The Past and Present Society
Rethinking Decolonization
Author(s): A. G. Hopkins
Source: Past & Present, No. 200 (Aug., 2008), pp. 211-247
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION*
The moment of decolonization is recorded by dates and signalled
by ceremony: the guard, political as well as military, is changed;
anthems are composed; flags are redesigned. When Malaya
became independent in 1957, the national anthem, 'My Coun
try', was adopted in the same year, and a new national flag was
hoisted in 1963.x When Nigeria became independent in 1960, the
national anthem, 'Nigeria, We Hail Thee', was composed for the
occasion and the national flag was flown for the first time.2 Simi
larly, when Jamaica gained independence in 1962, a new national
anthem, 'Jamaica, Land We Love', was adopted, as was the na
tional flag. These examples are just a few of many that could be
cited. But no purpose is served by adding to the list because the
point they make already has an accepted, if also a minor, part in
the historiography of decolonization.
It is more interesting and also surprising, even for scholars
who specialize in imperial history, to discover that a similar pro
cess was under way elsewhere in the empire-Commonwealth.
Canada's national flag replaced the Union Jack in 1965 and a
national anthem, 'O Canada', was adopted in 1980. Canada's ex
perience was far from being an oddity. Australia's national flag
was approved even earlier, in 1954, though 'Advance Australia
Fair' did not replace 'God Save the Queen' until 1984.3 'God
Defend New Zealand' achieved equal status with 'God Save
the Queen' in 1977, and thereafter began to supplant it; New
Zealand's flag still retains its Union Jack quarter, but pressure to
remove it has grown in recent decades.4 South Africa exchanged
* I am grateful to John Darwin, Dane Kennedy, Roger Louis and Stuart Ward for
their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1 When Malaya became Malaysia.
2 The anthem was composed by a British musician; a replacement, 'Arise, O Com
patriots, Nigeria's Call Obey', written by Nigerians, was adopted in 1978.
3 The Union Jack still occupies a quarter of the Australian flag, but there are now
moves to alter the design. The decision about the anthem followed a referendum in
1977 in which 'God Save the Queen' received only 19 per cent ofthe votes.
4 The Canadian, Australian and New Zealand anthems were all based on composi
tions ofthe 1870s and 1880s. New Zealand's flag (with the Union Jack quarter) was
adopted in 1902 at a time of patriotic support for the British cause during the Anglo
South African war.
Past and Present, no. 200 (August 2008) ? The Past and Present Society, Oxford, 2008
doi:10.1093/pastj/gtn015
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212 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
'God Save the Queen' for 'The Call of South Africa' in 1957; the
national flag, amended in 1928 to minimize the space allocated
to the Union Jack, continued to fly until 1994, but was then
replaced by an entirely new flag that eliminated the remaining
minuscule symbol ofthe British connection.5
Juxtaposing these dates and artefacts may establish a wholly
insignificant set of correlations. After all, the colonies achieved
independence after the Second World War, and principally in the
1950s and 1960s, whereas Canada, Australia, New Zealand and
South Africa had long been self-governing.6 Their superior status
was recognized by the term 'dominion', which was adopted to
distinguish the self-governing colonies of white settlement from
parts ofthe empire that remained subject to imperial rule. The
term was first applied in 1867 to describe the new Confederation
of Canada, and was attached to Australia and New Zealand in
1907 and to South Africa in 1910.7 Dominion status was a char
acteristically ambiguous imperial invention that recognized
various states of self-government while managing to convey over
tones of continuing subordination.8 Nevertheless, the dominions
were formally independent in internal affairs, and after the First
World War they secured a degree of representation in foreign
affairs too. Acquiring the ceremonial emblems of independence
may have been, for them, merely a delayed tidying-up opera
tion. In addition, it could be said that anthems and flags are
5 In 1994 'The Call of South Africa' was merged with 'God Bless Africa', which had
been composed in 1897.
6 Unfortunately, there is insufficient space in this article to include Ireland, which
anticipated many ofthe trends identified here.
7 In 1867 John A. Macdonald (who became Canada's first prime minister) favoured
the idea of calling the new state the Kingdom of Canada, but concerns that the title
would upset the republic to the south led to a search for a conciliatory alternative.
'Dominion' was the compromise proposed by Leonard Tilley, the evangelical polit
ician from New Brunswick who came across it (in Psalm 72) during his daily bible
reading. Australia achieved 'responsible government' as a federated state, the Com
monwealth of Australia, in 1901. See W David Mclntyre, 'The Strange Death of
Dominion Status', Jl Imperial and Commonwealth Hist., xxvii (1999), 194; W. David
Mclntyre, 'The Development and Significance of Dominion Status', 26 Sept. 2007,
at <http: //www. mch.govt. nz/dominion/mcintyre.html>.
8 In 1947, when India became independent as a republic, the term lost its value. It
ceased to be applied for official purposes after 1949, but remained in general circula
tion until the 1980s. Mclntyre, 'Strange Death of Dominion Status'; also John
Darwin, 'A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in British Polities', in Judith
Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), The Oxford History ofthe British Empire, iv, The
Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999). The definition adopted here follows J. D. B. Miller's
concise discussion in his Britain and the Old Dominions (Baltimore, 1966), 152-4.
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 213
epiphenomena that are not to be confused with much weightier
forces that set the course of decolonization, and that any attempt
to forge a link between Canada and Malaya in this regard is either
trivial or spurious.
It is undoubtedly the case that the existing literature does not
consider the possibility that the old dominions themselves might
be an integral part ofthe process of decolonization.9 The impres
sive contributions made to the study of decolonization since
Darwin referred to the subject in 1988 as being 'very underdevel
oped' have dealt almost exclusively with Africa and Asia.10 None
of the surveys of decolonization now available regards the old
dominions as being candidates for independence; nor do the
authors feel it necessary to justify omitting them from consider
ation. x l Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa make
just two brief appearances: one, a generalized reference to the
development ofthe Commonwealth after 1945, occurs because
ofthe need to discuss forms of continuing union while negotiating
independence for the colonies; the other, a specific reference to
South Africa, is included because of the impossibility of analys
ing nationalism in colonial black Africa without also referring
to white South Africa.
The reason for this omission is not that the evidence has been
assessed and the case dismissed, but that the subject has been
fragmented in ways that have precluded the enquiry. A major
shift in the historiography of the British Empire occurred in the
9 Though David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire
(London, 2001), traces the decline of a hierarchical social order in the empire as
a whole. Kosmas Tsokhas, 'Dedominionization: The Anglo-Australian Experience,
1939-1945', Hist. Jl, xxxvii (1994), suggests that the Second World War weakened the
relationship between Britain and Australia.
10 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War
World (Basingstoke, 1988), pp. viii, 247.
11 To cite just some ofthe most recent examples: D. George Boyce, Decolonisation
and the British Empire, 1775-1997 (New York, 1999); Nicholas J. White, Decolonisation:
The British Experience since 1945 (Harlow, 1999); John Springhall, Decolonization since
1945: The Collapse of European Overseas Empires (New York, 2001); L. J. Butler, Britain
and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (New York, 2002); Frank Heinlein,
British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind
(London, 2002); Roy Douglas, Liquidation of Empire: The Decline ofthe British Empire
(Basingstoke, 2002); Dietmar Rothermund, The Routledge Companion to Decoloni
zation (New York, 2006); Martin Lynn (ed.), The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat
or Revival? (Basingstoke, 2006); Ronald Hyam, Britain's Declining Empire: The Road
to Decolonisation, 1918-1968 (Cambridge, 2006).
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214 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
1960s, when the subject broke into two parts. One part took the
form of a wholly desirable commitment to write the indigenous
history of newly independent, ex-colonial states, thereby escap
ing the old and arguably racist view of the empire as a white
dominated and invariably progressive enterprise. The other
part, which complemented this development, was formed by the
rise in the dominions of a new, nationalist historiography that
emphasized internal themes and minimized the importance pre
viously attached to imperial connections. Both ventures have
been remarkably successful, though at the price of creating a set
of introspective histories of separate nation states. After half a
century of scholarly endeavour, the former dominions have now
achieved their historiographical independence, but they have
done so at the cost of ensuring that the new history, excellent
though it is, is scarcely known beyond the borders of the in
dividual states concerned. Meanwhile, studies treating the old
dominions as an entity have dwindled and the predominantly
constitutional theme that once held them together has lost fa
vour with historians.12 Between them, these trends have shunted
the study of the old dominions from the main line into a small
siding, where it remains.
The only sound basis for excluding the old dominions from the
process of decolonization after the Second World War is the claim
that they were already independent. It is true that in 1926 the
Balfour Report declared that the dominions were autonomous
within the empire and stood on a basis of equality with Britain.
It is also the case that in 1931 these sentiments were codified in
the Statute of Westminster, which confirmed the legislative in
dependence ofthe dominions.13 Leaving aside the ambiguities
in both documents, and ignoring the fact that the statute was
not accepted by Australia until 1942 and by New Zealand until
1947, neither proclamation was translated automatically or
12 For full surveys ofthe dominions during the period after 1945 it is necessary to
rediscover the excellent work produced at the time, notably Nicholas Mansergh, The
Commonwealth Experience (1969; 2nd edn in 2 vols., London, 1982); Miller, Britain
and the Old Dominions; J. D. B. Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of
Expansion and Attrition, 1953-1969 (London, 1969). The subject has been kept alive
by the notable work of W David Mclntyre, The Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and
Impact, 1869-1971 (Minneapolis, 1977); W David Mclntyre, The Significance of the
Commonwealth, 1965-90 (London, 1991).
13 Mansergh, Commonwealth Experience, ii, 21-35.
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 215
immediately into effective independence.14 Constitutional free
doms can still be limited by political will and circumscribed by
continuing economic or cultural dependence. To deny these pos
sibilities is to define imperial history solely by the legal status of
the countries formally connected to Britain, and thus to reject any
consideration of informal or invisible empire. This position is not
easily defended, and indeed has been abandoned by historians
of empire since Gallagher and Robinson changed the terms of
the debate half a century ago.15
An alternative interpretation will be advanced here.16 Formal
self-government did not confer full independence on the old set
tler colonies. It was only after the Second World War that they
added substantially to the freedoms they had already achieved.
The adoption of new anthems and flags, far from being mere
window dressing, represented a fundamental and remarkably
neglected transformation of the whole of the empire-Common
wealth and not just ofthe colonies. These ceremonial exchanges
marked the end of long-established connections between the
old dominions and Britain. Moreover, they did so in ways that
in some respects were more profound than the achievement of
formal independence was for the colonies because they involved
the destruction of the core concept of Britishness, which had
given unity and vitality to Greater Britain overseas, and the cre
ation of new national identities.17
If this argument holds, the study of decolonization needs to be
extended beyond Africa and Asia to include the old dominions.
The subject needs to become truly global because, to complete
the argument, decolonization was a response to changes in the
14 The statute was primarily a concession to Canada and South Africa. See Miller,
Britain and the Old Dominions, 38-41.
15 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', Econ.
Hist. Rev., 2nd ser., vi (1953). John Darwin has reaffirmed the importance of seeing
decolonization as a comprehensive process involving the 'complete overthrow' of
'institutions and ideas': John Darwin, 'Decolonization and the End of Empire', in
Robin W. Winks (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, v, Historiography
(Oxford, 1999).
16 It will be apparent that the argument draws together recent research on individual
dominions. I hope that the citations that follow will signify, if not fully discharge, my
debt to the scholars concerned.
17 The starting points for exploring these terms are now Carl Bridge and Kent
Fedorowich (eds.), The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity (London, 2003);
Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis (eds.), Rediscovering the British World (Calgary,
2005); Kate Darian-Smith, Patricia Grimshaw and Stuart Macintyre (eds.), British
ness Abroad: Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures (Melbourne, 2007).
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216 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
process of globalization after the Second World War.18 The dia
lectic of empire had begun by promoting a form of imperial
globalization that subordinated outlying regions and integrated
them with a dominant metropolitan centre. Structures of de
pendence put in place in the nineteenth century survived the
upheaval of the Second World War and were perpetuated for
a decade after 1945. Hierarchical imperial systems were then
subverted by a mixture of ideological and material forces that
emerged in the mid 1950s, partly as a result of developments
arising from imperial rule and partly in reaction to them. The
propagation and implementation of principles of human and
civil rights undercut systems of domination based on claimed
ethnic superiority; profound changes to the world economy re
duced the value of colonial forms of integration and created new
alignments; principles of civic nationality were adopted to meet
the needs of an increasingly cosmopolitan world. The result was
a novel synthesis, post-colonial globalization, which washed over
and eventually eroded the boundaries that had marked out both
Greater Britain and the colonial dependencies.19
I
REVIVING THE OLD EMPIRE AFTER 1945
Decolonization used to be seen as a continuous process that ac
celerated after the Second World War and became irreversible
with the loss of India in 1947. This interpretation still has merit
when placed in the longest perspective, but it misses important
discontinuities that have led to a reappraisal ofthe causes as well
as the timing ofthe end of empire. Recent research using newly
released official records has shown that Britain's aim in the years
immediately following the Second World War was to reinvigorate
the empire, not to abandon it.20 Europe was devastated; its
18 Elements of this argument are in A. G. Hopkins, 'Back to the Future: From Na
tional History to Imperial History', Past and Present, no. 164 (Aug. 1999); P. J. Cain and
A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, 2nd edn (Harlow, 2001), 'Afterword'.
19 See A. G. Hopkins (ed.), Globalization in World History (New York, 2002), 9-10,
and the general discussion of contemporary globalization ibid., 34-44.
20 Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 1941-1945: The United States and the Decol
onization ofthe British Empire (Oxford, 1977); Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in
the Middle East, 1945-51 (Oxford, 1984); and the recent discussion in Lynn (ed.),
British Empire in the 1950s.
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 217
prospects were uncertain and distant. The empire, which had
contributed generously and effectively to the war effort, seemed
to be a far more promising ally in the urgent task of winning the
peace.21 Following the loss of India, the British repositioned
their empire in Africa, Malaya and the Middle East.22 A 'second
colonial occupation'23 was devised to promote imports of raw
materials and foodstuffs that were vital to the British economy;
defence strategy was adjusted to assimilate the colonial empire
into Anglo-American plans for countering the expansion of the
Soviet Union.
The idea that the empire was revived shortly before its final
fall is a valuable corrective to the older story of unbroken decline.
As it stands, however, the argument is incomplete because it fails
to incorporate the substantial part played by the old dominions
in the strategy. Proposals to strengthen the British world by
revitalizing ties with the dominions drew upon notions of racial
superiority and racial unity that were still central assumptions of
the imperial order. Belief in the continuing value ofthe empire was
accepted by the leading figures in the two major political parties
in Britain and had considerable popular appeal, given the con
tribution made by the dominions (and the empire as a whole)
during the war.24 There was also the possibility of a bonus if the
readvertised Commonwealth could be transformed into a multi
racial organization that would march in step, yet still be led by
white officers.25
If Britain was eager to reaffirm ties with the old dominions
after the war, the dominions had a stake in the success of the
21 Scott Newton, 'Britain, the Sterling Area and European Integration, 1945-50',
Jl Imperial and Commonwealth Hist., xiii (1985).
22 Louis, British Empire in the Middle East; Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism,
559-62, 627-32.
23 The phrase is from D. A. Low and J. M. Lonsdale, 'Towards the New Order,
1945-63', in D. A. Low and Alison Smith (eds.), History of East Africa, iii (Oxford,
1976), 12-16.
24 The idea of a 'people's empire'during this period is elaborated by Wendy Webster,
Englishness and Empire, 1939-1965 (Oxford, 2005).
25 The prospect appealed to both Conservative empire-loyalists and Labour egali
tarians and gained momentum after India agreed to remain within the Com
monwealth. See Kathleen Paul, '"British Subjects" and "British Stock": Labour's
Post-War Imperialism', Jl Brit. Studies, xxxiv (1995). Webster, Englishness and
Empire, shows that the idea of a progressive empire had considerable popular support
in the immediate post-war years.
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218 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
venture too, providing it fitted their own interests.26 To under
stand the relationship between imperial sentiment and national
aspirations, it is necessary to recognize that imperialism in the
dominions was a unifying force signifying loyalty to the empire,
and that before the Second World War nationalism was, in
essence, a movement for self-government and statehood, not a
drive for full independence, still less a campaign for creating
separate, ethnically based identities.27 By granting 'responsible'
government to settler colonies in the nineteenth century, Britain
did indeed devolve important powers, but it was expected that
the dominions would continue to function as satellites, even with
out direct political control.28 By and large, the expectation was
met. Although older versions of the history of the dominions
traced the steps leading, in the well-known phrase, 'from colony
to nation', this interpretation suggests a degree of maturity and
independence that later writers have found unconvincing.29
Separate identities were slow to develop in the dominions pre
cisely because local affiliations were overlaid by a pervasive and
continuing sense of Britishness. As Hancock put it, if with some
exaggeration, 'pride of race counted for more than love of coun
try'.30 Britain's influence continued to mark all forms of cultural
expression. In Canada, anxiety about the increasing penetration
ofthe United States and the assertive claims of Quebec separatists
caused an even greater emphasis to be placed on the imperial
connection. The importance and continuing vitality of the
empire was imprinted on the educational system and advertised
to the wider public in a bid to promote an English-based high
26 Francine McKenzie has confirmed this point in her 'In the National Interest:
Dominions' Support for Britain and the Commonwealth after the Second World
War', Jl Imperial and Commonwealth Hist., xxxiv (2006).
27 Douglas Cole, 'The Problem of "Nationalism" and "Imperialism" in British Set
tlement Colonies', Jl Brit. Studies, x (1971), is a valuable and underused source on a
topic that has now generated a considerable literature.
28 Gallagher and Robinson's formulation in 'Imperialism of Free Trade' is (neces
sarily) oversimplified. The view taken here ofthe shift from formal to informal means
of control is set out in Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 209-16.
29 See John Eddy and Deryck Schreuder (eds.), The Rise of Colonial Nationalism:
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa First Assert their Nationalities, 1880
1914 (Sydney, 1988). A specific example of this dualism is Phillip Buckner,' "Limited
Identities" and Canadian Historical Scholarship: An Atlantic Provinces Perspective',
Jl Canadian Studies, xxiii (1988).
30 W K. Hancock, Australia, 2nd edn (Brisbane, 1961), 49. The comment can be
applied to the other dominions.
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 219
culture that would offset what was seen to be the low culture
seeping in from the south.31 In Australia, a young writer and
commentator, Arthur Phillips, was inspired by his awareness of
the dominion's continuing cultural dependence to produce the
memorable, and subsequently much debated, concept of 'cul
tural cringe'.32 Manifestations of cultural deference were even
more pronounced in the smaller and more remote settler society
of New Zealand, and also in South Africa, where the numerical
preponderance of indigenous Africans, combined with an uneasy
relationship with the Afrikaners, gave the minority English com
munity an additional motive for holding on to the connection
with the great metropolis.33 The profound commitment to pan
Britannic nationalism ensured that, by 1945, the dominions had
yet to become independent, if the term is applied not just to the
achievement of self-government but to the creation of separate
identities within different nation states.
Victory in 1945 was regarded in Britain and the dominions
as an opportunity to reinforce what Stephen Leacock had called
'the pure fire of imperial patriotism'.34 The enduring sense of
Britishness was well represented in the dominions by the leading
political figures ofthe day, notably John Diefenbaker and Lester
Pearson in Canada, Ben Chifley and Robert Menzies in Australia,
Peter Fraser and Sidney Holland in New Zealand, and Jan
Christian Smuts in South Africa, who were all committed sup
porters of empire and monarchy. Although South Africa's atti
tude cooled after Smuts and the United Party were defeated in
the general election of 1948, the country remained bound to
31 Jose E. Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada,
1945-71 (Vancouver, 2007); George Richardson, 'Nostalgia and Identity: The His
tory and Social Studies Curricula of Alberta and Ontario at the End of Empire', in
Phillip Buckner (ed.), Canada and the End of Empire (Vancouver, 2005); Paul Ruth
erford, 'The Persistence of Britain: The Culture Project in Post-War Canada', ibid.
32 The phrase first appeared in the journal Meanjin, iv (1950). The extensive debate
on the concept can be accessed through L. J. Hume, Another Look at the Cultural Cringe
(St Leonards, NSW, 1993), and A. A. Phillips, A. A. Phillips on the Cultural Cringe
(Melbourne, 2006).
33 The African population of South Africa rose from approximately 68 per cent of
the total in 1951 to 78 per cent in 2000; the white population (of which about 60 per
cent were Afrikaners and 40 per cent English settlers) fell from 21 per cent to 11 per
cent in the same period. William Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa (New York,
2001), 261-2.
34 In 1907. Quoted in Cole, 'Problem of "Nationalism" and "Imperialism"', 175.
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220 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
Britain by ties of finance and defence, and the ruling National
Party stayed within the constitutional framework of the Com
monwealth until 1960.
The few concessions made to local political aspirations left
the basis ofthe constitutional arrangements agreed in 1931 un
disturbed.35 The position ofthe monarch as head ofthe empire
Commonwealth remained untouched, and indeed was enthu
siastically endorsed, as popular support for the coronation of
Queen Elizabeth in 1953 demonstrated.36 Imperial honours
associated with monarchical and governmental patronage were
keenly sought and eagerly awaited everywhere except Canada
(which had abolished them in the 1920s) .37 Although the domin
ions had obtained the right to appoint their own subjects to the
post of governor-general by 1931,38 only South Africa did so on
a continuous basis before the Second World War.39 The legal
system in the dominions, though effectively decentralized, still
recognized the Privy Council as the ultimate court of appeal,
with the sole exception, again, of Canada, which abandoned the
procedure in 1949. Nevertheless, Canada did not achieve full
control over her affairs until the British parliament approved a
new constitution for the country in 1982. The creation of separate
citizenship in the dominions between 1946 and 1949 was prob
ably the most important constitutional innovation of the imme
diate post-war years, but the measure supplemented rather than
35 A trenchant statement of this position is James Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History
ofthe New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000 (Auckland, 2001), 318-21.
36 On the continuing influence after the war of imperial themes in advertise
ments, youth organizations, exhibitions, education and broadcasting, see John M.
MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion,
1880-1960 (Manchester, 1984). Kenneth Munro, 'Canada as Reflected in her Par
ticipation in the Coronation of her Monarchs in the Twentieth Century', Jl Hist.
Sociology, xiv (2001), provides a perspective from one ofthe dominions. This is not
the place to enter the debate occasioned by Bernard Porter's important study The
Absent-Minded Imperialists (Oxford, 2004), because it does not cover the period after
1945 in any detail. For an appraisal ofthe post-war years that takes issue with Porter,
see Stuart Ward, 'Echoes of Empire', History Workshop Jl, no. 62 (2006).
37 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, ch. 7.
38 1926 in the case of Canada.
39 South Africa abolished the post in 1961. The first South African appointee, Sir
Patrick Duncan (1937-43), was born in Scotland. The continuous list of Afrikaner
appointees began with Nicolaas de Wet (1943-6). Although governors-general had
been representatives rather than agents ofthe monarch since 1931, they remained
important symbols of a highly visible and continuing British imperial connection.
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 221
replaced rights to British citizenship, which were confirmed by
the Nationality Act of 1948 and continued to be highly prized.40
These constitutional formalities would have ceased to matter
had the 'crimson thread of kinship' that gave Greater Britain its
identity and unity been severed or significantly weakened.41 In an
era that was still in touch with Milner and had yet to envisage
Mandela, racial assumptions about the superiority ofthe British,
and the associated goal of strengthening Greater Britain, contin
ued to inspire imperial policy.42 Before 1945, the overwhelming
majority of emigrants to the dominions came from the British
Isles.43 When the war ended, the British government decided to
subsidize emigration to the empire to ensure that 'British stock'
retained its vitality overseas, even though there was a shortage of
labour at home.44 Between 1948 and 1957, just over one million
British migrants went to the dominions, many of them on assisted
passages.45 For their part, the old dominions continued to regard
Britain as the ultimate source of their identities, and Britishness
as the basis of their unity, throughout the 1940s and 1950s.46
40 Kathleen Paul, 'The Politics of Citizenship in Post-War Britain', Contemporary
Record, vi (1992); Randall Hansen, 'The Politics of Citizenship in 1940s Britain: The
British Nationality Act', Twentieth Century Brit. Hist., x (1999). Ireland had led the way
by creating separate citizenship in 1935 and by leaving the Commonwealth in 1949.
The exit was hastily executed and various supplementary measures had to be put in
place to ensure that Irish citizens in Britain were treated equally with Commonwealth
citizens and not as aliens. D. W Dean, 'Final Exit? Britain, Eire, the Commonwealth,
and the Repeal ofthe External Relations Act, 1945-1949', Jl Imperial and Common
wealth Hist., xx (1992).
41 This famous phrase was spun by Sir Henry Parkes (1815-96), the former Chartist
and farm labourer from Warwickshire who became prime minister of New South
Wales and a leading advocate of federation for the Australian states.
42 The political significance of race was clearly demonstrated in 1952, when Britain
deposed Seretse Khama, the heir to the chieftaincy ofthe Bangwato in Bechuanaland,
after he married a white woman who was also a British subject. The marriage infringed
South Africa's Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949. See Ronald Hyam, 'The
Political Consequences of Seretse Khama: Britain, the Bangwato, and South Africa,
1948-1952', Hist. Jl, xxix (1986).
43 A valuable survey is Stephen Constantine, 'Migrants and Settlers', in Brown
and Louis (eds.), Oxford History ofthe British Empire, iv; see also Stephen Constantine,
'British Emigration to the Empire-Commonwealth since 1880: From Overseas Set
tlement to Diaspora', Jl Imperial and Commonwealth Hist., xxxi (2003).
44 Stephen Constantine, 'Waving Goodbye? Australia, Assisted Passages, and the
Empire and Commonwealth Settlement Acts, 1945-72', Jl Imperial and Common
wealth Hist., xxvi (1998).
45 This was 82 per cent ofthe total leaving by sea: Constantine, 'Waving Goodbye?',
193.
46 Neville Meaney, 'Britishness and Australian Identity: The Problem of Nation
alism in Australian History and Historiography', Australian Hist. Studies, xxxii (2001);
(com. on p. 222)
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222 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
Australia took up the offer of assisted passages in 1946 and sup
ported subsidized immigration plans until 1972.47 The 'white
Australia' policy, originally codified in 1901, was rigorously ap
plied until 1973. New Zealand managed its own scheme for mi
grants from Europe from 1947; its discriminatory immigration
policy, though modified in 1974, was not abolished until 1987.
Canada's immigration scheme began in 1951 and remained dis
criminatory until 1962. Separatist nationalism was confined to
the Quebecois, whose aspirations were frustrated, and to the
Afrikaners, who were hobbled by their continuing economic
dependence on Britain.
South Africa's racist immigration policy, which survived until
1994, was allied to the most distinctive example of discrimination
within the empire, the policy of apartheid, which was put in place
after the National Party's election victory in 1948.48 Although
apartheid is usually treated, quite properly, as a theme that is
specific to the recent history of South Africa, it should also be set
in a wider imperial context. Its harshness and extremism gave it a
special notoriety, but the other dominions shared the basic prin
ciples of white superiority, even if they were not acted on as fully or
publicized as widely. Elevating Britishness entailed relegating
indigenous societies, or 'first nations', as they are now called,49
because to accept the validity of non-European cultures was a step
towards agreeing to equality of treatment, which would have
(n. 46 cont.)
Neville Meaney, 'Britishness and Australia: Some Reflections', Jl Imperial and Com
monwealth Hist., xxxi (2003); Phillip Buckner, 'The Long Goodbye: English Can
adians and the British World', in Buckner and Francis (eds.), Rediscovering the
British World, 199-203.
47 Though assisted passages for British emigrants to Australia continued till 1982:
Constantine, 'British Emigration to the Empire-Commonwealth', 27.
48 Deborah Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise
(New York, 1992); Alan Jeeves, 'South Africa in the 1940s: Post-War Reconstruction
and the Onset of Apartheid', South African Hist. Jl, 1 (2004); Saul Dubow, Scientific
Racism in Modern South Africa (New York, 1995); Saul Dubow, 'Afrikaner Nation
alism, Apartheid and the Conceptualisation of "Race" \Jl African Hist., xxxiii (1992);
Herman Giliomee, 'The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 1929-1948', Jl Southern
African Studies, xxix (2003). The intellectual basis began to be questioned from the
1970s: see Herman Giliomee, '"Survival in Justice": An Afrikaner Debate over
Apartheid', Comparative Studies in Society and History, xxxvi (1994).
49 The term 'first nations' was adopted in Canada in the 1980s and is now applied
more widely to describe the indigenous inhabitants of regions colonized by more
powerful white settlers (and thus includes the Sami, who fell under Norwegian dom
ination), and even more generally to refer to people such as the Ainu of Hokkaido, who
were subordinated by Japanese invaders from Honshu. See also n. 95 below.
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 223
questioned white supremacy and endangered what Milner had
called the 'destiny ofthe English race'.50
As South Africa transformed segregation into apartheid,
Canada and Australia adopted assimilationist measures whose
official justification was to increase the number of those who
could become Britons by qualification.51 Assertive policies of
acculturation sought to eliminate indigenous languages, customs
and beliefs, and to curtail native land rights. New 'national' pol
icies removed scattered groups, whose way of life depended on
access to extensive land resources, from their homelands. The
Inuit were compelled to serve as sub-imperialists by sending
settlers to wave the flag over Canada's territorial claims in the
High Arctic.52 The Innu of Labrador were transported, with
appalling consequences, to make way for modernization and to
be modernized more effectively.53 The position was rather dif
ferent in New Zealand. There, the Maori were placed at a higher
point in the racial hierarchy than other indigenous peoples and
their land rights enjoyed a degree of protection under the Treaty
of Waitangi.54 However, this qualification did not reduce the pri
ority given to white immigrants or diminish the privileges they
enjoyed; even 'mild' New Zealand attempted to renew policies of
assimilation after 1945.55 The version of history that casts pol
itical leaders in the dominions in the role of nationalists who won
successive concessions from the home country tells only one
side of the story. It fails to see that, from the perspective of first
50 Alfred, 1st Viscount Milner, 'Credo', Times, 27 July 1925. Jeffrey M. Ayres pro
vides an illustration of how the destiny ofthe 'English race' has changed in 'National
No More: Defining English Canada', Amer. Rev. Canadian Studies, xxv (1999).
51 Anthony Moran, 'White Australia, Settler Nationalism and Aboriginal Assimila
tion', Australian Jl Politics and History, li (2005). Hugh Shewell, 'What Makes Indians
Tick? The Influence of Social Sciences on Canada's Indian Policy, 1947-1964', His
toire sociale, xxxiv (2001), records the lamentable contribution made by the social
sciences to improving assimilationist policies.
52 Melanie McGrath, The Long Exile (London, 2006), describes the move in the
1950s from the east coast of Hudson Bay to Ellesmere Island 1,500 miles to the north.
53 A. G. Hopkins, 'Globalization with and without Empires: From Bali to
Labrador', in Hopkins (ed.), Globalization in World History.
54 The notion that the Maori were descended from (superior) Aryan stock is
examined by Tony Ballantyne, Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire
(Basingstoke, 2002). See also James Bennett, 'Maori as Honorary Members ofthe
White Tribe', Jl Imperial and Commonwealth Hist., xxix (2001).
55 Belich, Paradise Reforged, 476-8; R. Scott Sheffield, 'Rehabilitating the Indigene:
Post-War Reconstruction and the Image ofthe Indigenous Other in English Canada
and New Zealand, 1943-1948', in Buckner and Francis (eds.), Rediscovering the
British World.
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224 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
nations, governments in the dominions were also agents and in
stigators of colonial rule. Their commitment to asserting the su
premacy of the British world caused them, in the middle of the
twentieth century and on the eve of decolonization, to promote a
form of aggressive internal colonialism that is generally associated
with a much earlier phase of imperial history.56
Sentiment needed material support. If the British world was
to be the basis of continuing global influence, it had to offer
its members a return to prosperity and a guarantee of security.
Economic ties between Britain and the dominions remained
robust and resilient during the decade of reconstruction after
the Second World War.57 Imperial preferences and the sterling
area survived the war, despite attempts by the United States to
dismantle them, and were powerful influences on the interna
tional economy into the 1950s. In 1950, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand and South Africa accounted for over 27 per cent of all
Britain's exports and supplied about 20 per cent of her imports.
Seen from another angle, in the same year Britain supplied 60 per
cent of New Zealand's imports, 50 per cent of Australia's and 41
per cent of South Africa's. The only relationship not to flourish
56 Moran, 'White Australia, Settler Nationalism and Aboriginal Assimilation',
shows that these views survived through the 1960s, even though their basis shifted
from race to culture. President Trudeau attempted to reintroduce assimilation in
Canada as late as 1969, but was forced to abandon the idea in 1971 in the face of
determined opposition from indigenous peoples. On the concept of internal coloni
alism, see Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National
Development, 1536-1966, 2nd edn (New Brunswick, 1999).
57 The economic commentary that follows relies heavily on the following sources,
except where additional citations are made: John Singleton and Paul L. Robertson,
Economic Relations between Britain and Australasia, 1945-1970 (Basingstoke, 2002);
B. W Muirhead, The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy: The Failure ofthe
Anglo-European Option (Montreal, 1992); Tim Rooth and Peter Walsh, 'Canada in
the Twentieth Century: Continental Drift', London Jl Canadian Studies, xix (2003/4);
Francine McKenzie, Redefining the Bonds ofthe Commonwealth, 1939-1948: The Politics
of Preference (Basingstoke, 2002); Catherine R. Schenk, Britain and the Sterling Area:
From Devaluation to Convertibility in the 1950s (London, 1994); Catherine R. Schenk,
'Britain in the World Economy', in Paul Addison and Harriet Jones (eds.), A Com
panion to Contemporary Britain, 1939-2000 (Oxford, 2005); Gerold Krozewski, Money
and the End of Empire: British International Economic Policy and the Colonies, 1947-58
(Basingstoke, 2001); Gary B. Magee, 'The Importance of Being British? Imperial
Factors and the Growth of British Imports, 1870-1960', Jl Interdisciplinary Hist.,
xxxvii (2007). I am especially grateful to Francine McKenzie and Tim Rooth for
corresponding with me on these matters, and to the former for allowing me to refer
to her unpublished paper 'Trade between Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South
Africa and Britain, 1920-1973: The End ofthe Settlement Era', presented to the
International Economic History Conference, Helsinki, 2006.
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 225
was that with Canada, where competition from the United States
reduced Britain's share of Canada's imports to 15 per cent of
the total in that year.
Sterling held on to its position as a major international cur
rency. It ranked second only to the US dollar and was the unit
of account for about half the world's trade in the immediate post
war years. The sterling crisis of 1947 retarded hopes for an early
restoration of open, multilateral trade relationships, but had the
unplanned effect of strengthening ties within the empire and
the sterling area.58 Australia, New Zealand and South Africa
were keen supporters ofthe sterling area, and generously, if self
interestedly too, cancelled some of their wartime sterling balances
to ease the area's dollar shortages and to reduce pressure on the
pound. They also relied heavily on the London capital market to
an extent that, in the cases of New Zealand and South Africa, had
an important influence on domestic policies.59
Canada was equally keen to strengthen her connections with
Britain, which she saw as a means of counterbalancing the in
creasing pull ofthe United States.60 Canada needed the British
market to generate an export surplus that would enable her to
settle her trade deficit with the United States. Far from disown
ing ties with the empire, Canada pledged about C$1.25 billion
in 1946 to help fund Britain's recovery and revive her import
purchasing power.61 However, Canada struggled to expand ex
ports to Britain because her membership of the dollar bloc
restricted her access to markets in the sterling area. Canada's
inability to earn sufficient dollars from sterling sources, combined
with growing evidence ofthe limits ofthe British market, obliged
her to turn further towards the United States in the 1950s.62 But
this was her second choice, not her first one. In this matter, the
58 Tim Rooth, 'Australia, Canada, and the International Economy in the Era of
Postwar Reconstruction, 1945-50', Australian Econ. Hist. Rev.,x\ (2000).
59 On employment policy in the first case and on apartheid in the second. See John
Singleton, 'Anglo-New Zealand Financial Relations, 1945-61', Financial Hist. Rev., v
(1988); Peter Henshaw, 'Britain, South Africa and the Sterling Area: Gold Produc
tion, Capital Investment and Agricultural Markets, 1931-61', Hist. Jl, xxxix (1996);
Tim Rooth, 'Britain, South African Gold, and the Sterling Area, 1945-50', Jl Imperial
and Commonwealth Hist., xxxii (2001).
60 Muirhead, Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy.
61B. W Muirhead, 'Britain, Canada and the Collective Approach to Freer Trade
and Payments, 1952-57'', Jl Imperial and Commonwealth Hist., xx (1992).
62 Tim Rooth, 'Britain's Other Dollar Problem: Economic Relations with Canada,
1945-50', Jl Imperial and Commonwealth Hist., xxvii (1999).
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226 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
difference between Canada and the other dominions stemmed
from disappointed expectations, and not from any desire to cut
the ties of empire.
Formally speaking, the dominions were able to devise their own
foreign and defence policies, though it was expected, and gener
ally accepted, that these would not run counter to Britain's own
interests. Experience during the war had given the dominions an
incentive to take greater control of their security needs. The fall
of Singapore in 1942, though particularly alarming for Australia
and New Zealand, had advertised the much wider problem that
Britain's limited resources were being stretched too far to be
effective.63 Nevertheless, the dominions did not establish inde
pendent security policies after the war. Victory in 1945 removed
the most dangerous of the immediate threats. More important
still, the huge cost of funding a separate, national defence policy
ensured that independence in foreign affairs was constrained by
continuing reliance on external sources of military support.64
As the Cold War took shape, the dominions were incorporated,
willingly enough, into the global strategy formulated by the
United States and Britain for containing the Soviet Union. The
military weight of the United States eventually prevailed, but
Britain's influence remained strong for a decade after the war
while she aspired to be an independent nuclear power, main
tained a commitment to deploy conventional forces east of Suez,
as well as in the Middle East, and held a string of bases in the re
maining colonies. Australia continued to rely on Britain as a major
source of security until the late 1950s, while also co-operating
with her nuclear programme.65 New Zealand's even greater vul
nerability made her a compliant supporter of British foreign
policy down to and including Suez,66 and ensured that she re
mained wholly dependent on British military hardware until the
63 W. David Mclntyre, The Rise and Fall ofthe Singapore Naval Base (London, 1979).
64 Co-operation between Britain and the dominions in foreign policy is discussed by
McKenzie, 'In the National Interest', 556-61.
65 Wayne Reynolds, Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb (Melbourne, 2000); Andrea
Benvenuti, 'Australian Reactions to Britain's Declining Presence in Southeast Asia,
1955-63', Jl Imperial and Commonwealth Hist., xxxiv (2006), 409-11, 423; David
Lowe, 'Australia's Cold War: Britishness and English-Speaking Worlds Challenged
Anew', in Buckner and Francis (eds.), Rediscovering the British World.
66 Malcolm Templeton, Ties of Blood and Empire: New Zealand's Involvement in
Middle East Defence and the Suez Crisis, 1947-57 (Auckland, 1994).
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 227
1960s.67 South Africa also became fully integrated into Britain's
imperial defence policy during this period, when she became a
fervent and co-operative cold warrior, partly at least to blunt cri
ticism of apartheid.68 Canada's connection to Britain was quali
fied by the proximity and growing presence ofthe United States.
Nevertheless, Canada took care to co-operate with Britain when
ever possible (and did so, notably over the Korean War) and to
maintain her commitment to NATO in the hope of offsetting
the influence of her large southern neighbour.69
The ingredients of change were present in the dominions.
Their societies were more fluid than Britain's, their aspirations
had few fetters, and, being self-governing, they had the power to
revise the imperial connection. Yet, in the first decade after the
war, a revitalized brand of new conservatism held the dominions
to an imperial course. The idea of a greater British world, the
just reward of victory, seemed to have a future that rested on
more than the projection of nostalgia. Ties of kith and kin re
mained strong; economic links were substantial; security interests
favoured imperial co-operation; the leaders ofthe day remained
loyal to the monarch and the empire.
II
THE TRANSFER OF POWER
The second colonial occupation lasted for about a decade. A
series of decisions signalling the retreat from empire occurred
from the mid 1950s as imperial policy began to recognize chan
ging realities. The generally accepted median date is 1960, when
substantial parts of British (and French) Africa became inde
pendent. The Sudan (1956), Ghana (1957) and Malaya (1957)
came shortly before; Tanganyika (1961), Jamaica (1962) and
Kenya (1963) followed soon after. A detailed assessment ofthe
67 John Singleton, 'Vampires to Skyhawks: Military Aircraft and Frigate Purchases
by New Zealand, 1950-70', Australian Econ. Hist. Rev., xlii (2002).
68 Anglo-South African co-operation at this time was symbolized by the Simons
town Agreement of 1955, which allowed British ships to use the base and provided
for joint naval exercises. The agreement was not terminated until 1975, despite
Britain's formal opposition to apartheid.
69 McKenzie, 'In the National Interest', 568-9. Canada's diplomatic approach to
dealing with the United States can be seen in the negotiations over the lease ofthe air
base at Goose Bay: David J. Bercuson, 'SAC v Sovereignty: The Origins ofthe Goose
Bay Lease, 1946-52', Canadian Hist. Rev., lxx (1989).
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228 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
adjustment would need to evaluate the claims made for the sig
nificance of particular dates and events.70 For present purposes,
however, an approximation is sufficient: in 1950 the empire ap
peared to be a going concern, notwithstanding the loss of India;
by the end ofthe decade it was being taken apart at a speed that
even some colonial nationalists thought was making haste too
quickly.71
Historians have yet to recognize that this periodization also fits
the timing ofthe effective transfer of power to the old dominions.
By the close ofthe 1950s the white empire, which had been re
juvenated after the Second World War, was losing its vitality; by
the close ofthe 1960s, its expiration date was in sight. Racial
discrimination offended humanitarian principles and hampered
economic growth. The increasing importance attached to human
and civil rights damaged notions of racial superiority and encour
aged international migration; the pattern of specialization that
had underpinned the international division of labour for a century
and a half gave way to new alignments that depended on free flows
of labour; civic loyalties replaced ethnicity as the basis of national
identity.
The central development, which was clearly visible by 1960,
was the shrivelling of the concept, and the reality, of the British
world. After 1960 there was very little talk of'pride of race', and
less still ofthe 'pure fire of imperial patriotism'.72 Milner's age
had given way to that of Nehru and Nkrumah; Mandela's was on
the horizon. By the 1970s, it had become impossible to put the
Greater back into Britain, and Britain herself was coming under
siege from regional nationalisms in Northern Ireland, Scotland
and Wales. The obverse of these trends was the strengthening of
independent, national identities in the dominions, which severed
their ties to the empire at the same time as colonial nationalism
asserted itself in Asia and Africa. The movement towards
70 This exercise is undertaken by the contributors to Lynn (ed.), British Empire in the
1950s.
71 Alan Lennox-Boyd, the colonial secretary between 1954 and 1959, recorded that
he made various secret agreements with nationalist leaders (at their request) not
to accept their public demands for more rapid moves towards independence. See
D. J. Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development, v, Guidance towards Self
Government in British Colonies, 1941-1971 (London, 1980), 22.
72 The transition is discussed by Stuart Ward, 'The "New Nationalism" in Australia,
Canada and New Zealand: Civic Culture in the Wake ofthe British World', in Darian
Smith, Grimshaw and Macintyre (eds.), Britishness Abroad.
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 229
independence was less strident in the old dominions than it was
in Britain's dependencies, and for that reason has received little
attention outside the countries concerned, but it was no less de
cisive in creating separate and distinctive nation states.
The symptoms of imperial dissolution were everywhere to hand
but were especially visible in constitutional changes that publi
cized the loosening of formal ties. The Crown lost its imperial
status in Canada in 1952, when the monarch was restyled Queen
of Canada; Australia followed suit in 1973. By the end of the
century, republican sentiment had ceased to be confined to the
political fringe. Imperial honours, which Canada had already abol
ished, were abandoned by South Africa in 1961, by Australia in
1975 and by New Zealand in 1996.73 Canada ended appeals to
the Privy Council in 1949,74 South Africa in 1961, Australia in a
series of measures in 1968, 1975 and 1986, and New Zealand in
2004. Nationals became permanent replacements for British ap
pointees as governors-general in Canada from 1952, in Australia
from 1965 and in New Zealand from 1967; South Africa elimi
nated the post when it became a republic in 1961. The trend
towards separate citizenship for the dominions, which had been
agreed after the Second World War, increased after Britain passed
a series of acts, beginning in 1962, restricting 'rights of abode' for
Commonwealth citizens.75 After the passage ofthe Nationality
Act of 1981, Commonwealth citizens ceased to be regarded as
being British subjects. Canada repealed the Statute of West
minster and confirmed its independence as a sovereign state in
1982;76 Australia and New Zealand followed in 1986.77 In 1999
the Australian High Court recognized the cumulative effect of
post-war constitutional changes by determining that Britain
had become a foreign country.
The high hopes expressed in the 1940s for the future of
the Commonwealth itself also faded in the 1960s.78 The old
73Cannadine, Ornamentalism, 167-8.
74 Having already abolished criminal appeals in 1933.
75 D. W Dean, 'Conservative Governments and the Restriction of Commonwealth
Immigration in the 1950s: The Problems of Constraint', Hist. Jl, xxxv (1992).
76 Canada also took the opportunity to convert Dominion Day to Canada Day.
77 Mclntyre, 'Development and Significance of Dominion Status'.
78 S. R. Ashton, 'British Government Perspectives on the Commonwealth, 1964
71: An Asset or a Liability?', Jl Imperial and Commonwealth Hist., xxxv (2007), shows
that Britain put her own interests before those of the Commonwealth and expected
that other members would do the same. See also Krishnan Srinivasan, 'Nobody's
(com. on p. 230)
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230 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
dominions were unenthusiastic about the influx of new mem
bers, who altered what they had long considered to be a British
club and directed its management away from the homeland.79
Their disgruntlement was a manifestation of a deeper fissure.
Smuts had seen the Commonwealth as part of a Darwinian evo
lution that enabled political structures to adapt in a progressive
manner to changing circumstances.80 The empire, however, was
a hierarchical order arranged by Britain and presided over by the
monarch, whereas the Commonwealth was a multicultural, de
centralized organization with democratic credentials.81 These
conceptions of the world were irreconcilable. South Africa's
policy of apartheid and Southern Rhodesia's declaration of inde
pendence in 1965 revealed profound divisions between old and
new members of the Commonwealth.82 The failed attempt by
Prince Philip and Lord Mountbatten to restore white elites to
positions of authority in the Commonwealth underlined the in
compatibility between the old order and the new.83 The adapta
tion Smuts had envisaged could be achieved only by dismantling
the structure of empire and replacing it with an entirely different
organization that fitted the post-colonial era.
The severing of formal connections was matched by the decline
of popular support for the empire in Britain and the dominions.
Imperial patriotism, which provided a measure ofthe strength of
(n. 78 cont.)
Commonwealth? The Commonwealth in Britain's Post-Imperial Adjustment', Com
monwealth and Comparative Politics, xliv (2006).
79 See Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, 'Mapping the British World', Jl Imperial
and Commonwealth Hist., xxxi (2003), 9-10. As Frank Bongiorno has shown,
Australian leaders worked hard in the late 1940s to retain the British quality ofthe
Commonwealth: Frank Bongiorno, ' "British to the Bootstraps"? H. V. Evatt, J. B.
Chifley and Australian Policy on Indian Membership ofthe Commonwealth, 1947
49', Australian Hist. Studies, xxxvi (2005). W David Mclntyre, 'The Admission of
Small States to the Commonwealth', Jl Imperial and Commonwealth Hist., xxiv (1996),
traces the interminable and dispiriting wrangle over the status of new members of
the Commonwealth.
80 Kate Fletcher, 'The Culture of Personality: Jan Smuts, Philosophy and Educa
tion', South African Hist. Jl, xxxiv (1996).
81 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, 170-3.
82 Harold Wilson, the British prime minister, claimed that failure to overthrow Ian
Smith's regime would mean the end ofthe Commonwealth. See S. R. Ashton and
Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), East of Suez and the Commonwealth, 1964-1971 (London,
2004), p. lxxvi.
83 Philip Murphy, 'By Invitation Only: Lord Mountbatten, Prince Philip and the
Attempt to Create a Commonwealth "Bilderberg Group", 1964-66', Jl Imperial and
Commonwealth Hist., xxxiii (2005).
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 231
informal ties, began to ebb from the 1960s. The empire, even in
its Commonwealth guise, came to be seen as a threat to Britain's
identity and social unity as non-white immigrants made their
appearance in numbers that could readily be seen ? and readily
exaggerated.84 Empire Day, an event already in decline, was com
muted in 1958 to Commonwealth Day, which fared little better.85
In the dominions, the old guard of nationalist-imperialists, who
were born in the 1890s, was replaced in the 1960s. After Menzies
left office in 1966, no other dominion leader would claim, as he
famously did, to be 'British to the bootstraps'.86 Membership of
imperial organizations, such as the Victoria League, shrank in
the 1960s and 1970s.87 Royal visits, once prime occasions for
outbursts of imperial enthusiasm, began to generate controversy
instead. Queen Elizabeth's tour of Canada in 1959 proved to be
the last of its kind: it sharpened the differences between the
English and French communities and provoked a debate about
Canadian identity that exposed the fragility of Canada's ties with
the wider British world.88
The ethnic basis of Greater Britain began to disintegrate from
the mid 1950s, when it became clear that the number of 'race
patriots' emigrating to the empire was insufficient to maintain
the required levels of'British stock'. Despite favourable publicity
and financial inducements, British settlers accounted for only
51 per cent of immigrants entering Australia between 1945 and
1964, only 44 per cent of those entering New Zealand between
1946 and 1976, and only 33 per cent of those entering Canada
84 Approximately 500,000 non-white immigrants entered Britain from the
Commonwealth between 1948 and 1962. The psychological and cultural retreat
from empire after the mid 1950s is dealt with by Stuart Ward (ed.), British Culture
and the End of Empire (Manchester, 2001), and Webster, Englishness and Empire.
85 Jim English, 'Empire Day in Britain, 1904-1958', Hist. Jl, xlix (2006), 274.1 am
grateful to the author for his helpful correspondence on this subject.
86 The break-up of this particular consensus has been traced by Stuart Ward,
'Worlds Apart: Three "British" Prime Ministers at Empire's End', in Buckner and
Francis (eds.), Rediscovering the British World.
87 The Victoria League was active in promoting both national patriotism and British
imperial values in Canada and New Zealand until the 1970s. Katie Pickles, Female
Imperialism and National Identity: Imperial Order Daughters ofthe Empire (Manchester,
2002); Katie Pickles, 'A Link in "The Great Chain of Empire Friendship": The
Victoria League in New Zealand', Jl Imperial and Commonwealth Hist., xxxiii (2005).
88 Phillip Buckner, 'The Last Great Royal Tour: Queen Elizabeth's 1959 Tour to
Canada', in Buckner (ed.), Canada and the End of Empire. Igartua, Other Quiet Revolu
tion, dates the shift from ethnic to civic nationalism to the 1960s.
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232 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
between 1946 and 1965.89 The status ofthe newcomers suf
fered too: in the 1940s they were regarded in Australia as wartime
heroes; by the 1970s they had become 'whingeing Poms'.90 Vir
tually all the remaining immigrants were white, but they were not
British. The recovery ofthe British economy from the late 1940s,
the commitment to providing full employment at home, and a
fall in the birth rate in Britain made it hard for the 'mother coun
try' to continue to act as mother to the empire. At the same time,
rapid economic growth in the dominions themselves created a
demand for labour that Britain could not meet.
The first recourse was to non-British white migrants; later the
doors were opened to all comers to ensure that labour supplies
matched development demands. The proportion of immigrants
from Asia rose from 12 per cent in 1966 to 42 per cent in 1986 in
the case of Canada, and from 9 per cent to 43 per cent in the case
of Australia.91 In New Zealand, which opened its doors later than
Canada and Australia, the increase was even more dramatic: the
proportion of Asian immigrants jumped from 1.5 per cent in 1986
to 66 per cent in 1996.92 The position of South Africa was rather
different because it suffered, not from a shortage of labour, but
from the maldistribution of the abundant supplies that were al
ready present. However, the same processes were at work: the
apartheid system was brought down partly by the cost of main
taining artificial barriers; thereafter, the movement of human
resources was no longer directed by considerations of ethnicity
but by the requirements of the economy, as it was in Canada,
Australia and New Zealand.93
As the concept of racial superiority was being diluted by the
increasing presence of non-British immigrants, it came under
89 Constantine, 'British Emigration to the Empire-Commonwealth', 27.
90 Andrew Hassam, 'From Heroes to Whingers: Changing Attitudes to British
Migrants, 1947-1977'', Australian Jl Politics and History, li (2005).
91 Constantine, 'British Emigration to the Empire-Commonwealth'.
92 Rainer Winkelmann, 'Immigration Policies and their Impact: The Case of New
Zealand and Australia', in Slobodan Djajic (ed.), International Migration: Trends, Pol
icies and Economic Impact (London, 2001), 4-7. In 2001, 7 per cent of New Zealand's
population identified themselves as being of Asian origin. This figure is projected to
rise to 15 per cent in 2021; the Maori population is expected to grow from 15 per cent
to 17 per cent in the same period. See 'Statistics New Zealand' at <http://www.stats.
govt.nz/datasets/population/population-projections.htm>.
93 Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics ofthe National
Party, 1948-1994 (Athens, Ohio, 1996).
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 233
attack from internal forces too, as indigenous peoples rebelled
against assimilationist policies and claimed equal rights with
other citizens. The resurgence of the Maori, which began after
1945, was based on population growth and migration to the
towns, as well as on their notable contribution to the war
effort.94 First nations in Canada reacted to discriminatory and
dictatorial policies by forming local political organizations, which
came together in 1982, when the Assembly of First Nations was
founded.95 Australian aborigines, though less numerous and less
well organized, engaged in pacific resistance and began to create
an identity for themselves to repel assimilationist policies.96 In
South Africa, the African National Congress reorganized itself
and co-operated with the trade unions and the (banned) Com
munist Party to lay the foundations of the campaigns of mass
action that took place from the late 1950s onwards.97 In the
1980s, the United Democratic Front (formed in 1983) mounted
a series of increasingly effective demonstrations that led to a state
of emergency in 1986-90, and to the collapse of apartheid.98
Each of these movements had local roots, but all gained
strength from a further consequence of globalization after 1945:
the flow of ideas, expanding in volume and increasing in speed,
across national borders. New concepts of universal human rights,
enshrined in the charter and resolutions of the United Nations,
and adopted vociferously by Afro-Asian nationalist movements,
held the dominant nation states to account for their laws and
actions.99 First nations were quick to add weight to the cause by
94 Belich, Paradise Reforged, ch. 16. Its more distant origins are now being traced. See
Jeffrey Sissons, 'The Post-Assimilationist Thought of Sir Apirana Ngata: Towards a
Genealogy of New Zealand Biculturalism', New Zealand Jl Hist., xxxiv (2000).
95 The Assembly of First Nations, previously known as the National Indian Broth
erhood (1968), gave currency to the term 'first nations', which, strictly speaking, de
scribes the indigenous people of present-day Canada, other than the Inuit and Metis,
who arrived later. All these groups are known, collectively, as aboriginal peoples.
96 An example from New South Wales is provided by Barry Morris, Domesticating
Resistance: The Dhan-Gadi Aborigines and the Australian State (New York, 1990).
97 The Communist Party in South Africa was declared illegal in 1950. It was re
launched in 1953 as the South African Communist Party (SACP) and thereafter
operated as an underground organization until the ban was lifted in 1990.
98 The African National Congress was banned in 1960 and thereafter operated in
exile.
99 It has been customary to assume that resolutions of this kind carried little weight
with national governments. New evidence suggests otherwise. See A. W Brian
Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis ofthe European
Convention (Oxford, 2001); Azza Salama Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights
(com. on p. 234)
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234 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
developing a novel form of supranational politics that appealed to
the United Nations over the heads of their own governments.100
The World Council of Indigenous Peoples, formed in 1975,
became (and remains) an increasingly visible and effective pres
ence at the United Nations. As a result of these activities, the
1960s saw a transformation in public opinion and state policies
on a scale comparable to the shift in the nineteenth century from
condoning slavery and the slave trade to condemning them. It
became increasingly difficult to defend policies that endorsed
racial inequalities, and impolitic to make the attempt. The bal
ance sheet of political advantage called for fundamental change: it
was vital to create conditions that would attract non-European
immigrants into the workforce, defuse the threat of internal dis
order, and avoid adverse international publicity at a time when
the free world was trying to win hearts and minds throughout
the globe.
Change was dramatic. In 1945 the Canadian government had
opposed resolutions passed by the United Nations protecting
human rights in sovereign states; in 1965 Canada emerged as one
ofthe leading proponents of these principles.101 Assimilationist
policies were abandoned after a long struggle.102 The new con
stitution, adopted in 1982, renounced the legal principle (derived
from the Indian Act of 1887) that categorized indigenous peoples
as colonial subjects, and recognized their status as members of
first nations. In Australia, aborigines were given the right to vote in
federal elections in 1962 and won protection against unequal
treatment in the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975. The Abori
ginal Land Rights Act of 1976 and subsequent legal decisions
invalidated the doctrine of terra nullius and opened the way for
(n. 99 cont.)
Policiesin the United States, 1941-1960 (Cambridge, 2000). Recent work by Wm. Roger
Louis has also stressed the role ofthe United Nations: see his Ends of British Imperi
alism: The Ser amble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization (London, 2006), chs. 26-7. For
a specific example, see John Chesterman, 'Defending Australia's Reputation: How
Indigenous Australians Won Civil Rights', Australian Hist. Studies, xxxii (2001), pts 1
and 2.1 am grateful to Stuart Ward for drawing my attention to this source.
100 Russel L. Barsh, 'The Aboriginal Issue in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-1994',
Internat. Jl Canadian Studies, xii (1995).
101 Cathal J. Nolan, 'Reluctant Liberal: Canada, Human Rights and the United
Nations, 1944-65', Diplomacy and Statecraft, ii (1991).
102 Hugh Shewell, 'Bitterness behind Every Smiling Face: Community Develop
ment and Canada's First Nations, 1954-1968', Canadian Hist. Rev., lxxxiii (2002).
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 235
native Australians to reclaim their lands. The 'white Australia'
policy was reformed in the 1960s and abolished in 1973.103 The
door was then open to Asian immigration and to the end of
the labour shortage.104 By 1977, Malcolm Fraser, the Australian
prime minister, felt sufficiently purified to be free to attack South
Africa's racial policies. New Zealand established the Waitangi
Tribunal in 1975 to hear Maori claims against the Crown for
alleged breaches ofthe treaty signed in 1840.105 The tribunal
has had far-reaching consequences: it has been instrumental not
only in facilitating Maori land claims, but also in compelling
Pakeha (non-Maori) New Zealanders to rethink their identity.106
The corollary of these developments was a growing sense
of national identity in the dominions. The colonies of settlement
had never been carbon copies of the metropolis, despite the
hopes of British policy-makers that emigrants to the empire
would act as 'prefabricated collaborators'.107 Conditions of life in
the dominions were closer to those in the United States, where
the mythology of the frontier celebrated ideals of individual
ism, opportunity and endeavour.108 The dominions developed
similar value systems, known in Australia and New Zealand as
103 Gwenda Tavan, The Long, Slow Death of White Australia (Melbourne, 2005) is an
accessible starting point.
104 Matthew Jordan, 'The Reappraisal ofthe White Australia Policy against the
Background of a Changing Asia, 1945-67', Australian Jl Politics and History, Iii (2006).
105 There is now a considerable literature on this subject. For recent guides, see
Harry C. Evison, The Long Dispute: Maori Land Rights and European Colonisation in
Southern New Zealand (Christchurch, 1997); Alan Ward, An Unsettled History: Treaty
Claims in New Zealand Today (Wellington, 1999); Giselle Byrnes, The Waitangi Tribu
nal and New Zealand History (New York, 2004). The investigation of the treaty has
given history and historians an exceptional role in using the past to recreate the pres
ent. See M. P. K. Sorrenson, 'Towards a Radical Reinterpretation of New Zealand
History: The Role of the Waitangi Tribunal', New Zealand Jl Hist., xxi (1987); Michael
Reilly, 'An Ambiguous Past: Representing Maori History', New Zealand Jl Hist., xxix
(1995).
106 The tribunal can recommend financial compensation and the restitution of cer
tain types of Crown lands. See also the summary of recent Maori history in Belich,
Paradise Reforged, esp. 478-80 and 485-7. It is a measure ofthe extent ofthe change
that has taken place in racial attitudes that white New Zealanders now use an indi
genous term (albeit of uncertain origin) to describe themselves.
107 Ronald Robinson, 'Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism:
Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration', in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies
in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 1972), 124.
108 Identified, famously, by Frederick Jackson Turner, 'The Significance ofthe
Frontier in American History' (1893), reproduced in his The Frontier in American
History (New York, 1920).
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236 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
'mateship', which generated a degree of solidarity that cut across
social divisions, even though it embodied largely masculine vir
tues.109 Consequently, the dominions failed to reproduce Britain's
class-based, hierarchical model of social order, even though they
were keen to link achievement to status and reward it with hon
ours. This sense of distinctiveness ensured that Greater Britons
were also rather different Britons. Imperial patriotism had long
held the growth of a separate national consciousness in check.
The decline of loyalty to the Crown and empire allowed national
identities to develop fully.
Disengagement called for the creation of what Australian
leaders termed a 'national community' that was neither British
nor white.110 As ties of kith and kin slackened and non-British
immigrants and native peoples became equal citizens, pluralism
replaced assimilation and new national identities were founded
on civic consensus rather than on ethnic solidarity.l x x The pol
itical leaders who followed imperial loyalists, such as Robert
Menzies, were judged by their ability to uphold national inter
ests in countries that were rapidly becoming cosmopolitan. Core
values were redefined so that they could coexist with multicul
turalism.112 Culture, as well as the constitution, was repatriated.
From the 1960s onwards, official policy and private sponsorship
encouraged the development of national cultures to replace what
109'Mateship' has developed its own mythology. See Russel Braddock Ward,
The Australian Legend (1958; 3rd edn, Melbourne, 1978); Russel Braddock Ward,
'The Australian Legend Re-Visited', Hist. Studies, xviii (1978); Richard Nile (ed.), The
Australian Legend and its Discontents (St Lucia, Qld, 2000); Duncan Mackay, 'The
Orderly Frontier: The World ofthe Kauri Bushmen, 1860-1925', New Zealand Jl
Hist., xxv (1991).
110 James Curran, 'The "Thin Dividing Line": Prime Ministers and the Problem of
Australian Nationalism, 1972-1996', Australian Jl Politics and History, xlviii (2002).
Some ofthe complexities ofthe transition are explored by Anne Pender, 'The Mythical
Australian: Barry Humphries, Gough Whitlam and "New Nationalism"', Australian
Jl Politics and History, li (2005).
111 This rather blunt statement is designed to capture the main trend over half a
century. A fuller account would have to allow for the influence of both 'adopted pat
riotism' and the way in which newcomers reinforced a sense of Britishness among
those who felt challenged by them. On these points, see Constantine, 'British Emigra
tion to the Empire-Commonwealth since 1880', 19; Donal Lowry, 'The Crown,
Empire Loyalism and the Assimilation of Non-British White Subjects in the British
World: An Argument against "Ethnic Determinism"', Jl Imperial and Commonwealth
Hist., xxxi (2003).
112 Neville Meaney, 'The End of "White Australia" and Australia's Changing Per
ceptions of Asia, 1945-1990', Australian Jl Internat. Affairs, xlix (1995).
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 237
had come to be seen as inauthentic imperial imports.113 During
the last quarter ofthe twentieth century, the Queen's English and
approved forms of pronunciation ceased to be role models and
became targets for satire instead. Today, Australians cringe no
more ? and it is hard to imagine that they ever did.
The material basis of the British overseas world also began to
dissolve from the late 1950s. By the middle ofthe decade, the
conditions that had given new life to the imperial economy after
1945 had run their course. On the one hand, demand for im
ported food and raw materials slackened once post-war recon
struction had been achieved; on the other, Britain ceased to be
a major exporter of industrial goods and had herself become
heavily dependent on manufactured imports.114 Continental
Europe had recovered with unexpected rapidity from the devas
tation brought by the war, and now offered attractive business
opportunities. The transformation ofthe international economy,
which was driven partly by the commitment ofthe United States
to free trade, implied an end to the neo-mercantilist arrangements
that had helped to sustain the imperial economy since the early
1930s. Britain herself hoped in the 1950s to move beyond
the defensive imperial system, though without destroying it.
However, Britain lacked the necessary manufacturing base and
purchasing power, and was unable to make sterling convertible
until 1958,115 by which time the diversification ofthe old im
perial economy was under way.
The old dominions, apart from Canada, achieved a substan
tial measure of economic independence in external trade in the
1960s. Britain's trade with Australia dropped to the point where,
in the early 1970s, she supplied only 20 per cent ofthe country's
imports and took only 10 per cent of her exports. Even loyal New
Zealand had fallen: Britain supplied only 28 per cent of her im
ports and accounted for only 24 per cent of her exports in the
same period. South Africa, which was engaged in building a siege
economy, managed to cut imports from Britain to 20 per cent of
113 Stuart Ward,' "Culture up our Arseholes": Projecting Post-Imperial Australia',
Australian Jl Politics and History, li (2005).
114 By the 1980s manufactured goods accounted for three-quarters of all im
ports entering the UK. This story is told by R. E. Rowthorn and J. R. Wells, De
Industrialization and Foreign Trade (Cambridge, 1987).
115 The experiment was not a success: sterling was devalued in 1967 and the sterling
area crumbled shortly after.
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238 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
the total, while keeping exports at about 29 per cent. Britain
remained an important supplier of capital for all three dominions,
but here too her position was being eroded by competition from
the United States and by the development of capital markets
in the dominions themselves.116 Canada's trade with Britain
became insignificant as a result of her growing dependence on
the United States, which dominated her external trade and
finance:117 by the early 1970s, Britain supplied only about 5 per
cent of Canada's imports and took only 10 per cent of her exports.
Diefenbaker's awareness of this trend explains his desperate,
indeed hopeless, attempt to revive imperial trade in 1963, and
the acceptance by his successor, Lester Pearson, that the imperial
connection had ceased to matter.118
The decisive moment in the reorientation ofthe imperial econ
omy came in 1961, when Britain applied to join the European
Community.119 The application shocked the dominions: they
had neither anticipated it nor been consulted about it.120 Even
though the application was denied, a signpost pointing towards
new regional groupings had been planted. The move was both an
admission that the imperial economy had ceased to be viable and
a cause of its further decline. The jolt to the dominions prompted
them to develop alternatives that fitted their economic needs
better. The influx of non-British immigrants freed the dominions
from traditional, constraining affiliations; the growth of manufac
turing industries and financial services in the dominions created
opportunities for regional specialization.
The result of these developments was the emergence of regional
associations that replaced the remnants of the imperial connec
tion. By the time Britain finally entered the European Commu
nity in 1973, Australia and New Zealand had already come
116 For one of several possible examples, see Gianni Zappala, 'The Decline of
Economic Complementarity: Australia and the Sterling Area', Australian Econ. Hist.
Rev., xxxiv (1994).
117 Gordon T. Stewart,' "An Objective of US Foreign Policy since the Founding of
the Republic": The United States and the End of Empire in Canada', in Buckner (ed.),
Canada and the End of Empire.
118 Tim Rooth, 'Britain, Europe, and Diefenbaker's Trade Diversion Proposals,
1957-58', in Buckner (ed.), Canada and the End of Empire.
119 Stuart Ward, Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise ofthe Imperial Ideal
(Melbourne, 2001); David Goldsworthy, 'Menzies, Macmillan and Europe', Aus
tralian Jl Internat. Affairs, li (1997).
120 Paul Robertson and John Singleton, 'The Old Commonwealth and Britain's
First Application to Join the EEC, 1961-3', Australian Econ. Hist. Rev., xl (2000).
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 239
together (in 1965) to form the New Zealand-Australia Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).121 Since then, the engine of growth
in the region's international trade has been driven by links with
Japan and the countries in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), which was created in 1967. By the mid
1960s trade between Australia and Japan alone already exceeded
the value of trade between Australia and Britain. Canada, per
force, drew still closer to the United States. In 1989 the two coun
tries formed the North American Free Trade Agreement (also
NAFTA), which Mexico joined in 1994.122
South Africa stood outside these trends towards regionalism
because her commitment to apartheid compelled her to adopt au
tarkic policies. Nevertheless, the forces that had altered Britain's
relationship with the other dominions were at work there too. The
development of local industries and services began to diversify
the economy but required a skilled and mobile workforce and a
strong consumer base, which the apartheid system denied and
immigration policy was unable to correct. Swelling opposition to
apartheid from the first nations of South Africa raised the costs of
repression and in the end made the system unworkable. Interna
tional pressures, drawing on principles of universal human rights
that the other former dominions had come to accept, made South
Africa's position increasingly untenable. She had succeeded in
reducing her links with Britain, but had failed to fashion a
viable alternative.123 It was not until the 1990s, when apartheid
was abolished, that South Africa was able to join the other ex
dominions in establishing international ties that fitted the needs
ofthe globalizing world.
The decline of Britain's economic ties with the old dominions
and the rise of new regional connections had important implica
tions for foreign and defence policies. The Suez crisis in 1956
121 John Singleton, 'After the Veto: Australasian Commercial Policy in the Mid
Sixties', Australian Econ. Hist. Rev., xii (2001).
122 Stephen J. Randall, Herman Konrad and Sheldon Silverman (eds.), North
America without Borders? Integrating Canada, the United States and Mexico (Calgary,
1992); Maxwell A. Cameron and Brian W Tomlin, The Making of NAFTA: How the
Deal Was Done (Ithaca, 2000); Stephanie R. Golob, 'Beyond the Policy Frontier:
Canada, Mexico and the Ideological Origins of NAFTA', World Politics, lv (2003).
123 Apartheid's economic record was unimpressive and the long-term outlook was
bleak because ofthe underutilization of such a large proportion ofthe labour force. See
Terence Moll, 'Did the Apartheid Economy Fail?', Jl Southern African Studies, xvii
(1991).
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240 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
occurred at a moment when it still seemed possible, at least to
Eden, to demonstrate to the world that there were costs to pulling
the lion's tail.124 In the event, the costs were borne by Britain. The
split in the alliance with the United States, though temporary,
revealed the frailty that stood behind Britain's claim to be a
world power. The consequence was to speed the process of decol
onization and, as a corollary, to quicken the search for ways of
replacing the imperial connection. The dominions were divided
by Britain's decision to invade Egypt, but united in recognizing
that they now needed to devise their own policies for dealing with
a world that was rapidly becoming decolonized.
Britain's reorientation towards Europe and her increasing
budgetary problems led to a far-reaching reappraisal of strategic
priorities in the late 1950s. As a result, Britain cancelled her plans
for developing an independent nuclear deterrent in 1958, and
in 1968 abandoned her long-standing, if also long-questioned,
commitment to maintain troops east of Suez.125 Australia and
New Zealand were then obliged to formulate independent foreign
policies to deal directly with emerging ex-colonial states in south
east Asia and to adjust to a rapidly changing relationship with a
recent enemy, Japan.126 Canada's problem, how to manage the
expansion ofthe United States, was enduring and probably eter
nal, but it became more urgent once the traditional counter
balancing weight of Britain was removed. After 1986, when the
United States belatedly turned against apartheid, South Africa
was isolated from international sources of military supplies and
had to devise an independent defence policy, which included the
ambition to become a nuclear power. The outcome was that
Canada, Australia and New Zealand freed themselves from reli
ance on Britain but became dependent on the United States for
military supplies and protection. In this respect, however, their
new dependence was no greater than that of much of the rest of
the world.
124 The best introduction to the considerable literature on Suez is Louis, Ends of
British Imperialism, 'Introduction'. Dominion and other views are covered in Wm.
Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds.), Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences
(Oxford, 1989). On the relationship between the Suez crisis and the pace of decol
onization, see Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, ch. 22.
125 Reynolds, Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb; Hyam, Britain's Declining Empire,
386-97.
126 Christopher Waters, 'After Decolonization: Australia and the Emergence ofthe
Non-Aligned Movement in Asia, 1954-55', Diplomacy and Statecraft, xii (2001).
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 241
III
CONCLUSION
Small events can signify large developments, even if their import
is not always acknowledged. Changes to the flags and national
anthems ofthe old dominions were not trivial events to be left for
amateur enthusiasts to catalogue, but matters of deep significance
that merit the attention they have not yet received in studies of
decolonization. The argument advanced here suggests that the
dominions remained dependent on the British connection until
after the Second World War, even though they had already won
formal self-government and, within limits, pursued priorities that
reflected their own interests. From 1945 to the mid 1950s London
and the dominions made considerable efforts to strengthen the
imperial link; after the mid 1950s the ties that bound were
stretched; in the 1960s they began to fray. Only in the second
half of the twentieth century did the dominions attain full con
stitutional sovereignty, develop separate identities, establish
cultural independence, promote diverse economic relationships,
and free their foreign and defence policies from imperial in
fluence.
If this argument holds, it will be necessary to enlarge the estab
lished format of decolonization studies to incorporate the domin
ions into the analysis ofthe end of empire after the Second World
War. A full account of this process would have to allow for varia
tions: Canada started early, New Zealand began late, and the
consequences of independence are still unfolding in all the old
dominions. However, similar variations apply to the non-settled
empire too: India gained formal independence in 1947, but
Brunei had to wait until 1984, and discussion of neo-colonialism,
if pursued, would carry the story of the achievement of effective
independence by the ex-colonies well beyond these dates.
The causes of this metamorphosis are to be found in the chan
ging character and accelerating pace of globalization after the
Second World War. The dialectic of imperial development can
be seen as a diachronic process transforming one set of interlock
ing, symmetrical structures into another. Principles of human
rights undermined established notions of racial superiority, en
couraged non-British migrants to settle in the dominions, and
ended the possibility of tailoring ethnic identities to political
boundaries. Post-war economic recovery was first assisted by
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242 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
established imperial relationships and then outgrew them. Links
between the metropolitan industrial centre and primary produ
cing peripheries weakened; ties among developed economies,
especially in the 'triad' of North America, Europe and Japan,
grew stronger;127 the ex-dominions expanded their manufactur
ing output and added financial and service sectors to their econ
omies. These trends produced regional groupings that bypassed
or cut across the old geography of imperial integration.128 The
idealism of human rights and the materialism of economic devel
opment came together in refurbished polities that reshaped
national identities to reflect the creation of multicultural societies
and the evolving needs ofthe globalized world.
The transformation of the imperial order can also be viewed,
synchronically, from two angles. Imperial integration was verti
cal: economic links joined Britain to her distant satellites in ex
changes that tied production and consumption together; social
relations were governed by a racial hierarchy that ranked Anglo
Saxons above other peoples; political ties were based on the dom
inance of metropole and monarch and the ranked subordination
ofthe constituents of empire. Post-colonial integration was hori
zontal: economies became specialized in a narrow range of inter
mediate goods and services that were traded among multiple
regional centres; social relations were founded on a belief in
equality that was the necessary counterpart ofthe creation of multi
cultural societies; political systems were correspondingly open
and, in principle, democratic. New or expanded techniques of
communication ? a further hallmark of globalization ? ensured
that ideas, people and economic decisions flowed across borders
with a speed and degree of penetration that, in the end, not even
South Africa's autarchic state could control. By the close ofthe
twentieth century, the imperial era had ended. The idea that the
United States is capable of creating a new empire to deal with
weak states, failed states and rogue states rests on a misreading of
history. Imperial systems are incompatible with the process of
globalization as it has now unfolded, and not even the world's
127 The standard definition ofthe triad used here now needs revising to take account
ofthe rise of China.
128 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 636-40, 657-8; Tim Rooth, 'Economic
Tensions and Conflict in the Commonwealth, 1945-C.1951', Twentieth Century Brit.
Hist., xiii (2002).
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 243
superpower can recreate, in the twenty-first century, the condi
tions that allowed the age of great empires to flourish.129
The transfer of power to the dominions fits the chronology
already devised by historians of empire to explain the decoloniza
tion of the dependencies because globalization affected all seg
ments ofthe empire. The achievement of post-war reconstruction
and the expansion of trade among the advanced economies re
duced the demand for many primary products and diminished
the value ofthe colonial empire. Like the dominions, the ex
colonies were confronted with the need to adapt to declining
imperial ties by industrializing and by developing new trading
partners. The outcome, which was uncertain at the time of in
dependence but clear by the close of the century, was a marked
differentiation in the performance and fortunes of the ex
colonies. Some large or well-placed new states, such as India,
Malaysia and Singapore, had become important manufacturing
and financial centres; some small or poorly endowed countries,
notably in Africa and the Caribbean, had languished.
As these developments began to manifest themselves, policy
makers concluded that Britain's long-term interests were better
served by working with colonial nationalists rather than against
them. The colonies were not to be thrown away, but they were no
longer to be held at all costs. This calculation was influenced by
rising nationalism and rising expenditure. Nationalist sentiment
in the colonies drew on the same principles of racial equality and
self-determination that were bringing discrimination in the
dominions to an end. The British version of these principles had
an important influence on colonial elites, even though, in the ab
sence of white settlers, the ethnic conception of Britishness was
confined to small expatriate communities. Consequently, nation
alist claims in the colonies, as well as in the dominions, were
strongly coloured by ideals that the imperial power had pro
pounded ? initially to justify its claims to superiority. The
Indian National Congress was the first to confront Britain with
its own liberal precepts; other independence movements followed
India's lead during the first half of the twentieth century.
129 A. G. Hopkins, 'Capitalism, Nationalism and the New American Empire', Jl
Imperial and Commonwealth Hist., xxxv (2007); A. G. Hopkins, 'Comparing British
and American Empires', Jl Global Hist., ii (2007).
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244 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
The rising cost of retaining the empire was reflected in the
defence budget, which had to compete with pressing domestic
claims, notably commitments to full employment and the welfare
state. There was a growing ideological cost too. The perpetuation
of colonial rule, which was regarded as a vital part of winning the
Cold War in the immediate post-war years, came to be seen as a
liability by the 1960s. By then, the ideological contest between
the two forms of globalization represented by the Cold War com
pelled the United States and its allies to enact reforms at home
and abroad that would reduce the gap between the rhetoric of
freedom and the reality of continuing subordination.130
International migration was linked to decolonization in the
dependencies, as it was in the dominions, though the relationship
was one of consequence rather than of cause. The old dominions
parted from the British world when they failed to attract sufficient
numbers of British immigrants and were obliged to turn to other
sources of labour in continental Europe and Asia. The colonies
had no need to import labour; their problem was finding employ
ment for the existing, expanding workforce. In default of ade
quate opportunities at home, increasing numbers of migrants left
the ex-colonies in the second half of the twentieth century to seek
work in the advanced economies of Europe, North America and
Australasia.131 Migration from Britain had made the old domin
ions Greater Britains; migration from the rest ofthe world made
them cosmopolitan nation states. Today, the English 'race',
which is declining in numbers at home, is being supplemented by
a reverse flow of immigrants from the ex-empire. Milner's vision
of a Greater Britain made strong by Greater Britons had become
impractical, irrelevant and, finally, absurd.
If the existing literature on decolonization is expanded to in
corporate the transfer of power to the old dominions after the
130 On the Cold War as a contest of competing forms of globalization, see Mark
Atwood Lawrence, 'Universal Claims, Local Uses: Reconceptualizing the Vietnam
Conflict, 1945-60', in A. G. Hopkins (ed.), Global History: Interactions between the
Universal and the Local (Basingstoke, 2006), 229-33, 250-2. Its specific effect on US
domestic reforms is dealt with by Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the
Image of American Democracy (Princeton, 2000), and Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold
War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the GlobalArena (Cambridge, Mass.,
2001).
131 And in the petro-economies of the Middle East, where remittances from
Pakistani workers, for example, play an important part in raising incomes and reven
ues in the home economy.
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 245
Second World War, as argued here, other fresh and important
research prospects, within and beyond the empire, come imme
diately into view. One possibility, the effect of decolonization on
Britain, is already being explored, though the subject would gain
from the wider setting suggested here.132 A further possibility,
which has yet to be pursued, is to incorporate the literature on
the process of internal decolonization in the dominions and the
United States into studies ofthe end of empire.133 These subjects
are currently contained in separate compartments. By connecting
them, historians can recast the analysis of decolonization in ways
that reflect the full extent of its global reach.
The emancipation of first nations has transformed the history
ofthe dominions during the past twenty-five years in ways that are
comparable to the historiographical revolution that has recreated
the indigenous history of Africa and Asia. Canadian history has
been rewritten to incorporate research on indigenous peoples
before, during and after European settlement.134 A similar
trend in Australia has given rise to an animated controversy,
known as the 'history wars', about the effect of white settlement
on indigenous peoples.135 Studies ofthe history of New Zealand
have been profoundly affected by the Waitangi Tribunal, which
has directed attention to the history ofthe Maori.136 The history
of South Africa has been reworked to draw it into line with new
research into indigenous African history in other parts ofthe con
tinent.137 Knowledge of these advances is at present confined
mainly to specialists on the countries concerned (apart from the
case of South Africa, which inevitably spills into African studies
132 Stephen J. Howe, 'Internal Decolonization? British Politics since Thatcher as
Post-Colonial Trauma', Twentieth Century Brit. Hist., xiv (2003); Stephen J. Howe,
'When (if Ever) Did Empire End? "Internal Decolonisation" in British Culture since
the 1950s', in Lynn (ed.), British Empire in the 1950s', Ward (ed.), British Culture and the
End of Empire; Webster, Englishness and Empire.
133Hechter, Internal Colonialism. Hechter did not refer to internal decolonization,
but it seems logical to use the term to describe the dissolution of various forms of
subordination created earlier. See also Howe, 'Internal Decolonization?'
134 See, for example, Olive Patricia Dickason, Canada's First Nations: A History of
Founding Peoples from Earliest Times (Norman, 1992).
135 The controversy has been possible only because much more attention has been
paid to aboriginal history in recent years. See Stuart Macintyre and Anna Clark, The
History Wars (Melbourne, 2003).
136Seen. 105 above.
137 For an introduction to what is now a voluminous literature, see William H.
Worger, 'Southern and Central Africa', in Winks (ed.), Oxford History ofthe British
Empire, v.
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246 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 200
in general). Yet, as suggested here, first nations in the hinterlands
contributed to the effective decolonization of the old dominions
by advancing claims for equality that could no longer be denied.
This development was the clear counterpart of the nationalist
movements that gained momentum in the colonies after the
Second World War, and accordingly needs to be inserted into
existing studies of decolonization. Linking the new histories of
the old dominions to the indigenous history of other parts of the
empire will broaden the domain of historical studies in general and,
more particularly, create opportunities for comparative research
that will greatly enhance our understanding of colonial nation
alism.
This theme can be extended beyond the empire to the United
States, an ex-colony of white settlement that shared the racist as
sumptions ofthe Anglo-Saxon world down to the 1960s. Indeed,
the dominions regarded the United States as the mentor of dis
crimination. Segregationist legislation passed in the United
States strongly influenced both the 'white Australia' policy and
South Africa's apartheid system.138 Renewed efforts to apply as
similationist policies to Native Americans after 1945 paralleled
similar efforts in the dominions.139 Discriminatory measures were
rescinded in the United States at the same time as they were being
unravelled in the old dominions: the Supreme Court outlawed
segregation in schools in 1954; the Jim Crow laws dating from the
late nineteenth century were repealed by the Civil Rights Act of
1964.140 As first nations made their presence and claims felt in
the dominions, so the National Congress of American Indians
(founded in 1944) fought and eventually halted assimilationist
policies in the United States,141 and the broader civil rights move
ment brought down racial discrimination. The ideological battle
with the Soviet Union affected all constituents of the free world
138 Marilyn Lake, 'White Man's Country: The Trans-National History of a Na
tional Project', Australian Hist. Studies, xxxiv (2003); Dubow, Scientific Racism in
Modern South Africa; Giliomee, 'Making ofthe Apartheid Plan'; Giliomee,' "Survival
injustice"'.
139 Richard Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American
Racism (Berkeley, 1998).
140 Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the
Struggle for Racial Equality (Oxford, 2004). See also the important studies by Dudziak,
Cold War Civil Rights, and Borstelmann, Cold War and the Color Line.
141 Thomas W Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians: The Founding
Years (Lincoln, Nebr., 1999).
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RETHINKING DECOLONIZATION 247
and was as powerful an incentive to making concessions to the
civil rights movement in the United States as it was to meeting
the claims of nationalists in Europe's colonies.142
If the link between the dominions and the United States sug
gested here is accepted, it might be appropriate to let Martin
Luther King contribute the last word to this analysis of decolon
ization. The story of the civil rights movement in the United
States is usually regarded as part of the national epic, which it
undoubtedly was. But it was much more than that: Martin Luther
King understood that the parallels with the history of colonialism
were too striking to be treated in an insular manner.143 Gandhi
was one of his heroes; Nkrumah was another. King borrowed the
principle of non-violence from the Indian nationalist movement
and drew fresh inspiration from the celebrations (which he at
tended) marking Ghana's independence in 1957. He deplored
'our willingness to continue to participate in neo-colonialist ad
ventures', most evidently in Vietnam, which he referred to as a
'war that seeks to turn the clock of history back and perpetuate
white colonialism'.144 King recognized that the movement for full
emancipation in the United States was part of a broader struggle
to eliminate discrimination and oppression everywhere. It is a
perception that should encourage historians to think ofthe trans
fer of power after the Second World War as being a global (and
globalizing) process that overrode rather than underwrote con
ventional political and historical boundaries.
University of Texas at Austin A. G. Hopkins
142 Cary Fraser, 'Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock: The Eisenhower Adminis
tration and the Dilemma of Race for U.S. Foreign Policy', Diplomatic Hist., xxiv
(2000). Cary Fraser, Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism: The United States and the Genesis
of West Indian Independence, 1940-1964 (Westport, 1994) emphasizes the part played
by the Afro-American vote in the United States.
143 -pjie p0tentjai importance of this subject, and its current neglect, have been sig
nalled by Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, and Borstelmann, Cold War and the Color
Line. The imperial angle has been noted by Wm. Roger Louis, 'The Dissolution ofthe
British Empire in the Era of Vietnam', Amer. Hist. Rev., cvii (2002), 25.
144 Martin Luther King, 'The Casualties ofthe War in Vietnam', 25 Feb. 1967, at
<http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/publications/speeches/unpub/670225-001_
The_Casualties_of_the_War_in_Vietnam.htm>. This speech anticipated the better
known 'Beyond Vietnam', delivered in April, and is more pointed in its remarks on
colonialism.
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