HISTCOM.2
Histoire interne de la Commission européenne 1973-1986
Entretien avec
Peter SUTHERLAND
par Laurent Warlouzet
à Londres le 8 septembre 2011
Transcription révisée par Peter Sutherland
Coordonnateur du projet :
Université catholique de Louvain (UCL, Louvain-la-Neuve),
dans le cadre d’un financement de la Commission européenne.
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Entretien avec Peter SUTHERLAND (08.09.2011)
LW : Laurent Warlouzet
PS : Peter Sutherland
Before the interview, a document was exchanged to prepare the meeting in July and August
2011.
Written Interview
LW: During your career in Brussels, did you belong to (or lead) societies or clubs concerned
with European issues?
PS: Fine Gael/Christian Democrats, ICEM, IIEA, Kangaroo Group, Davos WEF, Ambrosetti
Group
LW: Which were your first contacts with other nationalities and other languages within the
Commission?
PS: Meetings with Jacques Delors, Abbaye de Royaumont sessions.
LW: Where did Commissioner socialize?
PS: Commission lunches, receptions, dinners at home.
LW: Did you see a lot of some of your colleagues outside of work?
PS: Personally, frequently, mostly at dinners in each other’s homes.
LW: How was your work organized? What were your relationships with your cabinet, your
DG?
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PS: Objectives were established in annual work programmes agreed with DGs and
incorporated in Commission work programmes. Work was organised on a weekly basis
around the timetable of Commission meetings, preparatory Cabinet meetings, meetings with
officials from the DGs, negotiations within the Council of Ministers, communication with the
European Parliament, bilateral meetings with Ministers from EU member states, visits to
member states with both governmental and non-governmental interlocutors, visits to the
Commission, including from industry chief executives, etc.
Meetings with the DG involved not only the Director General but also all officials at all levels
involved in the matter under review. Preparation for Commission meetings was closely coordinated by Chef de Cabinet and involved extensive discussion of issues coming up for
decision in the Commission with all members of the Cabinet.
Although prime focus was on matters directly related to portfolio responsibilities
(competition, social affairs including education, and inter-institutional relations with the
European Parliament), important time was given too to non-portfolio issues of general
importance to the college (agriculture, trade, industry, telecommunications, development,
external relations, etc.).
LW: How did you recruit your close collaborators (cabinet, DG officials)?
PS: I recruited my Chef and Deputy Chef a few months before taking office. My Chef who
had extensive experience of EU affairs was a serving diplomat with the Irish Department of
Foreign Affairs and my Deputy Chef had previously served as Chef of my Irish predecessor
in the Commission. I chose a Belgian lawyer, a fonctionnaire with the Commission, as my
principal adviser on anti-trust matters. I chose an outside agricultural expert as my adviser on
budget and agriculture matters. Two other advisers, both fonctionnaires within the
Commission, were my advisers on state aid on the one hand and external relations, social
affairs and inter-institutional relations on the other – both subsequently went on to become
Secretaries General of the Commission. DG officials were already in service and continued
throughout my period in office. An official in DG Social Affairs was also attached to my
Cabinet as an adviser on social affairs.
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LW: I interviewed John Temple-Lang who mentioned that he had been approached to become
chef de cabinet. Why did you choose a diplomat instead of a specialist of Competition Policy?
Was it because the chef was more concerned with others portfolios rather than with
competition policy?
PS: I was fortunate to be able to consider a wide range of very well qualified people for the
position of Chef de Cabinet. In the end, I chose Richard O’Toole, who had already developed
a considerable reputation in the Irish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had extensive experience of
EU and international economic negotiations, had an excellent knowledge of the internal
functioning of the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the
system of European Political Co-operation. He was also fully familiar with the main
principles underlying competition policy, both anti-trust and state aid. Although he did not
have a legal background, he shared my view on the economic and political importance of EU
competition policy as an essential pillar in completing the EU internal market and strongly
favoured my seeking the competition policy brief. We also shared a view on the responsibility
of the Commission as a college to function collectively and coherently across all areas of
policy and not only to manage a vertical department forming part of a specific portfolio.
Moreover, as part of the emerging “troika” process between incoming and outgoing
Presidencies, he had served in the French (Quai D’Orsay) and Italian (Farnesina) Foreign
Ministries and had an excellent command of French. He was known to have play a key role in
the oil sharing voting mechanism during the negotiations that had established the OECD’s
International Energy Agency and later had served in a Chief of Staff role in the office of the
Executive Director at the IEA in Paris. He had a keen sense of political and economic strategy
and was an important confidante in assessing the options open to me on the decisions I had to
take as Commissioner.
LW: Why did you choose the competition portfolio? What was the influence of your previous
experience as Attorney General?
PS: My previous legal career and service as Irish Attorney General did qualify for a post with
a quasi-legal role. But I was conscious of the undeveloped potential of the Treaty provisions
on competition, the fact that competition was an area of policy within virtual full competence
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of the Commission and that there were areas of policy such as, for example, air transport
liberalisation, telecommunications and energy where it needed to be applied strongly in order
to complete the EU internal market. I also believed that policies in the area of state aid, both
sectoral and regional aids, often extremely politically sensitive for individual states, required
greater coherence and stronger economic underpinnings in order to advance a level playing
field in the internal market.
LW: How did you cope with the German ordoliberal tradition and background of many DG4
officials?
PS: I was a great admirer of the German intellectual contribution to EU competition policy
since the beginnings of the European Community. (Indeed the German insistence on
including competition clauses in the EC Treaties was itself due to the American-inspired
provisions of the German constitutional and legal order that emerged after World War II.) The
German contribution had a rigour and depth that was important in setting the framework for
competition policy at the outset of EC.
At the same time, I believed that competition policy needed to be modernised and
strengthened by deeper economic analysis in addition to the legal reasoning. The Treaty too
made clear that the policy was to be inspired by the objective of integrating Europe and this
required a measure of political judgement to be brought to bear on how competition policy
was to be applied while upholding the integrity as well as the coherent economic and legal
rationale of the overall approach.
I was fortunate to work with officials in DG4 with strong personalities and of a high calibre of
different European nationalities. I never found that policy discussions with DG4 were framed
in terms of a particular national tradition, rather the framework was how decisions could
contribute to the common European interest.
LW: Was the influence of the US educational background more important than before?
PS: Not particularly. Although I was aware as a lawyer of the close parallels between the
main principles of the Treaty articles on competition and the Sherman and Clayton Anti-Trust
Acts in the US. I also thought that although inspired by similar objectives, US policy
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implementation could be quite litigious with uncertain outcomes for business whereas the EU
approach was capable of more definitive resolution with reduced legal uncertainty.
LW: How did information circulate around the Commission?
PS: Formal processes of communication occurred through inter-service consultations on
proposals and meetings. Documents for Commission consideration were reviewed by special
meetings of Cabinet members and the weekly meetings of Chef de Cabinets. In addition,
important topics were the subject of direct communication and meetings between
Commissioners, either bilaterally or in groups of Commissioners most concerned.
LW: What were your relations with the Court of Justice?
PS: There was no formal relationship as the Court of Justice rightly saw its role as
independent of the Commission, the Council and Member States. However, in formulating
particular decisions, I was concerned to build upon precedents established by the Court and
paid particular attention to reasoning of relevant Court decisions.
LW: What were your relationships with the Legal Service and in particular Ehlermann, who
seemed to be very interested in Competition policy?
PS: The Commission Legal Service was invariably consulted on all draft Commission
decisions, including competition policy. In my regular meetings with DG4 officials, I always
invited a representative of the Legal Service to participate and sought to ensure effective
reconciliation of inter-service differences with a view to stronger decisions. Klaus Dieter
Ehlermann was a fine Director of the Legal Service and an important discussion partner at
various times. Even though we did not always necessarily agree 100% on everything, I recall
that we had a good relationship and that the Commission decisions were usually better
because of our dialogue.
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LW: What were your relations with Great-Britain? Did Thatcher support the strengthening of
the EEC competition policy (despite its supranational consequences)?
PS: My relations with the UK were generally excellent but there were tensions. One of the
first negative state aid decisions I had to take was a UK case (Cloft). The UK accepted the
decision with good grace but rightly made it clear that they expected a similar approach by the
Commission to analogous cases. There were some tensions too over the Rover case, BA/Bcal
and the (old) Article 90 Commission Directive on telecommunication terminals but in the end
the UK accepted the Commission’s authority. Generally speaking the UK and Mrs Thatcher,
in particular, favoured efforts to complete the internal market from which it could greatly
benefit. Where this clashed with exercise of supranational authority, the Rover case and the
telecommunication terminals Directive (which was appealed by the UK amongst other
member states to the ECJ) being particular examples, the UK was uneasy and less supportive.
LW: What were your relations with Germany? Did the German support the strengthening of
the EEC competition policy (which they had heavily influenced in the 1960s)?
PS: Generally, Germany was strongly in support of the Commission’s efforts to strengthen
competition policy. There were virtually no differences of opinion that I recall on anti-trust
policy with perhaps some nuances on the conditions under which the selective distribution
block exemption operated. The main area of tension with Germany was Commission efforts
to scale back Germany’s extensive system of regional aids which politically important to a
number of Länder, including richer Länder such as Baviaria and Baden-Wurtemburg. On
sectoral aid, Germany was more supportive and on steel aid wanted the Commission to be
even tougher than it was on aid for restructuring.
LW: What was your policy concerning cartels?
PS: Since cartels and block emption decisions were entirely within the Commission’s
competences, discussions generally occurred on an inter-service basis with policy issues left
for Commissioners and their Cabinets to resolve. Views of industry and other affected
interests were taken into account. From time to time, the Council of Ministers was kept
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informed of matters of particular interest to member states (e.g. telecommunications, airline
deregulation).
LW: What was your policy concerning state aids?
PS: Again the state aid rules were within the full competence of the Commission. However,
the dismantling of the steel aid regime required extensive consultation with member states,
both collectively within the Council of Ministers and bilaterally. A particular focus was the
enforcement of stronger disciplines on state aid so as to ensure the efforts to complete the
internal market could not be undermined by ill-judged state aid interventions. The first survey
of state aids was an effort to collect systematic information on the scale and range of state aid
and to bring home to all concerned the need for strong disciplines. Efforts on financial
relations between states and individual companies were intended to remove distortions and to
create a level playing field between companies in receipt of particular benefits from states and
companies that did not have such benefits.
LW: Which were the most difficult state?
PS: The greatest tensions undoubtedly arose on French cases. Boussac and Renault were
particular examples. Italy had one or two difficult cases and the UK also but these were
usually ironed out.
LW: What were you relations with the other commissioners concerned with state aids
(Narjes)?
PS: Karl Heinz Narjes was generally supportive of the major competition policy issues that
were considered. He was particularly interested in the decisions on restructuring of the steel
industry and I made a point of consulting him regularly on the progress of our efforts to
dismantle state aid to the steel industry and to support the restructuring programme.
LW: What was your policy concerning mergers?
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PS: The Philip Morris and BA/BCal cases revealed that the Commission’s autonomous
powers under the Treaty competition rules could have a decisive impact on merger proposals.
However, these instruments had an extremely blunt legal effect and could not be applied
effectively to achieve more flexible outcomes. Hence the need for a new Council Regulation
enabling the Commission to police and approve conditions applicable to mergers. Member
States were extremely reluctant to surrender national powers to the Commission particularly
given the political sensitivities that could arise in particular cases. I made particular efforts to
persuade member states, especially Germany and the UK, that it was in their interests to
support the Merger Regulation and made extensive efforts to alleviate their concerns without
undermining the central thrust of the Commission’s proposal to deal with mergers of a
Community-wide dimension. However, the Court’s confirmation of the Commission’s right to
intervene in the Philip Morris and the demonstration of effective Commission action in the
BA/Bcal case, were crucial building blocks in my persuasion of the member states finally to
agree the Merger Regulation, not as it happened during my own term as Competition
Commissioner but early on in my successor’s term because the groundwork had been well
laid earlier. The subsequent experience of operation of the Merger Regulation has shown that
the new rules generally work well and a strong collaborative regime has been established
between the Commission and member state competition authorities.
LW: What was your policy concerning the liberalization of air transports?
PS: I had from the earliest stage of my involvement with the Commission identified airline
deregulation as an important issue whereby European citizens could greatly benefit from the
internal market. The Nouvelles Frontieres case law again provided a basis to use competition
policy to directly attack the restrictive cartel behaviour by the scheduled flag carriers which
led to high prices and poor quality/choice options for air passengers. By taking action under
old Article 88 of the EEC Treaty, the member states realised that they had little alternative but
to negotiate new air transport liberalisation directives and regulations that would
progressively institute a competitive air transport system in Europe. It was an issue that
captured public imagination and support for EU action and this was reflected in the support
received in national parliaments as well as the European Parliament. Many of the national flag
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carriers initially opposed the Commission’s policy but the economic case was overwhelming
and today’s landscape of very wide choice at lower cost is a major benefit to Europe’s citizens
and indeed to Europe’s business environment.
LW: What were the reactions of member-states? Which were pro and which were against (UK
and Germany)?
PS: Within member states, there were differing positions. Consumers and users tended to
support the Commission’s efforts to liberalise air transport. Incumbent flag carriers virtually
all resisted and especially those who feared that liberalisation would undermine their
traditional business model. It was difficult that our negotiating counterparts in the Council
were the Transport Ministries, who often had direct responsibility for the regime under which
the flag carriers operated and were reluctant to make changes, notwithstanding the clear
economic benefits for consumers and business generally. Even the more liberal UK and
Germany had difficulties with the Commission’s original legislative proposals and until the
Commission decided to invoke the competition rules there was little chance of credible
legislation emerging from the Council. The Commission’s decision to implement competition
policy to the sector made it clear that the result had to meet a standard that could meet the
Competition policy objectives.
LW: What was your role in the liberalization of telecommunications?
PS: Telecommunications was another very important sector that required major change to
boost European competitiveness. The old system of national telecommunications monopolies
was clearly ill equipped to implement the scale of innovation that was to occur globally in
telecommunications. The Commission had already led important work on GSM standards that
greatly contributed to mobile telephony. Again competition policy was to prove an effective
instrument to force an opening of markets and to end restrictive behaviour that both stifled
innovation and held back the forces of competition from delivery a range of quality and price
options to users. The instrument that I used was a little used power under old Article 90 of the
EEC Treaty to strike down restrictions on the rights of users to connect terminal equipment to
the public switched network. It was controversial in terms of member state sensitivities on
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sovereignty but the economic case was unrebuttable and the Commission’s action again
persuaded member states to begin to move to liberalise telecommunications to the great
benefit of European users and industry.
LW: What were the opinions of the main companies, especially British Telecom and Mercury
(Cable&Wireless) which were already in a competitive national market? Were the British and
the US examples influential?
PS: Those companies seeking to expand the range of economic services not restricted by the
national telecommunications monopoly were very much in favour of the Commission’s
approach. The economic benefits of liberalisation, including explosive innovation, were
already apparent in the US and the UK. It was clear that Europe too needed to be globally
competitive in this area.
LW: What were your links with non-European competition authorities?
PS: I paid particular attention to dialogue with non-EU competition authorities. Obviously
dialogue with the US was particularly important since both EU and US companies operating
globally were impacted by the decisions taken by both competition authorities. Generally, the
EU regime was capable of more flexibility with greater legal security for firms than the more
litigious framework within the US. Contacts with Japan were also of interest. It is noteworthy
that the impact of EU competition policy has been noted in many emerging markets and many
have decided to adopt their own competition regime based upon the principles set out in the
EEC Treaty.
LW: Did you take part in Fordham conference? Did the US example play a role in the EEC
reflections (leniency policy)?
PS: Yes, I believe that I did participate in an event Fordham. I believe that the leniency policy
was already seen as a desirable addition to competition policy by the officials in DG4 and I
recognised it to be a useful innovation.
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LW: How do you assess your term at the Commission?
PS: I believe that my term as Commissioner was a most productive period and the results
achieved have continued to have enduring economic benefits for European citizens and
European competitiveness more generally. The most noteworthy results included the
dismantling of the steel aid regime and the associated restructuring of the European steel
industry, the liberalisation of air transport in Europe, the productivity improvements and
innovation that emerged from European telecommunications liberalisation, the strong
disciplines that apply to state aid, the greater awareness amongst industry of the need to
observe the competition rules and avoid harmful restrictive practices, and the application of
competition rules to public enterprises or those enterprises which enjoy special rights. The
link between an effective competition policy and a dynamic internal market is also widely
accepted. Last but not least, I am particularly pleased with the tremendous success of the
Erasmus student exchange programme which I introduced as Commissioner for Social Affairs
and I have seen with my own eyes how it has contributed to strengthen the European identity
of so many young European citizens right across all areas of the EU.
LW: How could you explain that competition policy strengthened so dramatically during your
term?
PS: Many of the powers were already there but had not been used fully or to the limits of
what was possible. The rationale for having a strengthened competition policy was firmly
linked by the Commission to the completion of the internal market by 1992 and this created a
favourable environment for many of my initiatives. The technique of using a twin-track
approach combining innovative enforcement of competition law alongside legislative
proposals meant that the Council of Ministers could no longer duck the hard choices in the
legislative proposals and was required to reach a credible result. Otherwise, a blunter
discretion would by default be left with the Commission and the Court. The European
Parliament too favoured a strong legislative outcome.
LW: What were the circumstances of your departure?
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PS: My term of office came to an end.
LW: Why did you choose the GATT?
PS: The GATT chose me. I was jointly approached by USTR Mickey Kantor and EU Trade
Commissioner Leon Brittan to take the job of GATT DG. Consultations with key developing
countries, including India and Brazil, also revealed that they support me. I firmly believed
that the Uruguay Round could greatly enlarge the post-War trading system and spread the
wealth benefits much more widely to billions of people who had begun to espouse market
economies after 1989. I also believed that the impasse reached in the Uruguay Round could
be broken by persuading key heads of government in the major trading countries to make the
necessary compromises in order to secure vastly superior benefits for their peoples.
LW: Which are the main events you remember?
PS: Abbaye de Royaumont meeting which was crucial in forging the identity and ambition of
the first term of Jacques Delors Presidency of the Commission. My first Commission meeting
where I had to defend the approach taken DG Competition on environmental aid to promote
clean cars. The adoption of the air transport package by the Council of Ministers. My on site
visits to industries that were impacted by Commission decisions. The adoption of the Erasmus
Programme. The Spanish and Portuguese enlargement of 1986.
LW: What was the impact of the various enlargements on the Community?
PS: Broadly very positive.
LW: Which Commissioners stand out from the norm between 1973 to 1986? Why were they
memorable?
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PS: Jacques Delors (an extremely effective Commission President); Lorenzo Natali, a quiet
but powerful influence on the entire Commission; Etienne Davignon who was not a member
of the Delors Commission but who remained an influential European voice; Frans
Andriessen, a strong agricultural Commissioner.
LW: with regard to Delors, you said in a previous interview: “we had some fairly vigourous
debates... [for example] in the area of state subsidy control and interventionism”.
PS: Also I could refer to the Boussac case. There were many debates on Competition Policy
where Delors was not sympathetic to my rigorous approach but, in general, he tried to
exercise his Chairmanship role with appropriate discretion. This was not always evident at
Cabinet level.
LW: Which personalities do you find the most memorable amongst the fonctionnaires
between 1973 and 1986?
PS: Those of my Cabinet who were fonctionnaires Catherine Day, David O’Sullivan, JeanFrancois Verstrynge made a strong contribution to my team. Within DG Competition, I have
memories of Jean-Louis Cadieux as a particularly effective colleague. Klaus-Dieter
Ehlermann, head of the Commission’s Legal Service, was always a thought provoking
discussant.
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Interview, London, September 8th 2011
LW: You said that during your career in Brussels that you belonged to several clubs and
societies concerned with European issues.
PS: Before I joined the Commission and when I joined. I have been involved in European
affairs all my adult life. It was a motivating factor for my political engagement as it was for
Garret Fitzgerald, to appointed me as Attorney General in his two governments. The first time
I was only 35 years of age. What had brought us together from the beginning had been our
interest in European affairs. I had also been involved in the Action Committee for Europe, the
Monnet Committee before I became a Commissioner. I had been very involved in Ireland’s
accession referendum in 1972. Therefore I had a longstanding interest. I was a ChristianDemocrat. Europe was an important part of my political formation.
LW: When you arrived at the Commission, were your first contacts with the others
commissioners at the Abbaye de Royaumont’s sessions?
PS: No, that is not correct. When I was nominated as commissioner in August of 1984, I [...]
travelled to Paris and had lunch with Jacques Delors, with whom I set up an immediate and I
think good connection. We had lunch at a place called Chez Edgar. We had a similar interest
in European integration. I think I had a different approach, however I was essentially a
constitutional lawyer and thought like one. Like Walter Hallstein, I believed that the strongest
weapon in European integration that we had was the legal system. As he said we did not have
divisions, in the sense of military divisions, we had the rule of law. The rule of law, the use of
law was to me the most important instrument for the integration of Europe. I believed in the
supremacy of Community law as a concept. I also believed in the direct effect, the direct
applicability of Community law and the expansion of areas in which they applied. .Jacques
Delors never fully approved the use of law in this way. He did not like the concept of
‘gouvernement des juges’. Therefore he and I had a different approach.
Also I had been brought up in the only Common Law country in Europe that had a written
constitution. Therefore I had an understanding of the system of integration that brought the
United States into its union and retained the balances between the states and the deferral
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authorities.
I saw from the beginning that competition was the area where one could use Community
powers in a way which was unique. I believe that draining our period of four years we
transformed competition law in Europe and significantly enhanced the development of a
supranational capacity on the part of the EU. It was a crucial element in the success of the first
Delors Commission. We were living at a time when nationalised industries in
communications, air transports, energy, even banking and other areas, were in more or less in
absolute control In their areas When we left, we had largely demolished the uniquely anticompetitive cartel which was the air transport system. We had begun to open up the telecoms
system. We had driven in effect constitutional change through the use of competition issues.
For example in the Renault case, when we insisted on the French government removing the
‘Régie’ status which provided an ultimate complete protection for Renault. By the use of
article 90 §3 we struck at state monopolies in a way that was never been done before.
The first thing that we did within a very short period of my joining the Commission was to
take on the air transport sector. I said, within a month of arriving, in a public speech, that there
was a uniquely anticompetitive cartel at work in the sector. The battle that then ensued was a
defining one, which we won. It was a defining battle in the whole area of the use of
demonopolizing astate enterprises. In a sense it showed that national flag carriers in this most
visible area , with all the nationalistic power and the government power that they had behind
them, could, in fact, be defeated. This was to provide great advantages to consumers
everywhere. Other sectors were later to fall in line.
LW: Talking about Delors, what was his conception? Was it a more administrative,
bureaucratic conception?
PS: Yes, in a sense I think it was. It was an essentially French approach. He had a wonderful
mind, conceptually, for example on the single currency and on various other things. I think he
was basically not entirely happy with the 1992 programme as being the flag carrier for his
first Commission. He bought into it because it was clearly the vehicle that could be used for
greater integration, through free movements of goods, persons, capital and services. He gave
the 1992 portfolio, the Internal Market portfolio, to Cockfield, who was single minded,
dedicated and effective He realised that the internal market would not work if we did not have
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an effective competition policy. If state aids for an example could be used to subvert the
functioning of the internal market, would not work it would greatly damage the whole; idea.
I don’t think that Delors’ concept of integration really fully endorsed the market as being the
core of the move towards integration. But he was prepared to use it and he sought to balance
it with other policies. He tried through the Val Duchesse process to further an old Catholic
concept, the concept of personalism. This was supported. This was supported by Christian
Democrats.
He often cited Emmanuel Mounier, who was a Christian-socialist who had great impact on his
thinking.
But whatever about that, we would have approached European integration from different
points of view. Also we had significant differences over a whole range of state aid cases.
Some of these were French cases. Boussac was one of them and Renault another. In both I
had very serious conflicts with the French government. I remember on one occasion for an
example, before a vital European Council about the doubling of the structural funds, he came
back after lunch and looked at the college of Commissioners and he said: “Tonight, I know
that I am going to a disaster in the European Council and I intend to resign and there is only
one person that I know will resign with me in this commission and that’s Peter Sutherland”. I
remember shaking my head. I said that because it indicates that we were actually close on the
fundamentals, but we had a different route.
He understands of fully approve of the Anglo-Saxon approach to the total independence of the
judiciary. It was not that he believed that Courts should be subverted by politics but he could
not accept really that they could overrule politicians.
I had a major battle over regional aid in Germany. You may see in competition reports the
difficulties we had with Bade-Würtenberg, one of wealthiest German Land, about state
subsidies. We took them on. My period of four years was a period of constant conflicts with
governments and companies. And it was deliberate. Not because of a belligerence but because
of a desire to drive forward the supranational part of the Commission. Delors may have felt
that this undermined some support for the European Communities from some national
politicians. In the one year when I was in social affairs, we put through the Erasmus
programme. In proposing the Erasmus programme we again used the law, because we found a
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treaty basis which provided for majority voting rather than unanimity in creating the
programme.
LW: Why did your portfolio change? Why did you abandon social affairs?
PS: When I was given the competition portfolio, Delors asked me: “Would you mind also
taking for the year, until the Spanish come in, social welfare, social affairs and education?” I
was delighted. This was a huge second portfolio. So I took that for a year and then at the end
of the year –as had been understood throughout- the Spanish took it on but Delors then gave
me the responsibility for relationships with the European Parliament. This was to serve as a
second leg for the remaining three years of my term.
I had a very powerful cabinet and highly effective cabinet. I must be the only commissioner in
the history to have two secretary generals of the Commission in one cabinet. David
O’Sullivan and Catherine Day, were in my cabinet. Another member was Jean-François
Verstrynge who was a very able and occasionally tough lawyer. Eugene Reagan covered
various areas as an economist was a top-class man on agriculture, Above all Richard O’Toole
as my chef de cabinet, was enormously important to me. He was a fantastic operator and
friend. We came from a small country but we came as a very young team, all of whom were
totally dedicated to the same objective. When I left the Commission, I had a breakfast with
my team and they said: “What’s the next objective?” and I said that the next objective is the
only game in town, and that’s GATT. One or two were not convinced but I know Richard
O’Toole was. It was a logical nest step for us both. Indeed I would never have gone there if he
has not come with me.
LW: Why did Delors choose you for social affairs?
PS: I think that we had a personal empathy, through a mutual interest in sports for one thing.
Although he was a socialist, we both basically came from a Christian-Democrat background. I
knew and admired Jacques Chaban-Delmas. He had been close to and had worked for
Chaban-Delmas.
LW: You knew Chaban-Delmas before coming to the Commission.
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PS: Yes.
LW: You mentioned a conflict with the state of Baden-Würtenberg. Did you have pressure
coming for the German government?
PS: Yes, and from Baden-Würtenberg, The Prime Minister of Baden-Wurtenberg came to
Brussels to battle out a particular case. Also difficulties with Italy on regional aid when I was
trying to remove some alleged areas of the Mezzorgiorno which I did not consider to be
Mezzogiorno at all. I had meetings with Andreotti.
I had great difficulties over steel and shipbuilding but we also took them on.
LW: So there was continuity between Andriessen and you but you chose a more offensive
method?
PS: Yes. Frans Andriessen was very important but I had to build on what had been done with a
more aggressive approach. Frans was helpful and supportive throughout my term. .
LW: In the paper that we exchanged before the interview, you mentioned Ehlermann. You said
that he was extremely efficient but that you did not always agree with him on everything. Was
it related to competition policy?
PS: Yes. He was perhaps trying politically to find an accommodation between the President’s
cabinet and mine. He sometimes worked directly with the President. We pushed rather than
the Legal Service pushed the use of article 90 -.That was really an innovation. We did things
for example on merger policy. The merger draft which was ultimately adopted
LW: There was no interferences from the British government?
PS: No. The British government was always on the horns of a dilemma throughout that period
with me because, on the one hand they agreed with what I was doing in terms of the ideology
of the market –Mrs Thatcher would have been in agreement with that–, on the other hand
ideologically she would have opposed the use of the Community law as being superior to
national law. So when we interfered with the British over the Leyland deal, it became a huge
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cause célèbre. But at the end of the day the British, to their great credit, never overtly attacked
me and even when I took decisions that they did not like as those two cases –British Leyland
and B.Cal./BA – I was never overtly attacked by them, because they fundamentally agreed
with what I was trying to do. They were helpful, for an example, in the airline deregulation
issue, which was, as I said, the battering ram that we used as a mechanism to push the free
market, the internal market. Cockfield worked with me the whole time because of what he
was doing, and indeed in his White Paper he included in it references to competition policy as
being an ancillary and necessary element in this whole 1992 programme. It was afterwards
that the British asked me, after I left the Commission, to do the report to the European
Council on the functioning on the internal market, which I did, the “Sutherland report” as it
became known. I think it was in 1992 that it was brought to the European Council in Edinburg
when the British had the Presidency. Also Mr Major in his autobiography referred to the fact
that subsequently my name had come up as a possible presidency candidate and that he would
have approved. So I think that the British probably may have been hurt by what I was doing
but they were not opposed to me personally.
LW: So would it have been more difficult if yo had chosen for example a case of merger
occurring in France or in Italy?
PS: Yes, I have absolutely no doubt about it. If you take the air transport dossier for an
example, the strongest and the most consistent support came from the Dutch, from the
Netherlands where Neelie Kroes was minister of Transport at that time. Of course she was to
become a successor as a commissioner for competition. I had constant trouble with France.
LW: And the flag carriers, from Great-Britain and from Netherlands, were they in favour of
liberalisation?
PS: No, none of the flag carriers were in favour.
LW: Only the first low-cost airlines were in favour of liberalisation?
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PS: Yes, but they were very few in favour. I remember shortly after I arrived, during the first
month when I arrived in Brussels, I was invited to a dinner party by a former German
commissioner, Willy Haferkamp. Willy Haferkamp asked me for dinner and I was a bit
surprised. I turned up and there were three places at the table and I said to him who is that
third person. The third person then came in and his name was Runhau, he was the chairman of
Lufthansa. He sat down and he said: “you have no power to interfere with national bilateral
agreements” and I said: “We’ll see”. He said: “You haven’t” and I said: “We have” and it was
a difficult evening. So Lufthansa was one of the primary opponents. So Germany, whilst
supportive on competition issues, when it came to specifics -regional aids, some decisions, on
airline- was not always completely on side, but they were never overtly antagonistic to what
we were doing. They were basically supportive of competition policy. Sometimes political
events intervene with their own support of what we were doing. We were often battling
against everybody. I mean if you look at the history of the airlines issue [...] within a year, I
had sued [...] against ten governments. Later on, another one against seven airlines, national
airlines, which were the same as the governments.
LW: So it was Cockfield and you who were pushing for the liberalization of air transport and
not the commissioner for transport?
PS: Cockfield was not particularly interested in air transport. However he would have been
supportive of competition policy in every area. The commissioner for Transport was Stanley
Clinton Davis, who was a British socialist. He was the second British commissioner. He never
obstructed what I was doing. Sometimes he felt I was going too far and too hard, but he was
essentially helpful. He was a ambivalent about the market-based solutions having dominance.
However, would have been in favour of the Commission using its powers; he would not have
disagreed with that even though it challenged British notions of sovereignty. . He was a
lawyer and he understood what I was doing in this area but he would have had as a Labour
party person, more reluctance in taking on all the national flag carriers and their unions
LW: Concerning the Renault case, it was in 1988. You had difficult negotiations with the
government of Jacques Chirac but in the end you managed to reach an agreement.
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PS: Yes.
LW: Chirac was elected on a liberal economic programme...
PS: No French government has had a liberal economic programme. The only liberal economic
[politician] that I had ever came across in France was Madelin who really did try to help. But
Madelin was in french political circles, I would think, considered to be a bit of a loose
[candidate].
LW: He was briefly minister in 1986, so he took contact with you.
PS: Yes, I was awarded a price, the first European law price in Paris by some organisation.
Paris University Press published a book I produced at that time called “1er janvier 1993”. He
would have fundamentally supported what I was doing, with the Nouvelles Frontières case
and so on. There were minor elements in France who would have been in favour of what I
was doing but many would have been opposed. And I don’t think that Chirac was anything of
[a liberal].
I think that France, in my experience, was always a little reluctant on competition policy, and
indeed on the issue of ‘gouvernement des juges’ because in a way, on the power issue, France
is another side to the British coin, in nationalism terms. They are both countries that are
profoundly interested in the nation-state as de Gaulle demonstrated. That was not entirely
dead under the regime of Chirac.
LW: Germany was broadly supporting you but concerning the merger regulation, it was one of
the strongest opponent.
PS: That was a battle at the Bundeskartellamt. Obviously, it was a power battle. The
Bundeskartellamt was using every vehicle that it had to avoid the transfer of power to
Brussels. Therefore, they agreed with all the principles that I was pushing. And they said it
constantly, publicly. I can’t remember the name of the head of the Bundeskartellamt at the
time but he used to say...He was very supportive of me personally, of what I was doing, but
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they didn’t want to lose power. [...] So they agreed with of all the principles that we were
trying to push.
My portfolio was an association between the classic anti-trust and the state aid. The state aid
at the end of the day was where my heart was, where I really saw the possibility of pushing
the supranationality consistently against the state, and creating an integrated Europe. [...] You
were putting your finger on the nerve of national sovereignty when you were telling a nationstate that it could not use its taxpayers’ resources to support its industries against those of
another country, to export its own unemployment in others words. So that was something
which was, to me, politically, far more important, in many ways, than the antitrust side. But
on the antitrust side, we were also advancing a belligerent, an activist agenda, which had been
demonstrated by a massive increase in fines. On state aids, I remember a huge change with
the repayment...We were very active also on the antitrust, on the merger regulation, but also
on prosecutions.
LW: You had the support of Delors?
PS: I had no problem with Delors on the antitrust side.
LW: It was only on state aids.
PS: Yes.
LW: You had the support of the Court of Justice, for example with the famous Philip Morris
case...
PS: Yes, Philip Morris, fantastic case. Throughout the period, the Court of Justice had been
supportive.
LW: Did you know if some of the judges were more interested in competition than others? For
example, there were Pescatore, Everling, Mackenzie Stuart.
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PS: Yes, Pescatore and Stuart in particular were, I was aware of. But they were very
rigorously, and so was I, proper about the division the judiciary and the executive. So I went
in my time for a courtesy lunch once a year to Luxemburg. But I was never bilaterally related
to any of the judges. I never spent time with any of them on a bilateral basis.
LW: Concerned the Philip Morris case, on of its advantage was that it was based on article 85
instead of article 86.
PS: Yes.
LW: You said that Thatcher was both in favour of your policy and on the other hand reluctant
to give too much power to the Commission. Do you think that this vision had influenced Leon
Brittan?
PS: Leon, I have a considerable respect for what Leon did. Leon and I were then and remain
good friends to this day. [...] I don’t know whether Leon grew it or whether he had that from
the beginning as his approach when he went in there but he certainly had the same view as I
have both on trade –he was the one actually who appointed me as Director general of GATT;
he was the one who asked me with Mickey Kantor of the United States, so we were on the
same page. I think Leon, like Cockfield before him, was a fervent integrationist, and much
closer to my model than many others were. He saw the use of law, as a lawyer himself.
LW: So he wasn’t afraid of pushing forward the increase of the supranational powers of the
Commission, despite the fact that he was appointed by Margaret Thatcher.
PS: I can’t give you chapter on verse on that because I can’t remember specific cases but my
instinct is that he would have been prepared to do that, yes. Although he is not [a federalist], I
am a federalist, clear and simple. he would not say to you, sitting here: “I am a federalist,
clear and simple”. I am, and I always was.
LW: Outside competition policy, what were the most interesting issues for you within the
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college of commissioners?
PS: Every aspect of the internal market. The developing ideas on monetary union, the Delors
committee and so on, I was interested in that. Any areas where I saw the federalist aspect. The
Monnet method of the supranational as opposed to the intergovernmental has a potential for
pushing things forward; I pushed. And as I said, I am particularly proud of the Erasmus
programme, which was also indicative of the way I felt in a different area. I was active in all
areas of the debate at the Commission, and not merely competition.
I started on a difficult note. The first Commission meeting that I went to, that we had. Emile
Noël, whom again I was close to and who played some part in my getting the portfolio of
competition in the first place, Emile Noël, Delors said : “The first we have to do is that we
have to give a number of habilitation to Frans Andriessen. This is normal for an agriculture
commissioner to be given a whole range of delegated powers”. Nobody said that to me. And I
said: “I am sorry Mr. President, I have no note of this coming out at the Chef des cabinets’
meeting, I don’t know what you are talking about. I never heard the word ‘Habilitation’
before. I don’t know what it means but if I understand correctly, you are saying that Frans
Andriessen –for whom I have the greatest respect– is to be given a number of delegated
powers”. I said that I prefer that you put this back for a week. And Delors said: “Look, this
happens at the beginning of every Commission. These are just purely normal powers to give
[...] they had to be given to the commissioner for agriculture”. And he said: “I think we should
proceed and decide”. And I said: “I prefer that you put it back for a week”. And he said:
“Look, in the Gaston Thorn commission, there was never a vote. This is our first issue on our
first meeting. Are you suggesting that we vote on this?”. And I said: “I certainly not, I want
you to put it back for a week. But if you insist on proceedings, then I am pulling for a vote”.
And he said: “Right, I insist on the proceedings”. And we had to vote, and I think that I got
six votes. I lost but I only just lost. It was a traumatic beginning, because the taboo on votes
was gone.
LW: You mentioned an experience in the US, was it before you came to the Commission?
PS: Yes, before I came to the Commission, I had been [admitted] to the New-York Bar and to
the Supreme Court of the US. I have done a little bit of, not work in the United States, but I
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had some connections with the US law firm and I knew a little bit of the US law, that’s all I
am saying. I had to resign when I became more involved.
LW: You mean afterwards, when you quit the Commission?
PS: Yes.
LW: Did it influence your action as commissioner of competition?
PS: No, not at all. I never had any active US practice and I was not involved at all in antitrust
law and knew nothing about it really when I came to the Commission. [...] Although I was a
member of the New-York bar, it was merely a nominal thing.
LW: Even in the methodology, the approach?
PS: The only relevance was that US constitutional law was judicial review, the right of
judicial review, the right of federal authority, the use of constitutional law to influence, and
override national governments, was part of the US legal system which had uniquely become
part of the Irish legal system. So the Irish Supreme Court constantly referred to the US
precedents for the exercise of power, and holding back the executive and the legislative in
Ireland. So the US Supreme Court was more influential, perhaps, than the House of Lords, as
a legal precedent-setter in Ireland, and in my education therefore. [...] No one else had that
experience. That was an essential –looking back, if I can objectively, on what I did, that had a
great influence on my thinking. Because I was a young man, I was still in my thirties. And we
wanted to change the world.
LW: You said in the paper that sometimes you had debates with Delors, but most of the time if
was even more difficult at the cabinet level. Was it with Lamy?
PS: Yes, and Lamoureux. Lamy had constant battles with my chef de cabinet Richard
O’Toole. Richard O’Toole was a very interesting guy. He was a chemist, a scientist, who had
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[...] a first in Master’s, and then, who incredibly joined Foreign Affairs. He then had himself
seconded to the Quai d’Orsay where he worked with the French Foreign Service for a year.
He then had himself transferred to the Italian Foreign Service, where he worked for a year. He
then worked, he had himself seconded, in the International Energy Agency in Paris, and he
worked later on in the UN and in the Irish economic desk of the Foreign Affairs. So he came
with a wealth of experience. He was one year younger than me and he was a powerful [...]
influence on what we did.
LW: You mentioned that the EEC competition policy had a lasting influence outside Europe.
What are you thinking of?
PS: What I am saying is that the use of competition law -for an example when we had a major
Commission delegation, three commissioners went to Japan to speak to the Japanese about
[...] what we were doing at home, we had a major debate with three senior ministers from
Japan, and the Japanese Prime Minister and so on- Competition Policy was at the heart of the
external profile of Europe at that time in an important way.
Delors saw that, what we were trying to do, and I think that he became more and more
attracted by that. Although I doubt that if he ever openly said anything positive about
competition law. The Commission as a whole recognised that when we were making waves
publicly, it was largely as a result of these battles, of what we were doing on competition law
to make the internal market functioning effectively. The experience that we had and what we
were doing was being watched by other parts of the world. I think competition authorities in
other parts of the world were impressed by what was happening. All I can say is that in Japan,
in Latin America, in other places, they were constantly talking to us about their experience of
trying to develop their own law. [...]
LW: Did you have meetings with officials from foreign countries?
PS: Yes.
LW: You mentioned Japan, so you went to Japan.
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PS: Yes.
LW: Did you go to other countries.
PS: Well, I don’t want to exaggerate this. [...] I had constant interchanges with the US [...]
And I think Canada in other areas as well but I can’t remember the details. [...]
LW: At the GATT too, you tried to foster contact among competition authorities.
PS: Yes.
LW: Ok, I think everything else is in the written paper. [...]
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Index des noms de personnes
Andriessen, Frans, 15, 20, 26
Brittan, Leon, 14, 25
Cadieux, Jean-Louis, 15
Chaban-Delmas, Jacques, 19
Chirac, Jacques, 22, 23
Clinton Davis, Stanley, 22
Cockfield, Francis Arthur, 17, 21, 22, 25
Davignon, Étienne, 15
Day, Catherine, 15, 19
de Gaulle, Charles, 23
Delors, Jacques, 3, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, 26,
27, 28
Ehlermann, Klaus-Dieter, 7, 15, 20
Everling, Ulrich, 24
Fitzgerald, Garret, 16
Haferkamp, Wilhelm, 22
Hallstein, Walter, 16
Kantor, Mickey, 14, 25
Kroes, Neelie, 21
Lamoureux, François, 27
Lamy, Pascal, 27
Mackenzie Stuart, Alexander, 24
Madelin, Robert, 23
Monnet, Jean, 16, 26
Mounier, Emmanuel, 18
Narjes, Karl-Heinz, 9
Natali, Lorenzo, 15
Noël, Émile, 26
O’Sullivan, David, 15, 19
O’Toole, Richard, 5, 19, 27
Pescatore, Pierre, 24, 25
Runhau, Heinz, 22
Temple-Lang, John, 5
Thatcher, Margaret, 8, 20, 25
Verstrynge, Jean-François, 15, 19
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