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III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
entitled Spy Handler, are the main voices pointing out
anomalies that suggest the existence of such a person.
Let us explore the times, the cases, the context, and
some other intelligence professionals’ observations
that were secured in the development of this article,
to see if the fourth mole’s presence can be discerned.
T HE IMP ORTANCE OF LO OK ING BACK
A Counterintelligence
Cold Case File
The Fourth Mole
Mike Mattson
A
s you read this, is there somewhere in the environs of Washington, sitting in a comfortable
arm chair, an individual who has successfully
eluded all of the counterintelligence (CI) efforts
employed to search out THE FOURTH MOLE, a mysterious character who holds the key to answering
numerous anomalies that resulted in the loss of U.S.
operations and assets’ lives starting in 1985? Generationally, of course, this person could be lying in the
shade of a leafless oak, six feet under. But the imagination prefers the former to the latter circumstance,
as it leaves the door open for discovery, arrest, trial,
conviction and incarceration.
Might there also be a retired U.S. Intelligence
Officer (IO), a foil to the aforementioned individual,
who while sitting in his armchair, finds himself ruminating on the years spent assessing the damage done
by the spies of the infamous ‘Decade of the Spy’? Do his
thoughts always return to the feeling that something
didn’t add up; something was missing, concluding that
there could have been someone else? As retired former
Assistant Director of the FBI and former NSC staffer
John Lewis points out, “the CI mindset that there was
another one still keeps him up at night.”1
Interestingly enough, open source literature does
not abound with ruminations of such a mole. A true
CIA legend, Milt Bearden in his book with James Risen
entitled The Main Enemy and his KGB opposite number,
Victor Cherkashin in his book with Gregory Feifer
1. John Lewis (Retired FBI), interview by author, 22 July 2008,
Washington, DC, phone.
Winter/Spring 2009
It is particularly important for new intelligence
officers to study this time period, when treason from
within our own government resulted in the deaths
of some of the bravest and most extraordinary men
in the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation)
who had risked everything to help America maintain peace. Today we face an espionage threat that
is greatly expanded and well equipped to steal our
secrets and weaken our security. As Michelle Van
Cleave, the former head of U.S. Counterintelligence
at NCIX from July 2003-March 2006 pointed out in
her February 8, 2009 editorial in The Washington Post
on the importance of CI, “If left unanswered, these
growing foreign intelligence threats could endanger
U.S. operations, military and intelligence personnel
and even Americans at home.”2 The lessons learned
beginning in, “The Year of the Spy,” 1985 and continuing through the arrest of Robert Hanssen in 2001
are critical; first, in determining if we missed a mole
along the way, and secondly, to reinforce the National
Counterintelligence Executive’s (NCIX) emphasis on
CI awareness and practice.
T HE CO L D WA R AT M O S PHER E
The American and Russian systems of government were intrinsically different throughout the
Cold War. Their intelligence apparatus however, were
similar in one particularly disturbing sense. Both
offered unlimited opportunities for the well-placed,
enterprising intelligence officer (mole) to betray his
loyalty oath, and to commit treason with some degree
of comfort in regards to his safety and financial wellbeing.
Whether the penalty for treason results in the “9
gram” solution, referring to the weight of the bullet
used by the KGB for executions, or the sentence of longterm or life imprisonment available in both nations,
2. Van Cleave, Michelle, “Foreign Spies are Serious. Are We?”
The Washington Post, 8 February 2009, sec. B, p. 3.
Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies
Page 39
it is questionable whether all of those who were
apprehended and punished would have spied regardless, had they known the outcome to be obtained in
their case. Did they all have the belief that “it won’t
happen to me,” or was their motive, reward, sense of
adventure, or confidence in their own particular “spy
expertise,” sufficient to propel them on regardless
of the historically inevitable consequences, and the
mathematical certainty of eventual betrayal, capture
or death? Or was it a sense or the feeling of destiny
famously displayed by the former GRU (Soviet Military
Intelligence) Rezident in India, Dimitri Polyakov, who
had been recruited in 1961 and was working for the U.S.
government known to the CIA as agent BOURBON and
to the FBI as agent TOPHAT? Perhaps the psychiatrist
Dr. David Charney, an expert on the psychology of the
spy, can shed light on this mindset.
INTERVIEW WITH
DR . DAVID CHARNEY
Dr. Charney gained his expertise
into the spy’s mind after working as the
psychiatric consultant to Earl Pitts (FBI
Special Agent and KGB spy), Robert Hanssen (FBI Special Agent and GRU/KGB spy), and Brian Regan (USAF
and NRO/TRW employee who attempted to spy for
Iraq, Libya, and China) after they had been arrested.
Hanssen gave permission to author David Wise to
interview Dr. Charney for Wise’s book detailing the
Hanssen case (SPY: The Inside Story of How the FBI’s Robert
Hanssen Betrayed America).3 I sat down with Dr. Charney
and discussed the spy’s mindset, the Soviet/Russian
approach to espionage, and his thoughts on the fourth
mole theory.
Dr. Charney began our conversation with a
quote from the Chicago stockyards: “...(in their line
of business) we use every part of the pig except the squeal!”4
Dr. Charney relates this to the same way the Soviet
Union used to, and possibly still does, run certain
agents against the U.S. and other nations. The quote
highlights Dr. Charney’s view that most spies who
had worked for the Soviet Union were exploited for
everything they could provide, for as long as possible, then somehow they were given up and left to
fend for themselves. He argues that most of the time
3. Wise, David. Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI’s Robert
Hanssen Betrayed America. New York: Random House, 2003.
4. Dr. David Charney, interview by author, 11 November 2008,
Alexandria, VA, tape recording.
Page 40
these agents were given up to protect another highly
placed asset or penetration, for political gain, or just
strictly to shove it in the face of the opposing service,
making an international media splash. These end
games depended only upon the Soviet Unions’ goals,
political intentions and motivations at the time.
When Dr. Charney posited this theory to Earl Pitts
during one of their early interviews after his arrest in
1996, Pitts seemed to agree. More intriguing still was
the revelation that not only did this idea make sense to
him, but that he also believed he fell into this category
and had been given up to protect another high ranking
mole within the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC).
That man, as Pitts began to describe the behavior of
the employee who had hacked into another officer’s
computer system and explained lamely that he was
trying to expose vulnerabilities in IT security, was the
FBI’s Robert Hanssen. Had Earl Pitts’ suspicions been
taken seriously, could the FBI have caught the man
who some consider to have been the most damaging
spy in American history, a full five years before his
eventual capture?
Dr. Charney also stated his theory to Hanssen
once he had begun interviewing and consulting with
him from behind bars. While Hanssen acknowledged
that about a month or so before his eventual capture,
he did get the sense that something fishy was going
on and that there was an increased interest in him
while not being overtly shown, he could not completely
accept Dr. Charney’s belief that the KGB “tosses”
assets. “Hanssen would not rule it out,” says Dr.
Charney, whose beliefs on this run contrary to others
as we will see further on in this article.5 Hanssen did
make it clear that if this was, in fact, the practice of
the KGB, then it must have been a very closely held
secret because if that had leaked, it would have had a
devastating effect on asset recruitment. 6
After years of dealing with spies, Dr. Charney
sums up his beliefs by encompassing a few factors.
First, he acknowledges that Russians are the best
chess players in the world. With that comes a strategic thought process which is always looking for the
advantage and plans for the future rather then the
immediate time period. The Soviet Unions’ policies
regarding intelligence and statecraft then, and Russia’s now, are driven by politics and long-term visions,
while we in the U.S. are short-term players, as he says,
“an ADD7 nation.”8
5.
6.
7.
8.
Charney Interview.
Ibid.
Attention Deficit Disorder.
Ibid.
Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies
Winter/Spring 2009
Dr. Charney believes we could well have missed
somebody who was at a very senior level of government. If his theory of Pitts being given up to divert
U.S. counterintelligence from the trail of Hanssen, and
Hanssen being given up, as well, in 2001, the person
he was to protect had to be at the upper echelons
of government. He believes this person would have
been a career employee who had come up through the
ranks rather than a presidential appointee who would
have had only access to material during the term of
that appointment. Whoever this person is or was,
they would have risen through the ranks, held all the
necessary clearances, and attained a level of employment that guaranteed them cross-community access
and oversight to covert missions, asset operations,
counterintelligence measures employed at home and
abroad, and current intelligence on the KGB/SVR at
the time.9
ANOM ALIES ARE IMP ORTANT
The following incident exemplifies the internal
struggle within the CI discipline between investigating all the facts, leads and hunches, versus the
inevitability of ruffling feathers and running into
compartmentalization roadblocks. It also helps to
show why the conduct of damage assessments must
not be hampered, leads followed, and our CI mindset
always be to find the facts, no matter how narrow,
secured or blocked the compartmented zone.
In 1996, two years after the discovery of Ames’s treachery, FBI Special
Agent Thomas K. Kimmel Jr., who was
already working at FBI headquarters,
was tasked to conduct the damage
assessment on the Earl Pitts espio- Tom Kimmel, FBI
nage case. Pitts, following the earlier
treason of FBI agent Richard Miller, was arrested
in 1996 after having spied for
the Russians from 1987-1992
and taking in over $200,000
dollars. In the course of the
damage assessment, where the
goal was to discover and report
Richard Miller, FBI
what Earl Pitts compromised and
the damage caused to the IC, Kimmel came across
indicators and formulated a “hunch” that there was
another mole within the FBI.10 Agent Kimmel provided
9. Ibid.
10. Brian Kelley (Former CIA CI Operations Officer), interview
Winter/Spring 2009
the Bureau’s leadership with his findings on the Pitts
case in a 250-page report in March 1999.11 It was not
until April 1999 that a separate short memo, circulated by Kimmel, speculated that the FBI might
have another mole on
their hands.12 The challenge Mr. Kimmel had
throughout his damage
assessment was that he
Brian Kelley, CIA Counterintelligence
was not allowed access
Officer
to the files he required, to
be able to study all relevant “anomalies” in the process
of developing specific evidence and documentation. As
former CIA CI officer Brian Kelley proposed, it was a
case of institutional blindness on behalf of the FBI CI
officials who would not let Tom pursue his thesis that
there was another mole.13
That access was denied because the Bureau had
a mole-hunt underway in the most compartmented
manner which would necessarily have precluded Mr.
Kimmel from accessing the data he needed to determine if his “hunch” was verifiable. As a former Marine
Captain and, at that time, Assistant Director, National
Security Division (since February 1997), John Lewis
states in David Wise’s Book Spy, “We were not about
to allow him to be privy to all those files. My job as
Assistant Director was to protect sources and methods. I was not going to open up our entire innermost
secrets to someone who had never even worked with
this stuff.”14 Lewis did not disagree with Kimmel’s
theory that the KGB’s handling of Pitts might suggest
another mole. He states, “The fact that the Russians
had not tasked Pitts – we knew that. It was common
sense there might be somebody else.”15 What Lewis is
trying to convey here is the idea that once the KGB had
a man inside the FBI they should have been exploiting
(tasking) him left and right to collect valuable intelligence. Since that did not happen, one could only
assume Pitts was not the only FBI source they had,
and that another source(s) was providing better intelligence. It was only after the unmasking of Hanssen
that Kimmel was informed that his “hunches” were
right, but at the time he voiced them, they had not been
supported by facts.16
by author, fall 2008, Washington, DC, conversation.
11. Wise, 181.
12. Ibid.
13. Kelley interview.
14. Wise, 180.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 182.
Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies
Page 41
THE “FOURTH MOLE” PHENOMENA
Former CIA SE division chief Milt Bearden is the
leading open source voice for the idea of the likelihood
of a “fourth mole” after the following traitors were
exposed – Edward Lee Howard, Aldrich Ames and
Robert Hanssen.17 Victor Cherkashin (former KGB
handler of both Ames and Hanssen) and Gregory
Feifer in Spy Handler also state, “That the KGB ran a
“fourth mole” is undeniable. It is also true the CIA ran
agents that we (KGB) never caught.”18
Perhaps, at this point, it would be appropriate to
acknowledge a countervailing view often expressed
within the IC from time to time—especially when
confronted with a particular case, or cases, that have
fallen apart or ended. This contrarian view suggests
that a case gone bad, or an asset lost, is not due to
betrayal but rather bad luck, or the diligent work of
the opposition’s CI service. Explained another way,
there could be other means by which the KGB/SVR
could have gotten on to U.S. agents through SIGINT,
physical surveillance measures, chance encounters, or
a report to the police/military by a concerned citizen
who witnessed strange behavior. The fact that these
methodologies exist could be employed to argue
against the search for a mole within the U.S. IC. As Milt
Bearden explained, some IO would express this idea
in the following way, “every case contains the seeds
of its own destruction.”19 Bearden did acknowledge
that this is probably true but, in looking at all that
happened starting in 1985, his belief is that there was
a person we missed, a fourth mole.
Many of the names and operations that were
exposed are attributable to the espionage activities carried out by the main three moles of the era:
Edward Lee Howard (CIA), Aldrich Ames (CIA) and
Robert Hanssen (FBI). All three of these moles gave
up considerable information to the GRU/KGB/SVR,
essentially putting in jeopardy almost every Soviet/
Russian asset the U.S. had. The important things to
note in these cases are the timelines of betrayal and
how they correspond to the losses and anomalies
the U.S. encountered starting in 1985. The following
brief overview of these traitors, and the damage they
caused, are illustrated for the reader below.
17. Cherkashin, Victor and Gregory Feifer. Spy Handler: the True
Story of the Man Who Recruited Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames.
New York: Basic Books, 2005. 253.
18. Cherkashin, 254.
19. Milt Bearden (Former CIA Chief of Station and Operations
Officer), interview by author, 24 February 2009, Washington,
DC, tape recording.
Page 42
EDWARD LEE HOWARD
In the summer of 1983, the Soviet
embassy in Switzerland received a letter
from an American accompanying an
application for a tourist visa to Moscow.
The letter proposed a meeting with the
KGB where he would hand over information they
might find “interesting.” 20 The Soviets initially turned
him down for fear of an FBI trap, but the letter’s
author, Ed Howard, would soon resurface along with
his wife. Howard enrolled in 1982 and had completed
the CIA’s Internal Operations course at the Farm.21
While at the Farm, Howard was exposed to fellow case
officers’ identities, sensitive operations taking place
in Moscow, and the tradecraft skills used to deceive
our Cold War foe. Just before deployment, Howard
failed (after four attempts) a routine polygraph, finally
admitting he had used drugs and cheated on training
exercises at the Farm. He was fired in May 1983 and left
the Agency poised to make them pay for their betrayal
of him. Howard quickly turned to alcohol and was
descending into a very troubled state. The CIA failed
to notify the FBI about his condition even though he
was a potential risk to national security.
The KGB re-contacted Howard, tracking him
down in New Mexico, a year after his first attempts to
work with them.22 According to former KGB General
Oleg Kalugin, over the course of his espionage career,
Howard provided most of his information to the KGB
while on trips to Vienna, Austria, from 1984 through
1985. Kalugin described the intelligence provided as
“reams of information on U.S. moles in the KGB and
GRU.”23 Bearden points out in his book The Main Enemy,
and in his interview account with the author, that
Howard had no access to operatives outside of Moscow
but that he did have access to SIGINT information. As
Bearden said, “we assumed they had it all (referring
to the Soviets), our HUMINT and SIGINT information
was all tainted.”24 We are left to assume that although
Howard’s betrayal was extremely damaging, he could
not have physically had access to, or provided, certain
names/operations that would answer the anomalies
described later in this article.
20. Cherkashin, 146.
21. Ibid., 147.
22. Ibid., 148.
23. Kalugin, Oleg, The First Directorate, New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1994. 130.
24. Bearden Interview.
Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies
Winter/Spring 2009
ALDRICH AMES
For nine years, until his arrest
on February 21, 1994, Aldrich Ames
single-handedly crippled CIA operations within the Soviet Union, providing information that led to the
deaths of at least ten U.S. and allied agents.25 Ames
first approached the KGB on April 16, 1985, when he
handed a guard in the lobby of the Soviet embassy an
envelope addressed to the Washington KGB Rezident
Stanislav Androsov.26 According to Victor Cherkashin,
who was the KGB number two man in the U.S., the
letter (signed by a ‘Rick Wells’ from CIA) contained
the names of two Soviet traitors: Valery Martynov
and Sergey Motorin, as well as other very sensational
and important information on Western spies who
had penetrated our service.27 Open sources do not
disclose what exactly “very sensational and important
information on Western spies who had penetrated
our service,” consisted of. Ames is best known for
his June 13, 1985 major intelligence handover to the
KGB at Chadwick’s restaurant in Georgetown. There
are varying accounts here as to how many assets and
operations he compromised, but what is agreed upon
is that it was the most damaging asset leak the IC had
ever faced up to that time.
Cherkashin states that according to author
Ronald Kessler, the CIA stumbled upon Aldrich Ames
after a high-ranking SVR officer who fled to the U.S.,
codenamed AVENGER, betrayed him.28 This person
also led the CIA to another top-level KGB officer who
handed them the KGB/SVR file on Hanssen in November 2000.29 Cherkashin goes on to say that the SVR, as
well as himself, know who this person is in both cases
but are probably sitting on the information because
said person(s) are out of their reach.30 The important
thing he points out is that the U.S. does not know who
their AVENGER(s) are and have not found at least one
more mole from the CIA or FBI responsible for some
of the losses starting in 1985.31
25. Pound, Edward T., and Brian Duffy, “The Ferret and the
Moles,” U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 31, Issue 9, (10 September
2001): 30; available from Academic Search Premiere http://search.
ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=5100549&site=e
host-live; Internet
26. Earley, Pete. Confessions of a Spy. New York: G.P. Putnam’s
Sons, 1997. 176.
27. Ibid., 177.
28. Cherkashin, 251.
29. Ibid., 254.
30. Ibid., 253.
31. Ibid., 254.
Winter/Spring 2009
ROBERT HANSSEN
Robert Hanssen, on the other
hand, began spying for the GRU in 1979
then went dormant for the next six years,
as far as we know.32 During that initial
betrayal, Hanssen would not have known about CIA
recruitments overseas because of his position within
the FBI, though he did learn of TOPHAT (Dimitri
Polyakov) which started out as an FBI operation, run
later by CIA. As to this case, the question remains:
how did Hanssen learn of TOPHAT, because this was
not in the purview of his normal access, leaving us to
wonder if the information was leaked or told to him
in confidence? He reconnected with the Soviet Union
this time in service of the KGB on October 1, 1985,
and continued to work for them and their successor
organization, the SVR, until his arrest on February 18,
2001. The damage done by Hanssen was enormous,
betraying human and technical operations, costing
the U.S. millions in damage and the lives of many
foreign assets who had risked everything to spy for
the U.S.
During interviews and conversations with former
IC officers, the theory has been expressed that there
was another person(s) at a grade level higher than
Ames and Hanssen, somebody with an overarching
view of not just their organization but also every activity that the U.S. IC was involved with regarding the
Soviet Union. But that would be the easy explanation:
the more complex rebuttal would have you believe
that any read-in, information technology (IT) savvy,
confident and careful analyst at a lower pay grade
could have also caused this unexplained damage. One
thing remains, it has been over two decades since these
cases and anomalies became known. Both the U.S.
and Russia have released much information regarding
these issues, yet there is hardly any reference in open
source to the possibility that someone else was—or
still is—working as a deep cover mole or penetration
within the U.S. IC.
♟ ♝ ♜ ♛ ♚ ♞
Below, I provide a summary of the period, along
with a comprehensive analysis of the anomalies based
on evidence from open source material and first hand
accounts from former Intelligence and CI officers who
either had direct involvement in these cases, or were
active in the community at the time. Intelligencer
32. Wise, 24.
Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies
Page 43
readers will be left to make their own interpretation
as to whether or not they believe there ever existed, or
still exists, a spy we missed. A caveat is in order. This
author does not argue, and it is not the position of
this article, that the anomalies discussed herein are
the only anomalies that may point to the existence of a
fourth mole. What is presented here is limited to open
source materials, constrained by a lack of access to
classified information. Of course, this author would
welcome any additional non-classified material that
may have been overlooked and that would strengthen
the evidence for a fourth mole. Send such comments or
suggestions to me as indicated at the end of this piece.
T HE 19 8 0 S
ANOMALIES FROM THE
“DECADE OF THE SPY”
By 1985, the unexplained losses of U.S. foreign
agents and increasingly foiled operations, alerted
members of the IC that something was wrong. In order
to provide the reader with a context for these anomalies, I will also refer to cases that are not anomalies but
are, instead, traceable to the U.S. moles listed here. In
addition, the inclusion of these other cases provides
the reader a sense of the scope of damage wrought
commencing in early 1980s, as well as providing a
more precise, however incomplete, timeline of events
due to space limitations in trying to list the varied
estimates of 30-40+ cases. The unexplained losses/
anomalies that point to the possible existence of a
fourth mole consist of the following: Vetrov, Bokhan,
Polyshchuk and Gordievsky.33
Vladimir Mikhailovich Vetrov — FAREWELL
The first of such anomalies was the case of Vladimir
Mikhailovich Vetrov, a KGB
Line X (Science and Technology Collection) officer working for the French Intelligence
Service, the DST. He started
working for the DST in 1981
and between then and the fall of 1982 provided them
with over 4,000 documents regarding Soviet S&T
collection and the names of over 200 KGB Line X
33. Bearden, Milt, and James Risen. The Main Enemy: The Inside
Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown With the KGB, New York: Random
House, 2003, 516.
Page 44
officers.34 His career in espionage was short-lived however, because a year and a half later he was arrested,
charged, convicted and sentenced to twelve years in
prison for the murder of a homeless man in a Moscow
park who had happened upon Vetrov engaged in a
“French liaison” with a woman.35 After stabbing the
man to death, Vetrov feared the woman would tell the
authorities, so he killed her as well.36 In 1984, while
in prison, the rumors started to swirl that Vetrov –
aside from being a murderer – was also a spy working
for the French under the codename FAREWELL.37
As Bearden and Risen point out in The Main Enemy,
Vitaly Yurchenko (while in the U.S. October 25, 1985)
believed that Vetrov had been betrayed by the letters
he had been writing to his wife while incarcerated,
essentially pouring his heart out and disclosing he was
a spy. Yurchenko also suggested that perhaps it was a
prison informant who had discovered Vetrov’s espionage.38 Either way both of those stories seem unlikely
and un-verified. Nobody would believe that a hardened
and trained KGB officer would have divulged his deepest secret, the one that would really get him killed in
the Soviet Union, through letters or by confiding in a
fellow inmate. Thus, the story began to change. Soon
the information circling was that the woman Vetrov
killed was a known KGB First Directorate sex groupie
who had bedded down with many a KGB officer. 39 The
homeless man, as well, took on the new identity of a
jealous KGB officer who had happened upon Vetrov
in the park.40
It is important to note that the CIA did not know
Vladimir Vetrov by name, but the Agency had been
briefed on the intelligence he was providing to the
French as early as 1982.41 Bearden and Risen argue that
this was critical because it means that someone at CIA
was in a position to report to the KGB that one of their
S&T collection officers was working for French Intelligence.42 Armed with that information, it would only
have been a matter of time for the KGB to figure out
Vetrov was the mole and handle him accordingly. So
the question is: who gave this information to the KGB?
What makes the case an anomaly is that the answer to
who compromised him did not come from Edward Lee
34. Cold War Project; available from http://coldwarproject.com/bio/
vetrov_bio.htm; Internet.
35. Bearden, 131, 180.
36. Ibid., 180.
37. Ibid., 131, 180.
38. Ibid., 131.
39. Ibid., 180.
40. Ibid., 131, 180.
41. Ibid., 516.
42. Ibid.
Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies
Winter/Spring 2009
Howard, Aldrich Ames or Robert Hanssen. Howard
had been fired from CIA in 1983 and, according to The
Main Enemy, would only have had access or knowledge of agents being handled and run in Moscow,
not in other countries. Vetrov was discovered to be
a spy in 1984, at least a year before Robert Hanssen
re-approached the KGB to begin spying again. Ames
had provided his listing of all Soviet assets to the KGB
on June 13, 1985, after the date of Vetrov’s arrest and
eventual execution in 1984.43 What we do know is that
Vladimir Vetrov was the first asset that falls into the
anomalous betrayal category, the focus of this article.
Sergei Bokhan — BLIZZARD
Following Vetrov, Sergei Bokhan – codenamed
BLIZZARD – was called back to Moscow unexpectedly on May 21, 1985, when the KGB told him that
his eighteen year old son was having problems at
his military academy. Bokhan was a GRU colonel
stationed in Athens, Greece at the time, spying for
the CIA for ten years including informing them of
at least two attempts to sell American military technology to the Soviet Union.44 The first case was CIA
officer William Kampiles who attempted to sell U.S.
spy satellite information, and the second was in 1984
when a Greek agent had sold the GRU plans for the
Stinger missile.45 When Bokhan received the summons
to return to Moscow, he was highly suspicious. He
immediately began to feel as though this was a KGB
trap and that he had been compromised.46 In turn,
Bokhan quickly contacted his CIA handlers who
arranged an exfiltration plan allowing him to
defect, which he did successfully in May 1985.47
The question remains, why was Bokhan
recalled? The KGB had requested he return a full
month before Aldrich Ames identified him as a
spy on June 13, 1985 during his major handoff
to the KGB in Georgetown, and five months
before Robert Hanssen re-contacts the KGB to
start conducting espionage operations again.48
According to Brian Kelley, it is possible that
Ames could have betrayed him in April 1985
when he first approached the KGB as stated earlier,
during his walk-in at the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC. Open source does not indicate the names that
43. Ibid.
44. Cherkashin, 192.
45. Ibid.
46. Spylist, (Eyespy Magazine); available from http://www.
eyespymag.com/spylist.html; Internet.
47. Bearden, 152.
48. Ibid., 515.
Winter/Spring 2009
Ames provided at this first contact besides Marytnov
and Motorin, so it remains possible that Bokhan’s
name was included. Yet Milt Bearden believes that
none of the known traitors compromised Bokhan.
Also, Kelley states that Hanssen did not know about
the Bokhan case, eliminating him as the source.49 In
regards to Edward Lee Howard, Bearden suggests
in The Main Enemy, “Bokhan was being handled with
rigid compartmentalization by the CIA station in
Athens, so Howard was eliminated as the source of
compromise.”50
Paul Stombaugh and
Adolf Tolkachev — SPHERE / VANQUISH
CIA case off icer Paul
Stombaugh was the next
victim of betrayal on June
13, 1985. He was caught and
arrested by the KGB while
doing a surveillance detection run in preparation for
a meeting with his agent the Paul Stombaugh, CIA, at left, in
1985 KGB arrest.
next night in June 1985.51 He
was walking around Moscow
attempting to “go black” – essentially meaning you
have managed to elude your KGB surveillance and
can operate freely, if only for a short time.52 It was not
until the next day that the details started to leak out of
Moscow informing CIA Headquarters that not
only was Stombaugh caught in the act, it meant
that another prized asset, Adolf Tolkachev –
codenamed SPHERE and then VANQUISH –
had been compromised. Tolkachev was one
of our most prized assets. He was a Soviet
scientist by trade who had worked for CIA
f o r the previous six years providing thousands of top-secret documents from
his position at the Soviet aviation design
building in the heart of Moscow. The information he provided allowed the U.S. to save
billions in weapons development, planning
and intelligence. His value was truly priceless;
now, he had disappeared. Tolkachev, in fact, was
arrested in 1985 and subsequently executed in 1986.53
The CIA would later find out that Tolkachev had been
wrapped up earlier and was already in Lefortovo prison
awaiting trial that would lead to his execution, unbe49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
Kelley Interview.
Bearden, 515.
Ibid., 7.
Ibid., 153.
Bearden, 9.
Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies
Page 45
knownst to his case
off icer Stombaugh.54
Stombaugh’s mission
had been foiled from
the start. Rem Krassilnikov, the KGB’s head
of the Second Chief
Directorate’s American department, had
Arrest of Adolf Tolkachev by the KGB, 1985
orchestrated the arrest
of the young CIA case officer by having an actor pose
as Tolkachev in Moscow.55 As Stombaugh approached,
he was apprehended carrying rubles worth $150,000,
concealed miniature cameras, medicine for Tolkachev
and other incriminating material according to Cherkashin.56 According to Brian Kelley, the only likely scenario is that Edward Lee Howard gave up Stombaugh.57
This information is further vetted by Cherkashin in
his book where he states, “He’s [Tolkachev] been
betrayed by a CIA recruit preparing to take over his
handling from Stombaugh, Edward Lee Howard.”58
This is further evidenced by the date of his capture:
June 13, 1985, the same day that Aldrich Ames met
with his KGB handlers in Georgetown and provided
a wealth of information.59 Thus, Ames could not have
been the source for Stombaugh being caught because
that information would not have reached Moscow in
time. Also, Hanssen had not yet reconnected with the
KGB until October 1985.
Leonid Polyshchuk — WEIGHT
Leonid Polyshchuk was posted to Kathmandu,
Nepal in 1974 as a KGB officer. He had recently visited
a casino and gambled away all the money allotted to
him by the KGB, so the enterprising CIA stepped in,
providing him a loan to cover his losses.60 Polyshchuk
took the money and later agreed to spy for the CIA.61
While in Nepal, the CIA codenamed him GTWEIGHT
and trained him as their asset. The Agency lost contact with him and did not reconnect until Polyshchuk
was assigned as a Line KR officer in Lagos, Nigeria,
in February 1985 working until his arrest in August
1985.62 In this case, Polyshchuk was lured back to
Moscow under a false pretense. The ruse was that a
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
Cherkashin, 149.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Kelley Interview.
Cherkashin, 151.
Kelley Interview.
Cherkashin, 191.
Ibid., 192.
Ibid.
Page 46
Moscow apartment, one near his parents, which he
had been looking for, had become available. He was
notified by his father of the good fortune in early
April 1985, leaving the reader to assume the KGB
made one available to get him back into the country
as expressed by Milt Bearden in The Main Enemy. The
CIA had deposited 20,000 rubles, he would need back
in Moscow, in a hollow rock in the capital near the
Severyanin railroad station. The KGB witnessed the
drop through their surveillance.63 Polyshchuk was
arrested upon his arrival to Moscow. After the arrest,
an internal KGB story later leaked to the CIA and
FBI that, “the Second and Seventh Directorates had
stumbled upon this great find while trailing a CIA
officer.”64 It appears that the KGB was tipped off in
the spring of 1985 of Polyshchuk’s role as a traitor.
This took place before Ames betrayed him on June
13, 1985, and before Hanssen had re-contacted the
KGB in October 1985.65 It is assumed Howard did not
have access to this information because Polyshchuk
was operating outside of the Soviet Union which, as
pointed out by Bearden, Howard was not privy to that
information. Polyshchuk was later executed in 1985
and remains one of the main anomalies pointing to
the fourth mole.
Gennady Smetanin — MILLION
Gennady Smetanin, codenamed GTMILLION,
was a GRU Colonel in Lisbon, Portugal, who in 1983
had secretly sent a letter to the Defense Attaché’s office
at the U.S. embassy in Lisbon, offering his services to
American intelligence.66 In June of 1985 he was compromised by Ames. On August 27, 1985, he requested
a meeting on the outskirts of Lisbon with his CIA
handler, informing him that his scheduled leave to
Moscow had been moved up and he was to return in
the next two days, so that he could be back on the job
in late September.67 As he prepared to leave, a follow up
meeting with his handler was scheduled for October
4, 1985, a meeting he never made. As Bearden points
out, the next day, August 27, 1985, Paul Redmond (then
Chief of the Soviet/East European Division responsible
for all clandestine operations inside the Soviet Union)
knew that GTMILLION was gone.68 He hadn’t returned
to his post in Lisbon and essentially vanished. It was
later discovered he had been executed in Moscow in
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
Ibid.
Cherkashin, 192.
Bearden, 516.
Ibid., 104.
Ibid., 103.
Ibid., 104.
Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies
Winter/Spring 2009
1985.69
Sergei Vorontsov — COWL
Valeri Martynov — GENTILE / PIMENTA
On November 6, 1985, one of the
CIA’s assets in the KGB Rezidentura
in Washington, DC, Valeri Martynov
codenamed GTGENTILE by CIA and
PIMENTA by the FBI, went home to
Moscow unexpectedly on the same plane as Yurchenko when he redefected.70 He vanishes as well and
it is later found out that he too was compromised (by
both Hanssen and Ames) and executed by the KGB in
1985. His family was called back immediately as well,
having been told that Valeri was involved in a serious
accident.71
Gennady Varenik — FITNESS
KGB Lieutenant Colonel Gennady Varenik had
approached the CIA in April 1985 in Vienna, Austria,
claiming he needed money.72 He was recruited under
the codename GTFITNESS and warned the Agency
that the KGB planned to damage relations between
Washington and Bonn by bombing U.S. personnel in
Germany and blaming local radical terrorist groups
such as the Baader-Meinhof or Red Army Faction
gangs.73 Cherkashin says in his book that Varenik, to
be noticed, most likely fabricated these claims since
the KGB, says Cherkashin, did not condone or consider
the use of terrorism.74 Varenik, who had been working in the Soviet embassy in Bonn undercover as a
Tass correspondent, was suddenly called back to East
Berlin in November 1985. His family was also ushered
home, having been told their father had slipped on ice
and hurt himself.75 Former Case Officer Brian Kelley
worked this case, noting that we did find out Varenik
had been arrested in 1985 by Soviet authorities. He
also claims the case was heavily compartmented, suggesting that the source of this betrayal was someone
from the inner circle of all CIA Soviet operations.76
The Agency would later find out their asset had been
executed by the KGB in 1986. Cherkashin claims (albeit
vaguely) in his book that Ames “provided no precise
intelligence about Varenik, requiring the Center to
conduct its own significant analysis.”77
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
Ibid., 152.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Cherkashin, 198.
Ibid.
Ibid., 199.
Cherkashin, 199.
Kelley Interview.
Cherkashin, 199.
Winter/Spring 2009
Ames also exposed
Major Sergei Vorontsov, a
counterintelligence officer in the local Moscow
br a nch of t he SCD.
Vorontsov had contacted
the CIA in February 1984
by dropping a let ter Arrest of Michael D. Sellers by KGB, 1986.
through the window of
a U.S. embassy car.78 He was code named COWL and
provided the CIA with information about how the KGB
tracked American agents in Moscow, including the
use of a chemical substance – nitrophenyl pentadien
NPPD, called spy dust by the CIA – which the KGB had
developed decades earlier to track targets.79 Vorontsov
also provided the name of Father Roman Potemkin,
a KGB operative working under cover as an Orthodox
priest, as most of the Orthodox hierarchy was at the
time.80 Potemkin successfully recruited American
journalist Nicholas Daniloff, who later was arrested
after being set up by a source who gave him photographs of the Soviets Afghanistan campaign. Meanwhile, after Vorontsov was arrested based on Ames
information, the KGB set up a ruse to lure his CIA
handler. It worked, and Michael Sellers was expelled
from the Soviet Union in March 1986.
Oleg Gordievsky — TICKLE
Another anomaly of one of
the most tumultuous years in espionage history occurred with the
detainment by house arrest in 1985
of KGB Colonel Oleg Gordievsky
codenamed TICKLE who was the
Deputy Resident in London and
was working as a spy for MI6 (British Foreign Intelligence). He too
was recalled to Moscow in May 1985 before Hanssen
approached the KGB and before Ames had provided
the KGB with the listing of all our Soviet assets on
June 13, 1985. Once he was back in Moscow he was
questioned extensively and placed under house arrest,
which suggests the KGB was lacking the hard evidence
they had against the other compromised agents who
were working for the American intelligence services.
The main point in this case is that there is no doubt
Ames did give up Gordievsky, but when that took
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., 200.
Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies
Page 47
place (June 13, 1985) Gordievsky was already back in
Moscow and being subjected to hostile interrogation.81
Milt Bearden argues that neither Hanssen nor Howard
could have known about Gordievsky because of the
timelines of when they provided information to the
KGB and what they had access to at the time.82
A FIRST HAND ACCOUNT
J O H N F . L E W I S , J R . 83
“There are anomalies that have occurred over
the years that have kept many of the CI officers of the
FBI and CIA up at night because they could not be
explained,” John said during the author’s interview.
These were especially prevalent in the most active
spy years of the mid 1980s and ongoing until at least
1991. Gardner “Gus” Hathaway, the former Chief of
Counterintelligence, reinforced this opinion when he
told John in 1988 that, “we have no more assets left in
the Soviet Union.”84
These “anomalies” still exist because they could
not be explained, reconciled, or have conclusions
drawn from them based on what we know Edward Lee
Howard, Aldrich Ames or Robert Hanssen provided to
the Soviet Union during their betrayal of our country.85
During the 1980s, Mr. Lewis headed a very compartmentalized operation codenamed COURTSHIP that
involved the FBI and CIA working together to target
KGB officers in the U.S. attempting to recruit the one
who could provide us with the name of the mole within
our government. One of the other agents assigned to
the task force was none other than Robert Hanssen.
Bob, as Mr. Lewis refers to him was, in his words,
“the guy that was always around, always listening and
digesting everything around him, and yet nobody ever
knew he was there.”86
Being assigned to this task force allowed Hanssen the unlimited access to all Soviet agents we were
running in Moscow and around the world. He had
access to the files that provided an in-depth community-wide look at all Soviet assets and operations
being run. Through the work of COURTSHIP the FBI
did recruit some assets including Valery Martynov,
who was later given up by Ames, then Hanssen, but
81. Bearden, 516.
82. Ibid.
83. Former Assistant Director of the FBI National Security
Division.
84. Lewis Interview.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
Page 48
overall they did not land the asset who could provide
the name of who was disrupting all of our operations,
leading to the death of many of our assets.
As Lewis explained, there is a belief that information within the Intelligence Community travels just as
effectively around the water cooler, on a smoke break
or in the cafeteria, as it does in classified documents
that need to be signed for and delivered amongst those
who have a “need to know.” To hear in passing, “guess
who we’ve got in Moscow now,” is just as actionable as
seeing the cable traffic for a particular activity. Lewis
believes that while Ames or Hanssen may not have
had direct classified case knowledge of some of these
anomalies (i.e. had not seen it on paper), they could
have had verbal tip-offs and may have been able to
decipher for themselves what was happening with any
given activity throughout their espionage careers.87
That said, John Lewis strongly believes that there
are unexplained losses that he strongly suggests are
attributable to an uncaptured fourth mole.88
A V E T E R A N C I P R O F E S S I O N A L’ S
PERSPECTIVE
One idea that John Lewis continually stressed
is the fact that every time the FBI started to make
progress or possibly came close to a major break in
the mole hunt, a major event would take place that,
he believes, was staged by the KGB.89 These deception
operations would provide us with a spy, or someone
who we could go after, all the while the real purpose
was to avert the eyes of the CI community to the real
threat and danger posed by their most prized assets,
Ames and Hanssen.90
This was evidenced in the case of Ronald Pelton,
a former NSA employee who had retired in 1980 but
had found a new career in espionage once outside.
Pelton was in financial trouble and had declared
bankruptcy three months prior to retiring from NSA
in 1980. Between 1980 and 1984 he held a series of
jobs, none requiring a security clearance but, with
mounting expenses, he decided it was time to secure
an outside income. While on a trip to Vienna, Austria,
he walked into the Soviet embassy and demanded he
see the KGB Chief of Station wherein they discussed
an undisclosed price for the secrets he was willing
87.
88.
89.
90.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Lewis Interview.
Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies
Winter/Spring 2009
to disclose. Pelton then orally recited his knowledge
of Operation Ivy Bells, a highly compartmentalized
(less then 100 people were read in) NSA and U.S. Navy
joint project to secretly tap undersea cables to monitor Soviet military communications and track Soviet
submarines.91 The reader can reliably assume Pelton’s
SIGINT knowledge proved very helpful to the Soviet
Union. Soviet defector Vitaly Yurchenko, a walk-in
to the U.S. embassy in Rome on August 1, 1985, later
exposed Pelton’s actions. While Yurchenko’s bona
fides have been controversial for decades within the
community, his information lead to Pelton’s arrest
on November 25, 1985, and conviction, landing him
a life sentence. The KGB knew, with Pelton being out
of NSA, he was expendable: they had no more need
for him once he provided all he knew. So instead of
allowing him to continue and possibly giving up one of
their higher placed sources still providing legitimate
information, they allowed him to be given up knowing
it would create confusion and a diversion of resources
within the U.S. IC.
Lewis believes the cases of Edward Lee Howard
and Aldrich Ames fit into the same mold as the Pelton
case. As Robert Eringer points out in his book, Ruse:
Undercover with FBI Counterintelligence, Ed Howard’s
usefulness ended on July 12, 2002, when he “had an
accident,” supposedly tripping on some stairs in his
Russian dacha, breaking his neck.92 The only problem:
there were no stairs leading to the laundry room; so,
the story out of Russia quickly changed, referring to
a car accident, as well. All these versions of the death
are trivial because the authorities quickly cremated his
body without an autopsy, thus washing their hands
of Edward Lee Howard forever.93 Russian ‘retirement
parties’ take many forms. It could even be possible
that somehow (whether from the fourth mole or
another source) the SVR knew that Hanssen was no
longer useful and that he had been compromised or
not looked after properly by the SVR.
91. Nytimes.com, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/organizations/n/national_security_agency/
index.html?query=PELTON,%20RONALD%20
WILLIAM&field=per&match=exact (Last Accessed July 23,
2008).
92. Eringer, Robert. Ruse, Undercover with FBI Counterintelligence,
Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008.
93. Ibid.
Winter/Spring 2009
— PERSPECTIVES —
FROM THOSE WHO LIVED IT
According to John Lewis, many CI professionals
share the idea that “there is always one more.” He
asserts that the game of espionage was not always run
by the so-called “rules,” stating, “What would you do
to protect the most important source you have and may
ever have? You give away anyone and everyone else you
have to in order to keep the best asset protected.”94
John believes in his, “cynical retired CI opinion,” that
this fourth mole did exist or still does, and that this
person was once at a high level of government.95 He
believes the person is still alive because even unlike
other events from decades ago where intelligence and
information has been subsequently leaked years later,
there has been no progress or leads regarding this
theory and the unexplained compromises.96 He continues to assess that most likely this person is retired
now from the FBI or the CIA, but maybe has not been
completely cut off from the flow of information or
points of contact, thus the SVR finds them still of use
and in turn is either keeping quiet or actively working
to protect the individual at all costs.97
This belief is echoed by former CIA officer Milt
Bearden who in his interview with the author stated
that, “the anomalies don’t add up, there had to be
someone else.”98 Brian Kelley, who for four years was
erroneously thought by some investigators to be the
mole that continued to damage the IC, after being fully
exonerated by the capture of Hanssen, also believes in
the fourth mole theory.99
THE UNFINISHED MOLE HUNT
A spy can reach across the decades inflicting
incalculable damage to operations, secrets, and
careers, as well as causing the ultimate sacrifice.
Whether there is a fourth mole remains likely but
uncertain. But the strong possibility of his/her existence merits further study and investigation.
We study in retrospect all sorts of disasters, from
airplane wrecks, fires, the response to natural disasters and issues of war, peace and diplomacy, always
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
Lewis Interview.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Bearden Interview.
Kelley Interview.
Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies
Page 49
seeking to uncover unknown facts that will alter and
revise our understanding of what happened and why.
Indeed, historians continue to study the causes of
World War I, and diligently attempt to unearth new
facts that shed light on the causes of conflict. Despite
the cloak of secrecy of this area of historical inquiry,
prejudice against such analysis with respect to CI is
lamentable since our country has paid such a high
price for shortcomings in this area. While there are
commonalities among many spy cases, each case
has aspects that are unique and can inform even our
handling of current cases, enabling better protection
for our government from the ever growing threat of
future espionage acts targeting us and our allies. H
Mike Mattson is the Project Leader of the Open
Source Analyst team at Evidence Based Research,
Inc. in Vienna, VA. He holds a B.S. degree in Business Administration from the University of Mary
Washington and is currently pursuing a Master of
Arts degree in Strategic Intelligence Studies at the
Institute of World Politics.
AFIO thanks Mark Levin for his assistance with this article.
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Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies
Winter/Spring 2009