Sensorveiledning for POL1001 våren 2013
Politisk atferd
Spørsmålene i politisk atferd er ment å prøve studentene både i pensumkunnskap
(spørsmålene 1a til 1f) og evne til å bruke kunnskapen til å drøfte en problemstilling (oppgave
2a eller 2b). For å få en god karakter (A eller B) må studentene både ha feilfri eller nær feilfri
pensumkunnskap og levere et meget godt essay. De som har god pensumkunnskap, men ikke
greier bruke den aktivt, vil være typiske C-kandidater. Betydelige hull i pensumkunnskapen
fører til D og E. De som virker «uberørt» av store deler av pensum, skal ha F. Noen få
studenter vil skrive interessante (men gjerne noe pretensiøse) besvarelser på oppgave 2 men
likevel vise betydelige pensumhull. Dette er en eksamen i et gitt emne og ikke en test i
generell formuleringsevne og evne til fri, intelligent fabulering. De skal ikke ha bedre enn C.
Oppgavene var:
1. Gjøre greie for disse begrepene (maksimalt en halv side pr. begrep):
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Ideologisk dimensjon (Eng.: «ideological dimension»)
Krysspress (Eng.: «cross-pressure»)
Emosjonsvekkingsmodellen (Eng.:«valence-arousal model»)
Dagsordeneffekten (Eng.: «Agenda-setting»)
Antisipatorisk representasjon (Eng.: «Anticipatory representation»)
Stigende forventningers misnøye (Eng.: «The discontent of rising expectations»)
Svar enten på oppgave 2A eller oppgave 2B:
2A. Hvorfor vant nei-siden folkeavstemningen om norsk medlemskap i EU i 1994?
2B. Hvorfor har folk mindre tillit til partiene og politikerne enn til de politiske institusjonene
og regimet og hvilke følger får det?
Om 1a:
Begrepet «ideologisk dimensjon» er et empirisk begrep (ikke idealtyper). En ideologisk
dimensjon er et knippe holdninger som samvarierer. De ideologiske dimensjonene i opinionen
identifiseres vha faktoranlyser av holdningsspørsmål og «døpes» av valgforskerne. De
viktigste er «innvandring-solidaritet», «offentlig-privat», «vekst-vern» og «religiøs verdslig»
(navnene har variert noe), men det har også blitt identifisert et stort antall andre dimensjoner.
Mønsteret i dimensjonene er stabilt fra valg til valg, og panelstudier viser at individers
plassering i forhold til disse dimensjonene også er ganske stabile fra valg til valg.
Om 1b:
Begrepet «krysspress» stammer fra paul Lazarsfeldt og beskriver det sosiologene kaller
rollekonflikt. Krysspress oppstår når tilknytning til to (eller flere) grupper drar i retning av
ulike politiske preferanser. Det klassiske eksemplet i Europeisk politikk er kristne arbeidere
som rives mellom å stemme kristeligdemokratisk og sosialdemokratisk. Bjørklund har
beskrevet et psykologisk krysspress. Bjørklunds poeng er at effektene av sosialt krysspress
(f.eks. politisk tilbaketrekking) og en holdningskonflikt er de samme. Identifiserer du deg med
Arbeiderpartiet men er mot norsk EU-medlemskap kan det føre til politisk tilbaketrekking.
Om 1c
Emosjonsvekkingsmodellen er det norske navnet jeg har gitt «valence-arousal» modellen i
Den medialiserte politikken. Modellen beskriver to førbevisste psykologiske mekanismer som
regulerer atferden. Den ene mekanismen er knyttet til motsetningen mellom ro og frykt, den
andre motsetningen mellom apati og entusiasme. Innsikten i disse mekanismene er viktig i
den politiske kommunikasjonen. Hvis du kan skape en følelse av frykt rundt en politisk
konkurrent, øker du sjansen for at velgere vil forlate konkurrenten. Hvis du kan skape
entusiasme rundt ditt eget parti, øker du lojaliteten blant egne tilhengere og sjansen for at de
vil delta aktivt i en valgkamp, osv. George E. Marcus er det sentrale navnet i denne
tradisjonen.
Om 1 d
Hypotesen om dagsordeneffekten – slik den blir presentert i kurset - sier at medienes
dagsorden blir velgernes dagsorden. McCombs og Shaw er de mest sentrale navnene.
Hypotesen har vært testet i flere hundre studier og får i all hovedsak støtte. Den bør regnes
som en av de best etterprøvde hypoteser i opinionsforskningen. Våkne studenter har fått med
seg at denne typen effekter er sterkes når nye saker/stridsspørsmål dukker opp.
Om 1e
Begrepet «antisipatorisk representasjon» stammer fra Holmbergs representasjonsforskning.
Holmberg undersøker om politikerne i Riksdagen kjenne opinionens holdning (flertallets
holdning) i ulike viktige stridsspørsmål. Studien viser at politikerne har dårlig kjennskap til
opinionen generelt, at politikerne har en tendens til å tro at velgerne er enige med dem selv i
de aktuelle sakene, og at kjennskapet til opinionens standpunkt er noe større for de typiske
venstre/høyre-sakene enn for konfliktspørsmål i andre dimensjoner.
Om 1 f
Begrepet «stigende forventningers misnøye» stammer – tror man – fra den svenske
statsministeren Tage Erlander som undret seg over at hans regjering ble mindre populær til
tross for stadige levekårforbedringer. I analysen av stortingsvalgene i 2001 og 2005 ble
begrepet brukt om forventningene som ble skapt i takt med at oljeformuen vokste. Særlig FrP
økte sin oppslutning gjennom å kreve at mer av «oljepengene» skulle brukes på formål mange
velgere var opptatt av. «Stigende forventningers misnøye» kan oppfattes som et spesialtilfelle
av relativ deprivasjon: forventningene overgår behovstilfredsstillelsen.
Om 2A Hvorfor vant nei-siden …
Studentene bør koble dette aktivt til skillelinjemodellen . De bør også kunne beskrive den
typiske ja- og nei-velgeren i forhold til ideologiske dimensjoner. De bør vite hvilke partier
som var for og mot (Å hevde at AP var mot medlemskap er en typisk gjetning som bør
belønnes med F!). De bør kjenne til medienes rolle og de bør kunne beskrive betydningen av
ad-hoc politikk (Nei til EU) i denne sammenhengen: tidlig mobilisering, polarisert opinion,
alternativ informasjonskanal etc. De aller beste bør også forstå forskjellen på sentrumperiferi-begrepet slik det brukes i skillelinjemodellen og i Galtung/Hellevik/Gledisch sin
kommunikasjonsmodell.
Om 2B. Hvorfor har folk mindre tillit til partiene og politikerne enn til de politiske
institusjonene og regimet og hvilke følger får det?
Studenten bør beskrive flere dimensjoner i politisk tillit. Her finnes det flere ulike
framstillinger av dimensjonaliteten og ingen fasit. Et hovedskille går mellom oppfatninger om
borgerens/ens egen rolle som politisk aktør og tillit til de politiske institusjonene. Noen
faglige bidrag trekker et hovedskille mellom tillit til de som skjer på input siden (tillit til egen
påvirkning, partiene, politikerne, valgene, etc) og politikkens output (korrupsjon, kompetanse,
hederlighet, performance/økonomi, skandaler). Et tredje skille går mellom den diffuse
systemstøtten og den mer konkrete tilliten til institusjoner, aktører og prosesser. Sentrale navn
for studentene: Almond & Verba (regimestabilitet), Easton (betydningen av politisk
sosialisering og ringmur-modellen), Listhaug (mistillit som uttrykk for uenighet). Spørsmålet
i oppgaveteksten refererer til en velkjent observasjon: tilliten til partiene og politikerne er lav
og varierer mye over tid. Tilliten til institusjonene og «regimet» er høyere og langt mer stabil.
I Eastons tankegang beskyttes systemlegitimiteten av at misnøyen i første omgang rettes mot
partier og politikere og ikke institusjonene. I Listhaugs perspektiv er årsaken til dette at
mistillit er et resultat av politisk avstand (uenighet/konflikt). Uenighet med politikken til den
sittende regjeringen er den viktigste årsaken til at folk uttrykker mistillit til «politikere» og
«partier» i f.eks. valgundersøkelsene.
Politisk teori
Her skulle studenten besvare to av de fire oppgavene.
1. Compare Plato and Aristotle in terms of their ideas concerning justice, regime types
and the best regime, and education, and summarize Aristotle’s chief criticism’s of
Plato’s Republic [Staten].
Plato (speaking through Socrates) offered two ways of understanding justice.
The first was to posit that there are universal principles of justice, by which any law
or policy may be assessed. The second, in describing a just society, was to equate
justice with a system in which each person did what he or she was qualified to do.
This, in turn, justified rule by philosophers, who, according to Plato, were the only
ones who could understand the universal principles. In this way, the two ways of
understanding justice are shown to be connected. For Plato, the best regime was,
thus, a meritocracy, but he did not believe it possible to achieve this. In the world as it
is, however, Plato identified ”five kinds of regime: (1) kingdom or aristocracy, the
rule of the best man or the best men, that is directed toward goodness or virtue, the
regime of the just city; (2) timocracy, the rule of lovers of honor or of the ambitious
men which is directed toward superiority or victory; (3) oligarchy or the rule of the
rich in which wealth is most highly esteemed; (4) democracy, the rule of free men in
which freedom is most highly esteemed; [and] (5) tyranny, the rule of the completely
unjust man in which unqualified and unashamed injustice holds sway” (Leo Strauss
chapter in the textbook, p. 61). Plato made clear his contempt for democracy, but
considered tyranny by far the worst system. For Plato, education involved
censorship: he was especially interested in civic education, and required that people
be taught to respect the gods and goddesses; for this reason, some of what Homer had
written had to be censored.
According to Carnes Lord’s chapter (in the assigned textbook), Aristotle
believed that ”justice is what produces and preserves happiness for the political
community, and hence is virtually identical with law-abidingness, since the laws aim
to secure the common good of the city...Because, or to the extent that, the laws enjoin
the actions of all the virtues, justice is complete or perfect virtue” (p. 127). This
approximates Plato’s first way of understanding justice, but has nothing to do with his
second way. But Aristotle also discussed two other forms of justice: corrective justice
and reciprocity.
Although Aristotle held that ”there is only one regime that is by nature the best
everywhere” (as quoted in Lord, p. 128), which he identified with citizens’
participation in a mixed system, he also saw this as a form of politics which emerged
over time (p.142). Aristotle outlined six types of regime: one-man rule, called
monarchy when rule is exercised in the interests of the people at large, or tyranny
when it is not; rule by the few, called aristocracy when the rulers take care for the
interests of people, and oligarchy when they do not; and rule by the many, called polis
(or polity or politeia) when rule is in the common interest, and called democracy when
it is not. But Aristotle added that wealth was also a factor in identifying regime types,
suggesting that oligarchy involved rule by the rich, regardless of their number, while
democracy involved rule by the poor, regardless of their number. But one cannot
leave it at that, because, as Lord notes, Aristotle saw polity as involving a mixture of
oligarchy (or aristocracy – since ”Aristotle” used the term ”oligarchy”
inconsistently, for reasons explained in class) and democracy (p. 144). Lord adds that
”there can be little doubt that the best regime is understood by Aristotle as a form of
aristocracy” (p. 147) – again reflecting some internal inconsistency within Aristotle’s
Politics.
Although Aristotle had quite a lot to say about education in his Politics, Lord
contents himself with noting that adults should continue the education started in their
youth. He criticized Plato for being weak in philosophy and also for what he
considered a mistaken idea that rulers should study philosophy.
2. Both St. Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant constructed their political ideas on the
foundation of their respective moral theories. Explain the moral theories and political
ideas of each of these thinkers and show how their moral theories underlay their
political ideas.
Both St. Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant were interested in determining
the nature of morality (what is involved in being good?) and identifying how one can
understand the moral law. For Aquinas, the key was right reason (taken over from
Cicero, as Fortin notes), which provided a reliable window on Natural Law; for Kant,
the key was the categorical imperative, or the role of universalizability. Where
Natural Law was concerned, Aquinas distinguished ”between the common or primary
precepts of the natural law, with which all men must comply at all times, and its
proper or secondary precepts, which are subject to variations imposed by
circumstances” (p. 266) and therefore also to change over time, whether by addition
or subtraction. Since all men must comply with the Natural Law, it followed, for
Aquinas, that the rulers of any state were also subject to the Natural Law (as well as
Divine Law, of course).
Aquinas distinguished among Natural Law, Divine Law, and positive law, and
argued that ”[m]oral virtue is acquired precisely by the repetition of those acts which
the law prescribes or by habitual living and education under good laws,” as Ernest
Fortin writes in the assigned textbook (p. 257). In political terms, Aquinas valued
peace, harmony, and justice, and emphasized that Natural Law and Divine Law were
the standards by which to judge whether something was just or not. In theory, rule by
a wise, kind king, who was committed to justice, looked like it might be the best form
of rule. But Aquinas feared that even a virtuous king might be corrupted over time (let
alone the risk that his successor might be neither wise nor kind). He therefore
preferred ”the so-called mixed regime or the regime which blends in harmonious
fashion the best features of monarchy, aristocracy, and polity” (p. 257).
Kant also stressed the centrality of morality, as well as the importance of law,
but his treatment of these subjects is different. His preference in political life was for
the rule of law (the Rechtsstaat) and he believed that international organization(s)
could play a useful role in controlling violence between states. Although he believed,
as Pierre Hassner writes in the textbook, that only a moral politician would conceive
of the rule of law (a ”republican government”, as Kant somewhat confusingly called
it), ”not only does republican government not presuppose perfection in its citizens, but
the establishment of civil society in general [and of ’republican government’] is
possible among devils if only they be intelligent” (p. 584). The relationship between
the morality of the people and a good constitution is, in fact, the reverse, since a
”good constitution” can foster morality in people (p. 616). However, since freedom is
the prerequisite for moral decisions and hence for moral action, it followed, for Kant,
”that representative government, in which legislation is dominated by the general
will,” was the only legitimate government (p. 605). Hassner claims that ”[t]he
essential problem of Kantian politics is the nature and the philosophic and moral
status of the rights of man” (p. 585), but this underplays the importance of duty in
Kant’s scheme. Hassner does not ignore duty completely, however, and quotes Kant’s
categorical imperative: ”Act so that the maxim of your action might be elevated by
your will to be a universal law of nature” (as quoted p. 591). Given this premise, it
does not come as any surprise to find Kant asserting the complete harmony and
compatibility between politics and morality (p. 594).
Kant wrote some of his major works as the French Revolution was unfolding.
As Hassner notes, ”when Kant takes up such subjects as the French Revolution,
rebellion against tyrants, or wars of liberation, he arrives at a troublesome dual
judgment: retrospective vindication by history and unconditional condemnation by
morality” (p. 602). In other words, neither rebellion against tyrants nor revolution,
thereby overturning an existing system, can be justified in moral terms, and yet both
offer the promise of improving people’s lives and, thus, of being vindicated in the long
run.
As for the state’s role in supervising society, since Kant believed that the moral
worth of an action depended on the good will of a free subject, it followed for him that
the state could not compel people to be moral as such, only to obey the law: the state
can control people’s behavior, but not their intentions.
3. Both Bakunin and Stirner denounced the state and the Church, and yet there are
serious differences of opinion between them. Explain Bakunin’s theory, goals, and
understandings of politics, and – briefly – indicate what Stirner thought about these
matters.
Bakunin was an anarchist and, as such, wanted to abolish the state and the Church
alike. As Samuel Rezneck points out in the article assigned in this class, Bakunin
”detested on principle all exercise of authority as something vicious” (p. 272). In his
view, the state was ”an unnecessary and undesirable evil” (p. 275) which had been
”responsible ’for all the ills, all the crimes, and all the shame of human history’” (p.
226) – except, of course, for those ills and crimes for which he blamed religion.
Bakunin recognized the need for ”leaders” but rejected any notion that these
”leaders” would have the right to command anyone. Their leadership was to consist
in coordinating cooperation and in facilitating communication among people.
Bakunin noticed that all states relied ultimately on force, since without the possibility
of coercion, they could not assure that their laws would be obeyed.
Bakunin was outraged by economic inequality and believed that there was a
class struggle pitting working-class people against the bourgeoisie (p. 278). This, he
believed, had functioned, and could only function, as ”the accomplice and the
instrument of an economically dominant class” (p. 279). He may be described as a
humanist, if by humanism one understands the belief that people are essentially good
and that the general interest of people should be advanced. And the greatest interest
of people, or highest good, was liberty – which was precisely what people lost, he
thought, by submitting to any state.
What Bakunin envisioned as an alternative was a ”voluntary association of
men” operating according to a ”federative [principle], consisting in the fluid
federation of individuals and of groups for the purpose of satisfying common desires
and of fulfilling common ends” (p. 291). In such an arrangement, people would be
able to act according to their own nature. In such a situation, in Rezneck’s
paraphrase of Bakunin’s thinking, ”it is no reflection upon his liberty if he obeys the
commands of nature. Such obedience is, in fact, of the very essence of man’s liberty,
for he is only obeying himself” (p. 287). Since, in his view, the state was responsible
for all the evil in the world – Rezneck forgot about the importance of the Church in
Bakunin’s calculations – it followed, for Bakunin, that ”in an intelligent and
awakened society, jealous of its liberty....even the most....malevolent individuals
become necessarily good” (as quoted p. 290).
Although Stirner has, from time to time, been mistakenly classified as an
”anarchist”, Stepelevich (in the article assigned for this class) more accurately
describes Stirner as an egoist. He also cites R. W. K. Paterson’s even more precise
characterization of Stirner as a nihilistic egoist. Whereas anarchists, motivated by a
kind of humanism, want to destroy the state in order to replace it with the selforganization of people to solve their problems through coordination, rather than
command, Stirner, the egoist, mocked humanism as ”only the last metamorphosis of
the Christian religion” (as quoted p. 327), rejected Christianity as a lie, and wrote of
his opposition to the state, not with the idea of people solving their problems through
coordination, but only to serve himself, to do as he pleased. Stirner went so far as to
assert, in Stepelevich’s paraphase, that ”[t]he pleasures of unalienated selfpossession rest upon the degree to which the supernatural is rejected” (p. 326).
Stepelevich quotes Stirner’s assertion, ”All things are nothing to me” (p. 327).
Students who came to lecture may also remember that, in addition to deriding and
rejecting the state, religion, and humanism – as Stepelevich mentions – Stirner also
declared that he had no use for family, political parties, liberalism, socialism, or
monarchism. Students who came to lecture may also remember Stirner’s phrase,
”Down with the people – up with me!” The most important thing to stress with Stirner
is that, in his book, he did not express any interest in society, in the welfare of society,
or in coordination of society’s members. He declared that he was interested only in
himself and he explicitly repudiated the idea that he was advocating some kind of
freedom. Again, those who came to lecture may remember that Stirner expressly
rejected any setting of rules because, as Stirner put it, even if one freely agreed to a
certain rule on Tuesday, one would then find, on Wednesday, that one had lost one’s
freedom. Thus, Bakuni’s idea of a person ”only obeying himself” was, for Stirner,
still a form of obedience, and hence of loss of liberty.
4. Marx has been said to have radicalized Rousseau. Certainly, they shared some
common concerns, including the evolution of the state, property, morality, and
economic inequality, and both thinkers outlined programs for the betterment of
humanity. Compare these two thinkers in terms of the foregoing topics.
Rousseau traced the origin of the state to ”natural catastrophes” which compelled
people to live and work together. Although at first people lived together without any
state structure, the inevitable frictions between people resulted in the demand for
agreed rules and an agreed arbiter – and hence, the state and its laws. But the
disagreements or frictions which were most operative were those relating to property
disputes. In this way, the establishment of private property, which is the origin of
inequality, led directly to the foundation of government. And, for Rousseau, it can
only have been the rich who took the initiative here. Thus, Rousseau agreed with
Locke that one purpose of government was to protect property, but he disagreed with
Locke’s idea that private property was ”natural”.
Rousseau also denied Locke’s postulate that one could speak of any natural
morality (any Natural Law). Hence, in Allan Bloom’s paraphrase of Rousseau, ”since
morality is not natural to man, he must create it” (p. 567). Not only is Natural Law
dubious, in Rousseau’s view, but it is also ”a limitation on freedom” (p. 569), and that
limitation serves to protect the interests of the rich.
Rousseau’s ”solution is that every man give himself entirely to the community
with all of his rights and property...No one reserves any rights by which he can claim
to judge of his own conduct; hence there is no source of conflict between individual
and state, for the individual has contracted to accept the law as the absolute standard
for his acts” (p. 568). The law, in turn, will reflect the general will of the society,
rather than the will of the ruling elite. Rousseau felt, thus, that sovereignty could not
(or rather, should not) be alienated, and that meant, in turn, ”that representative
government is a bad form of government” (p. 570).
Rousseau was convinced that the general will would be vulnerable to
subversion if groups of people were allowed to organize political parties or factions.
The upshot was that he wanted to ban political parties and see citizens voting and
engaging in politics as individuals, not as members of one or another party. Rousseau
understood that religion contributed to shaping people’s behavior and therefore
wanted to have the government control religion, in order to assure that religion would
be useful.
Marx agreed with Rousseau in construing the state as the agency employed by
the rich in order to preserve and maintain class inequality. Thus, like Rousseau, he
connected the state to economic inequality, which, in Marx’s view, was rooted in
”private control of the means of production” (textbook, p. 808) – in other words,
private property. Again, like Rousseau, Marx believed that morality was interpreted
and utilized by the ruling elite to maintain their power. For Marx, therefore, the class
struggle is the result of class inequality and will end only when inequality is no more.
Marx looked ahead to a time when there would no longer be any need for
coercion and people would do their duty without even thinking of it as duty. Marx’s
maxim for the future communist society was ”from each according to his ability, to
each according to his needs.” For society to operate in this way, Marx realized,
human nature itself would have to change. While, according to Joseph Cropsey,
Rousseau envisioned society gradually taking over more functions from government,
without ever supposing that government could ever disappear, Marx actually thought
that government would eventually wither away (p. 824). But whereas Rousseau
thought he could put religion to use, Marx had no use for religion and looked forward
to a time when religion – the ”opium of the people” – would be largely extinct.