‘Omen’, a non-modal evidential particle
contributing to the truth-conditions of
the utterance
Larraitz Zubeldia
ILCLI and UCL
The nature of evidentiality
Leiden, 15-06-2012
1. Introduction
Three ways, at least, of analysing the
evidential elements:
(i) as illocutionary force indicators (Faller 2002)
(ii) as epistemic modals with an evidential
presupposition (Izvorski 1997; Matthewson et al.
2007)
(iii) as contributing to the not-at-issue component
of the assertion (Murray 2010).
A different analysis needed for ‘omen’.
2
1. Introduction (II)
Contribution to the propositional content, but
a non-modal element.
Tests to distinguish between:
(i) contributing to the truth-conditions vs. being an
illocutionary force indicator
the assent/dissent test
the scope test
(ii) being a modal vs. non-modal element
felicity tests.
3
2. Previous proposals
Illocutionary force analysis (Faller 2002, e.g.):
Cuzco Quechua evidentials: illocutionary modifiers
(speech act theory, Searle 1969).
E.g., reportative enclitic ‘-si’:
Para-sha-n-si.
rain-prog-3-si
p=‘It is raining.’
ill=present(p)
sinc={∃s2[Assert(s2, p) ∧ s2 ∉ {h, s}]}
4
2. Previous proposals (II)
Modal analysis (Izvorski 1997 and Matthewson et
al. 2007, e.g.):
Evidential elements in Bulgarian and St’át’imcets:
contribute a modal content (that p is (possibly) and
necessarily true)
the evidential content is a presupposition that restricts the
modal base.
E.g., “a sentence of the form [ku7] is felicitous whenever the speaker
came to believe the content of p by means of a report from some other
5
person.” (Matthewson et al. 2007: 204)
2. Previous proposals (III)
Contribution to the not-at-issue content (Murray
2010):
The utterances with evidentials have three components:
(i) the presentation of the at-issue proposition
(ii) the evidential restriction or a non-negotiable update
the type of evidence
(iii) the illocutionary relation or a negotiable update
a proposal about what to do with the at-issue content.
6
3. How to analyse ‘omen’?
Two main claims from the ‘standard’ view on
‘omen’ (Euskaltzaindia 1987, Mitxelena 1987,
Sarasola 1996, e.g.):
a. ‘Omen’ signals that the proposition the speaker
expresses was said by someone other than herself.
Contribution issue.
b. The speaker expresses uncertainty on the truth (or
falsity) of the proposition expressed.
Issue on the speaker’s expression of uncertainty.
7
3. How to analyse ‘omen’? (II)
Contribution to the proposition expressed or
an illocutionary force indicator?
A modal or a non-modal element?
8
3.1. Contribution to the propositional content
vs. illocutionary force indicator
Two of the tests:
The assent/dissent test
The scope test
9
3.1.1. The assent/dissent test
If an element can be questioned, doubted,
rejected or accepted, it contributes to the
propositional content of the speech act;
otherwise, it should be taken as an
illocutionary force indicator. (e.g., Faller 2006)
10
3.1.1. Assent/dissent test (II)
Applied to a simple utterance, e.g.
(1) “Euri-a
rain-det.sg.abs
ari
omen d-u”
prog
rep
3sg.abs.prs-have
‘It is said that it’s raining.’
the test involves responses such as:
(a) “egia
al
da
hori?”
q
3sg.abs.prs.be
that
da
egia
hori”
3sg.abs.prs.be
true.det.sg
that
true.det.sg
‘is that true?’; or
(b) “ez
no
‘that’s not true’; or
(c) “egia”
true.det.sg
‘true’.
11
3.1.1. Assent/dissent test (III)
The question: what we are challenging by (a), rejecting by (b)
or accepting by (c):
that it is raining (p) or
that someone else said that it is raining (pomen)?
12
About p
(2) a: “Egia
true.det.sg
al
da
euri-a
ari
q
3sg.abs.prs.be
rain-det.sg.abs
prog
d-u-ela?”
3sg.abs.prs-have-comp
‘Is it true that it’s raining? I can’t hear it.’
b: “Ez
no
da
egia
euri-a
ari
3sg.abs.prs.be
true.det.sg
rain-det.sg.abs
prog
d-u-ela,
urdin-urdin
3sg.abs.prs-have-comp blue.blue
da-go
eta”
3sg.abs.prs-be
as
‘It’s not true that it’s raining, as it’s completely cloudless.’
c: “Egia
da
euri-a
ari
d-u-ela.
true.det.sg
3sg.abs.prs.be
rain-det.sg.abs
prog
3sg.abs.prs-have-comp
Ez
al
d-u-zu
entzu-ten?”
no
q
3sg.abs.prs-have-2sg.erg
hear-ipfv
‘It’s true that it’s raining. Can’t you hear it?’
13
About the ‘omen’-utterance (pomen):
(3) a: “Egia
al
da
hori?
Benetan
true.det.sg
q
3sg.abs.prs.be
that
really
norbait-ek
esan
di-zu
hori?”
someone-erg say.pfv
3sg.abs.prs-2sg.dat
that
‘Is it true? Did anybody tell you that?’
b: “Ez
no
da
egia
hori.
3sg.abs.prs.be
true.det.sg that
Ez
di-zu
no
3sg.abs.prs-2sg.dat
inor-k
esan,
zu-k
asma-tu
someone-erg
say.pfv
you-erg
make.up-pfv
d-u-zu”
3sg.abs.prs-have-2sg.erg
‘That’s not true. Nobody told you that, you’ve made it up.’
c: “Egia.
Ni-k
ere
adi-tu
d-u-t”
true.det.sg I-erg
also
hear-pfv
3sg.abs.prs-have-1sg.erg
‘True. I also heard that.’
14
3.1.1. Assent/dissent test (VI)
An experiment, restricted to the rejection response
(Zubeldia 2010).
Several scenarios and conversations:
half with ‘omen’-utterances
half with ‘esan’ (‘to say’)-utterances.
The participants had to evaluate two answers:
one rejects p
the other one rejects pomen.
15
Z=-.914, n=22, p=.361
Z=-.517, n=22, p=.605, two-tailed
Z=-.404, n=22, p=.686
Z=-.629, n=22, p=.529
16
3.1.1. Assent/dissent test (VIII)
It looks as if ‘omen’ contributes its reportative
meaning to the propositional contents of the
utterance.
Some people doubt the validity of the
assent/dissent test (e.g., Matthewson et al.
2007; Koontz-Garboden 2009; Murray 2010;
Matthewson to appear).
But another test: the scope test.
17
3.1.2. Scope test
Scope criterion (e.g., Recanati 1989): If an element is in
the scope of a (logical) operator, then it contributes to
the propositional content of the utterance.
‘Omen’ gets narrow scope within:
sentential (external) negation
communicative predicates: e.g.,
‘esan’ (‘to say’)
‘erantzun’ (‘to answer’)
knowledge predicates: e.g.,
‘kontuan hartu’ (to take into account’).
18
3.1.2. Scope test (II)
External negation
(4) “Ez da
no
3sg.abs.prs.be
egia
euri-a
ari
omen
true.det.sg
rain-det.sg.abs
prog
rep
d-u-ela”
3sg.abs.prs-have-comp
‘It is not true that it is said that it is raining.’
The utterance must be interpreted as
(5) IT IS NOT TRUE THAT SOMEONE ELSE SAID THAT IT IS RAINING
and not as
(6)
SOMEONE ELSE SAID THAT IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT IS RAINING
19
3.1.2. Scope test
(III)
Knowledge predicate:
(7) “Ez z-u-en
no
3sg.erg.pst-have-pst
kontuan
har-tu 36-ko
gerra
into.account
take-pfv
war.det.sg
36-gen
has-i
zenean,
Lizardi-ren
alargun-ak
start-pfv
when
Lizardi-gen
widow-det.sg.erg
Oria ibai-ra bota
omen z-it-u-ela
Oria
rep
river-adl
throw.pfv
liburu
gehien-ak”
book
most-det.pl
3sg.erg.pst-3pl.abs-have-comp
‘(S)he did not take into account that, when the war of 36 started,
Lizardi’s widow threw most of the books to the Oria river.’
20
3.1.2. Scope test (IV)
It must be interpreted as
(8) (S)HE DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT SOMEONE ELSE
SAID THAT LIZARDI’S WIDOW THREW MOST OF THE BOOKS TO
THE ORIA RIVER
and not as
(9) SOMEONE ELSE SAID THAT (S)HE DID NOT TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT THAT LIZARDI’S WIDOW THREW MOST OF THE BOOKS
TO THE ORIA RIVER
21
3.1.3. Further tests
No contradiction:
(10) “Euri-a
ari
omen d-u,
baina
ez
prog
rep
3sg.abs.prs-have
but
no
d-u-t
uste
euri-rik ari
d-u-en-ik”
3sg.abs.prs-have-1sg.erg
think
rain-prtv
3sg.abs.prs-have-comp-prtv
rain-det.sg.abs
prog
‘It is said that it is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining.’
(11) “Euri-a
ari
omen d-u,
baina
ez
rain-det.sg.abs
prog
rep
but
no
d-u
ari
euri-rik”
3sg.abs.prs-have prog
3sg.abs.prs-have
rain-prtv
‘It is said that it is raining, but it is not raining.’
22
3.1.3. Further tests (II)
Contradiction
(12) #“Euri-a
rain-det.sg.abs
ari
omen du,
baina
prog
rep
but
3sg.abs.prs-have
inor-k
ez
d-u
esan
euri-a
someone-erg
no
3sg.abs.prs-have
say.pfv
rain-det.sg.abs
ari
d-u-ela”
prog 3sg.abs.prs-have-comp
‘It is said that it is raining, but nobody said that it is raining.’
23
3.1. Contribution to the propositional content vs.
illocutionary force indicator (II)
‘Omen’ does not affect the illocutionary force of
the utterance, but rather its propositional content.
An ‘omen’-utterance reporting p does not assert
that p, but that someone else stated that p.
This result similar to the results of:
McCready & Ogata (2007) for Japanese evidentials.
Ifantidou (2001) for Greek ‘taha’.
Schenner (2008) for German ‘sollen’.
24
3.2. Modal vs. non-modal
Two main ways of understanding modality:
as quantifying over possible worlds
(à la Matthewson et al. 2007, e.g.)
as encoding the speaker’s degree of certainty
(à la de Haan 1999, e.g.).
25
3.2.1. Quantifying over possible worlds
Felicity tests: (in)felicitous if the reported
proposition is
(i) known to be true and
(ii) known to be false.
26
3.2.1. Quantifying over possible worlds (II)
(9) Gauza-k
thing-det.pl.abs
ondo
omen d-oa-z.
Bada, gauza-k
well
rep
3pl.abs.prs-go-3pl
yet
thing-det.pl.abs
ez
d-oa-z
ondo,
eta
are
okerr-ago
no
3pl.abs.prs-go-3pl.
well
and
even
bad-more
joan-go
dira
kontu-ak
etorkizun
go-prosp
3pl.abs.prs.be
thing-det.pl.abs
future
hurbil-ea-n (…) (Berria, 28-07-2009: 5)
near-det.sg-loc
‘It is said that things are going well. Yet things are not going well,
and things will go even worse in the near future.’
27
3.2.1. Quantifying over possible worlds (III)
(10) (…) baño gu-re
but
we-gen
osaba-k
eta
oik
oñ-ez
uncle-det.pl.abs
and
they.abs
foot-ins
jute
emen-tzien
Ordizi-a
lane-a,
go-ipfv
rep-3pl.abs.pst.be
Ordizia-adl
work-adl
oñez,
oñez,
oñez.” (Oral)
foot-ins
foot-ins
foot-ins
‘It is said that our uncles and they used to go to Ordizia on foot, on
foot, on foot, on foot.’
‘Omen’ is felicitous if the reported proposition is known to
be true/false (see, also, Faller 2002 and Murray 2010,
28
e.g.).
3.2.1. Quantifying over possible worlds (IV)
Further arguments to exclude a modal analysis:
1. If we took the evidential content as a
presupposition, what would be asserted in the
utterance? p?
2. Presuppositions cancellable (see, a.o., Beaver
2001; Green 2000; Potts 2007; Soames 1989).
However, the ‘omen’-utterance cannot be cancelled.
3. The presuppositional account cannot explain
properly the embedding cases (McCready and Ogata
2007).
29
3.2.2. Encoding the speaker’s degree of certainty
A quite general assumption in Basque linguistics: the
speaker using an ‘omen’-utterance expresses uncertainty
(Euskaltzaindia, The Royal Academy of the Basque
Language 1987, e.g.).
But not all ‘omen’-utterances carry that meaning The
expression of uncertainty not part of the semantic meaning.
It must be a pragmatic content:
part of Gricean ‘what is said’?
an implicature?
Cancellability ‘test’ (Grice 1967a, 1967b) as a criterion.
30
3.2.2. Encoding the speaker’s degree of certainty (II)
(15) “Upel
barrel
bat
irits-i
zai-t
one
arrive-pfv
3sg.abs.prs-be-1sg.dat
Amantillado-a
omen
d-en-a” (Poe 2000: 118)
Amantillado-det.sg
rep
3sg.abs.prs.be-comp-det.sg
‘A barrel has arrived for me, which is said to be Amantillado.’
(16) “baina
but
zalantza-n
na-bil
hala
ote d-en”
doubt-ins
1sg.abs.prs-be
so
q
3sg.abs.prs.be-comp
‘but I doubt that (it is so).’
(17) “Ziur
na-go
hala
d-ela,
sure
1.sg.abs.prs-be
so
3sg.abs.prs.be-comp smell-det.sg.ins
ezagun
d-u”
evident
3sg.abs.prs-have
‘I’m sure it is, you can tell from the smell.’
usain-ean
31
3.2.2. Encoding the speaker’s degree of
certainty (III)
The
expression of uncertainty cancellable
implicature of ‘omen’-utterances.
But
an
what kind?
Conventional?
Conversational?
32
3.2.2. Encoding the speaker’s degree of
certainty (IV)
No a conventional implicature.
Questioned in post-Gricean pragmatics (Bach 1999,
e.g.).
Not cancellable.
A conversational implicature. But what kind?
particularized?
generalized? (GCI)
It seems the case with ‘omen’:
Inferred from the utterance of an ‘omen’-sentence, assuming
that the speaker is observing the Cooperative Principle, and
33
the second maxim of quality.
3.2.2. Encoding the speaker’s degree of
certainty (V)
‘Omen’:
✓ contributes to the propositional content of the
utterance
✗ an illocutionary force indicator
✗ a modal element.
34
3.3. Contributing to the not-at-issue content
Previous proposal:
My proposal:
the reported proposition the main proposition
the evidential meaning/contribution an illocutionary force
indicator/presupposition/not-at-issue content.
Two ≠ propositions:
The proposition p expressed by an utterance without ‘omen’
≠
The proposition pomen expressed by an ‘omen’-utterance.
Murray (2010: 92):
The not-at-issue content “updates the common ground, but
it is not negotiable and cannot be directly challenged or 35
denied”.
4. Conclusion
None of the previous proposals is valid for
analysing the Basque reportative particle ‘omen’:
✗ an illocutionary force indicator
✓ contributes to the propositional content of the
utterance
✗ a modal element.
A fourth way of analysis: contribution to the
propositional (at-issue) content of the utterance,
but a non-modal element.
36
4. Conclusion (II)
Contributing to the proposition expressed ≠
being a modal element:
A number of other tests have been advanced in the
literature for distinguishing modal from non-modal
evidentials. (…) Here I will concentrate on the two
main tests which distinguish modal from non-modal
analyses, namely whether the evidential can be
semantically embedded under propositional operators,
and whether the evidential has modal content which
can be directly challenged. (Matthewson to appear:
14)
37
5. Further work
In a narrow sense:
To analyse the non-canonical use of ‘omen’
(Etxepare 2010).
To analyse other evidential elements:
‘ei’
‘bide’.
To study the question particles ‘al’ and ‘ote’.
In a wider sense:
Any contribution to the debate on the relationship
between evidentiality and epistemic modality?
38
Acknowledments
Dr. Kepa Korta and Prof. Robyn Carston.
Corey Benom, Kasper Boye, Richard Breheny, Eros Corazza, Bert
Cornillie, Martina Faller, Thiago Galery, Joana Garmendia, Bittor
Hidalgo, Mikhail Kissine, Jesus M. Larrazabal, María Ponte,
Nausicaa Pouscoulous, Daniel Sax, Kate Scott, Ye Tian, Jyrki
Tuomainen.
Funding resources: Postdoctoral grant by the Basque Government,
project of the Basque Government (IT323-10) and the Spanish
Ministry of Science and Innovation (FFI2009-08574).
39
Corpora
Gonzalez, Ventura (2009): “Ikastoletan, urak dakarrena urak
daroa”. Berria, 28-07-2009: 5.
Lertxundi, Anjel (2001): Mentura dugun artean. Irun:
Alberdania.
Poe, Edgar Allan (2000): Kontakizunak. Euba: Ibaizabal.
(Translation: Koro Navarro).
Ereduzko prosa gaur, The Basque Institute of UPV-EHU, The
Basque Institute of UPV-EHU, http://www.ehu.es/euskaraorria/euskara/ereduzkoa/).
Oral corpus. Data collected by the recordings made along
with my colleague Asier Aizpurua, in 2001.
40
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44
Eskerrik asko!
Thank you!