Mirosława Grabowska
Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw
Public Opinion Research Center
&
Tadeusz Szawiel
Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw
Religion and democratization after communism: the case of Poland
(Draft – do not quote or cite without permission)
In this paper we analyze (I) the historical background of the state-church relations and
(II) state-church relations during the communism. (III) We argue that the differentiation of
state-church relations „fits” in the typology proposed by Benyamin Neuberger1. Last, but not
least (IV) we present state-church relations in Poland.
I.
History
The state-church relations depend, firstly, on the history – whether Reformation was
victorious what frequently lead to the creation of an established church – and the development
of state-church(es) and society relations. For example, in pre-Revolutionary France, the
Catholic Church held a strong position, enjoyed privileges and generally, it identified itself
with ancien régime. It was the French Revolution that finally turned it into the enemy or, at
least, made it stand in opposition. This division was maintained by the post-Revolutionary
periods of political changes: the Bourbon Restoration and the Second French Empire were in
favor of the church; whereas the republics, especially the Third Republic, were pro-secular.
Secondly, particular political decisions made by particular people are important, e.g.
introducing compulsory, free, and secular elementary education (1882) by Jules Ferry (183293) and,
thirdly, the “founding documents” such as United States Declaration of Independence
or Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, and legal regulations: constitutions and
concordats, laws, and judicial rulings.
Forthly, society matters, as well as social groups and people. If a society was
religiously homogeneous, or at least one religion and one denomination were clearly
dominant, then the position of this denomination was different than it would have been in a
society that was divided or diversified in this respect. However, such a dominant church
might have been an established church or might have remained in an alliance with a regime or
might have even been in opposition – it used to be the case in the empires annexing countries
of different religion or denomination. In such cases, religious identity became a substantial
element of national identity. This is not only Polish peculiarity. Similarly to the model of a
Pole-Catholic (who defied partition powers – Orthodox Russia and protestant Germany
1
Neuberger B., Religion and State in Europe and Israel. W: R. Hazan and M. Maor (eds), Parties, Elections and
Cleavages. Israel in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective. London, Portland OR: Frank Cass 2000, p. 65-84.
2 conducting anti-Polish and anti-Catholic politics)2, there would develop a model of an
Orthodox Serb or Greek (against Islamic Ottoman Empire) or an Irish-Catholic (against
Anglican British Empire).
Fifthly, time matters, or rather times of trial, which Europe experienced in the last
century. The period of World War I was the time of improving state-church relations and
bringing clergymen closer to soldiers at the fronts and in entrenchments. World War II
brought a threat of repressions, but also a temptation to collaborate. When Polish clergymen
died or were murdered in the concentration camps, Father Jozef Tiso (1887-1947) was the
president of the Republic of Slovakia (1939-45) which was entirely dependent on the Third
Reich and he collaborated in transportation of the Jews to the concentration camps. Cardinal
Alojzije Stepinać (1896-1960) supported national and fascist Ustaša – Croatian Revolutionary
Movement, Independent Croatian State (1941-45), (1889-1959), and the ethnic cleansings
that were conducted. The same Catholic Church, Catholic clergymen, yet different
testimonies.
II.
Communism
Church(es) in communism require separate discussion. It was time of a particular trial
– permanent struggles with a system that did not only repress churches and clergymen but was
also secularizing societies. It was time of trial for the entire societies and institutions, social
groups and individuals. It is impossible to elaborate here on the history of communist system
and its struggles with religion and churches – this subject has been extensively discussed both
in a general historical studies3, but also in sociological, and political science literature
(referring to the entire Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, particular regions or countries)4.
Without a doubt, the constitutive characteristics of the system were imposed and they
influenced all the countries of the communist bloc. However, the period of time, country,
religion, or denomination conditioned the degree of severity that characterized or could
characterize politics of local communists. Whether it was a period of a former system
destruction and creation of the new, period of consolidation and stabilization, or period of
system decline. Whether it was the Stalinist period or later. Whether a particular church was
global (as the Catholic Church), or local; hierarchical, centralized or not (as Islam5). One has
2
A notion referring to the relations between national and religious identity; it had also political dimension –
resistance against the occupants and their politics.
3
Davis N., Europe. Oxford University Press 1996 or numerous works by Richard Pipes.
4
Very frequently cited are the following: Ramet S. (ed.), Religious Policy in the Soviet Union. Cambridge
University Press 1993 and Anderson J., Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and Successor States.
Cambridge University Press 1994 and other publications of these authors. Recognized are also the works of
Dimitry V. Pospielovsky: a three volume series: A History of Soviet Atheism in Theory and Practice, and the
Believer. New York: St. Martin’s Press 1987-88, vol. I-III and The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia.
New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press 1998.
5
In the case of Islam, one cannot speak of church as a form of religious organization. For sure, not in Sunni
Islam where no separate group of clergymen exists – although imam leads prayers and he needs to know Koran
3 to bear in mind that each country – a subsystem of the communist system – was not only
dependent on the periodical shifts in the communist headquarters, but it had its own subperiods and politics, also very idiosyncratic, and this also characterized the Soviet Union.
For example, the Russian Orthodox Church that before World War I had 54000
parishes was left with 500 parishes only in 1940. Let us not elaborate on mass murders of
bishops and clergymen (counted in hundreds)6 and numerous repressions. A particular
campaign (conducted between 1920 and 1931) against church bells deserves mentioning –
they were too loud and made of precious metals; therefore, they were muted and melted to
obtain raw materials. Sometimes, as if seizing the opportunity, the bell-towers were also
destroyed. There were two goals of this campaign: anti-religious and economic. It was
particularly destructive when it concerned the bells of historic Orthodox churches and
monasteries, as was the case of the Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius: 19 bells of the total weight of
8165 poods (1 pood is about 16 kg) were removed and the monastery, which was turned into a
museum, was left with 3 bells only – small, yet historical, crafted in 1420, 1598, and 1649.
Along the bells, certain elements of the monastery’s immovables were robbed (candlesticks,
church vessels, iconostases and icons, gold and silver from the gilding, even cassocks and
rugs).7 When during World War II Stalin needed support of the Russian Orthodox Church and
religion, the orthodox churches were open again – there were 17000 of them and in 1957 –
22000. However, when Nikita Khrushchev gained the power, he started his own anti-religious
campaign and extorted that 12000 orthodox churches be closed. In 1985, there were less than
70008 active churches. More religious freedom was allowed at the end of the 1980’s and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
As far as the Central European countries are concerned: in Poland from 1956 to 195859, there was a thaw in the state-church relations, yet in Czechoslovakia or Hungary – not. It
was conditioned by a number of factors: a context, a political situation within country, even
personal beliefs of the first secretaries of the communist parties. The following were also
taken into consideration: religious composition of the society and its religiosity, the strength
of church organization and attitudes (more attitudes than political actions) of religious leaders,
even their traits of character. 9
and the principles of Islam. In Shia Islam, there exist a group Ayatollahs and a hierarchical structure. In a model
Islam state, i.e. caliphate, religion, morality, and state law shall remain in ideal harmony.
6
Russian Orthodox Church commemorates them: the Sunday closest to January 25 (February 7 in Gregorian
callendar) is the Sunday of the Holy New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia. Among the martyrs are the
murdered members of the tsar’s family, clergymen, and lay martyrs. This date was chosen because that day in
1918 when the Red Army seized Kiev and the metropolitan of Kiev Vladimir Bogojawlenskij was arrested,
murdered in the presence of monks and his body was profaned. Saint Vladimir Bogojawlenskij is referred to as
„proto-martyr of the communist yoke in Russia.”
7
V.F. Kozlov, Ruination of church bells in 1920–1930
http://www.danilovbells.com/bellsonrussia/publications_about_bells/ruination_of_church_bells_in_192.html
8
After: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persecution_of_Christians_in_the_Soviet_Union. Different sources cite
different figures, yet the ratio is similar.
9
The works of the above mentioned authors: Ramet P., Cross and commissar: the politics of religion in Eastern
Europe and the USSR. Indiana University Press 1987 and Anderson J., Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet
4 Finally, the leaders need to be indicated expressis verbis (both on the side of a church
and communism): outstanding, firm or weak, or simply unwise. Turning back in time to the
example of France: Napoleon signing a concordat (1801) spared his country a religious
conflict and Pius X imposing sanctions on two French bishops for their political attitudes
provided a pretext for the actions of „secularizers” and a breach of the concordat (1904).
Let us remind that during the Second World War, the religious leaders adopted various
standpoints towards Hitler Germany. Proceeding to the communism. It would be intriguing to
compare the history and social impact of Primate Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński (1901-81), Josef
Cardinal Beran (1888-1969) and Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty (1892-1975). Their age was
almost the same, they came from province. During the German occupation, all of them
presented outstanding attitudes: Stefan Wyszyński was the chaplain of the Home Army and he
was hiding from Gestapo; Josef Beran was imprisoned (in 1942-1945 in Dachau
concentration camp); Jozsef Mindszenty was also hiding and was arrested twice (for helping
Polish refugees, among other accusations). After the war, all of them came to the primatial
episcopal sees: Wyszyński in 1948, Beran in 1946, a Mindszenty in 1945. Three of them had
to face communism.
In 1950, Wyszyński signed an agreement with communist government, yet he was
arrested and remained imprisoned from September 1953 to October 1957. However, after
being released, he participated in the Second Vatican Council and was very active in the
country. In 1957-66 he conducted the celebrations of the millennium of the baptism of Poland
and he contributed to writing the letter from the Polish bishops to the German bishops
(1965)10. The communist authorities frequently attacked him, the Church was subject to
numerous restraints and persecution, yet it managed to function and even develop. During his
pilgrimage to Poland in 1979, John Paul II said about Wyszyński: “such a father, a shepherd,
a primate is given by God once in 1000 years.”
Beran entered a conflict with communist government when in 1948 he
excommunicated Father Josef Plojhar who was eagerly participating in the communist
regime. This excommunion that he did not want to recall was probably the pretext for his
arrest and imprisonment in 1949-63. When he was released, he could not return to his bishop
duties. In 1965, he was allowed to leave Czechoslovakia and he spent the rest of his life in
Rome where he died and was buried.
Mindszenty was arrested at the end of 1948 and in 1949 show-trial he was sentenced
to life imprisonment for high treason. The Hungarian Revolution freed him in 1956 and after
its suppression by the Red Army he was hiding in the American Embassy in Budapest. He
spent there next 15 years and it was Paul VI who induced the government to let him pass
Union and Successor States. Cambridge University Press 1994 along with numerous works by Jan Żaryn on the
Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of Poland.
10
See: http://web.archive.org/web/20120223054907/http://www.opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/W/WE/kep/oredzieniem_18111965.html; also:
http://enominepatris.com/deutschtum/geschichte/hirtenbrief.htm
5 through Hungary on his way to Rome, where he moved in 1971. Soon, he moved to Vienna to
be closer to his homeland and he spent there his last years. In 1989, he was rehabilitated and
in 1991 his remains were repatriated to the country to be solemnly buried in the primate crypt
in the Esztergom cathedral.
The biographies of these three primates present not only striking similarities, but also
differences in their histories, religious, social and political impact. All three were unbroken
with respect to Nazism and communism. All three were imprisoned. Yet, only Primate
Wyszyński succeeded, not without difficulties, in the creation of modus vivendi of the
Catholic Church and the communist state and is commonly referred to as the Primate of the
Millennium. Primate Beran and Primate Mindszenty withered away in prisons and in the
exile. Was this a result of personal differences? Was Stefan Wyszyński more flexible? Or
maybe Josef Beran and Primate Mindszenty were too uncompromising? Maybe instead of
searching for differences in politics and primates’ approaches, one has to point out the
communists – particularly ruthless in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Bolesław Bierut and
Władysław Gomułka were slightly more careful, thoughtful than Klement Gottwald, Mátyás
Rákosi or János Kádár. Maybe the decisive element was the uneven strength of the Catholic
Church in these three countries and a different level of the societies’ religiosity? Did
Czechoslovak communist have to respect Catholic Church – not perceived as national by the
unreligious society?
III.
Typology
The hitherto analyses and examples convince us that there was more to the statechurch(es) relations than just a letter of the law: these were the historical and political, social,
national, and cultural conditionings. The Benyamin Neuberger’s typology11 takes it into
consideration – not only does it classify, but it also explains or at least points at historical and
social background of many state-church(es) relations models.12 Therefore, this typology will
be discussed there – let us start with the table elaborated on its basis.
Table 1. Sociological models of state-church(es) relations:
Model of
statechurch(es)
relation
Name of the
model in
original
Atheism of
communist
states
[my definition –
MG]
Secularabsolutist model
in the totalitarian
Separation
of state
and
church
Recognized
denomination
model
Endorsed
church
Established
church
Theocracy
Separation
of church
and state
Recognized
communities
model
Endorsed
church
Established
church
Theocracy
11
Neuberger B., Religion and State in Europe and Israel. W: R. Hazan and M. Maor (eds), Parties, Elections and
Cleavages. Israel in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective. London, Portland OR: Frank Cass 2000, pp. 6584.
12
We hold these models to be Weber’s ideal types.
6 Example:
communist
regimes
Soviet Union and
communist bloc
countries
France
Mexico
Netherlands
USA
Germany
Austria
Luxemburg
Belgium
Hungary
Elaborated on the basis of Benjamin Neuberger’s typology models
Italy
Poland
Great
Britain
← Sweden
Greece
Iran
Saudi
Arabia
The typology proposed – holding the state-church(es) relations to be particular
historical-social-legal entities – is, in fact, a continuum from atheism of communist states to
theocracy.
Let us commence with the extremes. Communist states with a formal separation of
state and church(es) practically aimed at destroying, or at least limiting and marginalizing the
churches, and „enlighting”, i.e. secularizing societies. They succeeded to various degrees –
certain countries, even in Europe, were close to this ideal. For example, in 1967 Albania,
mosques and churches were closed and possessing a Bible or entering a church marriage was
held to be a crime.13 With the fall of communism in Europe, its idiosyncratic model of statechurch(es) relations disappeared. Theocracy is on the other end of the extreme – in its pure
form this is a state governed by the clergymen according to the regulations of one religion that
the state follows. Religious minorities are discriminated and sometimes persecuted.
Nowadays, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the closest followers of this model.
Moving from the extremes of this continuum to the center, let us examine from one
hand the separation of state and church(es) and the established church, on the other.
The separation of state and church adopted two forms: either hostile towards
religion as in France or Mexico or more open as in the United States of America. In each
version of this model, one respects a secular character of a state and non-interference of state
in the religious and church matters and of churches in the government or politics. In fact, it is
difficult to find a perfect embodiment of this model. For example, in France the state
authorities guaranteed the right to appoint Catholic bishops (which they rarely, but do
exercise), yet for historical reasons they respect different state-church relations in AlsaceLorraine14 (which France regained after the World War II).
The organizations or religious communities do not formally possess the buildings of
worship – churches, protestant churches, and synagogues as they belong to the state or a city,
but “in return” they finance them. There are no religion classes, but there exist private
religious schools. There remain both chaplains in the army (what is probably a heritage of the
13
It is difficult to credibly estimate the religious composition of the Albanian society: the largest group comprise
Muslims (39-70%), then the Orthodox (20-24%), and the Catholics (10-17%)
14
The French model of separation of the state and church(es) is not in force – the relations are regulated by
Concordat of 1801 (signed by Napoleon and Pope Pius VII). The state supports Catholic Church, but also
Lutheran and Calvinist churches, and Jewish communes (the clergymen of these religions and denominations
obtain their salary from the state, among others). The religion classes are not forbidden in public schools;
although, they are not compulsory. At the Marc Bloch Strasbourg II University, there exist departments of
Catholic and Protestant theology, the only departments of this type in France.
7 rapprochement of clergymen and laymen in the World War I trenches) and the religious
services in hospitals and jails.
Although the model of state-church(es) separation does not mean that there remain no
problems or that all the problems have been solved, but it means a continuous debate what is
in line with the separation and what might threaten it. It is observable that certain changes
have been taking place in this model. In 2004, it was forbidden to wear explicit religious
symbols (i.e. a hijab, a cross, the star of David) in public schools. In 2011, the Orthodox
Christmas liturgy ceased to be broadcasted along with Catholic and Protestant lent sermons
that have been broadcasted since 1946. In the same year, a law was passed which forbade
covering faces in the public, what entails forbidding Muslim women to wear veils covering a
half or an entire face and burqas. It seems that in France the scale turns towards laïcité –
circumscribing religious communities and the believers in the public sphere. For example, this
is not the case of the Netherlands.
On the other side of the spectrum, next to theocracy yet closer to the center was
located the established church model. Until recently, it has been implemented in the United
Kingdom15, Scandinavian countries, and Greece, among others. In this model, for historical,
political and social reasons (dominance of this religion in the society) one religion and one
church are claimed to be official or established, a church fulfills important state functions, and
the state, according to law, decides in church and religious matters. A good example is, or
until recently was, England and the Church of England. Since the 1688 Glorious Revolution
when the throne was given to William III of Orange and Mary II, only a member of the
Church of England might wear a crown of the United Kingdom and the coronation oath
obliges the monarch to support and defend the Church of England. A king or a queen is the
head of the Church of England and the archbishop of Canterbury along with 24 bishops are
the members of the House of Lords. A king, respecting Prime Minister’s recommendations,
appoints bishops and the parliament decides about the important church matters, e.g. in 1992
it allowed for a divorced man to be ordained and in 1994 it allowed women to be ordained
and take lower positions in the church hierarchy. However the state itself gradually, virtually,
and also formally withdraws from the religious and church sphere. The parliament delegated
its power to appoint bishops to the General Synode of the Church and a king appoints only
these bishops who were selected by the Church. The state ceremonies are attended not only by
the English clergy, but also Catholic and Jewish and in 1994 Queen Elisabeth II participated
in the ceremony of the Catholic Cathedral Church of Westminster centenary – it was the first
time since 1688 when a reigning head of the state participated in the Catholic service.
Similar changes can be observed in other countries. In Sweden, the established church
was the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Sweden. However, certain changes have been taking
place for more than half of the last century – first they were slow and gradual, but their
15
The United Kingom is an interesting case of a country with two established churches: the Church of England
oraz the Church of Scotland. Here, we will discuss only England and the Church of England.
8 culmination in 2000 lead to abolishing the status of the established church, enshrined in the
constitution, which is referred to as disestablishment; in vernacular, it is called a divorce of
the state and the church.
The Orthodox Church of Greece is socially dominant (94% of the society being
members thereof16) and was included in the 1975 Constitution which states the Orthodox
religion to be dominant17 and determines who heads the Church on the basis of particular
church documents, and forbids to introduce changes in the translation of the Scripture. The
situation of the Orthodox Church of Greece is more favorable than other churches. It is
supported by the state through direct and indirect subventions. It is the state that pays
remunerations and pensions to the clergy and the employees of the Church. However, all
churches are exempt from taxation. In school, religion classes (not compulsory) are conducted
by teachers and according to the program approved by the Orthodox Church. Yet, each
religious group is allowed to found its own school. The Constitution (Paragraph 13)
guarantees religious freedom to everyone.
Three examples presented above clearly do not constitute the representative sample of
cases which are characteristic of an established church model, but the trend is visible:
established churches cease to be established or become less established in a sense that a state
intervenes in the church and religious matters less frequently and other churches and religions
gain rights that they have been devoid of.
In the center of this continuum, close to the separation of state and church, there is the
recognized communities model and close to the established church there is the endorsed
church.
The recognized communities model, often referred to as the German model,
developed virtually in Germany, but state-church relations remain similar in Austria, certain
cantons in Switzerland, Luxemburg, Belgium, and Hungary. The historical development of
this model was favored by a religious division of a society (Germany, Belgium, Hungary);
although, this is not dependence free of exceptions (Austria).
16
Biotechnology Report. Fieldwork: January 2010 – February 2010 – see:
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_341_en.pdf 382.
17
English translation - official, parliamentary – of the beginning of Chapter II. Relations of Church and State is:
Article 3
1. The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. The Orthodox Church of
Greece, acknowledging our Lord Jesus Christ as its head, is inseparably united in doctrine with the Great Church
of Christ in Constantinople and with every other Church of Christ of the same doctrine, observing unwaveringly,
as they do, the holy apostolic and synodal canons and sacred traditions. It is autocephalous and is administered
by the Holy Synod of serving Bishops (…)There is an ongoing debate, what means observing unwaveringly, as
they do, the holy apostolic and Synodal canons and sacred traditions – whether the wording applies only to the
sphere of the sacred, religious and church matters, or extends to the realm of light. The latter interpretation
would mean that the law should be in accordance with the holy canons and sacred traditions. Full text translation
is available at:
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf
9 Religious freedom is obviously guaranteed in Germany (Article 4 of the German
Constitution, i.e. Grundgesetz18). Moreover, denomination groups are legally acknowledged
and possess equal rights if they fulfill certain requirements, such as: the size of the
community, continuity and institutionalization, loyalty towards German Constitution. These
conditions are difficult to be fulfilled by the Islam community, because it is neither
homogenous nor organized and represented by one institution19 (moreover, certain members
of Muslim clergy reject the right to convert which is burdened with death penalty in Islam).
Nevertheless, the states aims at guarantying Muslims the same rights as the members of other
religions possess. It was not until recently (2005) when Jehova’s Witnesses were
acknowledged (first in Berlin, then in 13 other lands). Yet, in 2006 the court rejected the
possibility of acknowledging the Church of Scientology. The separation of state and church
does not exist in a sense that a state cooperates with churches in many areas and this
cooperation is institutionalized, and the religion is not pushed out from the public sphere. The
state financially supports the denomination groups through collecting special church tax from
the declared believers which is then divided between churches proportionally to the number of
church tax-paying believers. Churches run kindergartens, schools, hospitals, nursing homes,
provide religious services in hospitals, army, and prisons, etc. In public schools, religion
lessons comprise a “regular” part of a curriculum and are conducted according to the doctrine
of a religious community, what is granted by the German constitution.20 Religion teachers,
employed by the state, need to be accepted by a proper church. However, parents may
„unenroll” their child from these classes.
In this model, as in other, certain differences between countries exist. For example, in
Hungary instead of withdrawing their child from religion lessons, they need to be enrolled.
Despite these differences, the fundamental characteristics remain and they can be generally
described as a cooperation of a state and many different churches that have equal rights.
The endorsed church model describes a situation where one church, although not
established, is preferred in a country either virtually or only symbolically. This model is
presented by Italy, Spain, Ireland, Poland, maybe Bulgaria and Romania, among other
countries. In these countries – historically and temporarily – one denomination and one
church remains dominant – Catholics in Spain comprise 71%21 of the population, in Italy –
88%22, Ireland – 84%23, Poland – 93%24, Orthodox Catholics comprise 87% of Romanian25
18
See: http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/konst/niemcy.html.
It wasn’t until 2007 when the Muslim Coordination Board was estalished (Koordinierungsrat der Muslime in
Deutschland ).
20
Art. 7 Point 2 and 3. guarantees a right to establish private schools (Art. 7 Point 4). See: http://www.de-iurepl.org/gesetze/recht/verfassung/text/1,1,741,DE,PL,.html
21
Barómetro abril 2012. Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, p. 17. (Accessed: 19 June 2013)
22
Rapporto Eurispes 2006, p. 1099 – resulted cited in Corriere della Sera z 18 January 2006. (Accessed: 19 June
2013)
23
In 2011 census 84.2% of the population declared to be Catholic (a decline of 2.6% in comparison to 2006).
Census 2011: This is Ireland – Religion. Central Statistics Office Ireland, pp. 42-43. (Accessed: 19 June 2013)
19
10 and 83%26 of Bulgarian population. It does not mean, of course, that all believe and attend
religious services.
Constitutions of these countries take it into account, for example, through enlisting and
somehow emphasizing a dominant religion or a church. Spanish constitution of 1978
guarantees freedom of religion and worship, declares religious neutrality of the state, and
simultaneously states: “public government takes into consideration religious beliefs of the
Spanish society and maintains the relations of cooperation with the Catholic Church and other
religions.”27 Italian constitution (1947) declares both the state and the Catholic Church to be
independent and sovereign, but it adds: “their relations are regulated by the Lateran
Treaties.”28 The Lateran Treaties, signed in 1929, regulated the relations between Vatican and
Italy acknowledging Vatican as an independent state and comprised a concordat regulating
state and Church relations in Italy. In 1984, the statement acknowledging the Catholic
Religion as the dominant was removed and certain changes concerning financing the Church
were introduced. Similar solutions can be found in the Polish Constitution (1997) which
guarantees equal rights of all the churches and denominations and declares state’s impartiality
in the matters concerning religious beliefs, granting freedom of expressing them in the public.
Simultaneously, it states: “the relations between the Republic of Poland and the Catholic
Church are governed by the international agreement between the Holy See and other acts.” 29 Moreover, the preamble includes an invocation to God and recognition of the Christian
heritage of the nation.
The Constitution of Ireland (1922, 1937) goes even further. It commences with a
preamble: „In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom,
as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred, We, the people of Éire,
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained
our fathers through centuries of trial, Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting
struggle to regain the rightful independence of our Nation, And seeking to promote the
common good (…) Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.” The
Article 44 reads: “1. The State acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to
Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect and honour religion.
24
Result of a study „What we are, what is important to us? Poles 2012” conduced by Public Opinion Research
Center and commissioned by the Center of Thought of Pope John Pole II in January 11-16, 2012 on random
route of population aged 15 and up; the percentage of Catholics to adults was determined (N=958). In 2005-2012
in the Public Opinion Research Center studies, the percetage of Catholics varied from 93.1% do 94.7%. See the
Public Opinion Research Center report „Changes concerning faith and religiosity of Poles after the death of John
Paul II.” (BS/49/2012). Presented by. R. Boguszewski.
25
Data concerning Romania – see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romania#Religion
26
Data concerning Bulgaria – see: http://www.nationmaster.com/country/bu-bulgaria/rel-religion – the data
comes from 2001 census.
27
Aricle 16. See: http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/konst/hiszpania2011.html.
28
Article 9. See: http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/konst/wlochy2011.html.
29
Article 25. See: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/polski/kon1.htm
11 2. The State recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman
Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens.”
Simultaneously, this Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience, freedom of
religion and religious practices, and the state pledges neither to support financially any
religion nor discriminate against religion.30
In turn, the Constitution of Bulgaria which guarantees freedom of religious practices
and a separation of religious institutions and the state simultaneously declares that Eastern
Orthodox Christianity shall be considered the traditional religion in the Republic of
Bulgaria.”31 The Constitution of Romania (1991) does not mention the Romanian Orthodox
Church (maybe due to the fact that it was slightly discredited by a cooperation with Ceausescu
regime). The Constitution guarantees both: freedom of religion and independence of religions
from the state and an aid in providing religious services in the army, hospitals, prisons, care
homes, and orphanages.32 After many years of communist oppression, the Romanian
Orthodox Church and other churches freed themselves from the state. However, the fact that
the Romanian Orthodox Church is financed by the state has been and remains natural and it
treated as a form of compensation for the acquisition of Church properties in 1863.
Nowadays, this financing has a form of direct and indirect subsidies and tax exemptions
(which is stated in the Act of 2006 and additional Act on Remuneration of Clergy of 1999 and
2008). A more detailed act on the freedom of religion and a general status of denominations
has been discussed for a long time. The Romanian Orthodox Church expected that it be
described as a national church. However, the law that was passed in 2006 states only that “the
Romanian State recognizes the important role of the Romanian Orthodox Church and that of
other churches and denominations as recognized by the national history of Romania and in the
life of the Romanian society.”33 Additionally, this Act introduces a new concept of
partnership role between the state and the church(es).
It shall be observed that the endorsed church model includes countries which like
Spain after Franco’s regime and Italy after Mussolini’s regime have rejected the established
church model and the countries such as Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania which freed
themselves from the state atheism after the fall of communism. The former and the latter have
not adopted the model of a separation of state and church. Nonetheless, the endorsed church
model is a compromise between paying respect towards tradition and beliefs of the majority
of the society, and remaining tolerant towards other denominations, religions, and churches
and guarantying a right to practice faith in the idiosyncratic manner. The compromise is
uneasy, as in this model neither the legal solutions, nor the practice of state-church relations
are evident, clear, and coherent. The constitutions and acts of law include declarations of
30
Preamble and Article 44. See: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Ireland_(original_text).
Article 13. See: http://www.parliament.bg/en/const.
32
Article 29. See: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=371
33
Article 7. See: http://www.culte.gov.ro/library/files/legislatie/18.pdf.
31
12 neutrality and impartiality towards religions and churches. Simultaneously, attempts have
been made to give justice to the dominant position of a particular religion and church, its
historical achievements, and social role. This “justice giving” may be limited to mentioning
the dominant religion and church, pointing at the documents regulating relations between a
state and a church or it may adopt a form of nearly solemn confession of faith, as it is the case
of the Constitution of Ireland. It is difficult not to pose questions where a symbolic
recognition stops and the actual preference begins, where the statistical-social dominance
ends and a state favor begins.
Concluding this part, let’s express three caveats. The models of state-church(es)
relations distinguished by Neuberger are treated here as Weberian ideal types; therefore, these
are models that include essential characteristics for a particular type of relations, yet such
relations cannot be found in their pure form or maybe they simply do not exist in reality.
These models allow to be treated as reference points in drawing comparisons with a
particular, „empirical” state-church(es) relations. It means that the boundaries of these types
are not sharp (this is not a classification) and one may doubt whether Romania shall the
assigned an endorsed church model. Moreover, certain characteristics are joint, e.g.
acknowledging denomination groups which is constitutive for the German model or a process
of registering churches and denominations burdened with certain conditions that need to be
met, which is present in the majority of countries assigned various models.
The second caveat concerns changes over time: while elaborating on particular
models, we have already highlighted that state-church relations undergo changes – some
particular and other fundamental, the best example thereof being disestablishment of
Evangelic-Lutheran Church of Sweden in 2000. One may risk making a statement that there is
a decline tendency of the established church model and a migration of countries to the center
of Neuberger’s typology.
Thirdly, it also shall be emphasized that church-state relations in the post-communist
countries are being shaped now, the legal regulations adopted being incoherent and
undergoing changes and varying interpretations. Russia is a good example to make this
observation. The 1993 Constitution states that “1. The Russian Federation is a secular state.
No religion may be established as a state or obligatory one. 2. Religious associations shall be
separated from the State and shall be equal before the law.”34 However, in 1997 a Law on the
Freedom of Conscience and Denomination Groups35 was passed, the preamble of which
acknowledges special contribution of the Russian Orthodox Church in history, culture, and
spirituality of the country and it distinguishes four religions: Christianity, Buddism, Islam,
and Judaism. The act creates fairly complicated legal order which requires denomination
groups (local and centralized religious organizations) to meet certain conditions (number of
34
Article14. See: http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-02.htm
English translation of the Act – See:
http://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/freedomofconscienceeng.html
35
13 members, time of existence) and obliges them to register. Moreover, the government is
granted a right to disallow the religious activity of a certain group. For example, in 2007 a
court in Petersburg ordained the Peterburg Scientological Center to be closed (it refused to
give access to their documents and the court claimed that the government has a right to
inspect these documents). The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World
Christianity, also known as the Unification Church, well-known as Moonies, faced a refusal to
register three local organizations (which would allow it to create a centralized religious
organization). This church claimed that the registration process was hindered by various
government agencies, e.g. office of fire safety, tax inspectors or epidemiological inspectors.
Finally, the Jehova’s Witnesses head office in Petersburg complained that it had been
controlled in order to find a reason for closing them. This and other similar cases are sent to
the European Court of Human Rights which, at that time, declared that the Russian
government infringed obligations resulting from the European Convention on Human Rights.
It means that, despite the Constitutional declarations, there is no equal treatment of religious
associations in Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church is virtually privileged, and Russia is
approaching towards the established church model.
IV.
The Polish case
Let us closely analyze the case of Poland: its society and the state-church relations.
After (1) a short historical introduction and (2) characteristics of the condition of Polish
society religiosity and the position of the Catholic church we will sketch a process of these
relations’ formation after 1989 on the basis of a chosen key issues: (3) introduction of religion
classes to schools and (4) anti-abortion law. Clearly, certain important issues remain: the
return of Church property illegally confiscated by the communists after World War II; legal
protection of Christian values (introduced to the Broadcasting and Television Act of 1992,
Article 18), the case of concordat (signed in 1993 by Hanna Suchocka’s government, yet
ratified in 1998 only because the 1993-97 Parliament blocked the ratification as it comprised
mainly of the post-communist Left-Wing Alliance [SLD] and Polish Peasant Party [PSL]) or
recently the debate on the changes in financing churches. Not all of these issues generate
equally heated public debate. Finally, we will analyze a problem (5) whether and to what
extent the appearance of more expressive and extreme forces on the public and political scene,
both from the leftists anti-clerical or even anti-religious circles and from the right-wing circles
of religious right may change this situation.
(1) Reformation in Poland did not win, Catholic Church maintained its dominant
position, what was confirmed by the Constitution of May 3, 1791 which simultaneously
guaranteed freedom to other religions. During the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth (1795-1918), in a clash with the annexing states – Orthodox Russia and
14 Protestant Germany conducting anti-Polish and anti-Catholic politics, the religious identity
became a crucial component of national identity. After gaining independence, in the Second
Republic of Poland, a multi-national and religiously diverse country, the 1921 Constitution
guaranteed freedom of conscience and religion, but it also stated that “the Roman-Catholic
religion, being confessed by the majority of the society, has a leading position among
religions with equal rights.”(Article 114) Therefore, the state-Church relations in the Second
Republic of Poland were close to the endorsed church model.
During the World War II, the Catholic Church backed the society and suffered the
same loses. The situation repeated during the communist period: Catholic Church, similarly to
the society, was subjected to controls, restrictions, and repressions and simultaneously, it
attempted (when it was finally possible after 1956) to conduct politics of independence from
the communist system, support for the religious and national values, and since the second half
of the 70’s more or less tangible support of democratic opposition, the „Solidarity”
movement, and underground Solidarity, after the introduction of martial law. The role of the
election of Karol Wojtyła as a pope and his first and following pilgrimages to Poland cannot
be underestimated.
(2) Therefore, it is not surprising that in 1989 the Polish society was characterized by
vivid religiosity and the Catholic Church enjoyed widespread respect.
Figure 1. Religious belief in the period 1992-2013 (in percent)
Do you consider yourself to be a person:
deeply believing
believing
rather unbelieving
totally unbelieving
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Source: CBOS, on the basis of annual summaries
Please note the change (in 1993) in the question and response cafeteria.
15 Figure 2. Religious practices in the period 1992-2013 (in percent)
Do you participate in religious practices such as masses, religious worships or meetings?
At least once
a week
Several or dozen
times a year
Does not
participate
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Source: CBOS, on the basis of annual summaries
Please note the change (in 1997) in the question and response cafeteria.
Therefore, in a religious and social dimension the Catholic Church entered the post1989 era as a large community of true believers attending religious practices quite frequently
and in the institutional and political dimension – as an unquestioned moral authority.
In the religious and social dimension, the changes are not profound: self-declarations
of religiosity have remained on a very high level – more than 90% (of believers and strong
believers), yet the regular religious practices are becoming slightly less frequent (at least once
a week or more) which were close to 60% and now oscillate around 50%. If this is the
beginning of secularization (understood as weakening of religious faith and the drop in
frequency of religious practices), it is rather crawling than galloping. Moreover, the values of
other religiosity indices fluctuate and the comparisons with other countries demonstrate that
certain aspects of religiosity of the Polish society are similar to religiosity of other European
countries, but in many aspects Poland is placed higher than other countries.36
However, the situation of the Catholic Church has changed radically in the
institutional dimension. Having regained independence and freedom of action confirmed by
the concordat (1998), the Catholic Church has been developing structurally (new dioceses and
new parishes have been created) and functionally. Parishes legally conduct various activities:
36
In Poland, identification with religion and simultaneously religious practices rank among the highest in Europe
as opposed to Lutheran Denmark, Catholic Austria or Orthodox Greece where identification with religion is
high, but religious practices remain on low level of frequency – corresponding percentages are: 88% and 53%
for Poland, 71% and 3% for Denmark, 64% and 17% for Austria, 86% and 19% for Greece. Similar is the case
of the selectivity of religion concerning the level of acceptance of Christian or other believes: in Poland, a belief
in God is high (96%), a belief in sin (86%) and life after death (73%) are high, but belief in reincarnation is low
(17%); whereas in Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine 41%, 37%, 37% of the society, respectively, believes in
reincarnation. EVS 2008 data.
16 75% of parishes run regular charity activities, the Light-Life Movement (known as the Oasis
Movement) operates in 50% of the parishes, the Rosary Groups function in one third of the
parishes, and 25% of the parishes host such groups as: Catholic Renewal in the Holy Spirit,
the Catholic Action, among others.37
Simultaneously, the authority of the Catholic Church was quickly diminishing. While
in 1989, a positive assessments of the Church gained a record level of about 90%, in 1992 it
fell below 50% and then for several years maintained a little bit higher than 50%.38 It was due
to the fact that the changes in the presence of religion and the Catholic Church in public
sphere were and remain diversely assessed, not only positively. It seems that the crisis in the
assessment of the Catholic Church in the first half of the 90’s was associated with: the
establishment of the Catholic Church-state relations from scratch, the heated debates
concerning the introduction of religion classes to schools, the anti-abortion law, and the
Catholic Church’s claims to the properly illegally confiscated. Although, the assessment of
the Catholic Church as an institution has improved (it has been obtaining about 60% of
positive opinions and it remains one of a few most-appreciated institutions), it still cannot
regain the position of an unquestioned authority that it had at the end of the 80’s.
One cannot ignore that the “Pope factor” does not work (both at the social and institutional
level). During 27 years of pontificate of John Paul II, he pilgrimaged to Poland eight times
and each pilgrimage constituted of numerous meetings, Holy Masses, and homilies. The
media covered the pilgrimages – the Holy Masses celebrated by the Pope were excellent
spectacles, the esthetics of which supported the content expressed, yet the direction did not
choke spontaneity. Also, the personal charisma of John Paul II affected people; the Pope
maintained great contact with masses, was a wonderful speaker, and enjoyed almost
unequivocal trust. All of these have passed. Just as the presence of John Paul II had an impact,
equally has his absence. It is difficult to assess how this absence, this lack has and will have
an impact on both religiosity of the Polish society and the condition of the Catholic Church,
finally, the social image of state-Catholic Church relations.
Attitudes towards various forms of the presence of religion and the Catholic Church in
the public sphere are presented in Table 2.
37
Fedyszak-Radziejowska B., Zmiany społeczne i przystąpienie Polski do Unii Europejskiej jako zadanie i
wyzwanie dla Kościoła katolickiego – opinie duchowieństwa parafialnego. [“Social changes and Accession to
the European Union as a task and a challenge for the Catholic Church – opinions of parochial clergy.”] pp. 7778.
38
Report of the Public Opinion Research Center „Religijność Polaków: 1984 - 1994” (BS/108/95/94). Opr. M.
Falkowska. ["Religiosity of Poles: 1984 - 1994" (BS/108/95/94), ed. M. Falkowska.]
17 Table 2. Attitudes towards the presence of religion and the Church in public life (in
percentage)
In Poland, the subject of a place of religion in public life has been widely discussed. Please indicate whether you
are offended or not offended by these situations:
Year of study and the institution researching
1995
1997
2001
2005
2007
2009
2010
2013
Situations:
IS UW PGSW IS UW PGSW
PGSW
CBOS
CBOS
CBOS
Percentage of answers „do not offend”
Crosses in public buildings,
87
88
88
91
88
91
88
88
e.g. government offices,
schools
Religion classes at school
79
84
88
90
84
90
84
82
Religious character of the
75
82
88
89
85
87
84
85
military oath
Priests appearing in public
69
73
76
77
69
76
79
74
TV stations
Speaking of the Church on
69
68
74
75
65
68
65
61
moral issues
Church presenting its
34
38
40
40
33
47
35
39
standpoint on the laws
passed by the Parliament
Priests telling people how to
--17
19
18
26
16
15
vote
Consecrating public places
-----81
77
76
and buildings by priests
Participation of
-----84
79
80
priests/bishops in the public
ceremonies and
commemorations
In the recent years, the opinions concerning the presence of religion and the Catholic
Church, despite fluctuations, have remained quite stable – these are rather deeply rooted
convictions and attitudes than volatile opinions that change according to a situation. These
fluctuations, both positive and negative, are context-related. We may presume that a relatively
high level of acceptance of religion and the Catholic Church in the public sphere in 2005 is
co-related with the death of John Paul II that very same year. Moreover, the electoral context
and short-term political trends may affect Polish General Election Study – PGSW – (which is
conducted 2-3 weeks after the parliamentary elections). However, one may not speak of a
directional change, a tendency.
An overwhelming majority (9 in ten persons) does not have anything against crosses
in public buildings, religion classes at school, or a religious character of the military oath, and
a vast majority (8 in 10 persons) is not offended by a participation of priests or bishops in the
public ceremonies and a consecration of public places and buildings by priests. With time,
vast majority has accepted priests appearing in public TV stations. This is simply a Polish
landscape – crosses and priests – and it strengthens the solemnity, the ceremonies attended by
clergy are more special and festive.
A majority (but only about two thirds) accepts that Church makes statements
concerning moral issues. Questionable is however the fact that the Catholic Church presents
18 its standpoint on the laws passed by the Parliament and the vast majority finds it unacceptable
when priests tell people how to vote in elections. Therefore, the political role has never been
and still is not socially acceptable.
(3) Introduction of religion classes to school as a non-compulsory courses took
place in September 1990 on the basis of the instruction of the National Education Minister
(the Prime Minister at that time was Tadeusz Mazowiecki). According to this instructions,
students whose parents did not allow their child to participate in religion classes must have
had provided classes in ethics. Both the introduction of religion classes to schools as the
manner of doing this were questioned (by two Polish Ombudsmen – Ewa Łętowska in 1990
and Tadeusz Zieliński in 1993), criticized, and publicly discussed. In the following years, it
was discussed whether a grade in religion class (or ethics) shall be included in school report
and counted as an element of a mean of school results. Now it is being discussed whether it
should be possible to take the matriculation exam (matura) "of religion" as one of the optional
subjects to choose from.
In 1990-92, Public Opinion Research Center asked about an attitude towards religion
classes at schools: 24-28% were in favor of compulsory religion classes, 45-48% – for those
classes as voluntary, and 22-30% wanted to remove religious education from schools (a few
percent had no opinion).39 In 2008, (responding to a question formulated in a different
manner) 65% of respondents were in favor of religion classes in public schools, 32% were
against. At the same time, a majority (55 to 62%) was against grading during religion classes,
against including it in the mean results (as is currently the case), against the possibility to pass
the matriculation exam (matura) "of religion" (now this is not possible). But if we pose
general questions about consent for religion classes, the results from various research centers
which in the recent years have studied this issue show – see: Table 1. – that the majority
(since the second half of the 90s, 8-9 in 10 persons) accepts religion classes at school.
However, their opinions concerning particular solutions differ. Regardless these caveats, the
wording of the questions, the majority has been favorable towards religion classes during the
entire period analyzed.
(4) Since 1956, abortion (until the Law on Family Planning, Human Embryo
Protection, and Conditions of Termination of Pregnancy of 7 January 1993) was practically
conducted upon request (formally, due to the medical conditions, if the pregnancy was
suspected to come into being as a result of a crime or the living conditions were severe). As it
seems, there was a relatively widespread approval for abortion. The Catholic Church initiative
39
Reports of the Public Opinion Research Center: „Opinie nt. problemu nauczania religii katolickiej w szkołach
publicznych” [”Opinions concerning Catholic religion education in public schools”] June, 1990; „Opinie nt.
nauczania religii w szkołach publicznych” [”Opinions concerning Catholic religion education in public schools”]
December, 1990; „Opinia publiczna o nauce religii w szkołach” [”Public opinion on religious education in
schools”] March,1991; „Religia a szkoła” [”Religion and school”] May,1992.
19 of the late 80’s to introduce new, restrictive legal regulations was approached with vivid
opposition and critique. There were attempts to organize a referendum concerning that matter
as it was hoped that the project of limiting access to abortion would come to grief. The
referendum did never take place and the law was passed. It states that pregnancy can be
terminated in three instances: if it is a result of a crime, if it presents a threat to life and health
of a mother, if medical conditions indicate severe and irreversible fetal defects. In 1996, the
left-wing majority in the Parliament made an attempt to increase the availability of pregnancy
termination – allowing to terminate pregnancy due to social reasons – which failed. The
following year, the Constitutional Tribunal declared the liberalized law to be unconstitutional
and the amendment was revoked. The law in force distinguishes Poland among other
European countries that are less restrictive – almost all European countries allow for an
abortion “upon request,” granting women unlimited access to pregnancy termination
procedure.
What is the approach of a society on this matter? The data presented in Table 3. shows
the results.
Table 3. Approach towards abortion in various situations (Public Opinion Research Center
data, in percentage)
What do you
think, shall
abortion be
allowed by
law when:
- mother’s life
is under
threat
- mother’s
health is
under threat
- the
pregnancy is
a result of
rape or
incest
- it is known
that the child
will be born
with severe
defects
- a woman is
in a difficult
financial
condition
- a woman is
in a difficult
personal
condition
Respondents’ responses according to time of survey*
III 1992
VI 1999
X 2002
I 2005
XI 2006
IX 2007
VI 2010
VIII 2011
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No
XI 2012
Yes No
88
6
86
6
85
8
88
8
86
8
91
5
87
7
87
7
81
11
82
11
77
14
77
14
80
14
77
15
85
9
78
14
79
14
71
18
80
10
72
16
73
15
77
15
73
16
79
12
78
12
78
13
78
13
71
15
61
24
65
21
66
22
62
24
66
21
60
25
59
27
61
23
47
39
38
47
44
44
42
46
27
59
34
55
26
63
24
65
16
73
-
-
-
-
38
47
36
51
21
64
30
56
23
65
21
67
13
74
- a woman
simply does
not want to
have a child
27 58 28 58 28 60 16 72 23 66 18 73 16 75 14
* Positive responses were summed (“definitely yes” and “rather yes”), as well as negative (“rather not” and
“definitely not”). “Hard to tell” was omitted.
20 75
Let us observe that the consent for abortion in these three situations allowed by the
law in force is high and quite stable: if mother’s life or health is under threat or if a pregnancy
is a result of a crime, abortion is accepted by a vast majority (in general, by 8-9 persons in
10). Slightly different are the opinions concerning abortion in a situation when it is known
that the fetus is “irreversibly defected”: a majority accepts abortion, but in the last 20 years
the consent for these solution has dropped. The possibility of abortion in a situation when a
mother is in a severe financial condition, or difficult personal condition, or she simply does
not want a child, at the beginning of the 21st century was accepted by a significant group of
respondents (almost 50%) and now it is rejected by 75% of the surveyed.
Therefore, in the period analyzed the pro-life approach has strengthened. These
changes result, in my opinion, not only from the Catholic Church’s teaching present in the
public discourse, but also the law itself and its influence, technology or more precisely, the
popularity of ultrasounds and the resulting images of the fetus, ecological attitudes referred to
a human.
(5) Both acceptance and rejection of the presence and activity of religion and the
Catholic Church in public life are context-related. The existing model of state-church relations
has not developed deep tradition, it remains fragile, itand it depends on political powers and
their good will. Whereas, both on the secular left and the Catholic right, there exist groups
who think that deregulating the accomplished modus vivendi, a religious peace based on a
model of “the presence of religion and the Catholic Church within the independence and
autonomy of the Catholic Church and the state”40 remains their ideological obligation and it
will guarantee them measurable advantages. Nowadays, the most prominent among these
groups are: on the secular left Palikot’s Movement (and its electorate) and on the Catholic
right – Radio Maryja (and the listeners of this radio station).
Let us start with Radio Maryja founded in 1991. Other institutions were also founded
by this radio station (a private university and a publishing house), but Radio Maryja is not
limited to institutions only – around the radio there flourished a social network. The listeners
identifying themselves with the radio station form the Radio Maryja Family: in 2008, 20% of
40
This is a fragment from the concordate: “(…) The State and the Catholic Church are (…) independent and
autonomous (…)” (Art. 1).
21 the people surveyed declared that there exists Radio Maryja Family in their parish41, in 2011 –
19% 42. It seems that parochial structures of the radio are quite stable.
The radio station from Toruń has evoked and still evokes many controversies. It was
accused of anti-Semitism, nationalism, hostility towards European Union and politicization –
it has been supporting the Law and Justice in several elections43. In 2011 parliamentary
election, on the Law and Justice lists there were candidates connected to or particularly
endorsed by Radio Maryja. The phenomenon of the radio station from Toruń has been a
subject of research, analyzes, and publications. These studies rather do not confirm (or at least
not entirely) the accusations towards the radio station.
On the basis of the radio audience measurement that has been studied in the recent
years by various centers employing various methods it has been estimated that almost 2% to
4% of the society listens to Radio Maryja and that equals half to one million of Poles. There
are also higher estimates.
Public Opinion Research Center asked about listening to this station for 3 months44
and created a large dataset (N=3145) which allowed to conduct analyses (to such an extent
that allowed to include the same variables in all three surveys) and obtain statistically
significant results45. It turned out that Radio Maryja listeners do not comprise a homogenous
group: generally, they are older, less educated, believing and practicing, but 20% are younger
than 40, 25% live in the cities inhabited by more than 100 000 people, one third earn highschool or higher education, 50% earn average monthly income, 25% consider their families’
and their personal living conditions to be at least good. They go voting (the listeners of Radio
Maryja declare to participate in elections more often than those who do not listen to this
station46), they mainly vote for the Law and Justice and their candidates, but also other
political parties, including the Civic Platform.
In the second round of presidential elections in 2010, 57% of Radio Maryja listeners
supported Jarosław Kaczyński and 35% Bronisław Komorowski (6% do not remember whom
41
See. Reports of the Public Opinion Research Center „Rzeczywistość parafialna. Opinie z lat 2005 i 2008”,
[“Parochial Reality. Opinions from 2005 and 2008”] October, 2008, ed. B. Wciórka.
42
See. Reports of the Public Opinion Research Center „Polaków obraz rzeczywistości parafialnej” [“The image
of parochial reality held by Poles”] , November, 2011, ed. N. Hipsz.
43
More on that subject in the report of the Public Opinion Research Center „Słuchacze Radia Maryja” [„Radio
Maryja listeners”], August, 2008, ed. M. Grabowska.
44
Reports of the Public Opinion Research Center „Aktualne problemy i wydarzenia” [„Contemporary problems
and events”] conducted on representative random samples of Polish adults przeprowadzono na 8–14
September, 2011 roku (N=1077), 29 September – 5 October, 2011 roku (N=1099), 4–13 Novermber, 2011
(N=969).
45
Only statistically significant differences and relations are discussed (at level ≤ 0,03).
46
Only 71% of Radio Maryja listeners and 66% of non-listeners declared the participation in the second round of
presidential election (the actual turnout was 55.31%); the willingness to vote in the parliamentary election in
2011 was declared (in the surveys conducted in September and October) by 70% of Radio Maryja listeners and
62% of those who do not listen to this radio station; the willingness to vote in the parliamentary election in 2011
was declared (in the surveys conducted in November) by 72% of Radio Maryja listeners and 58% of those who
do not listen to this radio station (the actual turnout was 48.92%). Report of the Public Opinion Research Center
„Dwadzieścia lat Radia Maryja” [“20 years of Radio Maryja”], December, 2011, ed. M. Grabowska.
22 they voted for) and among those who do not listen to the Toruń-based radio station the
proportions were inverse: 22% supported Jarosław Kaczyński and 70% Bronisław
Komorowski (4% do not remember).
In September and October 2011 (just before the election), 40% of Radio Maryja
listeners declared that they would vote for the Law and Justice, 12% for the Civic Platform,
and 29% did not know whom they would vote for (4% refused to answer). Among those who
do not listen to the Toruń-based radio station, 16% wanted to vote for the Law and Justice,
37% for the Civic Platform, and 22% did not know whom they would support (4% refused to
answer). After the election, in November, 70% of Radio Maryja listeners said that they voted
for the Law and Justice, 14% for the Civic Platform (3% refused to answer). Among those
who do not listen to Radio Maryja, 20% confirmed to have supported the Law and Justice,
and 46% voted for the Civic Platform (3% refused to answer).
Moreover, Radio Maryja listeners rather do not accept the Prime Minister Donald
Tusk and his government; they critically assess both his achievements and current politics.
Jarosław Kaczyński remains an authority for them.
It seems that Radio Maryja gathers persons – the elderly and the practicing – who
otherwise would be eager to vote for the Law and Justice and listening to this radio station
just confirms this tendency and mobilizes to electoral participation. We think that we may
assume that Radio Maryja community is a Polish counterpart of the American religious right:
the radio station supports elements of conservative politics and is able to motivate its listeners
to support them by casting the ballot.
On the other side of the ideological spectrum a political party established by Janusz
Palikot – Ruch Palikota (Palikot’s Movement) is located, which was registered on 1 June,
2011. Before the parliamentary election of 2011, Palikot’s Movement formally conducted a
campaign for the separation of the state and the church, but practically – anti-clerical. It
postulated withdrawing religion classes from schools, liberalizing anti-abortion law, and also
legalizing soft drugs, among others. In the election, the party won 10% of votes – for the first
time since 1989 such views are represented in the Parliament. Voting for Palikot’s Movement
was correlated with a young age (24 and below) and not going to church.
Although the party is new, the anti-clerical groups have existed47, but they were barely
present in the public debate. Anti-clericalism existed “under the skin” and these were only the
spectacular protests against the presence of the cross in front of the Presidential Palace after
the Smoleńsk catastrophe in 2010 which played a role of a catalyst allowing the opponents of
the presence of religious symbols and the Catholic Church in the public sphere to present
themselves.48
47
A magazine „Fakty i Mity” [Facts and Myths], published since 2010, the political party “Racja” of Polish Left,
the Foundation of Free Thought, publishing a webpage “Racjonalista” [the Rationalist] and others.
48
After the Smolensk catastrophe (10 April 2010), which killed 96 people, including Polish President Lech
Kaczynski and his wife, scouts put (April 15) a wooden cross in front of the Presidential Palace. At the cross,
23 Since the election, the party has undertaken parliamentary initiatives and outside
parliamentary activities to radically separate the state and the church and to legalize
marihuana. Without any success. The support for Palikot’s Movement is now very low (from
January to July 2013, it has fluctuated from 6 to 2%).
*
To conclude:
Firstly, state-church relations have been undergoing changes and in the postcommunist countries they have been developing: the legal regulations adopted are sometimes
incoherent and are subject to changes.
Secondly, because of historical, social, and political reasons, in Poland there has been
developing a model described as “the presence of religion and the Catholic Church in the
public sphere within independence and autonomy of the Catholic Church and the state” or – in
Neuberger’s terms – an endorsed church model.
Thirdly, the analyses presented including a dozen or even 20 years indicate that the
Polish society has accepted the currently existing model of state-church relations. The
majority is not hurt and even, it can be assumed, they feel comfortable with this model.
Fourthly, the presence and activism of radicals, who are either entirely favorable
towards the presence of religion classes and the Catholic Church in public life (and even
demanding its extension and intensification) or totally rejecting this presence, do not have a
direct influence on social attitudes. At least so far. It seem that the mere existence of religious
symbols, the Catholic Church, and the clergy in the public sphere is well-rooted in the culture
– this is just a Polish landscape.
However, fifthly, the debate may, or already does, address detailed questions (e.g.
whether a high-school exam in “religion” as one of the non-compulsory classes should be
possible).
Sixthly, much have been and remain dependent on entrepreneurs, both political and
religious and their offer, their manner of presenting one’s own opinions. It depends on how
they will convince others, how they will act, how they will use the resources available.
Although it remains unknown, the experience from previous years justifies skepticism as to
availability of such personalities.
people put candles, laid flowers, gathered and prayed. The so-called "defenders of the cross" wanted to keep it
until a monument commemorating the victims of the catastrophe would have been created. After conflicts the
cross was moved (September 16) to the palace chapel, and eventually went to St. Anne Church. However, not
only followers, but also opponents gathered around the cross. The protests against the cross were called via
Internet – they have forms of happenings, parodies, for believers even iconoclastic (pretending John Paul II,
constructing of a cross with beer cans, etc., etc.). The biggest took place on 9 August (evening and night).
According to various statistics, five thousand young people could take part in it – not many, but these events
were reported by all the media.