Number 6
2010
ISSN 1862-3581
Hanspeter Mattes
On October 10, 2010, in the Libyan coastal city of Sirte, the second Arab-African summit
took place, more than 30 years after the first one. Numerous heads of state from the Arab League and the African Union took part in this joint conference.
Analysis
By the 1970s substantial Arab-African cooperation had already come into being and was
institutionalized at the summit in Cairo in 1977. The goal was to bring about a balance
of interests between Arab oil states that—thanks to OPEC’s petroleum revolution—acquired substantial foreign currency revenue, and capital-poor, but resource- and waterrich African states. With financial help from the Arab states, both the economic development of Africa and the supply of food (the “breadbasket strategy”) and raw materials from Africa to the Arab states would be effectuated.
 The cooperative efforts were strained from the beginning because the Arab states
hinged their financial and economic cooperative willingness—although unspoken—on political factors (primarily on whether the African states supported their
position on Israel).
 Although the Arab-African cooperation was institutionalized in a way that made
voting rights equally distributed, in fact it was de facto hierarchically organized. The
Arab states were less committed to communal cooperation per se than they were to
bilateral cooperative relationships, which they could have more control over.
 The fresh start in Arab-African cooperation spurred by the conference in Sirte is in
line with the old concept of “balance of interests” on an international level.
 The new strategic partnership will only last if the Arab states put an end to their political instrumentalization and cease pursuing goals of power politics.
Keywords: Arab League, African Union, development cooperation
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus
INTERNATIONAL EDITION
Aftermath of the Sirte Summit:
Arab-African Cooperation on the Upswing?
In recent years, the efforts at cooperation between
continents and regional organizations have greatly increased. The European-African cooperation
since the first, “historical” Europe-Africa summit
in Cairo in 2000, the Europe-Latin America summits since 1999, and the summits between Latin
American and Arab states since May 2005 are all
testaments to that. In the midst of all this, Arab
and African states have also experienced a revival in their relationship, whereby the expansion of
economic cooperation with the goal of obtaining
an interregional balance of interests is central.
Arab-African Cooperation: A Historical Overview
In recognition of the emerging crisis in development politics, which began at the end of the first
development decade and lasted until the beginning of the 1970s, the developing countries called
for strengthened “collective self-reliance” and an
expansion of horizontal cooperation on an equal
basis, concepts which, taken together, were supposed to have abated the crisis. The OPEC countries’ 1973 petroleum revolution—which brought
petroleum-producing countries a drastic surge in
revenue, which in turn benefited the Arab League
(AL) as well as the Organization of African Unity
(OAU)—served to precipitate a successful cooperation between the two regions. Because of the differing prerequisite conditions of each region, a dynamic development in cooperation was predicted,
not only because there were historical ties, but also because the complementarity of the economic
factors (labor, fertile soil, and water in sub-Saharan Africa, and capital in the Arab oil-producing
states) was seen as advantageous (Neitzel/Nötzel
1979; Haseeb 1985).
Furthermore, the collaboration benefited from
a political factor: Starting after the Six-Day War in
1967, the Near East conflict had an increasing influence on Arab-African relations. With the Yom
Kippur War in 1973 and the related sporadic occupation of African territory by the Israeli army, the
conflict got a new focus. The OAU council of ministers spoke out against Israel in 1973, following
which many African states broke off their oncestrong diplomatic ties with Israel. Oil played a
central role in their decision; many African states
had fears stemming from the petroleum revolution about whether their oil supply would be sufficient and affordable. The political considerations
GIGA Focus International Edition 6/2010
of the African states necessitated their compliance—African states supported the Arab states regarding Israel as a quid pro quo for securing both
petroleum delivery and further Arab economic
and financial aid.
The framework for an institutionalization of
Arab-African cooperation was outlined at various AL and OAU congresses. These endeavors
sparked not only the 1974 founding of certain development agencies—such as the Arab Bank for
Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)—and
Arab funds for technical and financial help for the
African states, but also the creation of political
consultation structures (cf. Table 1), the latter of
which were agreed upon at the first Arab-African
summit in Cairo.
The First Arab-African Summit (Cairo, March 1977)
Four declarations were adopted at the 1977 Cairo
summit in the presence of numerous Arab and African heads of state:
1) a political declaration that detailed a cooperation based on the charters of both the OAU and
the AL and that specified the reciprocal support
for the liberation of Palestine and the abolition
of Apartheid in Africa;
2) a program of action for Arab-African cooperation that established sectoral cooperation;
3) a resolution entitled “Organization and Method
for the Realization of Afro-Arab Cooperation”:
this important document stipulated that the foreign ministers (the so-called “Joint Ministerial
Council”) hold a summit every 18 months and
that the heads of state do so every three years;
furthermore, the document outlined the framework for the so-called “Permanent Commission for Arab-African Cooperation” (PCAAC),
a committee made up of 24 members (12 from
the AL and 12 from the OAU), which was also
supposed to convene every six months to supervise the implementation of the agreed-upon
resolutions;
4) a resolution on economic and financial cooperation that de facto constituted a declaration of
intent on the part of the Arabs to provide financial aid to the African states.
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Table 1: Important Dates in Arab-African Cooperation History
1973
2/18/1974
3/1974
4/19–22/1976
3/3–6/1977
3/7–9/1977
5/31–6/1/1977
1984
10/22–31/1993
2000–2009
9/24/2009
1/16/2010
2/14–16/2010
3/4/2010
7/6/2010
10/1/2010
10/5/2010
10/10/2010
2013
Petroleum revolution
Founding of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
Founding of the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African Countries
(AFTAAC) and the Arab Fund for Financial Assistance to African Countries
1st Arab-African foreign minister conference (Dakar)
2nd Arab-African foreign minister conference (Cairo)
1st Arab-African summit (Cairo); institutionalization of cooperation specified summit conferences every 3 years, joint foreign minister meetings every 18 months,
meetings of the permanent committee (PCAAC) every 6 months; de facto, however, only 12 meetings in over 30 years
1st PCAAC meeting; due to foreign policy differences, no regular meetings; for example: 11th meeting 1991, 12th meeting 2001, 13th meeting 2009
Institutionalization of Afro-Arab Parliamentary Dialogue; so far 12 parliament
meetings, most recently in April 2009 (Abuja)
1st Arab-African trade fair (Tunis); 7 successive fairs had taken place as of 2010
Increasing demands of Arab and African states to revive the cooperation
Arab-African minister meeting on Darfur
Meeting of the joint AU/AL Secretariat; decision made to hold the 2nd ArabAfrican summit
1st Arab-African minister meeting on agriculture development and food security
14th PCAAC meeting (Cairo)
15th PCAAC meeting (Cairo)
Arab-African Forum on Trade and Investment (Tripoli)
1st Arab-African youth summit (Tripoli)
2nd Arab-African summit (Sirte); date chosen by Libya for its symbolic significance
3rd Arab-African summit planned for Kuwait
At the end of the summit conference, it initially
appeared as if Arab-African cooperation—if nothing else, thanks to the generous financial help of
Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states—now had
an effective incentive to work to avoid a relapse
into the failures of earlier cooperation attempts.
However, this optimism proved premature: various developments, starting at the latest in 1979
and mostly relating to the Arabs, sabotaged the
cooperation. Subsequently, plans for the second
summit, supposed to take place in Kuwait in 1980,
collapsed, and the second Arab-African summit
did not end up taking place until 2010.
The Failure of Cooperation
The cooperation failure of the 1970s can be ascribed to many different political and economic
factors relating to both regional organizations. The
most significant of those, however, was Egypt’s
initiation of the peace process with Israel, which
brought about the Camp David Accords and the
GIGA Focus International Edition 6/2010
subsequent suspension of Egypt from membership in the AL, which also shifted its chair from
Cairo to Tunis. Egypt’s conduct affected Arab-African cooperation in that the majority of states in
the OAU in fact also welcomed the peace process
with Israel. The controversial Libyan military engagement in Chad, the debate about Western Sahara, and the Camp David Accords all served to in
effect paralyze the OAU’s work at the beginning
of the 1980s. Moreover, for the African states, the
amount of economic and financial help from the
Arab states was especially disappointing. Since
1986 (at the latest), due to the international financial crisis that had arisen in the meantime, the
drastic decline in oil prices, and the financial situation of the Gulf states caused by the 1991 Gulf
Along those lines, there were also huge disagreements and
much debate over Libya’s attempts to militarily instrumentalize the Arab-African cooperation in its pursuit of the “destruction of imperialism, racism and Zionism.”
Between 1975 and 1983 a total of 8.2 billion USD of Arab aid
(subsidies and loans) flowed into African states; the amount
was much lower than the African states had expected.
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War, the needs of sub-Saharan African states had
been left unattended to.
After the appeals by the African heads of state
at the OAU summit conference in June 1981 in
Nairobi for an “urgent intensification of Arab-African cooperation” fell mostly on deaf ears, the enthusiasm for cooperation was markedly subdued
and the intervals between PCAAC congresses became increasingly longer.
Causes of the Revival of Arab-African Cooperation
Many factors contributed to the attempts starting at the end of the 1990s/beginning of the 2000s
to overcome the existing obstacles to Arab-African cooperation. For one thing, despite the problems in the cooperative committees, some Arab
countries—particularly Egypt, Algeria and Libya—continued to maintain close relationships
with sub-Saharan countries and thus became familiar with their development problems. Povertyinduced migration, transborder criminality, counterterrorism, the conflict in Darfur, and the issues
surrounding the use of Nile water were just a few
topics that made the benefits of a resumption of
cooperation and a coordination of political action
clear to both African and Arab states.
Within the AU as well as the AL there were
many calls for the aforementioned cooperation
and coordination. The calls came from, among
others, the PCAAC, which met again in April 2001
in Algiers for the first time in over ten years; the
executive board of the AU (Maputo, July 2003);
and the joint AU/AL Secretariat (Addis Ababa,
May 2005 and December 2007). The cooperative
endeavors became more intense particularly after
2003, when a situation similar to that of the 1970s
occurred: On one hand, the Arab (and this time
also African) oil exporters experienced drastically increased petroleum prices and, accordingly,
recorded high foreign currency earnings. On the
other hand, numerous African nations had huge
The African states’ financial crisis and debt problems were the
reason that the cooperation with the AL was kept alive; cf.
Chabar (1986).
Libya, in keeping with its attempts to persuade the UN to lift
its sanctions, (which were based on its involvement in the
Lockerbie plane crash), started in the 1990s to revise its formerly militant and expansionist policy on Africa.
The OAU was disbanded in 2002 and the AU (African Union)
was established as its successor organization.
See: http://www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/council%2
0of%20minsters%20meetings/Maputo/EX_CL_Dec%2053.pdf>.
GIGA Focus International Edition 6/2010
problems paying the ever more expensive energy
import prices. Moreover, the Arab states demands
for food imports increased greatly due to high
population growth in Arab states, causing them to
quickly and urgently reorient themselves towards
“Breadbasket Africa,” which led to the first-ever
“Africa-Arab Agro Investment Summit” in Zanzibar, May 2009.
In the face of global challenges, many heads of
state believed the revival of Arab-African cooperation to be vital, and as a result both regions
agreed to the proposal approved in January 2010
by the joint AU/AL Secretariat to hold the longoverdue second summit in the fall of 2010 in Libya.
The Second Arab-African Summit
(Sirte, Libya: October 2010)
The decision to hold the second summit entailed a
succession of preparatory meetings:
• The summit organization committee (with representatives from Egypt, Algeria, Burkina Faso,
Ghana, Kuwait, Tanzania as well as host-nation
Libya) held gatherings.
• The PCAAC also met twice in Cairo (March 4
and July 6, 2010).
• A meeting of the Joint Ministerial Council took
place on October 8 in Sirte, during which Arab and African positions on Sudan and Israel,
as well as economic programs of action, among
other topics, were discussed and the “Sirte Declaration” was drafted.
The positions of both regional organizations were
injected into the negotiations at different moments.
While the AU had already formulated their objectives at the end of July 2010 at their meeting in
Kampala, the Arab heads of state did not convene
until October 9, 2010, in Sirte, at a special session
of the AL. Though the special session was trig Agenda at <www.fara-africa.org>; for more on the rent controversy vis-à-vis the buying of agricultural land in African states in order to supply food to Arab consumers, see:
<http://farmlandgrab.org> (“Food Crisis and the Global Land
Grab”).
An example would be Nigerian President Yar’Adua, who
said as much in April 2009; cf. allafrica.com, accessed April
22, 2009 (“Yar’Adua Urges Afro-Arab Cooperation on Globalization Challenges”).
Prior to this, the PCAAC had proposed on the occasion of its
13th congress in October 2009 that there be a summit; Libya
assured all parties that it would foot the total bill for the conference, thus winning the right to host.
--
gered by an Arab-specific cause, the summit also
served as preparation for the Arab-African summit at which the Arab heads of state discussed the
future of Sudan first and foremost.
These indispensable diplomatic-political preparations were accompanied by many Arab-African events; the goal of these events, which were
organized and funded by Libya, was to strengthen
Libya’s position in the Arab-African relationship
network. Among these events were the first-ever
Arab-African youth summit10 in Tripoli on October 5, 2010, and an Arab-African cultural conference at the end of October in Benghazi.
Libya became heavily involved in economic topics as well. Following the first Arab-African minister meeting February 14–16, 2010, in Sharm-elSheikh, Egypt—which dealt with agricultural cooperation and food security (and during which the
“Joint Plan of Action on Food Security for All” was
passed)—Tripoli hosted an Arab-African trade forum at the end of September, and on October 2–3
a conference took place there on the expansion of
Arab-African trade and the investment capability
of Arab investors in sub-Saharan African states.
Results of the “10/10/10” Summit
Hosni Mubarak, the president of the first summit
in Cairo in 1977, also opened the second summit,
which was then led by revolutionary leader Qaddafi11 under the motto “Afro-Arab Cooperation: Towards a Strategic Partnership” and followed the
procedure agreed upon by the organization committees. After substantial debate, and after having
listened to speeches from AL General Secretary
Amr Musa, Chairman of the Commission of the
AU Jean Ping, and host Qaddafi, among others,
the summit’s attendees, from approximately 60
countries (among them 30 heads of state), passed
the documents drafted by the foreign ministers.
The need for Afro-Arab cooperation was emphasized in the addresses from members of both
sides, though from different perspectives. Even
during President Mubarak’s opening remarks12
was the acknowledgement of the importance of
10 For more on the central topic of discussion, employment, see
Tripoli Post, October 13, 2010 “Afro-Arab Youth Council Demands Empowerment.”
11 For more on the schedule and details of the summit and various related documents, see www.afro-arabsummit.com. In
the German press, the high-profile summit was almost completely ignored
12 Nile News, October 10, 2010, according to the BBC (“Egypt
Leader Calls for Active Arab-African Partnership”).
GIGA Focus International Edition 6/2010
Arab-African cooperation clear: Mubarak said
that he welcomed the revitalization of partnership
in the form of new long-term strategies, including a plan of action from 2011 to 2016, and he simultaneously highlighted the sustained commitment on the part of Egypt towards the rest of Africa. For their part, Amr Musa and Jean Ping voiced
their appreciation of the positive steps made in
the last three decades; they admitted to and acknowledged the difficulties and problems of the
past and called for a new page to be turned in joint
relations.
The changes in recent years would appear
to have not only brought about an accelerated
globalization but to have also shown that only
strengthened cooperation on regional and interregional levels can secure the welfare of all peoples.
In that sense, the summit could be seen as overdue
in demonstrating and channeling the new vigor
of the interregional relationship. Jean Ping put
the spotlight on economic collaboration and announced that the AU/AL Secretariat had decided
to found an African-Arab chamber of commerce
as well as the African-Arab Development Forum
(as a discussion platform for questions of development in regards to both regions).
In Qaddafi’s greatly anticipated speech, he emphasized that two-thirds of Arabs are also Africans and that, therefore, cooperation with the oilrich Arab states in West Asia has to be strengthened first and foremost. He spoke of the necessity not only for the Arab and African states to work
together better within their own regional coalitions, but also for the AL and the AU to cooperate more intensively with one another in the areas
of politics, economics and security. He opined that
only through that cooperation can peace and security prevail. Along those lines, Qaddafi not only deplored the lack of involvement, particularly
of the rich Arab states, but also apologized for the
disgraceful behavior towards the Africans, saying
that the Arabs enslaved and exploited their African brothers just as the Europeans did. “For that I
am sorry and I regret these practices,” he said, after which he received a resounding round of applause from the audience.13
A second, much noted and commented-upon
topic was the situation in Sudan; here, Qaddafi,
in view of the imminent referendum, cautioned
13 Libyan TV, October 10, 2010, according to the BBC (“Text
of Libyan Leader’s Speech in Sirte During Arab-African
Summit”).
--
against a partition of the country because this step
“could be a contagious disease that could infect
the whole of Africa” and lead to war. The African heads of state (from Nigeria, Chad, and elsewhere)—just like the Arab heads of state did at the
AL special session two days prior—openly recognized this danger, and pleas for the preservation
of territorial integrity in Sudan were thus incorporated into the official Sirte Declaration.14 The prerequisite for safeguarding territorial integrity is
that the Arab states quickly fulfil their pledge to
invest one billion USD into the economic development of South Sudan.
Aside from
1) Sudan,
2) the dedication to peaceful methods of conflict
settlement (for instance, regarding the redistribution of Nile water and the conflict in Somalia)15 and
3) the combating of terrorism,16 the debate was
dominated above all by development politics.
Predominantly, the development politics talk was
more specifically about the concrete steps in cooperation regarding water, energy, raw materials,
food production and the environment. This cooperation, according to Jean Ping, could only be
made possible through the support of investors
and trade; Ping clarified that African states should
count on a substantial commitment (i.e. investments) from the richer Arab states. According to
the finalized conference documents, while the Arab states did agree on the cooperative goals, the
question of financing remains open.
Two central documents were passed; the first,
the “Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy,” comprised
four aspects:
1) peace and security,
2) investment incentive and commercial exchange,
3) agriculture and food security, and
4) social and cultural cooperation.
14 Tripoli Post, October 19, 2010 (“African-Arab Summit: No to
Sudan Secession”); Sirte Declaration cf. Jananews, October
12, 2010.
15 Panapress, October 12, 2010 (“Sirte Summit Calls for Cooperation on Conflict Resolution”).
16 The coordination of counter-terrorism was endorsed by both
sides and further steps were envisaged; in regards to the current virulent Islamic terrorism in the Sahel, Qaddafi and the
heads of state from Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Chad met
and came to an agreement on a further plan of action. See:
L’Essor (Bamako), October 13, 2010 (“Mini-Sommet sur la sécurité”).
GIGA Focus International Edition 6/2010
The joint development goals are to be implemented through political dialogue in the form of highranking consultations and corresponding official
talks conducted by a joint economic committee.
The crux of the strategy is clarified in the second document, the “Afro-Arab Joint Action Plan
2011–2016.” This document served as a replacement for the “Declaration and Program of Action
on Afro-Arab Cooperation” from March 1977. The
30-page plan of action for 2011 through 2016 encompasses the specific measures that should be
undertaken in the appropriate sectors—from the
monitoring of investments, to the organizing of
annual trade fairs, to the founding of the AfricanArab Institute for Strategic and Cultural Studies.
Both the Arab and African sides reacted positively overall to the summit, and this—for instance
in the case of Senegalese President Wade and Liberian President Sirleaf—was partly tied to an explicit appreciation for Qaddafi’s commitment. As
representatives from Zambia phrased it, “Libya is
a power that must be recognized in Africa.”
The revitalization of Arab-African cooperation
was welcomed and deemed necessary by all, and
the desire to consolidate—the South African representative went as far as to use the word “duty”—
was expressed. All delegations emphasized the mutual benefits of cooperation, and the President of
Congo-Brazzaville Denis Sassou Nguesso praised
the summit for having “opened new doors” in the
cooperation between Arab and African states.
A few critical remarks came from the ranks of
the Libyan opposition (“Just another waste of time
and money”); for them, the summit was nothing
more than a show, especially considering that no
historical decisions could be expected in general
from weak Arab rulers.
The Future of Arab-African Cooperation
Arab-African cooperation has been strained by
two factors from the beginning. First, the Arab states have routinely made financial and economic cooperation dependent on political factors.
While the Arab states’ appeals for African support
regarding Arab foreign interests were successful,
it was not a genuine support and suggested more
a conciliatory, opportunistic attitude on the part of
the African states. In light of such an Arab-centric
starting point for cooperation, from time to time
and under certain circumstances, the will of the
--
Arab states to cooperate strongly waned when the
support of the African states didn’t seem absolutely necessary anymore.
Second, the Arab-African cooperation and relationship in general lacked balance (read: equality). De facto hierarchically organized, the monetary flow from Arab states into Africa was supervised by the AL and AU, but only moderately, and
there was no way of really controlling the destiny of the funding through the institutions of Arab-African cooperation; bilateral help became the
preferred choice of the Arab states because it is
and was easier to supervise.
Arab-African cooperation, which in the 1970s
set a precedent in South–South collaboration, has
developed over time into a sort of Third World variety of a North–South divide. Direct implications
for the future of Arab-African cooperation can be
observed. The future does look promising, provided the errors of the past can be avoided; i.e. the Arab states must stop politicizing and strive towards
a real balance of interests. The signs of progress on
that front were definitely apparent in the declarations passed at the 2010 summit, but the Arab politicization was already a point of contention at the
first summit in 1977. The 2010 conference participants still supported the founding of a Palestinian state, but the Near East conflict overall played
a much more subordinate role than it did in 1977.
In at least this way, Arab-African cooperation was
depoliticized. The benchmark for the new strategic partnership remains the actions that, despite all
intentions, will in all likelihood continue to lag behind verbalized goals.
GIGA Focus International Edition 6/2010
Bibliography
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coopérationarabo-africaine, Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant.
Haseeb, Khair el-Din (ed.) (1985), The Arabs & Africa, London: Croom Helm.
Mattes, Hanspeter (1990): Die arabisch-afrikanische
Kooperation: Auf dem Weg zur 2. Gipfelkonferenz, in: Hofmeier, Rolf (ed.), Afrika-Jahrbuch
1989, Opladen: Leske+Budrich.
Neitzel, Hartmut und Renate Nötzel (1979), Afrika
und die arabischen Staaten, Hamburg: Institut für
Afrika-Kunde.
Zarour, Charbel (ed.) (1989), La coopération araboafricaine. Bilan d’une décennie 1975-1985, Paris:
L’Harmattan.<www.afro-arabsummit.com> (official website of the second summit)
<www.au.int> (website of the African Union)
<www.arableagueonline.com> (website of the Arab League; only in Arabic)
<www.aftaac.org.eg> (Arab Fund for Technical
Assistance to African Countries)
<www.badea.org> (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa)
--
 The Author
Dr. Hanspeter Mattes is Deputy Director of the GIGA German Institute for Middle East Studies. His fields
of research include the domestic and foreign policies of North African states as well as soft security problems in North Africa/the Sahel/Middle East.
E-mail: [email protected]; website: <http://staff.giga-hamburg.de/mattes>.
 GIGA Research on the Topic
In the framework of Research Team 3 (“War and Peace Processes”), GIGA Research Programme 2, “Violence and Security,” also examines interregional approaches to both the elimination of local conflicts and
the creation of peace-oriented development dynamics. Supporting GIGA Research Programme 4, Research Team 2 (“Global Governance and Norm-Building”) is concerned with the role of regional powers
and regional organizations in the international political economy.
 Related GIGA publications (selection)
Bergholm, Linnea (2009), Heikle Beziehungen: Vereinte Nationen, Afrikanische Union und Friedensmissionen in
Afrika, GIGA Focus Afrika, 10, online: <www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus/afrika>.
Mattes, Hanspeter (2009), Vierzig Jahre libysche Revolution: mehr Erfolg bei der Machtsicherung als bei der Landesentwicklung, GIGA Focus Nahost, 9, online: <www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus/nahost>.
Seibert, Gerhard (2009), Brasilien in Afrika: Globaler Geltungsanspruch und Rohstoffe, GIGA Focus Afrika, 8,
online: <www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus/afrika>.
The GIGA Focus is an Open Access publication and can be read on the Internet and downloaded free of charge at <www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus>. According to the conditions
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indication of the initial publication as GIGA Focus and no changes in or abbreviation of texts.
Editors: André Bank and Hanspeter Mattes; Series Editors: André Bank and Hanspeter Mattes
Editorial Department: Meenakshi Preisser and Silvia Bücke
Contact: <[email protected]>; GIGA, Neuer Jungfernstieg 21, 20354 Hamburg, Germany
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