t out to b o l s t e r the position of
Arif i n the A r a b w o r l d ; one o b s e r v e r put i t that he hoped A r i f ' s ego
would survive the onslaught. During the conference, Arif and Nas se r
w e r e unmistakably f r i e n d l y , and a f t e r the conference, along with Ben
Bella, Arif was s e v e r a l t i m e s a guest a t N a s s e r ' s home.
-
As f o r r e l a t i o n s between the UAR and J o r d a n , a reconciliation
took place during the conference, but i t w a s c l e a r that this reconciliation w a s no s u r p r i s e to e i t h e r side. Within a few h o u r s of H u s s e i n ' s
a r r i v a l , he and Nas se r had a meeting without benefit of m e d i a t o r , and
within 24 h o u r s the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two
c o u n t r i e s had been announced. The m i n o r i r r i t a t i o n s w e r e easily d e a l t
with: the J o r d a n i a n A i r F o r c e planes that had c o m e to Egypt with the
AWH- 1- '64
help of defecting pilots w e r e to b e r e t u r n e d and a n amnesty d e c r e e d
f o r the pilots. The m a j o r i r r i t a t i o n of UAR propaganda, which in J o r dan i s a s o u r c e of civil and m i l i t a r y u n r e s t , had a l r e a d y been stopped.
What the UAR received f r o m J o r d a n w a s a n a s s u r a n c e that during the
conference (and f o r s o m e time a f t e r ) Hussein would not engage in any
anti-UAR maneuvering. This a s s u r a n c e w a s d e s i r a b l e not s o m u c h b e c a u s e of the Syrian Baath (which could only with the g r e a t e s t difficulty
show common c a u s e with a n A r a b m o n a r c h ) but principally b e c a u s e of
Hus s e i n ' s r o y a l c o u n t e r p a r t s in Saudi A r a b i a . Nas s e r needed, and obtained, a c l e a r field f o r his i m p o r t a n t negotiations with Saud and F a i s a l
-and without the possibility of a n antirevolutionary r o y a l f r o n t .
T h e r e i s a connection between the parlous s t a t e of the Egyptian
economy and the importance of negotiations with Saudi A r a b i a . Some
Egyptians go to the untenable e x t r e m e of saying that economic urgency
i s the only r e a s o n that the UAR i s i n t e r e s t e d in changing i t s A r a b policy f r o m one of a n t i r e a c t i o n a r y s u b v e r s i o n to one of "harmony in div e r s i t y . " It i s t r u e that the economy i s a t a p a r t i c u l a r l y low ebb a t the
m o m e n t and that t h e r e i s little i m m e d i a t e relief in sight; with the economy s t r a i n i n g i n e v e r y d i r e c t i o n in a n attempt to change i t s own n a t u r e ,
the u s u a l s h o r t a g e of foreign exchange h a s become c r i t i c a l and the
Egyptian pound i s buying considerably l e s s than i t used to-all this a t
a t i m e when the u s u a l p r o v i d e r s i n both E a s t and We s t a r e disenchanted
o r unable to help. The UAR i s d e s p e r a t e l y anxious to stop spending
l a r g e s u m s of i t s money on m i l i t a r y support of the republican r e g i m e
in Yemen, but i t cannot find a way of withdrawing i t s t r o o p s t h a t does
not run the politically impossible r i s k of returning Yemen to the f o r c e s
of the not-yet-defeated I m a m o r s o m e other anti-Egyptian " r e a c t i o n a r ies." Saudi A r a b i a , which has ( a t l e a s t until recently) been giving enc o u r a g e m e n t and m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e to the I m a m , holds the key to s u c c e s sful Egyptian withdrawal, b e c a u s e without a complete under standing
between the two outside powers that s e e k to d e t e r m i n e Y e m e n ' s future,
t h e r e i s no political a l t e r n a t i v e to continuing r i v a l r y and expensive involvement.
Though i t w a s billed in the C a i r o p r e s s a s the p r o b l e m of r e l a tions between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen, t h e r e w a s little
doubt in anyone ' s mind that the r e a l p r o b l e m w a s to find a f o r m u l a f o r
reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and the UAR. T h e r e w e r e minor
m a t t e r s that could be e a s i l y worked out ( s u c h a s r e i m b u r s e m e n t f o r
seized Saudi property in C a i r o ) , but the m a j o r m a t t e r of Yemen constituted a formidable difficulty. The situation of Yemen i s a n e x t r a o r dinarily complicated one, and the s p i r i t of reconciliation that might initiate the s e a r c h f o r a solution m u s t ultimately b e b o l s t e r e d by a l a r g e
-
AWH- 1 ' 6 4
and mutual m e a s u r e of good faith-which h a s recently b e e n totally
lacking. The a t m o s p h e r e of reconciliation a t the conference allowed
p r o g r e s s i n Egyptian-Saudi relations only up to a c e r t a i n point. Nass e r and King Saud soon established a friendly, talking relationship
t h a t indicated a political direction, but the distance traveled toward the
goal of final understanding w a s only enough to e n s u r e f u r t h e r t a l k w i t h
Crown P r i n c e F a i s a l , the t r u e r u l e r who absented himself f r o m the
euphoria in C a i r o and who was in a position to disavow any of his brothe r ' s commitments.
Both s i d e s know that t h e r e m u s t ultimately be some kind of s o lution to the future of Yemen, and both s i d e s have played t h e i r c a r d s
well. Though F a i s a l now s e e m s to b e i n the s t r o n g e r bargaining position b e c a u s e of the frightening c o s t s of maintaining UAR t r o o p s , N a s s e r holds s o m e s t r o n g t r u m p s . The biggest i s probably his influence
over the i m p a c t of the A r a b revolution on Saudi A r a b i a ; the Saudi p r i n c e s
a r e a s vulnerable to the a t t a c k s of Voice of the A r a b s a s any group i n
the Middle E a s t . Another N a s s e r t r u m p i s the d e m o n s t r a t i o n of h i s
l e a d e r s h i p a t the s u m m i t conference, the e a s e with which he w a s able
to i s o l a t e S y r i a and Saudi A r a b i a , and the magic by which he w a s able
to gain acceptance a l m o s t overnight f o r a r a d i c a l r e o r d e r i n g of h i s own
A r a b policy. Since the conference, both Arif and Ben Bella have been
personally involved i n mediation efforts between N a s s e r and F a i s a l ,
and, filled with public e n t h u s i a s m about the sudden n e c e s s i t y to " c l e a r
the a i r " between a l l A r a b s t a t e s , they have finally (through t h e i r p e r sonal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ) succeeded in a r r a n g i n g a meeting in Riyadh of
two UAR v i c e - p r e s i d e n t s with Crown P r i n c e F a i s a l , a n intelligent m a n
who h a s c e r t a i n l y r e a l i z e d that N a s s e r ' s e s p o u s a l of the c a u s e of gene r a l reconciliation h a s b e c o m e a g e n e r a l Arab p r e s s u r e on himself.
The f a c t that a meeting i s i n the offing probably m e a n s that a b a s i s f o r
d i s c u s s i o n of the Yemeni problem h a s b e e n a l r e a d y a g r e e d upon. The
bargaining will be s h a r p and may take many meetings, but the d i r e c tion i s c l e a r .
Nobody a t the conference really expected that t h e r e would be a
reconciliation between S y r i a and the UAR, though a t one point i t did
look a s i f (in one o b s e r v e r ' s words) "the unity kick" w a s getting out of
hand. But r e l a t i o n s between N a s s e r and the Syrian Baath r e m a i n e d
cool and c o r r e c t , and the isolation of Amin el-Hafez proceeded s o well
t h a t i t m a y even have been overdone. A s f a r a s c a n b e d e t e r m i n e d , the
Syrian l e a d e r had a p r i v a t e meeting with only one o t h e r head of s t a t e
(Abdul S a l a m Arif), and even Salah B i t a r , the deputy of the Syrian d e l egation and a m a n widely known f o r moderation, saw the other heads of
s t a t e only briefly and abortively. According to a n Egyptian r e p o r t , Ha-
AWH- ~ ' 6 4
f e z contributed to his own isolation by making b e l l i g e r e n t r e c o m m e n dations and providing the c o n f e r e e s with d e t a i l s of the m i l i t a r y f o r c e
that he himself would use i n c a r r y i n g the recommendations out; Bourguiba then spoke with a t o l e r a n t F r e n c h - t y p e logic that m a d e Hafez app e a r i m m a t u r e , and N a s s e r brought f u r t h e r d i s c r e d i t by demonstrating
that Hafez' f i g u r e s on Syrian m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h w e r e considerably m o r e
glowing than those given by h i s own Syrian chief of staff a t a League
meeting held a month previously. A S y r i a n r e p o r t , on the o t h e r hand,
explains Hafez' behavior by s t r e s s i n g the Syrian conviction that, despite
a g r e e m e n t s , the proceedings of the conference would not finally b e s e c r e t , and that, a s in the c a s e of the A p r i l 1963 unity talks, the UAR
might even publish conversations verbatim-and that f o r his S y r i a n
i m a g e , Hafez apparently feels his p o s t u r e m u s t be w a r l i k e . Whatever
the t r u t h of t h e s e r e p o r t s , i t i s c e r t a i n that Hafez f e l t himself isolated,
and i t i s a f a i r guess that he r e s e n t e d i t . He and B i t a r m a d e a l a s t a t tempt to do something about this by staying on f o r 2 4 h o u r s a f t e r the
end of the conference in the hopes of seeing N a s s e r , but no interview
was granted and Hafez had to be content with a handshake a t the a i r p o r t .
One Egyptian purpose in proposing a s u m m i t conference was to
bind S y r i a to a common A r a b policy that the UAR could live with and to
k e e p S y r i a f r o m r a s h m i l i t a r y a c t s that could e m b r o i l the UAR in a w a r
with I s r a e l . Did the isolation of S y r i a contribute to the accomplishment
of t h i s p u r p o s e ? The knowledge in S y r i a that Hafez and the Baath w e r e
humiliated a t the A r a b s u m m i t will probably not bring a closing of r a n k s
and a strengthening of the Baath position; in that unstable land, the humiliation i s m o r e likely to be understood a s a need f o r change-and that
Hafez s e e m e d to a g r e e with this prognosis i s d e m o n s t r a t e d by his l a s t minute a t t e m p t s to have a publicized talk with N a s s e r The danger now
i s that Hafez, w e a k e r internally a s a r e s u l t of isolation, w i l l t r y to bols t e r h i s position by embarking on s o m e kind of m i l i t a r y adventure. Despite the a g r e e m e n t on a unified m i l i t a r y command, what i s t h e r e really
to p r e v e n t h i m f r o m engaging in s o m e e a r l y and provocative w a t e r diversion-and a l l "in the s p i r i t of the s u m m i t 1 ' - s o n e a r to I s r a e l that i t
m u s t b r i n g a m i l i t a r y r e a c t i o n ? P e r h a p s the Egyptian calculation i s
t h a t the humiliation of Hafez will b r i n g a change of r e g i m e b e f o r e Hafez
h a s a chance to b e m i l i t a r i l y r a s h . If t h e r e h a s b e e n a miscalculation,
i t will not be the f i r s t time that Egypt h a s misunderstood the Syrian p e r sonality.
.
The f o r m a l r e s u l t s of the conference a r e embodied i n a s t a t e m e n t dated J a n u a r y 17, 1964. The Council of the Kings and Heads of
State of the A r a b League, i t s a y s , "has adopted the p r a c t i c a l r e s o l u tions, both defensive and technical, e s s e n t i a l to warding off the i m m i nent Zionist menace." The Council a l s o reached "unanimous a g r e e ment to s e t t l e a l l differences and c l e a r the A r a b a t m o s p h e r e of a l l
b l e m i s h e s and to suspend a l l campaigns by information m e d i a ; and to
consolidate relations between the Arab s i s t e r s t a t e s , to e n s u r e collective co-operative reconstruction, and to w a r d off the a g g r e s s i v e expansionist d e s i g n s menacing a l l A r a b s alike." The s t a t e m e n t goes on to
say that "the convening of m o r e of these meetings a t the highest level
i s a m a t t e r of v i t a l A r a b i n t e r e s t " and that the next s u m m i t meeting
will be held i n Alexandria i n August 1964. The s t a t e m e n t speaks a l s o
of the P a l e s t i n e "entity" and what i t s r o l e m u s t be in the liberation of
the fatherland, and it h a s quite a few additional r e m a r k s about the international position of the A r a b world.
Behind and beside t h i s f o r m a l s t a t e m e n t , t h e r e a r e r e s u l t s of
considerable i n t e r e s t . The s t a t e m e n t ' s r e f e r e n c e to "defensive and
technical'' resolutions alludes to Arab plans to d i v e r t the J o r d a n w a t e r s
in v a r i o u s ways so that the w a t e r s cannot be used by I s r a e l and to d e fend those d i v e r s i o n s with m i l i t a r y f o r c e . As announced a t a p r e s s
conference given by the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l of the A r a b League, the
A r a b d i v e r s i o n a r y w o r k s will involve bringing the w a t e r s of the H a s bani and the Banyas into the Litani r i v e r s y s t e m , which e m p t i e s into
the M e d i t e r r a n e a n on the c o a s t of Lebanon, o r sending t h e m by canal
o v e r to the Yarmuk s y s t e m in S y r i a and J o r d a n ; t h e w o r k s w i l l a l s o involve the f u r t h e r development of the Y a r m u k i r r i g a t i o n s y s t e m in J o r d a n .
The d i v e r s i o n a r y plans have both positive and negative a s p e c t s : the negative a s p e c t e n t a i l s diverting the w a t e r so that i t cannot be used by I s r a e l (and t h i s , said the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l , will take between 18 months
and two y e a r s ) , and the positive a s p e c t i s the use of the w a t e r by the
A r a b s t h e m s e l v e s ( t h i s will take l o n g e r ) . The negative a s p e c t will c o s t
a total of six and one q u a r t e r million Egyptian pounds for work that
m a y s t a r t a s e a r l y a s May of this y e a r . A unified m i l i t a r y command
(with the Egyptian Aly Aly A m e r a s c o m m a n d e r in chief) will have i t s
h e a d q u a r t e r s in the UAR and will have both s o l d i e r s and a budget a t i t s
d i s p o s a l . P l a n s have been made f o r "all m i l i t a r y eventualities
."
All this has something of a f a i r y - t a l e quality, though some v e r y
s o b e r A r a b s believe i t i s not just talk. The d i v e r s i o n a r y w o r k s planned
f o r the Hasbani and the Banyas will be in Lebanon, w h e r e the L e b a n e s e
will have g r a v e doubts concerning the c o m m i s s i o n of provocative a c t s
on t h e i r soil-and g r a v e r doubts about the p r e s e n c e of non-Lebanese
A r a b defensive f o r c e s . The feasibility s t u d i e s n e c e s s a r y to m a j o r d i v e r s i o n a r y w o r k s take a long time, and t h e r e h a s been no evidence that
AWH- 1- '64
the engineering groundwork h a s b e e n a s well laid a s some non-engin e e r s a r e claiming. Nor i s i t y e t c l e a r that the A r a b plans really env i s a g e taking m o r e w a t e r than the Johnston P l a n allotted in 1955. Without this, the I s r a e l i s would have l i t t l e r e a s o n to complain. A s f o r the
unified m i l i t a r y command, it i s a t the m o m e n t no m o r e than a paper
a r r a n g e m e n t ; s o f a r no troops f r o m one Arab country have been s t a tioned defensively on the s o i l of a n o t h e r . T h e r e a r e a dozen o t h e r
doubts that a r e being e x p r e s s e d by the cynics- the A r a b plans provide
plenty of t i m e , they say, and t i m e changes a l l plans.
F r o m the Egyptian viewpoint, i t m a y not m a t t e r too much
whether i t i s p a r t l y a f a i r y t a l e o r not. The Egyptians a r e pretending
t h a t they a r e perfectly s e r i o u s , and p e r h a p s they a r e ; but what i s i m portant i s that the responsibility f o r a common Arab plan h a s b e e n
s p r e a d to other A r a b s t a t e s , including S y r i a . If the A r a b d i v e r s i o n a r y
w o r k s a r e subject to e n d l e s s d e l a y s , i t will not be the fault of the UAR,
which w i l l b e giving e v e r y support. If they a r e in fact put into o p e r a tion, and i f the I s r a e l i s e i t h e r by g u e r r i l l a t a c t i c s o r by f o r m a l attack
blow t h e m up, I s r a e l will b e c l e a r l y the a g g r e s s o r . In the m e a n t i m e ,
under the sign of a n I s r a e l i t h r e a t , the UAR c a n move steadily forward
with i t s new policy of co-operation with A r a b governments, enhancing
i t s l e a d e r s h i p and coming to t e r m s with Saudi Arabia-and d i s c r e d i t ing the S y r i a n B a a t h whenever possible.
[ p h o t o g r a p h s c o u r t e s y A1 A h r a m , ~ a i.] r ~