The direct election and “recall” of the mayors in Germany::
From representative democracy-based to direct democracy-based local leadership
Hellmut Wollmann
Humboldt-Universität Berlin
[email protected]
Discussion paper
to be presented to the panel on “local democracy”
th
within the 4 International Conference “on Democracy as Idea and Practice”
to be held on January 10-11, 2013
at the University of Oslo
1
. 1. Introduction1
At the outset some variants of direct democratic local government institutions should
identified and defined.
Representative democracy is characterised by the right of the citizens to elect representative
bodies (local councils) which, in turn, elect position-holders for the conduct of executive
functions, be it in a monocratic form (such as mayors), bei it in a collective form (such as
executive committees, “cabinets”, “Magistrat”).
By contrast, direct democracy may come in different institutional forms to empowering local
citizens in local decision-making..

The “genuine” and historically earliestr form is the “general assembly” in which all
citizens meet to make decisions on local government matters instead of or besides the
representative body. Examples are the “Gemeindeversammlung” in Switzerland and
Germany (in the meantime defunct, see Wollmann 2008: 74) or the “ting” in the
history of Scandinavian local government (see Wollmann 2008: 70).

Another important form is the “referendum” in which the local citizens have the right
to decide on local government relevant matters in decision-making procedures by
majority vote. Such referendum may either pertain to “substantive matters”, that is, to
the “subjects matters” within the competence of local government. Or they may relate
to “institutional matters” such as the decision on territorial boundaries of local
government or on its institutional/constitutional setting, for instance, the introduction
of the direct election of the mayor (see Wollmann 2008:: 69 ff. for some comparative
references. Local referenda will be dealt with in more details in other papers to be
presented to this Oslo panel)..

At last the direct democratic empowerment of the citizens can also pertain to the
direct election (or reversely to the “recall”) of local position holders, first of all of the
local mayors but also (for instance in some US State constitutions and practice) of
other positions, including the local coroner.
1
This draft paper draws on Wollmann 2004. For a internationally comparative treatment of the arrival and
expansion of the direct election of the mayors see Wollmann 2009, for comparative references see also
Wollmann 2008: 70 ff.
2
In this paper we shall focus, as a crucial mode of direct democratic empowerment of local
citizens, on the election (and “recall” of the local mayor.
In doing so the paper will single out the institutional development in Germany for a number
of reasons.. For one, historically the development of local government institutions has been
marked, since the early 19th century up to the early 1990s, by the predominance of
representative government based institutions as embodied in the council election of mayors
and executive boards in almost all Länder. Second, in early 1990 within a few years, in a
spectacular sequence of legislative activities, all Länder changed to the direct election of
mayors. This astounding institutional “path-dependent” continuity, on one hand, and
“institutional revolution”, on the other, it is assumed and argued, calls for and makes for a
conceptually and empirically fascinating case and case study which is ventured into and
presented in the following.
Conceptual our analysis will conceptually be guided by (neo-) institutionalism, particularly in
its historical institutionalism in which the concept of path-dependency looms large (see
Wollmann 2008: 17 ff., Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013)
2. Historical background up to 1919
Since the introduction of modern local government in the early 19th century in Germany
essentially three types of elected local government developed.

In Prussia, the Prussian Municipal Charter which was adopted in 18082 provided for
elected local councils (elected at that time on the basis of a woefully plutocratic
electoral class system) that elected an executive board (called Magistrat). The
Magistrat consisted of the mayor and some other board members and constituted a
collective decision-making.

In some States municipal charters were put in place which introduced elected local
councils that elected (executive) mayors. This institutional arrangement was clearly
influenced by France’s post-revolutionary
(however short-lived) municipal
legislation of 1790 in which, by explicitly distinguishing between the elected council
as a local “legislative body” and the (council elected) mayor as “local executive” an,
2
It deserves mentioning that the Prussia Municipal Charter of 1808 is the oldest European municipal charter that
remained in force well into the early 20th century. The French municipal legislation of 1790 was historically the
first one of this kind, but was abolished already in 1800 when Napoleon imposed his centralized State model..
3
as it were, quasi-parliamentary local government system was “invented” (see
Engeli/Haus 1975: 10).

In the (small) Kingdom of Württemberg (in the South West of Germany) where,
dating back to medieval times, the towns possessed some local autonomy the direct
election of traditional mayors (called Schultheiss) was introduced at the beginning of
the 19th century. In 1871 the direct election of the mayor was stipulated in formal
legislation and was maintained until 1933 (see Wehling 2003: 25).
Thus, while historically the principle of representative democracy, as embodied in the
council-elected mayor or executive board (Magistrat), as a sort of quasi-parliamentary
form, prevailed in most of Germany, in the Kingdom of Württemberg the directly elected
mayor caught roots as an early form of a local “quasi-presidential” system .
3. Development between 1919 and 1933
Following the Revolution of 1919 and the political and constitutional rupture from the postauthoritarian Bismarck Reich to the democratic Weimar Republic each of the Republic’s
member States, now called Länder, passed their own municipal charters which showed a
significant degree of (“ path-dependent “) institutional continuity with regard to its respective
regional tradition.

In most areas parts and many cities, including Berlin, of the Land of Prussia the
elected council with a council-elected collective executive board (Magistrat) dating
back to the 1808 charter continued to be in place as a form of quasi-parliamentary
local government.

In Western areas of Prussia, particularly in the big cities of the Rhinish provinces, the
elected council with council-elected (executive) mayor form was installed as a quasiparliamentary local government form as well. Some of the (council-elected) mayors
of the big cities, particularly in the Ruhr area, rose to national visibility and influence,
for instance,. Konrad Adenauer who was Lord Mayor of the City of Köln (and
became the first Chancellor of the of the Federal Republic after 1949). .

In the South Western State of Württemberg the direct election of the mayor with
institutional roots in the 19th century continued (“path-dependently”) to be in place..

In addition in the early 1920’s, Land of Bavaria (temporarily) experimented with the
direct election of the mayor (see Engeli/Haus 1975: 608).
4
Thus, notwithstanding the constitutional, political and also territorial rupture which Germany
went through after the Revolution of 1919 the main institutional schemes of elected local
government manifested a remarkable degree of “path-dependent” continuity with regard to the
respective regional traditions – with council-elected executive mayors or boards (Magistrat)
as variants of representative democracy being prevalent and with the directly elected mayor
being an exception.
After the Nazis seized power in 1933 the democratic institutions on all levels of government,
including the local government level, were crushed and the principle of one man (“Führer”)
dictatorship was imposed. The municipal mayors were turned into centrally appointed local
“Führers”.
4. The reconstruction of democratic local government after 1945
When, after Germany’s liberation from the Nazi regime and under the Occupation by the
Allied Forces, democratic government was restored in the three Western Occupation Zones
on the territorial basis from which in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany emerged..
During the late 1940s and early 1950s the Länder whose previous boundaries were largely
redrawn adopted new municipal charters.
The design and adoption of the new municipal charters which, by constitutional tradition, was
in the legislative competence of each of the Länder were influenced by two factors.. For one,
each of them tended to link up, in a kind of “path-dependency”, with the specific institutional
tradition of their respective area. Second, the Occupation Forces wielded some influence on
the early legislation of “their” respective Land. Moreover, when it came to decide whether
the principles of representative democracy or those of direct democracy should be given
preference in rebuilding post-war local democracy an overall reluctance prevailed, regarding
all levels of post-1945 democratic State, to strengthen direct democratic principles. This
scepticism, if not aversion against direct democratic (“plebiscitarian”) institutions was
nourished by the recollection of the fatal role which national referendums played in fuelling
demagogic propaganda from the extreme right and left and in paving the way for the Nazis
seizing power. Furthermore, reflecting the deepening Cold War tensions and the division of
Germany there was some apprehension that the communists might use “plebiscitarian”
instruments to question and undermine West Germany’s political consolidation on this side of
5
the Iron Curtain. Thus, scepticism and resentment against direct democratic institutions and a
preference for representative democratic ones became a “founding conviction” of post-1945
(West) Germany.
On this historical background different local government schemes were put in place in the
newly created (West German) Länder with varied impact of the factors of “regional tradition”
and Occupation Force intervention.

In the newly formed Länder of Hesse and Schleswig-Holstein which comprised areas
of the former (and dismantled) Land of Prussia (and similarly in the City States of
Hamburg and Berlin) the local government scheme was put in place which, based on
the elected local council and the council-elected collective executive board
(Magistrat), prevailed in most parts of former Land of Prussia and (path-dependently)
dated back to the Prussian Municipal Charter of 1808 (see Dreßler 2003: 134 on the
case of the Land of Hesse). Hence, in these new Länder (and City States)
representative democratic schemes were restored characterised by councilelected/appointed collective (executive) bodies with a mayor as an “equal among
equals” (see Dreßler 2008: 136).

In the Land of Rheinland-Pfalz which in the West borders France a local government
scheme was adopted which, hinging on the elected local council and the councilelected (executive) mayor, follows the institutional tradition of this area, that is, the
local “quasi-parliamentarian” form which, in turn, as was mentioned earlier,
historically dates back to France’s post-revolutionary municipal legislation of 1790.

In the local government legislation that was adopted in the (South-Western) Land of
Baden-Württemberg, in 1952, the direct election of the mayor was adopted. In doing
so it (“path-dependently”) linked up the directly elected mayor form which, reaching
back, as was mentioned, to the 19th century in the area of Württemberg that came to
be incorporated in the newly formed Land of Baden-Württemberg. In line with this
electoral tradition it has been provided that the elective term of the mayor differs from
that of the council. Thus, the “staggered” election of the mayor, different from the
council election, has become an essential feature of the mayoral scheme à la BadenWürttemberg. It may well be that besides the region’s own “path-dependent”
institutional “memory” and legacy, the adoption of the directly elected mayor has been
fostered also by the fact that the Land of Baden-Württemberg was situated in the
6
American Occupation Zone, hence, possibly borrowing from some US States where
the direct election of mayors has as well a long tradition..

Furthermore in the South-German Land of Bavaria, too, the direct election of the
mayor has been introduced, however with the important institutional difference from
Baden-Württemberg that the mayoral election takes place simultaneously with the
council election (and not in a “staggered” modality). Again, some regional continuity
should be called to mind as in the Land of Bavaria the direct election of mayors has
been experimented with in the early 1920s (see Engeli/Haus 1975: 608). Moreover, it
can be plausibly assumed that, as the Land of Bavaria belonged to the American
Occupational Zone, the US example of getting local mayors elected weighed on
Bavaria’s post 1945-local government legislation.

The most dramatic shift from the “path-dependent” regional local government scheme
took place in the newly formed Länder of Nordrhein-Westfalen and Niedersachsen
which, covering significant parts of the former (dismembered) Land of Prussia and
altogether counting almost 40 percent of the Federal Republic’s entire population,
were indicatively situated in the British Occupation Zone. Between 1919 and 1933 in
these parts of Prussia the (“quasi-parliamentary”) local government variant was in
place based on the elected council and the council-elected (executive) mayor.
Particularly in the big cities of the Ruhr Area the mayors rose, in this period, to
become powerful local (and in part nationally visible) leaders, Konrad Adenauer, as
Lord Mayor of the City of Köln being one of them, in what came to be called the
“Rhinish” model of the (albeit council-elected) powerful executive mayor.
The British Occupation Force profoundly resented the “Rhinish” (executive) mayor
model perceiving and suspecting it as constituting a “monocratic” threat to local
democracy and as potentially harboring a
continuity with (dismantled) Prussia’s
autocratic tradition. So they instead advocated the English local government model as
defined by an elected local council with broad decision-making and executive powers, by
symbolic rather than influential mayor and a chief executive officer acting under the
direction of the council. Under the guidance, if not arm-twisting by the British
Occupation Force the Land parliaments adopted municipal charters which bestowed
comprehensive powers (Allzuständigkeit) upon the elected councils, including their right
to “call back” any matter to their own decision-making (Rückholrecht), created the
position of a council-appointed and council-controlled chief administrative officer (called
7
Stadtdirektor), and provided for a council-elected mayor with hardly more than
decorative functions (see Kost 2003: 201). In giving comprehensive powers to the elected
local council (“all power to the council”) a truly representative democratic model of local
government was expected to be put in place which in this “extreme” form was somewhat
“alien” to the regional institutional tradition and culture (see Bogumil 2001: 68)
The local government schemes which emerged after 1945 – three of them with “pathdependent” roots in the respective region’s institutional past and one of them as a kind of
“import” from the English local government scheme– came to exist since their post-1945
well into the late 1980s, that is, for the duration of 40 years, with a remarkable
institutional continuity in West Germany’s Länder. With the coexistence of representative
democracy-based and direct democracy-based variants of the election of mayors these
different local government schemes may be seen and interpreted to have constituted over
the years a kind of institutional “laboratory” and “test ground” for different ways of
institutionalizing the relation between citizens, elected councils and executive bodies.
.
5. The all but “revolutionary” shift to the direct democratic election of the mayors since the
1990s
Since the early 1990s in surprising sequence of legislative acts in Länder’s legislation, the
direct election of the mayors has been introduced in Land after Land, thus replacing the
hitherto existing prevalence of the representative democracy-type election of the local
executives by the direct democracy-type election of the mayors.
The strikingly fast and all but complete adoption of the direct election of mayors throughout
all Länder within a few years has been effected essentially by two different coinciding and
converging factors and impulses.
Democracy deficit
For one, there was a rising sentiment and conviction in ever more broadening public
perception and discussion that the representative democracy-related principles and practices
8
have, over the years, shown “democracy deficits” which call for and justify being remedied
by strengthening direct democratic institutions and procedures (see table).
Quite consistently the call for having the mayors directly elected has come hand in hand with
introducing binding local referendums (For details see the paper by Theo Schiller presented to
this workshop).
Table Direct election and recall of the mayor
direct election
in force
of „recall“ procedures
length
elective terme
„recall“
since
Mayor
Landrat
Mayor Lo
cal
„recall“ procedure provisions
in place?
council
Mayor Landr
at
referendum vote
on
procedure
„recall“
iniative
popular
council
Minimum
intiative
iniative
requirement
(minimum
(minimum
yes-votes
requirement in requirement
percent
of
of in percentage of
council votes)
electorate
of electorate
Bad.-
1.4.56
+
-
8
5
-
-
----
----
----
Bayern
15.1.52
+
+
6
6
-
-
----
----
----
Brandbu
5.12.93 bzw. +
-
8
5
+
-
25/15
2/3 majority
25
rg
20.5.98
Hessen
20.1.91/
+
+
6
5
+
+
----
2/3 majority.
25
13.6.99
+
+
7/9
5
+
+
----
2/3 majority
33,3
Ns
22.8.96
+
+
5
5
+
+
----
¾ majority
25
Nord
17.10.94
+
+
5
5
+
+
----
2/3 majority.
25
5.10.93
+
+
8
5
+
+
----
2/3 majority
30
16.6.94
+
+
+
+
----
2/3 majority.
30
Württ.
20.5.92
Meckl.V
orpom
rheinWestf
RheinlPfalz
Saarl
12
Sachs
12.6.94
+
+
7
5
+
+
33,3
¾ majority.
50
SachsAn
12.6.94
+
+
7
5
+
+
----
¾ majority
30
23.7.96
+
+
6/8
5
25
2/3 majority
33,3
12.6.94
+
+
6
5
----
½ majority
30
halt
SchlesHolst
Thü
+
-
ringen
From Wollmann 2004: 155
9
The mounting general criticism of the traditional forms and procedures of representative
democracy and party democracy and the call for direct democratic remedy received a
momentous push by the “peaceful revolution” in East Germany and by the key role which
basic democratic movements and groups played in toppling the Communist regime. Thus,
the democratically elected parliament of (then still existing) German Democratic Republic
in spring 1990 discussed the draft bill of a new municipal statute. In the pertinent legislative
debate the introduction of binding local referendums as well as of the directly elected mayor
was seen crucial in order to heed and preserve the “grass-root democratic” legacy of the East
Germans’ peaceful revolution (see Wollmann 2002). Although the East German parliament,
as it ran out of time to complete the required legislative business, at the end refrained from
passing legislation on the direct election of the mayors, it explicitly enjoined the upcoming
East German Länder parliaments to provide for the direct election of mayors .
Performance deficit
The other factor that drove the introduction of the direct election was the – and increasingly
accepted – argument that the council-elected mayor was too dependent on the council and
institutionally not strong enough to exercise effective political and executive leadership
particularly when it comes to take and to bring to bear difficult budgetary decisions. This
negative assessment of the council-elected mayor was contrasted with the directly elected
mayor especially of the Baden-Württemberg type who was credited with being an effective
political and executive leader not least in budgetary matters.
Another important impulse for turning to the direct election of the mayor, particularly in its
“Baden-Württemberg” variant, came from the Land of Nordrhein-Westalen where, as was
mentioned earlier, after 1945 – with the “handwriting” of the British Occupational Force, a
local government scheme was put in place in which the elected council was given a
“supreme” decision-making and executive responsibilities, with a council-appointed and
council-controlled CEO-type chief administrator (Stadtdirektor) and a largely “decorative”
council-elected mayor. This scheme which was inspired by the British local government
system stood in stark contrast with the local government scheme which, being rooted in the
10
area’s institutional tradition, hinged on the “Rhinish” model of the (council-elected) strong
CEO-type mayor the strong council-elected executive (with no CEO-type administrative
officer besides him/her). As Nordrhein-Westfalen’s English local government –inspired local
government system evolved over the years, the council-elected mayor who in the original
legislative design and intent was meant to be hardly more than “symbolic” continuously
gathered strength and influence. In a way, this continuously growing political and
administrative “muscle” of the mayor might be interpreted as the reappearance of the
“Rhinish” mayor rooted in the ”genes” of the region’s institutional and political tradition to
which the “British” institutional import had remained somewhat “alien” (see Bogumil 2001:
68). Be it as it may, the fact of the matter was that a permanent zone of conflicts and “tug of
war” developed between the power-conscious, as it were, “neo-Rhinish” mayor and the (ofter
not less power-conscious) chief executive (Stadtdirector). These tensions and conflicts
between these two actors or “two top positions” (zwei Spitzen) as they were called kept
weighing on and marring the operational capacity of local policymaking and administration
and did much to discredit the existing system and question its overall “governability”.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, in an all but “domino-type” sequence of legislative acts, one
Land after the other adopted the direct election of the mayor. The first direct elections of the
mayor were held in the further course of the 1990s. In the geographically, demographically
and politically important Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen, for instance, the reform legislation
was enacted in 1994 and the first direct mayoral elections were held in 1999 (see Kost 2003:
202)
6. Common institutional features and variants in the direct election (and “recall”) of mayors
6.1. The Baden-Württemberg model
The directly elected mayor form which has been in place in the Land of Baden-Württemberg
since the early 1950s served as the much referred example and model in the pertinent reform
debate since the 1990s.
The following features of the Baden-Württemberg model stand out.

The mayor is directly elected for 8 years.. .
11

Any citizen (and not only those nominated by political parties) may be a mayoral
candidate (which reduced the direct grip of the political parties on the selection of
candidates)..

As the mayor is elected for 8 years, while the local council has a five year elective
mandate, the elections are “staggered”. As the election of mayor takes place on a
distinct from the council election it be seen as a “genuine” form of direct democratic
involvement of the citizen.

As the election of the council and the direct election of the mayor take place at
different times and for different durations, this arrangement comes closest to a kind of
local “presidential system”.. .

The mayor chairs the sessions of the elected council and may make the “decisive vote”
in the case of a “tie”. Furthermore, he may chair any council committee.

The mayor is a (CEO type chief executive who solely exercises the direction and
control over the municipal administration. There is no city manager-type chief
administrative officer besides him/her.

The mayor is the (sole) representative of the municipality in the intergovernmental
relations.
The strong position which the Baden-Württemberg mayor has in the local political system
has been called that of an “elective monarch” (Wehling 2003: 26) who, in combining the
(sole) executive power and chairing the plenary sessions (and commissions) of the elected
council, is aditionally legitimated by being directly by the local citizens. This kind of
“local (quasi-) presidential system” goes, in formal terms, beyond the US American
presidential system where, guided by the “separation of powers” imperative, the President
is institutioinally strictly severed from Congress.
The Baden-Württemberg mayor has, over the years, risen to and taken on a largely nonpartisan profile. This shows in different aspects. For one, it has become routine that, even
if a candidate has run on a political party ticket, he/she often chooses, once elected, to
sever or at least institutional ties with the respective political party (for instance, by not
attending party group caucuses). The disposition and readiness of a mayoral candidate or
sitting to deemphasize his/her party affiliation or loyalty are fostered by the Land’s system
of “staggered” local elections, as the mayors and the councils have different electoral
terms (the former 8 year, the latter 6 years), so that political party competition does not
spill over from the council to the mayoral elections. The non-partisan stance of a sitting
12
mayor is particularly called for in the case of “cohabitation”, that is, when, resulting from
the “staggered” electoral sequel, the mayor and the council majority belong to different
political parties and when, thus, it is crucial for the sitting mayor to seek consensus and
compromises “across the aisles”. Furthermore it has over the years become accepted
practice (also in the eyes and appreciation of the local electorate, that mayors, besides
being “political animals”, are administrative professionals who have acquired skills in
administrative activities before running for mayoral office and by whom, becoming a
mayor, this is seen as entry to professional career to be hopefully continued in
subsequent mayoral mandates. In sum, the non-partisan profile and stance of the mayor
can be seen as expression and component of the Land of Baden-Württemberg’s
consensus-based (konkordanzdemokratisch) rather than a competition-prone
(konkurrenzdemokratisch) political culture (see Wehling 2003: 27, for a detailed
discussion on “consensus-based” versus “competition-prone” political culture in German
local politics and Länder see Holtkamp 2008).
6.2. Land of Hesse variant: Persistence of traditional “Magistrat” features in the directly
elected mayor scheme
In the case of the Land of Hessen, the Magistrat scheme which path-dependently dates back
to the Prussian Municipal Charter of 1808 has essentially been retained as, besides
introducing the direct election the mayor, it provides for the traditional collegial body of the
magistrate whose members are appointed by the council on a proportionate formula reflecting
the political party strength in the council. Whereas the mayor is directly elected for six years,
the members of the magistrate are appointed by the council for eight years. Thus, the terms of
office of the mayor and the members of the Magistrat are “staggered”. The magistrate
continues to act as a collegiate/collective decision-making body which can, by majority vote,
overrule the mayor whose status is thus, in line with the time-honored Magistrat tradition, that
of primus inter pares (equal among equals) ( see Dressler 2003: 136.137)
6.3. Simultaneous or staggered elections of mayors and councils
Of the 16 Länder 13 have adopted the “staggered” modality of the direct election of the
mayors, thus following the Baden-Württemberg example and its approximation to a local
“presidential system”.
13
After 1990 three Länder provided for the simultaneous election of mayors and councils.
Besides the Land of Bavaria where the simultaneous election has been in place from the
1950s the simultaneous election was, after 1990, stipulated the Land Nordrhein-Westfalen and
the Land of Niedersachsen.
As the reform discussion conducted in the Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen evidenced the Social
Democrats, while finally supporting the reform regard the simultaneous election as an
instrument to hold the directly elected mayor, to a certain degree, under the control and in the
spell of political party politics. While in 1999 the first direct election of the mayors took place
simultaneously with council elections, the Christian Democrat led coalition decided use the
next mayor election as an entry to changing, in the future, to a “staggered” formula in line
with the Baden-Wüttemberg model.
However, the recently formed “red green” (Land) government coalition (of Social Democrats
and Greens) decided to return, in 2019/20 to the “simultaneous” election modality. The
responsible Minster of the Interior argued that holding the mayoral and the council election
simultaneously would, for one, ascertain a stronger political congruence of the council and the
mayor3 and would, secondly, achieve a higher voter-turnout.
6.4. Recall procedure
As a conspicuous direct democratic innovation the “recall” of the mayor has been introduced
in some of the Länder as a direct democratic procedure and tool to remove a sitting mayor
from office by way of local referendum. There is no example or precedent of such “recall”
procedure in German institutional history. It can be plausibility assumed that the recall
procedures that are familiar in US local government practiced have served as examples.
Two variants of the “recall” procedures have in installed in the German Länder (see table).
.
On the one hand, consistent with the underlying direct democratic logic the local electorate is
given not only the right to vote on a recall referendum (under certain procedural and majority
requirements), but also to initiate the recall proceduire (with a certain requirement of
signatures petitioning the referendum) However, only three Länder,
that is, the (East
German) Länder of Brandenburg and Sachsen and the (West German) Land of SchleswigHolstein) have adopted this fully fledged direct democratic variant. Interestingly two of the
3
Sse Land Minister of the Interor Ralf Jäger (SPD), press notice of June 14 2012:: “Bürgermeister und Räte
sollen an einem Strang ziehen” („Mayor and Council shall pull in the same direction“,
http://www.nrw.de/landesregierung/jaeger-wir-wollen-eine-hoehere-wahlbeteiligung-13041/
14
three are East German Länder which probably still reflects the basic democratic experience
of their founding period.
.
The other Länder have put down an, as it were, “tamed” version of the recall procedure by
reserving the right of initiating the recall procedure to the local council which decides with a
qualified majority vote of its members), while the local electorate is restricted to finally vote
on the recall motion as adopted by the council. In this variant of the “recall” procedure it is a
kind of mix of the representative democratic and the direct democratic principles. As the
decision as to whether a “recall” procedure lies in this variant solely with the council the latter
exercises a kind of representative democratic control over the local citizens in their exercise
of their direct democratic power.
It deserves being highlighted that the Länder of Baden-Württemberg and Bayern which were
the only one in the 1950s to introduce the direct election of the mayor interestingly did not
provide for their possible “recall” and have not done so until now.
Since its introduction the “recall” procedure were quite frequently initiated and resulted, by
way of a successful referendum, in the removal of a sitting mayor from office. Between 1995
and 2006 some 36 recall procedures led to the destitution of the sitting mayor (for detailed
data and analyses see Fuchs.2007).
Out of these 36 a total of 17 took place in the Land of Brandenburg where where the recall
procedure can, in its consistently direct democratic variant, be initiated also by the local
citizens themselves. When between 1994 and 1998 not less than ten percent of the full-time
mayors came to be removed from office by local recall referendums the Länder politicians
(and mayors) somewhat nervously to what, in the media, was labelled a “new popular sport”
of local citizens of “playing bowling with the mayors” (Bürgermeisterkegeln). Subsequently
the Land parliament of Brandenburg raised the minimum percentage of citizens required to
initiate a recall procedure. But afterwards the number of successful recall procedures has
remained comparatively high which plausibility suggests that making use of this direct
democratic instrument has caught roots in the political culture of this Land.
6.7. Voter turnout
Generally speaking in recent years the voter turn-out in local elections has overall noticeably
decreased. In council elections it has come down to oscillate around 50 and 55 percent.
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Insofar as direct elections of mayors have been held on the “staggered” formula, that is, not
simultaneously with the council elections, the available data suggest that the voter turnout has
been on the average lower, in part considerably lower than in council elections in the respective
municipalities.
Based on the data on voter turnout available for the 70 big cities with more than 100.000
inhabitants (see Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2011: 8-26)4 in 33 cities (or 47 perent) the mayoral
and council elections were recently held simultaneously, while in 37 (or 53 percent) the mayoral
elections were conducted as “staggered” events.
Whereas in the simultaneously held elections the voter turnout oscillated around 50 percent it
was noticeably lower in separately conducted mayoral elections. In 23 cities with “staggered”
mayoral elections it was about 10 percent lower than the council elections held in the same time
period. It some cases the voter turnout came down to 30 percent, in a an extreme case to 23
percent. At this point it should be called to mind that the recent decision taken by the “red green”
government coalition of the Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen to return to holding the mayoral
election simultaneously with the council election was based on the argument to thus increase the
voter turnout.
7. Concluding remarks
7.1. Path-dependent continuity and “institutional revolution”.
In the first sections of the paper an account was given that in the historical perspective the
German local government system has, in the preponderance of the representative democracyrelated institutions, manifests a remarkable degree of institutional continuity since the early
19th century well unto the early 1990s, notwithstanding profound political, constitutional and
territorial ruptures (in 1919, 1933 and 1945). The “path-dependent” continuity shows along
three institutional tracks. In two them, covering most of Germany, the the representative
democracy-related council-elected monocratic mayors or council-elected collective board
(Magistrat) prevailed, while, rather in a small Southern region, the direct democracy - prone
direct election of the monocratic mayor (marginally) emerged.. In the second section of the
paper it was shown that in the early 1990s this “path-dependent” preponderance of the
representative democracy-related council election of mayors and executive boards (Magistrat)
has been, in a surprising swift and complete wave of legislative acts, terminated in all Länder
and replaced with the direct election of the mayors. It was argued that the reason for this
astounding “institutional revolution” lay in the coincidence and convergence of two currents
4
See Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2011: 27 ff. also for data on the municipalities between 50.000 and 100.000
inhabitants which, at this point, are not being taken into account
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of critical debate which hinged on “democracy deficit” and “performance deficit” of the
existing mayoral system.
7.2. Impact on the local political arena
Finally a brief assessment shall be given how the “secular” shift to the directly elected mayor
has impacted on the local political arena. As some empirical evidence is available particularly
on the “Baden-Württemberg” model which has been in place for half a century it will be
primarily referred to in the following summarizing remarks.
The introduction of the directly elected executive mayor has, no doubt, profoundly changed
the “local power triad” of local citizens, elected council and mayor.
Mayor/council relations
Particularly in the “Baden-Württemberg” model in which the mayor is not only directly
elected and not only in a chief executive (CEO) function but also chairs the council (and its
committees) the mayor has acquired a position outside and inside the council. In the political
and administrative practice which has developed in Baden-Württemberg over the years the
mayor in exercising his/her administrative and executive functions and leadership has
assumed a largely non-partisan and professional profile. The reason for this non-partisan
stance of the mayors in Baden-Württemberg can be seen both in institutional and cultural
factors.. For one, the Land´s electoral law allows “everybody” to run for office and thus does
not does not privilege the political parties in the nomination procedure.. Second, as the
mayoral term of office is significantly longer (8 years in the first term and even longer in a
second term) than that of the council (5 years), this serves as a further institutional incentive
to detach the mayoral race from the party political competition. Third, in the Land´s political
history and culture, independent (“non-partisan”) local groups (so called “city hall parties”,
Rathausparteien) have traditionally shown considerable electoral strength in local council
elections. In fact, only half of the mayors in Baden-Württemberg are members of a political
party. Even those who are party members and were supported by their political party in the
run-up for the mayoral election largely detach themselves, once elected, from their political
party and to seek a non-partisan stance and profile (see Wehling 2003, Bogumil 2001: 186).
Most mayors have some kind of law training or a public administration background, often
acquired in another municipality, rarely in the municipality where they chose to run for
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mayoral office. Thus, the position and role of the mayor has been “professionalized” and has
turned the mayoral office into a career in its own right.
While the directly elected executive mayor has thus acquired significant political and
executive power and “muscle” in the local political arena, the elected council continues to
play an important political role. In those Länder where the council can pass a kind of “vote of
non-confidence” motion to initiate a recall procedure (to be finally decided by local
referendum) the council possesses an additional political tool to ascertain some “checks and
balances”.
Mayor / local citizens relations
Through the direct election of the mayor an immediate political link and accountability has been
established between him/her and the local citizens. This is particularly true if and when the
sitting mayor seeks re-election.
The political
accountability
of mayor has been further
strengthened by the “recall” procedure which may be perceived and taken account of by the
sitting mayor as a kind of Democlesian Sword pending over his/her activities and adding to some
“checks and balances”.in local politics.
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