The Carter-Reagan Transition: Hitting the Ground Running
Author(s): James P. Pfiffner
Source: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 4, Congress and the Presidency:
Considerations on Leadership and Legislative Success (Fall, 1983), pp. 623-645
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27547983 .
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THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION:
HITTING THE GROUND RUNNING
by
JAMES P. PFIFFNER
Associate Professor of Political Science
California State University, Fullerton
I. Introduction
a President
and functions
In
performs.
order to achieve his policy goals a Presi
dent must first gain control of his major
tools of power:
the budget,
legislation,
and administration.
personnel,
This article will analyze the early experi
ence of the Reagan administration
in its
to gain control of the govern
attempts
ment
in these four crucial areas. It will
that in achieving
conclude
its legislative
and budget
the
administration's
goals
careful planning and consummate
politi
cal skills can serve as a model
for future
transitions.
This is not to assert that it
these
goals with no costs to other
gained
choices by the
priorities. Early personnel
administration
put a heavy emphasis on
personal
loyalty to Ronald Reagan. This
was done at the cost of professional
expe
rience and the ability of many chief execu
their own management
tives to choose
teams. The personnel
involved a
process
series of clearances that helped assure that
all bases were touched, but this was done
at the cost of time. Subcabinet
personnel
appointments
dragged on into the sum
mer of 1981 at the cost of administrative
direction. This
leadership and managerial
extended the period of bureaucratic
drift
that is involved in any change in top lead
ership. This article will also examine the
view from the bottom up, that is, what
in the bureaucracy
happens
during a pe
riod of presidential
transition.
are made, not born.
Electoral mandates
a President
What
does after his election
and in his first several months
in office
sets the tone for his administration
and
may determine whether or not he is able
on his campaign
to deliver
promises.
While President Reagan's
transition was
marked by some successes and some fail
ures, he took office under a favorable set
of circumstances.
No major domestic or
foreign crises were pending, and the U.S.
had been returned from Iran.
hostages
The nation had elected him in a landslide
him with the
victory and had presented
in several de
first Republican
Senate
the
cades.
electorate
had
Although
it had not articu
spoken emphatically,
lated its preferences
very precisely. The
analysis of public opinion polls showed
that the public did not necessarily
support
the conservative
goals or drastic budget
cuts the Reagan administration
had prom
ised, though it did want increased defense
reduced taxes and overall re
spending,
in spending.1
ductions
sense electoral
But in an important
are made in office, not born in
mandates
President
the election.
pursued
Reagan
in his early months
in
his policy priorities
office and received positive approval rat
ings in opinion polls. The electoral "man
to lead the
date" was an opportunity
to go,
in
the
he
wanted
direction
country
to accom
and he took that opportunity
plish much of what he had set out to do in
in office.
his first eight months
transition
The goals of any presidential
are to take over the government
in order
to direct national policy toward the priori
ties of the new President. This article will
focus on the transition of governmental
power rather than on the many other roles
II. The
Lame-Duck
Eleven
Weeks
and control can come
Policy
to a presidential
administration
only after
the inauguration on January 20th. But the
for the takeover of power
groundwork
must begin well before November,
and be
under way in earnest immediately
after
for the tran
the election. The foundation
direction
623
624
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
sition is laid during the lame-duck eleven
weeks between election and inauguration.
As the outgoing
ties up
administration
loose ends, the President-Elect
scrambles
to put together a governing
team, and the
bureaucracy
slips into neutral gear while it
awaits its new bosses.
The Outgoing
Administration
After the election new policy initiatives
stop as agencies become reluctant to make
on
that may become moot
agreements
January 20. The outgoing administration
is usually sensitive to the need to give the
incoming President as clean a slate as pos
sible. On the other hand, there is a flurry
to complete
well
those policy decisions
underway so that they cannot be easily re
versed by the new people. One example of
this was the litigation over the Profes
Career Exam
sional and Administrative
ination (PACE), the professional
level en
had
examination
that
been
try
challenged
in court as discriminatory.
The Justice
and the Office of Personnel
Department
were handling
the case, and
Management
in the final days of the Carter administra
a consent
decree
that
tion, negotiated
committed OPM to develop Civil Service
entrance examinations
that did not have a
on
discriminatory
impact
minority
the outgoing Carter offi
groups.2 While
the cost to
cials felt they were minimizing
and still upholding
the
the government
of
the
non-discrimination,
Reagan
spirit
people felt they made an eleventh hour
to a
the government
deal that committed
form of reverse discrimination.
concern of all newly elected
A major
is that the outgoing
ad
administrations
will attempt to seed the bu
ministration
either to
reaucracy with its own people,
save their jobs or to leave behind people
to the old and hostile to the
sympathetic
new administration's
goals. One way this
can be done is to have people who entered
as political
the government
appointees
converted to career status in the Civil Ser
Service
vice or to career Senior Executive
appointments.
In the past this could be done wholesale
in." It oc
and was.called
"blanketing
staffed a new
curred when a President
from his own party,
agency with officials
and then issued an executive order that
put the personnel of the new agency under
the jurisdiction
of the merit system and
under Civil Service rules. The next admin
istration thus could not throw out the po
litical appointees
upon taking office, and
could remove them only for cause through
cumbersome
Civil
Service
procedures.
Most presidents
since the Pendleton Act
was passed in 1883 to World War
II en
gaged in this practice to a greater or lesser
extent.
This option
is no longer readily avail
able to presidents,
but individual political
can try to immunize
them
appointees
selves from being ousted by the next ad
for themselves
ministration
by getting
"career status" with all the attendant pro
of the Civil Service.
cedural protections
is called "burrowing
This maneuver
in."
On January 4, 1980 OPM sent out FPM
Personnel
Bulletin
(Federal
Manual)
to remind agencies
273-18
that during
re
election years they ought to "carefully
to be certain
view all personnel
actions
they meet all civil service rules and regula
tions and also that these actions are free
of any stjgma of impropriety."
The bulle
tin urged agency personnel directors to re
that would
view carefully
any actions
in the ex
of positions
place incumbents
in
the
service
service.3
cepted
competitive
In a follow-up Operations
Letter to OPM
officials on September
17, 1980 it was re
that "before
iterated
any competitive
staffing action is initiated involving a con
version of an excepted service employee"
it should be ascertained
that there is a
and
"bonafide
that, "In no in
vacancy"
stance should vacancies
be announced
solely to convert an excepted service em
ser
ployee to a position in the competitive
vice."4
Despite OPM policy there were some
of political
conversions
ap
attempted
pointees to the career service. OPM inves
in three agencies
tigated 43 conversions
the transition
and con
period
during
cluded that 13 were
improper. Conver
if there is a genuine
sions are legitimate
selection process or if the em
competitive
service ap
ployee had a prior competitive
are at
Not all conversions
pointment.
in." The General Ac
tempts to "burrow
THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 625
of
did an investigation
counting Office
cases during the transition pe
conversion
riod that covered four additional
agen
cies. While
it found no improper conver
sions, it found that some attempts were
made but stopped by OPM or the agency's
system. The GAO
personnel monitoring
report suggested that a more comprehen
sive monitoring
system be instituted for
future presidential
the
transitions.5 While
of potential
from
conversions
problem
political to career status is a serious one,
the number of such attempts during the
transition was small, and
Carter-Reagan
the OPM monitoring
system seemed to
most
up
pick
improper actions.
President
Carter named Jack Watson
his deputy for the transition. On Novem
sent a memo to cabinet and
ber 10Watson
agency heads reminding them that the pur
pose of the Presidential Transition Act of
1963 was to provide for "the orderly trans
fer of the executive power." He admon
for the in
ished those preparing materials
coming transition teams not to innundate
them with excessive detail or unsolicited
advice.
"Our guideline
is simply to be
in
and
every way pos
forthcoming
helpful
the new people
sible, without
burying
of briefing books and pa
under mountains
line
Thus
the
official presidential
per."6
was to be as helpful as possible
to the in
There were, how
coming administration.
the
ever, some undercurrents
advocating
These
of help and cooperation.
minimum
probably reflected attitudes of individuals
who still felt bitter about the campaign or
in
who received less than full cooperation
the transition from the outgoing Ford ad
four years earlier.
ministration
sent out
On November
12,1980 Watson
another memo reminding heads of depart
ments
and agencies
that the President
to give the new administration
wanted
in filling career
latitude"
"appropriate
transfers. Since
SES vacancies or making
the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act pro
hibits new agency heads from transferring
career Senior Executives
until 120 days
the memo
instructed
after taking office,
that "the President expects all department
and agency heads personally and carefully
for new
to review all recommendations
and transfers of career
SES appointments
SES employees between now and January
In addition to this the director
20,1981."8
of OPM had been carefully monitoring
all
new SES appointments
for the last several
to avoid
months of the Carter Presidency
even the appearance of improper political
to the career ranks. In this
appointments
period some entirely legitimate personnel
actions were held up or cancelled in order
to eliminate any hint of partisan person
nel actions.
memo
re
On December
10 a Watson
from presi
quested letters of resignation
dential appointees who expected to leave
the government
by January 20, although
it pointed out that resignations were not
technically required until requested by the
new administration.
It also asked
for
letters of appreciation
from the
draft
to the appointees
President
and for the
names of the officials who would be act
the presidential
ing in positions
appoint
ees left.9 Some of the final acts of the Car
were to decide which
ter administration
political appointees were to get what type
for ser
of gift as a token of appreciation
vice in the Carter administration.
The Reagan
Transition Bureaucracy
The Presidential Transition Act of 1963
provides that in order "to promote the or
derly transfer of the executive power in
connection with the expiration of the term
of the office of a President
and the inau
a
new
of
that the Ad
President"
guration
ministrator
of General
Services
(GSA)
the Presi
provide office space wherever
dent-Elect wants as well as staff, travel,
and printing
communication
expenses.
in 1976, provides $2
The Act, as amended
and
million
for incoming administrations
for the departing President.10
$1 million
in 1976 President Carter returned
While
to the treasury,
$300,000 of his allotment
used the full $2
the Reagan administration
in private
million
plus another million
the amount
asked about
funds. When
advocating
spent by an administration
lower government
spending, deputy direc
Verne
tor for transition administration,
Orr, replied "The dollar just doesn't buy
what it did four years ago."11
Nixon
chose to
President-Elect
While
in
run his transition from the Pierre Hotel
626
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
New York City and Carter did much of
his work from his home in Plains, Ronald
chose a large government
office
Reagan
at
M
blocks
1726
several
Street,
building
from the White
House.12
ap
Reagan
III to direct transi
pointed Edwin Meese
in Washington
tion operations
while his
"kitchen cabinet" of business executives
met on the west
coast to recommend
and other high
cabinet
level appoint
ments. The main divisions under Meese
were
headed
personnel,
by Pendleton
and Congres
branch
James; executive
E.
sional relations,
headed by William
and policy issue groups in the
Timmons;
and domestic
areas,
budget,
foreign,
headed by Richard Allen, Caspar Wein
and Martin
respec
Anderson,
berger,
tively.13
was in charge of about 100
Timmons
teams sent into most
federal
transition
into five is
agencies. They were organized
sue clusters:
economic
national
affairs,
services, resources and
security, human
and
legal-administrative.
development,
The function of the teams was to set up
shop in each agency (which some did the
examine ongoing
day after the election),
to the transi
and
issues,
report
operations
tion headquarters
the status of agency op
and
and recommend
erations,
changes
of the
cutbacks. Other major
functions
teams were to test people for
transition
in the new admin
possible appointments
istration and to reward loyal campaign
workers who would not be kept on.
the agencies
While
and departments
to prepare briefing books
to
scrambled
the new teams with their func
acquaint
the team members
tions and operations,
were keeping tight lipped about their rec
ommendations.
The teams had full access
to budget and operation
files, though not
to individual personnel
of
files. Members
the career service in general were very re
sponsive to the transition teams, since any
member might become a new boss or col
ended up
league. Some team members
heading the agency to which they were as
signed, while some teams were dismissed
when the new boss was named (e.g. State
and Defense).
There were so many people working on
soon de
the transition that the operation
in itself. Tran
veloped into a bureaucracy
sition press secretary James Brady said
there were 588 listings in the telephone di
teams
in agency
rectory, but if people
were
there could be twice as
included
many people.14 The Carter transition had
312 people on the payroll.15 One of the
problems with a staff of such size is trying
to determine who speaks for the new ad
Even
ministration.
transition
though
teams had no policy authority, and public
statements were supposed to be funneled
the transition
there
through
hierarchy;
were a number of embarrassing
leaks as
of various interests began
representatives
to push their own policy preferences.
Early in the transition period members
of the OPM transition team, Donald De
met with
vine and R. T. McNamar,
directors. The purpose
agency personnel
was to assure the career
of the meeting
Civil Service that the Reagan administra
tion would respect the integrity of the ca
reer personnel
there
system and promise
would be no "sweeping
changes."
They
said they understood
that career SES posi
tions were not frozen but they expected
that any appointments
would be carefully
scrutinized
and filled only if absolutely
the
necessary. They said they supported
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and
its continued
promised
implementation.16
They asked for advice on how to make the
transition a smooth one, but no useful
were
comments
from the
forthcoming
to
advice
the new
Such
group.
usually got
administration
via other channels; usually
a high level person with credibility in both
was asked
to relay by
administrations
hand any advice or suggestions
from the
administration.
departing
III.Taking Over the Government
Control
Legislative
President Reagan's
early successes with
com
the Congress
have been considered
of
to
Woodrow
those
Wilson,
parable
and Lyndon
John
Franklin Roosevelt,
son. He benefitted
from the sense of eco
nomic crisis felt by the public and from
his land-slide victory. And he was able to
overcome
tendencies that
the fragmenting
frustrated his three immediate predeces
THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 627
sors in their efforts with the Congress.
But his success was qualified by the fact
that he focussed his legislative efforts on
his economic program to the virtual exclu
sion of other Republican
priorities. This
section will examine the basis of the im
pressive,
early legislative victories of the
in its courting of
Administration
Reagan
Congress,
liaison, and legisla
legislative
tive strategy and tactics.
Ronald Reagan began the careful court
ing of Congress
long before he became
In 1977 he helped set up a
President-Elect.
for
action committee,
Citizens
political
the Republic,
that funneled
campaign
to Republican
candidates.
The
money
came
when
62
of
those
he
payoff
helped
were victorious
and could be expected to
be grateful
for his help and coattails.17
After his nomination
his aides made early
contacts with members
of Congress
and
set up a network of advisory committees
for the Reagan
that included
campaign
of Congress.18 He made a
160 members
to the importance
of
gesture
symbolic
his
Congress during
campaign by staging
on the steps of the Capitol a show of unity
on his future legislative agenda. While not
itwas intended to be
specific in substance,
an important gesture. Of more
substan
inclusion of
tive importance was Reagan's
Senator Paul Laxalt
and Congressman
Thomas B. Evans, Jr. in weekly campaign
in
strategy sessions at his headquarters
VA.
Arlington,
After
the election Congress
continued
to be a major
The
transition
priority.
President-Elect
held a series of dinners to
which he invited members
of Congress.
With
the realization
that Democratic
votes would be necessary
for his legisla
that he would
tive agenda he announced
as am
retain ex-Senator Mike Mansfield
to Japan. He took particular
bassador
care to court House Majority
Leader Tip
at perceived
who
O'Neill
had chafed
slights from the Carter White House. He
and his wife were invited to a private din
ner at the White House,
and he was also
invited to the President's
small 70th birth
of Con
day party. Republican members
gress were invited to advise the transition
teams in the departments.
And the Presi
dent-Elect
sought the advice of Senators
Robert Dole,
and Strom
John Tower,
in making his cabinet choices.
Thurmond
was an
The choice of Max Friedersdorf
new
in
decision
the
President's
important
had been
legislative strategy. Friedersdorf
President
Ford's chief lobbyist and had
worked
in legislative liaison for President
Nixon. He was widely
respected on the
Hill and selected his lobbying staff from
those with strong professional
experience
with Congress. The intention was to show
a sharp contrast with President Carter's
choice of Frank Moore who recruited a
less experienced
In his
staff.
lobbying
con
with
dealings
Congress
Reagan
ari
out
his
sciously deemphasized
being
sider to Washington.
His advisors
felt
that the "outsider"
concept had been one
of the reasons for President Carter's
lack
of early success with the Congress.
The main elements of the Reagan
legis
lative strategy were speed and focus. Old
alike
hands and academics
Washington
that the scope of budgetary
had warned
changes sought by the new administration
to get
would
be virtually
impossible
the
the Congress,
through
particularly
strate
The Reagan
House.
Democratic
gists realized that if itwas to be done at all
it had to be done quickly, both to take ad
vantage of public confidence and the elec
tion "mandate"
and to move before op
the first
could
coalesce.
During
position
were in
of 1981 the Democrats
months
electoral vic
shock from the Republican
tory and were unable to unite on any co
to the Reagan economic
herent opposition
program.
The second element of the strategy, fo
cus, was intended to avoid what they felt
was the Carter mistake
of sending Con
soon.
too
too
Thus the Rea
gress
much,
gan
neglected
strategy
systematically
other Republican
particularly
priorities,
abor
such as bussing,
"social
issues,"
tion, school prayer, and crime. Since he
Senate for
could count on the Republican
of his legislative
the keystone
support,
strategy was his ability to carry the block
known as the
of conservative Democrats
"Boll Weevils."
They were a vulnerable
they were conserva
target both because
tives and would likely be somewhat
sym
pathetic to his program, and also because
628
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
Reagan had carried many of their districts
in the election.
of the votes of the Boll
The winning
Weevils
(and of other House members)
covered
the gamut of legislative
tactics
from softsell to hardball. To garner votes
for his economic
the President
package
and personally
dealt with
systematically
He called them re
wavering members.
he invited them to the White
peatedly;
and Camp David and gave them
House
small favors such as cuff links or tickets
to the Presidential
box at the Kennedy
The President's
Center.
ap
personal
and soft pedaled.
proach was understated
He dealt with general issues and did not
get involved with the details of legislative
horse trading. His aides would follow up
with specific promises and threats.19
In addition to small favors and courte
made policy com
sies the administration
to
such as the
votes,
get
promises
"rental" of Democrat
John Breaux's vote
for a pledge on sugar price
in exchange
on peanut price
supports or a compromise
carrots
the
of favors
When
supports.20
and compromises
did not do the job, the
sticks of political hardball were brought
out. One of the main tactics was going di
rectly to the voters. It is ironic that Presi
dent Carter was criticized so severely on
to go over the
the Hill for threatening
to the people if legisla
heads of Congress
tors would not give him what he wanted.
President Reagan did not threaten, he just
did it. He put pressure on Congress
by a
series of televised speeches to the nation
as well as personal
to groups
appeals
around the country by himself and mem
In the battle
bers of his administration.
for the administration's
tax bill, the Presi
dent in a televised speech asked people to
call their Representatives
and demand sup
port for his bill. With the help of donated
corporate phone banks the volume of calls
at the Capitol switchboard doubled.21
The "Southern Blitz" masterminded
by
sent high administration
of
Lyn Nofziger
ficials into the districts of 45 southern
in late April 1981 to pres
Representatives
sure them to vote with the administration
on the first concurrent
resolution.
Con
the me
groups were organized,
blanketed with paid and volun
con
and even campaign
tary messages,
were mo
tributors of the Representatives
bilized.
One of the most potent tactics was the
use of electoral
leverage. There was the
threat that big political
action money
would be used against those who opposed
the President's
program.22 There was also
the promise
that conservative
organiza
for the Sur
tions, such as the Committee
vival of a Free Congress and the Fund for
not
the Conservative
would
Majority,
Democrats
the
against
campaign
voting
right way.23 There was even a presidential
promise not to campaign against southern
Democrats who consistently
supported his
budget program.24 Some have argued that
these short term political
victories were
at the price of long term Re
purchased
publican renewal in the south.25
a
Thus by skillful courting of Congress,
coherent
strategy, and shrewd
legislative
use of a wide range of lobbying tactics did
President Reagan accomplish most of the
he set in his first
legislative
objectives
in office. He even enjoyed
eight months
in Congress
than
greater party discipline
had his Republican
Eisen
predecessors
or Ford. While
his early
hower, Nixon,
success with Congress was comparable
to
those of Wilson,
Franklin Roosevelt,
and
Lyndon Johnson; the range of his legisla
tive goals was narrower. President Carter
threw a plethora of difficult
issues to the
Congress and lost on many of them in his
early months
(though his overall success
rate was not exceptionally
low). President
limited his legislative agenda to a
Reagan
few important,
issues;
though difficult,
then with the virtuosity of an old pro he
rolled through Congress with a battery of
carrots and sticks. In order to concentrate
on the economic plan, tough issues were
put off until later. One of the few set
backs in this early period of the Reagan
was the failure to coor
administration
with
dinate
the Schweiker
Congress
Stockman proposal for Social Security re
in the
form, leading to its repudiation
Senate.26 The payoff of all the efforts that
servative
dia were
THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 629
went into the Reagan
legislative program
came in its budget victories, which are the
subject of the next section.
Budget Control
Most
administra
previous
incoming
tions asserted
their budget priorities
by
making marginal
changes in the proposed
It used
budget of the outgoing President.
to be considered
impossible to do much to
a budget proposal
that had been a year in
the making because of the complexity
of
the document
and because of all of the
political bargains that had been struck in
arriving at the totals for each program.
Yet by March
10, only 49 days after tak
ing office, President Reagan submitted to
Congress a complete revision of President
Carter's FY1982 budget,
including
large
defense increases, large tax cuts, unprece
in domestic programs,
dented reductions
in the then current
and even reductions
FY1981
impressive,
budget. Even more
within
he had achieved vir
six months
if not eco
tually all of his budgetary,
nomic, goals.27 The sharp reversal of po
litical and budgetary priorities was no ac
cident. It was the product of a carefully
laid out plan that put political and gov
into high gear im
ernmental machinery
upon President Reagan's
mediately
taking
office. In the budgetary arena the admin
istration did indeed "hit the ground run
ning," much more so than with respect to
personnel or management.
The Reagan
budget victories of 1981
were the result of advance planning,
sin
execu
of
of
and
purpose,
speed
gleness
for the
of the groundwork
tion. Much
specific budget cuts that the new adminis
tration would make was done by David
Stockman
during his two terms in the
as a Representative
from Michi
House
after Reagan's
gan. Immediately
victory
Jack Kemp,
he, along with Congressman
wrote an economic plan entitled "Avoid
that be
Dunkirk"
ing a GOP Economic
came known as the "Stockman
Mani
President
festo."28 Stockman
impressed
Elect Reagan so much that he selected him
to be his Director
of the Office of Man
and
Budget, the youngest person
agement
to hold Cabinet
rank in 150 years.29
of the
Stockman's
intimate knowledge
of
command
bud
his
budgetary process,
get figures, and his lobbying abilities with
were crucial to the early
the Congress
Reagan budget victories.
The new administration
decided to re
vise completely
the Carter budget propo
sals for Fiscal Year 1982 and submit its
own budget to the Congress.
the
Before
were
cuts
for
inauguration,
plans
budget
teams that
made
transition
by Reagan
were assigned to each federal agency and
had access to internal budget and plan
ning documents. After January 20 Stock
man was in charge of the entire OMB ma
chinery which he put to work overtime
tearing apart the budget they had just put
together for President Carter. The overall
strategy was to achieve most of the victor
ies quickly in order to cow the opposition
of Con
and stampede as many members
on the winning
band
gress as possible
wagon.30
Immediately upon taking office the ad
took actions to implement its
ministration
in the executive
branch.
budget
plans
OMB sent out bulletins to heads of execu
tive departments
and agencies freezing ci
travel expendi
vilian hiring,31 reducing
in consulting
reductions
tures,32 making
and related services,33 and placing a mora
of certain
torium on the procurement
11 President
equipment.34 On February
stressing
Reagan sent out a memorandum
the short time that was available to revise
the entire Carter budget and stated that
with the OMB budget
any disagreements
limits had to be con
plans or personnel
to
48
director within
the
OMB
veyed
hours of the agency's receipt of the bud
a process
that normally
get revisions,
takes
A
weeks.35
of
televised
series
presidential
documents
and
official
began
speeches
the administration's
political budget cam
paign for Fiscal Year 1982. On February 5
in a TV address the President warned of
an "economic
of tremendous
calamity
if his program were not
proportions"
18 in a speech to a
passed. On February
joint session of Congress he presented his
630
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
for Economic
"Program
Recovery"
ex
along with an inch-thick document
to
mone
his
fiscal
and
approach
plaining
tary policy. This was followed on March
10 by another address to Congress and the
release of Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revi
the Reagan
for
sions,
budget proposal
Fiscal Year 1982, prepared by the Office
of Management
and Budget. The follow
De
ing month OMB released Additional
tails on Budget Savings, a document
that
for each pro
specified budget projections
gram being cut along with the rationale
for the proposed
cuts. During
the same
of the Cabinet and Council
time members
of Economic Advisers were actively seek
ing appearances on TV and before various
and
interest
political,
governmental,
the adminis
groups in order to promote
tration's budget plans.
One source of potential opposition
to
the proposed
cuts in domestic programs
was the executive
branch bureaucracies
that were being cut. The administration
to neutralize this
used several approaches
it delayed executive
potential opposition:
and carefully orchestrated
appointments
cabinet level acceptance
of budget cuts.
some argue that the career service,
While
are a potent
the permanent
bureaucrats,
to cuts; they were a
force in opposition
factor in this set of circum
negligible
stances. They might have been able to ar
gue convincingly
cuts,
against program
but no one in the administration
would
listen to them, whereas the administration
would have to at least listen to a Reagan
career executives
In addition,
appointee.
because of their role perceptions
and ca
reer interests, tend to be very responsive
to new political appointees
and their pri
orities.36
the first few weeks of the ad
During
before the newly appointed
ministration,
secretaries were fully able or willing to de
fend their organizations,
small meetings
were held with Stockman,
the President,
and several White House
aides present,
along with the cabinet secretary. The new
was confronted
with
Stock
appointee
cuts and given a chance
man's proposed
to argue against them, but that was diffi
in the position of
cult because "they're
the group line.
having to argue against
And the group line is cut, cut, cut."37 Al
the new cabinet
sup
though
strongly
in
economic program
ported the Reagan
some cuts to their
general and probably
programs in particular,
they may have felt
to go along with decisions
railroaded
made by others before they were ready to
take an active role in the process. Stock
man admitted
a very awkward
"That's
for
and
you make them re
them,
position
I have a little ner
sentful very fast. ...
vousness
about
the heavy-handedness
with which I am being forced to act."38
But the cabinet was a small problem of
bringing along the home team compared
with the political challenge that faced the
in Congress.
administration
sent his de
After
President
Reagan
to the
tailed budget
revision proposals
on March
had
10, the Congress
Congress
to take the first major step in the congres
sional budget process by passing a first
concurrent
resolution,
budget
setting
spending, revenue, and deficit targets for
Fiscal Year 1982. The crucial strategic de
cision had been made
in February by the
to use the reconciliation
administration
process in conjunction with the first con
current resolution. Reconciliation
was set
up in the 1974 Budget Act to enable the
to
House or Senate to require committees
to
in
order
change reported
legislation
conform with the second concurrent reso
lution.
The Reagan
it
plan was ambitious;
called for budget cuts?$48.6
billion ini
be made by changes in the laws
tially?to
and extended
the
programs
authorizing
cuts over Fiscal Years 1983 and 1984. The
usual budget procedure would
call for a
first concurrent resolution to set spending
in
targets and then a second resolution
to make
the ceilings final. In
September
the interim, the appropriations
committee
would pass spending bills within the tar
gets of the first resolution, and if any indi
vidual bill violated the final totals of the
a reconciliation
second
bill
resolution,
to report
could instruct the committees
out a revised bill to conform with the sec
The Republicans,
ond resolution.
how
ever, felt that the only way to get Con
THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 631
gress to go along with the largest budget
cuts in U.S. history was to put them all in
one bill and pass it as soon as possible.
The crucial votes came in the House on
May 7, when it passed the first concurrent
resolution and on June 26 when it passed
the reconciliation
package,
including
in existing
In April
changes
legislation.
the House
Budget Committee
reported
out a Democrat
backed budget resolution
calling for more
spending but a smaller
deficit than the administration
proposal.
After
several weeks of intense lobbying,
defected
however,
sixty-three Democrats
the administration
and passed
backed
known as "Gramm-Latta"
package
by
253-176 on May 7. This vote was crucial
it showed that President Reagan
because
House
could control the Democratic
and
get his unprecedented
budget
changes
14 the
On May
through the Congress.
House
and Senate conference
committee
resolution
agreed to the first concurrent
re
instructions
reconciliation
including
to come
committees
quiring authorizing
in law that would
up with the changes
in budget
cuts
the
billion
$36
provide
wanted by President Reagan.
Over the next few weeks
authorizing
in both houses
committees
struggled to
make the cuts required of them in the re
conciliation
As each com
instructions.
mittee made its changes the separate bills
were referred back to the budget commit
tees to compile them in a package and br
ing them to the floor for a vote. In mid
June each Budget Committee
reported
out the budget cut packages. As in the
resolu
May vote on the first concurrent
tion, the crucial test came in the House.
The House Budget Committee
reported a
from the recommendations
bill compiled
that provided $37.7 bil
of 15 Committees
lion in savings and claimed
the bill in
cluded 85% of the cuts wanted by Rea
and conservative Demo
gan. Republicans
claimed that entitlements
crats, however,
were not cut enough and not enough pro
grams were put into block grants.39 They
a substitute
called "Gramm
proposed
Latta
II" that conformed
very closely
wanted.
with what the administration
The administration
again pulled out its
guns in lobbying for the Gramm
substitute.
The President
himself
each of the 63
telephoned or telegraphed
who had voted with the ad
Democrats
on the first budget
ministration
resolu
in
tion.40 Compromises
and concessions
in order to
the final package were made
win votes, some of them departures
from
the administration's
earlier proposals.
For example, David Stockman
promised
that the administration
would not oppose
the revival of sugar subsidies. He later
said: "In economic principle,
it's kind of
a rotten idea," but "they don't care, over
in the White House,
they want to win."41
came when
vote
The
the
deciding
House
defeated
that
(210-217) a motion
to
have allowed
the Democrats
would
force votes on the separate pieces of the
substitute
reconciliation
rather
package
than yes or no on the whole package as
the Republicans
The Gramm
wanted.
Latta
reconciliation
itself
substitute
on June 26. The Senate
passed 232-193
had already passed a very similar bill on
June 25 by a vote of 80-15. The omnibus
reconciliation
package cut a total of $35.1
billion
from the baseline
established
by
for a total savings of
CBO for FY1982
billion
for Fiscal Years
1982
$130.6
1984.42
The FY1982 reconciliation
bill was his
toric in that it was a major reversal of the
spending priorities of the past several de
cades. House
Chair
Budget Committee
James Jones called it "clearly
the most
in
and historic
monumental
turnaround
It
fiscal policy that has ever occurred."
cut
the
in
U.S.
provided
largest spending
hundreds of programs
history, affecting
some of the greatest changes
and made
ever made in a single bill by the Congress.
heavy
Latta
Personnel
Each
Control
has the
incoming administration
a
to
of
number
officials
authority
appoint
for the formulation,
who are responsible
of administra
and advancing
direction,
tion policies, or who serve in a confiden
to policy makers.
tial relationship
These
are members
of the "excepted
appointees
service" since they serve at the pleasure of
and are not subject to the
the President
632
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
merit
of the Civil
system requirements
Service. The top cabinet and subcabinet
about
positions,
500, are
numbering
ranked in the Executive
Schedule
levels
I?III: cabinet, under, deputy, and asso
ciate
secretaries.
Schedule
Executive
IV and V, as well as General
Levels
Schedule levels 16-18 are now included in
the Senior Executive Service. Ten percent,
about 700 of 7000 (8500 are authorized)
of these are non-career members,
that is,
The option
is also
political
appointees.
available to appoint a number of "limited
term" or "limited emergency"
Senior Ex
ecutives. Finally, there are Schedule C po
sitions, about 1800 in number, at the GS
15 level and below. Schedule C duties in
clude policy-determining
responsibilities
or a confidential
to key of
relationship
ficials.43
Each election year the House Commit
tee on Post Office and Civil Service pub
and Supporting
lishes Policy
Positions,
the "Plum Book."
It lists by agency each
administration
incumbent by name, posi
tion, and salary. During every transition
there is a scramble
for this committee
it identifies
those specific
print because
can
that a new administration
positions
fill and the names of the political
ap
pointees who must leave.44
In order to fill the top five hundred ex
as well as hundreds of
ecutive positions
on regulatory
other positions
commis
sions, advisory boards, etc., recent presi
dential candidates have had personnel op
erations going well before
the election.
Candidate Carter set up a "Talent Inven
before his election.45
In
tory Program"
April 1980 Edwin Meese asked Pendleton
"head
James, who headed a Los Angeles
a
to
set
up
firm,
hunting"
personnel oper
ation
for the Reagan
administration.
a staff and organized
James assembled
the "Reagan-Bush
Planning Task Force"
in August
located in Alexandria,
Virginia
1980.46 It was funded and run entirely
from
the
and
separately
campaign,
therein were planted
the seeds of future
in the Republican
discord
Such
Party.
conflict may be inevitable in any modern
administration.
is
presidential
Governing
not the same as campaigning,
and a presi
dential candidate must have people plan
ning future administration
policy and per
sonnel decisions
in addition
to campaign
workers who are otherwise occupied.
The conflict arises after the electoral
victory when those who ran the campaign
feel they ought be have priority in running
In the Carter administra
the government.
tion this conflict erupted in the battle for
White House
turf between Hamilton
Jor
ran the campaign,
and Jack
dan, who
who ran the transition
Watson,
opera
tion. In the Reagan
the
administration
conflict
surfaced
after
in
the
shortly
auguration when the right wing of the Re
publican Party began to complain that lo
yal Reagan campaigners were not getting
their fair share of appointments.
This conflict was not salient in Presi
dent Reagan's
of his Cabinet
selection
and immediate White House
staff. Each
must
make
these
President
selec
clearly
tions personally.
The
staff
immediate
must be tuned in to the President's
per
the com
sonality and style and possess
of the President.47 The
plete confidence
are different
criteria for cabinet positions
and include important political and sym
bolic considerations.
President
Reagan
made his selections with the help of his
that met on the west
"kitchen
cabinet"
coast. John Ehrlichman
has observed that
their administrations
Presidents
begin
with
and weak White
strong cabinets
House
staffs and end them with strong
staffs and weak cabinets.48
While President-Elect
Reagan promised
to re-institute
as
"cabinet government,"
Carter had in 1976, the President's
advi
sors took extraordinary
measures
to as
sure that new cabinet appointees were in
tune with the White House.
In the first
few weeks of the administration,
frequent
cabinet meetings were held to set out the
"party line." Budget cutting, as described
above, was done from the White House
with little participation
from newly ap
or their staffs.
cabinet officers
pointed
to keep
The White House
also decided
over subcabinet
tight control
appoint
ments
rather than let cabinet members
own people, as President Carter
their
pick
had. Whatever
President
Reagan meant
THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 633
it did not in
by "cabinet government,"
of budget or person
clude the delegation
nel authority.
The struggle over subcabinet positions
created the greatest internal controversies
in the early Reagan administration.
Two
main dilemmas dominate
subcabinet per
in any administration:
sonnel selection
will selections be made primarily by the
or by department
and
House
White
heads
agency
and, what is the proper bal
ance between political
loyalty and admin
istrative competence. Most executives nat
to put together
urally want the discretion
their own teams; Robert McNamara
said
own
was
the
his
subordinates
choosing
most
important request he had made of
imme
John Kennedy.49 President Nixon,
new
au
his
cabinet
after
giving
diately
an
over
to
said
aide,
appointees,
thority
"I just made a big mistake."50
President
Carter, as part of his approach to cabinet
gave the primary discretion
government,
selection to his cabinet sec
for personnel
retaries.51
in con
The Reagan
administration,
scious contrast, made it clear from the be
selection would
that subcabinet
ginning
House.
from the White
be controlled
as Chief of Staff of the Reagan
Meese,
transition team, was favorably
impressed
and staffing
with a study on organizing
prepared by the Center for the Study of
It pointed up the trials of
the Presidency.
in subcabinet
the Carter administration
lost
like Carter,
"Nixon,
appointments.
to
the appointments
according
process,"
be
dif
it
would
time
This
Penn James.52
secretaries
"When
the cabinet
ferent:
were selected, Meese made it clear, 'Now
process
look, this is how the appointment
is going to be run.' And they were fully
aware as to how the White House was go
the appointment
process
ing to handle
before they were appointed. That was the
package that they bought."53
The intent was not to make all of the se
but to assure
lections in the White House,
that all selections made were fully accept
able to the White House. The President's
kitchen cabinet also played a role in the
selection: "our most crucial concern was
to assure that conservative
ideology was
The three criteria
properly
represented.
we followed were, one, was he a Reagan
And three, a
man? Two, a Republican?
of the
The
influence
conservative?"54
cabinet
kitchen
however,
diminished,
in the Old Execu
when it lost its offices
inMarch
1981.
tive Office Building
It was inevitable that such an approach
cause some conflicts.
In general,
would
that were
secretaries
those
cabinet
to win the
the
best
chance
had
strongest
Haig (with the
disputed cases. Alexander
of his deputy, William
Clark)
exception
got his choices through the White House
if not through the Sen
personnel process,
Defense
ate, with
Secretary
dispatch.
is reported to have prompted
Weinberger
the resignation of a White House person
nel staffer by saying "I will not accept any
more
from the White
recommendations
so don't bother sending them."55
House,
Other cabinet members,
however, did not
have the political or personal clout with
to be able to insist on
the White House
their choices when they disagreed over ap
pointments.
The question of who selected appoint
ees was closely intertwined with the other
major dilemma of loyalty versus compe
of administra
tence. At
the beginning
to have two
new
Presidents
tend
tions,
will under
fears: that "the bureaucrats"
mine their policies and that their appoint
ees will "go native" and become coopted
they head. Thus per
by the departments
force that
sonal loyalty is a centripetal
forces that
helps counter the centrifugal
to the pro
draw presidential
appointees
in
in
the
and
grams
agencies
colleagues
is that in
which they work. The problem
and manage
order to have programmatic
than just
ment
control you need more
The
in
the
person
position.
"your guy"
must
also have a blend of substantive
skill in or
and administrative
knowledge
bid
the President's
der to do effectively
and
in
the
very
competitive
complex
ding
bureaucratic world.
and skill is
One indicator of knowledge
in
administrative
experience
previous
Pendleton
or
business
government.
re
James, as head of the White House
cruitment
effort,
sought out executives
634
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
proven track records who would be
"We had five cri
loyal to the President.
with
teria all along?compatibility
the
President's
philosophy,
integrity, tough
a team
and being
ness,
competence,
in the
player."56 James, who had worked
of the Nixon
and
personnel
operations
Ford
found
administrations,
naturally
many competent people among those who
had served in previous Republican
admin
istrations. The problem with them, from
of the Republican
the perspective
right
wing, was that some of them had not sup
ported Ronald Reagan soon enough.
In late January and February
1981 con
of Rea
servative right wing
supporters
gan's candidacy began to complain vocif
erously that Reagan campaigners were be
excluded from the per
ing systematically
in
sonnel selection process.
John Lofton
the February issue of the Conservative Di
gest claimed that the Reagan administra
tion was being
filled with
"retreads"
from the Ford and Nixon administrations
and called for James to be fired. He de
"There will be no Reaganism
clared,
without Reaganites."57
The person carrying
the conservative
banner on the inside was Lyn Nofziger,
who ran White House political operations
from his office in the Old EOB. He met
groups, and in
regularly with conservative
March
1981 told the President
that con
servatives were being frozen out of his ad
ministration.
His criteria for administra
tion personnel differed significantly
from
those of James. He felt the personnel pro
cess should root out not only Democrats
but Republicans
who in the past had sup
"I
than Reagan.
ported other candidates
have problems with them. This, damn it,
is a Reagan Administration."58
Nofzi
of competence
also dif
ger's conception
fered somewhat from that of James: "We
have told members
of the Cabinet we ex
pect them to help us place people who are
with
competent.
anyone who
...
As
far
supported
as
I'm
Reagan
concerned,
is compe
tent."59
Due to Nofziger's
efforts and pressure
from conservative
groups, after the first
two months
the appointment
process took
a turn to the right, at least enough to mol
lify right wing critics.60 James' deputy was
who was
replaced by John S. Herrington,
more acceptable
to the right wing interest
groups. James denied that any policy shift
took place, saying that loyalty was always
a primary criterion in hiring and that the
were al
recent conservative
appointees
rather
ready in the personnel
pipeline
than the result of any policy shift.
not all
To keep things in perspective,
were
of
the
focus
administrative
positions
and the
pitched battles between Nofziger
and the right wing did not al
moderates,
was suc
win.
ways
Caspar Weinberger
a distin
cessful in getting Frank Carlucci,
servant to be his
guished career public
deputy,
though Alexander
Haig was not
in preventing
the appointment
successful
of William
Clark as his deputy. Clark, a
Supreme Court,
justice on the California
in foreign af
had virtually no experience
he was later to be ap
fairs. Ironically,
pointed as President Reagan's national se
curity advisor and was to be instrumental
in Haig's
resignation.
se
The overall result of the personnel
was an administration
lection process
staffed with officials
selected more
sys
for their personal
loyalty to
tematically
than any other recent ad
the President
Not
it was an
ministration.
incidentally,
with relatively
little prior
administration
at least at the
government
experience,
subcabinet
level. As of June 26, 1981, of
confirmed by the Senate,
those appointees
76 of 112 (59%) of those in the subcab
inet, 18 of 23 (78%) in independent agen
cies, and 7 of 7 in independent
regulatory
experi
agencies had no prior government
ence.61
This
reflected
government
change
Ronald
anti
Reagan's
and
his
campaign
promise to
"business
as
usual."
"There's
an
awful lot of brains and talent in people
who haven't
learned all the things you
can't do."62 This should have made Sena
tor Jesse Helms happy. One of his staff
about the early Reagan
ap
complained
to the Wall Street Journal:
pointments
"All these people are the experts of the
mistakes of the past. Why can't he at least
get some new people who could have a
some different
to make
mis
chance
also
takes?"63 The Reagan administration
in nam
made some unusual appointments
THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 635
ing to positions
people who were hostile
or
at
least
to,
highly critical of, the tradi
of the agencies they were
tional missions
at In
to head, for example James Watt
at the Environ
terior and Anne Gorsuch
mental Protection Agency.
to
to disputes over whom
In addition
were
to
there
also
which
position,
appoint
complaints about the slowness of the pro
cess itself. In the spring of 1981 there was
a widespread
that appoint
perception
ments were not coming as fast as they
from
ought to.64 There were complaints
the Hill that officials who should have
been available to testify on administration
There
programs were not yet appointed.
were complaints
from the administration
on board were
that the few top officials
of
their
time
all
testifying on the
spending
from the
Hill. And there were complaints
lead
that essential program
bureaucracy
in policy
resulting
ership was missing,
James
Pendleton
drift and inefficiency.
to deny that the pace of ap
continued
was particularly
slow and
pointments
that quality of personnel was
maintained
more important than speed.
Some of the delays were caused by fi
and con
nancial disclosure
requirements
that resulted
flict of interest regulations
from what James called "post-Watergate
Some delay was inevitable,
hysteria."65
due to the range of clearances built into
the personnel
process. Each nomination
had to run a formidable gauntlet running
from the cabinet secretary and the person
to White House
to Nofziger
nel office
to either Martin
counsel Fred Fielding,
or
Richard Allen
Anderson
(domestic)
to
the
triad (James
security)
(national
to
Baker, Michael Deaver, Edwin Meese)
and fi
liaison office,
the congressional
himself.66 Some
nally to the President,
times names of candidates would make it
most of the way through the process only
to be vetoed at the last minute by the po
or
the kitchen
office
litical
affairs
cabinet.67 Once through the White House
affairs
international
process,
personnel
Senate
nominations
approval
requiring
were often held up by Senator Helms who
nominees were
thought State Department
not
conservative
Despite
enough.68
administration
claims
that
it
was making major
faster
appointments
Carter and Kennedy,69
than Presidents
Journal reported that after
The National
to the
ten weeks Reagan had submitted
to Carter's
142
Senate 95, as opposed
Time magazine
calculated
nominations.70
that, as of the first week in May, of the
top 400 officials,
only 55% had been an
and
36% formally nominated,
nounced,
21% actually confirmed.71
In January 1977 the Civil Service Com
mission approved a rule allowing agencies
to create another set of Schedule C posi
tions identical to those already authorized
for 120 days "in order to facilitate the or
derly transition of duties as a consequence
Administra
of a change in Presidential
tion."72 Thus during a transition each de
and agency can have twice as
partment
as usual
many Schedule C appointments
for its first 120 days. On June 16, 1981
OPM Director Donald Devine authorized
of the period for another
the extension
120 days "since a number of key political
to
have not yet been appointed
officials
the
federal agencies,
thereby continuing
for the new Admin
transition
period
istration."73
the slow pace of appoint
Although
in many ways, some
ments was disruptive
saw the silver lin
officials
administration
or
in
virtue
found
They ar
necessity.
ing,
it
gued that the lack of appointees made
for agencies to resist the se
very difficult
House
vere budget cuts that the White
the slowness of
was advocating.74 While
may have helped the Presi
appointments
it did little to fa
dent's budget program,
cilitate the transition in the administration
of the executive branch.
Administrative
Control
come to office
Most modern Presidents
with an abiding distrust of the bureau
that their pol
cracy. They are convinced
will
be
initiatives
ignored, or
delayed,
icy
of
two decades
even sabotoged.
After
Eisenhower
rule President
Democratic
felt the need for his own people at the op
erational levels, not merely the top of the
were
Schedule C positions
government.
this
for
created
purpose.75
felt that the career bu
John Kennedy
reaucracy was too stolid for his new initia
636
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
tives and drew domestic
policy making
into his White House
staff. In one analy
sis his administrative
strategy amounted
to guerilla warfare with numerous "back
and special task forces usurp
channels"
of the career bureau
ing the powers
distrust of the
cracy.76 Richard Nixon's
was
his
bureaucracy
legendary. When
failed to fruc
initiatives
Congressional
to "take over the bu
tify, he decided
reaucracy and take on the Congress" with
funds and his
tactics such as impounding
responsiveness
Jimmy Carter
program.77
as a self-proclaimed
came to Washington
to reduce the number
outsider promising
from 1900 to 200.
of federal agencies
this promise was quickly forgotten,
While
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 did
create several important tools of adminis
trative control
House
that the White
the SES pro
could
use, particularly
visions.
Ronald Reagan also came to office as
an outsider,
that government
claiming
was the problem with U.S.
society, not
from the administra
the solution. Aside
and personnel
tion's budget
campaign
seem
not
to be a sep
there
did
strategies,
arate administrative
strategy. The admin
did make a series of
istration, however,
im
aimed at establishing
tactical moves
and unambiguous
control over
mediate
the executive branch. A freeze was im
posed on civilian hiring and lowered per
led to the firing of
sonnel
ceilings
thousands of Civil Service employees. The
President also fired the striking air traffic
as well as the newly created
controllers
inspectors
general who had supposedly
roles. Finally,
he "zeroed
non-partisan
out" the Community
Services Adminis
tration, which had taken over the func
of
tions of President
Johnson's
Office
Economic
While
each of
Opportunity.
these actions had important
immediate
the larger purpose was the
consequences,
statement
that the Reagan
ad
symbolic
was
in charge and there
ministration
would be no more "business as usual."
In his first official act after being inau
gurated, President Reagan signed a mem
orandum
imposing a "strict freeze on the
to be
of
Federal
civilian employees
hiring
applied across the board in the executive
The purpose of the freeze was
and
the size of government
"controlling
stopping the drain on the economy by the
public sector."78 An accompanying White
House
press release said that compensa
tion and benefits
for Federal
civilian
workers comprised a "major" part of the
saw
Federal budget.79 The administration
the freeze as a means to show the bureau
cracy who was in charge, show the public
it would fulfill its promises,
and begin a
series of broader cutbacks aimed at do
mestic
spending and personnel.
A memo of January 24, 1981 made
it
clear that the administration
intended the
freeze to be retroactive, when it included
in the freeze all those who had not been
formally hired by election day, November
5, 1980. Thus many (some estimate up to
20,000) were caught in the freeze who had
letters offering
them
duly authorized
jobs, but who did not yet have formally
signed Standard Form 50's (Notification
of Personnel Action).
Several cases were
in court challenging
the retroac
brought
tivity of the freeze as a breach of contract
with those who had good faith offers of
though not a signed SF50.
employment,
They also charged that many prospective
underwent
extensive personal
employees
in giving up their old jobs and
hardship
in order to accept
traveling toWashington
jobs that were then retracted by the ad
ministration.
The petitioners,
however,
lost on February
25 when U.S. District
Court Judge Charles B. Richey ruled that
the freeze was "not only constitutional
and legally permissable
but . . . essential
to the well being and general welfare of
the American
people at this time."80
OMB
Director
Stockman
explained
that the freeze was made necessary by "a
situation demanding
sacrifices to help in
under control
the
bringing
immediately
size and cost of government."81
While
to those who
this provided
little comfort
gave up jobs on the basis of letters prom
Director
Stockman
ising them positions,
said cases of "severe hardship" would be
to the freeze. A
considered for exceptions
memo on January 29, 1981 specified that
had to demonstrate
potential
exemptions
loss"
"severe
financial
and irreparable
and at the same time had to show the per
branch."
THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 637
son "was
in his or her actions
prudent
in terms of timing of sever
(for example,
or taking on new
ing other employment;
financial commitments
in anticipation
of
a new job)."82 This catch-22 type condi
in addition
to other
tion,
restrictions,
to the freeze few and far
made exceptions
between.
The freeze was successful
in showing
the public and the bureaucracy
that the
was
cut
administration
serious about
backs. It was criticized by others for caus
than it was worth in
ing more disruption
or reducing per
terms of saving money
sonnel. W. Bowman Cutter, who was Ex
ecutive Associate
for Budget
Director
in
wrote that the
the Carter administration,
freeze was
"fake,
gimmicky
symbol
ism."83 He argued that in his experience
of running three freezes for the Carter ad
he found
that exceptions
ministration,
were always necessary (for example, in the
Defense Department
which employs half
of the government's
civilians) and that va
rather than in
cancies occur randomly,
wants to cut. The
positions management
in a series of
Office
General Accounting
reports has argued that the best way to
in government
reductions
is
manage
through work force planning and budget
control, rather than through the imposi
tion of personnel
and hiring
ceilings
freezes. In this way the managers
closest
can decide how best to cut
to operations
essen
back activities without
disrupting
tial services.84 GAO
contended
that the
Carter and Reagan freezes were not suc
cessful in substantially
reducing employ
ment and that itwas not clear whether any
money
was
saved.85
In the late spring and summer of 1981
the hiring freeze was selectively
lifted in
agencies for which there were established
For most
domestic
personnel
ceilings.
were
well
these
below
ceilings
agencies
those on board at the time. This necessar
ily involved the reduction of employees by
natural attrition (not replacing employees
or formal reduc
who leave voluntarily)
tion in force (RIF). Both of these proce
dures are costly and disruptive,
though
the administration
felt that overall reduc
tions were more important than the effi
of individ
ciency or smooth functioning
ual agencies.86
The Reagan administration
also sought
to assert its control over the government
by firing all of the inspectors
general
whose positions were created by statute in
1976 and 1978. The purposes of the posi
in
tions were to centralize audit functions
major agencies and have the IG's report
on their efforts to uncover
to Congress
fraud, waste and abuse. The IG positions
were intended to be apolitical,
though the
if
could remove an incumbent
President
to Con
he communicated
the reasons
gress.
saw Rea
in Congress
Some Democrats
of
all
the
incumbent
IG's as
gan's firing
an attempt to politicize
the auditing func
tion by appointing
his own people who
could then suppress any embarrassments
to the administration.87
The White House
replied that it was a conscious attempt to
establish
the precedent
that each Presi
dent could name his own IG's. After mak
ing the precedent-setting
point, President
some
of the same
Reagan
reappointed
IG's he had just fired.
Later, in the summer of 1981, the Presi
dent again asserted
his administrative
control by firing air traffic controllers
who had voted to go on strike. His action
the principle
that
strikes
established
not be tolerated
and effectively
would
broke the Professional
Air Traffic Con
trollers Association
(PATCO).
the administration
established
Finally,
its direction by "zeroing out,"
i.e. abol
Services Adminis
ishing, the Community
tration. There was a marked contrast with
Richard Nixon's
earlier efforts to do away
with the Office of Economic Opportunity
its funds. Nixon's
efforts
by impounding
a united Congress and
directly confronted
were defeated in Federal court decisions.88
President
Reagan was able to persuade
to go along with his propos
the Congress
als and thus avoided any question of the
of the administration's
constitutionality
or spending decisions.
appointment
18 OMB Director Stockman
On March
sent a "Dear Mr. Director"
letter to CSA,
or
even though there was no appointed,
even acting, director. The letter stated:
638
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
"we will not seek to renew the authoriza
tion of the Community
Services Adminis
and that CSA plans "should
tration,"
provide for the separation of all personnel
by the end of Fiscal Year 1981."89 CSA
functions were to be included in state ad
ministered
block grants proposed
by the
administration.
there was much
Although
gallows humor at CSA in the last half of
FY1981, under the leadership of the vet
eran Dwight
ran
Ink, agency managers
the shutdown
and CSA
professionally,
closed its doors on September
30, 1981.90
While
the above actions, despite their
drawbacks, were successful from the ad
one big hole in
ministration's
viewpoint,
its approach to administrative
control was
in getting new appointees
the slowness
into subcabinet positions. This was due to
clearance
and the conflicts
procedures
over
described
particular
appointees
above. This helped the administration's
budget strategy by eliminating
potential
advocates
for agency budgets, but it did
little to give the administration
program
matic control of the government.
One of the major
in any
drawbacks
transition is that bureaucratic
presidential
and programs
tend to go into
agencies
neutral gear until new leadership provides
This
toward
policy direction.
tendency
policy drift is extended by delays in ap
Career
do not
executives
pointments.
want to move too far in any direction for
fear that the new boss will not approve. A
consideration
of this syndrome from the
bureaucratic
is provided
in
perspective
sections.
subsequent
In one lesson it learned from the Carter
and Nixon
the new Reagan
experiences,
administration
did not dissipate
its ener
gies pushing any grand scale reorganiza
tion of the government. Carter had prom
ised to reduce the number of federal agen
cies from 1900 to 200. Nixon had tried to
consolidate
twelve cabinet departments
into eight, but Congress
would not go
to abolish
the
along. Reagan
promised
of Energy
and Education
Departments
re
but he did not squander his political
sources on these projects
in his first two
years.
The general strategy of trying to reduce
the span of control of the President
by
similar agencies with
similar
bunching
one
functions
under
umbrella
together
agency has the advantage of settling some
turf battles before they get to the Presi
dent's desk. Major policy disputes, how
ever, cannot be swept under an organiza
tional rug. The agency itself, its clientele
and Congressional
committees
groups,
will continue to dominate
the action, and
still will have to decide if he
the President
wants to throw his weight one way or an
are
other. Thus major
reorganizations
more
are
trouble
than
worth,
usually
they
both in the Congress
and in the executive
branch.
This does not mean that no reorganiza
tions took place, only that they were im
at the micro-level,
i.e. within
plemented
and agencies,
where
departments
they
count. While
is
large scale reorganization
often touted as a panacea,
small scale re
are often effective
tools of
organizations
good management.
They engender uncer
in agencies
tainty and thus inefficiency
when
so they
they are implemented,
should be used with sensitivity and only
when necessary.
But in certain circum
stances they are useful in gaining control
of an agency and can accomplish
pur
rules and regulations
poses that personnel
In 1981 Budget cuts pro
make difficult.
vided useful
for agency
justifications
heads to reorganize
their organizations
for their own purposes.91
IV. The View From the Bureaucracy
career employees
in the executive
branch, the transition period is a time of
The last few months
before
uncertainty.
an election the bureaucratic machine
be
gins to slow until the election of a new
at which
time it is in neutral
President,
internal maneuv
gear. In sharp contrast,
ering increases to a high speed. The result
is a machine
operating at a high level of
to con
r.p.m.'s but with little direction
vert all of the energy to useful productiv
ity.
transi
During
periods of presidential
tion the upper levels of the bureaucracy
are marked
ca
by active maneuvering;
reers can be made or broken. Attitudes
at
lower levels are marked
by cynicism and
the feeling that there will be arbitrary
To
THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 639
Each
changes of policy and organization.
set of attitudes
results from the intense
This condition does not usu
uncertainty.
ally preclude the carrying out of routine
of well
functions or the accomplishment
established agency goals. The inefficiency
comes at the cutting edge of policy formu
innovation.
lation and program
at the top results from
The uncertainty
a lack of leadership and direction. Senior
executives do not want to stick their necks
out too far in any one policy direction for
fear that the new boss will come in and re
verse directions. Those who had come to
occupy positions of trust and power over
adminis
the four years of the out-going
tration are fearful that they will be identi
fied as partisans of the previous discred
The re
ited and rejected administration.
luctance to take any initiatives, even those
that seem to make good political and or
sense and that would be in
ganizational
is
the best interests of any new incumbent,
about who will
reinforced by uncertainty
to run the agency.
be appointed
Every career executive has seen a range
in presidential
of quality
appointments,
from the highly professional
expert with a
or
in government
of experience
wealth
to the complete neophyte who is
business,
also a political hack. The probable future
actions of the former can be calculated
much more easily than those of the latter.
But people whose career depend on it tend
losses rather
to minimize
their maximum
than to pursue the high risk strategy of
backing an initiative that may be repudi
ated by the new boss. Senior executives
want to jump on the band wagon of the
new boss, but they do not yet know in
it is heading.
what direction
can lead to
The period of uncertainty
career or
to
one's
enhance
opportunities
can re
settle old scores. Old animosities
emerge, and colleagues can be seen as riv
turf can be again
als. Areas of disputed
to
There
may be oppor
challenge.
opened
tunities to reorganize one's bureaucratic
enemies out of existence. The focus of all
this maneuvering
is, of course, the new
agency head who will have the power to
make or break policies and careers. The
speculation about who the new President
will appoint is intense, and at the first hint
of a rumor people
scurry off the tele
phone to contact their "inside sources" or
to get a fix on the new
to Who's Who
boss.
The people on the new administration's
transition team are in an ambiguous posi
tion because it is never clear if they were
assigned to pay off a campaign debt or if
the new leaders of
they will be appointed
The obvious
bureaucratic
the agency.
strategy here is to act as if they had al
and impress them
ready been appointed
One impresses
with your responsiveness.
boss with a positive
the new (potential)
and "can do" attitude. One must also ap
and not overly obsequi
pear professional
ous. The usual tack in briefing new ap
is to present one's own operation
pointees
as efficient and essential to the operation
In a high risk gambit one
of the agency.
might offer up program or personnel cuts
to show that one is not the stereotypical
empire building bureaucrat.
is of
The executive branch bureaucracy
le
ten portrayed as a unified, monolithic
viathan with the sole goals of survival and
This leads to the expectation
expansion.
will be
that a new political
appointee
faced with a united front. Political
ap
pointees who believe this will be at a dis
suf
the bureaucracy
because
advantage,
as a car
fers from the same vulnerabilities
tel. One small leak can easily become a
flood and break the whole edifice. In any
agency there are enough senior managers
and
who hold varying political,
policy,
values that new appointees
professional
with any sense of character
judgement
will not have to face a unified opposition
whatever
to their policy preferences,
they
the anti-government
are. This
includes
of the
and anti-welfare
policy preferences
administration.
Reagan
is likely to be the
In fact, the opposite
can be ex
Senior executives
situation.
and
to
render
positive
professional
pected
for
appointees
support to new political
rea
as well as self-interest
professional
the
sons. Career
accept
professionals
and constitutional
democratic
legitimacy
of the incoming administration.
They also
see their own roles as neutral with respect
to political party, if not always with re
Self in
spect to programs or institutions.
640
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
terest also provides a strong incentive to
to the new leadership. Se
be responsive
nior executives are ambitious and want to
team.
of the management
be members
They will only be included if they actively
the administra
and effectively
support
tion's policies.
For these reasons the typical fears of
new administrations
that "the bureau
their policies
crats" will try to undermine
are usually exaggerated.
There will prob
some personality
ably be some dissidents,
of opin
and some differences
conflicts,
of bu
ion; but there is little likelihood
warfare
reaucratic
waged
by
guerilla
senior executives
against an administra
tion's policies.92 There will undoubtedly
be bureaucratic warfare, but the cleavages
will flow along program, policy, and insti
as
tutional lines with political appointees
well as careerists on both sides of the bar
ricades.
is the first
The Reagan administration
to come to office enjoying the new flexi
in the Civil Service Re
bilities provided
the
form Act of 1978. Primary
among
are the
new management
prerogatives
SES provisions. These allow agency heads
to transfer senior executives from position
to position much more easily than in the
past. Rank in person rather than position
some security to the executive
provides
the agency head to match
while allowing
to the appropriate
the executive
position
without
being bound by the rank of the
usual incumbent of that position.
is that
One of the restrictions, however,
career senior executives cannot be moved
involuntarily until 120 days after the new
agency head is appointed. The purpose is
to ensure that senior executives will have a
chance to prove their competence and loy
During
alty to the new administration.
spring in 1981, due to the Civil Service re
than the usual
there was more
forms,
amount of paranoia among senior execu
tives. There were newspaper reports in the
Post and Star that the White
Washington
House was planning "mass transfers" of
senior executives at the end of the 120 day
waiting period. These fears proved to be
and there is no evidence that
groundless,
abused
its
the Reagan
administration
powers over the SES during the transi
tion.93 Thus a strong precedent has been
set for avoiding
of the
the politicization
cam
since the Reagan
SES, particularly
as
to
end
"business
paign
promised
usual," and had sharply contrasting
pol
to the preceding
several
icy preferences
In fact, one of the major
administrations.
themes of the transition teams was to re
assure the career service that the new ad
its campaign
rhet
ministration,
despite
the in
oric, valued, and would preserve,
tegrity of the merit system.
The new Reagan
administration
did,
to re
efforts
however, make
systematic
new and enforce the split between politics
and administration
that the public admin
istration community
found so attractive
in the earlier
the 20th
of
decades
ad
century.94 Often the newly appointed
ministration
members of an agency would
meet to make policy decisions without any
input from career executives,
bringing
them in to implement decisions only after
all important decisions
had been made.
This approach was due to the typical dis
trust of the bureaucracy
felt by most new
administrations.
This did little to enhance the quality of
decision making.
For rea
management
sons stated above,
there is little to fear
career executives.
from most
But more
the
administration
deprived
importantly,
itself of valuable advice as well as support
career executives
from the
by excluding
In
formulation.
early stages of policy
cases career executives
are experi
most
in their areas and have
enced experts
many good ideas for beneficial
changes.
Such potentially
valuable
input might be
stifled if they are systematically
excluded
career ex
In addition,
from consultation.
often
ecutives
have
shrewd
political
as
as
contacts in
well
valuable
judgement
other agencies and on the Hill.
Ignoring
these resources at their disposal can make
the job of political appointees much more
No
amount
of consultation,
difficult.
can relieve members
of the ad
however,
of the authority or the duty
ministration
to make
final decisions.95 Each new ad
ministration
goes through a cycle. Grad
of
ually, as the abilities and drawbacks
career executives
known and as
become
trust begins to develop with the experience
THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 641
of working together, the artificial barriers
of the politics/administration
dichotomy
the
break down. The sooner this happens,
sooner any administration
will be able to
mobilize
fully the political and substan
of the career service to
tive expertise
achieve its policy goals.
about the integrity of the
Reassurances
merit system and the absence of abuse of
the SES, however, were of little comfort
to those at lower levels in the bureaucracy
of reduc
who were facing the uncertainty
tions in force. The Reagan
campaign
promises to cut back federal agencies and
were always
clear and were
personnel
with
the immediate
reiterated
forcefully
new
freeze.
The
reduced
personnel
hiring
ceilings and the budget cuts established by
OMB inMarch and April 1981made it
reductions would be
clear that personnel
most
in
domestic
necessary
agencies,
either through natural attrition or formal
Either
in force
reductions
(RIF's).
method would place government workers
in jeopardy of losing their jobs or of being
reduced in rank or position.96 The uncer
tainty, needless to say, resulted in severe
morale problems.
Those who were not fired were never
the programs
theless threatened because
to being
in were vulnerable
they worked
termina
either
eliminated,
by outright
tion, or by the slow deletion of functions
and authority. One of the problems here
is that employees,
particularly at mid and
lower levels, perceive that the fate of their
to
careers or their programs has nothing
This lack of a
do with their performance.
sense of efficacy can easily lead to cyni
seems
cism in which arbitrary "politics"
this attitude,
to control everything. With
why should one work hard if one's own
cannot control one's fate?
performance
ad
Thus the cutbacks of the Reagan
in 1981 had the unfortunate
ministration
in
effect of seriously undermining morale
morale
is
While
domestic
many
agencies.
to measure,
it
if not impossible,
difficult,
factor in any organiza
is an important
it drops, people become de
tion.97 When
tached from their jobs and do not see any
to work
toward
need
organizational
about their
goals. They become worried
for
careers
look
and
opportuni
personal
It is difficult
ties in other organizations.
to recruit bright, young managers
to or
that seem to be in decline.
ganizations
This was probably
the major
adminis
trative challenge
the Reagan administra
tion faced in its early years.98
cause some uncertainty
All transitions
and disruption,
but within
departments
and agencies
they can be handled with
more or less grace. The incoming agency
of
head can choose to handle appointees
the outgoing
and career
administration
executives who will be replaced with pro
fessional respect and can make their exits
as smooth
as possible.
them
Giving
chances to find new positions
and using
for early retirement are
selective options
to do this. The agency head can
ways
choose the least painful way to reorganize
the agency or separate personnel. On the
the new agency head can
other hand,
come with six-guns blazing and demand
of all holdovers
by close of
resignations
that day. He can have their of
business
fices locked and their desks cleared out.
He can put heavy handed pressure on ca
reerists to leave quickly, and can reassign
them to undesirable
locations
geographic
on the 121st day after his appointment.
It probably
takes an executive who is
in
in himself and his position
confident
to take the low-key,
the administration
route. There
is, after all, no
gracious
is running the agency,
of who
question
and there is plenty of legal power to back
it up. Those who are insecure in them
selves or their positions may feel the need
to assert their authority
through heavy
handed actions and abrupt firings. They
will
inspire fear in their subordinates
the Machiavel
rather than respect. While
lian approach to control through fear may
enhance personal power, it will not lead to
to run an
the sort of teamwork necessary
in the complex
and some
organization
times treacherous milieu of Washington.
it will be a disservice to
More importantly,
of which the appointee
the administration
is a member.
V.
Conclusion
fact about presiden
The overwhelming
from a management
tial transitions
per
in
are
that
is
costly
extremely
they
spective
642
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
terms of productivity
sacrificed and mo
mentum
lost. Important changes in policy
off sunk costs.
direction mean writing
in
entail policy
top
management
Changes
drift and turf battles at the agency level.
The benefits of a representative
govern
ment, however, are well worth the cost of
in presidential
involved
the disruptions
transitions.
While presidential
transitions are neces
they can be accom
sarily inefficient,
plished more or less quickly and effec
tively and can be conducted with more or
what
less grace. From this perspective,
can future presidents-elect
learn from the
First of all,
Carter/Reagan
experience?
the transition must begin before the elec
tion and be professionally
staffed. The
of policy
issues and the
development
cannot be left until
search for personnel
after the election. Itmust be kept inmind,
that the governmental
transition
however,
staff and the political campaign staff will
battle over who will run the government.
must expect such con
The President-Elect
flict and make his choices clear.
and Meese
both performed
Watson
are lawyers
in
the
Both
transition.
ably
with good minds
The
and experience.
must be given very
Reagan administration
high marks for the execution of its legisla
tive and budget programs.
(Whether or
not these programs were successful
in re
is another ques
viving the U.S. economy
process
personnel
tion.99) The political
gets a mixed review. It selected loyal ad
ministrators
but sacrificed professional
ism and time. Administrative
leadership
direction were sacrificed
and managerial
to budget, personnel,
and cutback priori
ties. Many agencies were so disrupted by
the process that their operations were seri
in the short run, and long
ously affected
term management
recruitment may have
that
been hurt. It is probable,
however,
this was not an unintended
consequence,
as seen by the administration,
but viewed
as a necessary
tradeoff.
can future administrations
learn
What
areas
in
the
from the Reagan
experience
of legislation,
budget, personnel and ad
ministration.
One lesson is that Congress
will
still pass a President's
legislative
that since
Some had concluded
package.
the fragmenting
Johnson
pres
Lyndon
sures in Congress?structural
reforms,
interest pressure
turnover,
high
single
the
end of the Presi
marked
groups?had
dent's role as legislative leader. President
Reagan proved that White House control
in spite of un
of legislation was possible
cuts and a Democratic
budget
popular
House. But it took most of President Rea
resources during his first
gan's political
six months
in office to win the budget bat
tle on the Hill. These victories, however,
turn
did not accomplish
the economic
around that supply-siders
had predicted,
led to the largest
and his budget policies
deficits in U.S. history. Not until the end
of the second year of the Reagan adminis
tration did the economic
recovery begin,
although the stock market proved an ear
lier harbinger.
What did the elaborate presidential per
The White
sonnel
system accomplish?
House kept closer control over subcabinet
than any other recent ad
appointments
ministration.
Thus many Reagan
loyalists
were appointed,
but at the cost of admin
and letting cabinet
istrative experience
members
choose their own management
teams. While
the Carter and Nixon per
sonnel systems may have been too lax in
this regard, the Reagan
system may have
been too strict. The delay in appointments
that was caused in major part by the ad
clearance
ministration's
proce
political
dures took a toll in departmental
leader
How
ship and program
development.
was
the Reagan
administration
ever,
spared the severe stress of staff vs. Cab
inet which
characterized
the Carter ad
the Meese
ministration.
Further,
origi
nated cabinet councils provided an effec
tive system of relating Cabinet
and staff
in policy development.
to be addressed
is
The larger question
whether
described
actions
the above
to administrative,
amount
and
policy,
of
control
the
government.
programatic
The Reagan transition period did provide
significant budgetary cutbacks for domes
tic agencies, and the personnel
system en
sured personal
loyalty to the President
But there did not
from the subcabinet.
seem to be much positive policy direction
to set the tone for the Reagan administra
THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION
| 643
tion. Even in defense, the early budget ac
tions seemed to be the addition of more
to the previous
administration's
money
priorities rather than a carefully targetted
redirection of defense policy.100
Setting a positive policy direction is dif
an
for
ficult
administration
whose
avowed goals are essentially
If
negative.
is part of the problem,
then
government
doing less is better. Major
changes in do
mestic policy were made at EPA and the
of Interior, but these were ac
Department
cutbacks
complished
primarily
through
to modify
and the decision
enforcement
of
In cutback
situations
regulations.
where government
is seen as part of the
problem,
positive
is, at best,
leadership
difficult.
"hit
the
inherently
Having
this was the challenge
ground running,"
the Reagan administration.
confronting
Notes
1. See Austin Ranney,
The American
Elections
of
1980 (Washington:
American
Insti
Enterprise
et al., The Elec
tute, 1981), Gerald
Pomper,
tion of
1980: Reports
and Interpretations
(Chatham, N.J.: Chatham
House,
1981), Ellis
Sandoz and Cecil V. Crabb,
Jr., A Tide of Dis
content:
The 1980 Elections
and Their Mean
ing
(Washington:
Congressional
Press,
1981), and Royce
Crocker,
Government
and Public
Spending
Quarterly
"Federal
Opinion,"
Public Budgeting
and Finance
(Autumn
1981),
Vol.
1 No.
3, pp. 25-35.
v. Campbell,
2. See Luevano
Civil Action
No.
79-0271.
3. FPM Bulletin
273-18,
January 4, 1980.
4. OPM Operations
Letter No.
332-246,
Septem
ber 17, 1980 signed by Richard
B. Post.
5. GAO Report FPCD-81-51
(B-202713) May 27,
1981 signed Clifford
I. Gould.
in
The OPM
on
the U.S.
Commission
covered
vestigation
Civil Rights,
the Department
of Education,
cov
and the EEOC.
The GAO
investigation
ered the FTC, SBA, USDA,
and DOT.
for Cabinet
6. Memorandum
and Agency Heads,
"An Orderly
Transition
of the Pres
Subject:
10, 1980, signed "Jack"
idency," November
Watson.
7. See Richard
E. Neustadt,
"The Reagan Transi
Research
Presidency
Group Newsletter
(April 1981), p. 2.
8. The White House,
for Cabinet
"Memorandum
and Agency
November
Heads,"
12, 1981,
signed "Jack" Watson.
for Department
9. Memorandum
and Agency
De
Heads,
Subject:
"Resignation
Policy,"
cember
10, 1980, signed "Jack" Watson.
78 Stat. 153.
10. Public Law 88-277,
De
11.Congressional
Report,
Weekly
Quarterly
cember 27, 1980, p. 3657.
tion,"
a treatment
of transitions
from Kennedy
see Richard E. Neustadt,
Presi
through Carter
dential Power(New
York: Wiley,
1980), Chap
ter 11: "Hazards
of Transition,"
pp. 208-243.
For a study of transitions
from Wilson
through
see Laurin L. Henry,
Eisenhower
Presidential
12. For
Transitions
(Washington:
Brookings,
1960).
see Richard
For an inside view of a transition
on "Staffing
E. Neustadt,
Memorandum
the
"
October
President-Elect,
30, 1960, available
in the Kennedy
Boston, MA.
Library,
13. Washington
Post, November
16, 1980, p. A9.
14. Washington
Post, December
15, 1980.
15. Congressional
December
27, 1980,
Quarterly,
p. 3656.
16. See "Minutes
on the Transi
of IAG Meeting
of Personnel
No
tion," Office
Management,
vember
at
14, 1980. The author was present
this meeting.
17. Congressional
2920.
18. Ibid.
19. Hendrick
Congress,"
Ibid.
Quarterly,
October
4,
1980,
Smith,
"Taking
Charge
New
York Times, August
9,
p.
of
1981.
20.
21. Congressional
1, 1981, p.
August
Quarterly,
1372.
22. Smith,
of Congress,"
New
"Taking
Charge
York Times, August
9, 1981.
23. See Washington
Post, April
26, 1981, p. A10,
1981, p.
Congressional
July 25,
Quarterly,
1325.
24. Congressional
June
13, 1981, p.
Quarterly,
1025.
25. James MacGregor
Burns has made
this argu
ment.
See the Los Angeles
19,
Times,
January
1982, Part IV, p. 1.
26. See William
"The
of
Education
Greider,
David
Stockman,"
The
Atlantic
(December
1981).
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
For a more
of the Reagan
complete
analysis
administration's
and tactics,
strategy
budget
see: James P. Pfiffner,
"The Reagan
Budget
The
Fiscal
1982 Budget
Cam
Juggernaut:
at the 1982 Conven
paper presented
paign,"
tion of the American
for Public Ad
Society
Hawaii.
ministration,
Honolulu,
See Washington
Sec. C, p. 1, December
Post,
14, 1980.
"The
Walter
Stockman
Shapiro,
Express,"
Post Magazine,
8, 1981,
Washington
February
p. 8.
"A Reporter
in Washing
Elizabeth
Drew,
Yorker
ton," The New
(June 8, 1981), p. 138.
81-6 (January 24, 1981).
OMB Bulletin No.
81-7 (January 24, 1981).
OMB Bulletin No.
81-8 (January 24, 1981).
OMB Bulletin No.
OMB Bulletin No. 81-9 (January 30, 1981), see
81-11 (February
also OMB Bulletin
11, 1981).
35. Memorandum
for Heads
of Non-Cabinet
of the 1982 Budget,"
"Revisions
Agencies,
Rea
7, 1981), signed by President
(February
36.
gan.
"The Challenge
of Fed
See James P. Pfiffner,
in the 1980s," Public
Ad
eral Management
ministration
(forthcoming).
Quarterly
644
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
37.
Stockman
38.
Ibid.
39. Congressional
1167.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
quoted
in The Atlantic,
Quarterly,
July
June
Congressional
Quarterly,
1127.
The Atlantic,
p. 50.
Greider,
p. 33.
idency
above.
4,
1981,
p.
27,
1981,
p.
1, 1981, p.
August
Congressional
Quarterly,
1377.
Personnel
See James P. Pfiffner,
"Presidential
Research
Presidency
Group Newslet
Policy,"
ter (Spring
IV No. 2, p. 5.
1982) Vol.
The Plum Book also lists those in Schedule A
B
and Schedule
(about
100,000)
positions
(about
17,000). These are part of the excepted
to hold exam
it is not practical
service because
for the positions;
inations
they include attor
and
Bank examiners,
neys, chaplains, National
in cooperative
students
education
programs.
Schedules A and B do not turn over with each
45.
administration.
incoming
and Kathryn
See Bruce Adams
Kavanagh
and Performance:
Promise
Carter
Baran,
MA:
Builds a New Administration
(Lexington,
Lexington
See Dun's
Books,
Review,
1979).
the Reagan Ad
"Staffing
ministration,"
(May 1981), p. 91.
47. For an excellent
of the roles of the
analysis
see: Brad
White
House
staff and the cabinet,
46.
48.
American
49.
Political
Science Association
Con
1981, New York City. See
vention,
September
to Power
also Witness
(New York: Simon and
7.
Schuster,
1982), Chapter
See
America
Califano,
Joseph
Governing
Simon
and Schuster,
(New York,
1981), pp.
treat
and thorough
16-17. For an insightful
ment
of presidential
recruitment
op
personnel
erations and the role of the Senate in confirma
see Calvin MacKenzie,
The Politics
tions,
of
Presidential
The
Appointments
(New York:
Free Press,
1981).
50. Richard P. Nathan,
The Plot That Failed
(New
York: Wiley,
1975), p. 50.
"Wanted:
275 Reagan
51. See Dick
Kirschten,
Team Players;
Empire Builders Need Not Ap
Journal
6, 1980),
(December
ply," National
See Hoxie,
the Ford
pp. 2077-79.
"Staffing
in Nash, Organizing
and Carter Presidencies,"
and Staffing,
pp. 72-75.
52. Pendleton
James
by Lou Cannon,
quoted
House
Take Right
by White
"Appointments
Post
Turn," Washington
(June 18, 1981), pp.
1, 12, 13. The Center for the Study of the Pr?s
is noted
in footnotes
47 and
51
and
in Calvin MacKenzie,
53. Quoted
"Cabinet
in Reagan's
Personnel
Selection
Subcabinet
at the 1981 Amer
First Year,"
paper presented
Science Association
ican Political
Convention,
New York City, p. 24.
ibid.
54. Henry
Salvatori
quoted
Evans and Robert Novak,
55. Rowland
"Cleaning
Post
the Kitchen,"
Out
(March
Washington
20, 1981).
James quoted
56. Pendleton
Smith,
by Hedrick
in Top
Cite Gains
"Conservatives
Posts,"
York Times
New
(March 8, 1981), p. 24.
a
"The New Right Preaches
is its
and Ronald
Religion,
Reagan
Journal
National
(May 2, 1981), p.
Prophet,"
and Novak,
779. See also Evans
"Reganism
Post
Without
Washington
(Janu
Reganites,"
57. Dom
Bonafede,
New
ary 23, 1981).
Thrives
58. Quoted
Raines,
"Nofziger
by Howell
on Tough
Times
New
York
Reputation,"
(June 25, 1981), p. B12.
at
"A Reporter
59. Quoted
Drew,
by Elizabeth
The New
Yorker
16, 1981),
(March
Large,"
60.
The President's
Cabinet:
Issues and
Patterson,
for
American
Society
(Washington:
Questions
Public Administration,
1976), see also "Com
ments Presented
at the Panel on White House
American
Po
Staff/Cabinet
Relationships,"
litical Science Association
Convention,
Sep
tember 1981, New York City. See also Bradley
D. Nash, with Milton
S. Eisenhower,
R. Gor
and William
C. Spragens, Organiz
don Hoxie,
the Presidency
(New York:
ing and Staffing
for the Study of the Presidency,
Center
1980).
at panel on the Presidency,
Comments
made
study
61.
pp. 91-92.
Per
and Subcabinet
See MacKenzie,
"Cabinet
First Year,"
in Reagan's
sonnel Selection
pp.
16, 20. See also Lou Cannon,
"Appointments
Take Right Turn," Washing
by White House
ton Post
(June 18, 1981), pp. 1, 12, 13; Hed
in Top
rick Smith,
"Conservatives
Cite Gains
York Times
Posts," New
(March 8, 1981), p.
"White House Head
24; and Howell
Raines,
York Times (May
hunter Feels the Heat," New
3, 1981), p. E3.
Per
and Subcabinet
See MacKenzie,
"Cabinet
sonnel Selection,"
p. 19.
Recruit
62. Quoted
"Reagan's
by James Reston,
New
York Times (November
ing Philosophy,"
12, 1980).
Jobs Still
63. Quoted
"Top
by James M. Perry,
in Federal Agencies
As Nominations
Vacant
13, 1981).
(March
Lag," Wall Street Journal
64. See Lou Cannon,
"Reagan's
Appointments
Post
'Mess' Decried,"
1,
(March
Washington
"One-Man
Wrecking
1981); Philip
Geyelin,
Post
14, 1981);
Crew,"
(April
Washington
a Sub
"You Say You Want
Dick Kirschten,
it with Marty,
Post? Clear
Cabinet
Dick, Lyn
Journal
and Fred," National
(April 4, 1981),
Jobs Still Va
p. 564; James M. Perry,
"Top
As Nominations
cant
in Federal
Agencies
Wall Street Journal
13, 1981);
(April
Lag,"
"White
House
Headhunter
Howell
Raines,
New
York Times
Feels
the Heat,"
(May 3,
'*
Molasses
Pace on Ap
1981); Time Magazine
(May 11, 1981), p. 19.
pointments,"
Jobs Still
in James M. Perry,
65. Quoted
"Top
Wall Street Journal
Vacant,"
(April 13, 1981);
in
"The Ethics
but cf. J. Jackson Walker,
of Interest Laws
Conflict
Government
Act,
Public Adminis
and Presidential
Recruiting,"
trative Review
659-665.
pp.
(November/December
1981),
THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 645
66.
in MacKenzie,
and
"Cabinet
diagram
1981 APSA
Personnel
Subcabinet
Selection,"
a Sub
"You Say You Want
paper; Kirschten,
National
Journal
Cabinet
Post?,"
(April 4,
"Staff
and Dun's Review,
1981), pp. 564-567;
See
(May 1981),
ing the Reagan Administration,"
p. 91.
Headhunter
Feels
"White House
67. See Raines,
see
the Heat," New York Times (May 3,1981);
"If
T. Cross,
the White
also Christopher
a Top Job, Hang Up,"
to Offer
Calls
House
or early
Post
(late February
Washington
March,
1981).
Wall
Jobs Still Vacant,"
68. See Perry,
"Top
Street Journal
(April 13, 1981).
'Mess'
69. Lou Cannon,
"Reagan's
Appointments
Post
1, 1981),
Decried,"
Washington
(March
p. 1.
a Sub-Cabinet
"You Say You Want
70. Kirschten,
journal
Post?," National
(April 4, 1981), pp.
Time,
"Molasses
Pace
on Appointments,"
30,
FPCD-81-4,
(December
Emphasis,"
1980), pp. 46-49.
Freezes
Government-Wide
85. "Recent
Hiring
in Managing
Em
Federal
Ineffective
Prove
FPCD-82-21
10, 1982).
(March
ployment,"
in
involved
of the tradeoffs
86. For an analysis
of per
these two methods
between
choosing
see: James
P. Pfiffner,
sonnel
reductions,
"Inflexible
Fiscal Stress, and the Tax
Budgets,
Chase
in The Municipal
Money
Revolt,"
Press,
1983).
(Boulder: Westview
87. Congressional
21, 1981),
(February
Quarterly
p. 342.
the Bud
The President,
88. See James P. Pfiffner,
Press,
get, and Congress
(Boulder: Westview
1979), pp. 116-117.
89. OMB
letter (March
18, 1981), signed "David
Stockman."
The Ulti
See Dwight
Shutdown:
Ink, "Agency
PA
Times
mate
15,
(December
Challenge,"
1981), p. 3.
of this argu
statement
91. For a more
complete
"The Challenge
see James P. Pfiffner,
ment,
in the 1980s," Public
of Federal Management
Administration
(forthcoming).
Quarterly
in very try
of professionalism
92. For a discussion
see: Dwight
Ink, "Agency
ing circumstances,
90.
(May 11, 1981), p. 19.
72. 5 CFR Part 213.
Vol. 46 No.
115 (June
73. Federal
16,
Register,
1981), p. 31405.
New
"Of Meese
and Men,"
74. William
Safire,
York Times
(February 2, 1981).
to the Bu
"Do What
E. Neustadt,
75. Richard
Post
10,
(November
Washington
reaucracy,"
Shutdown,"
p. 3.
1980).
The Kennedy
See Garry Wills,
Imprisonment
Brown,
1982).
(Boston: Atlantic/Little
The Plot
That Failed
77. Richard
Nathan,
(New
York: Wiley,
1975), p. 8, see also pp. 82-84.
76.
78. Memorandum
for the Heads
of Executive
93.
De
and Agencies,
Hiring
Subject:
partments
Freeze, The White House,
(January 20, 1981),
civilian em
Federal
Reagan."
signed "Ronald
in
from 2.94 million
had decreased
ployment
in 1980. As a percentage
1970 to 2.82 million
it dropped
from a high of
of total employment
94.
95.
per 1000 in 1980. (OMB, U.S. Budget:
Special
FY1982,
pp. 286-288.)
Analyses
of the Press Secretary,
Office
79. White
House,
"Fact
Sheet: Hiring
20,
Freeze,"
(January
com
and benefits
compensation
1981). Total
about $57 billion of a total budget of
promise
about $700 billion.
"Job Freeze by
80. Quoted
by Laura A. Kiernan,
Post
Is Upheld,"
(Febru
Washington
Reagan
ary 26, 1981).
and Budget, Memoran
of Management
81. Office
and
of Executive
dum for Heads
Departments
Civilian
Federal
Hiring
Subject:
Agencies,
Freeze
(January 29, 1981).
in original.
Ibid., parentheses
a Good
Is a Bad Policy,"
"When
Symbol
Star (January 27, 1981).
Washington
96.
97.
98.
99.
PA
Times
15,
1981),
in the
1980s,"
Public
Administration
(forthcoming).
Quarterly
be
of the relationship
For a classic treatment
and career execu
tween political
appointees
see: Hugh
A Government
Heclo,
of
tives,
1977).
Brookings,
Strangers
(Washington:
Fiscal
"Inflexible
See
Pfiffner,
Budgets,
Mu
inManaging
Stress, and the Tax Revolt,"
edited
Sbragia
by Alberta
nicipal Money,
forthcoming).
(Boulder: Westview,
Ibid.
of Federal Man
"The Challenge
See Pfiffner,
in the 1980s," Public Administration
agement
(forthcoming).
Quarterly
See James P. Pfiffner,
and Economic Policy
100.
(December
Transi
of the Presidential
"Effects
See GAO,
Senior
Executive
tion On
the
Service,"
FPCD-82-29
(March 23, 1982); see also Merit
"An MSPB
Service Protection
Board,
Special
(April 2, 1981).
Study on the SES,"
of this issue
For a more
discussion
complete
see: Pfiffner,
of Federal Man
"The Challenge
agement
in 1981 and
in 1968 to 2.8 percent
3.8 percent
it dropped
from
relative to the U.S. population
16.3 federal employees
per 1000 in 1952 to 12.7
82.
83.
of GAO
For a bibliography
reports on freezes,
see: "Fed
and personnel
reductions,
ceilings
Force Planning:
Time for Renewed
eral Work
A.
564-567.
71.
84.
editor,
The President
(Philadelphia: ISHI
Publications,
forthcoming).
inWashing
"A Reporter
See Elizabeth
Drew,
Yorker
(June 8, 1981), p. 141;
ton," The New
et al. Setting Na
see also Joseph Pechman,
The 1982 Budget
tional Priorities:
(Washing
ton: Brookings,
1981).