Joint Development of the
Continental Shelf where
Delimitation is Pending:
Cooperative Opportunity or Complication
in Oceans Governance
Professor Clive Schofield
Territorial Sea Baseline
Internal waters
Maritime Zones under the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea
Continental Shelf
The
Area
Sea-bed, Subsoil, Sedentary Species
(Extended
Continental Shelf)
Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ)
Water Column,
Sea-bed, Subsoil
12 M
Contiguous
zone
Territorial
sea
Shelf
High Sea
200 M
12 M
Sea Level
Upper
Slope
Animation by Arsana & Schofield, 2012
Source: TALOS Manual (5th edition, 2014)
Plateu
or
Terrace
Lower
Slope
Rise
Deep
Ocean
Implications of Creeping Coastal State Jurisdiction
•
Extended maritime claims
200 nautical mile claims = 147km2 million (43M2 million)
41% of the area of the oceans
PLUS: c.30km2 million of extended continental shelf
areas (and counting)
•
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Proliferation in overlapping claims to maritime
jurisdiction, “new” potential maritime boundaries
and maritime boundary disputes
c.54% of potential maritime boundaries agreed
BUT: many agreements partial or not in force
Continental Shelf and EEZ delimitation
LOSC Articles 74 and 83
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the
States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and
cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into
provisional arrangements of a practical nature and,
during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or
hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such
arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final
delimitation.
The legal rationale for joint development arrangements
Key Components of Joint Development
•
•
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A formal agreement
Definition of a special zone
Without prejudice clauses
Definition of the resources to which the
arrangement applies
• Agreement on the laws and jurisdiction governing
exploration, operations and revenue sharing
• Uncontested sovereignty over the area
designated as a joint development zone
• Political will
Joint Zones as an addition to delimitation
• Bahrain-Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf (signed 1958)
• Qatar-United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) in the Persian
Gulf (1969)
• France-Spain in the Bay of Biscay (1974)
• Colombia - Dominican Republic in the Caribbean (1978)
• Australia-Papua New Guinea in the Torres Strait (1978)
• Iceland-Norway in the North Atlantic (Jan Mayen Island)
(1981)
• Faroes-UK in the North Atlantic (1999)
• Boundaries defined so security/enforcement jurisdiction
clear cut
Source:
International
Maritime
Boundaries
Torres Strait
Source: Geoscience Australia
Faroes-UK
Source: International Maritime Boundaries
Joint Zones in lieu of delimitation
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Kuwait-Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf (1965)
Japan-South Korea in the Sea of Japan (1974)
Sudan-Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea (1974)
Australia-Indonesia in the Timor Sea (Timor Gap) (1989)
Malaysia-Thailand in the Gulf of Thailand (1990)
Malaysia-Vietnam in the Gulf of Thailand (1993)
São Tomé-Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea (2001)
Australia-Timor Leste in the Timor Sea (2002)
The East China Sea
Advantages of Joint Development
• Unlocks intractable disputes
• Sidesteps sovereignty issues
• Allows development/management of resources/
environment to proceed without delay
• Without prejudice clauses effectively address
concerns over compromising jurisdictional claims
(at least in a formal legal sense)
Additional Advantages
• Avoids the need for a costly ‘once and for all’
boundary delimitation exercise
• Often perceived to be an ‘equitable’ solution
• Cooperative – no ‘winner’ or ‘loser’
• Flexible in area, administration, function and
duration
Can apply to living or non-living resources
Can be general or resource-specific
Can be permanent or temporary
Can be applied to security issues
• Consistent with international law
• Models exist
Challenges in the Application of Provisional Arrangements of
a Practical Nature
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The Limits of zones of cooperation
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Does using the limits of overlapping claims
areas legitimise and encourage excessive
maritime claims?
Third party rights – other claimants?
Complexity and Continuity
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Intricate arrangements and ongoing costs
Difficult to negotiate and sustain
Need to endure for the long haul
A challenge to State sovereignty
A source of friction in relations?
Challenges in the Application of Provisional Arrangements of
a Practical Nature
•
Downstream issues
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As much of a prize as the marine resources
themselves?
Dealing with the impacts of “success”
Gulf of Thailand examples - a
concentration of State practice
Gulf of Guinea
Timor Sea arrangements
The Gulf of Thailand
Cambodia – Vietnam
joint ‘historical waters’ area
Malaysia – Thailand
joint development area
Malaysia – Vietnam
joint development area
Cambodia – Thailand
Memorandum of
Understanding
Source: National Bureau of
Asian Research, 2011
Source: National Bureau of
Asian Research, 2011
Sao Tomé EEZ
São Tomé and Príncipe – Nigeria JDZ
Cameroon Claim Line
120°
130°
125°
Sulawesi
I N D O N ESI A
Wetar
k
Lombo
FLORES
Tanimbar
Islands
OR
TIM
SU
MB
A
10°
Roti
Arafura Sea
102°
O C E A N
IEEZ
r
Timo
Ashmore
Islands
200
300
400km
8°
120°
IND
IEEZ
Mercator Projection
Central Meridian 128°E
Latitude of true scale 0°
5°
JAVA
IAN
AE
EZ
SCALE
100
Mercator Projection
Central Meridian 106°E
Latitude of true scale 10°S
A U S T RA LI A
15°
0
111°
Sumatra
Sea
Scott
Reef
EZ
AE
106°
5°
8°
I N D O N ES I A
OCE
AN
Christmas I
MAP 96/ 523.25
125°
130°
Agreed extension of the seabed
boundary in the area between
continental Australia and the
Indonesian archipelago (Article 1)
Area subject to 1974 MOU
regarding the operations of
Indonesian traditional fishermen
within the Australian fishing zone
Agreed exclusive economic zone
(water column) boundary in the
area between continental Australia
and the Indonesian archipelago
(Article 2)
Zone of Co-operation
(Timor Gap Treaty)
Previously agreed seabed
boundaries (1971 and 1972)
SCALE
0
12°
102°
160km
A US
TRA LI A
135°E
AEEZ
Sawu
I N D I A N
IRIAN JAYA
Aru Islands
Babar
Alor
10°
Kai
Islands
Buton
Selayar
WA
SUMBA
135°
106°
IEEZ
12°
111°
Agreed seabed and water column boundary
between Christmas Island and Java (Article 3)
Area of overlap between Australian seabed
jurisdiction and Indonesian exclusive economic
zone (water column) jurisdiction
Indonesian exclusive economic zone boundary
Australian exclusive economic zone boundary
Map 5 - Consolidated depiction of all Australian-Indonesian
maritime boundaries after entry into force of the Treaty
Overlapping
claims in the
Timor Sea
Source: Clive Schofield,
‘Minding the Gap: The
Australia – East Timor Treaty
on Certain Maritime
Arrangements in the Timor
Sea’, International Journal of
Marine and Coastal Law,
Volume 22 (2007), No.2: 189234.
Opportunities and Challenges in the Application of
Provisional Arrangements of a Practical Nature
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Great potential merit but…
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Not to be entered into lightly, simply
because negotiations deadlocked
Significant implementation
challenges to overcome
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What area?
Third party rights
Institutional issues
Certainty and Continuity
Downstream issues
Political dimensions