1
University of North Carolina at Asheville
Fear Was All That Was Needed:
The Communist Involvement in the Bonus March of 1932
A Senior Thesis Submitted to
The Faculty of the Department of History
In Candidacy for the Degree of
Bachelor of Arts in History
By
Amanda Phillips
2
In his memoirs, Pelham Davis Glassford, the Chief of Police of the District of
Columbia in 1932 recalled his involvement in the World War I veteran’s Bonus March on
Washington and his relationship with Edward Atwell, the commander of the military
police during the protest. He wrote: “‘Bigger and better night sticks for the
Communists,’ was Atwell’s slogan. Once I accused him of dumping seven radicals in the
river. ‘Sure I did,’ admitted Atwell, ‘they needed a bath.’”1 Glassford’s recollection
alludes to his belief in Communist involvement in the Bonus March of 1932. The
passage also illustrates the aggressive position the police had towards possible
Communist involvement. Moreover, not only did it suggest the use of violence on
Communist veterans, but it also demonstrated that such violence was not a secret.
The Communists were, in fact, involved in the Bonus March. There was a threat
of Communist activity among the World War I veterans participating in the march, and
the media used this threat to feed the fear of communism to the public. At the time, it
was believed that the Communist protestors, the Rank and File veterans, outnumbered the
non-Communist veterans. The fear of high numbers resulted in governmental security
measures, such as surveillance, the use of military police, and the separation of suspected
Communist veterans from non-Communist veterans. The Rank and File’s participation
affected the attitude of the non-Communist protestors towards those marchers affiliated
with communism. Fueled by the media and the government, the fear of communism
generated outside of the veteran community became internalized by the non-Communist
veterans. The government, the media, and the non-Communist veterans all fed on this
1
Pelham Davis Glassford, “Communist,” Box 15, Folder 18, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of
California, Los Angeles. Edward ‘Eddie’ Atwell commanded the military police, which was a police force
containing about three or four hundred men.
3
fear, causing behavioral changes, giving President Hoover and General Douglas
MacArthur, the Army Chief of Staff, reason for using military action on the veterans.
From the administration of President Warren Harding until that of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, there was a presidential tradition of vetoing bills that would
provide World War I veterans a bonus in return for fighting to defend the United States.
In 1924, the American government passed a bill known as the Adjusted Service
Certificate Law, giving the veterans an average “bonus” of $1,000 per person. But, under
the law, most veterans would not receive any payment until 1945.2 However, shortly
following the crash of the stock market in 1929, the world fell into economic shambles
leaving many people unemployed and hungry. As anxiety over the Great Depression
grew, American veterans began to feel that the country they defended from 1917-1918
was nothing more than a place of starvation and idleness.
Over the period of two summer months in 1932, about 20,000 veterans assembled
in Washington, DC. They slept in shacks known as “Hoovervilles” on Anacostia Flats, in
various other camps, and in abandoned government buildings. Their protest, which came
to be known as the Bonus March, the Bonus Army, or the Bonus Expeditionary Force
(B.E.F.), lobbied Congress to pass the bonus bill known as Patman’s Bill. The bill
proposed an immediate cash payment of the veterans’ bonus for the full value of the
2
Paul Dickson and Thomas B. Allen, The Bonus Army: An American Epic (New York: Walker
and Company, 2004), 159. The Adjusted Service Certificate Law gave those who served in the military
between April 5, 1917 and July 1, 1918 compensation at the rate of $1 a day for home service and $1.25 a
day for overseas service. From this was deducted sixty days’ service because the veterans were paid $60
upon discharge. Also, the veterans who were entitled to $50 or less were paid immediately while the rest
received certificates to be redeemed in 1945 with four percent interest. Overall, the total value of
certificates equaled to $3.5 billion, which adds to about $1,000 per person.
4
veteran’s Adjusted Service Certificates.3 While the veterans camped in the Capitol,
various rumors spread concerning the Communist Party’s involvement in the Bonus
March. The administration and non-Communist servicemen treated Communist veterans
as traitors to democracy. On July 28, 1932, the local police force’s attempt to evict
veterans from abandoned government buildings provoked a riot, which brought in the
federal troops and abruptly ended the Bonus Army.
Early-twentieth-century Americans both feared communism and viewed it as a
legitimate political party that focused on empowering the mistreated people in society.
The fact that Communists and Socialists overthrew the Russian government in 1917
instilled fear in Americans and the government because if it could happen in Russia, the
perception was that it could happen in America. The fear of communism in America also
heightened due to the first “Red Scare” between 1917-1920. During this time period the
Communist Party platform distinguished communism as a radical movement because of
“their commitment to Marxism-Leninism, [and] their conviction that industrial
capitalism…[was] the root cause of the injustice” in society.4 Americans valued rights,
such as owning private property, choosing a religion of one’s choice, and the right to
vote. Americans feared Communists because they would “overthrow [these] civilized
norms and replace them with an unspeakable tyranny.”5 Communism meant “taking
sides with the poorest, most vulnerable, most exploited people against the ruling elites
3
Donald J. Lisio, The President and Protest: Hoover, MacArthur, and the Bonus Riot (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1994), 29.
4
Albert Fried, Communism in America: A History in Documents (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1997), 3-4.
5
Fried, 4.
5
who thrived on their sufferings.”6 In addition to fighting for the veterans’ bonus, the
Communists condemned racism, demanded relief for unemployed workers, and
organized unions.7 Most Americans considered communism a threat to their democratic
government, which was the reason that the Communist Party never became a mainstream
political party in America.
A few scholars have debated over the numbers of Communist Party members
involved and the effectiveness of the Party’s infiltration in the Bonus March. According
to historian Harris Gaylord Warren, the Communists, led by Emanuel Levin, the
chairman of the National Bonus Army Committee in the Workers Ex-Service Men's
League (WESL), prepared to march to Washington in order to “infiltrate and capture” the
Bonus Army and ultimately “force Hoover to call out the troops.”8 In contrast, historians
Paul Dickson and Thomas Allen argued that there were fewer Communists in the Bonus
March than women and children. However, this downplay of Communists in the protest
was not widely believed by the Military Intelligence Division, the Hoover administration,
or General MacArthur.9 Another historian, Donald Lisio wrote that the Communist
strategy motivated “the workers [to]…organize [in] ‘a tightly disciplined, quasi-military
party…in which every member would function as an obedient solider.’ A militant,
revolutionary organization would then radicalize the people through mass street
6
Fried, 4.
7
Robin D. G. Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 15. Fried, 6.
8
Harris Gaylord Warren, Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 1967), 225.
9
Dickson and Allen, 152.
6
demonstrations and confrontations with reactionary forces.”10 The implementation of
this strategy started in the Tenth Plenum of the Comintern Executive Committee in
1929.11 This strategy gives the perception that the Communists encompassed more
numbers than in actuality, making them appear more effective and organized. The
Communist Party was small, but they made a big impact through their organization and
effectiveness.
Fear of communism in the Bonus Army prevailed among government officials
prior to the arrival of the first contingent of Bonus marchers and during the protest.
Secretary of War, Patrick J. Hurley had a “determination to drive the B.E.F. away and to
brand it as a gang of Communists and hoodlums.”12 According to Jonathan Alter,
Secretary Hurley had purposely spread word that the demonstrators were Communists
“hoping to create a pretext for a crackdown.”13 Therefore, Hurley believed that
Communists inspired and organized the protest. Historian Donald Lisio also illuminated
aspects of a Communist conspiracy within the Bonus March, which created a “Red
Scare” in the government. One way Lisio showed this fear of a Communist conspiracy
was through the threats of Communist marchers advancing on the Capitol. The author
stated that these “sensational stories of Communist activity were part of a huge
10
Lisio, 88. Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, The American Communist Party: A Critical History
1919-1957 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 174. It is important to note that between 1935-1939 the history of
communism in American is known as the “Popular Front” period, where the party’s platform and strategy
adapted to the social and political conditions of America. Although this notion can be seen prior to 1935,
the Communist Party became involved in organizing labor unions, attempted to eliminate racism, etc.
Maurice Isserman, “The New History of American Communism Revisited” Reviews in American History,
vol. 20, no. 4 (1992):536-542.
11
Lisio, 88.
12
Warren, 229.
13
Jonathan Alter, The Defining Moment, FDR’s Hundred Days and the Triumph of Hope (New
York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2007), 122.
7
propaganda build-up…to credit the Communists with organizing the B.E.F,…and to
attract the attention of any veterans who might be growing impatient with their own
[democratic] leadership.”14 Some governmental figures took this threat seriously.
Deputy Chief of Staff, George Van Horn Moseley reacted by creating the emergency
plans for Washington in case a riot occurred, which included the use of military force.
Also, many government officials, with the exception of President Hoover, wondered
“what violence the Communists might incite…[and] they feared impending riot and
possibly revolution, which might become widespread enough to threaten the American
democracy.”15 According to the majority of federal officials, it is clear that a perceived
threat of communism existed in the protest for the bonus. Where did this fear come from
and did the Communists pose a huge threat with their activities?
Scholars have debated over who was to blame for the veteran’s eviction and over
the Communist element in the march. A couple of scholars have blamed President
Hoover and his administration for their lack of sensitivity towards the veterans.16 On the
other hand, Lisio argues that MacArthur, instead of President Hoover, was the main
instigator, proven when MacArthur attacked all of the veteran camps and drove them out
of Washington against Presidential orders. Many scholars, with the exception of
14
Lisio, 105.
15
Lisio, 88.
16
Warren; Lisio; Rexford G. Tugwell, “Roosevelt and the Bonus Marchers of 1932,” Political
Science Quarterly. 87, No. 3. (1972), 363-376. JSTOR. http://0www.jstor.org.wncln.wncln.org/stable/2149206?&Search=yes&term=Tugwell&term=Marchers&term=193
2&term=Roosevelt&term=Bonus&list=hide&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoAdvancedSearch%3Fq0%3DRo
osevelt%2Band%2Bthe%2BBonus%2BMarchers%2Bof%2B1932%26f0%3Dti%26c0%3DAND%26q1%3
DTugwell%26f1%3Dau%26c1%3DAND%26q2%3D%26f2%3Dall%26c2%3DAND%26q3%3D%26f3%
3Dall%26wc%3Don%26Search%3DSearch%26sd%3D%26ed%3D%26la%3D%26jo%3D&item=1&ttl=1
&returnArticleService=showArticle
8
Jonathan Alter, Paul Dickson, and Thomas Allen, claim that the Communists completely
organized the Bonus March.17 In reality, the Communists were involved, but they only
made up a small component of the crowd. They were more active than the other
veterans, and that frightened the government and non-Communists. That fear, fueled by
the media and the government, turned the veterans against each other, causing violence
and provoking the government to send in the military to restore order.
Preceding the assemblage of veterans in the Capitol, the Communist veterans
organized their advocation for the bonus in their headquarters located in New York
City.18 Emanuel Levin, a committee chairman of WESL, carried on the majority of his
work in the headquarters located in New York instead of the Capitol. In the New York
office, a group of nine men calling themselves the Joint Committee of WESL and the
Provisional Bonus March Committee began issuing printed circulars and hand bills
demanding the payment of the bonus.19 These printed advertisements made it to the
Washington, DC where the Communist veterans dispersed the pamphlets. The
Communist leaders such as John T. Pace, C. B. Cowan, Roy W. Robertson, and others
ran the Capitol outpost. These leaders had more field experience with the daily activities
of the veterans compared to those working at the Communist Headquarters in New York
City. One common handbill handed out by Communist bonus marchers proclaimed:
“Let no threat of the Dictators who are out to break our struggle prevent you to continue
17
Alter, 122; Dickson and Allen; Warren.
18
Pelham Davis Glassford, “Communists 2,” Box 14, Folder 2, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679). Department of Special Collection, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of
California, Los Angeles. There are three documents written by Glassford labeled “Communists” so for the
purpose of clarification they have been numbered.
19
Pelham Davis Glassford, “Communist,” Box 15, Folder 18, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679).
9
the fight for the BONUS!”20 In this statement, the label “Dictators” referred to
government officials who were alarmed by the Communist presence in the Capitol,
especially veteran Walter Waters, the elected Commander of the Bonus Army.
Also from these advertisements, one can see what the Communists’ objective
was. One sticker read:
SUPPORT AND JOIN THE PARADE! SUPPORT THESE DEMANDS:
1. CONGRESS MUST NOT ADJOURN UNTIL THE BONUS IS
GRANTED IN FULL TO EVERY VETERAN.
2. The $100,000 appropriated as a loan to get us out of Washington must
be given instead to shelter and feed the veterans in Washington.
3. That the Rank and File be allowed to present this petition the way the
masses want it presented.
PETITION BY THE RANK AND FILE OF THE BONUS MARCHERS
TO 72nd CONGRESS AND THE MASSES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
US. SUPPORT THE PICKETING ON THE HILL!21
This sticker displays the dedication of the Communist Party to adhere to the ideas and
desires of the masses.
Even prior to the protest, WESL sent letters to veterans publicizing the Bonus
March in Washington and the fight for the immediate cash payment of the bonus. The
letter told veterans to “wire your congressmen and senators demanding a favorable vote
on the bonus” and to “distribute ballots to veterans wherever you find them, regardless of
their veteran organization affiliations. Get them to vote.”22 The Communist veterans
20
Advertisement: “Let no threat of the Dictators who are out to break our struggle prevent you to
continue the fight for the BONUS,” Box 15, Folder 18, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679).
Department of Special Collection, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los
Angeles.
21
Advertisement: “SUPPORT AND JOIN THE PARADE!,” July 19, 1932,” Box 15, Folder 18,
Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young
Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
22
“Close Ranks-Forward March. On to Washington Rank and File Veterans. Be in Washington
June 8 March for the Bonus,” Box 15, Folder 18, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679).
th
10
involved in the Bonus March were very active in attempting to get an immediate cash
payment of their bonus. According to Police Chief Pelham Glassford, “the main body of
the B.E.F., under Walter Waters, [the commander of the Bonus Army], were taking no
part in the Capitol picketing and…Robertson’s policy, looked like action.”23 Another
advertisement the Communists promoted was their “three point program.” The “three
point program,” showed the Communists’ goals of “immediate payment of the balance
due on the Adjusted Compensation Service Certificates, to repeal the Economy Act, and
immediate remedial relief for the unemployed and farmers.”24 Clearly, the radical
element involved in the Bonus Army was highly energetic about their cause and efficient
at getting work done.
Through parades and picketing of the White House and Capitol Hill, the
Communist Party proved to be very productive in advancing the Bonus Army, but they
were less successful at promoting the Communist cause. One of the first events the
Communists attempted to execute was a parade on Pennsylvania Avenue on the evening
of June 8th, 1932. This parade fell on the same day the B.E.F. planed a parade as well.
Conflict with the B.E.F. parade and “rumors that the B.E.F. would stone them
[Communists] if they passed Camp Glassford” provoked the Communists to call off their
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los
Angeles.
23
Pelham Davis Glassford, “Bonus Expeditionary Force,” Box 14, Folder 2, Pelham Davis
Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library,
University of California, Los Angeles.
24
“Comrade Rank and File Veterans,” Box 1, Emanuel Levin Collection of Bonus Army Materials
(Collection 1087). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of
California, Los Angeles.
11
parade. 25 The Communists also picketed the White House, which took place on July 25,
1932 to convince Senate members to pass the bonus bill.26 They advocated this event
with a handbill that stated “VETERANS! CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE FOR THE
BONUS; PICKET – THE WHITE HOUSE! DEMAND A SPEICAL SESSION OF
CONGRESS!!!”27 Furthermore, on July 15, 1932, the Rank and File veterans decided to
capitalize on the event coined as the “Death March,” which was comprised of a group of
veterans who marched single file at the Capitol for five days and nights. Roy W.
Robertson, who Army Intelligence reports believed to be a “leader of a group under
Communistic influences,” organized the Death March.28 Unfortunately, the Communist
Party’s attempt at organizing a rival event did not give them the attention they desired
because the spotlight was on Roberston. Literature passed out among the marchers by
the Communists contained advertisements to picket Capitol Hill. One handbill stated
“Support the right to the Rank and File to Meet on the Hill.”29 Clearly, the Communists
promoted the bonus through parades and picketing of the White House and Capitol Hill.
25
Pelham Davis Glassford, “Communists 1,” Box 14, Folder 2, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of
California, Los Angeles.
26
W.F. Sager, Minutes of the WESL meeting, July 23, 1932, Box 15, Folder 18, Pelham Davis
Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collection, Charles E. Young Research Library,
University of California, Los Angeles.
27
Advertisement: “VETERANS! CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BONUS,” Box 15,
Folder 18, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collection, Charles E.
Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
28
Nugent Dodds, July 22,1932, Department of Justice, File 95-16-26,
http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/bonmarch.htm
29
Advertisement: “Support the right to the Rank and File to Meet on the Hill,” Box 15, Folder 18,
Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collection, Charles E. Young
Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
12
The Communists not only were more active in their protest, but they also gained
the police’s trust. Not all of the non-Communist veterans gained the police’s confidence
because of Commander Waters’ unruly behavior that resulted in breaking the police
barrier and thousands of veterans storming Capitol Hill. Glassford’s account of his
relationship with John T. Pace, the field commander for the Communist veterans,
confirmed that some Communists did gain the police’s trust. When Glassford realized
that Pace was planning a second attempt to picket the White House he went to Pace’s
office. Glassford said “See here Pace, I haven’t had a day off since the bonus marchers
arrived in this city – I’d like to go away for the weekend, how about an armistice on this
picketing business until my return?’ Pace replied, “O.K. General, when will you be
back?” Glassford’s response was “About ten o’clock Monday.” They settled on
resuming the picketing at noon on Monday. Glassford wrote that when he arrived on
Monday morning he “found that the ‘Rank and File’ were preparing to picket the White
House.”30 This demonstrates that certain Communist leaders had gained Glassford’s trust
because he wrote “I was confident that Pace would not violate his word” and abide by the
law.31
Furthermore, the Communists received permits to hold demonstrations to further
their cause which the media misinterpreted. In a WESL meeting composed of about 150
veterans, the leaders emphasized that a permit had been granted to them for the parade on
30
Pelham Davis Glassford, “Communists 2,” Box 14, Folder 2, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679).
31
Pelham Davis Glassford, “Communists 2,” Box 14, Folder 2, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679).
13
June 8th.32 Glassford mentioned that the Communists were “granted permits for meetings
any time they applied for them.”33 In contrast, The New York Times claimed that
“authorities at the Capitol denied the Communists permission to hold a demonstration.” 34
This newspaper statement went against what Glassford declared because the Communists
clearly held demonstrations in the Capitol. This false information created a perception in
the eyes of the public that the Communists were not law abiding citizens because they
supposedly demonstrated without a permit. Therefore, the Rank and File veterans
actually abided by the law and gained the trust of Glassford, unlike Waters who went
against police orders and broke through the police line. Because the Communists were
active, the only real threat they possessed was their motivation for the execution of their
passions.
Not only were the Rank and File veterans productive during the protest, but they
also continued to vehemently fight for the immediate payment of the bonus preceding the
end of the march. The New York Times printed the Communists announcement
concerning a “drive for a new Bonus March to Washington when Congress convenes
next December.”35 In the same article, a Communist veteran stated that “we stand ready
32
John Apostolides, Minutes of the Worker’s Ex-Service Men’s League meeting, July 6, 1932,
Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young
Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. These minutes are also located in the Justice
Department: http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/bonmarch.htm
33
Pelham Davis Glassford, “Communist,” Box 15, Folder 18, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679).
34
“7,000 in Bonus Army Parade in Capitol, Orderly But Grim,” The New York Times, June 8th,
1932. http://0proquest.umi.com.wncln.wncln.org/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=U01EPTYmSU5UPTAmREJTPTFBQ0Q
@@&cfc=1
35
“Reds Accept Blame for Bonus Rioting,” The New York Times, July 31, 1932. http://0proquest.umi.com.wncln.wncln.org/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=U01EPTYmSU5UPTAmREJTPTFBQ0Q
@@&cfc=1
14
to go to Washington again and fight once more for the bonus and for the working men.”36
After the protest the Communist veterans continued head strong, advocating the bonus
through various conventions (See appendix A).37 This opening page of a newsletter,
geared towards providing information to fellow Communists, displayed the numbers
from each attended state at the Rank and File Convention in 1934. Another indication of
the Rank and File veterans holding conventions after the march can be seen in a political
cartoon comparing the Rank and File Convention with the non-Communist veteran
convention (see appendix B).38 In this political cartoon, the Rank and File were present
at both conventions advocating for the bonus. However, the people at the nonCommunist veterans’ convention told the Communists to “Shut Up!” and threatened to
throw them out. Regardless of their welcome, this political cartoon shows that the
Communist veterans were not only active throughout the Bonus March, but were also
very productive following the bonus demonstration in the Capitol. The Communists did
not pose a threat to the democratic governing system through their activities because they
abided by the law and gave no hint of overthrowing the current governing system. Where
did the fear of communism come from if it did not come as a result of their activities?
The threat of communism first appeared in the newspapers as the veterans from
around the country embarked on their journey to Washington, DC. The New York Times
36
“Reds Accept Blame for Bonus Rioting,” The New York Times, July 31, 1932. http://0proquest.umi.com.wncln.wncln.org/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=U01EPTYmSU5UPTAmREJTPTFBQ0Q
@@&cfc=1
37
“Rank and File,” May 19, 1934, Box 1, Emanuel Levin Collection of Bonus Army Materials
(Collection 1087). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of
California, Los Angeles.
15
printed story after story concerning the Communists progression towards the Capitol.
One article mentioned a group of veterans traveling to the Capitol from New York where
police described 300 of them as “rival communists” and 200 as “good American
citizens.”39 The article continued about the 300 Communists who had “mobilized under
the auspices of the Workers’ Ex-Service Men’s League, a Communist
organization...[who] clambered aboard a ferryboat, many of them without paying their
fares.”40 Another example of acquiring transportation in such a way came from both the
contingent from Cleveland led by C. B. Cowan and from Detroit led by John T. Pace,
both of whom were Communists and had criminal records. According to the
investigation done by the Attorney General, William D. Mitchell, these groups had “held
up a mail train and attempted to commandeer transportation to Washington.”41 This
showed that the media deemed those veterans Communists who obtained transportation
to the Capitol without paying for it.
The newspapers presented the threat of a possible Communist takeover of the
Bonus movement, which created fear in various individuals who were not in Washington
38
“Rank and File Demand Bonus in Both Conventions,” The Fighting Vet, October 15, 1932,
Box14, Folder 2, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collections,
Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
39
“Veterans Here Off to Capital as House Forces a Bonus Vote: The Bonus Development & 500
Veterans Here Start Capital Strike,” The New York Times, June 5, 1932. http://0proquest.umi.com.wncln.wncln.org/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=U01EPTYmSU5UPTAmREJTPTFBQ0Q
@@&cfc=1
40
“Veterans Here Off to Capital as House Forces a Bonus Vote: The Bonus Development & 500
Veterans Here Start Capital Strike,” The New York Times, June 5, 1932. http://0proquest.umi.com.wncln.wncln.org/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=U01EPTYmSU5UPTAmREJTPTFBQ0Q
@@&cfc=1
41
William Starr Myers and Walter H. Newton, The Hoover Administration: A Documented
Narrative (New York: Charles Scribner’s Song, 1936), 274. This idea can also be seen in “1,069 in B.E.F.
Had Crime Record, Mitchell Says; Hoover’s Friends Stunned; Censure Move Gaining,” The Washington
Herald, September 12, 1932; “Bonus March: 1932”; President Hoover and the Depression: 1929-1933;
Hoover Online Digital Archives; Hoover Library.
16
at the time. For example, Henry J. Amy, the commander of the New York County
organization of the American Legion stated “as far as the veterans from New York are
concerned, I am satisfied that they were inspired by the Communist propaganda of the
Workers’ Ex-Service Men’s League, and it seems to me obvious that the whole
movement is the result of the Communist inspiration.”42 Putting Amy’s opinion into the
newspaper showed how people outside of Washington viewed the Bonus Army as
Communist-inspired and the power the media had in representing the trepidation of
communism.
The media communicated rumors of Communist involvement in the B.E.F. to the
public, which turned the threat into a fear of communism. The media and the
government made it appear that the entire Bonus March, which contained 20,000
veterans, was full of Communists. This was far from the truth. At the beginning of the
protest, The New York Times claimed that 4,000 Communists purged the ranks.43
According to Glassford, there was “at no time more than a couple of hundred bonus
marchers among the veterans in Washington affiliated with the Communist element.”44
Moreover, Commander Walter Waters stated that “the entire number in the Communist
42
“Says Reds Inspired Bonus Army,” The New York Times, June 10, 1932. http://0proquest.umi.com.wncln.wncln.org/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=U01EPTYmSU5UPTAmREJTPTFBQ0Q
@@&cfc=1
43
“‘Bonus Army’ Rallies For Parade Tonight,” The New York Times, June 7, 1932. http://0proquest.umi.com.wncln.wncln.org/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=U01EPTYmSU5UPTAmREJTPTFBQ0Q
@@&cfc=1
44
Pelham Davis Glassford, “Communist,” Box 15, Folder 18, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679).
17
camp during the whole episode of the B.E.F. never exceeded three hundred.”45 Also,
Glassford stated that “never for a moment were they [the Communist veterans] out of
control,” further proving that the fear projected by the media was blown out of
proportion.46 Because the media presented numerous articles surrounding the danger of
the Communist involvement, Communist leaders questioned “how [it is] that the Workers
Ex-Service Men League can hold meetings without disorder. We do not advocate
violence or dirty work as printed in the press.”47 This statement further showed the
abundance of the media’s flaunting of an unwarranted threat.
The New York Times furthered their claim of a Communist threat by stating that
during the veteran’s march on June 8th, police “had received a warning…that a unit of
100 alleged Communists, known as ‘shock troops’…had been sent [to Washington] with
instructions to cause violence and precipitate an invasion of an important government
building, believed to be either the White House or the Capitol.”48 However, even though
this newspaper published the possibility of disorder, the incident never occurred and no
violence broke out.
45
W. W. Waters, B.E.F. The Whole Story of the Bonus Army, Mass Violence in America (New
York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1969), 93.
46
Pelham Davis Glassford, “Communist,” Box 15, Folder 18, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679).
47
John Apostolides, Minutes of WESL, July 5, 1932, J. F. Watts, The Rout of the 1932 Bonus
Army from Washington, (Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1982). Microfilm # S201.471.
48
“7,000 In Bonus Army Parade in Capital, Orderly But Grim,” The New York Times, June 8,
1932. http://0proquest.umi.com.wncln.wncln.org/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=U01EPTYmSU5UPTAmREJTPTFBQ0Q
@@&cfc=1
18
The newspapers also created political cartoons that depicted the Communist
involvement in the Bonus Army (See appendix C).49 A political cartoon titled “Again, in
No Man’s Land” illustrated that the veterans were caught between the crossfire of the
federal and local administration officials and the Communists. The caption underneath
the political cartoon stated “between two fires, the administration and the ‘Reds,’” which
further demonstrated that there was angst between the two. Publishing such a political
cartoon suggested that the administrations and the Communist servicemen were the only
two options for the non-Communist veterans other than the no-man’s land. The cartoon
depicted fear by symbolizing the march as a battle instead of a peaceful protest.
Headlines like “Says Reds Inspired Bonus Marchers,” “But No Trouble Occurs,
Despite Reports That Communists Planned a Disturbance,” “Bonus Army Drives 8 Reds
From Ranks,” and “Reds Urge Mutiny in the Bonus Army” flooded the newspapers.50
Such headlines spread the fear that Communists had taken control over the Bonus March.
With headlines and articles over-dramatizing the Communist involvement, the media was
directly responsible for the production of fear in the public, the government officials, and
in turn, the non-Communist veterans.
Officials of both the federal government and the city of Washington put security
measures into effect against the Communist veterans from the time the first contingent of
49
“Again, in No Man’s Land,” The B.E.F. News, June 25, 1932, Box 15, Folder 5, Pelham Davis
Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library,
University of California, Los Angeles.
50
“Says Reds Inspired Bonus Marchers,” The New York Times, June 10, 1932; “But No Trouble
Occurs, Despite Reports That Communists Planned a Disturbance,” The New York Times, June 8, 1932;
“Bonus Army Drives 8 Reds From Ranks,” The New York Times, June 28, 1932; “Reds Urge Mutiny in the
Bonus Army,” The New York Times, June 19, 1932. http://0proquest.umi.com.wncln.wncln.org/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=U01EPTYmSU5UPTAmREJTPTFBQ0Q
@@&cfc=1
19
veterans arrived in Washington, DC until their eviction on July 28, 1932. Protecting
against the Communists shows that the officials possessed a fear of communism in the
Bonus March. The federal government placed spies within the Bonus Army contingents
and assigned the majority of them to the Communist factions. On the local level, the
Washington administration put multiple security measures on the Bonus Marchers
through the various types of police control exerted on the service men. The Metropolitan
Police force, under the supervision of Glassford had the Communists under “close
surveillance” ever since “the Communists opened their office in Washington.”51 Then,
“military police organization of the main B.E.F. camps” reinforced control over the
Communist elements. 300 to 400 men comprised the military police, who worked
together with the Metropolitan Police under Glassford’s command.52 Some other duties
of the military police were to “maintain law and order at various camps and billets, assist
in directing traffic, and maintain a contraband against the introduction of liquor and
weapons.”53 The military police’s most important role was to prevent the “spread of
Communistic and radical propaganda” and quite often, “the military police made life
miserable for the radicals and Communists.” 54 In addition to these two groups of police
control involved, were the Capitol police that placed their authority over the Capitol
51
Pelham Davis Glassford, “Communist,” Box 15, Folder 18, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679).
52
Pelham Davis Glassford, “Communist,” Box 15, Folder 18, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679).
53
Pelham Davis Glassford, “Communist,” Box 15, Folder 18, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679).
54
Pelham Davis Glassord, “Communist,” Box 15, Folder 18, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679).
20
grounds.55 Clearly, fear must have existed since three different types of police groups
exerted control over the main B.E.F., as well as watched the Communist service men
carefully.
As a result of the Communist involvement in the protest, the local administration
put measures of isolation into effect by separating the Communist veterans and nonCommunist veterans into different camps and using identification cards. Commander
Waters put the Communists into separate camps in hopes of decreasing their influence on
the rest of the veterans. In an interview of Glassford by the Collier’s National Weekly, he
stated “as everybody knows, the radical element was separated from the main body of the
marchers and got no sympathy from them.”56 Another means of isolation by the local
Washington police was in the distribution of identification cards, also known as B.E.F.
membership cards. The purpose of the ID cards was to prevent protestors who did not
fight in World War I from becoming involved in the march and to “weed out
Communists from the ranks.”57 The veterans were “required only that they give
satisfactory proof of honorable service in the World War.”58 Unfortunately, the practice
55
Pelham Davis Glassford, “The Bonus Expeditionary Force,” Box 14, Folder 2, Pelham Davis
Glassford Papers (Collection 679).
56
Owen P. White, “General Glassford’s Story,” Collier’s The National Weekly, October 29, 1932,
Box 14, Folder 5, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collections,
Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
57
“Capitol Faces Siege of 8,000 Veterans,” The New York Times, June 6, 1932. http://0proquest.umi.com.wncln.wncln.org/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=U01EPTYmSU5UPTAmREJTPTFBQ0Q
@@&cfc=1
58
R. B. Ellison, Statement to the press from the Attorney General, September 12, 1932, Box 14,
Folder 12, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E.
Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
21
of registering came to a halt on June 12.59 The government officials feared that
Communists would infiltrate the protest so they attempted to isolate Communist threats
through B.E.F. membership cards and segregation of radical elements.
The fear that communism had infiltrated into the Bonus movement and influenced
the attitude of non-Communist veterans and their leaders can be seen in the way they
decided to uphold the law. Not only did the federal and local governments put security
measures into place, but the veterans themselves also, according to Police Chief
Glassford, “voted to institute military discipline. They voted to outlaw liquor…to uphold
and respect the law and the constituted authorities…to suppress subversive
propaganda…and to suppress pan-handling.”60 In fact, Commander Waters demanded
military discipline and put into effect three rules: “no panhandling, no liquor, and no
radical talk.”61 To Waters, “radical talk” meant Communist ideas. The last rule also
reflected his fears that the Communists would infiltrate or had already infiltrated the
B.E.F. Also, liquor would result in unruly behavior, which could lead to veterans
breaking the law. Waters and the veterans created these rules to prevent possible riots
that could possibly overthrow the American democratic government, which the majority
believed to be the Communists’ motive for their presence.
59
William D. Mitchell, Letter of the Attorney General to the President, in State Papers and Other
Public Writings of Herbert Hoover 1931-1933, vol. 2, ed. William Starr Myers (New York: Doubledy,
Doran & Company, Inc, 1934), 276. Also found in the Justice Department:
http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/bonmarch.htm
60
Pelham Davis Glassford, “The Bonus Expeditionary Force,” Box 14, Folder 2, Pelham Davis
Glassford Papers (Collection 679). This idea is also presented in “Bonus Army Asked to Leave Capitol,”
The New York Times, June 9, 1932.
61
W. W. Walters, 92. This idea is also presented in “Bonus Army Asked to Leave Capitol,” The
New York Times, June 9, 1932.
22
The anxiety over the Communist involvement in the protest, fed by the media and
the government, influenced the attitude of Walter Waters, the commander of the B.E.F, as
well as the mainstream veterans. Waters feared the activities of the Communists to the
extent that he refused to give any Rank and File veteran food. Glassford had to step in
and order Waters to feed the Communist groups.62 Additionally, Waters stated that
“whenever and where ever we have learned of men in the Rank and File or among the
leaders indulging in any expressions contrary to the tenets of 100 percent Americanism,
we have immediately taken steps, without outside pressure to rid the B.E.F. of those
men.”63 Waters, in his statement, not only addressed what he feared about Communists,
the fact that they lacked “100 percent Americanism,” but he also equated radicals, who
lacked that nationalism, to Communists. As Commander, Waters ideas influenced the
majority of veterans underneath his authority and this led to non-Communist veterans
treating suspected Communists badly. Police reports recorded numerous accounts of
non-Communist veterans beating Communist veterans for handing out pamphlets and
stickers stating the objective of the Rank and File veterans. 64 One of the most
compelling incidents towards the end of the march was from Joseph Drobnick, a veteran
who was handing out leaflets that “called for unity of the Rank and File.” He placed one
62
Pelham Davis Glassford, “Communists,” Box 15, Folder 18, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679). The account of this can also be found in W. W. Waters, 94 and in John Apostolides,
Minutes of WESL, July 5, 1932, J. F. Watts, The Rout of the 1932 Bonus Army from Washington,
(Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1982). Microfilm # S201.471.
63
“Defends Bonus Army: Have Thrown Out Communists,” The New York Times, June 10, 1932.
http://0proquest.umi.com.wncln.wncln.org/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=U01EPTYmSU5UPTAmREJTPTFBQ0Q
@@&cfc=1
64
Ogden T. Davis, “Letter complaint of Rank and File Delegation, Bonus Marchers,”
Metropolitan Police Department, July 8, 1932, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679).
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los
Angeles.
23
on a board and “five or six” men beat him for being involved with Communists.65 In fact,
Waters stated that one of his “chief problems with the Communists was to prevent the
men of the B.E.F. from almost killing, literally, any Communist they found among
them.”66 A more appalling event displayed by the B.E.F. was the “kangaroo court,” in
which the “jury” gave the victim, normally a Communist veteran caught distributing
literature in the camps, “fifteen lashes across the back with a belt.”67 The nonCommunist veterans’ harsh treatment towards the Communist veterans displayed the
general population’s fear that Communists would overthrow the American democratic
government.
Such a fear circulated by the media and the government also influenced the
commander of the B.E.F. military police, Eddie Atwell. Atwell wrote that “those last few
days before the eviction were hideous. Late one night, shouts that the Communists were
advancing on Camp Marks caused near hysteria among the campers.” Atwell continued
the story by describing thousands of veterans arming themselves with “pipes, bricks, and
other crude weapons.” These men were so fearful of the Communists that “they almost
attacked a small band of their own loyal members.”68 Atwell wrote that “each day the
65
“Statement from Joseph Drobnick,” July 19, 1932, Box 15, Folder 18, Pelham Davis Glassford
Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library,
University of California, Los Angeles.
66
W.W. Waters, 94.
67
W.W. Waters, 95, 96.
68
Edward “Eddie” Atwell, Washington, the Battle Ground: The Truth About the Bonus Riot
(Patriotic Publishing Society, 1933), 32. This can also be found with the Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of
California, Los Angeles.
24
men grew more edgy and the situation more explosive.”69 In fact “so much propaganda
about Communists and communism had been put out by the authorities and the press that
most of the bonus marchers…were afraid to trust each other.”70 Not only did the
marchers distrust each other, but also the “‘Reds’ were feared and despised by almost all
men.” 71 Atwell’s story depicts the fear generated towards the Communist veterans by
the non-Communist veterans. Such anxiety over the Communist involvement in the
Bonus March would not have existed if it were not for the government and media’s
exaggeration of the Communist element.
The government and media’s discrimination against the Communists produced a
fear among the veterans of being associated with the Communists. These nonCommunist veterans developed anxiety over being mislabeled. For instance, two
veterans were overheard talking about the government and a veteran walking by told
them “‘Jeeze, you guys are a nice pair of ‘Reds’!’ Both men jumped up. ‘Who the hell’s
callin’ us ‘Reds?’ We can knock the hell out of any guy that does. And out of all ‘Reds’
too!” The unidentified veteran responded, “‘Well, then you guys are socialists.’
‘Socialists, hell! We’re Americans, that’s what we are!’”72 Clearly, the Communist
veterans participating in the Bonus March faced high amounts of discrimination for their
political preferences not only from newspaper clippings, government officials, and the
police, but also from their fellow service men.
69
Edward “Eddie” Atwell, 32.
70
“Communist Angle Eliminated,” The B.E.F. News, November 5, 1932, Box 15, Folder 5,
Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young
Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
71
W.W. Waters, 99, 97.
72
W.W. Waters, 100.
25
Over the two months the veterans assembled in the Capitol, tensions rose in the
Bonus March between the protestors. This escalating tension led to violence on
individual Communist veterans and resulted directly in their eviction from the Capitol.
On July 28, 1932 police attempts to remove veterans from abandoned buildings
scheduled for demolition started a riot. The veterans and police threw bricks at one
another. The riots resulted in the deaths of two veterans. The local authorities admitted
defeat and President Hoover called for the “detachments of infantry, cavalry, machinegun, and tank crews [which] laid down an effective tear-gas barrage” and set fire to the
Hoovervilles.73 The federal troops did not show up until a few hours later, after the riot
had been contained.
But, many conspiracies arose surrounding the riot that broke out. According to J.
W. Wilford, the Commander of the Sixth Regiment, “the trouble [that] broke out…was
planned and provoked by Department of Justice agents planted among the men.”74 Such
a claim can also be found throughout The B.E.F. News during the month of November
1932. In fact, various veterans believed that the “agents hired by the Justice Department
started throwing bricks” and commenced the riot on July 28, 1932.75 Regardless of these
conspiracies surrounding the governmental spies placed among the veterans, the fact that
73
T. Curtin, “War-Hardend Eyes Turn Aghast from Tragedies of Czar-Like B.E.F. Eviction,” The
B.E.F. News, July 30, 1932, Box 15, Folder 5, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679).
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los
Angeles.
74
J. W. Wilford, “Statement of Commander J.W. Wilford, Sixth Regiment, B.E.F.,” Box 14,
Folder 12, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E.
Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
75
“Communistic Angle from the Investigation. Find Startling Facts,” The B.E.F. News,
November 5, 1932, Box 15, Folder 5, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of
Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
26
these conspiracies arose further demonstrates the fear the government had about the
Communists.
The exaggeration of the Communist involvement caused the federal government
to blame the Communists for starting the riot. The press stated that “the day’s
disturbances were blamed on the radical element among the bonus-seekers.”76 In fact,
the newspapers went as far as stating that the “Communist Party, at its headquarters
accepted responsibility….for the demonstration that resulted in the Bonus Army riots in
Washington.”77 However, in the press statement made by the President to the nation
concerning the use of federal troops on the marchers, he first referred to those involved as
“the so-called bonus marchers.” 78 Such a title implies that non-veterans, radicals, and
Communists infiltrated the veterans. Hoover continued in his speech that “an
examination of a large number of names discloses the fact that a considerable part of
those remaining [were] not veterans.”79 Clearly, Hoover believed the media’s outlook on
76
“Hoover Orders Eviction: Blaming Reds, He Asserts Bonus Camp Included Many Criminals,”
The New York Times, July 29, 1932. http://0proquest.umi.com.wncln.wncln.org/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=U01EPTYmSU5UPTAmREJTPTFBQ0Q
@@&cfc=1
77
“Reds Accept Blame for Bonus Rioting,” The New York Times, July 31, 1932. http://0proquest.umi.com.wncln.wncln.org/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=U01EPTYmSU5UPTAmREJTPTFBQ0Q
@@&cfc=1
78
Presidential Press Release; July 28, 1932; “Bonus March: 1932”; President Hoover and the
Depression: 1929-1933; Hoover Online Digital Archives; Hoover Library. The Press Release is also found
in Herbert Hoover, Press Statement July 28, 1932, Explanation of the use of troops at the request of the
authorities of the district of Columbia to control the so-called Bonus Marchers, in State Papers and Other
Public Writings of Herbert Hoover 1931-1933, vol. 2, ed. William Starr Myers, (New York: Doubledy,
Doran & Company, Inc, 1934), 242.
79
Herbert Hoover, Press Statement July 28, 1932, Explanation of the use of troops at the request
of the authorities of the district of Columbia to control the so-called Bonus Marchers, 242. The Press
Statement by Hoover is also found in “Hoover Orders Eviction: Troops at Capitol Rout Bonus Rioters,”
The New York Times, July 29, 1932. Also, stating that the ex-service men were Communists and radicals
can be seen in “Grand Jury Inquiry Ordered by Hoover: Agents Posing as Veterans in ‘Red’ Camp
Expected to Be Chief Witnesses,” The New York Times, July 30, 1932. http://0proquest.umi.com.wncln.wncln.org/pqdweb?RQT=302&COPT=U01EPTYmSU5UPTAmREJTPTFBQ0Q
@@&cfc=1
27
the Communists and their statements that the Bonus March was infiltrated with
Communists.
Furthermore, the government argued that the marchers were not only
Communists, but also criminals, even though some of the non-Communist and
Communist veterans both held criminal records. President Hoover directly stated that
federal force was utilized because “many were Communists and persons with criminal
records,” 80 even though according to Glassford the military police under his control
“enforced the law with an absolute minimum of trouble and arrests.”81 A chart will show
that the crime rate overall increased while the protesters were staying in Washington;
however, that should be expected when there was a sudden increase in people, especially
one of 20,000 (see appendix D).82 The Attorney General said the “Bonus Army ‘brought
into Washington the largest aggregation of criminals that had ever been assembled in the
city at any one time.”83 Despite everything, Hoover stuck to this idea for the use of
military action in another press statement made on September 10, 1932.84 The
80
Herbert Hoover, Press Statement July 28, 1932, Explanation of the use of troops at the request
of the authorities of the district of Columbia to control the so-called Bonus Marchers, 242.
81
Pelham Davis Glassford, “The Bonus Expeditionary Force,” Box 14, Folder 2, Pelham Davis
Glassford Papers (Collection 679).
82
“Crime Rate in Washington DC Chart,” Box 14, Folder 13, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers
(Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of
California, Los Angeles.
83
R. B. Ellison, Statement to the press from the Attorney General, September 12, 1932, Box 14,
Folder 12, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E.
Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
84
Herbert Hoover, Press Statement, September 10, 1932, Making Public the Report of the
Attorney General on the So-called Bonus Riots, in State Papers and Other Public Writings of Herbert
Hoover 1931-1933, vol. 2, ed. William Starr Myers (New York: Doubledy, Doran & Company, Inc, 1932),
275. This can also be found in the Justice Department: http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/bonmarch.htm.
28
government’s justification for using the military was two-fold, that by the end of the
protest, the majority of the marchers were either Communists or criminals.
Even though the Bonus March came to an end on July 28, 1932 the overall idea of
the march was not completely lost. This protest displayed a desire from the veterans to
receive their bonuses for fighting in World War I and they wanted it so badly that they
slept in “Hoovervilles” for two summer months. In 1933, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt superseded Hoover as president and had to deal with the issue of the bonus.
Even though FDR denied the veterans immediate cash payment for their bonuses, he
provided jobs for the veterans in Florida and eventually the veterans did receive their
bonuses, as promised, in 1945. The general population often perceives the press and the
government as a reliable reflection of social reality. However, in the case of the Bonus
March, their representation of the Communist element was over-dramatized. Due to the
federal government and media’s biased coverage of the march, fear of communism
consumed the local officials of the District of Columbia, the different types of police, and
the non-Communist veterans. This led to a violent change in the behaviors of the nonCommunist servicemen, which can be seen in their confrontations of any Communist
veterans.
29
Appendix A:
This opening page of a newsletter, geared towards providing information to fellow
Communists, displayed the numbers from each state that attended the Rank and File
Convention in 1934.
“Rank and File,” May 19, 1934, Box 1, Emanuel Levin Collection of Bonus Army
Materials (Collection 1087). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young
Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
30
Appendix B:
In this political cartoon, the Rank and File present at both conventions advocated for the
bonus. Displayed on the “Let’s Go” side, the Communist veterans were welcomed with
their ideology. However, the Communists were told to “Shut Up!” and threaten to be
thrown out in the non-Communist veteran convention.
“Rank and File Demand Bonus in Both Conventions,” The Fighting Vet, October 15,
1932, Box 14, Folder 2, Pelham Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of
Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los
Angeles.
31
Appendix C:
This political cartoon titled “Again, in No Man’s Land” illustrated that the veterans were
caught between the crossfire of the government and local administration officials and the
Communists. Displaying such a political cartoon suggests that the administration and the
Communist servicemen were the only two options for the non-Communist veterans other
than the no man’s land. The cartoon depicted fear by symbolizing the march as a battle
instead of a peaceful protest.
“Again, in No Man’s Land,” The B.E.F. News, June 25, 1932, Box 15, Folder 5, Pelham
Davis Glassford Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E.
Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.
32
Appendix D:
This chart shows that the crime rate overall increased while the protesters were staying in
Washington. However, that should be expected when there was an sudden increase in
people, especially one of 20,000.
“Crime Rate in Washington DC Chart,” Box 14, Folder 13, Pelham Davis Glassford
Papers (Collection 679). Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research
Library, University of California, Los Angeles.