Coalition Cabinets and Bicameral Presidentialism: Exploration from Latin America
Adrián Albala
University of São Paulo (USP)
Contact: [email protected]
Draft Please do not cite without author permission
This paper has been prepared to be presented at the 28th World Congress of the International Political
Science Association (IPSA), July 23-28.
Abstract:
Bicameralism, more especially symmetrical bicameralism, constitutes one of the most important differences between parliamentary
and presidential systems. This supposes therefore a two-round procedure in the policymaking process for the president, increasing
then the shadow of the unexpected. Indeed, controlling one of the two chambers may not be sufficient for the president so as to
guarantee the approval of policies. The question is then to know what if a government doesn’t control both houses. In this case, how
does he proceed on the approval of policies? Finally, how coalition cabinets are affected by the uncontrolling of one chamber, if
not both?
The analysis focuses on the 28 cases of coalition cabinets in Latin America, since the return of democracy, which presented a
bicameral framework. I show that bicameralism dramatically affects the composition of the coalitions, as the absence of a majority
in the two chambers engenders a post-electoral agreement round. Moreover, through a duration test, I set out that when a coalition
holds a somehow majority in both houses, then the coalition agreement would last longer.
Keywords: Bicameralism, Coalition Cabinets, Presidentialism, Latin America, Fuzzy Sets
Introduction
The theoretical field, in political science, dealing with coalition cabinets in presidential regimes has registered
recently an exponential production, both in quality and diversity of the topics. Indeed, since the seminal – and
belated- works that aimed to attest to the existence of the phenomenon (Abranches 1988, Deheza 1998), the
scope of analysis have widespread until reaching, almost, the level of knowledge of coalition cabinets under
parliamentary regimes.
In the meantime, following the mainstream trend of the literature in political science, institutions still constitute
the most recurrent dimension for explaining the phenomenon (Altman 2001; Chasquetti 2001; Cheibub et al.
2004; Amorim Neto 2006; Cheibub 2007; Chasquetti 2008; Figueiredo and Limongi 1996, 2008; Raile et al.
2011; Alemán and Tsebelis 2011; Martinez Gallardo 2012; Chaisty et al. 2012; Kellam 2013; Martinez
Gallardo 2014).
Hence, it is quite surprising that most of these studies have limited themselves to elaborate and test arguments,
"copy-pasting" models elaborated by mainstream literature on coalition theories, which were developed,
essentially, by scholar studying West European Parliamentary Democracies (Albala 2016a). Taking out some
examples, Chasquetti (2008), Amorim Neto (200, 2013) and Altman (2001) set out their models on coalition
formation and survival considering every party strength in the lowest chamber.
Beyond the fact that these systems operate differently (Cheibub et al. 2014), parliamentary systems, and
especially West European ones except Italy, share as a main common attribute that the government is
accountable to a unicameral parliament, or an asymmetrical one (i.e. a parliament in which one of the two
chambers is more relevant or powerful than the other) (Lijphart 2012).
However, symmetric Bicameralism constitutes one of the most important differences between parliamentary
and many –Latin American- presidential systems. This feature supposes, indeed, a two-round procedure in the
policymaking process for the president, increasing then the “shadow of the unexpected” (Lupia and Strøm
2008). Thus, controlling only one of the two chambers may not be sufficient for the president to guarantee the
approval of policies, or to guarantee the survival of the coalition (VanDusky-Allen and Heller 2014; Hiroi
2008; Binder 2003). Bicameralism appears, thus, as a relevant condition for either, the policymaking process
and the coalition governance (Hiroi and Rennó 2014).
Consequently, by avoiding or misconsidering the bicameral feature, the above-cited examples of coalition
theories applied to presidentialism fail, then, in capturing a correct presidentialised framework to their
analysis, turning quite dubious their results.
This work aims, thus, to improve coalition theories on presidential regimes by including, for the first time, the
bicameral condition. In fact, I shall intent to answer to the central question: has bicameralism an impact on
the formation and/or survival of coalition cabinets in presidential regimes?
I assume that, no matter its nature -whether programmatic, heterogeneous or ‘negative’-, the partners of a
coalition cabinet seek to enjoy a legislative majority as to minimize the costs of bargaining, and ensure, or
maximise, the policymaking process. Therefore, every coalition cabinet would seek to reach a bicameral
majority. Based on a sample of 29 coalition governments in Latin America, dealing with bicameral
legislatures, I set out that bicameralism has a determinant impact on the formation of coalition cabinets, by
extending the bargaining process between potential coalition members. Additionally, I realize a duration test,
using Fuzzy Sets methodology, pointing out that when coalition cabinets hold a bicameral majority, they would
last longer than if they do not.
This work inscribes, then, as an intent to generalize the consideration of bicameralism for the legislative studies
applied to presidential regimes. The first part will consist in a conceptual and theoretical framework of the
existing literature on bicameralism and coalition theories, and the elaboration of the hypothesis. Then I shall
contextualize the object to the Latin American field. I will show that neither of the two concepts are rare in
the region. Finally, I proceed to the tests on the formation and survival of coalition cabinets in the Latin
American presidential regimes.
Considering Bicameralism and Coalition Cabinets in Presidential Regimes
One of the most common pitfall in social and political sciences, consist in comparing phenomena without
using a clear definition of what the proper phenomenon. In other words, without a conceptual definition of the
object they aim to study, many scholars end by comparing apples with oranges. This statement fits perfectly
well when considering the studies dealing with bicameralism and coalition cabinets, and these conceptual
failures often conduce to concept stretching (Sartori 1984).
This lack of defining concepts exposes these works to dubious conclusions and constitutes the main reason for
the low level of predictability of the models presented. Indeed the use of such loose considerations on the
cases’ selection leads to a failure on coding measurement and a malformation on the shaping of the study.
Heterogeneity generates therefore instability in the scope of the analysis and reduces so the validity of using
similar variables for standard comparison. By proceeding so, causal inference remains dubious.
Hence, in order to avoid these pitfalls, we aim, thus, to delimitate our conceptions of bicameralism and
coalitions, following a min-max strategy (Gerring and Barresi 2003). I begin with the framing of bicameralism
and follow with the concept of coalition cabinets.
Framing the definition of “symmetrical bicameralism”
First of all, it appears that beyond coalition theories, bicameralism has not concentrated, until recently, great
attention by the literature in political science. This is even more surprising as bicameralism is quite a common
constitutional feature all around the world (Norton 2004). As a matter of fact, Tsebelis and Money (1997) have
pointed out that legislatures composed by two chambers represent one third of every legislatures in the world.
Thus, in the great lines, the concept has generally been reduced to a legislature composed by two chambers
(Uhr 2006; Tsebelis and Money 1997; Mueller 1996). Indeed, it is under that rather simplistic conception that
several scholars analysed Bicameralism, through the lens of veto players’ theory, as potential element of
process that may motivate strategic behaviour. Nevertheless, Tsebelis (1995; 2010) considers the two
chambers as potentially two distinct veto players if, and only if, the two chambers are incongruent (i. e. the
forces in the two chambers are not the same). Scholars that follow this line, stress out that by increasing the
number of players, bicameralism affects the process of policymaking by creating delays or vetoes during the
process (Perez-Liñán and Rodriguez-Raga 2009; Hallerberg 2011; Hunnreup Dahl 2013; Van Dusky-Allen
and Heller 2014).
However, this generic conception hides considerable variation in types of bicameralism, needing a more
specific analysis (Cutrone and McCarthy 2008). Hence, Lijphart (1984; 2012) has carried on a classic
distinction and typology of the different forms of bicameralisms. The author distributed the different types of
bicameralisms around two main dimensions: i) the symmetry/asymmetry of the chambers; and ii) the
legitimacy/ representativeness of the second chamber. The first condition, the symmetry/asymmetry
distinction, consists in determine whether the two chambers share similar powers, attributions or influence in
the policymaking process1. The second condition supposes the election process of the members of the upper
chamber (usually called the Senate). Lijphart shows that in many parliamentary countries, the senators are not
elected directly when they are elected2.
These considerations are assumed by Tsebelis and Money (1997: 211), as they state that even weak upper
chambers may exercise influence or veto whenever they are incongruent to the lowest chamber.
1
These considerations are distinct in Lijphart words. Indeed, the German Bundesrat may not share the same attributions and powers
as the Bundestag, but its composition (the minister-president and cabinet ministers of every länders) turns it very influent for the
chancellor.
2
The British House of Lords is a classic example of an unelected upper chamber.
Moreover, bicameralism is also generally linked to federalism as the second or "upper" house consists in the
unity of the federation (Peterson and Mughan 1999; Mueller 1996). Thus, following these common
considerations, it appears that most bicameral legislatures are asymmetrical, as the negative votes of the second
chambers on can frequently be overridden by the first chambers, and that the cabinet is responsible exclusively
to the first chamber (Lijphart 2012:192). Moreover, the legitimacy of the two chambers relay on different
processes, in which the upper house is generally less representative or, even, les democratic than the lower
house (Mueller 1996).
However, all of those considerations mostly apply for Western parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes
(Uhr 2006). In fact, despite existing a diversity of bicameral models under presidential polities, most share a
same tendency in which both chambers have formally comparative powers, attributions and influence, and the
legitimacy of the chambers relay, always on the direct vote (Reynoso 2010; Llanos and Nolte 2006; Sanchez
et al. 2005). Although the president is not accountable to any of the two chambers, as he/she takes his
legitimacy from the popular vote (Cheibub et al 2014), he can thus choose to which one he shall submit first
the bills to be voted. In other words, bicameralism under presidentialism, consists in two legislative bodies
that share similar powers and influence. The major differences between the different models of bicameralism,
relay on the electoral process (e.g district size for electing senators vs. deputies), and the duration of the
mandate within each house3.
Framing a definition of coalition cabinets in presidential regimes
Following the Presidential vs. Parliamentary debate initiated by Linz (1994), it is possible to highlight three
main differences between both regimes. First, the direct election of the Head of Government, who is at the
same time the Head of State, by popular vote
3
in a zero-sum game. The election operates selecting
Generally, when there is any difference, the upper chamber has longer mandates and the conditions for applying to it are more
restrictive.
instantaneously, or after a second round if needed, a winner among all the candidates. This winner is the only
actor in charge of forming his government (Martinez-Gallardo 2014; Cheibub 2007) and no government can
be formed without the president's party. Hence, presidential election operates as a cleaver, leading to a
bipolarisation of the competition between winners and potential winners vs. election losers (Samuels and
Shugart 2010).
Secondly, the election of the president, either simultaneous or not to legislative elections, does not depend on
a parliamentary bargaining (Camerlo and Perez Liñán 2015; Cheibub et al. 2004). President's legitimacy
derives from his/her own election. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the president rules alone. In a case of
coalition cabinet, the president is thus constraint by the coalition agreement in order to keep its parliament
majority.
Finally, under presidentialism, the mandate of the executive head is fixed. This means that even if the president
loses his majority in congress, he remains in office until the next election, which takes place following a
constitutionally mandated time schedule. This is a fundamental difference with parliamentary regimes
(Cheibub 2007; Cheibub et al. 2015), and may potentially diminish the bargaining strength of coalition
partners by reducing their “walk away value” (Lupia and Strøm 2008). Hence, as the eventual departure of
any member of the coalition does not lead to the fall of the government, the “walking away” option for a
coalition member, is less decisive as it is more costly and may reveal unsuccessful (Martínez-Gallardo 2012;
Albala 2016). Thus, I consider coalition cabinets under presidential regimes, following this institutional
framework.
Therefore, a coalition government supposes the presence of distinct political forces within the cabinet,
counting with the corresponding support of all the members in congress. This participation has to proceed
from an inter-party agreement. That is, a coalition government is, above all, the result of a negotiation between
two or more parties, which requires sufficient strength and mutual commitment on a broad list of topics over
different levels (mostly at the executive and legislative levels). The collectivization of these outcomes proceeds
from particular goals expressed as shared positive or negative values 4, power ambitions, policy common
orientations and a sight to re-election or political “grasping”. This engenders so, a higher exposition to both
political and electoral accountability. Coalition members are, hence, responsible and accountable to both the
president and the parties conforming their legislative basis.
Following this narrow definition, I shall not consider as “coalition cabinets” i) governments which allies are
composed by co-opted or independent ministers5 ; ii) governments of a single party comprising of several
internal factions, as autonomous as they might be 6; and iii) governments formed by a dominant party and
‘satellite’ parties7.
On another hand, coalition cabinets are dynamic phenomenon. Indeed, members that form coalitions may opt
to walk away, if they feel, for instance, that the conditions to remain in the coalition are not electorally
sustainable. On another hand, parties that are not present in the original coalition may desire to enter the
coalition, if they consider that they may get some advantage in participating in the government. Anyway,
whatever the motivation for entry/exit, any change in the original coalition supposes, then, the beginning of a
new coalition.
How bicameralism might affect coalition cabinets
As noticed above, very little work from coalition theories have considered the potential impact of
bicameralism in the formation and dissolution processes of coalition cabinets. Moreover, the rare studies that
have done it have shown contradictory results. Finally, as we insisted in the complete lack of comparative
4
Negative values expressed as a common rejection of a third political actor, like in the Uruguayan case for instance.
By saying so we do not exclude every cabinets that include independent ministers, we rather mean that we do not consider
independents counting as distinct partisan “coalition partners".
6
Like Uruguayan Frente Amplio.
7
In these cases, the denomination of ‘party’ is merely formal. It is a strategy for dominant parties to inflate, artificially, their
parliamentary group, through a by-pass of the electoral law. Elections for senators in Argentina constitute a good example of this.
Since the 1994 Constitutional reform, every province elects three senators as follows: 2 senators for the wining list, and 1 for the
first “minority”. Thus in several provinces, like La Rioja or Buenos Aires, the Justicialist Party and its ‘testimonial’ allies frequently
obtain every seat under competition.
5
studies dealing with the impact of bicameralism over presidential coalitions, the assumptions and prime
hypothesis of this study would lay on the (rare) existing references from the literature studying coalition
cabinets on parliamentary systems. Therefore, in continuation, I present the theoretical potential of
bicameralism in the formation process. Then, I discuss the potential impact of two legislative chambers on
the duration of a coalition agreement.
The forming of a coalition government, and the beginning of a coalition cycle, articulates a priori around the
occurrence of recent or forthcoming elections, marked in Figure 1 as “t 0 ”. The range of possible scenarii
implies different degrees of organization, institutionalization and coalition pre-visibility. I illustrated and
simplified these scenarios, in Figure 1, according to the timing of their formation. Thus, the coalition
formation process may operate from each side of t0, meaning that coalitions may have a pre electoral inception
(noted t -1) when they were formed during the electoral campaign or even before8. On the other side, coalitions
are considered as post electoral (noted t+1), when they were formed between the length that goes from the
Election Day to the Assumption Day. As a matter of fact, the presidential mandate’s principle of fixity not
only concerns the termination of the mandate but also its beginning. Thus, the process of cabinet formation
under presidential configuration is limited in time, running from the proclamation of the result of the election
to the inauguration-day of the mandate, generally fixed by the Constitution. This feature supposes that by the
day of the assumption, the president must have formed his cabinet. This is quite different from what occurs
in parliamentary regimes, in which, generally, the bargaining rounds for coalition formation begin after the
election and has, theoretically, unlimited length (Cheibub et al. 2015; Golder 2010).
** FIGURE 1 HERE**
Therefore, considering that any governments would benefit from getting a majority in both chambers, as it
would diminish the possible tension of uncertainty for the policymaking process, I assume thus, following
8
In the case of collective primaries, for instance, see Albala (forthcoming)
Heller and Brandusse (2014), that every government should seek to achieve a majority in both chambers.
Additionally, I assume that a president-elect who could not manage to obtain a bicameral majority at t 0, would
try to include new members as to obtain it for the Assumption Day, in the lapse between t 0 and t+1.
Moreover, this assumption introduces also the question of the cabinet size. This topic appears, indeed, as an
unresolved one by parliamentarists´ scholars. In fact, a first round of studies have argued that the absence of a
majority in the two chambers would force the formateur of a cabinet to include as many partners as necessary
to reach a bicameral majority (Lijphart 2012, Sjölin 1993). Therefore, bicameralism would suppose a
formation of surplus coalition. As a matter of fact, Diermeier et al. (2009), argue the opposite, and claim that
bicameralism would induce, in fact, cabinet size by reducing the number of coalesced partners and favouring
minimal wining coalition types. Finally, Druckman and Thies (2002) found no clear evidence between
bicameralism and coalition size.
Considering this controversy and the fact that this work constitutes the very first tentative to stress out any
implication of bicameralism over presidential coalitions; I argue, then, that bicameralism in presidential
regimes, impacts in the coalition formation process as it conduces presidents to widen their coalition pacts.
Thus, the first hypothesis states:
H1: Bicameralism affects coalition formation by extending the bargaining process and widening it
In complement to the hypothesis about the formation process, it appears interesting to check out if
bicameralism has an impact –or not- on the duration of a coalition agreement. Actually, the main theoretical
considerations that emerged from veto players theories is that, ceteris paribus, bicameralism may decrease
government duration (Tsebelis 2000; Tsebelis and Money 1997). Indeed, a majority divergence in the two
chambers is supposed to conduce to political gridlocks that could only be fixed through hard compromises
agreements between the majorities of each chamber (Cutrone and McCarty 2008, Hunnerup Dahl 2013).
Moreover, a second chamber increases the cost for intraparty discipline, as it implies that every co partisans
in both chambers should follow the same party line, no matter the socio-political context or congressmen’s’
individual interests (Van Dusky-Allen and Heller 2014).
Therefore, following this literature, bicameralism should have an impact only in case of majority incongruence
in the two houses. Applied to coalition cabinets, this statement supposes that by increasing the number of veto
players, bicameral incongruence increases the occurrence of political gridlocks and tensions within the
coalition. In other words, coalition cabinets that do not hold a bicameral majority would be short living. As a
matter of fact, Druckman et al. (2005) have found that governments that control a majority of seats in both
chambers last substantially longer than those who lack majority status in one of the chambers. These
conclusions have, also been challenged by other works (Diermeier et al. 2009; Eppner and Ganghof 2015) that
have shown no relevant impact of bicameralism over coalitions’ duration.
I shall then test whether bicameralism has an impact on the duration of the coalition agreement. I turned out
the argument into a positive one, arguing that the withholding of a bicameral majority would delay the coalition
dissolution. Thus the second prime hypothesis states that:
H2: When a coalition cabinet, in presidential regime, holds a bicameral majority, then the coalition
agreement would last longer
Now the theoretical framework has been settled, it appears necessary to point out the empirical relevance of
the phenomenon that combines bicameral legislatures together with coalition cabinets in presidential regimes.
Through a study of Latin American evidences, I highlight, indeed, that the phenomenon is far from being rare.
In a first part, I shall stress out the occurrence of bicameral polities in the region. Then I show if the
combination bicameralism + coalition cabinets is a rare configuration in the total experiences of coalition
cabinets in the region.
Bicameralism and Presidential Coalition cabinets in Latin America
Although Presidentialism is a constant for every Latin American polity (Negretto 2013), federalism is not so
common in the region. Indeed, only four Latin American countries present a federal organization. On the
contrary, as exposed in Table 1, bicameralism is a widespread configuration, as it is present in 50% (9/18
cases) of the Latin American polities. This data is sensibly higher than the 30% world average as described by
Tsebelis and Mahoney (1997).
**TABLE 1 HERE**
Therefore, these data sets out that the correlation Federalism/Bicameralism is not so evident. Indeed, among
the bicameral polities, the major part –six out of nine occurrences- are unitary cases (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Paraguay, Dominican Republic and Uruguay). On another hand, among the four federal polities, one
(Venezuela) has adopted a unicameral parliament.
Constitutional features are, nonetheless, not frozen in time. Indeed, two countries (Peru and Venezuela) have
operated recently a shift from bicameral to unicameral congress. By opposition as Lijphart (2012) stressed out,
no shift from unicameral to bicameral has ever been registered. Finally, among all the bicameral cases, only
Bolivia presents a somehow asymmetrical bicameralism (García Montero 2008, Llanos and Nolte 2003;
Llanos 2003)
Therefore, the potential scope for the phenomenon (i. e. Coalition cabinets + bicameralism) raises at 50% of
Latin American cabinets, turning it a relevant probability of occurrence. This number is actually higher, when
we compute every government since the third wave of democratization in the region, which started in 1979.
Indeed, I have computed 134 assumed government in the region, that is 134 new cabinets deriving from
democratic processes. Among these cases, 54.47% (74) were held in bicameral polities 9.
9
From now on the percentages I present correspond to every cabinet formed at the Assumption Day.
So, now I exposed that bicameralism is a common constitutional feature in the region, I shall stress out that
coalition cabinets combined with bicameralism is not a rare combination either.
Coalition cabinets and bicameral congresses in Latin America
The very first generation of coalition theories applied to presidentialism set out to evidence the existence and
viability of the phenomenon in Latin America (Abranches 1988; Deheza 1998, Lanzaro 2001, Chasquetti
2001; Cheibub et al. 2004; Albala 2009). This attempt consisted as an answer to the presidentialism vs/
parliamentarism debate, in which many scholars stated that coalitions would be unstable or undesirable under
a multiparty presidential configuration (Linz 1994; Linz and Valenzuela 1994). Thus, the finding of this first
“wave” pointed up that, since 1958 coalition governments made up more than half of the governments in Latin
America. Moreover, some countries such as Brazil and Chile have only experienced this type of governments
(Deheza 1998; Reniu and Albala 2012).
For our purpose, I consider the coalition cabinets held after the third wave of democratization (Huntington
1991). Hence, following my previous definition exposed above, I have computed 30 cases of coalition
governments in the region. This represents an occurrence of 22.23% (30/134) of every assumed government
in Latin America, since 1980.
Additionally, when focusing on the combination coalition cabinets + bicameralism I find out that the extreme
majority (93.3%) of those coalition cabinets in Latin America were formed under bicameral polities. Indeed,
only two occurred in a unicameral polity: Ecuador (the presidencies of Borja and Gutiérrez). Thus, I stand
with 28 cases of coalition cabinets ruling under bicameral legislatures, exposed in Table 2. These represent
20.89% of the total amount of newly assumed government since 1980. Now, if I reduce the general scope to
every assumed government in bicameral polities, this rate raises to 37.83% (28/73). In other words, coalition
cabinets represent 37.83% of the total amount of governments formed under bicameral polities in Latin
America. Thus, as a first observation, neither coalition cabinets in presidential regimes, nor their occurrence
under bicameral legislatures, are uncommon.
**TABLE 2 HERE**
From this empirical basis I will proceed, in continuation, by the test of the two main hypothesis. First, I will
test the impact of bicameralism in the coalition formation process. Then I will test if the holding of two
houses affects the duration of coalition pacts.
Testing the impact of Bicameralism on coalition formation
Remembering that the first hypothesis of this study consists in setting out if bicameralism has an impact –or
not- on the process of coalition formation, it is necessary to proceed to a quick institutional consideration.
Indeed, as mentioned above, one of presidentialism main feature consists in the principle of fixed mandate
(Linz 1994; Cheibub 2007). Nevertheless, this principle concerns not only the termination of the mandate, but
also its beginning. The process of cabinet formation under presidential configuration is, indeed, limited in
time, running from the proclamation of the result of the election to the inauguration-day of the mandate,
generally fixed by the Constitution. This feature supposes that by the day of the assumption, the president must
have formed his cabinet. This is quite different from what occurs in parliamentary regimes, in which, generally,
the bargaining rounds for coalition formation begin after the election and has, theoretically, unlimited length
(Cheibub et al. 2015; Golder 2015).
The length between the Election Day of the president (hereafter E.D), corresponding to t 0 in the theoretical
timeline presented above, and the Assumption Day (hereafter A.D), corresponding to t + 1 , may vary from one
constitution to another. Additionally, more and more cases have introduced recently the principle of ballottage
into their electoral law, as to provide a greater legitimacy to the president-elect, which may conduce to a
reduction of the lapse between the second turn A.D. Moreover, the extension of the lapse between the first and
the second round of the election also varies. Thus, I expose in Graph 1 the constitutional lapse between E.D,
and A. D, including the eventuality of a ballottage. It shows a significant variation across the cases, presidentselect have thus, from two weeks (Argentina and Bolivia in case of run-off), to five months (Uruguay if the
election did not need a second turn), to form their cabinets.
**GRAPH 1 HERE**
The main question consists to find out some differences in the composition of the legislative support between
the two rounds. In other words, as coalition cabinets are embodied through legislative coalitions, I shall verify
if the legislative contingent of a president-elect registered a raise from E.D to A.D, through the inclusion of
new coalition partners. Moreover, I may set out, following Graph 1, that the longer the lapse for negotiation
between ED to AD, the higher the probability for a president-elect to find an agreement with other/new parties.
Thus, I exposed in Table 3 the 28 presidents-elect of the sample, comparing their legislative strength at E.D
with the one they got at A.D. I simplified the operationalization of the legislative strength into three
possibilities, whether the president-elect got: i) no majority at all (marked 0); ii) a legislative majority in one
House (denoted 1); and, iii) a bicameral majority (denoted 2).
Therefore, as H1 supposed that a lack of bicameral majority would conduce to new negotiations, I proceed to
the test of this hypothesis to the study of the presidents-elect who did not have majority at all, or a majority in
only one chamber at E.D. An alteration of the majority value would indicate the inclusion of a new partner in
the cabinet, and so confirm that bicameral majority matters presidents.
Additionally, I also included the earliness dimension, supposing that a pre-electoral coalition (indicated by the
mark 1) would obtain a bicameral majority. In the case that it had not, the argument (H1a) sets that it would
seek to obtain a majority in the two chambers through a widening of the original agreement. On another hand,
I state that in the case of presidents-elect who did not lead electoral coalitions but failed to obtain a bicameral
majority at E.D, would seek to obtain it through the formation of a coalition cabinet at A.D (H1b).
**TABLE 3 HERE**
Analysing the results
The data indicates a clear confirmation of H1. Indeed, only 39.28% (11/28) of the presidents-elect got a
bicameral majority (2), at E.D. Nevertheless, the rate raises at 67.86% (19/28) at A.D, indicating that 8
presidents-elect proceeded to open negotiations with other parties as to form a coalition or enlarge their
electoral coalition. In other words, 8 presidents-elect that could not obtain a bicameral majority through the
election, decided to include new members before their assumption, so as to obtain and enjoy a bicameral
majority. Conversely, the rate of minority coalitions (fully or partialy) fall from 60,72% ( 0= 28.58% + 1=
32.14%) to 32,14% (7.14% +25%).
Moreover, when focusing in the presidents-elect that had no majority (0) or not full majority (1) in the two
chambers, who represented the wide majority (60.71% or 17/28), I observe that most (9/17) intended –and
managed- to improve their legislative condition, obtaining at least a majority in one house. Additionally,
among the presidents who failed to obtain bicameral majorities, the first three Chilean presidents since the
return of democracy (Aylwin, Frei and Lagos), had to deal with a particular constitutional feature inherited
from the Pinochet rule: the existence of 9 designated senators, mostly from the military forces, who prevented
the government to reach a majority in the Senate. Therefore, excluding those three special cases, only five
presidents-elect failed at to negotiate a widening of their legislative basis, confirming, thus, H1a.
On another hand, the data shows that bicameralism has been a central feature for presidents-elect that could
not reach a bicameral majority while running alone. Indeed, among the three cases that ran alone at E.D, all of
them negotiate with new partners the achieving of a bicameral majority. This seems, thus, to confirm H1b.
So, as a first conclusion, I can state that bicameralism has a relevant impact upon the coalition formation
process.
Moreover, there is a very interesting data among the president who obtained only a partial majority, that is a
majority in only chamber: in every case, the defecting house (i. e. the house in which the president could not
get a majority), was the Senate. In other words, obtaining a majority in the upper house appears harder than
in the lower house, despite a lower number of chairs in the Senate, compared to the House of Deputies. This
is probably due to a different electoral rule for electing the senators, turning every chair in the Senate more
costly, which confers to every individual senator a much greater power and influence than the representatives
of the lower chamber.
Now I have shown the critical impact of bicameralism on coalition formation in presidential regime, I shall
focus on its eventual impact on the durability of coalition agreement.
Bicameralism and the duration of the coalition agreement
The conventional view about coalition cabinets, under presidential regimes, used to consist in considering
them as unstable or short lived. As a matter of fact, Martínez-Gallardo (2012) has shown recently that there
is, in fact, wide variation in the durability of these forms of governments. Many of these cabinets have a
duration equivalent to executive coalitions under parliamentary regimes. These findings are not trivial, as they
provide evidences of the stability and efficiency of this form of cabinet. As the objective of this work consists
to find out, which are the prime implicants responsible for increasing the duration of coalition pacts I aim,
therefore, to explain the duration of coalition cabinets. I will test several hypothesis, highlighting the impact
of bicameralism.
First, I need to define the outcome to be explained. Thus, by “durability of the coalition agreement” I consider
the length during which a coalition cabinet remained stable, regarding its original partisan composition (at
A.D). Therefore, I shall not consider cabinets’ reshuffles. The termination of a coalition cycle is, thus, effective
when any alteration in the original composition occurs. This implies either: i) the defection of a member (a
party), whatever the motivation for walking away; and ii) the inclusion of a new member to the coalition10.
Both scenario suppose, indeed, a modification of the balance of powers and influence within the original
coalition. In other words, I shall consider here how long the original coalition at A.D, remained together.
Therefore, I calibrated the outcome, expressed in months as follows:
- 1, if the coalition pact remained stable during the entire president's mandate;
- 0.5, if the pact lasted half of the formal president mandate;
- 0.2, if the pact lasted 20% if the formal presidential mandate, and so on.
Similar to coalition formation processes, the rupture of a coalition agreement and the defection/ inclusion of a
coalition member may have several origins, both external and internal. Nevertheless, coalitions’ duration, in
presidential regimes, is not an empty theoretical field. Indeed, some scholars have already discussed about
theoretical frameworks that would induce coalition maintenance/ dissolution 11. Therefore, the objective
consists here in pointing out whether bicameralism has a relevant implication –or not- in the duration of
coalition pacts, compared to the already existing literature. Following a broader aim to identify why coalition
cabinets last on multiparty presidential regimes, I added four other variables and a control variable, picked
from the existing literature about coalition politics under presidential rule. Thus, I expect to map and find out
some inferential configurations upon the survival/termination of a coalition pact in presidential regimes. In
continuation, I present the four most common arguments from coalition theories’ literature, as complementary
to the bicameral hypothesis (H2).
Selecting additional and “configurational” hypothesis
10
This second scenario supposes that the president needed or, at least felt that he needed, to widen its coalition for ensuring the
governability or the legitimacy of its action.
11
See for instance the Works by Altman (2000), Garrido (2003), Chasquetti (2008), Martínez-Gallardo (2012), Reniu and Albala
(2012), Spoon and West (2015), among others.
First, the most common constraint for studying coalitions, at both the formation and dissolution stage, is the
institutional variable (Strøm et al. 1994, Albala 2016). Indeed, most scholars who worked on government
coalitions in presidential systems established that the institutional system operates as a strong constraint
against walking away temptations (Chasquetti 2008; Garrido 2003; Altman 2001). The main argument is that
the electoral system, through the possibility of re-election and the absence of significant intermediate elections
(i.e. for governors or parliament), should facilitate the survival of the coalition. Thus, H3 states as follow:
H3: If there is institutional constraints potentializing a defection, then the coalition stability is threaten.
Additionally and in the same verve, the powers of the president are considered to have a great impact on the
coalition survival. Indeed, several scholars argue that presidents that hold strong and asymmetrical powers
upon the parliament (mostly through the possibility of governing by decree) are not expected to consider their
partners (Martínez Gallardo 2012; Amorim Neto 2013). In these cases, the incentives for remaining in the
coalition decreases. Hence, paradoxically, strong powers attributed to the presidents are supposed to have a
negative impact negatively on the fulfilment of coalition agreements. Thus:
H4: If the presidential powers are asymmetrical vis-à-vis to parliaments’ attributes, then the coalition would
not last long.
Thirdly, as an internal condition we added the “number of partners variable”, following the literature on veto
players (Tsebelis 2002, 2006: Alemán and Tsebelis 2011; Saalfeld 2011). These works assume that an increase
in the number of players dilutes the concentration of veto, turning more insecure and unpredictable the result
of the game. In other words, an increase of the number of parties into the government would higher the
transaction costs within the government. Applied to coalition cabinets in presidential regimes, Chasquetti
(2006, 2008) stood without relevant evidences that a higher number of parties in a coalition cabinet would
increase the probability of coalition breakdown. Conversely, a lower number of partners would make it easier
to find a solution in case of disagreement among the members, decreasing thus the potential dissatisfaction
within the coalition, which in turn would increase the duration of the coalition. It is surprising that this
hypothesis has not been fulfilled until then, and has not been combined to other conditions. I shall test, then,
how the number of players’ condition would combine with other conditions. I stated the hypothesis as it
follows:
H5: if the number of parties in the coalition is high, the number of veto player increases, then the lifetime of
the coalition’s agreement should decrease.
Finally, I add a contextual condition assuming, following Martínez-Gallardo (2012), that a favourable sociopolitical context, expressed in high rates of economic growth and low levels of unemployment, has a positive
impact over coalition stability. I stated this condition as:
H6: If there is a critical context happening, the incentives for government defection should increase
Research Design and Method
I will test these hypotheses through the inclusion of the 27 concluded coalition governments in Latin America,
picked from Table 1. The data cover the period between the mid-1980’s until 2015. The dataset records the
parliamentary strength of the coalition in both chambers, and includes measures of the conditions, following
the five hypothesis to be tested, as exposed above. I operationalised every condition using Fuzzy memberships.
Thus, I will proceed to the testing of the hypothesis, through a Fuzzy Sets Quality Compared Analysis (from
now on fsQCA). FsQCA is a case-oriented approach and one of the variants of the QCA methodology (together
with “crisp set” and “multivalue” QCA). It consists in establishing set relationships between configurations of
conditions (or “independent variables”), and an outcome (in other words, a “dependent variable”). Causal
relations are, in QCA, expressed in terms of “sufficiency” and “necessity”. In short, a condition, or a
configuration of conditions, is considered as “sufficient” if its presence is enough for producing the outcome.
On the other hand, a condition is called “necessary” when the outcome cannot, or can hardly, be produced
without it (Ragin 2000; 2008a; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). The particularity of fsQCA resides in that it
considers different degrees of membership for both the conditions and the outcome, above the dichotomy
present/absent (csQCA), or high/ medium/ low membership (mvQCA). The degrees of membership to a
certain set, range from 0 to 1, reflecting the diversity of the existing world.
Therefore, I expose in Table 4 the calibration details of the outcome and every condition, corresponding to the
five hypothesis to be tested. In order to proceed to a clearer test of the hypothesis, I ranked the calibration of
the conditions in regards to their theoretical likeliness to occur.
**TABLE 4 HERE**
The strength of QCA is that the process is explicit and systematic, making easy the replication of the test and,
through a transparent coding and a presentation of the cases. Therefore, this characteristic turns the verification
of the process easy (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Thus, in order to make transparent and comprehensive the
forthcoming conclusions, I computed the codification process on Table 5, in which we can easily observe the
values of every condition for each case. I highlighted the MAJ condition as to facilitate the understanding of
its relationship with the Outcome variable.
Hence, following the statement of the five hypothesis, the expected results upon the duration of the agreements
(DUR > 0.5), should logically be summarised by the combination of: i) the holding of a parliamentary majority
(MAJ ≥ 0.55), together with ii) strong institutional constraints (INST ≥ 0.66), with iii) few partners (PART ≥
0.51), iv) moderate presidential powers (PWP ≥ 0.66), and a “favourable” context (CONTXT ≥ 0.51). This
theoretically “perfect path” would be noted: MAJ*INST*PART*PWP*CONTXT→ DUR .
**TABLE 5 HERE**
Results and principal findings
I carried out the testing of the hypothesis using the QCAGUI package under the software R, elaborated by
Adrian Dusa (2006). As to determine which causal configurations should be classified as leading to DUR, I
proceed to a double test with set the classic consistency cut-off of 0.8 and 0.9. I opted for the parsimonious
solution, as I consider that this solution formulas help better to direct attention to hitherto unexplained (also
called “remainders”) cases (Shneider and Wageman 2012:108). I proceed in a first time to the sufficiency test,
with a 0.8 cut-off point, and then I realize the necessary test, with a cut-off point of 0.9.
I present in Table 6 the result for the test of sufficiency. The test sets out that the only sufficient condition to
produce, by itself, the outcome RESULT, is the MAJ condition, with a total consistency value of 0.807, and a
high coverage level of 0.883. In other words, it appears that having a bicameral majority or almost bicameral
majority is sufficient condition for guarantying a longer duration of the coalition agreement. I can summarise
this sentence by the following causal mechanism: MAJ => RESULT
**TABLE 6 HERE**
For the Necessary test, with a cut-off point set at 0.9, the MAJ condition appears again as an unavoidable
condition, being present in the three paths INST*MAJ*CONTXT + PART*MAJ*CONTXT +
PART*PWP*MAJ, with a total consistency value of 0.930, and a relevant coverage level of 0.672.
** TABLE 7 HERE**
Reading this relation I point out that, if a coalitions wishes to last longer, then it has 1) to be formed in a polity
presenting a somehow favourable institutional framework (INST), having a bicameral majority (MAJ) and
enjoying a favourable context (CONTXT); or 2) it has to be formed by few parties (PART), holding a
bicameral parliamentary majority (MAJ), and facing a favourable context (CONTXT); or 3) it has to be formed
by few parties (PART), with a somehow weak president (PWP), and holding a bicameral majority (MAJ).
The MAJ condition is, therefore, an obligatory condition for producing longer coalition agreements. That is to
say, without the presence of the MAJ condition, a coalition agreement would be short living. This finding does
not mean, however, that every time we have MAJ we would have a successful coalition agreement. The case
of Rousseff II, for instance, is a proof of that, as despite enjoying a super bicameral majority, the coalition of
Dilma Rousseff’s second mandate last only a few months (see Table 5).
Thus, considered alone, as a necessary condition, it appears quite consistent with the result, showing a
consistency value of 0.886, and a coverage score of 0.865. From far, these are the highest scores for individual
conditions.
Therefore, enjoying of a bicameral majority appears, thus, as a Sufficient and a Necessary condition for the
results, as it is part of both the Sufficient and Necessary tests with high levels of consistency. In other words,
the withholding of a bicameral majority tends to be necessary and sufficient for a broader duration of the
coalition. By opposition, when coalitions governments do not hold a bicameral majority their life expectancy
is reduced.
Conclusion
This article addresses the original question of how bicameralism would affect coalition formation and
durability in presidential regimes. Indeed, despite a recent production boom in the literature, coalition theories
applied to presidential polities, had never considered the occurrence of bicameralism. This is because most of
the studies produced for understanding coalition cabinets in presidential systems, were elaborated importing
existing models from the mainstream literature on coalition theories, elaborated by scholars studying
parliamentarist polities. For those later studies, indeed, bicameralism is not a relevant feature because, except
Italy, no polity present a configuration of two chamber with symmetric attribution and influences.
However, presidential regimes operate different (Cheibub et al. 2015), and one of the main observable
differences is that when it occurs, bicameralism is, generally, a symmetric bicameralism. In other words,
bicameralism under presidential systems operates with two chambers with similar powers, attributions and
influence. Thus, it appeared quite relevant to study the potential impact of bicameralism over coalition
cabinets.
This article has shown, actually, that bicameralism has a critical influence in both the formation process and
the duration expectancy of coalition cabinets. Indeed, I have pointed out that president who could nor achieve
a bicameral majority after their election, seek to negotiate with other parties, through the forming of coalition
agreements or the widening of their electoral coalition. This is because having a bicameral majority would
ensure a governability and attenuate the shadow of unexpected contexts.
Moreover, I have also set out that when a coalition holds a bicameral majority or almost bicameral majority,
his expected duration (i.e the durability of the coalition formed the day of the assumption of the cabinet)
increases. This finding is quite relevant, as it appears much stronger than any other hypothesis set by the
existing literature. Bicameralism imposes, thus, as a central condition in the study of coalition cabinets in
presidential systems.
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TABLES AND FIGURES:
Figure 1. Coalition formation timeline under presidentialism
Table 1: Bicameralism and Federalism in Latin America
Note: Venezuela and Peru used to have bicameral legislatures until 1999 and 1992, respectively, but have
shifted, since, to unicameral congresses.
Source: Sanchez et al. (2004) and Llanos (2003)
Table 2: Coalition Cabinets and Bicameral Polities in Latin America
Notes: * = did not finished his mandate
Source: Author’s elaboration
Graph 1: Lapse between E.D/ A.D
Note: I inserted in black the lapse between the first, or unique, election round and the inauguration
of the mandate. I inserted in grey the lapse between the second election round and the assumption.
Source: Author’s elaboration from national constitutions
Table 3: Comparison of the bicameral majorities between E.D and A.D
Table 4: Calibration of the Conditions
Table 5: Raw Data Matrix of Coalition Cabinets’ Durability in Latin America
Table 6: Sufficiency Test
Table 7: Necessity Test