European Competition Law Prof. Fabio Bassan a.a. 2015‐16 Article 102 TFEU
Article 102 TFEU provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a
dominant position within the internal market or in
a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the internal market insofar as it
may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
Article 102 TFEU
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
Limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers;
Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage;
Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contracts.
Article 102 TFEU
-
Any abuse
by one or more undertakings
of a dominant position
within the internal market or
in a substantial part of it
shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
internal market
- insofar as it may affect trade between Member
States
Article 102 TFEU
Dominant position:
The ECJ has defined dominance in terms of an
undertaking’s ‘economic strenght’ and its
ability to act independently on the market.
United Brands (1978): ECJ: The dominant
position relates to a position of economic
strenght enjoyed by an undertaking which
enables it to prevent effective competition being
maintained on the relevant market by giving it
the power to behave to an appreciable extent
independently of its competitors, customers and
ultimatle of its consumers
Article 102 TFEU
Dominant position:
Hoffmann-La Roche
(1979): ECJ
The dominant position relates to a position of economic strenght
enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective
competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its
competitors, of its customers and ultimately of its consumers.
Such a position does not preclude some competition, which it does
where there is a monopoly or quasi-monopoly, but enables the
undertaking which profits by it, if not to determine, at least to have
an appreciable influence on the conditions under which that
competition will develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard
of it so long as such conduct does not operate to its detriment.
Article 102 TFEU
Dominant position:
Problems with the definition:
- Concept of independence; wider and more nebulous
than power over price
-  the independence has to exist only ‘to an appreciable
extent’ and is competing with continuing competition on
the market
-  The reference both to the ability of an undertaking to
impede effective competition (the power to exclude
competitors) and to behave independently, are different
tests or part of the same test?
Article 102 TFEU
Dominant position
Assessing dominance:
Continental can (1973) ECJ: the dominance
exists only in relation to a particular market and
not in the abstract.
Two-stage procedure, by first identifying the
relevant market and secondly examining the
undertaking’s position on that market and
analysing the competitive constraints which the
undertaking faces.
Article 102 TFEU
Dominant position
Assessing dominance
relevant market
- the product market
- the geographic market
Article 102 TFEU
Dominant position/Assessing dominance/relevant market/
- 
the product market
- 
Demand substitution
United Brands (1978):
ECJ had to consider why people eat bananas and whether or
not they are treated by consumers as reasonably
interchangeable with other kinds of fresh fruit. It decided that
there was only a small degree of substitutability between
bananas ond other fruits, partly because of the unique
appearance, taste, softness, seedlessness, and easy handling
of the banana.
The judgement does not make it clear why these distinctive
characteristics should impact on the determination of the
product market.
Article 102 TFEU
Dominant position/Assessing dominance/relevant market/the product
market/Demand substitution
Michelin (1983): tyre market, or the (narrower) market for new
replacement tyres for lorries, buses, and similar vehicles?
Many fact to be considered:
- lorries and buses need larger tyres than cars and vans;
- there are different sizes of lorry and bus tyres;
- tyre manufactures supply their tyres separately to new lorry and
bus manufactures and to dealers who fit tyres on lorries and buses
as replacements;
Which, if any of these tyres were substitues for each other so that
they formed part of the same product market?
Article 102 TFEU
Dominant position/Assessing dominance/relevant market/the product
market/Demand substitution
France Télécom (2007): the relevant market is the French market
for high-speed internet access for residential customers.
The difference between high and low speed internet is clearly
perceived by consumers.
The analysis on price differences shows that consumers are
prepared to pay a premium for the extra performance and
covenience of high speed.
Article 102 TFEU
Dominant position/Assessing dominance/relevant market/the product
market/the structure of supply and demand
Michelin I (1983): “for the purpose of investigating the possibly dominant
position of an undertaking on a given market, the possibilities of competition
must be judged in the context of the market comprising the totality of the
products which, with respect to their characteristics, are particularly suitable
for satisfying constant needs and are only to a limited extent
interchangeable with other products. However, it must be noted that the
determination of the relevant market is useful in assessing whether the
undertaking concerned is in a position to prevent effective competiton from
being maintained and behave to an appreciate extent independently of its
competitors and customers and consumers. For this purpose, therefore, an
examination limited to the objective characteristics only of the relevant
products cannot be sufficient: the competitive conditions and the structure of
supply and demand on the market must also be taken in consideration”.
Article 102 TFEU
Dominant position/Assessing dominance/relevant market/the product
market/the structure of supply and demand/primary and secondary
markets (aftermarkets)
-  The question of whether a product is to be considered a single
whole or as a number of separate products is illustrated by Hugin
(1979).
-  Hugin was a swedish firm which produced and sold cash register
and their spare parts. It had the 12% of the cash register Community
market.
-  When Hugin refused to keep on selling spare parts of its cash
register to Liptons (a small distributor) the ECJ found that spare
parts constituted a separate market from cash registers.
-  ECJ applied the same reasoning in Volvo (1988), Renault (1988),
Hilti (1988).
Article 102 TFEU
Dominant position/Assessing dominance/relevant market/the product
market/the structure of supply and demand/primary and secondary
markets (aftermarkets)-derivative markets
-  Commercial solvens (1974): a raw material aminobutanol,
constituted a product market of its own.
-  It was the first case to deal with the problems posed by derivative or
ancillary markets. Such markets can be distinguished from those for
the primary product.
-  Question: whether there can be a market in an ‘input’ which the
producer of the ‘input’ does not offer for sale but uses only for its
own purposes.
Article 102 TFEU
-  Answers:
-  In Magill (1995) the ECJ upheld the Commission’s definition of
a market in ‘television listing’ although the broadcasting
companies did not sell them for publication.
-  In Bronner (1998) the ECJ accepted that there could be a
market for the home delivery of newspapers even though the
undertaking concerned had developed it only to distribute its own
newspapers.
-  In IMS (2001) the ECJ said that could be a potential market in
‘inputs’ which a monopolist decided not to market
independently (a system for representing pharmaceutical sales
data over which the undertaking claimed copyright).
Article 102 TFEU
Dominant position/Assessing dominance/relevant market/the product
market/Supply substitution
•  Continental can (1973):
–  The ECJ held that the market must be defined from the supply side as
well as the demand side. In that case the Commission found three
separate markets consisting of different types of metal containers for
food pakaging. The ECJ held that the Commission had not explained
why these products were in separate markets and were not all part of a
larger light metal container market.
–  Other supply-side substitution analyses:
•  Michelin (1983): there was no elasticity of supply between tyres for heavy
vehicles and car tyres owing to significant differences in production
techniques;
•  Tetra Pack I: there was no supply-side substitution, because manufactures
of other types of milk-packaging machinery were not able to produce such
pachaking.
Article 102 TFEU
Dominant position: geographic market
-  If the company operates all over Europe, the (european market) is
restricted by:
-  Legal regulations
-  British telecommunications (1983)
-
- Barriers to trade
- high transport costs
- language
- marketing
- consumers preference
The market may be confined to a number of member states, to a
single member state, to a part of a member state.
Article 102 TFEU
Dominant position: geographic market/cases
•  Nestlé/Perrier (1983) : the Commission found that the relevant
geographic market for mineral water was limited to France.
Irrespective of European integration, French consumers continued
to choose local products.
•  British Midland v. Aer Lingus: the Commission defined as a
separate market the air route between Dublin and Heathrow
•  Michelin (1983): is the most criticized geographic market: the ECJ
upheld the Commission’s finding that there was a separate market
for heavy vehicle new replacement tyres in the Netherlands.
•  Alsatel/Novasam (1988): the ECJ did not accept that a particular
region of France, rather than the country as a whole, was the
geographic market for telephone installations
Article 102 TFEU
•  Dominant position: geographic market/cases
•  Michelin (2001): The company claimed that the market was no
longer national. The Commission rejected this claims, on the those
grounds: what matters is to assess the real capacity of dealers to
obtain supplies from outside their national territory and the
similarities or differences in the supply structure.
•  In Michelin the Commission found that:
–  the large manufactures still organized their distribution and sales along
national lines;
–  There were considerable differences in the large manufacturers’ market
share from country to country, that is hardly compatible with a European
market with homogeneous competition
–  There were appreciable price differences from country to country.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Dominant position: assessing market power
- the assessment of dominance will take in account the competitive
structure of the market and in particular:
- the market position of the dominant undertaking and its
competitors (i.e. current market shares)
- constraints imposed by credible threats of expansion or entry
(barriers to expansion or entry) and
- countervailing buyer power
Article 102 TFEU
• 
Dominant position: assessing market power: market shares
– 
It referes to the present state of the market
– 
It is a relative element (not absolute): it depends
• 
• 
(i) 
on competitors’ market share
on barriers to entry
High market shares and the presumption of dominance: the higher
the market share, the more likely a finding of dominance
Hoffmann-La Roche (1979): the ECJ although recognizing that the
significance of market shares may vary from market to market, and
acknowledging the relevance of other factors, held that “very large
shares” are in themselves indicative of dominance unless there are
‘exceptional circumnstances’
Article 102 TFEU
•  Dominant position: assessing market power: market shares
•  In Hilti (1994) and Tetra Pak II (1996) citing Hoffmann La Roche,
the ECJ held that market shares respectively of 70-80% and 90%
were themselves evidence of a dominant position. But barrier to
entry were very high.
•  In AKZO (1991) a 50% share of the market was considered giving
dominance: with the 50% of the market there is a presumption of
dominance
Article 102 TFEU
•  Dominant position: assessing market power: market shares
•  Market shares as a relative factor: Hoffmann La Roche: the
relationship between the market shares of the undertaking
concerned and of its competitors, especially those of the next
largest, was a relevant factor.
–  The market power of an undertaking with a market share of 51% will be
considerably different depending on whether it simply has one
competitor with the 49% of the market, or three competitors which have
16, 16, and 17% of the market, respectively, or 49 competitors with 1%
each.
–  Hoffmann La Roche: 45% of the market gives a company dominance
when it is twice as large as its competitor.
–  Michelin: 57%= dominance: the remainder was fragmented.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Dominant position: assessing market power: market shares
(ii) Low market shares and dominance
Below 40/50% of market share dominance is unlikely but possible.
The lowest share at which an undertaking has been considered
dominant has been 39.7% (British Airways, 2003).
Article 102 TFEU
•  Dominant position: assessing market power: other factors
–  Indications from the undertaking itself
•  Its own assessment of its position (i.e.: AKZO regarded itslef as the
world leader in the peroxides market)
•  Profits (if the undertaking is earning monopoly profits)
•  Performance indicators (ie the ability of an undertaking to obtain
premium prices)
•  Overall size and strenght of range of products (portfolio power)
Article 102 TFEU
•  Dominant position: assessing market power: barriers to
entry and expansion
–  constraints imposed on an undertaking by credible threats of
future entry or expansion. When there are barriers, competitors
can not enter or expand on the market and change the existing
market share situation
–  United Brands (1978), Hoffmann La Roche (1979), Michelin
(1983)
Article 102 TFEU
•  Dominant position: assessing market power: other factors
indicating dominance
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
Statutary monopoly, legal regulation, intellectual property rights
Superior technology
Established distribution and sales networks
Vertical integration
Economies of scale and scope
Access to financial resources and the need for investment
Access to key imputs
Advertising, reputation, product differentiation
Article 102 TFEU
•  Dominant position: assessing market power: (iii) countervailing
buyer power
•  Dominance is defined as the independence of an undertaking from
(inter alia) its customers. Hence, an undertaking constrained by a
powerful buyer is not in a dominant position.
•  In order to meet this condition the buyer should be able to protect
the market itself by defeating any price increase. This is possible
when the buying side is highly concentrated.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Dominant positions in the new economy
•  Competition on the new economy tends to be on innovation.
•  Dominant positions are often temporary and fragile.
•  Hence, in dynamically competitive markets in the new economy the
immediate competitive constraints are far less important than the
potential competition.
•  Some ‘new economy markets’ have a ‘network effect’ (network
externalities). The more users a network has, the more valuable it
becomes to an individual user. Once a network has a certain
number of users, the market may ‘tip’ towards that network.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Network effect: Microsoft (2007):
–  “In industries exhibiting strong network effects, consumer
demand depends critically on expectations about future
purchases. If consumers expect a firm with a strong reputation in
the current (product) generation to succeed in the next
generation, this will tend to be self-fulfilling as the consumers
direct their purchases to the product that they believe will yield
the greatest networks gains”.
Article 102 TFEU
Conduct which can be an abuse
The meaning of abuse
Article 102 does not forbid the holding of a dominant position per se but
only an abuse of it.
List:
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
Limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.
Article 102 TFEU
Exploitative and exclusionary abuses. Reprisal abuses
Three ways of describing abuses:
a) exploitative abuse: conduct whereby the dominant undertaking
takes advantage of its market power to exploit its customers
b) exclusionary abuse: conduct whereby it prevents or hinders
competition on the market
c) reprisal abuse: it is specifically aimed at another undertaking and
encompasses steps taken to discipline or punish that other
Article 102 TFEU
Exploitative and exclusionary abuses
-  Continental can (1973): 3 principles
-  Article 102 did not set out an exhaustive list of prohibited conduct. But it
could be an exhaustive list of CATEGORIES of abuse: it is only that the
types of conduct WITHIN those categories that are not listed
exclusively. (It covers such a wide range of conduct that it is difficult to
see what is not encompassed).
-  The conduct which excludes competitors, strenghtens the dominant
position and weaken competition was prohibited irrespective of the fact
that the dominant undertaking had not exploited or otherwise used its
market power in concluding the transaction.
-  Art. 102 should be interpreted in the light of art. 3(f) of the Treaty (a
system ensuring that competition in the market is not distorted) and art.
2 (promoting harmonious development of economic activities).
Article 102 TFEU
Exploitative and exclusionary abuses
•  The broad nature of the concept of abuse
–  The definition of abuse (exclusionary, mostly)
•  Hoffmann – La Roche (1979): “The concept of abuse is an objective
concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position
which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of
the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition
is weakened, and which, through recourse to methods different from those
which condition normal competition in product or services on the basis of the
transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the
maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the
growth of that completion”.
Article 102 TFEU
Exploitative and exclusionary abuses
•  The market power does not need to be used for an abuse to be
committed
–  Continental can (1973): the dominant undertaking does not need to be
using its dominance to commit the abuse. It is the fact that the
undertaking is dominant that renders its behaviour abusive.
•  A dominant undertaking has a special responsibility.
–  Michelin (1983): “a finding that an undertaking has a dominant position
is not in itself a recrimination but simply means that, irrespective of the
reasons for which it has such a dominant position, the undertaking
concerned has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair
genuine undistorted competition on the common market”.
Article 102 TFEU
Exploitative and exclusionary abuses
•  The market power does not need to be used for an abuse to be
committed
–  The dominant undertaking’s special responsibility increases with
its degree of dominance.
•  Tetra Pak II (1997): the actual scope of the special responsibility
imposed on an undertaking in dominant position must be
considered in the light of the specific circumstances of the case (a
quasi monopoly).
•  Compagnie Maritime Belge (2000): particularly onerous special
responsibility upon undertakings enjoying a position of dominance
approaching a monopoly.
It leads to the super-dominance concept. Criticized, beacuse it has
no economic basis
Article 102 TFEU
Exploitative and exclusionary abuses
•  The market power does not need to be used for an abuse to be
committed
–  Abuse as an objective concept
•  Hoffmann La Roche: a dominant undertaking conduct can be abusive
irrespective of the undertaking’s subjective intent to exclude competitors or
weaken competition.
–  If the object pursued by the conduct of a dominant undertaking
is to limit competition, that conduct would also be liable to have
such an effect.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Exploitative and exclusionary abuses
•  Objective justifications
–  Protecting the undertaking’s own commercial interests: the
‘meeting competition defence’
•  United Brands (1978): Article 102 does not prevent an undertaking from
protecting its own commercial interests when they are attacked.
•  But it does not apply if the undertaking’s actual purpose is to strenghten this
dominant position and abuse it.
•  And the undertaking’s response must be proportionate and reasonable.
–  Legimitate public interest objectives (health and safety)
–  Efficiences (if efficiency gains outweights its detrimental effects).
Article 102 TFEU
•  Abuses concerning prices
•  A) price discrimination
–  It occurs where the same commodity is sold at different prices to
different customers despite identical costs (or sales at the same price
despite dfferent costs).
–  The ability to practice persistent price discrimination is characteristic of
a market power.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Abuses concerning prices
•  Predatory pricing: it is the practice whereby an undertaking prices
its product so low that competitors cannot live with the price and are
driven from the market. Once the competitors are excluded from the
market the undertaking hopes to increase prices to monopoly levels
and recoup its losses.
•  It is anticompetitive because it means low prices in the short term,
but the effects are to strenghten the power of the dominant
undertaking to the prejudice of consumers.
•  This strategy is possible only if there are serious barriers to entry.
Article 102 TFEU
• 
• 
Abuses concerning prices
When prices are predatory?
(1) The Areeda-Turner test (Harvard Law Review)
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A price lower than reasonably anticipated short-run marginal cost (SRMC)
is predatory, whilst a price equal to or higher than reasonably anticipated
short-run marginal cost is not predatory.
Reasonably anticipated means that a conduct cannot be judged ex post.
The marginal cost is judged by what seemed reasonable at the time.
(2) The AKZO test (1991)
Prices below average variable costs (AVC) must be regarded as abusive,
because there is no profit-maximizing reason for them. The only
explanation is that they are intended to eliminate competitors.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Abuses concerning prices
•  Margin squeeze: it occurs where a vertically integrated undertaking
dominant in the upstream market for an input sells the input to its
downstream competitor at a price which does not allow the
competitor to operate profitably. In this case the competitor’s margin
(the gap between the cost of the input and the price on the
downstream margin) is ‘squeezed’.
•  The leading case on margin squeeze in EU Law is Deutsche Telekom
(2003): DT effected a margin squeeze by charging its competitors on the
retail market in Germany a higher price for access to the ‘local loop’ than it
was charging its own retail customers.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Abuses concerning prices
–  Exclusive purchasing (single branded) contracts
•  Exclusive purchasing contracts (also called requirements contracts and,
more recently, single branding or non-compete obligations) are
arrangements by which a customer is obliged to obtain all or most of its
requirements for the relevant product from one supplier.
•  Hoffmann-La Roche (1979): ‘An undertaking which is in a dominant
position on the market and ties purchasers – even if it does so at their
request – by an obligation or promise on their part to obtain all or most of
their requirements exclusively from the said undertaking abuses its dominant
position within the meaning of article 102’.
•  Practices: discount and rebate schemes (quantity [volume] discounts and
loyalty rebates
Article 102 TFEU
•  Abuses concerning tying and bundling
–  An undertaking
•  supplies a product (the tying product) on condition that the customer obtains
something else (the tied product) from the supplier as well,
•  or provides them cheaper if he does;
•  or the undertaking only supplies the two things together
•  or ensures that the two things only work properly together and do not work at
all or as well with competitors’ product.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Abuses concerning tying and bundling
•  Tying usually refers to situations where customers that purchase
one product (the tying product) are required also to purchase
another product from the dominant undertaking (the tied product)
•  Bundling usually refers to the way products are offered and priced
by the dominant undertaking.
–  Pure bundling: products are only sold together, in fixed proportions
–  Mixed bundling: (multi-product rebate, or economic tying): the supplier
offers a financially advantageous deal if the customer buys both
products.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Abuses concerning tying and bundling
–  Microsoft (Commission Decision 2005):
•  Microsof had abused of its dominant position on the client pc operating
systems market, where it had over 90% of the market, by supplying
Windows to the computer manufacturers with its Windows Media
Player(WMP) pre-installed.
•  The basis: the Windows operating system and the WMPwere two distinct
products. By bundling them together Microsoft was leveraging its monopoly
power into the media player market where it faced more competition.
•  For tying to infringe article 102 four elements must be present:
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1. two separate products
2. dominance in the tying market
3. the customers are given no choice to obtain the tying product alone
4. the tying forecloses competition.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Abuses concerning refusals to supply
–  A dominant undertaking infringes article 102 by refusing to supply its
products or services or to grant access to its facilities. Constructive
refusals, where the offer is such that the supplier knows it is
unacceptable, may also infringe.
–  Refusals to supply are normally exclusionary abuses, in that the
dominant undertaking’s behaviour denies the other party the tools it
needs to compete on the market.
–  i.e. an undertaking dominant in an upstream market and also present in
a downstream market refuses to supply the resource over which it is
dominant to a competitor on that downstream market.
–  The duty to supply is contrary to the freedom of contract. It comes from
the ‘special responsibility’ of the dominant undertaking.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Abuses concerning refusals to supply: cases
•  Commercial solvens (1974): Commercial Solvens was using its
dominant position on the raw material market to affect competition on the
derivatives market, that it refused to supply to a customer because it wanted
to compete with it downstream.
• 
Napier Brown/British Sugar (1990): the Commercial Solvens principle is
applied to a deliberate move to remove a competitor from a downstream
market: the dominant supplier of industrial sugar, which itself produced the
derivative retail sugar, refused to supply industrial sugar to a competitor on
the downstream market.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Abuses concerning refusals to supply: the ‘essential facility’
concept
•  Essential facility: is domething owned or controlled by a vertically
integrated dominant undertaking to which other undertakings need
acces in order to provide products or services to customers. This is
a ‘bottleneck monopoly’. A refusal to grant access to an essential
facility is a breach of the special responsibility that the holder of the
facility has as a dominant undertaking.
•  But: when does access have to be given? To whom does it have to
be given? On what terms?
Article 102 TFEU
•  Abuses concerning refusals to supply: the ‘essential facility’
concept
•  Oscar Bronner (1998): 4 factors should be present for a refusal to
be an abuse:
•  1. the refusal would have to be likely to eliminate all competition
in the downstream market from the person requesting access;
•  2. the refusal must be incapable of objective justification;
•  3. the access must be indispensable to carrying on the other
person’s business;
•  4. There must be no actual or potential substitute for it.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Abuses concerning refusals to supply and intellectual property
rights
–  Magill (1995): it concerned copyright in ‘television listings’ (tv
programme schedules). Listings of programs to be broadcast were
protected by UK intellectual property law (not also in other EU state
members, where IP rights cover only the fruits of creative or intellectual
effort.
–  An Irish publisher, Magill, started to publish a comprehensive weekly tv
guide giving details of all programmes available. It was challenged by
TV operators.
–  The EU Commission and ECJ held that tv companies have infringed
article 102: the companies were each dominant in the market for their
weekly listings their policies were driven by the desire to protect their
own weekly guides in the downstream markets.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Collective dominance
•  ‘any abuse by one or more [economically independent]
undertakings of a dominant position’
–  Flat glass (1992): abuse of joint dominance. Three companies were
united by such economic links that, by virtue of that fact, together they
hold a dominant position. i.e.: through agreements or licences they had
a technological lead affording them the power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of their competitors, their customers,
their consumers. In other words, it is not only for the structure of the
market. There must be some ties between operators.
Article 102 TFEU
•  Collective dominance
–  The Commissione applied the conscept to undertakings bound by
contractual links.
–  The economic links may be contractual, structural (such as cross
shareholdings or common directorship) or provided by the structure of
the market which ensures parallelism of behaviour between firms on an
oligopolistic market.