Working Paper Series No. 40
The New ‘Three Rs’ of Education
in Japan: Rights, Risk, and
Responsibility
Robert Aspinall
Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies
Ryukoku University
Mission of the Afrasian Centre for
Peace and Development Studies
Poverty and other issues associated with development are commonly found in many Asian and
African countries. These problems are interwoven with ethnic, religious and political issues, and
often lead to incessant conflicts with violence. In order to find an appropriate framework for
conflict resolution, we need to develop a perspective which will fully take into account the
wisdom of relevant disciplines such as economics, politics and international relations, as well as
that fostered in area studies. Building on the following expertise and networks that have been
accumulated in Ryukoku University in the past (listed below), the Centre organises research
projects to tackle new and emerging issues in the age of globalisation. We aim to disseminate
the results of our research internationally, through academic publications and engagement in
public discourse.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Tradition of Religious and Cultural Studies
Expertise of Participatory Research / Inter-civic Relation Studies
Expertise in Southwest Asian and African Studies
New Approaches to the Understanding of Other Cultures in Japan
Domestic and International Networks with Major Research Institutes
Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies
The New ‘Three Rs’ of Education in Japan: Rights, Risk,
and Responsibility
Robert Aspinall
Working Paper Series No.40
2009
Ⓒ2009
Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies
1-5 Yokotani, Seta Oe-cho, Otsu,
Shiga, JAPAN
All rights reserved
ISBN 978 4-903625-61-4
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies.
The publication of the Working Paper Series is supported by the Academic Frontier Centre (AFC)
research project “In Search of Societal Mechanisms and Institutions for Conflict Resolution:
Perspectives of Asian and African Studies and Beyond” (2005-2009), funded by the Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, and Ryukoku University.
The New ‘Three Rs’ of Education in Japan: Rights, Risk, and Responsibility
Robert Aspinall ＊
Introduction
Since the 1980s the rhetoric of education reform in Japan has been focused on the individual.
After decades of education for conformity, politicians, teachers, parents and students themselves
are demanding increased scope for expression of individual differences and choices. Economic
change, the modernization of Japanese society, and international pressures have also had an
impact. However, in responding for pressures for more attention on the individual, institutions
and individuals have been constrained by various factors. There are complex interconnections of
diverse processes and forces. One development was the rise to prominence of the discourse on the
Rights of the Child which grew from almost nothing in the 1970s to a dominant position in the
1990s. However, this development has also sparked a backlash against what is sometimes seen as
selfish individualism and a decline in the notion of the individual citizen’s enduring responsibility
to the public good.
One way of making sense of the rise of individualism in post-industrial societies is to adopt the
sociological paradigm of “Risk Society” (Beck 1992) which is of use in analysing the way
individuals are now being encouraged to become their own “risk managers” i.e. calculators of
how their actions and choices will affect their own lives. This kind of thinking is less concerned
with the welfare of the group. It also involves people taking more responsibility for their actions.
The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the implications of the rise to prominence of the
individual in Japanese educational discourse, and to look at the effect this may be having on the
risks, rights and responsibilities of some of the individuals and institutions concerned.
Socio-economic Trends and the Erosion of Security
Educational discourse does not take place in a vacuum: it usually interacts with wider trends in
the economy and society. The coming to an end of Japan’s post-war period of economic growth
inevitably had wide ramifications for all aspects of life. Economic growth was, of course, not the
only casualty of Japan’s “lost decade” of the 1990s. The Japanese system also seemed to go
through a crisis of confidence in the safety and security it had provided its citizens following the
hard work of post-war reconstruction. Japan’s formula for providing economic growth alongside
welfare protection for the majority came unravelled during the 1990s. The formula was based on
＊
Professor, Faculty of Economics, Shiga University.
1
the lifetime employment system for male heads of household. These men would be granted full
pension and health benefits as part of their employment contract. These benefits would also
accrue to the rest of the family, thus sparing the state the necessity of providing comprehensive
welfare protection. In return for the guarantee of lifetime employment along with all these
benefits, the worker dedicated himself to the firm wholeheartedly for the entirety of his working
life. The lifetime employment system did not cover all male workers but it was a pervasive and
important system that was at the centre of national welfare planning.
The economic squeeze that followed the bursting of the speculative bubble in 1991 put terrible
pressure on many Japanese companies. But, true to their obligations, they tried to lay off as few
workers as possible. This meant putting a freeze on new hires. Genda Yuji, an Associate Professor
of University of Tokyo is very persuasive in a recent study (Genda 2005) in analysing this
trade-off between protecting the vested interests of middle-aged and older workers versus
sacrificing the opportunities for young workers to gain entry to stable employment. Genda is
critical of those who put the blame on the victims of this squeeze. New words that were coined
during the 1990s like parasaito shinguru (“parasite single” – those who still live at home with
their parents even when they are in their late 20s or 30s) and furiitaa (“freeters” – those who did
not take full-time work, but instead did a succession of part-time jobs) were designed to make
young people feel guilty about not getting jobs that were simply not there. This moral censure of
under-employed youngsters can be viewed as one part of a wider conservative discourse against
“problem” children and young people from the early 1990s onwards. A perceived rise in juvenile
crime – especially violent crime – has added fuel to this discourse.
Another response made by Japanese firms to the economic crisis of the 1990s was to cut costs by
shifting more and more production overseas. This process also reduced the number of jobs
available for new hires in Japan. It also opened up firms to the criticism that they were running
away from problems at home rather than trying to help solve them. Their withdrawal from Japan
is one of the two types of “exit” that Leonard Schoppa analyses in his recent book Race for the
Exits. The other “exit” is the refusal of many Japanese women to marry or have children. Here
Schoppa uses the concept of “exit” devised by Alfred Hirschman (1986). Hirschman’s theory
contrasts “exit” (withdrawal from a relationship or organisation) with “voice” (attempting to
improve a relationship or organisation by complaining or campaigning for reforms). In short,
Schoppa contends that Japanese firms and women have not mobilized to press for reform through
the political system (voice) because they could opt out (exit) instead. Schoppa does not claim that
this is the whole story and he admits that there are exceptions.
Japan scores very badly on comparative indexes of women’s position in work and politics.
Women have never occupied positions of real power in government, and unequal pay and sexism
in the workplace has still not been dealt with by serious legislation (i.e. laws that actually impose
2
sanctions on those who break them). The experience of North European countries suggests that if
women achieve reasonable levels of power and equality, then pro-childcare and pro-working
women legislation will follow. Increased fertility rates inevitably follow from this. In this respect
Japan still has a lot of “catching-up” to do.
North European style welfare reforms would entail a shift from welfare based on the family
(headed by a male) to welfare based on individual citizens. If this were to happen it would mean
the complete ending of the post-war Japanese welfare model. Thus it would also have an effect on
the Japanese employment model too. This in turn would effect the education system and the ways
in which school leavers and university graduates look for work.
The whole Japanese employment and welfare system functioned very well during Japan’s
catch-up period of economic growth that lasted until the end of the 1980s. The crisis of the 1990s,
however, showed that the system was overdue for overhaul. Unfortunately the people who
suffered most from the crisis were those who had the least say in the way things are done: young
people and women. Large private corporations, although powerful, chose not to put pressure on
the government for whole-scale reform. The economic uncertainty of the 1990s thus gave rise to
many other kinds of uncertainty. The trust that had once been there for the Japanese state and the
large corporations was undermined. The rise to prominence of the furiitaa and the parasaito
shinguru were signs of a society in which many young people were opting to “look after number
one” rather than take up their side of the social contract. The next section will look at how the
discourse on education reform reflected these social trends.
Changing Educational Discourse
i) Nakasone’s reforms
Education reform in modern Japan is usually divided into three phases of reform: the first was the
creation of a modern education system under the Meiji restoration; the second was the period of
democratic reform under the American Occupation; and the third is dated from the formation of
an ad hoc council on education reform (Rinkyôshin) by prime minister Naksone Yasuhiro in the
1980s. The best analysis of the Rinkyôshin reforms is provided by Len Schoppa in an earlier
work.
In his analysis, Schoppa distinguishes between two sets of educational issues that were brought to
the fore by Rinkyôshin. Firstly, he identifies the ‘old issues’ i.e. those that have been a source of
controversy and debate since the Occupation. They include the demands “to restore moral
education to its old central position and . . . for reform of the strictly egalitarian 6-3-3-4 system.”
These are contrasted with ‘new issues’ less tied to the historical experience of the main actors in
the educational policy making process. New issues include “growing criticism of the
3
standardisation and ‘qualificationism’ of Japanese education.” (Schoppa 1991: 52) These issues
have come to the fore because of the change in Japan’s economic position in the world since the
1950s. Japan’s ‘economic miracle’ of the 1960s and ‘70s brought to an end the period of
economic ‘catch up’ with the West which had been the object of much of government and
business’s early post war policy. The education system, which had helped in this ‘miracle’ by
providing Japan with skilled and obedient assembly line workers and fastidious bureaucrats, was
now called upon to provide citizens who could meet the different challenges of global economic
leadership in a fast-changing commercial and industrial environment. Thus, certain characteristics
of the education system which had previously been regarded as strengths, such as its uniformity
of educational provision, and its emphasis on group harmony and co-operation, now began to be
regarded as weaknesses due to their tendency to stifle individual choice, initiative and creativity qualities that many argue need to be nurtured if Japan is to continue to function as a successful
economy and society. In light of these criticisms and demands many specific reform proposals
have been made and debated on. We will now briefly consider the main ones discussed by
Rinkyôshin, classified under the two headings ‘old issues’ and ‘new issues’.
Old issues are those that have been the subject of widespread disagreement and debate among
those involved in education since the Occupation period. Nakasone’s contribution was to bring
them to the fore of national political discourse, by making education reform, for the first time, a
major plank of the LDP’s political and electoral strategy. The two main issues in this category
were reforming the 6-3-3 system and bringing back traditional moral education. We will deal with
these in turn.
The 6-3-3 system came under attack from the moment it was put forward as the model for
Japanese schooling during the Occupation. (It was derided as a foreign imposition). However,
once it had become established it proved very difficult to alter. Reform was hindered by, among
other things, the inability of would-be reformers to agree on one alternative form of organisation.
This did not deter Nakasone from putting his personal weight behind calls for more flexibility in
the secondary school system, including the establishment of some six year secondary schools.
However, obstruction from the Ministry of Education in the 1980s prevented any change taking
place. The ministry changed its position on this in the 1990s, and today there are six-year
secondary schools in many school districts.
A return to moral education that emphasises ‘Japanese Values’ is a proposal that had been
advocated by conservatives ever since the Occupation authorities removed the Meiji-era Imperial
Rescript on Education. This was one area where Nakasone, the members of Rinkyôshin, the
Ministry of Education and the education zoku in the LDP were all broadly in agreement. They all
wanted to see a return to education that cultivated patriotism and strengthened each pupil’s
identity as a Japanese person. However, they had to face the problem that any proposals
4
concerning moral education that they made had to be implemented by ordinary classroom teachers,
most of whom were members of the Japan Teachers’ Union, Nikkyôso. The union had a reputation
from the ‘60s and ‘70s of stifling government and ministry reforms at the implementation stage.
This is why Rinkyôshin reform proposals included proposals to reform teacher training as well as
the content of education for children. Teacher training and assessment would be an avenue by
which right wing reformers could create the kind of classroom teacher who would be willing to
teach the kind of moral education of which they approved. This is also why the Left have been
traditionally opposed to any reform of teacher training or assessment that is controlled by the
authorities or their appointees.
The ending of the ‘catch up’ phase of economic development has brought about calls for
deregulation in many areas of Japanese public life, from financial institutions to the restrictive
personnel practices of large companies. It is only to be expected, therefore, that similar calls for
deregulation should be made in the sphere of public education. In this regard the two key words
that came out of Rinkyôshin’s deliberations were ‘liberalisation’ (jiyûka) and ‘flexibilisation’
(jûnanka). The former concept involved proposals for increasing competition in the compulsory
sector of the education system (at present parents have no choice but must send their children to
the school that is in their zone). The latter concept involves more student choice and more
emphasis on a child’s individuality. (Both concepts are also linked to proposals for reform of the
university entrance exam system.) Schoppa argues that these proposals were largely stymied by
Ministry of Education opposition (Schoppa 1991: 247). However, although it is true that
Nakasone failed to get these proposals implemented during his period of office as Prime Minister,
it is equally true that the debate about ‘liberalisation’ and ‘flexibilisation’ is far from over as we
shall see in the discussion below (Hood 2001).
The concept of kokusaika or ‘internationalisation’ is a very vague one. No actor in the education
policy making process says they are opposed to it. More than any other concept it seems to
represent the arrival of the Japanese education system into the post ‘catch up’ world, a world in
which Japan must play its part as a global economic power. On one level ‘internationalisation’
represents little more than efforts to increase international exchanges between Japanese students
and teachers and their counterparts in other countries. It has also been used to help promote better
foreign language teaching (that means overwhelmingly the teaching of English) in Japanese
schools. In 1988 the Council of Local Authorities for International Education (CLAIR) was
established jointly by the Ministry of Home Affiars, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of
Foreign Affiars, to promote internationalisation at the local level. One of CLAIR’s main
achievements has been the expansion of the Japan Exchange and Teaching Programme (the JET
programme), which sends foreign nationals into Japanese secondary schools to assist with
language teaching and various international exchange projects organised at the local level. There
is a consensus of support for this and other, similar programmes. However, at the ideological
5
level ‘internationalisation’ can also be a cause of conflict. For example the Right has used it as a
justification for an increase in ‘patriotic’ education, the argument being that children can not be
taught to respect the cultures of other countries before they respect their own. In this way the
‘new issue’ of internationalisation can be brought in to add weight to arguments in favour of a
return to ‘old issue’ arguments like the need for more patriotism.
ii) The “individual” in educational discourse
The Japanese word for “individual”, kosei is similar to the term kokusaika in the sense that no
actor in the political process is openly opposed to it. Similarly, however, there is a huge
disagreement about what the word actually means when it is applied to concrete educational
reforms. The left often accuse the right of using kosei as a means for introducing neo-liberal
market reforms into education, while the right accuse the left of using kosei to encourage
irresponsible attitudes and behaviour among young people.
Anthropologist, Peter Cave (Cave 2007: 24-30) has analysed the long history of the word kosei in
educational debate in Japan. He found that in the early years of the Twentieth Century it was
linked, in educational journals, with the spread of achievement tests and the concepts of IQ and
eugenics. At this time “kosei was being used to mean ‘difference from others’, a difference which
could be positive or negative.” (Ibid. 25) The Ministry of Education was also on board. “In 1927,
the Ministry of Education itself issued a directive stressing the importance of ‘respect for
individuality’ and the dangers of uniformity, in terms which bear a striking resemblance to
Ministry rhetoric during the 1990s.” (Ibid. 26) Critics then and now say that the Ministry is more
concerned with ‘aptitude’ rather than ‘individuality’ in the fuller sense of the word. Teachers and
schools are encouraged to match children with the appropriate aptitudes to particular educational
and training tracks. In other words, the Ministry is mostly concerned to see the labour demands of
the economy satisfied by providing workers with appropriate skills.
The pre-war Japanese notion of kosei was not in any way incompatible with a totalitarian state.
Cave cites the example of educationalist Ishiyama Shûhei who wrote in 1940 that “mistaken
totalitarianism ignores individuality” while, in contrast, “Japanese totalitarianism respects the
individualities of the people and demands that they discharge their duties according to their
individualities.” During the post-war Occupation Ishiyama modified his views – but did not
change them entirely. He was involved in drawing up the Ministry of Education’s first post-war
educational guidelines and especially the chapter that was entitled “Humanity, Character and
Respect for Individuality.” Below is a section from that chapter.
Education from now on must make the completion of each person’s individuality (kosei)
the primary aim. . . To complete individuality is not to make each person into a lonely
human being, separated from each other. Human beings are ‘social organisms’ (shakaiteki
6
seibutsu), and have the ability to live their lives cooperating with and helping one
another. . . As a matter of course, therefore, completing individuality includes developing
this kind of ability. The more individuality is perfected, the more this kind of ability will
be displayed, and the stronger will become the links with other individualities, in other
words social solidarity (shakaiteki rentaikan). (Quoted in Cave: 2007: 27)
Observers of educational practice in Japan, the ways in which teaching and learning are actively
conducted, usually point to the importance placed on group harmony and cooperation (See for
example Rohlen and LeTendre 1996). Teachers encourage children to develop into individuals
who are aware of the inter-connectedness of social relationships. Although left and right fought
over many ideological issues in the post-Occupation years, this was an area where they actually
had a lot in common. Thus when the reforms proposed by Nakasone’s Rinkyôshin came to the fore,
those elements that were concerned with promoting more choice and flexibility were opposed by
people on both sides of the political dividing line. By the time the 1990s came, however,
discourse on the place of the individual in education became influenced by a new kind of
language – the language of children’s rights.
iii) The discourse on rights
For the Japanese, the U.S.-inspired 1947 constitution was a revolutionary document. The
household was replaced by the individual as the basic unit of society, and this individual was
declared to be the possessor of political, social and economic rights. Some of these rights went
further than those granted to U.S. citizens by their own constitution and its amendments. For
example, Japanese citizens were not only guaranteed a right to a basic education, but it was also
declared that this education must be free of charge.
The new constitution and its companion document, the Fundamental Law of Education
represented just one part of the sweeping changes introduced to Japan during the American
Occupation 1945-52. The debate about the durability and significance of the reforms of this era
continues to this day. However, it is beyond doubt that some changes were more quickly absorbed
than others. Institutional changes, like the dismantling of the army and the navy, and the removal
of the prohibition of workers’ independent organisations, had immediate and durable effects.
Other kinds of change that required transformations to deep-rooted social and cultural beliefs,
like attitudes to the proper role of women and children, could never be so quick to achieve. As
political scientist Ian Neary points out “neither those in senior positions in Tokyo nor the leaders
of local communities had much familiarity with ideas of rights. Far more familiar was the idea
that individuals and groups should set aside their selfish desires and work for the good of the
community and the state.” (Neary 2002: 16).
Others have argued, however, that traditional Japanese communal culture (including its emphasis
7
on situational ethics) is not so far removed from concepts of rights as westerners might suppose.
Se and Karatsu argue the following case for a distinctive Japanese conception of human rights.
[A]ccording to a formal theory of the good life latent but dominant in Japanese culture, in
order for us to pursue our good lives, we need to follow a common process for seeking our
good lives: the process in which we cultivate our empathic ability, internalize the
perspectives of various others (whether they are intimate or remote), examine our existing
conceptions of the good life and ways of pursuing them from the diverse internalized
perspectives, and refine the conceptions and the ways of pursuing in search for those
which truly suit our encompassing situation. (Se and Karatsu 2004: 283)
This is a theory of human rights not based upon transcendental absolutes, but upon the nature of
the human being as a social animal – a being that requires relations with others in order to
determine his or her own life choices (how to seek out a good life). However, this theory is an
idealistic theory that does not take account of the hierarchical relations that exist in every
Japanese human group, or the political power exerted by certain institutions and the state.
However, it does have value in the way that it opens up the possibility of human rights being
accepted as a part of Japanese culture and not an alien imposition from a foreign culture.
In any case, the adoption into Japanese culture of ideas of human rights was bound to take time,
and the rights of women and children were bound to lag behind those of adult men. In post-war
Japan, in both families and schools, children continued to be taught the values of group
conformity, social hierarchy and proper family roles. Children were all educated under the same
curriculum until the end of compulsory education (fifteen years old). After that they were divided
into different types of senior high school that directed them to different types of career according
to academic ability. Cohorts of boys and girls moved through each school as an entire group and
teachers taught classes with the whole class method. Progressives in the postwar Japanese
education system were more inspired by European socialist and Marxist ideas than by American
liberalism, and thus they often looked favourably upon the group-centredness of Japanese
educational practice. In the 1950s and ‘60s when the Left and Right were involved in bitter
ideological battle over education, the rights of the individual child were therefore lost in the
general melee.
Before the 1970s, political arguments about education in Japan had never brought up the subject
of children’s rights. During the 1980s, however, international developments in this area forced
Japanese educators to face up to new concepts. The UN convention on the Rights of the Child is
based upon the so-called “three ‘p’s”: children’s needs for a balance of ‘provision’, ‘protection’
and ‘participation’. If classical liberal theory on human rights distinguishes between positive
rights - the right to be given something, like education, housing, employment, health care – and
8
negative rights – the right to be left alone by the state and by others in one’s own private sphere
where one can hold one’s own political and religious views and express them without fear of
censure – then the right to provision clearly is an example of the former, and the right to
protection and participation could combine both kinds of positive and negative rights. (For
example, the protection of an individual child requires the action of parents, guardians and/or the
state, but at the same time the purpose of protection is to allow the child to grow into a
free-thinking individual, confident that their views will be tolerated by society.)
Because of the histories of both ideological groupings, both the Japanese Left and the Japanese
Right were much more comfortable arguing about positive rights than negative rights. The
government side could claim genuine achievements in getting over 90 per cent of boys and girls
to stay in full time education until age eighteen. The numbers going on to higher and further
education were also impressive, and Japan could boast very good results in science and
mathematics when compared to other nations. The Opposition complained about imposition from
above in the education system – for example the government’s enforcement of respect for the
national flag and anthem – but valued the teaching of group-centred ideals in the classroom. Left
wing and other progressive teachers wanted to teach children the values of sharing and
selflessness as well as group solidarity.
Both Left and Right were also dedicated to the protection of children, to defending their positive
rights. Both sides were unequipped, however, to deal with the concept of negative rights when
applied to children. This can be seen in the response to a perceived rise in juvenile crime in Japan.
Commentators are currently concerned about a lack of discipline in contemporary youth. There
has also been a backlash about educational standards, with commentators of all political
persuasions concerned about the consequences of recent educational reforms aimed at introducing
more flexibility and less pressure in to secondary education. Reforms aimed at nurturing the
negative rights of children, for example increasing their freedom of choice and creativity, have
brought about demands to a return to more structured and disciplined times.
Reform and Change in the Real World of the Japanese Education System:
the Case of University Reforms
How had the discourse on individuality and rights, combined with increasing economic change (at
both the domestic and global level) been translated into actual change at the genba (the place
where teaching and learning occur)? As a case in point we will take one sector where major
reforms have taken place recently: the university sector.
The aim of the current wave of university reforms in Japan is to introduce market forces into the
higher education sector. In 2004, Japan’s national universities (which teach about 20 percent of
9
the country’s students) were turned into independent agencies. Academic and administrative staff
numbering 123,000 in total lost their status as national civil servants and also their guarantee of a
job for life. More managerial power was given to the presidents of these universities. Also, public
subsidies were cut and will continue to be cut for the medium term, forcing these universities to
find alternative sources of funding. Sources of government funding, meanwhile, will increasingly
be open to competition among universities.
Direct control from the Ministry of Education has been relaxed, making it easier for these
universities to reorganize academic programmes and set their own budgets. They also now have a
limited power to adjust tuition fees. In changes directly influenced by recent British reforms of
the university sector, third-party evaluation agencies were set up in order to evaluate research and
education.
Many of these reforms are based on reforms already implemented in the UK, Australia and
elsewhere. They embody the western economic notion of the individual existing within a free
market. Students, who are individual consumers will make choices about which products provided
by universities (degree courses) they will opt for. In turn, universities will compete with each
other for students (a declining base of consumers in Japan due to demographic trends), as well as
for funding from the government and other sources. According to market theory, this should result
in an increase in quality of teaching and research at Japanese universities. Some critics have
commented, however, that while competition might be a good thing for institutions at the top
level, it can have a corrupting effect on universities that are seen as low-level or unpopular. These
institutions sometimes have to resort to filling student places regardless of the readiness of those
students for higher learning (Yonezawa 2008: 80). Full blown market theory would require such
institutions to improve themselves or eventually close down. Such a theory does not take into
account the damage done educationally to those who pass through such an institution in its dying
days.
The case of university reform illustrates how the ‘three Rs’ that are the subject of this paper affect
actual education change and reform. Firstly, national universities that are no longer guaranteed a
living by the state must embrace the business notion of Risk, i.e. they have to develop courses
and research projects that will attract students and funding, but if they fail they will suffer
negative consequences. Secondly, the students as consumers are encouraged to have an increased
awareness of their individual Rights. They are encouraged to shake off their normally passive
role in the higher education process. This development is reinforced by the realization that the
certainty of permanent employment upon graduation is no longer there, and therefore more
attention needs to be paid to the quality of the learning process. Finally, individual students,
professors and university managers have to face the burden of extra Responsibility as the
guarantees that were once there are reduced or eliminated. For the first time in higher education
10
in Japan, mistakes or lapses of judgment should have real consequences. Traditionally, both
professors and undergraduate students have had quite a relaxed attitude to the academic study
conducted by students during their time at university (Lee-Cunin 2004: 201-204). There were no
serious negative consequences for the careers of either the students or the professors if teaching
and study were carried on in a fairly relaxed and even slipshod manner. Many critics of this state
of affairs look forward to an increase in responsibility for both student and teacher.
A closer look at key conditions on the ground, however, reveal that in spite of the rhetoric of
dramatic reform, in practice very little has so far changed in several key areas. In spite of using
the language of deregulation, the Ministry of Education has actually retained a lot of control over
what goes on in universities. The means of control, however, have changed from direct to indirect
methods. The Ministry has not set up a properly independent body that would be comparable to
the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), but instead has retained a lot of
influence over how teaching and research are evaluated. Furthermore it is still the Ministry that is
responsible for determining the medium-term goals for each university after “taking into account”
a draft prepared by each university.
Also, a limited “performance-related pay” system was supposed to have been introduced for
academic staff. However, the application of this system was down to each university president
and in practice very similar pay structures were retained from the pre-2004 system, i.e. pay based
upon seniority. In some cases bonuses that were supposed to be given to staff for extra
achievements were in fact just handed out to all staff on a rotating basis. In addition, although
some new flexibility was introduced for the setting of tuition fees, by the start of the 2007
academic year only three formerly national universities (out of a total of 87) had set fees for
undergraduate courses that were different from the standard.
Universities were also encouraged to compete for extra government funding for “Centers of
Excellence” in key research areas. However, in practice the winners of these competitions were
the large (former Imperial) universities like Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya. This reinforced the
pre-existing status hierarchy which placed these institutions at the top. Smaller universities
simply lack the resources – both human and financial – to compete with these large institutions on
a level playing field.
Japan’s 2004 university reforms were supposed to prepare institutions of higher learning for a
more uncertain – a more risky – future. As shown above, the reforms are more noted for rhetorical
change rather than substantive change. However, even if these reforms were subject to more
thoroughgoing implementation it is still questionable how effective they would be in helping
Japan meet the challenges of the 21 st Century. An analysis of recent UK managerialist education
reforms (on which many Japanese reforms are based) makes the following point about the
11
relationship between risk and reform.
The state continues to portray an anxiety about change and a rejection of anything that
promotes challenging open and empowering skills. Yet . . . to meet the uncertainty that the
globalised world presents, these are the necessary part of the toolkit that the population
requires. (Eastwood and Ormondroyd 2005: 44)
The case of university reform therefore cautions us against assuming that the rhetoric of reform at
the government level is always matched by reality at the genba i.e. the place where policy is
actually implemented.
Conclusion
In early 20 th Century England, as education was expanded to cover more and more of the
population, teachers were encouraged to concentrate on the basics – the so-called “three Rs” i.e.
reading, writing and arithmetic. The modernizing Japanese state of the same period also focused
on these basics – with great success. At the dawn of the present century, however, state education
systems around the world face new challenges. This paper has focused on a new set of “three Rs”:
rights, risk and responsibility; three of the contested concepts of this new age of change and
reform.
All three of these concepts are linked to the increased focus on the individual in Japanese
government policy. Japan’s signing of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child represented a
major shift in focus towards individual-based education. However, it was only one event in a long
history of discourse on the individual in education in modern Japan. The concept of children’s
rights however was a relatively new term in this debate and it prompted many (not only those on
the political right) to warn about the dangers of introducing too much selfish individualism into
the system. When children go too far in asserting their rights, for example when they flout adult
authority, they are reminded by adults of the need for more responsibility.
Children and their parents have more rights today in a different sense: i.e. they have rights as
consumers. Reforms and wider economic and demographic changes have given consumers of
education in Japan more choice than ever before. An increase of choice in society, of course, also
brings about an increase in risk: new risks for providers of education services as well as
consumers. How will the Japanese education system cope as individual citizens and institutions
are encouraged more and more to become their own “risk managers”? This is a question that
needs to be addressed in the very near future.
12
References
Aspinall, Robert W. 2001. Teachers’ Unions and the Politics of Education in Japan. Albany: State
University of New York Press.
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage.
Cave, Peter. 2007. Primary School in Japan: Self, individuality and learning in elementary
education. London and New York: Routledge.
Eades, J.S., Roger Goodman and Yumiko Hada, eds. 2005. The ‘Big Bang’ in Japanese Higher
Education: The 2004 Reforms and the Dynamics of Change. Melbourne: Trans Pacific
Press.
Eastwood. Linda and Chris Ormondroyd. 2005. Risk and Education: A Distortion of Reality. In
Risk, Education and Culture, eds. Hope, Andrew and Paul Oliver. 32-45. Aldershot:
Ashgate.
Franklin, Bob (ed). 2002. The New Handbook of Children’s Rights: Comparative policy and
practice. London and New York: Routledge.
Genda, Yuji. 2005. A Nagging Sense of Job Insecurity: The New Reality Facing Japanese Youth.
Tokyo: International House of Japan.
Hischman, Alfred. 1986. Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays. Cambridge
Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Hood, Christopher P. 2001. Japanese Education Reform: Nakasone’s Legacy. London: Routledge.
Lee-Cunin, Marina. 2004. Students’ Views in Japan. Rochdale: Fieldwork Publications.
Neary, Ian. 2002. Human Rights in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. London: Routledge.
Rohlen, Thomas P. and Gerald K. LeTendre. 1996. Teaching and Learning in Japan. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Schoppa, Leonard. 1991. Education Reform in Japan: A case of immobilist politics. London and
New York: Routledge.
----- 2006. Race for the Exits: The Unraveling of Japan’s System of Social Protection. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Se, Teruhisa and Rie Karatsu. 2004. A conception of human rights based on Japanese culture:
promoting cross-cultural debates. Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 3, No 3.
Yonezawa, Akiyoshi, 2008. Quality Assessment and Assurance in Japanese Universities: The
Plight of the Social Sciences. Social Science Japan Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1.
13
Working Paper Series
No.1 (2005)
James R. Simpson, Future of the Dairy Industries in China, Japan and the United States: Conflict
Resolution in the Doha Round of WTO Agricultural Trade Negotiations
No.2 (2005)
K. Palanisami, Sustainable Management of Tank Irrigation Systems in South India
No.3 (2006)
Nobuko Nagasaki, Satyagraha as a Non-violent Means of Conflict Resolution
No.4 (2006)
Yoshio Kawamura, and Zhan Jin, WTO/FTA and the Issues of Regional Disparity
No.5 (2006)
Shin’ichi Takeuchi, Political Liberalization or Armed Conflicts? Political Changes in Post-Cold War
Africa
No.6 (2006)
Daniel C. Bach, Regional Governance and State Reconstruction in Africa
No.7 (2006)
Eghosa E. Osaghae, Ethnicity and the State in Africa
No.8 (2006)
Kazuo Takahashi, The Kurdish Situation in Iraq
No.9 (2006)
Kaoru Sugihara, East Asia, Middle East and the World Economy: Further Notes on the Oil Triangle
No.10 (2006)
Kosuke Shimizu, Discourses of Leadership and Japanese Political Economy: Three Phallus-centrists
No.11 (2006)
Nao Sato, The Composition and Job Structure of Female-Headed Households: A Case Study of a Rural
Village in Siemreap Province, Cambodia
No.12 (2006)
Takuya Misu, The United States and the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)
No.13 (2006)
Om Prakash, Asia and the Rise of the Early Modern World Economy
No.14 (2006)
Takehiko Ochiai, Regional Security in Africa
No.15 (2006)
Masahisa Kawabata, An Overview of the Debate on the African State
No.16 (2006)
Kazuo Takahashi, The Middle East, the Middle Kingdom and Japan
No.17 (2006)
Tomoya Suzuki, Macroeconomic Impacts of Terrorism: Evidence from Indonesia in the Post-Suharto
Era
No.18 (2007)
Kenichi Matsui, International Energy Regime: Role of Knowledge and Energy and Climate Change
Issues
No.19 (2007)
Kazuo Takahashi, Not the Most Popular Decision: Japan’s Ground Self Defense Force Goes to Iraq
No.20 (forthcoming)
Gyanendra Pandey, The Punjabi Village Community: in Violence and in Resettlement
No.21 (2007)
Yoshio Kawamura, Participatory Community Development and a Role of Social Statistical Analysis:
Case of the JICA-Indonesia Project-Takalar Model
No.22 (2007)
Takashi Inoguchi, The Place of the United States in the Triangle of Japan, China and India
No.23 (forthcoming)
Ruby Lal, Colonialism and the Debate on Muslim Respectability
No.24 (2007)
Kosuke Shimizu, Human Security, Universality, and National Interest: A Critical Inquiry
No.25 (2007)
François Debrix, The Hegemony of Tabloid Geopolitics: How America and the West Cannot Think
International Relations beyond Conflict, Identity, and Cultural Imposition
No.26 (2007)
Naomi Hosoda, The Social Process of Migration from the Eastern Visayas to Manila
No.27 (2007)
Chizuko Sato, Forced Removals, Land Struggles and Restoration of Land in South Africa: A Case of
Roosboom
No.28 (2007)
Michael Furmanovsky, Reconciliation, Restitution and Healing: The Role of Vietnam Veterans in
Facilitating a New Era in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, 1985-2005
No.29 (2007)
Hiroyuki Torigoe, Land Ownership for the Preservation of Environment and Livelihood
No.30 (2007)
Kokki Goto (Edited, Annotated, and with an Introduction by Motoko Shimagami), Iriai Forests Have
Sustained the Livelihood and Autonomy of Villagers: Experience of Commons in Ishimushiro Hamlet in
Northeastern Japan
No.31 (2007)
Kazuo Kobayashi, The “Invention of Tradition” in Java under the Japanese Occupation: The
Tonarigumi System and Gotong Royong
No.32 (2007)
Benedict Anderson, Useful or Useless Relics: Today’s Strange Monarchies（加藤 剛訳『有用な遺制か
無用な遺物？現代における君主制という不思議な存在』
）
No.33 (2008)
Pauline Kent, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: The Use of Radical Comparisons to Enhance Mutual
Understanding
No.34 (2008)
Naomi Hosoda, Towards a Cultural Interpretation of Migration in the Philippines: Focusing on
Value-Rationality and Capitalism
No.35 (2008)
Anan Ganjanapan, Multiplicity of Community Forestry as Knowledge Space in the Northern Thai
Highlands
No.36 (2008)
Shinji Suzuki, The Increasing Enclosure of Mangrove Wetlands: Towards Resource Management in
Development Frontiers
No.37 (2008)
Akiko Watanabe, Migration and Mosques: The Evolution and Transformation of Muslim Communities
in Manila, the Philippines
No.38 (2009)
Acharawan Isarangkura Na Ayuthaya and Senjo Nakai, The Emergence and Development of Interfaith
Cooperation: A Case Study of the Theravada Buddhist Advocacy for People Living with HIV/AIDS
(PWA) in Upper Northern Thailand
No.39 (2009)
Jeremy Rappleye, Decline of the Tokyo Technocrats in Educational Policy Formation? Exploring the
Loss of Ministry Autonomy and Recent Policy Trends with Reference to ‘Globalisation’ and
Educational Transfer
Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies
Ryukoku University
1-5 Yokotani, Seta, Oe-cho, Otsu,
Shiga, JAPAN
ISBN 978 4-903625-61-4