Cogn Process
DOI 10.1007/s10339-014-0615-3
SHORT REPORT
Conceptual and perceptual encoding instructions differently
affect event recall
Elvira Garcı́a-Bajos • Malen Migueles
Alaitz Aizpurua
•
Received: 25 October 2013 / Accepted: 28 March 2014
Ó Marta Olivetti Belardinelli and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014
Abstract When recalling an event, people usually
retrieve the main facts and a reduced proportion of specific
details. The objective of this experiment was to study the
effects of conceptually and perceptually driven encoding in
the recall of conceptual and perceptual information of an
event. The materials selected for the experiment were two
movie trailers. To enhance the encoding instructions, after
watching the first trailer participants answered conceptual
or perceptual questions about the event, while a control
group answered general knowledge questions. After
watching the second trailer, all of the participants completed a closed-ended recall task consisting of conceptual
and perceptual items. Conceptual information was better
recalled than perceptual details and participants made more
perceptual than conceptual commission errors. Conceptually driven processing enhanced the recall of conceptual
information, while perceptually driven processing not only
did not improve the recall of descriptive details, but also
damaged the standard conceptual/perceptual recall
relationship.
Keywords Conceptual encoding Perceptual encoding Instructions Event recall
Introduction
In psychology, various theories in cognitive processing have
been characterized by the distinction between conceptual
and perceptual processing. Examples include the levels of
E. Garcı́a-Bajos (&) M. Migueles A. Aizpurua
University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU, Avenida Tolosa,
70, 20018 San Sebastián, Spain
e-mail: [email protected]
processing theory (Craik and Lockhart 1972), which distinguishes between deep (semantic) and shallow (perceptual) processing; global (Gestalt/holistic) and local models
in visual processing (Navon 1977); top-down (i.e., conceptually driven) and bottom-up (i.e., perceptually driven)
processing; or automatic and controlled processes. These
ideas are also found in dual-trace conceptions used to predict and explain memory performance, such as the distinction between gist (thematic information) and verbatim
(perceptual features) traces of the fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd and Reyna 1990) or the distinction between central
(plot relevant) and peripheral (details) content in the processing of events. In general terms, the distinction between
conceptual and perceptual processing emphasizes the
encoding processes, and it is well known that deep and
elaborate processing influences later retention (Craik and
Tulving 1975). Accordingly, interventions such as encoding
instructions and strategies, warnings, testing and practice
have been used to improve memory, although none have
focused directly on the effects of conceptually versus perceptually driven processing in memory for events. The
primary goal of this study is to examine the effects of conceptual and perceptual encoding in subsequent event recall.
Episodic memories consist of sensory–perceptual–conceptual–affective information derived from a single experience. They are summary records of experience that
contain perceptual information often in the form of visual
images and a conceptual frame that provides a conceptual
context of the event (for reviews, see Conway 2009; Williams et al. 2008). In our daily life, we process events either
as a whole or by focusing on details. Global processing
involves conceptual or thematic information, significant
relationships and spatial–temporal or causal links between
different elements, while perceptual processing, the processing of details, involves distinctive analysis and
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Cogn Process
attentional resources. Conceptual processing is relatively
more general, automatic and based on prior knowledge.
Since perceptually driven processing requires greater
attention and focus on more particular aspects, it can
interfere in the processing of other contents. In a recent
study by Förster (2012), the author discusses the how and
why of global and local processing, pointing out two processing systems: one processes holistically, while the other
processes the individual parts. Global and local processing
are responsible for conceptual and perceptual processing.
Förster proposes that global processing is functional for
understanding the general meaning of novel events,
whereas local processing supports encoding of details in
familiar situations, and more attentional processes are
activated when events are surprising or threatening. This
global versus local processing model implies different
styles of cognitive processing. We are interested in three
aspects: learning how these general conceptual and perceptual processing systems operate in event recall; determining whether specific encoding instructions for
conceptual or detailed contents activate different processing styles; and whether these processing styles have a
positive or negative impact on subsequent event recall.
In our everyday lives, we deal with complex situations
without much complication because our cognitive system
is set up to encode and synthesize them. For example,
free recall of events includes main facts and a reduced
amount of specific details (e.g., Migueles and Garcı́aBajos 1999). Results can be interpreted from the fuzzytrace theory (Brainerd and Reyna 1990), which distinguishes between gist and verbatim traces, or from classic
automatic versus attentive processing perspectives through
global/conceptual and local/perceptual processes. From
the perspective of the fuzzy-trace theory, when processing
an event the essence or thematic information and the
literal information linked to the perceptual features are
encoded. We tend to depend more on conceptual information, easy to elaborate and maintain, to the detriment
of perceptual information, which gets lost over time and
requires more attention to be encoded. We should point
out that this type of organization in event recall, product
of the cognitive processing style, also characterizes the
recall of other materials such as stories, passages, texts or
autobiographical experiences. For example, Garcı́a-Bajos
and Migueles (2013) asked participants to narrate a
positive or negative emotional experience in their lives
and found that as far as content is concerned, the actions
comprised the main content of the narratives. Emotional
details, temporal details, persons and spatial details, in
that order, all distinctive aspects of an episodic multidimensional memory, were prominent in both types of
narratives, whereas objects, sensorial details and details
about physical condition were complementary.
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Can we change the standard cognitive style of processing events? In order to overcome the limitations in processing, it is important to determine whether encoding
instructions can improve the encoding of conceptual or
perceptual information. Strategic encoding processes can
be useful in a variety of contexts, for example, in educational settings for children showing particular memory
difficulties, for head injury patients with poor encoding, or
to prevent lapses of memory in normal aging for people
with poor acquisition. For these reasons, in this experiment,
the role of instructions and practice was examined to study
the effects of conceptually and perceptually driven
encoding in the recall of perceptual and conceptual contents of an event presented by a movie trailer. But it is not
only relevant to focus on conceptual versus perceptual
processing during the encoding of events; retrieval is also
important. The principle known as Transfer-Appropriate
Processing (TAP; Morris et al. 1977; for a review, see
Roediger et al. 2002) posits that for a test to reveal prior
learning the processing requirements of the test should
match the processing conditions at encoding. In other
words, we are also interested in determining whether performance in the final test for perceptual and conceptual
contents is determined by how well the processing
requirements of the test matched encoding and practice
phases. We used instructions and practice to induce
encoding style because the benefit of enactment over verbal
instructions has been demonstrated and does not require
additional memory resources (Yang et al. 2014).
Method
Participants
One hundred and two psychology students from the University of the Basque Country, 83 women and 19 men, with
an average age of 21.92 (SD = 5.71), participated in the
experiment. The participants were randomly assigned to
three groups: conceptual, perceptual and control-encoding
instructions.
Materials
Two movie trailers were used as the events. The first one
was a trailer for the movie Everybody’s Fine (2009)
directed by Kirk Jones, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
mTMM-rJkffE, with a running time of 2.27 min. It was
used to practice the encoding instructions through questions containing conceptual, perceptual or control information. The second one was a trailer for Confessions of a
Shopaholic (2009) directed by P.J. Hogan, http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=8-WMLeQeV3c, lasting 2.21 min.
Cogn Process
It served to evaluate the effect of activating a specific
processing style in the recall of conceptual and perceptual
information. Movie trailers were chosen because they are
attractive, they briefly synthesize the script of the event,
include main events and give many details. Very different
trailers were selected for practice (family relationships) and
testing (compulsive shopping) to avoid thematic interferences or source confusion.
Design
A 3 (encoding instructions: conceptual, perceptual, control) 9 2 (examined information: conceptual, perceptual)
mixed factorial design was used, with encoding instructions as the between-participants factor and examined
information as the within-participants factor. We analyzed
correct recall, commission errors, unanswered questions
and response confidence in correct answers and errors for
conceptual and perceptual information of the event.
Procedure
All of the participants were told they were participating in
an experiment on attention and that they would watch two
movie trailers. The trailers were presented on a projection
screen using a computer. Before watching the first trailer,
they were given different encoding instructions. In the
conceptual condition, participants were told to pay attention
to the plot of the event, to the facts, and to the actions
performed by the main characters in the trailer. In the perceptual condition, participants were told that they should
pay attention to specific details to improve perceptual processing of the event. The participants in the control group
were not induced to any processing style; they were only
told that the first trailer was for practice purposes.
To reinforce the activation of a conceptual, perceptual,
or control cognitive processing style, after viewing the
trailer for Everybody’s Fine, participants in the conceptual
condition answered ten questions which included conceptual information (e.g., What happens with the main character and his grown children? or What would make him
feel proud?); participants in the perceptual condition
answered ten questions about specific details (e.g., What
was his daughter’s name? or What instrument does his son
play?); the control group answered ten general knowledge
Table 1 Proportion of correct
recall, commission errors and
unanswered questions (SDs in
brackets) as a function of
encoding instructions and event
information
Instructions
questions (e.g., If it is autumn in Europe, what season is it
in Argentina? or What is the capital of Japan?). Conceptual
and perceptual questions included central aspects of the
event, trying to avoid peripheral, minor or incidental details
not related with the main characters or the plot of the event.
Participants were encouraged to answer all questions,
taking into account confidence responses, but they were
also allowed to leave questions unanswered. Regardless of
the condition, participants took between 3 and 4 min to
complete their answers. Before watching the second trailer,
Confessions of a Shopaholic, all participants were told that
they would be asked questions about the trailer afterward,
repeating the specific instructions for each group: questions
about what happened for the conceptual group, questions
about details for the perceptual group and unspecified
questions for the control group. After watching the second
trailer, they all answered 16 closed-ended questions
arranged in chronological order, half conceptual (e.g.,
What happens in the store when she shops the sales? or
What do they say that seems ironic?) and half perceptual
(e.g., What color gloves is she wearing at the perfume
store? or What did she spend $350 on?). There were never
more than two conceptual or perceptual questions in a row.
For each question, participants rated their confidence in
their answers on a scale of 0 (not confident at all) to 7
(absolutely confident). Participants took between 4 and
6 min to answer the 16 questions. Before ending the session, participants were asked if they had previously seen
the movies. Only one participant claimed to have seen one
of the films and her/his data were not included in the study.
The session lasted approximately 40 min.
Results
The cued recall task was scored by assigning one point for
every answer whether correct or incorrect. In addition, we
counted the number of questions left unanswered. Thus, to
examine the effects of encoding instructions on the recall
of conceptual and perceptual information of the movie
trailer, we analyzed correct answers, errors and unanswered
questions (Table 1), and response confidence (Table 2).
The results were analyzed by four 3 (encoding instructions:
conceptual, perceptual, control) 9 2 (examined information: conceptual, perceptual) mixed ANOVAs.
Correct recall
Conceptual
Errors
Perceptual
Conceptual
Unanswered
Perceptual
Conceptual
Perceptual
Conceptual
.72 (.20)
.53 (.23)
.07 (.11)
.23 (.20)
.21 (.19)
.24 (.21)
Perceptual
.57 (.24)
.54 (.20)
.06 (.11)
.22 (.17)
.37 (.23)
.24 (.18)
Control
.61 (.20)
.52 (.21)
.09 (.09)
.24 (.17)
.30 (.21)
.24 (.21)
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Cogn Process
Correct recall
The proportion of correct answers was higher for the recall of
conceptual information (M = .64) than perceptual information (M = .53), F(1, 99) = 19.39, p \ .001, g2p = .16.
The instructions factor was not significant, F(2, 99) = 1.54
p = .22, g2p = .03. However, the instructions 9 information interaction, F(2, 99) = 3.86, p = .024; g2p = .07, was
significant. The conceptual instructions produced better
recall of the conceptual information compared with the
perceptual instructions group (.72 [ .57, t(63) = 2.79,
p = .007) and the control group (.72 [ .61, t(63) = 2.21,
p \ .03), with no significant differences between the perceptual and control groups (.57, .61). There were no significant differences in the recall of the perceptual
information between the three instructions groups. A relevant result is that the perceptual instructions not only produced no significant improvement in the recall of perceptual
information, but actually canceled the standard relation of
better recall for conceptual than for perceptual information.
As can be seen in Fig. 1, participants with conceptual
encoding instructions, t(33) = 4.43, p \ .001, and the control group, t(30) = 2.34, p \ .03, correctly recalled more
conceptual than perceptual information.
context, they committed more perceptual (M = .23) than
conceptual errors (M = .07), F(1, 99) = 79.46, p \ .001,
g2p = .45, with no significant differences as a function of
encoding instructions. The commission errors represented
10 % of the answers for the conceptual information and
30 % for the perceptual details.
Unanswered questions
The proportion of unanswered questions was generally
higher for the conceptual (M = .29) than for the perceptual
information questions (M = .24), F(1, 99) = 5.11,
p = .026, g2p = .05. Although the instructions factor, F(1,
99) = 1.47, p = .24, g2p = .03, was not significant, the
instructions 9 information interaction was F(1, 99) =
5.04, p \ .01, g2p = .09. This was because the participants
who were given perceptual encoding instructions left more
conceptual questions unanswered (M = .37) than perceptual questions (M = .24), t(33) = 3.39, p \ .01. There
were no significant differences between the two types of
questions in either the conceptual encoding instructions
group or the control group. In other words, by intentionally
paying attention to perceptual content the recall of conceptual information was impaired.
Commission errors
Response confidence
Participants were encouraged to respond to all questions,
but they also had the option of not responding. In that
Confidence ratings (from 0 = no confidence to 7 = total
confidence) were higher for correct recall (M = 5.37) than
for commission errors (M = 3.40), F(1, 34) = 59.95;
p \ .001; g2p = .64. This pattern for response confidence
demonstrates that participants, to some extent, distinguished the correct from the incorrect answers they produced. There were no significant differences in confidence
between conceptual, perceptual and control instruction
groups or between conceptual and perceptual information.
It is not the nature of the contents (conceptual, perceptual)
or the processing style (conceptual, perceptual, control),
but accuracy that seems to modulate response confidence in
the recall of an event, in this experiment a movie trailer,
using closed-ended questions.
We naturally tend to have better recall of conceptual
than of perceptual information, and with specific instructions we can reinforce the recall of conceptual information
without reducing the recall of perceptual details. However,
taking into account the correct answers, errors, answered
and unanswered questions and confidence, the results show
an outstanding response bias for perceptual information in
recall. This is not only because participants answered more
perceptual (M = .76) than conceptual information questions (M = .71), t(101) = 2.27, p \ .03, but also because
despite their ability to judge the accuracy of their answers,
as seen in their confidence ratings, they risked answering
Table 2 Confidence means (0–7) and SDs for correct recall and
errors
Instructions
Correct recall
Conceptual
Errors
Perceptual
Conceptual
Perceptual
Conceptual
5.76 (.94)
5.64 (1.04)
4.17 (2.29)
3.28 (1.76)
Perceptual
5.45 (1.21)
5.86 (.96)
3.75 (1.70)
3.44 (1.61)
Control
5.44 (.95)
5.86 (.99)
3.31 (2.34)
3.33 (1.75)
Proportion of correct recall
1
0.9
0.8
p < .001
ns
p < .03
0.7
0.6
Information
0.5
0.4
Conceptual
0.3
Perceptual
0.2
0.1
0
Conceptual
Perceptual
Control
Encoding instructions
Fig. 1 Mean proportion of correct recall of the event
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Cogn Process
considerably more questions on perceptual than conceptual
information, without actually knowing the answers.
Discussion
In this study, memory for conceptual aspects and perceptual details was assessed using a closed-ended recall task.
Although transfer or priming from past experience has
been observed in implicit memory tasks that do not require
effort or conscious recollection of recent experiences (for a
review, see Roediger III 1990), the memory task used in
this experiment required explicit, intentional and conscious
recollection of the past. The participants showed better
recall for conceptual information that represents the gist of
the event than for perceptual information associated with
specific details. The results support a cognitive processing
style based on global aspects that capture general meaning
and are acquired effortlessly, together with the processing
of more specific details that require greater attention
(Förster 2012). Details can serve to identify events and lend
them veracity, for instance, to tell them apart from similar
events that have occurred at other times and therefore
better control the source of the information (e.g., Johnson
et al. 1993).
The encoding instructions had different effects and
showed that processing styles elicited in the first task
produced carry-over effects to the second memory task.
The conceptual encoding instructions improved performance for the recall of conceptual information. Following
the ideas of the TAP, memory recollection is best when the
operations of retrieval overlap or recapture the operations
used during encoding. Processing conceptual information
presumably requires little cognitive effort and did not
affect the recall of perceptual information, which implies
processing resources. This effect is similar to the effect
produced by intentional (vs. incidental) processing
instructions in the free recall of a witnessed event (Migueles and Garcı́a-Bajos 1999). The participants in that
experiment were told to pay attention to the event because
they would later be evaluated. The result, much like in the
present experiment, was that the instructions produced
better recall for the central actions of the event but did not
affect the specific details. This way of automatically processing what is involved in an event is very economical for
the cognitive system, but has its drawbacks. For example,
gist-based processes contribute to false recognition and
warning about the phenomenological characteristics of
false memories are not effective (e.g., Neuschatz et al.
2001) because they are based on conceptual elaboration,
which is generic and not very distinctive (Zaragoza et al.
2011). On the contrary, encoding distinctive perceptual
information helps to reduce false memories (Israel and
Schacter 1997; Storbeck 2013), because the perceptive
details seem to lend veracity to the information.
With perceptual encoding instructions, TAP did not
appear for perceptual information. The perceptual encoding
instructions did not improve performance, probably
because perceptually driven processing requires attentional
resources, and the sequence of events in the trailer, like
many situations in everyday life, was too fast to employ
elaboration strategies for remembering specific details. In
fact, a perceptual interference effect (see Mulligan 2000)
was observed, which deteriorates the recall of conceptual
information. In other words, when we pay attention to
specific details, we can miss other more general contents.
With perceptual instructions, participants left more conceptual questions unanswered, breaking the standard recall
pattern for the trailer, characterized by a set of representative actions that synthesize the gist of the event and a
smaller set of perceptual details; this pattern also characterizes event recall (e.g., Migueles and Garcı́a-Bajos 1999).
It is like the proverbial forest for the trees—when participants do not attend to the event as a whole, but focus
instead on the details, they see the trees but lose sight of the
larger view of the forest (see Förster 2012).
The proportion of errors in the questions on perceptual
details was striking, especially because, according to participants’ confidence ratings, to a certain extent they were
able to differentiate correct answers from errors, regardless
of whether the information was conceptual or perceptual.
This response bias is not found in free recall of events,
where the number of errors is minimal and many participants make no mistakes at all; it should be pointed out,
however, that participants produce more errors connected
with specific details than with actions (e.g., Migueles and
Garcı́a-Bajos 1999). In this experiment, the overall percentage of errors was 15 %, a figure similar to the 12.3 %
found by Coxon and Valentine (1997) in young adults
using closed-ended questions concerning an event. In that
same experiment, the percentage of unanswered questions
was 24.6 %, similar to the 24 % found in the present
experiment for questions on perceptual information. Apart
from the differences between free recall and recall with
closed-ended questions, we asked ourselves why questions
on perceptual information produced more errors than
questions on conceptual information. When we try to
answer a question for which we do not have an immediate
answer, we generate likely alternatives and give more
credence to perceptual than to conceptual information,
much like in the remember (perceptual evidence)/know
(conceptual existence) paradigm (Tulving 1985). Moreover, it has been observed, especially among elderly persons, that we incorporate details and perceptive attributes
to our memories to lend them greater veracity (Karpel et al.
2001).
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Cogn Process
Conceptual and perceptual encoding operate through
different mechanisms, one more automatic, the other more
attentive; and on information of different natures, semantic
contents or meaning in one case, perceptive or distinctive
in the other. The idea of enhancing memory in natural
situations should take into account the mechanisms and
properties that underlie conceptually and perceptually driven processing. Several conclusions can be drawn from this
study: with a standard processing style (control group), we
remember more conceptual than perceptual information
about an event; gist information synthesizes any event is
encoded effortlessly and is guided by schemas. Conceptual
encoding instructions significantly improve the recall of
conceptual information without impairing the recall of
details because conceptually driven processing does not
require cognitive effort. Contrarily, the perceptual encoding instructions were not only ineffective in improving the
recall of perceptual details, but actually impaired the recall
of conceptual information. Although the perceptual group
did not statistically differ from the control group in correct
recall, participants left more conceptual than perceptual
questions unanswered, and the standard relation of better
recall for conceptual than for perceptual information is
disappeared. In other words, the act of paying close
attention and memorizing the perceptual details weakened
participants’ recall of conceptual information, perhaps
partly due to the quick sequence of events in the trailer. In
addition, trying to pay attention to encode every detail of
the video may led participants to spend considerable
working memory resources, damaging recall of conceptual
information due to working memory limitations. Further
research is needed to determine the role of encoding
instructions in memory for complex events.
It is worth pointing out the striking bias in errors for
perceptual information, despite the fact that participants
seemed to have a certain degree of phenomenological
control over the accuracy of their memory, as seen in their
response confidence, especially compared with the free
recall of events, where errors are very incidental. Therefore, in situations where errors can have serious consequences, such as eyewitness memory or diagnosing
diseases, it is important to pay special attention to this bias
in perceptual errors when closed-ended questions are formulated or answered. On the other hand, greater degree of
meaningful elaboration or processing facilitates successful
communication (Woltin et al. 2012) and typically results in
better retention on recall and recognition tests (Coane
2013). Thus, promoting conceptual processing may be
useful for encoding events and for narratives as suggested
for clinical (e.g., PTSD-like symptoms; Kindt et al. 2008),
academic (e.g., texts; Cook and Mayer 1988) or autobiographical contexts (e.g., personal/social experiences), and
for cognitively disadvantaged groups such as children
123
affected by Autism, individuals with mild cognitive
impairment or elderly people.
Acknowledgments This research was supported by Grants
PSI2012-32960 from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and GIU12/19 from the University of the Basque Country
UPV/EHU.
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