ANNALS, AAPSS,505, September1989
The Pacific Basin versus the
AtlanticAlliance:
Two Paradigmsof
InternationalRelations
By JAMES R. KURTH
For many years, the study of internationaleconomy and internaABSTRACT:
tional security,two fields of internationalrelations,has been based respectively
uponthe two conceptsof internationalliberalismandextendeddeterrence.Both
concepts developed out of the conditions of the Atlantic/Europeanarenaafter
WorldWarII;togetherthey formthe AtlanticAlliance paradigm.This paradigm
poorly fits the Pacific/Asianworld. In regardto the internationaleconomy, the
EastAsian statesareadherentsnotof internationalliberalismbutof international
mercantilism.In regardto internationalsecurity,they arecases not of extended
deterrencebut of finite deterrence.Together,these concepts form the Pacific
Basin paradigm.The 1990s will be a period of conflict between these two
internationalrelationsparadigms,the decliningone of the UnitedStatesand the
Americanhalfcenturyandthe risingone of the EastAsian powersandthe future.
James R. Kurth is professor of political science at SwarthmoreCollege, where he teaches
internationalpolitics, Americanforeign policy, and American defense policy. During the years
1983-85, he was a visitingprofessor of strategy at the U.S. Naval WarCollege. His professional
publications have focused upon the political and economic sources of the foreign and defense
policies of the UnitedStates and other great powers.
34
35
PACIFICBASIN VERSUS ATLANTICALLIANCE
OR almost half a century,the study
of internationalrelationsand of two
of its fields, internationaleconomy and
internationalsecurity,has been basedupon
a few centralconcepts. The field of internationaleconomy has been based uponthe
idea of international liberalism: liberal
states, particularlythose in NorthAmerica
andWesternEurope,supportmarketforces
withinan open internationaleconomy.This
mightbe termedthe GATTmodel, afterthe
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
which was established in 1948. Similarly,
the field of internationalsecurity has been
based upon the idea of extended deterrence: the United States contains Soviet
military aggression, particularlyin Western Europe,by the threatof nuclearescalation in response. Deterrence is said to be
extended because the United States extends its commitmentbeyond its own territory to cover the territoriesof its allies.
This might be termed the NATO model,
after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was establishedin 1949.
THE ATLANTICALLIANCE
PARADIGM:INTERNATIONAL
LIBERALISMAND
EXTENDEDDETERRENCE
The two concepts of internationalliberalism and extended deterrence, the two
models of GATT and NATO, thus fill out
the economic and security dimensions in
the analysis of internationalrelations.Together,they forma distinctiveway of looking at the world, what might be called the
AtlanticAlliance paradigm.
The conceptsof internationalliberalism
and extended deterrence both developed
out of the conditionsof what was the geographical center of world politics after
World War II, namely, Europe, America,
andthe AtlanticOceanthatlinkedthem,all
organizedby the United States within the
Atlantic Alliance. But both concepts had
been prefiguredin the earliereconomic and
security policies of Great Britain, especially duringthe centurybetween the Napoleonic wars and WorldWar I. The first
was also knownas internationalliberalism;
the second was known as coalition strategy.' AfterWorldWarII, it was naturalfor
the United States, which was replacing
Britainin so many otherways and places,
to replace it also as the upholderof these
concepts. They are ideas that have come
readily to nations that are commercial
economies, liberal polities, and maritime
powers.
From theAtlantic/European
reality to the
Pacific/Asian reality
It was also natural, however, for the
United States, which was now both the
majorAtlanticpowerandthe majorPacific
power, to apply these ideas to both the
Atlantic/European reality and the Pacific/Asian reality. There were, after all,
many apparentsimilarities in the security
situations of the two regions. The Soviet
Union appearedto threatenboth Western
Europe and East Asia, it had imposed a
communist revolution in Eastern Europe
and supportedone in China, and the two
superpowersconfrontedeach other in the
two Germaniesand the two Koreas.There
were similaritiesin the economicsituations
as well. The shattered industries of defeated Germany and defeated Japan had
1. KarlPolanyi, TheGreatTransformation:The
Political and EconomicOriginsof Our Time(Boston:
Beacon Press, 1957), chap. 1; Paul M. Kennedy,The
Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York:
CambridgeUniversity Press, 1976); idem, The Rise
and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random
House, 1988).
36
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICANACADEMY
Federal Republic-bureaucracy; in the
language of recent social theory, it was a
case of the society leading the state. The
resultwas that when Germanliberal capitalism looked to the world, it adopted a
policy of internationalliberalism,a policy
very much like thatof the UnitedStates. In
contrast,in Japanthe liberalcapitalistrestoration was led by the still-centralized
Japanese bureaucracy,with supportfrom
the Japanesetradingcompaniesandbanks;
it was a case of the stateleadingthe society.
The result was that when Japaneseliberal
TheAtlanticAllianceparadigm
capitalism looked to the world, it adopted
as a Pacific Basin fantasy
internationalmercantilism,a policy very
from that of the United States.3
different
This way of looking at the two realities,
The
greatest disasters in U.S. security
however, of course masked importantdifferences, and it would lead to monumental policy-toward China in the 1940s and
1950s and towardIndochinain the 1960s
disasters.
The way the communistrevolutionoc- and 1970s-resulted from the American
curredin Chinawas very differentfromthe effort to interpretthe Asian realitythrough
way it generally occurred in Eastern Eu- the Europeanprism, to squeeze it into the
rope. In the former, communism came to NATO model. Similarly,the greatestconflicts in U.S. foreigneconomic policy - topower throughstronglocal armedforces the People's LiberationArmy-with mod- ward Japanand the East Asian newly inest supportfrom the Soviet army in Man- dustrializingcountriesin the 1980s-have
churia. In the latter,communism came to resulted from the U.S. effort to squeeze
power throughthe occupying Soviet army, these countriesinto the GATTmodel.
with modestsupportfromweak local communistparties.2
THE PACIFICBASIN
PARADIGM:INTERNATIONAL
Further,the way liberal capitalism reMERCANTILISMAND
turnedto power in Japanwas very different
FINITEDETERRENCE
in
West
from the way it returned
Germany.
with
it
returned
it
is
In both countries,
true,
If we look at the Pacific/Asianworld in
the supportof theoccupying U.S. army,but
its own terms, and not in those of the Atthe local capitalistcoalitions were not the
world, a quite different
same. In Germany the liberal capitalist lantic/European
of
international
relationswill rerestoration was led by German corpora- paradigm
be
called
the
Pacific Basin
what
sult,
might
tions and banks,with supportfrom a nowparadigm.
fragmented- intothe differentstatesof the
much in common; George Kennan included both in his famous list of the five
world power centers-the others were the
United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain. The U.S. response to the economic
distress was the MarshallPlan in Western
Europe in 1947 and the New Course in
Japan in 1948. The U.S. response to the
security threatwas the militarydefense of
South Korea in 1950 and the military
buildupin West Germanyin 1951.
2. Thereare exceptions to this pattern,however:
communismcame to power in Chinaratheras it did in
YugoslaviaandAlbania,andit came to power in North
Korea ratheras it did in the rest of EasternEurope.
3. Clyde V. Prestowitz,Jr.,TradingPlaces: How
WeAllowedJapan to TaketheLead (New York:Basic
Books, 1988); ChalmersJohnson,MITIand the Japanese Miracle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1982).
PACIFICBASIN VERSUS ATLANTICALLIANCE
In regardto the internationaleconomy,
the East Asian states are not international
liberals but ratherinternationalmercantilists; that is, they believe in a strong state
guiding an organicsociety towardeffective
competition in the world economy, for the
purposeof increasingthepowerandwealth
of the state and society.4In regardto internationalsecurity,the East Asian states are
not cases so much of extended deterrence
as of finite deterrence.Japan,becauseof its
insular geography,and China, because of
its massive populationand its own nuclear
force, are much less likely targets of a
Soviet blitzkriegthanWesternEurope.The
problemof deterringthe Soviets in Asia is
more soluble and the solution more stable
than in Europe. The East Asian countries
have acknowledgedthis in theirown ways.
Japanhas recentlydevelopedits conceptof
"comprehensive security"; China earlier
developedits conceptof "people'swar."5As
we shall see, the securityconcept of finite
deterrencealso can fit neatlythe economic
concept of internationalmercantilism.
If a Pacific Basin internationalsystem
based upon the concepts of international
mercantilismand finite deterrencewere to
come into being, however, the United
Stateswould no longer be the core country
4. Bruce Cumings, "The Origins and Development of the NortheastAsian Political Economy: IndustrialSectors, ProductCycles, and Political Consequences," International Organization, 38(1):1-40
(Winter1984); Roy Hofheinz,Jr.,and KentE. Calder,
The Eastasia Edge (New York:Basic Books, 1982).
See also Prestowitz, TradingPlaces; Johnson, MITI
and the Japanese Miracle.
5. RobertW. Barnett,BeyondWar:Japan 'sConcept of ComprehensiveNational Security (McLean,
VA: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense,
1984); Ellis Joffe, "People'sWarunderModem Conditions: A Doctrine for Modem War,"China Quarterly, vol. 112 (Dec. 1987); Paul H. B. Godwin,
"ChangingConceptsof Doctrine, Strategyand Operations in the Chinese People's LiberationArmy 197887," ibid.
37
in the Pacific region. If internationalmercantilismwere adoptedby all of the major
states in the Pacific Basin, including the
United States, the United States would
close its open market. Similarly, if finite
deterrencewere adoptedby all of the major
states in the region, including the United
States, the United States would withdraw
its Seventh Fleet. But without the U.S.
open market and the U.S. Seventh Fleet,
the United States would be of little importance to Asia and the Pacific. Japan and
Chinawould become the core countriesof
the Pacific Basin, and the rest, including
the United States, would become the periphery,ratherlike LatinAmericahas been
in the inter-Americansystem.
It will be useful, therefore,to examine
the historicaloriginsof the EastAsian concepts of internationalmercantilismand finite deterrence,in the expectationthatthis
will better prepareus to discern their future. Although one or both of these concepts areheld in some versionby most East
Asian states, including the so-called little
tigers- South Korea,Taiwan,Hong Kong,
and Singapore-what gives them their
contemporaryweight is the fact that they
are held by Japanand China.
The moder historiesof these two greatest East Asian powers have been very different, in part because they have been so
intertwined,especially in the half century
from the Sino-JapaneseWar(1895-96) to
World War TI.China has experienced on
Chinese territory itself successively the
Opium Wars,the TaipingRebellion, a variety of foreign incursions and occupations,the Revolutionof 1911, the civil wars
of the warlord era, the Japanese invasion
and occupation, the civil war between the
Nationalistsandthe Communists,the Revolution of 1949, and the CulturalRevolution. The comparableevents thatJapanhas
experienced in the same period and on
38
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICANACADEMY
Japaneseterritoryitself have been only the
Meiji Restoration,the Americanbombings
during World War II, and the American
Occupation.
The consequence of this contrastis that
throughoutalmostall of its modernhistory,
China has not been a coherent state, one
holding a consensus ideology and guiding
a cohesive society in a concerted policy.
Conversely, throughoutalmost all of its
modernhistory,Japanhas been very much
that. It is only in recent years that the
Chinese state has become coherentenough
to supportand sustain its own versions of
internationalmercantilismandfinite deterrence. But the Japanese state has been
doing this for many decades.The Japanese
story, therefore,will be the center of our
discussion.
JAPANAS AN IMPERIAL
MERCANTILIST:FROMTHE
MEIJIRESTORATION
TO THE PACIFICWAR
The contrastingeconomic concepts of
liberalismand mercantilismare bound up
with contrastingrelative positions in the
timing of industrialization.The idea of liberalismcame naturallyto states thatindustrialized relatively early-particularly
Britainbut also the United States- andthe
idea of mercantilismsimilarly came naturally to states that industrializedrelatively
late, such as Germanyand Japan.The reasons for this contrasthave been much discussed by economic historians, and we
shall not repeatthemhere,6butwe can note
that the late industrializersneeded to protect theirinfantindustriesfrom the already
strong early industrializers,they needed
6. JamesR. Kurth,"ThePolitical Consequences
of the ProductCycle: IndustrialHistoryand Political
Outcomes," International Organization, 33(1):1-34
(Winter1979).
access to foreign marketsthatwere already
dominatedby the early industrializers,and
they needed large amounts of capital in
order to catch up with the early industrializers. For all of these reasons, they
needed a strong state and a mercantilist
policy to give protectionand direction to
the developing economy. A leading economic historian,AlexanderGerschenkron,
arguedthattherewas a generalpatternthat
the later a countrybegan its industrialization, the greaterwas the role of the state, in
a sequence composed of Britain, France,
Germany,Japan,and Russia.7
Japan as a
late industrializer
Within Europe the country that exemplified mercantilism was Germany, and
within Asia it was Japan. Consequently,
there were numeroussimilarities in their
historiesfromthe 1860s- the Germanunification and the Meiji Restoration-to
World War II. Japanese industrialization,
however, began about a generation later
thanthat of Germany.This was one factor
making the Japanese state even more
prominentand its policy even more mercantilist thanwas the case for Germany.
But while Japanwas like Germanyin
being a late industrializer,it was like Britain in being an island country. The first
condition led Japan to emphasize state
guidanceof the economy; the second led it
to emphasizeforeignmarkets.But because
its industrializationwas late, most foreign
marketswere already filled up by earlier
industrializers.Thus Japanhad to become
a late imperializeras well, and because it
was anislandcountry,it hadto be a sea-borne
empire, one supportedby naval power. In
7. Alexander Gerschenkron,Economic Backwardnessin Historical Perspective (Cambridge,MA:
HarvardUniversityPress, 1962).
PACIFICBASIN VERSUS ATLANTICALLIANCE
39
doing so, it began to emulate the leading Japan between
internationalliberalismand
maritimepower of the time, Britain.
imperialmercantilism
between
maritime
power
Japan
By the 1920s, both Germanyand Japan
and continentalpower
had developed industriesthatwere among
Japan'ssituationin relationto its conti- the most competitivein the world- princinent, Asia, was significantly different, pally chemicals in Germanyandtextiles in
however, from Britain's situation in rela- Japan.The prosperityof the decade meant
tion to its continent, Europe. Because thattherewas a good internationalmarket
China was united under one government, for theirgoods. Consequently,the ideas of
which, however,was weak - while Europe internationalliberalism became more atwas divided into several states, which, tractive in these two late industrializers
however, were strong-Japan had the op- than they had been before. But with the
portunityto invade the Asian mainland,an advent of the Great Depression, the open
opportunitythat Britainhad not had since internationalmarketwas replaced with a
it lost its territoriesin France in the fif- jungle of tradebarriers.Imperialmercanteenthcentury.Thus Japanwas a maritime tilism returned, and with a vengeance.
power that then tried to become also a Thus Japan invaded and occupied Mancontinental one. In doing so, it began to churiain 1931, becomingeven morea conemulate the leading continentalpower of tinentalpower thanbefore.
the time, Germany,as well as the leading
maritimeone, Britain.
The intellectualorigins
Japan's emulation of Britain helped
of internationalmercantilism
bringaboutthe Anglo-Japanesealliance of
1902. This in turnenabledJapanto underBy the late 1930s, Japanwas the home
takethe Russo-JapaneseWarof 1904-5 and of the most advancedmercantilisttheorists
to annexKorea(1905-10). In turn,the Rus- in the world. Japaneseeconomists develsian defeat in that war focused British at- oped sophisticatedconceptions of how a
tentionexclusively on Germanyas theonly state could nurturethe developmentof its
threateningcontinentalpower and helped society by competing within a dynamic
bring about the Anglo-Russian entente of world economy. It would not be until the
1907 andthe BritishentryintoWorldWarI. 1960s thatsome of these ideas, such as the
Japan's annexation of Korea was the producttrade cycle, would appearamong
beginning of its continentalpower. It was American economists, and then only
now in a positionfor an eventualexpansion amonga few.8These conceptionsprovided
into Manchuriaand even a full invasion the intellectual foundation for the induswhen the opportunity or the necessity trial strategy of the Japanese Ministry of
arose. The opportunitycame with the Chi- Commerceand Industryin the 1930s. But
nese Revolutionandthewarlordera(1911- these beginnings of an internationalver27); the necessity would arrive with sion of mercantilismwere abortedby the
ChiangKai-shek'sefforts to reunifyChina fulfillment of the imperial one, the Japaafter 1927 and especially with the coming
8. Cumings, "Northeast Political Economy,"
of the GreatDepression after 1929.
pp. 2-3; Prestowitz,TradingPlaces, pp. 105-11.
40
nese invasionof Chinaitself. The Ministry
of Commerceand Industrywould have to
be converted into the Ministry of Munitions duringthe war before it could be born
againas the Ministryof InternationalTrade
and Industryafterthe war.
Japan between China
and America
With its invasion of China in 1937,
Japan became still more a continental
power. Its emulation of Germany helped
bring about the TripartitePact with Germany and Italy in 1940. This in turn enabled Japan to expand into Indochina in
1940 and 1941 and to undertakewar with
the UnitedStates,beginningwith a preventive strikeand surpriseattackat PearlHarbor. The United States, in one of its first
efforts at extendeddeterrence,had in 1940
moved most of its Pacific Fleet from San
Diego and Long Beach to Pearl Harbor.
The resultwas the most dramaticfailureof
extended deterrencein history.In turn,the
Japanesewarwith the UnitedStateencouraged Hitlerto declarewar upon the United
States also, uniting the Europeanwar and
the Pacific war into a trulyworld war.9
The Chinapolicy was the projectof the
Japanesearmy;its purposewas to create a
mercantilist empire. The Pearl Harbor
strategy was the project of the Japanese
navy; its purpose was to ensure military
security for that empire. Together, the
Chinapolicy and the PearlHarborstrategy
combined the economic and the security
9. Since Japanalso attackedBritishpossessions
in East Asia at the time that it attackedPearl Harbor,
Britainwas thenat warwith Japanas well as Germany
and Italy; this technically would have linked the Europeanand Pacific wars, even if the United States had
not entered the Europeanone. But by itself, Britain
would not have been able to continue a war in the
Pacific, and in practicethe Europeanand Pacific wars
would have been separateones.
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICANACADEMY
goals of Japan, and they combined the
armyand the navy as the means to achieve
them. The result was supposed to be the
GreaterEastAsia Co-ProsperitySphere,an
ordered realm capable of international
mercantilismand comprehensivesecurity,
a splendid empire of the sun. The results
were actually to be the Pacific War, the
largestnaval battlesin history,the artificial
suns over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the
U.S. occupationof Japan,and the American Century.
JAPANAS AN INTERNATIONAL
MERCANTILIST:FROMTHE
AMERICANOCCUPATIONTO
THE JAPANESEASCENDANCY
With the end of WorldWarII, the Japanese armywas replacedby the U.S. army,
which continued to perform some of the
same roles as the Japanese army had before, that is, it fought and remained in
Koreain large measureto ensure the militarysecurity of Japan.Similarly,the Japanese navy was replacedby the U.S. navy,
which continued to perform some of the
same roles as the Japanese navy had before: it providedopen marketsfor Japanese
goods in Southeast Asia and ensured the
freeflow of oil to JapanfromIndonesiaand
the PersianGulf. It had been the oil embargo of the United States, the leading oil
exporterof 1941andthe SaudiArabiaof the
day, that had actuallydriven the Japanese
governmentto the decision to seize the oil
of the DutchEastIndies,the predecessorto
Indonesia,andto protectthe strategicflank
of that oil lifeline with a preventivestrike
on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.
The supremacyof
the bureaucracy
Withoutits own army and navy, Japan
no longer had its own continentalstrategy
PACIFICBASIN VERSUS ATLANTICALLIANCE
or maritimestrategy.What was left was a
broken economy scattered about the one
pillar that remainedfrom the prewarorder
andthatthereforebecame the commanding
height of postwarJapan:the bureaucracy.
The American Occupation reinforced
these conditions. By destroying the old
militaryandby institutionalizinga limit on
a new military within the new constitution-article 9-the Americans removed
one pillar of the prewartriple alliance of
military,industry,andbureaucracy.By dismantling the industrialzaibatsu, if only
temporarily,they also reduced a second
pillar.By relyingon thebureaucracyforthe
actual administrationof Japan during the
Occupation, the Americans enhanced the
role of the remaining pillar and thereby
confirmed its supremacy.Since it still had
its own bureaucracy,Japanstill hadits own
industrialstrategy.
The synthesisof
internationalmercantilism
Thus the MacArthurOccupationrecapitulatedthe Meiji Restoration.The foundation was once again laid for state guidance of the economy, but this time it would
be directed exclusively to an industrial
strategytargetedon internationalmarkets,
not imperialones. With the conclusion of
the Occupation,the Japanesestate was in
an even betterposition to lead the Japanese
society than it had been before WorldWar
II and to lead it with a particularvision.
That vision combined the best of the two
conflicting visions of prewar Japan, the
internationalliberalism of the 1920s and
the imperial mercantilism of the 1930s.
The vision was internationalmercantilism.
The only power that could oppose the
internationalmercantilism of Japan was
the United States, but it did not choose to
41
do so. Why the UnitedStatesdid not, when
it was promotingliberalismand opposing
mercantilismso vigorously in Europe,has
been the subjectof considerablescholarly
analysis. Robert Gilpin argues that the
dominantconsiderationin U.S. policy was
internationalsecurity, ratherthan international economy.'? In Europe, the United
States had several major allies; it could
play them off against each other. In Asia,
the United States had only one majorally,
and that was Japan;this gave Japanmuch
greaterbargainingpowerthanwas the case
with any one Europeanally. In any event,
internationalmercantilismremainedintact
in Japanandlargelyhas continuedso down
to the presentday.
The internationalmercantilismof Japan
andotherEastAsian statesconceives of the
state as guiding society toward effective
competition in the world market, for the
purposeof increasingthepowerandwealth
of the state and society, but it also conceives of this competition as taking place
within a context of dynamic, not static,
comparative advantage, where the state
helps society to move progressivelyhigher
on the ladderof technology,to shift out of
low-technology and low-wage industries
and into high-technology and high-wage
ones. As a countrymoves up from a lower
rung on the technological ladder, other
countries- especially EastAsian newly industrializingcountries- will move uponto
it. Thus internationalmercantilism conceives the world economic competitionto
be not a zero-sumbut a positive-sumgame;
not only one but many countrieswill benefit, and these benefits will be not only
short-termgains but long-term develop10. RobertGilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation:ThePolitical Economyof Foreign
Direct Investment(New York: Basic Books, 1975),
pp. 109-11.
42
ment. But this mutual development requires the more advanced countriesto be
continually developing new technologies
and new industries, so that they can devolve theirold industriesto less developed
countries. This in turn requires the guidance of a strong and coherentstate.
The concepts of
comprehensivesecurity
and finite deterrence
Because Japancould no longer provide
for its own security with its own military,
it had to constructa functionalequivalent
with a combinationof U.S. militarypower,
its own economic power, and, in casesfor example, the Middle East-where neither of these was very useful, its own lowposture diplomacy. It is this comprehensive combinationthat has become the
concept of comprehensivesecurity,but the
core of comprehensive security has been
economic power.
Within the frameworkof comprehensive security, the concept of finite deterrence could become especially reasonable.
Japan,because of its insulargeography,is
a much less likely targetof a Soviet blitzkrieg thanis WestGermanyand moregenerally WesternEurope.The problemof deterrence of Soviet military aggression
againstJapanis more soluble and the solution is more stable than they are with respect to Europe.
Of course, Japanese finite deterrence,
unlike thatof Chinaor France,cannotrely
upon a nationalnuclearforce. The artificial
suns over Hiroshima and Nagasaki producedin Japanan enduringnuclearallergy,
so therecan be no Japanesenucleardeterrent. Further,Japanese finite deterrence
would really be extended deterrencein the
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICANACADEMY
sense that it would have to be extended
beyond the national territory,namely, to
include South Korea. But Japanesedeterrence would still be extended only into a
rathersmall countryagainst a rathersmall
adversary,North Korea. South Korea is
now a plausible target of only a North
Korean blitzkrieg-like the one in June
1950 - not a Soviet one - unlikeWestGermany- and not even a Chineseone, unlike
the one in November 1950.
CONTRADICTIONAND
COOPERATIONIN CONCEPT
At first glance it might seem that the
Japaneseconceptsof internationalmercantilism and finite deterrencewould be in
fundamentalcontradictionto theAmerican
concepts of internationalliberalism and
extendeddeterrence.The decade-longdisputes between Japanand the United States
over economic and security issues would
seem to provide sufficient evidence that
this is the case.
In reality,however,Japanand the other
East Asian states benefit from the U.S.
policies of internationalliberalismand extendeddeterrence,even thoughtheywould
not adoptthe policies for themselves.From
their perspective, the best world is one in
which the United States has policies of
internationalliberalism and extended deterrencewhile they pursue policies of internationalmercantilismand finite deterrence. Even within the United States,
however, there are importantgroups who
find Japaneseeconomic and security conceptions quite acceptable.This is most obviously the case with the general notion of
comprehensivesecurity,but it is also true
of internationalmercantilismandfinite deterrence, ideas that are the opposite of
Americanways of thinking.
43
PACIFICBASIN VERSUS ATLANTICALLIANCE
Comprehensivesecurity and
complex interdependence
The Japanese concept of comprehensive securityhas much in commonwith the
American concept of complex interdependence. This is the idea that economic
issues have joined security issues as high
politics, that economic conditions constrain military adventurism and military
spending, and that internationalinterdependence has transformedthe traditional
pursuitof nationalinterests.The conceptof
complex interdependenceis clearlyconsistent with, indeed is a logical extension of,
the concept of international liberalism.
When the advocates of complex interdependence do turntheirattentionto security
issues, they usually support a policy of
arms-controlagreements with the Soviet
Union, that is, the detente of the early
1970s and the new detente of the late
1980s.
Like the concept of internationalliberalism, the concept of complex interdependence comes naturallyto a particular
group within a nation, for example, to financial institutions engaged in international business. Such ideas formed the
basic world- view of the City of London
from the middle of the nineteenthcentury
until WorldWarII, and they have formed
the basic worldview of the international
banks of New York since the 1960s. The
policy of the City of London towardNazi
Germanyin the 1930s was thatof appeasement; the policy of the New York banks
towardthe Soviet Union in the 1970s and
again in the late 1980s has been that of
detente." This is not to say that the policy
11. JamesR. Kurth,"TravelsbetweenEuropeand
America: The Rise and Decline of the New York
ForeignPolicy Elite,"forthcomingin a volume edited
by MartinShefterfor the New YorkCity Projectof the
Social Science ResearchCouncil.
of the Soviet Union has been the same as
that of Nazi Germanyand that the policy
of detentethereforehas been mistaken.
Internationalmercantilismand
internationalliberalism
The response of these same intereststo
the concept of internationalmercantilism,
held by Japanand other Asian nations as
well, is rathermore complex, but it also
ends in acceptance.The U.S. financial institutions can accept the combination of
American international liberalism and
Asian internationalmercantilismbecause
the gap between the two is a void thatthey
can fill. Internationalmercantilismcan create dynamic industries,but it is slower to
develop cosmopolitan financial services;
the growth of industrialexports outpaces
the developmentof internationalfinancial
connections. The dynamic industries of
one country will need the sophisticated
financial institutions of another country,
which, however, are willing to provide
these services to any rich country. Conversely, a successful mercantilismmay be
so successful that it can make it in the
interest of almost anyone to make a deal
with it. The U.S. financialcommunitysees
itself in this role vis-a-vis the mercantilist
industriesof Asia today,just as the City of
London saw itself in this role vis-a-vis the
protectionistindustriesof America in the
nineteenthcentury.
The financial institutionsare joined in
their internationalliberalismby other important American interests, particularly
multinational corporations that produce
abroadfor sale at home and professional
groups-lawyers, doctors, professorsthat provide services that by their nature
cannot be imported and therefore do not
face foreign competition. Together, they
form a solid political coalition in support
44
of internationalliberalism and in acceptance of the internationalmercantilismof
other nations. On the other hand, workers
engaged in the production of tradableimportable-goods are steadily displaced
from theirjobs. The result, or at least the
cliche, is the son of a $40,000-a-year autoworkerbecoming a $10,000-a-year fastfood worker.
Thus the nationsthat adhereto international liberalism,in particularBritainand
the UnitedStates,graduallydivide intotwo
parts-indeed, two nations-one that is
benefitedby an open economy andone that
is devastatedby it. Conversely,the nations
that adhere to internationalmercantilism,
especially JapanandSouth Korea,become
even more united, indeed organic, nations
than they were before.
Finite deterrenceand
extendeddeterrence
There are also groupswithin the United
States with a similar response to the concept of finite deterrenceheld by Japanand
otherAsian nations.The U.S. militaryservices can acceptthe combinationof American extended deterrenceand Asian finite
deterrence because the gap between the
two is a void that they can fill. The gap
provides a role and a rationalefor the U.S.
Navy in the westernPacific, the U.S. Army
in South Korea, the U.S. Marines in Okinawa, and the U.S. Air Force in all three.'2
The interestsof the militaryservices, of
course, arenot the most importantfactorin
deciding where they will be deployed, especially in an era when Congress will cut
defense spending.But the same solid polit-
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICANACADEMY
ical coalitionof financialinstitutions,multinationalcorporations,and liberalprofessionals that prospers in the gap between
American international liberalism and
Asian internationalmercantilismalso finds
acceptablethe gap between Americanextended deterrenceand Asian finite deterrence. The mutualbenefits that are the result of the first gap are, in their minds,
protectedby the extended deterrencethat
is partof the second.
In addition,thereare emergingthe elements of a grand bargain between the
banks in America and the banks in Japan.
The former are experienced in international lending but poor in cash-or rich in
bad loans; the latter are just the reverse.
The American banks hope to direct the
flow of Japanesecapital to their own advantage- for example, toward helping to
fundthe LatinAmericandebt;the Japanese
banks hope to continue to operate within
the cheap security system provided for
themby Americanmilitaryforces. The obvious bargainto be struckis for the Americanbanksto continueto supportAmerican
extended deterrencein the Pacific Basin,
while the Japanesebanksbegin to provide
capital to the grandprojectsof the American banks,particularlyin LatinAmerica."3
FROMTHE PACIFICWAR
TO THE PACIFICPACIFIC
The 1990s,a halfcenturyafterthePacific
War,will be a period of tension between
two internationalrelationsparadigms:(1)
the declining one of internationalliberalism and extended deterrence,created by
the United States in the Atlantic/European
12. I have discussed the maritimestrategyof the
13. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America'sNew GeoU.S. Navy in my "United States and the North Pa- strategy," Foreign Affairs, 66(4):696-99 (Spring
cific," in Security and Arms Control in the North 1988); RobertGilpin, The Political Economyof InterPacific, ed. AndrewMackandPaulKeal (Winchester, national Relations (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniverMA: George Allen & Unwin, 1988), pp. 27-49.
sity Press, 1987), pp. 328-39.
PACIFICBASIN VERSUS ATLANTICALLIANCE
world and extended by it into the Pacific/Asian world, the paradigm of the
American half century; and (2) the rising
one of internationalmercantilismandfinite
deterrence, created by the Pacific/Asian
powers themselves, the paradigm of the
future.The two paradigmsarein an uneasy
but symbiotic relationship.The relationship between the AtlanticAlliance and the
Pacific Basin paradigmsis ratherlike the
relationship between yin and yang, that
famous Asian symbol thatappearsin many
places in Asian life, includingthe centerof
the South Koreanflag. The Atlantic Alliance paradigmis waning and the Pacific
Basin paradigmis waxing, but each is intimately- and dialectically- connected to
the other.
In its contemporary version, international mercantilism can mean economic
cooperationbetween the states of the Pacific Basin in a reasonable but changing
division of laborbased upon dynamic, not
static, comparativeadvantagein the internationalmarket.Similarly,comprehensive
security can mean comprehensivecooperation between the states of the Pacific
Basin, with military deterrence directed
only at the most finite security objective,
the protectionof the nationalterritory.
A half century ago Japan adheredto a
harsherversion of internationalmercantilism and comprehensivesecurity: imperial
45
mercantilismandEastAsian hegemony.In
pursuit of these policies, Japan warred
upon the other great Asian power, China.
In doing so, it came into conflict with the
Americanparadigmof internationalliberalism-the open door in China-and extended deterrence-the U.S. forces in the
Philippinesand the U.S. fleet at PearlHarbor. This in turn opened the way for the
Pacific War,the Americanvictory,and the
Americanhalf century.
If Japanand China should again come
into conflict, as they did a half centuryago,
the outcome of the tension between the
AtlanticAlliance andthe Pacific Basinparadigm is likely to be a descent into chaos
and a journey into the unknown,although,
of course, not necessarilyin a way like the
Pacific War. Conversely, if Japan and
China should come into cooperation,even
morethanthey have in the past decade,the
outcome of the tensionbetween the Atlantic Alliance and the Pacific Basin paradigms is likely to be the gradualwaning of
the first and waxing of the second, the
dialectic of yin and yang.
The AtlanticAlliance paradigmand the
AmericanCenturyenteredintotheirhistoric
moment throughthe Pacific War.The Pacific Basin paradigmand the Pacific Centurywill enterinto theirhistoricalmoment
only if the Pacific Basin remainspacific.