Burundi Conflict Risk Assessment‐ February 2016 Mathieu Bélanger, Liam Gardner‐Murphy, Catherine Giugovaz, and Samantha Nicholl INAF5203‐ Prof. Carment February 4, 2016 Background Since gaining independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi has been racked by successive waves of political violence. In the past fifty years, Burundi has suffered three civil conflicts, eight attempted coups d’etat, and two genocides.i The most devastating conflict began in 1993 and was fuelled by instability in neighbouring Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The 2005 Arusha Accords brought the conflict to an end and initiated a process of political reform and military demobilization. In May 2015, President Nurunziza announced he would run for a third term leading to mass protests. Following an attempted coup in June 2015, President Nkurunziza was re‐elected amidst allegations of intimidation. Violence escalated dramatically in December 2015 with rebel factions launching coordinated attacks across Burundi and the government carrying out reprisal attacks. The United Nations has estimated that more than 200,000 people have fled Burundi and hundreds of people have been killed since the June 2015 elections.ii In January 2016, Amnesty International reported evidence of mass graves on the outskirts of Bujumbura.iii Stakeholders Internal Stakeholders Actor Military Government Opposition Actor African Union Regional Impact Effects The Burundi military has a history of orchestrating coups against both Tutsi and Hutu leaders.iv It is currently Destabilizing regarded as Tutsi dominated and unified with instances of Tutsi officers leaving to support opposition groups.v The CNDD‐FDD party gained power under President Nkurunziza and reduced or abolished many checks and Destabilizing balances on political power.vi Corruption remains endemic in the Burundi political system.vii Additionally, President Nkurunziza has decided to seek an unconstitutional third term leading to political turmoil.viii Traditionally, tension has existed along ethnic lines between Hutus and Tutsis; however, more recent hostility has ix
been between rival Hutu factions.
Antagonistic and authoritarian behaviour on behalf of the government towards Mixed opposition groups has pushed them towards boycotting elections and utilizing more violent means of protest.x External Stakeholders
Impact Effects The AU recently abandoned their plan to forcefully enter Burundi due to the aggressive anti‐interventionist stance taken by President Nkurunziza.xi If the AU proves unable to dynamically engage itself in Burundi, the country may Mixed slide into more pronounced conflict.xii With over 230,000 refugees fleeing Burundi, the potential for instability in the surrounding states is of concern.xiii The Great Lakes region has a history of rebel Hutu and Tutsi groups using the porous borders between states to Mixed cause political stability throughout the region.xiv States, such as Rwanda and the DRC, are already fragile and any intensification of violence in Burundi (especially along ethnic lines) stands to diminish regional stability.xv 1 United Nations Stabilizing The UN has been a positive force due to its promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Burundi and its encouragement of peaceful mediation.xvi Secretary‐ General Ban Ki‐moon met with multiple regional organizations, including the AU, to directly engage regional leaders on the impending crisis in Burundi.xvii Risk Assessment Indicators Governance and Political Instability Unstable/ Deteriorating (‐) The ruling party, CNDD‐FDD, dominates the executive, legislative and judiciary braches of the government despite a constitutional requirement to share power.xviii There is also a limited separation of power between the executive and the judiciary.xix (‐) In June 2013, President Nkurunziza approved broad new media laws restricting press freedom.xx There are increasing levels of hostility and violence directed towards journalists by government forces.xxi (‐) In 2015, there was a failed coup attempt by the army indicating that legitimate channels for peaceful opposition have narrowed.xxii (‐) In 2015, President Nkurunziza won a third term despite mass protest and constitutional limits.xxiii (‐) Security forces have been accused of using excessive force against civilians.xxiv Crimes, particularly crimes related to sexual and political violence, are vastly underreported and rarely investigated by the police.xxv (+) In 2014, Burundi’s parliament blocked attempts by the ruling party to impose changes to the constitution.xxvi Assessment
The political situation in Burundi has deteriorated significantly with increasing reports of human rights violations by both government and opposition forcesxxvii, targeted violence and unlawful arrests of opposition membersxxviii, new laws restricting press freedomxxix and reports of intimidation and fraud by the government during the past two election periods strongly indicating a movement towards an autocratic regime. Demographic Stress Unstable/ Deteriorating
(‐) Population density has increased steadily since the 1970s with an average of 421 people per square km of land.xxx Burundi has the second largest population density in Sub‐Saharan Africa.xxxi (‐) Annual population growth has remained constant at 3.3% per year with a current population of 10.82 billion.xxxii (‐) Very high fertility rate with the average woman bearing 6 children during her lifetime placing additional stress on state institutions.xxxiii (‐) The number of refugees seeking asylum in Burundi has risen steadily in the past several years reaching 52, 936 in 2014.xxxiv (‐) 45.64% of the total population is 14 years old or younger and 19.23% of the total population is between 15‐24 years old creating a significant youth bulge in the population.xxxv Youth unemployment has also remained steady at around 10.7%xxxvi Assessment
The high percentage of youth in the country combined with youth unemployment levels has placed additional stress on state services and has greatly increased social unrest within the population. The high percentage of disenfranchised youth also provides a recruitment pool for the government youth militia, the Imbonerakure, who have been accused of carrying out acts of violence.xxxvii The number of refugees seeking asylum in Burundi is also at its highest level since 1995 placing significant stress on state infrastructure.xxxviii 2 Militarization Unstable/ Deteriorating (+) DDR and SSR process resulting from the Arusha Accords helped to integrate previously opposing armed forces.xxxix The Burundian National Defense Force (NDF) is composed of 50% Hutu and 50% Tutsi soldiers.xl (+) Overall military expenditure (%GDP) remains relatively high (2.0%), but has declined steadily over the past decade toward regional average.xli (‐) Former Minister of Defence General Gaciyubwenge was sacked after the failed coup attempt and replaced by a Nkurunziza loyalist, Emmanuel Ntahomvukiye.xlii Since Gaciyubwenge’s departure there are growing reports of NDF defections to opposition groups. xliii (‐) Suppression of protestors has taken on new and brutal forms with accusations coming from NGOs that security forces have employed rape and torture against civilians.xliv Assessment
The Burundian NDF was successfully integrated with rebel factions following the Arusha Accords. Since political protests began in 2015, the NDF has been increasingly deployed alongside police forces to violently suppress dissidents. There are growing reports of defections along ethnic lines and atrocities committed by the NDF. History of Armed Conflict Unstable
(‐) Military regimes held power from 1966‐93 with dictators violently suppressing dissent, most notably in large‐scale massacres of Hutus throughout the 1970’s and 80’s. (‐) The 1993 assassination of an elected Hutu moderate by the largely Tutsi‐dominated military sparked a decade of civil war.xlv (‐) Nearly 225,000 Burundian refugees have fled to neighbouring countries (Tanzania, Rwanda, DRC, and Uganda) since April 2015.xlvi There are reports that Burundian refugees are being targeted in Rwanda for recruitment into non‐state armed groups.xlvii Assessment
Burundi has experienced prolonged periods of intrastate violence since independence. The potential to mobilize war through the manipulation of ethnicity remains a reality and is often exploited by the elites. Evidence of arbitrary killings being committed by state security forces, and the recent discovery of mass graves, suggests that there is sustained low‐level violence in Bujumbura. As a result, there has been a mass exodus of Burundians into neighbouring countries, including much of the opposition. Population Heterogeneity Stable (+/‐) Ethnic groups include Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%), and Twa (1%)xlviii although they share the same culture, history, and language.xlix (+/‐) Resistance to the Hutu President has thus far been united across ethnic lines although there are reports that the majority of violence is carried out by security forces in Tutsi neighbourhoods.l (‐) The government has been actively trying to manipulate ethnicity in order to spark fear and distract from a political crisis.li Assessment
Historically, there has been tension between the Hutus and the Tutsis. The potential for ethnicity to be used as a justification for violence is high. In particular, political power continues to be an area where ethnic relations are easily manipulated. 3 International Linkages
Stable/Unstable & Improving/ Deteriorating
(+) Burundi is a member of the East African Community (EAC) who is leading mediation efforts. (+/‐) The AU PSC ambassadors proposed sending a force of 5,000 peacekeepers to Burundi against the consent of President Nkurunzizalii but later agreed to send a high‐level delegation to initiate peace talks instead.liii (‐) Declining relations with Rwanda exacerbate the refugee crisis. There are reports that Rwanda’s army has been recruiting and training rebels to fight against Nkurunziza.liv Assessment
Neighbourhood instability is a cause for concern in Burundi. Burundi‐Rwanda relations are deteriorating with allegations of the Rwandan army recruiting and training Burundian rebels.lv The EAC has been unmotivated and unsuccessful in mediation efforts and there is a lack of commitment by the international community. There is potential for further deterioration of intrastate relations. Economic Performance
Unstable/ Deteriorating (+) GDP growth rates and overall GDP per capita have improved steadily over the past decade. Annual GDP growth is at 4.7% (ahead of the 4.4% regional average) and GDP per capita has increased from $704 in 2006 to $758 in 2015.lvilvii (‐) 50% of the national budget is sourced through international development assistance. (‐) Political instability has impeded market activity in Bujumbura, which accounts for 55% of Burundi’s economic output. Rates of inflation for basic commodities in the capital have increased from 7.2% to 11.7% in two months.lviii Assessment
Burundi’s economy remains poorly diversified and heavily dependent on external aid. Approximately 50% of the national budget is sourced through development assistance. Government revenue is likely to continue to fall as political instability interrupts market activities. Human Development Stable
(‐) 48% of the population has access to sanitation facilities. (‐) Low average life expectancy (56.3 years)lix; High child mortality (54 deaths per 1,000 live births).lx (‐) Low net enrolment rate with only 21% of secondary school age children registered.lxi Assessment
Human development has not improved significantly over the past decade and life expectancy remains low. The high influx of refugees from neighbouring countries over the past several years coupled with the high population rate in Burundi has stressed health care and education services. Environmental Stress
Unstable / Deteriorating
(‐) 90% of Burundians rely on subsistence farming and the average size of a family owned farm has decreased from 9‐12 acres (1970) to approximately one acre (2015).lxii (‐)Burundi remains severely exposed to the impacts of flooding and drought. The country is anticipating heavy storms resulting from the El Nino 4 system; flooding has already destroyed hundreds of hectares of crops and one dam used for irrigation.lxiii Major floods in the capital killed more than 50 people in early 2014.lxiv Assessment
Burundi is vulnerable to severe agricultural disruptions in the wake of natural disasters. Heavy rains resulting in flooding are likely to destroy crops, creating food scarcity and further reducing revenue from exports. Scenarios Best Case Worst Case Most Likely Concerted international pressure compels President Nkurunziza to participate in mediation with opposition groups. Government agrees to lift restrictions on independent media and frees political prisoners. Tension with neighbouring Rwanda is reduced through EAC‐supported interstate dialogue. Nkurunziza agrees to restart the postponed constitutional review of the Arusha Accords. Burundi allows UN observers back into the country to investigate allegations of human rights abuses committed by both sides. Resumption of international aid helps to prevent food shortages and stabilize flagging economy. Nkurunziza abandons proposed mediation, accusing opposition groups of instigating violence. The Burundian government intensifies crackdown on opposition neighbourhoods and begins arming the Imbonerakure. Violence becomes increasingly salient along ethnic lines and reports of human rights violations increase dramatically. International community responds by further cutting aid flows, exacerbating food shortages and crippling the economy. Heightened rhetoric from Nkurunziza prompts escalation from Rwandan government, leading to increased cross‐border flow of armed groups and overall regional destabilization. Failure of government to effectively manage existing demographic strains (including refugees pushed back from Rwandan border) creates further hardship for those displaced by violence. Burundian government agrees in principle to mediation; however talks collapse due to accusations of both sides operating in bad faith. Demands of opposition groups are not met and the CNDD‐FDD will continue to dominate all branches of government. The Burundian government continues to postpone the constitutional review of the Arusha Accords, citing national instability. Low‐level violence continues in opposition neighbourhoods, and security forces respond severely to subsequent attacks against government/military sites. Restrictions on independent media remain in place. Reports of human rights violations will continue to emerge, however external intervention will be unable to mobilize in the face of outright hostility from the Burundian government. 5 i
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2014 xlii Nina Wilen, Gerard Birantamije &David Ambrosett, “Is Burundi Still a Credible Peacekeeper?”, The Washington Post (May 23, 2015). xliii “Update‐ Burundi Local Data on Recent Unrest – 26 April 2015 – 16 January 2016,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, http://www.crisis.acleddata.com/update‐burundi‐local‐data‐on‐recent‐unrest‐26‐apr‐2015‐16‐january‐2016/ (Accessed January 29, 2016). xliv “Burundi ‐ Crisis Watch No. 149,” International Crisis Group, January 4, 2016. xlv
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There was evidence shown to Refugee International investigators as proof of enlistment. Additionally, Rwandan police were said to be involved. “Asylum Betrayed: Recruitment of Burundian Refugees in Rwanda”, Refugees International, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2015/12/14/rwanda (February 2, 2016). xlviii
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The AU decides to deploy an African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) for 6 months. This mission would be responsible for preventing further deterioration of the security situation and creating an environment where peaceful negotiations can be held. Peace and Security Council. Communique. 565th Meeting. 17 December 2015. http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc‐565‐comm‐burundi‐17‐12‐2015.pdf liii
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today/are‐african‐heads‐of‐state‐dropping‐the‐ball‐in‐burundi liv
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2014‐000019‐bdi (January 27, 2016). 8