Bad Civil Society
Author(s): Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein
Source: Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 6 (Dec., 2001), pp. 837-865
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BAD CIVIL SOCIETY
SIMONECHAMBERS
JEFFREYKOPSTEIN
Universityof Colorado at Boulder
O
n July 4, 1999, BenjaminSmith,a memberof the WorldChurchof the
Creator,went on a shootingrampagetargetingJews, AfricanAmericans,and
Asian Americans.Despite the Church'sdisavowalof any connectionor support for his actions, one look at the Web site of the WorldChurchof the Creatormakes it quite clear where Mr. Smith nurturedhis hatredand fear. The
WorldChurchof the Creatorpromotesandfostersmanyof the "goods"associated with civil society, however.Participantslearn cooperationand trust.
They acquirea sense of belonging and perhapsmeaning in their lives. They
develop the virtuesof civility and sacrifice,at least amongthemselves. They
are asked to rise above narrowself-interestand take on a perspectiveof the
group.But the WorldChurchof the Creator,even withoutthe madacts of one
derangedindividualwho merely broughtthis group to our attention,is an
example of bad civil society. Its existence and the existence of many other
similargroupsasks us to rethinkandperhapstake a differentperspectiveon
the "civil society argument."'
The gist of the civil society argument,which has received a greatdeal of
attentionof late, goes somethinglike this: a robust,strong,and vibrantcivil
society strengthensand enhancesliberaldemocracy.2But a civil society full
of WorldChurchesof the Creatorclearlywould not performthis function.Is
this a seriousworry?Althoughit is not likely thatAmericancivic life is going
to be overrunby such organizations,we do feel thatnot enough attentionhas
been paidto the theoreticalandempiricaldilemmasthatthe existence of such
AUTHORS'NOTE:Theauthorswish to thankPrinceton 's UniversityCenterforHuman Values
and Centerof InternationalStudiesfor supportwhile writing this essay. Wewould also like to
thank Bob Amdur,Ronnie Beiner, Sheri Berman, Michael Bernhard, John Fanestil, Amy
Gutmann,JeffreyIsaac, GeorgeKateb,David Mapel, and Mark Warrenas well as participants
of the Political Theory Colloquium at Princeton and the Seminarfor Social and Political
Thoughtat Columbiafor helpful commentson earlier draftsof this essay.
POLITICAL
Vol.29 No. 6, December
2001 837-865
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? 2001SagePublications
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groupsraise.3One possible reasonfor the lack of interestand concernabout
bad groups in the civil society literaturecan be found in the genesis of the
civil society argument.4
Therearemanyversions of the civil society argument,often divergingon
the issue of exactly how civil society andassociationalparticipationenhance
liberaldemocracy.Defendersof manyversionsof the argumentare in agreement,however,concerningthe negativehypothesis:the destructionor disappearanceof associationallife signals the demise of democracy.The negative
thesis arose out of two opposite but eerily similarpathologiesfacing democratic orders(or potential democraticorders)in the late twentiethcentury:
atomistic individualism,on one hand, and isolating totalitarianism,on the
other.The formeris thoughtto underminedemocracyby denudingcitizens of
any of the skills, interests,anddispositionsnecessaryto makeliberaldemocracywork.The latterdestroysthe potentialfor democracyby forcingcitizens
to retreatinto isolation from fear of the state.
In both cases, we see civil society addressingthe debilitatingaffects of
depoliticizationand withdrawalthat are potentiallydevastatingfor democracy.If the questionis, Whichis betterfor democracy,self-absorbedindividualism or associationalparticipation?the answerseems to be clear:associationalparticipationholds morepromisefor democracy.The answeris notjust
clear but glaringly obvious in the case of totalitarianism.We must choose
autonomous self-organization over frightened isolation as the friend of
democracyeverytime. But whatif this is no longerthe question?Certainlyin
EasternEuropeit is no longerthe obviousquestion.InAmerica,it is not clear
if it was everthe rightquestion,as Americanshavealwaysbeenjoiners andit
is now hotly contestedwhetherthatpatternof participationis in decline.5The
more importantquestion facing us is what type of civil society promotes
democracy.In otherwords,the choice is not reallybetweenisolationandparticipation but ratherbetween different types of participation.But in this
debate, few are talking abouttypes of participationthat underminedemocracy. Although many acknowledge that participationis no panacea, the
debateoften proceedsas if it were. We want to talk aboutcivic participation
thatweakens liberaldemocracy.We want to talk aboutbad civil society.
In this essay, then, we make three claims. (1) The problem of bad civil
society is moreseriousforthe civil society argumentthanis usuallyacknowledged even in stable democracieslike the United States. (2) The problemof
badcivil society requiresthe introductionof a comparativeanalysisto get the
rightangle on the problem.We will arguethatthe rightangle involves asking
the question, Why do people join "bad"organizations?and this is partially
answeredby looking at places where a lot of people do join such organizations. (3) We will argue that socioeconomic factors are very importantin
Chambers,Kopstein/ BAD CIVIL SOCIETY
839
understandingwhy people join "bad"organizations,and this in turnmeans
that we need to put civil society theory back into contact with some traditional issues of social justice.
We begin with a section (I) outliningsome examples of civil association
that appearto underminethe civil society argument.We then very briefly
introducea comparativeperspectiveon civil society that highlights socioeconomic factors influencing group membershipchoice (II). The four sections that follow discuss possible responses to bad civil society including
argumentsthatsee badcivil society as an issue of containment(III),as a freedom of associationissue (IV), as a moraleducationissue (V), and finally as
an issue of democratic efficacy (VI). We argue that although all these
approachesoffer interestinginsightsintothe role andsignificanceof associations, they often fail to acknowledgeand addressthe problemeitherby way
of a discussion of the causes of bad civil society or the solutions to bad civil
society. We concludewith a call for theoristsin theirdiscussionof civil society to reengageeconomics and questionsof basic welfareandmaterialsecurity thatwere once core elements of political philosophy (VII).
A finalwordaboutwhatwe meanby bad civil society. Forthe purposesof
this essay, we understandbad civil society to refer to something narrower
thangeneralilliberaland antidemocratictendencies.In the firstplace, we do
not want to deny that a legitimate and indeed positive role of associations
sometimesinvolves resistingandcontestingthe liberalstate.We do not want
to insist on what Nancy Rosenblumhas called "congruence"-the idea that
only groups that actively and directly promoteliberal values are valuable.6
Indeed, we do not want to enter the debate about what promotes liberal
democracy at all. Thus, we do not offer a full theory of civil society that
would, amongotherthings,catalogueall the ways thatassociationallife in all
its guises can supportandstrengthena politicalcultureorbe valuableto individuals or offer some good. We will leave this to others.7Furthermore,we do
not offer a full definitionof civil society beyond saying thatwhateverelse it
includes, it includes voluntaryassociations.Again, many othershave taken
the lead in this.8
We have chosen a minimal and negativeapproachto the question of bad
civil society. It is minimal because we only investigateone value that we
argueis a necessarybutfarfromsufficientconditionfor the long-termviability of liberalism. We call this value the value of reciprocity.Reciprocity
involvesthe recognitionof othercitizens, even those with whom one has deep
disagreement,as moral agents deserving civility. Our approachis negative
because we do not investigateall the ways to promotethis value so much as
look at associations that actively and publicly challenge this value through
the promotionof hate, bigotry,racism, anti-Semitism,and aggressivexeno-
840
POLITICALTHEORY/ December2001
phobia. The questionhere is not whethergroupsdiscriminatein theirmembership,althoughit is hardto imagine a groupthatpublicly advocatedsome
form of hate that did not discriminate.The question is about whethertheir
statedvalues, beliefs, creed, agenda,ideology, or platformis clearly incompatiblewith a belief in equal moralconsideration.9We are investigatingthe
causes of one particularpathologyof civil society: groupsthatadvocatehate
and bigotry. We are justified in taking this narrowcase because, although
manythingsmay undermineliberaldemocracy,nothingdestroysit (or makes
it impossible to build) fasterthanhate.
I. BOWLINGWITHFARRAKHAN
In 1995, RobertPutnampublisheda now famous articletitled "Bowling
Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," which has been recently
expanded into a book under the same title. In both studies, he defends a
Tocquevillianview that stresses the "importanceof a strongand active civil
society to the consolidation of democracy."'lWhereas many scholars had
accepted Tocqueville's assessment that American democracy had experienced a successful consolidationprecisely because of its strong and active
civil society, Putnam argues that "there is striking evidence . . . that the
vibrancyof Americancivil society has notablydeclinedoverthe past several
decades.""He cites much evidence in defense of this claim, butthe example
thatfurnishedthe title of the articleandbook has become the posterchild of
civic decline:"Between 1980 and 1993 the totalnumberof bowlersin America increasedby 10 percent,while league bowling decreasedby 40 percent."
The social significanceof the rise of solo bowling "lies in the social interaction andoccasionalcivic conversationsoverbeer andpizza thatsolo bowlers
forgo."12Bowling alone does not produce"social capital";thatis, it does not
produce the "networks,norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination
and cooperationfor mutualbenefit."13
We have no quarrelwith this argument.It probablyis the case thatthe rise
of solo bowling signals a social shift thathas implicationsfor the characterof
civil society. Ourproblemwith Putnamis on the otherside of the argument.It
is the assumptionthatbowling in a leaguewill producethe sortof social capital thatwill strengthenratherthanunderminedemocracy.As the title of this
section implies, thatdependson who makesup one's league andwhat sortof
substantivebeliefs are being reinforcedin the "occasional civic conversations"thatgo on while one bowls. In his earlierwork, Putnamarguedthatas
long as associationsare not verticallyorganized,they foster the right sort of
social capital. He now admits that he failed to acknowledgethat a "whites
Chambers,Kopstein/ BAD CIVIL SOCIETY
841
only" bowling league would not createthe same kind of social capitalas an
integratedone. The lessons of trustand solidarity,of developingan "I"into a
"we,"do not strengthendemocracywhen the trust,solidarity,and the "we"
are such thatthey do not go beyondthe groupin question.As Amy Gutmann
has succinctly put it,
Among its members,the Ku Klux Klan may cultivate solidarityand trust, reduce the
incentivesfor opportunism,anddevelop some "I's"into a "we"... (but)... the associational premises of these solidaristicties are hatred,degradation,and denigrationof fellow citizens and fellow humanbeings.14
We need to recognizethe differencebetweenparticularistcivility anda more
democraticcivility. Particularistcivility containsall the goods thatare associated with participation(trust,public spiritedness,self-sacrifice), but only
between membersof a particulargroup,and it often encouragesthe opposite
sortof attitudeto membersoutside of the group.Democraticcivility, in contrast,extends the goods learnedin participationto all citizens regardlessof
groupmembership.
Putnam has since revised his theory of social capital in an attemptto
addresssome of these problems.We do not feel the revisions arecompletely
satisfactory,however.In the introductorychapterof BowlingAlone, Putnam
admitsthat"SocialCapital,in short,can be directedtowardmalevolent,antisocial purposes,just like any otherform of capital.... Thereforeit is importantto ask how the positive consequencesof social capital... can be maximized andthe negativemanifestations... minimized."'5Putnamthennotes a
number of distinctions that are helpful in this regard,the most important
being between social capital that stresses bridging and social capital that
emphasizes bonding. Bonding involves looking inward and tends to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups. Bridging, by contrast,
involves making connectionsacross social, ethnic, and political cleavages.
This is, as Putnamnotes, an importantdistinction;it is not able, however,
to distinguishbad from good social capitalany more thanhis originalundifferentiated model could. Bonding includes such diverse groups as
"church-basedwomen's readinggroups, ethnic fraternalorganizations,and
fashionablecountryclubs."'6While admittingthatbondingandbridgingmay
be in tension, Putnaminsists that bonding is as importantas bridging, and
many of his examples of good social capitalare heavy on the bonding function, for example, neighborhoodor churchties. To deal with the problemof
"malevolent"social capital,one would have to look more deeply into bonding and ask which bonding actively discourageswhat we have called democratic civility.We believe thatthis cannotbe assessed withouttakingup the
842
POLITICALTHEORY/ December2001
ideological content and substantive messages that members receive.
Knowingthata church-basedwomen's readinggroupis an essentiallybonding experiencedoes not tell you whetherthey arereadingTheTurnerDiaries
or The ColorPurple. In any case, Putnamnevertakes up these sortsof questions or even the generaltheme of bondingversusbridging,because, finding
"no reliable, comprehensive, nationwide measures of social capital that
neatly distinguish'bridgingness'and 'bondingness' . . . this distinctionwill
be less prominent[in the book] than I would prefer."'7And indeed, it is not
discussed in any analytic or sociologically rigorousway.18
While moreandmorescholars,like Putnam,arerecognizingthata vibrant
civil society can containelements that are an anathemato democracy,there
remainsa lingering,neo-Tocquevillianenthusiasmfor participationas such,
especially when it is conceived, as Putnamconceives it, as a choice between
civic engagement and individual apathy.Even Nancy Rosenblum, who is
skepticalof a generalpolitical effect of associationalmembership,nevertheless notes a generalmoralsignificance:"thechief and constantcontribution
of associationsto moraldevelopmentis cultivatingthe dispositionto cooperate."'9But the moralsignificanceof cooperationmustbe tied to the question,
Cooperationwith whom?Cultivatingthe dispositionto cooperatewith members of one's own race might be better describedas moral decline than as
development.Rosenblum,like so manyothers,includingthose she criticizes
for theirTocquevillianexcesses, sees civil society throughtraditionalliberal/
communitariancategories:civil society is an antidoteto anomie,apathy,and
isolation.Whatwe argueis thatthisperspectivefails to see thatsometimesthe
cureis worse thanthe disease. In additionto looking at associationsfromthe
point of view of participationversus nonparticipation,we suggest that the
political and moralsignificanceof associationsalso requiresthatwe look at
associations from the point of view of the substantivevalues that are promoted within associations.Fromthis perspective,the political value of civil
society for democracyclearly becomes a contingentaffair.As two critics of
civil society literatureput it, "if civil society is a beachheadsecureenoughto
be of use in thwartingtyrannicalregimes,whatpreventsit frombeing used to
underminedemocraticgovernments?"20
The WeimarRepublichad a vibrantand well-organizedcivil society that
gave birthto andnurturedthe Nazi movement.21High levels of associational
participationin post-1918 Italycorrelatevery nicely with supportfor Mussolini.22The new civil societies of Russia and EasternEurope are home to
groups like the Russian National Unity and the RomanianNational Union
thatorganizelargenumbersof citizens aroundproto-fascistideologies. During the Communistera, the formerYugoslaviaarguablyhad the most developed civil society of any EasternEuropeancountry.Yet this did little to pre-
Chambers,Kopstein/ BAD CIVIL SOCIETY
843
vent the post-Communistera being inauguratedwith ethnic cleansing, civil
war, and the worst massacres in Europe since WorldWarII.23Conversely,
some have arguedthatone of the factorsprotectingRussiafroman antiliberal
takeoveris the relative weakness of its civil society, making it difficult to
organizea large-scalesocial movement.24
One responseto what has alreadybeen said is to suggest thatperhapsthe
problemof bad civil society is only a problemfor nationssuch as post-World
WarII Germanyor post-SovietRussiathatlack stabledemocratictraditions.
It is not likely thatilliberalforceswill triumphwithinthe Americancontextin
anynearfuture.Nevertheless,the UnitedStatesis full of groupsthatadvocate
illiberal and antidemocraticcauses.25Should we be worried?We arguethat
the smallerscale ofilliberalism in the United Statescomparedto, say,Russia,
is not a reasonto dismiss the dangersof badcivil society in the Americancontext. Nor is it a reasonto dismiss the relevanceof comparison.Clearercases
of bad civil society can shed light on less clear cases.
A greatdeal of the debateaboutcivil society assumes a type of American
exceptionalismthat makes comparisonseem irrelevant.This is sometimes
warranted.The constitutionaltraditionof the United States does point to an
idiosyncraticset of argumentsand considerationsin the Americancase. But
it also sometimes leads to complacency. The complacency goes like this:
illiberalforces are small, marginalized,and containedwithin a strongrights
tradition.It is inconceivable,given ourstrongconstitutionaltradition,thatthe
liberalstate should fall to such forces. Thus,we do not need to learnany lessons from nations where the state does appearto be jeopardized,or where
there are no strong liberaltraditions.26
This view is shortsightedfor two reasons. First, even if it is the case that
illiberal forces are small in numbertoday, it is not a waste of time to try to
understandthe phenomenaof bad civil society. This might allow us to identify warningsigns of the growthof bad civil society in the future.But second
and more important,the dangercontainedin bad civil society is not exclusively aboutthe ability to directlydestabilizethe statethroughthe mobilization of largenumbersof people. Illiberalforces need not set theircap on the
stateto undermineliberalism.Because illiberalforces cannotdestabilizethe
statedoes not meanthatthey cannotcontributeto an insidiouserosionof values that leaves liberalismvulnerableto all sorts of threats.27
The most importantof these threatsis the potentialspilloverof extremist
rhetoricinto the mainstreamof political discourse.Hategroupsnot only feed
off of divisions in a given society, they also nurturethem. One need only read
the Web sites of extremistgroups such as the Freemenor the Hammerskin
movementsor listen to the talk radio of G. GordonLiddy and then read the
speeches of Pat Buchananwith his references to the Congress as "Israeli
844
POLITICALTHEORY/ December2001
OccupiedTerritory"or PatRobertsonwith his cabalsof"internationalbankers"to understandhow haterhetoriccanbe repackagedby clevermainstream
politiciansand how it filters its way into populardiscourse.Hate groupsare
the ideological nurseriesof ideas thatcan formthe core of muchmorepernicious largerassociations.It is not unreasonableto say thatthe Freemenand
the ChristianIdentitymovementprovidethe theoryandthatpeople like Timothy McVeighprovidethe practice.But even when this does not occur,even
when hate groups do not grow in size or carryout violent acts, their ideas
often infect the political mainstreamand diminishthe reservoirof good will
between citizens that is essential to any healthy democracy.28
The Nation of Islamis good exampleof this. Whatis worrisomeaboutthe
Nation of Islamis not simply,or even mainly,the numberof recruitsandconverts it gathersinto the organization.What is worrisome is the numberof
AfricanAmericansoutsidethe Nation of Islamwho find Louis Farrakhanan
inspirationaland positive figure.29Louis Farrakhanand the leaders of the
Nation of Islam, it is safe to say, are purveyorsof hate. Although they have
attemptedof late to moderatetheir message and head towardthe political
"center,"they continueto propagateparanoidanti-Semitism(thatin tone and
contentis ironicallysimilarto Robertson's)andinsultingviews of Catholics,
gays, and white people. We do not deny, indeed it is importantto our argument thatwe acknowledge,thatin additionto racistmessages, the Nation of
Islamprovidessome very importantgoods to its membersas well as African
Americans in general. These goods appearto outweigh the fact that Louis
Farrakhanstandsfor all the thingsthatliberaldemocracyabhors."Ordinary"
AfricanAmericanscan ignore, overlook, orjust not care aboutthe fact that
Farrakhanfansthe flames ofbigotry.This generalsupportis evidencethatthe
necessity of supportingdemocraticreciprocityfails as a trumpcardfor a significantsector of the population.One must ask oneself why this is this case.
Why is the value of reciprocitynot strongenough among a significantnumber of African Americansto induce a majorityof them to repudiateLouis
Farrakhan?
The answermustbe foundin a generalweakness,perhapsfailure,
on the partof liberaldemocracy.Liberaldemocracyhas failedto finda strong
enough place within the heartsand minds of a sector of AfricanAmericans
becauseliberaldemocracyhas failedmanyAfricanAmericans.This is a serious problemthatwe shouldcareaboutandthatis manifestin manyexamples
of bad civil society.
TheNationof Islamis a troublingcase, a hardcase, anda case thatit is not
impossible to imagine replicatedin other sectors of society. It is a troubling
case for the reasonswe just sketched.It is a hardcase partlybecause it is not a
case of freedomof association.Thereis no questionhere aboutwhetherthe
stateshouldlimitor even prohibitthis group.Suchan interferencewouldvio-
Chambers,Kopstein/ BAD CIVIL SOCIETY
845
late the very values of tolerationand respect (not to mentionreligious freedom) we wish to defend. This is not a case in which the grouphas no or very
few redeeming qualities. The Nation of Islam has many such qualities. It
impartsa sense of discipline,self-worth,andtrustamongits followers.It carries out importantlocal functions of crime fighting and security in areas
where the governmenthas repeatedlyfailed. The Nation of Islam performs
many of the functions and roles for which we value associationallife. But
nevertheless,we want to say that its growingpopularityand strengthwould
be a bad thing for democracy,for it promotes particularistcivility at the
expense of democraticcivility. It would be betterif recruitsand supporters
alike could find all the "goods"offeredby the Nation in otherorganizations
that did everythingthe Nation did but withoutthe hate.
II. THEECONOMICSOF HATE
We are not alone in recognizingthat civil society often standsin a much
more complex relationshipto democracythansupportersof the civil society
argument tend to acknowledge. Most notable in this regard is Nancy
Rosenblum'sthoroughstudy of Americancivil society and her call to scale
back the political claims made on behalf of civil society and look at the "personaluses of pluralismin America,"to quoteher subtitle.Furthermore,many
studentsof civil society acknowledgethat civil society can be the home of
dangerousilliberalelementsanddevelopstrategiesto deal with these groups.
In the remainderof this essay, we evaluatethese strategies.We come to two
conclusions. The first is thatin acknowledgingthatnot all associationallife
supports (or ought to support) democracy,many theorists, but especially
Nancy Rosenblum, undervaluethe danger posed by hate groups. Second,
strategiesto deal with hate groupsoften fail to take into considerationsocioeconomic factorsthatcontributeto the attractivenessof such groups.It is not
so much the existence of bad groups that worries us. It is the existence of
(sometimes good) reasons tojoin bad groups thatworriesus. In contrastto
political theory,empiricalscholarsin the past two decadeshave turnedaway
fromthe emotionalandtowardthe social andeconomic conditionsthatfoster
hate groups and political extremism.
One way to get a graspon this problemis to look comparativelyat places
wherepeople arejoining bad groupsandask, Whojoins? Let us startwith the
most famouscase: the Nazis in Germany.Althoughinferringpoliticalbehavior from economic position is always a hazardousendeavor,the evidence
from the Nazi case is quite convincing. Recent scholarshipon who became
Nazis after 1925, based on thousands of individual-level membership
846
POLITICALTHEORY/ December2001
records, indicate that the decision to become a Nazi was tied to concrete
materialdeprivationsof the people who joined andthe specific proposalsfor
theirameliorationput forwardin the Nazi program.30
This is not to say that
materialdeprivationwas the only cause of, or even a sufficientconditionfor,
the rise of Nazism; but we can say with some assurancethat the core of the
Nazi membership(those who joined before 1932) came from regions and
occupations most severely affected by economic hardships. It can be
assumedthatnot all joiners adheredto Nazi racialideology. Like the Nation
of Islam, however, supporterscould overlook the party's failureto support
principlesof reciprocityin the pursuitof more concretegoods.
In contemporaryRussiaandin much of post-CommunistEasternEurope,
right-wing skin heads and other extremistgroups, as well as supportersof
right-wingparties such as Barkashov'sRussian National Unity, tend to be
drawndisproportionatelyfromthe downsized industrialsuburbanregions.31
Zyuganov's national communists are drawn disproportionately from
downwardlymobile elderly voters, impoverishedruralvoters, and unpaid
industrialworkers.32In short, post-Communism'sglobalization crisis has
providedthe fuel for its antiliberalmovements.33The point here is that it is
not growinginequalityalone thathas fueled the supportfor antiliberalmovements in the post-Communistworld. Significantinequalityalways existed in
the Soviet Union. Whatis new, however,is the upheavalassociatedwith the
prospectof unemploymentand the potentialfor radicaldownwardmobility,
somethingthat was virtuallyunknownin the Communistera.
Evidence of the relevance of this lesson in the American context is not
hardto find.Accordingto a recentreportof the SouthernPovertyLaw Center
(SPLC), in the 1990s, extremists succeeded best in recruitingamong the
young in "edgecities,"whereparentsworkedlong hours,facedthe prospects
of downsizing,anddid not havethe time to buildthe integrativestructurethat
would providealternativesfor young people.34AlthoughDonald Greenand
his collaboratorshave recently argued that macroeconomic performance
does not correlatevery well with anomic hate crimes, the same is not true,
they admit,for organizedgroupbehavior,preciselythe kind of behaviorthat
shouldintereststudentsof badcivil society.35As RobertWuthnowhas shown
in a recent study,to the extent that"good"social capitalhas declined in the
United States over the past two decades, "this decline has occurredamong
marginalizedgroupswhose living situationshavebecome moredifficultdurInternationalrelationsscholarshave long maintainedthat
ing this period."36
there is an intimate relationship between international inequality and
antiliberalismbetweensocieties at the level of the internationalsystem.37It is
not unreasonableto arguethatsuch a relationshipalso exists within national
societies.
Chambers,Kopstein/ BAD CIVIL SOCIETY
847
The most extensive and systematicresearchon participationandpolitical
supportfor extremistpartiesmovementsand groups,however,has been carried out on WesternEurope.Multiplestudiesof WesternEuropeancountries
have convincinglyand repeatedlydemonstratedthe close link between high
unemployment(as well as a host of other institutional,demographic,and
nonsocioeconomic causes) and supportfor extremist groups and political
parties.38Of course, this simple statistical association is not easily interpreted.For one thing, most researchdoes not show that it is only the unemployed who arejoining these groups or voting for extremistparties.39Nor
does it show that people with low incomes incline to extremismany more
thanthose with higherincomes.40Most important,even if unemploymentis a
necessary cause of supportfor extremistmovements,it is clearlynot a sufficient cause (indeed,for any importantpoliticalphenomenonthereis unlikely
to be a single sufficientcause). Whatit does suggest, however,is thatin societies where people define their self-worthin terms of their ability to obtain
work and secure a living wage, the very threat of downward mobility is
often enoughto move a growingsegmentof the populationtowardextremist
views andentice them to follow extremistleaders.Unemploymentis but one
indicator-to be sure an importantone-of social dislocation or threatened
dislocation, especially the kind of dislocationthat is generatedin advanced
capitalist societies, even those that are experiencing long-term aggregate
growth.
Webelieve thatratherthandismiss a searchforthe socioeconomicrootsof
bad civil society as inherentlyunknowableor indeterminate,and therefore
retreatinto a fuzzy explanationof "anomie,"theorists could contributea
greatdeal to unpackingthe etiology of groupmembershipand reconnecting
the analysis of good versus bad social capital to traditionalissues of social
justice. It is importantto note herethatthe empiricalresearchthatestablishes
the connection between unemploymentand bad civil society is not purely
materialistin its implications.Nor do we raise it to "refute"the anomiethesis
as put forwardby Nancy Rosenblumandthe long traditionin social psychology that informs her analysis. Both processes, socioeconomic dislocation
and anomie, may be at work simultaneously.In the industrializedWest,
deprivationand the threatof downwardmobility is most frequentlyexperienced over long periodsof time, andwithin families, as a profoundlycultural
matter. Instead, contemporarycross-national studies of extremist groups
suggest that political theory could help clarify the complex connections
between the culturalvalence of materiallife and the sources of anomie in
moder society. This suggests that, rather than setting off analyses that
emphasize anomie against those that stress threatsto material security as
848
POLITICALTHEORY/ December2001
mutually exclusive explanations, the two modes of analysis need to be
reintegrated.
Persistentmaterialinsecuritymakes it difficultto takethe promiseof liberal democracy seriously. Inequality,if defined not in a static manneras
social stratificationbut,rather,dynamicallyas the resultof changesorthreatened changes in life chances, cannot but contributeto the creation of bad
social capital. We need to understandthe forces that play off the cultural
reserves of hate in a society to try to effect change at the level of cause. To
repeat:we are not putting forwarda hardcorematerialistargumentto the
effect that all ideas are producedby materialconditions,but we are arguing
thatdiscussions abouthow to promoteand inculcatethe values necessaryto
maintaina healthyliberaldemocracyneed to takemore heed of the relationship between materialconditions and ideas. Such a discussion should also
considerthe relationshipbetween materialconditionsand the kindof social
capitalthat is createdand destroyed.
Essentially the lesson of East Europe,Russia, and other democratizing
areasis thatthe cogency of the civil society argumentis much more dependent on materialfactorssuch as economic prospectsand changingclass position of membersof civil society than the theoreticaldebate would seem to
acknowledge.There is no reason to doubt-indeed, there is a great deal of
evidence to support-the propositionthatthis is also truefor the WestEuropeanandAmericancase. Thus,the generalthrustof ourargumentgoes something like this: althoughwe applaudthe "moralturn"in liberal and democratic theory that concerns itself with the cultural and dispositional
requirementsof a stableliberaldemocracy,we arguethatthis turnshouldnot
distractus fromsome of the materialconditionsrelevantto the productionof
ideas. Citizens'beliefs and values, includingthe beliefs and values thatsupportor undermineliberaldemocracy,areshapedthrougha very complexweb
of factors.Communication,deliberation,education,civic involvement,and
so on are surely importantcomponentsof this web. But also important,and
often overlookedin ourpostmaterialframeof mind, arebasic materialinterests and needs. Poverty,downwardsocial mobility, diminished economic
expectations,and even basic inequalityas we have definedit here can create
illiberalcitizens thatno amountof deliberationwill convinceotherwise.This
is the lesson of democratizingcountries,and we need to take note.
III. CONCEIVEDAS A PROBLEMOF CONTAINMENT
Nancy Rosenblumsuggests thathate groups,paramilitaryorganizations,
and militias can serve an importantfunctionin a liberalsociety:
Chambers,Kopstein/ BAD CIVIL SOCIETY
849
None of these associations are schools of civic virtue, even potentially.But they may
serve the purposeof containment.They can providesafety valves. Associations can circumscribeexhibitionsof hate and hostile outbreaksof envy. Loathsomegroups can be
lifelines.41
Rosenblum quotes Minutemenleader RobertDePugh, who notes that it is
betterto have nuts and kooks inside organizationsthan on their own and as
unpredictableas loose canons.
If they decide to blow somebodyup, Okaythey go blow somebodyup. But ifthey arepart
of a group ... well, then there's a good chance someone in the organizationwill know
about it and they're going to take steps to bring this person undercontrol.42
This is no doubtsometimestrue,but it is not clearhow often it is trueor even
how importantsuch a factwouldbe. If the containmentargumentis supposed
to ease our mind concerningthe presence of bad elements in civil society,
thentherearethreeconsiderationsworthkeepingin mind.First,andthe most
obvious observation,is thatthe containmentargumentis a contingentargument that only works so long as it works. That is, groups contain violence
only so long as they contain violence. They sometimes promote, organize,
andexecuteviolence. We shouldtryand find out when they arelikely to containit andwhen they arenot. The United Stateshas hadits own tasteof terrorism that has made many people wake up to the possibility that our society
containswells of potentialviolence of which we were unaware.If it were the
case thattodaygroupsdo, to some extent,containviolence, will they always?
Rosenblum'spredominantlypsychological approachis not alwayshelpful in
answeringthis question.
A secondconcernis thatit is not alwaysclearfromRosenblum'sargument
what is being contained.The quote from DePugh implies that it is violence
that is being contained,but at other times Rosenblumimplies that the hate
itself is being contained. Is the argumentthat as free-floating individuals,
angryand envious citizens will engage in exhibitionsof hate, the expression
of which would be containedwithin the group if they only joined up? This
view of containmentseems less plausible than the one aboutviolence. The
very existence of these groups,with theirWebsites, literature,andactivities,
broadcaststheirviews. The organizationof hateinto groupscanperhaps"circumscribeexhibitionsof hate"within the limits of the legal, but they do not
circumscribeexhibitionsof hate within the limits of the hurtful.
Finally, althoughthe containmentargumentis sometimes true, it is not
always true. It is not clear how one would test it in any empiricalway. The
World Church of the Creator, although repudiating Benjamin Smith's
actions, speaksquite fondly of"BrotherSmith"on theirWebsite andregrets
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only his death, nothing else. Is this group containing other potential
BenjaminSmiths?Or did it give Smiththe reinforcementand confidencehe
neededto act on his paranoia?Hardto tell. Even thoughit would be difficult
to test the containmenthypothesis,it is importantto get some kindof a handle
on the conditions under which it might or might not be true. Indeed,
Rosenblumherself sometimes supportsan opposite hypothesisto the effect
that,ratherthangatheringin preexistingextremisminto a somewhatmoderating environment,many of these groups gatherin individuals,particularly
youth,who have no particularideology and"make"them into racists.This is
the story thatRaphaelEzekiel tells in TheRacist Mind.43It is also the story
foundin the SPLCstudy,"Youthat the Edge."Here a pictureemergesof talented andenterprisingrecruiterswho are"havinga field day"recruitingdisaffectedwhite youth.These areindividualswho become seducedby the simplistic messages of hate and blame. They are looking for villains and
scapegoats.As we notedearlier,the causes areoften tied to economic factors.
A spokespersonfor the SPLC noted, "Withthe developmentof a two tiered
economy,we're seeing the rise of a new underclasssusceptibleto the lure of
hate groups."44It is true that the currenteconomic "boom"has increased
wealth at the aggregatelevel. But it is also true that inequalitybetween the
richestandthepooresthas been growingforthepastdecadenot only between
rich andpoorcountriesbutalso withinthe industrializednationsof the West,
especially the United States. This cannotbut contributeto the insecurityof
perceivedlife chances.
Of course, racists are never completely made. One needs a historic and
culturalreservoirto dig up familiarstories and narratives.We are not claiming thateconomic andsocial circumstancescreatehateout of nothing.This is
obviously not true in EasternEurope,where ethnic divisions have a strong
hold independentof economic factors. The American context also has its
own traditionof hate, racism, and anti-Semitismthat was not simply produced by economic injustice or insecurity.Economic insecurities exploit
racial and ethnic divisions. They make it difficult if not impossible to overcome historicdivisions and differences.They offer fertilegroundfor stereotypes and scapegoatsto blame.
Rosenblum,althoughwilling to acknowledgethateconomic factorsmay
play a role in the popularityof hategroups,notes thatthe empiricalresultsare
inconclusive.45And even if they were conclusive, she is skeptical that we
could do anything about it, because addressing such problems "would
involve nothing less than eliminatingeconomic insecurity,relieving status
anxiety,andconfiguringpolicies to legitimizetraditionalvalues andcommunities (withoutdepreciatingcontemporaryliberalone's)."46She assumesthat
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851
this is an outrageousagenda,butwhy? Isn'tthis whatliberalsocial equalityis
supposedto strive for?
Ratherthansocial causes, Rosenblumprefersthe psychological language
of isolationandanomie.Again we see an image, so familiarin contemporary
theory,of the unattachedindividualcast adriftby modernity,seeking meaning and belonging in her life. Sometimes when the causes of anomie are
extreme,the sought-aftersolace is equallyextreme.Rosenblumoften implies
thatif the choice is between individualisolationandgroupmembership,who
are we to deny the proto-racistor diehardanti-Semitea home? But these are
not necessarilythe options.Rosenblumherselfnotes thatassociationallife is
very variedand diverse. The choices are sometimes between differenttypes
of belonging. Again, we need to work on the causes thatgive people reasons
to join bad groups. The psychologizing approachis often fascinating and
insightful.We do not wantto deny thatanomieis a largepartof the story.Our
quarrelwith Rosenblumis reallytwofold. First,she does not takethe threatof
bad civil society seriously enough. She dismisses the threatbecause (a) if
anything,hate groupscontainhate;(b) even if they do not, they aresmall and
marginalizedanyway; and (c) given American traditionsand institutions,
they arelikely to staythatway. Wehavearguedthat(a) the containmentthesis
is far from proven;(b) even small and marginalized,they can do damageto
public trust; and (c) assuming that, say, some version of ethnic cleansing
could never happen in America assumes a deep analyticalbias in favor of
continuity,somethingwe believe it is not prudentto assume. Second, she is
too quickto dismiss the role of socioeconomic factorsin the story aboutwhy
people might be attractedto organizedhate groups. The evidence does not
supporther dismissal.
IV CONCEIVEDASA PROBLEM
OF FREEDOMOF ASSOCIATION
One of the naturaland obvious questions to ask with regardto bad civil
society is, When is the statejustified in limitingan associationfor the sake of
promotingliberal democraticvalues? In the Americancontext, this is most
often discussed as a constitutionalquestionfor the courts,andultimatelythe
SupremeCourt,to decide. Forthis reason,muchof the interestin bad groups,
militias, Nazi groups,and so on is an interestin the legal and moral issue of
freedom of association versus state interests and where the line should be
drawn.47In this context, there is much discussion of SupremeCourtrulings
and hard or controversialcases establishing precedent. Often the issue at
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handis discrimination,as with the much discussed Robertsv. UnitedStates
Jaycees or Bob Jones Universityv. UnitedStates cases. Sometimesthe issue
is free speech, as with manyNazi cases or the separationof churchand state.
These cases often raise very importantmoral questions involving how we
balancethe good of freedomof associationandothergoods like equalopportunity.To answerthem, theoristsmust spell out what is so good aboutfreedom of association and what other concerns could possibly trumpsuch a
good. Answers to these questionscan push us forwardin untanglingthorny
ethicaldilemmasassociatedwith a liberalway of life. Butthese sortsof questions can also distractus from othersorts of questions.
Withits strongfocus on legal challengesandconstitutionalcases, the academic literatureoften gives the impressionthat once we solve the interference versus noninterferencequestion,we will have solved the problemsof
bad civil society.48Sometimes, however,we want to say that althoughthe
stateis notjustifiedin limitinga certainassociation,the activitiesof thatassociation are worrisomenonetheless and we want to do something about it.
Amy Gutmannbrings up an interestingcounterfactualthat speaks to this
worry.In talkingaboutBob Jones Universityv. UnitedStates, she arguesthat
the state was within its legitimateright in denying tax exempt statusto Bob
JonesUniversityon the groundsthatthe university'spolicy forbiddinginterracialdatingwas a case of racialdiscriminationthatthe state could not support.She is not so surethatthe same argumentwould hold if Bob JonesUniversity were a church that forbade miscegenation (the Nation of Islam
prohibitsmiscegenation).Gutmannwrites,
Liberaldemocracieslegitimatelydepend on universitiesfor providingfair educational
opportunityin a way thatthey do not (andshouldnot) dependon churches.... In the case
of the church,the statecould not as clearlyclaim to have a compellinginterestin regulating as a directmeans of securingeducationalandeconomic opportunitythatis free from
racial discrimination.49
This seems right.Manyliberalsend the discussionhere,however.Thatis,
many theoristsend the discussion afterjustifying the distinctionbetween a
universityand a churchandthe role thatthatdistinctionoughtto play in our
reasoningabout state action. This is where we want to startthe discussion.
Justbecausetherearecompellingreasonswhy the stateoughtnot to regulate
a churchbecause of its beliefs does not meanwe shouldnot careandworryif
a churchthatpreachesagainstmiscegenationexperiencesgrowingmembership.50This would still be a problemfor liberaldemocracyeven if we were in
agreementthatthe solutionwas not to place limits on the association.Solving
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853
the where-to-draw-the-lineproblem does not solve the bad civil society
problem.
Some arguethatfreedomof associationitself mightcombatbadcivil society. Bad civil society canbe mitigatedby ensuringpluralism.Weneed to promote a civil society that is diverseand varied.In this way, citizens can form
attachmentsthat cross-cut the social, ethnic, and racial divisions that feed
hate andracism.Althoughstrongfreedomof associationis a necessarycondition of associationalpluralism,we wantto suggest thatit does not by itself
necessarilycombatbad civil society. As Rosenblumnotes, it is not the existence of pluralorganizationthat is important;it is the experienceof pluralism.5 Stephen Macedo echoes this by noting "the crucial thing is tofoster
But Rosenblum and
membershipsthat are not tribalisticbut pluralistic."52
sometimes Macedo imply thatthe existence of a marketin associationswill
in andof itself"foster"the "experience"of pluralism.We do not see why this
must follow. Just because there is a relatively open marketin associations
does not meanthatcitizens will choose cross-cuttingmemberships.Thereare
other forces at work, includingorganizations'own interestin monopolizing
theirmembers'attention.53Free marketsoffer consumersmany options, but
in and of themselves they do not guaranteethatconsumerswill breakout of
well-established patterns.What more needs to be done to promote crosscutting membershipsin additionto safeguardinga free marketin associations?Or,the questionthatinterestsus more:how does one discouragemembershipin bad organizationswithoutviolatingbasic principlesof freedomof
association?This questionis obliquelyaddressedby theoriesinterestedin the
opportunitiesfor civic educationofferedby a vibrantcivil society. However,
we argue below that there are neverthelessimportantshortcomingsto this
perspectiveas well.
V CONCEIVEDAS A PROBLEM
INTERNALTO CIVILSOCIETY
A greatdeal has been writtenon the ways associationalmembershipcan
shapecitizens'dispositions,attitudes,andcharacter.Of particularinterestare
the ways in which associationalmembershipcan shapeandinculcatethe dispositions necessary to maintain a healthy liberal democracy. Although
Tocqueville is often the inspirationin these arguments,there is a striking
range and variety of democraticeffects attributedto associations.54Toleration, respect(both for self andother),cooperation,an interestin the common
good, autonomy,communicativeand deliberativecompetence, knowledge,
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POLITICALTHEORY/ December2001
industriousness,public spiritedness, even governmentaleffectiveness are
just some of the goods said to be attainablethroughcivil engagement.
The varietyof goods that can be found in associationallife atteststo the
richnessanddiversityof civil society. But this shouldsend a warningsignal.
If we can find liberal,deliberative,andrepublicangoods in civil society, then
this must mean, among other things, that civil society is somewhatneutral
with regardto the type of political orderthatit could promote'It is not completely neutral.We know thatit is incompatiblewith totalitarianism.But is it
The soft-authoritarianism
of Wilhelmine
compatiblewith authoritarianism?
the
interwar
of
east-central
and
southeastern
Germany,
regimes
Europe,and
cold war Latin America indicate that the answer is yes. Somethingsimilar
could be said aboutpartsof Asia where a vibrantand active civil society is
developing minus the centralvalue of pluralism."The Islamic traditionis
also developing its own conceptionof civil society that differs significantly
from a liberalconceptionalthoughstill stressingvoluntaryassociations.56
Civil society, it would appear,can be manythingsto manypeople andtake
many shapes in many cultures. This implies that we should consciously
choose the type of civil society we want. And, indeed,we now see an active
debate about the ways in which the state should be shaping civil society.
Interestinglyenough, much of this debateis not spawnedby the recognition
thatcivil society is variableandcan serve as a home for a vast arrayof political ideals includingilliberalones. Instead,the debatecomes out of the argument thatcivil society is on the decline in manyWesterndemocracies,especially in the United States. The relevant contrast in the literatureis not
between an associationallife thatpromotesliberaldemocracyand one that
might promote,say, nativism.Rather,it is between an associationallife that
promotes liberalismand democracyand no associationallife at all, or one
that is moribundand minimal. Galston is much quoted as saying that "the
greatest threat to children in modern liberal society is not that they will
believe in something too deeply, but that they will believe in nothing very
deeply at all."57This does not seem completelyright.Certainly,froma political point of view, it would be better for citizens to believe in nothing very
stronglythanto be swept by a wave of xenophobiaor ethnic hate. Which is
the more serious threatin liberal democracies?Apathy or hate? Apathy is
surelymore widespread,but hate is more devastatingand can grow to levels
thatperhapsdo not threatenthe state'sexistencebutthatdo threatenthe legitimacy and the quality of liberaldemocracyfor those who are the targetsof
thathate.This is not to say thatwe shouldnot be combatingapathy.It is to say
we shouldnot be too confidentthathatebecomes politically relevantonly in
places like Kosovo. In any case, the "shapingof civil society" literaturecan
Chambers,Kopstein/ BAD CIVIL SOCIETY
855
be helpful with regardto the problemof groupsthat actively disparageand
underminereciprocity.
The ideahereis thatstatescanpromotegood civil society throughpolicies
explicitly designed to strengthenorganizationsthatproducethe rightsort of
moral effects. Such policies would include a vast array of subsidies, tax
exception,preferentialtreatment,partnerships,andthe like. Wethinkthatthe
reshaping strategy has promise up to a point. By itself, the tinkeringand
nudgingof civil society in "good"directionswill not succeed in keepingbad
civil society at bay unless other conditions are met. But is reshapingeven
possible?
Moreandmorepeople aretakingnote ofNancy Rosenblum'sobservation
thatthereis no evidence thatpositive lessons learnedin associationallife will
always have spillovereffect in the political realm.This is surely correct,and
our example at the beginningof the essay bearswitness to this. Membersof
the Churchof the WorldCreatorlearncooperationandtrust,butthis does not
mean that they then become cooperativeand trustingdemocraticcitizens.
This generalobservationshouldnot leadus to conclude,however,thatwe can
nevercome to conclusionsaboutthe democraticeffects of participation.First
of all, we can come to some very clearconclusionsaboutthe types of associational membershipthatdo not promotedemocracy.Rosenblumherself says
"social scientists have had more success in demonstratingthe moral (typically ill) effect ofincongruencebetweenassociationallife andliberaldemocIf we can idenracy in particularinstancesthanthe logic of incongruence."58
tify groups that have clear negative spillover effect, then this does-seem to
offertargetsof indirectpolicy. In the case of the Nationof Islam,for example,
this might involve subsidizing groups that effectively combat drug use and
crime in residential areas as well as offer other services provided by the
Nation. Furthermore,although spillover does not take place in all cases, it
does takeplace in some cases. Thus, a reshapingagendacalls for studieslike
Rosenblum'sandMarkWarren'sthatcan chartthe varietyof associationsout
thereand the types of things they do and how much they are likely to have a
spillovereffect. It does call for somethinglike what Macedo talks about-"a
science of grouplife."59It is unlikely ever to be a very precise science, however.We cannotalways predictwith certaintywhat the effects of a reshaping
policy will be.
In Russia, for example, since 1991 therehave been many creative,externally fundedprogramsdesignedto promoteassociationallife. Dubbed"civil
society for export"by one scholar,programsrunby such philanthropicorganizationsas the FordFoundation,the EurasiaFund,andthe SorosFoundation
have alteredthe organizationallandscapein unexpectedways. In additionto
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POLITICALTHEORY/ December2001
some very positive effects for participants,however, donors have, in some
cases, undercutthe social bases and supportfor good organizationsthrough
theirlargesse.In particular,heavily fundedgroupstend to hew closely to the
donors'concernsandlose contactwith theirconstituenciesin theirown society. The outcomeis a patron/clientrelationshipbetween outsidefoundations
and domestic groups that would otherwise be associating with each other.
Groupsthatdo not receive outsidefunding,by contrast,tendto be less democraticand often are even "bad,"but they frequentlyhave a closer connection
to society. Creatingcivic groupswith externalfundingis extraordinarilydifficult and, at best, a partialsolution to the problemof bad civil society.6
Although only suggestive, this illustration of the unintended consequencesof shapingindicatesthatwe are farfromhavinga "scienceof group
life."We shouldbe conscious of the ways public policy can affect civil society and, indeed, actively pursuethose policies that appearto promotegood
associations.But ourpower to predictand controlcivil society, especially if
we adhereto even minimalliberalstandardsof freedomof association,is tenuous at best. Scholarslike Yael Tamirworrythatthe shapingstrategyallows
the governmentto remakecivil society in its own image, thus destroyingthe
autonomy of self-organization.61Our worry is the opposite (not that we
would like to see governmentremake civil society in its own image). The
statehas limitedpowerto bringaboutdesiredeffects. The stateis neitherneutral nor omnipotent.Civil society is shapedand determinedby state policy
butnot in a very predictableandreliableway. We have a responsibilityto try
to nudgecivil society away fromdevastatingpaths,butthis shouldnot be our
only strategy.Subsidizing"good"groupswill not work if individualsaredisaffected, and, as the case of Russia shows, in resource-poorenvironments
such a strategywill tendto createsmall, isolatedislandsof liberalismandtolerance. The uncertaintiesof the reshapingapproachagain indicate that we
should also be looking at largersocioeconomic factorsthatcontributeto the
rise of bad civil society.
VI.CONCEIVEDAS A PROBLEMOF DEMOCRACY
So farwe have arguedthatbadcivil society is, amongotherthings, a problem of social justice. Certaineconomic insecuritiesweaken commitmentto
core liberaldemocraticvalues by giving people reasonsto distrustthe promises of liberal democracyand to seek out scapegoats and targetedgroups.
Some would regardthis as a problemto be addressedby deliberativedemocracy.The argumentmight go somethinglike this:joiners are angrynot just
abouttheirlife chancesbutabouttheirinabilityto do anythingabouttheirlife
Chambers,Kopstein/ BAD CIVIL SOCIETY
857
chances. Bad civil society is really a problemof democracy.It is a problem
havingto do with political efficacy andvoice. Like the moraleducationargument, thereis somethingto this view. However,it again tends to slide exclusively into an institutionaldesign argumentavoiding hardproblems of life
chances.
Likemanycivic republicans,deliberativedemocratsareinterestedin what
Sandelhas called the "formativeproject,"thatis, the ways institutions,social
structures,andeconomic forces shapeidentity,affect interest-formation,and
influence value orientation.Theories of deliberativedemocracydiffer from
civic republicanism,however, in that they usually take a proceduralrather
than perfectionist approachto interest formation.For example, in distinguishing deliberativefrom communitarianapproachesto modernity,Seyla
Benhabibacknowledgesthatbothapproachesidentifya pervasivediscontent
on the partof social actors.62Communitariansattributethat discontentto a
loss of a sense of belonging, which results in a loss of civic virtue.The cure
theyprescribeis activeassociationallife. In contrast,Benhabibattributesdiscontent to a lack of political efficacy. The "malaise"of modernitycan be
tracedto a loss of control over one's life and the conditions that determine
one's chances. The cure is an accessible and efficacious public sphere.
Where do people turnwhen their frustrationis not addressed?Benhabib,
along with many othertheoristsof deliberativedemocracy,is primarilyconcerned with the retreatinto apathy and passivity. There are other options,
however.Dissatisfiedcitizensmay turnto groupsthatappearto offeranswers
to their frustrationsbut in fact offer only scapegoats.In these situations,the
political efficacy argumentdoes speak to the problem of bad civil society.
Indeed,thereis some empiricalresearchthatconnectsa lack of efficacy in the
public sphere with gravitationtowardantidemocraticgroups. This is Sheri
Berman'sconclusion, for example, aboutthe WeimarRepublic:
insteadof respondingto the demandsof an increasinglymobilizedpopulation,the country's political structuresobstructedmeaningfulparticipationin public life. As a result,
citizens' energiesandinterestswere deflectedintoprivateassociationalactivities,which
were generally organizedwithin ratherthan across groupboundaries.63
Ourargumentis not that a vibrantand effective public spherewill magically transformracists into liberal democrats.It is not about civic reeducation. Nor are we saying that the public expression of antidemocraticsentiment shouldbe encouragedso thatit does not infect privateassociations.The
argumentgoes morelike this:therewill alwaysbe a certainnumberof people
who reject the core principlesof liberal democracy.There is nothing much
we can do aboutthis hardcore. It is the "swing-vote,"if you will, thatshould
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POLITICALTHEORY/ December2001
interestus. These arethe people who come to bepersuadedthatJews, immigrants,AfricanAmericans,or Croatsareto blame, or thatliberaldemocracy
as a whole is to blame, for their predicament.An effective and democratic
public sphere will not make any difference to people like the Communist
Deputy Albert Makashov,who in 1998 stood up in the Russian Parliament
and lamentedthat
life in our countryis getting worse and worse. Never before has it been this bad in Russia.... Who is to blame?The executive branch,the bankers,and the mass media are to
blame. Usury,deceit, corruption,andthieveryare flourishingin the country.Thatis why
I call the reformersyids. Who are these Jews?64
Whatis worthinvestigatingis, How manywill find Makashov'sexplanation
convincing,and why?
Although the causes of the frustrationand discontent that Makashov
hopes to exploit are economic, his "explanation"targetsa group as the villainous force behind all the bad things that are happening.Although often
tappinginto deep reservoirsof bias andprejudice,this type of explanationis
more likely to persuadethe "swing vote" if they have no other reasonable
alternative,thatis, if all effortsto understandand get a hold of the economic
and social circumstancesof their life fail. Powerlessnessmakes people susceptible to solutions that, at the very least, offer the satisfactionof venting
one's angerandfrustrationon a clearlyidentifiedvillain. Focusedhatecanbe
empowering.This conclusionis supportedby some researchon social movements. For example, Foley and Edwardsarguethat
where the state is unresponsive,its institutionsare undemocratic,or its democracyis ill
designedto recognizeandrespondto citizens demands,the characterof collective action
will be decidedlydifferentthanundera stronganddemocraticsystem. Citizenswill find
theireffortsto organizefor civil ends frustratedby statepolicy-at some times actively
repressed,at others simply ignored. Increasinglyaggressive forms of civil association
will springup, and more and more ordinarycitizens will be driveninto active militancy
againstthe state or self-protectiveapathy.
Deliberative democracy has an importantcontributionto make to this
debatebecauseit focuses on empowermentandthe forces thatblock empowerment.But, as with the moraleducationargument,the riskis thatin focusing
too narrowlyon institutionaldesign, proponentswill fail to tacklehardquestions of economic insecuritythatcause the frustrationin the firstplace. The
Habermasianversion of deliberativedemocracyis proneto this problemfor
two reasons.The firstcan be tied to the importantdistinctionbetweensystem
and lifeworldwhile the second can be found in a stringentproceduralism.
Chambers,Kopstein/ BAD CIVIL SOCIETY
859
The system/lifeworlddistinctionspills over into a state/civil society distinction that contributesto a blind spot with regardto the possibility of bad
civil society. AlthoughHabermasiansacknowledgethatthe state createsthe
conditionsfor a healthycivil society andpublic sphere,especially in the form
of rightsguarantees,they mistruststatepower. States are "system."They do
importantand worthwhilethings, but ultimatelythey operateon the logic of
power and must be kept within the control of a popularwill autonomously
developed out of the self-organizationof the lifeworld, that is, out of civil
society.6 The system/lifeworlddistinctionis very useful in identifying and
explaining certainpathologies that plague liberal capitalistdemocracies.It
can,however,leadto the impressionthatthe autonomousself-organizationof
citizens is always good. Failureto discuss the cases when citizens organize
for bad causes strengthensthis impression.The tendencyis to see threatsto
democracyexclusively in the form of impedimentsto self-organization.
The second and thornierreason why Habermasemphasizes institutional
reformof democraticpracticesover distributionalreformis that he favorsa
highly proceduralmodel of liberal democracy.Unlike Rawls, who put forwarda theoryofjustice, Habermasclaims thatit is up to participantsto work
out the details of a fair system ofjustice. This leads to a familiarcircle. How
do you democraticallybring aboutthe conditionsof a healthyand authentic
democracy?What happens when resentmentdue to unequal life chances
severelyunderminesthe qualityof democracybutthereis no populardemocraticwill to addressthose inequalities,partlybecausethose inequalitiesdistortparticipation?We haveno magic solutionto this problem,butwe areconvinced that it is not a reason to stop talking about the politics of economic
insecurityor give up on states as effective actors in the battle against social
injustice.
VII.CONCLUSION
In this essay, we have arguedthat rights, civic education,promotionof
good associations,andan expandedpublic spherewill not be enoughto build
liberal democracies(or maintainthe qualityof establishedliberaldemocracies) if failure in social justice leads to disillusionmentwith the promise of
liberalism.The rights approachto bad civil society is importantbut insufficient because it only works as long as bad civic groupsremainmarginal.In
general, rights argumentshave a laissez passer view of the problem, and
interest only "kicks in" once the problem is threateningto the order as a
whole. Not only may this be too late to save democracyin extremecases, but
it may be insufficientto preventthe qualityof democracyfrombeing under-
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minedin not so extremecases. The civic educationargumentis also laudable
but insufficientbecause thereis very little evidence thatit can work in situations of scarcity.Even underconditionsof relativeabundance,the power to
shape associational life from the outside is tenuous at best. Finally, the
expandedpublic sphereargumentlies closest to our own normativepreferences. But even here it is, like the rightsandcivic educationsolutions,essentially an institutionalfix, the efficacy of which presupposesa level of social
justice that may not exist. The shortcomingswe have just discussed pose
more serious problems for transitionaldemocracies than well-established
ones. Nevertheless,this should not make us complacentaboutthe dangers.
The precedingdiscussion also providesthe justification for shifting and
broadeningthe focus of civil society studiesbackto issues of socioeconomic
justice, equality, and the social prerequisitesof civic development. From
Aristotleto Rousseauto Lipset,the historyofpolitical thoughttime andagain
suggests that society does not remainvery civil and democraciesdo not do
verywell underconditionsof deep andpersistentmaterialandstatusinequalities. Tocquevillehimself worriedthatin the modem world,materialand status inequalitiesremainjust as deep as underthe ancien regime but are more
keenly felt thanever.Addressingthe problemsof bad civil society will mean
returningto the issues of social justice thathave been at the core of political
theory since its inception.
The point may soundbanalbut it is not. In the past two decades,political
theory has graduallyceded the groundon themes of materiallife, equality,
andthe possibilityof realizingone's life planto the economists.Increasingly,
questionsthatgo to the heartof politicalmembershiphavebecome the exclusive territoryof technocraticandmathematicalthinking.Theremay be good
reasonsfor this. Economics enjoys more prestigethanat any time in its history.Yet, social science has also shownthatthe gains associatedwith the rapidly changingdivision of laborare also associatedwith social upheaval,dislocation, and even growing inequalities not only between rich and poor
nationsbutalso withinwealthyones, all of which suggeststhatit may be time
to redefinethe standardsby which we measureeconomic success andfailure.
Such a redefinitionof the termsandmeaningof materiallife should concern
us as political theorists.
NOTES
1. Michael Walzeruses this phrasein "TheCivil Society Argument,"Dimensionsof Radical Democracy,ed. ChantalMouffe (London:Verso, 1992), 89-107. Ouruse is somewhatmore
generic but essentially the same.
Chambers,Kopstein/ BAD CIVIL SOCIETY
861
2. Thereareso manyproponentsof versionsof this argumentthatit would be difficultto list
themall. MarkWarrennotes that"withindemocratictheoryaremarkableconsensusis emerging
aroundTocqueville'sview thatthe virtuesandviability of democracydependon the robustness
of associationallife."Democracyand the TerrainofAssociation (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2000). Here is a sample of the diversity of the list that includes liberals,
communitarians,and critical theorists: Michael Walzer, "Civil Society Argument";Joshua
CohenandJoel Rogers,AssociationsandDemocracy(New York:Verso, 1995);RobertPutnam,
MakingDemocracy Work:Civic Traditionsin ModernItaly (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1993); Jean L. Cohen and AndrewArato, Civil Society and Political Theory(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
3. Yael Tamiralso thinksthat"bad"civil society poses some problemsfor the civil society
argumentalthoughfor quite differentreasonsthan ours. See Yael Tamir,"Revisitingthe Civic
Sphere,"FreedomofAssociation, ed. Amy Gutmann(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,
1998), 214-39. MarkWarren,Amy Gutmann,andJeanCohennote thattheoristsshouldbe cautious in theirenthusiasmfor a blanketpositive effect of groupmembership.See Warren,Democracy and the TerrainofAssociation; Amy Gutmann,"Freedomof Association:An Introductory
Essay,"Freedomof Association, 6; Jean Cohen, "Trust,VoluntaryAssociations and Workable
Democracy:The ContemporaryAmericanDiscourse of Civil Society,"Democracyand Trust,
ed. Mark Warren (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 208-48. Nancy
Rosenblumoffers one of the few extendeddiscussions of bad groupsbut, in the end, does not
think that we need to be overly worriedand, indeed, sometimes argues that "bad"groups can
have good effects. We challenge this readingbelow. See Nancy Rosenblum,Membershipand
Morals: ThePersonal Uses of Pluralismin America(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress,
1998), 239-84. RobertPutnamhas recentlyacknowledgedthat"social capital"can be bad, but,
as we discuss below, he does not in fact addressthe problemwe are raising.See RobertPutnam,
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community,(New York: Simon &
Schuster,2000).
4. In comparativepolitics thereis a vast literatureon extremismandradicalism.This literature does not often cross paths with the civil society discourse.
5. JeanL. Cohen,"Does VoluntaryAssociationMakeDemocracyWork?"DiversityandIts
Discontents: CulturalConflictand CommonGroundin ContemporaryAmericanSociety, ed.
Neil J. Smelser and Jeffrey C. Alexander (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity press, 1999),
263-92; SeymourMartinLipset,"MalaiseandResiliency in America,"Journalof Democracy6,
no. 3 (1995): 4-18; RobertD. Putnam,"Bowling Alone: America'sDeclining Social Capital,"
Journalof Democracy6, no. 1 (1995): 65-78; ThedaSkocpol,ed., CivicEngagementinAmerica
(Washington,DC: Brookings Institution, 1999); Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schozma, and
HenryE. Brady,Voiceand Equality:Civic Voluntarismin AmericanPolitics (Cambridge,MA:
HarvardUniversityPress, 1995).
6. Rosenblum,Membershipand Morals, 36-41.
7. See Warren,Democracyand the Terrainof Association, for a thoroughsurveyandhelpful theory of the full democraticpotentialof civil society.
8. See JeanL. Cohen and AndrewArato, Civil Society and Political Theory(Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1992). See Note 2.
9. Althoughextremeformsof hate like thatrepresentedby the WorldChurchof the Creator
are easy to identify, we acknowledge that the category "bad civil society," like all social
typologies, will slide into some gray areasaroundits edges. We discuss some of these below.
10. Putnam,"Bowling Alone," 65.
11. Ibid., 65. See also Putnam,Bowling Alone, 27.
12. Putnam,"Bowling Alone," 70. See also Putnam,BowlingAlone, 112-15.
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POLITICALTHEORY/ December 2001
13. Putnam,"Bowling Alone," 67. See also Putnam,Bowling Alone, 19.
14. Gutmann,"Freedomof Association:An IntroductoryEssay,"6.
15. Putnam,Bowling Alone, 22.
16. Ibid., 22.
17. Ibid., 23-24.
18. See ibid., where, in a chaptertitled "TheDarkSide of Social Capital,"Putnamanswers
the chargethattolerationwas on the risepreciselyat the sametime as, accordingto his argument,
civic engagementwas on the wane. Thus the question arises, Does associationalengagement
encouragenarrownessand hindertolerance?Putnamdenies the generalcorrelationbut admits
"some kinds of bonding social capitalmay discouragethe formationof bridgingsocial capital
and vice versa"(p. 362). He never takes it furtherthanthis generalobservation.He never asks
which forms of bondinghinderbridgingor why some people are more likely to be attractedto
those formsratherthanmoredemocracy-friendly(or at least democracy-neutral)formsof bonding. (See also p. 400.)
19. Rosenblum,Membershipand Morals, 59.
20. MichaelW. Foley andBob Edwards,"TheParadoxof Civil Society,"JournalofDemocracy 7, no. 3 (July 1996): 46.
21. SheriBerman,"Civil Society and the Collapse of the WeimarRepublic,"WorldPolitics
49, no. 3 (1997): 401-29; StephenHansonandJeffreyKopstein,"TheWeimar/RussiaComparison,"Post-SovietAffairs 13, no. 3 (1997): 252-83.
22. Fiuppo Sabetti,"PathDependencyand Civic Culture:Some Lessons from Italy about
InterpretingSocial Experiments,"Politics and Society 24 (1996), 19-44.
23. David Rohde,Endgame:TheBetrayaland Fall of Srebrenica,Europe's WorstMassacre
since WorldWarII (New York:Farrar,Straus,and Giroux, 1997).
24. Jeffrey Kopstein and Stephen Hanson, "Pathsto Uncivil Societies and Anti-Liberal
States,"Post-SovietAffairs 14, no. 4 (1998): 369-76.
25. For a view of the extent of illiberalismin America,see LymanT. Sargent,Extremismin
America(New York:New YorkUniversityPress, 1995).
26. Nancy Rosenblummakes this argumentin Membershipand Morals, 35.
27. Is America experiencingan "insidiouserosion of values"?On one hand, there is overwhelming evidence thatat the aggregatelevel, Americansare more tolerantthanever of difference. On the otherhand,the SouthernPovertyLaw Center(SPLC) warnsus thatthe numberof
Web sites devoted to hate has exploded and more and more youth are being lured into hate
groups. On one hand,civil rights are firmly entrenchedin America;on the other,thinly veiled
nativismis on the initiativeagendasof many states. Ourpoint is not to resolve this debate one
way or another.All we aresaying is hate (any amountof it) is bad,particularlyfor those who are
its targets.The Americanpublic spherehas no special exemptionor protectionfrom the insidious effects of hate beyond our vigilance and understandingof the phenomenon.
28. Was George W. Bush's much criticized visit to Bob Jones University evidence of our
strongdefenses againstbigotryor a sad reminderthatsuch "slips"do not really cost public figuresmuch?It says much for the Americanpublic thattherewas an immediateoutcryagainstthe
visit. Buttherearealso manyAmericans,notjust AfricanAmericans,who aredevastatedthatwe
elected a manwho, in the year 2000, still could not see for himself any problemwith such a visit
or, worse, calculatedthat such a visit would help his political chances.
29. The supportfor Farrakhanamongthe non-Muslimblack populationin the United States
in the 1990s variedaccordingto how the questionwas askedandthe immediatecontextin which
it was asked.In two opinion surveysconductedfor TimeandNewsweekbetween February1994
(directly after the controversysurroundingKhalid Muhammad'sinflammatoryKean College
Speech) and October 1995, the results remainedremarkablyconsistent.Forty-eightpercentof
Chambers,Kopstein/ BAD CIVIL SOCIETY
863
black respondentsheld thatFarrakhanwas not a bigot and a racist.More thanhalf (59 percent)
thoughtthathe spoketruthfully,andhalf consideredhim a positiverole model of blackyouthand
as a positive influence in the community.For a summaryof these and othersurveys,see Robert
Singh, TheFarrakhanPhenomenon:Race, Reaction,and the ParanoidStyle in AmericanPolitics (Washington,DC: GeorgetownUniversityPress 1997), 205-10.
30. William Brustein, TheLogic of Evil: The Social Origins of the Nazi Party, 1925-1933
(New Haven,CT:Yale UniversityPress, 1996). For a similarargumentaboutthe Nazi vote, see
RichardHamilton, WhoVotedFor Hitler? (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1982).
31. Kopsteinand Hanson,"Weimar-RussiaComparison,"252-83.
32. VeljkoVujacic,"GenaddiyZyuganovandthe 'ThirdRoad,"'Post-SovietAffairs12, no. 2
(1996): 118-54.
33. Stephen White, RichardRose, and Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes(Chatham,NJ:
ChathamHouse, 1997).
34. SouthernPovertyLaw Center,"Youthat the Edge: A Generationin Danger from Hate
Groups"[Online]. (SouthernPovertyLaw CenterWeb site, December 1999). Availablefrom:
http://www.splcenter.org/cgi-bin/goframe.pl?dimame=/whatsnew&pagename=index.html.
35.
Clearly, economic conditions shape the tactics and vitality of political organizations,
whetherit be the Nazi Partyin Germanyduringthe 1930s or the Ku Klux Klan in the
United States duringthe 1970s. The question is whethersimilargroupdynamics shape
the patternsof unorganizedmass action carriedout sporadicallyby small groups. Our
empiricalfindings may suggest the importanceof distinguishingbetween coordinated
anduncoordinatedformsof collective action.(DonaldP.Green,DaraZ. Strolovitch,and
Janelle S. Wong, "Defended Neighborhoods, Integration, and Racially Motivated
Crime,"AmericanJournal ofSociology 104, no. 2 [September1998], 372)
36. Robert Wuthnow,"The Changing Characterof Social Capital in the United States"
(paperpresentedat PrincetonUniversity,Princeton,NJ, May 13, 2000), 55.
37. Andrew C. Janos,East-CentralEurope in the Modem World,(Stanford,CA: Stanford
UniversityPress, 2000); RobertW. Tucker,TheInequalityof Nations, (New York:Basic Books,
1977).
38. The most importantarticlesthatnot only summarizethe huge existing literaturebut also
providenew researchare RobertW. Jackmanand KarinVolpert,"ConditionsFavouringParties
of the ExtremeRight in WesternEurope,"BritishJournal ofPolitical Science 26, no. 4 (1996):
501-21; Michael S. Lewis-Beck andGlennE. Mitchell,"FrenchElectoralTheory:TheNational
FrontTest,"Electoral Studies 12, no. 2 (1993): 112-27; SubrataMitra,"TheNational Frontin
France:A Single-Issue Movement?"Right WingExtremismin WesternEurope, ed. Klaus von
Beyme (London:FrankCass, 1988), 47-64; GerritVoermanandPaul Lujcardie,"TheExtreme
Right in the Netherlands,"EuropeanJournal of Political Research22, no. 1 (1992): 35-54. On
membershipin right-wingextremistmovementsthatareinclinedto violence, the most extensive
researchhas been carriedout in EastGermany.Again, the link betweenhigh unemploymentand
right-winggroupviolence is quiteclear,if not easily interpreted.Fora summaryof this research,
see Armin Pfahl-Traughber, "Die Entwicklung des Rechtsextremismus in Ost-und
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichteno. 39 (2000): 3-14.
Westdeutschland,"
39. Although, in the case of East Germany,some studies do point to the unemployedand
especially unemployedyouth as being overrepresentedin violent groups.See Pfhal-Traughber,
"Die Entwicklung des Rechtsextremismus," 11; Frank Neubacher, Fremdenfeindliche
Brandanschldge.Eine kriminologisch-empirischeUntersuchungvon Tdtern,Tathintergriinden
und gerichtlicher Verarbeitungin Jugendstrafverfahren(Monchengladbach,1999).
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POLITICALTHEORY/ December2001
40. Lewis-Beck and Mitchell, "FrenchElectoralTheory."
41. Rosenblum,Membershipand Morals, 22.
42. Quotedin Rosenblum,Membershipand Morals, 9, 272.
43. RaphaelS. Ezekiel, TheRacist Mind (New York:Viking, 1995).
44. Quoted in Bob Herbert,"WhenHate Sees an Opening,"New YorkTimes,January17,
2000, A17.
45. The data she cites, however, are almost entirely concerned with isolated hate crimes
ratherthangroupmembershipor strength.See Rosenblum,Membershipand Morals, 278-79.
46. Rosenblum,Membershipand Morals, 278.
47. See, for example, Kent Greenawalt,"Freedomof Association and Religious Association,"Freedomof Association, 109-44; George Kateb,"TheValueof Association,"Freedomof
Association, 35-63; Peter de Marneffe,"Rights,Reasons, and Freedomof Association,"Freedom of Association, 145-73.
48. This impressionis sometimes intentional,as with theoristswho think we should leave
civil society alone as muchas possible. See, forexample,Kateb,"ValueofAssociation."Forothers, the impressionis unintentional,as with theoristswho simply concentrateon constitutional
cases in theirwritings,not meaningby thatthatwe shouldnot also publiclycriticizegroupseven
they are affordedprotectionunderthe constitution.See, for example, Gutmann,"Freedomof
Association:An IntroductoryEssay."
49. Gutmann,"Freedomof Association:An IntroductoryEssay,"7.
50. Intermarriageis a hardcase for our category "badcivil society."Are orthodoxJewish
groupsthatforbidmarryingnon-Jewsas "bad"as a hypotheticalBob Jones Churchthatforbids
marryingblacks?As with all typologies, one must deal with gray areason a case-by-casebasis.
Here we would say thatboth the intentof the rule as well as the effect mustbe looked at in context. For example, thatthe Bob Jones Churchis preachingto a majorityand empoweredgroup
andhas specifically targeteda minoritydisempoweredgroup,while orthodoxJewishgroups,in
the United Statesanyway,are in the opposite situation,is not irrelevantin evaluatingthe social
message being sent by any given rule. Ultimately,however,one must ask if a rule or policy is
accompaniedby hateandmalevolencetowardothers.Wouldthis rule,forexample,hindergroup
members'interactingwith, say, non-Jewsor AfricanAmericansin othercontexts?Takingthese
sorts of questionsinto consideration,it is possible to make distinctions,althoughthey might be
somewhatmessy.
51. Rosenblum,Membershipand Morals, 17.
52. Stephen Macedo, "ConstitutingCivil Society: School Vouchers,Religious Nonprofit
Organizations,andLiberalPublicValues,"Chicago-KentLawReview 74: 800, p. 113, emphasis
added.
53. Foran interestingargumentalong these lines, see NadiaUrbanati,"APhenomenologyof
AssociationalLife," The Good Society 9, no. 1 (1999): 58-60.
54. Fora surveyofthe variety,see Warren,Democracyand the TerrainofAssociation,chaps.
2,4.
55. See Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, KanishkaJayasuriya,David M. Jones, ed., Towards
Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia (New York:St. Martin's, 1995).
56. Hasan Hanafi, "Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society: A Reflective Islamic
Approach,"AlternativeConceptionsof Civil Society,ed. Simone ChambersandWill Kymlicka
(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress, forthcoming).See also Suzanne Last Stone, "The
JewishTraditionof Civil Society,"ibid., andRichardMadsen,"ConfucianConceptionsof Civil
Society,"ibid., for furthervariationson the liberalconception.
57. William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversity Press,
1991), 255.
Chambers,Kopstein/ BAD CIVIL SOCIETY
865
58. Rosenblum,Membershipand Morals, 39.
59. StephenMacedo,"Community,Diversity,andCivic Education:Towarda LiberalPolitical Science of GroupLife,"Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (Winter1996), 240-68.
60. SarahHenderson,"ExportingCivil Society: ForeignFundingand Women'sGroupsin
Post-Soviet Russia" (Ph.D. diss., Departmentof Political Science, University of Colorado at
Boulder,2000).
61. Yael Tamir,"Revisitingthe Civic Sphere,"224.
62. Seyla Benhabib,Situatingthe Self Gender,Community,and Postmodernismin Contemporary Ethics (New York:Routledge, 1992), 77-78.
63. Berman,"Civil Society and the Collapse of the WeimarRepublic,"424-25.
64. Albert Makashov, "Usurers of Russia," quoted in Johnson's Russia List, no. 2461
(November6, 1998), 7.
65. Foley and Edwards,"Paradoxof Civil Society,"48.
66. Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory,esp., 523-32; JiirgenHabermas,
"FurtherReflections on the Public Sphere,"Habermasand the Public Sphere,ed. CraigClaxon
(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1993), esp., 452-57.
SimoneChambersis an associateprofessor ofpolitical theoryat the Universityof Colorado at Boulder.
JeffreyKopstein is an associate professor of comparativepolitics at the Universityof
Coloradoat Boulder.