Notes
Institutional Veto Players
Matt Golder & Sona Golder
Pennsylvania State University
Federalism and Decentralization
Notes
It is useful to distinguish between federalism in structure (de jure federalism)
and federalism in practice (de facto federalism).
De jure federalism ⇒ Federalism.
De facto federalism ⇒ Decentralization.
Federalism
Notes
Federalism has three structural components.
1
Geopolitical division.
2
Independence.
3
Direct governance.
Federalism
Notes
Federalism has three structural components.
1
Geopolitical division.
2
Independence.
3
Direct governance.
A federal state is one in which sovereignty is constitutionally split between at
least two territorial levels so that independent governmental units at each level
have final authority in at least one policy realm.
States that are not federal are known as unitary states.
676
Principles of Comparative Politics
Notes
Federal Countries, 1990–2000
Table 15.1
Country
Regime Years
1
Argentina
Democracy
1990–2000
2
Australia
Democracy
1990–2000
3
Austria
Democracy
1990–2000
4
Belgium
Democracy
1994–2000
5
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Dictatorship
1990–2000
6
Brazil
Democracy
1990–2000
7
Canada
Democracy
1990–2000
8
Czechoslovakia
Democracy
1990–1992
9
Ethiopia
Dictatorship
1995–2000
10Germany
Democracy
1990–2000
11Malaysia
Dictatorship 1990–2000
12Mexico
Dictatorship 1990–1995
Democracy1996–2000
13Micronesia
Democracy
1990–2000
14Nigeria
Democracy
1999–2000
15Pakistan
Democracy
1990–1999
16Russia
Democracy
1992–2000
17
Democracy
1993–2000
18Switzerland
Democracy
1990–2000
19USSR
Dictatorship 1990–1991
20
United Arab Emirates
Dictatorship
1990–2000
21
United States of America
South Africa
Democracy
1990–2000
22Venezuela
Democracy
1990–2000
23Yugoslavia
Dictatorship 1990–1991
24
Dictatorship
Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro)
1992–2000
Source: Data are from Bednar (2009); the coding for regime type is from the Polity IV data set.
Note: All of these countries satisfy the criteria of (a) geopolitical division, (b) independence, and (c) direct governance.
In Table 15.1, we list all twenty-four countries that could be considered federal at some
point between 1990 and 2000 (Bednar 2009).1 We also list whether these countries are
democratic or authoritarian based on their Polity IV scores (Marshall and Jaggers 2003). By
1. The European Union also meets our criteria for a federal system. We do not include it in Table 15.1, however, because the
European Union is not an independent state.
15: Institutional Veto Players
677
definition, all countries that do not appear in Table 15.1 are unitary states. As the information in Table 15.1 indicates, federalism is relatively rare in the world. As of 2000, only about
10 percent of the world’s independent countries were federal; slightly less than 20 percent of
the world’s population lived in a federal country. On the whole, those countries that are
federal tend to be either relatively large countries, such as Australia, Brazil, the former Soviet
Union, and the United States, or relatively heterogeneous and diverse countries, such as
Belgium, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is an example of a federal dictatorship. The UAE
currently comprises seven emirates in the Middle East—Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah,
Ra’s al-Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Quwain. See Map 15.1, which shows the seven emirates. Originally, the seven emirates were known as the Trucial States, and they formed part
Federalism
Map 15.1
The Federal States of the United Arab Emirates
Notes
United Arab Emirates.
IRAN
Abu Dhabi.
RA’S AL-KHAIMAH
Persian
Gulf
R’as al-Khaimah
UMM AL QUWAIN
Umm al Quwain
AJMAN
Ajman
Sharjah
OMAN
FUJAIRAH
RA’S ALKHAIMAH
FUJAIRAH
Fujairah
SHARJAH
Dubai
QATAR
DUBAI
AJMAN
SHARJAH
ABU DHABI
A BU D H AB I
UNITED ARAB
E M I R AT E S
SAUDI ARABIA
Ajman.
Dubai.
Fujairah.
Ra’s al-Khaimah.
OMAN
Sharjah.
Umm al-Quwain.
Federalism
Notes
15: Institutional Veto Players
679
Brazil’s States and Federal District
Map 15.2
GUYANA
SURINAME
VENEZUELA
French Guiana
(Fr.)
AMAPÁ
RORAIMA
Manaus
PARÁ
Cuiabá
Rio de
Janeiro
Municipal (5,560).
DISTRITO
FEDERAL
ESPÍRITO
SANTO
Belo
Horizonte
SÃO PAULO
State (26).
ALAGOAS
SERGIPE
Salvador
MINAS
GERAIS
PARANÁ
PACIFIC
OCEAN
Federal (1).
RIO GRANDE
DO NORTE
PARAÍBA
Recife
BAHIA
BRASÍLIA
GOIAS
MATO
GROSSO
DO SUL
PARAGUAY
CEARÁ
PIAUI
TOCANTINS
MATO
GROSSO
RONDÔNIA
BOLIVIA
CHILE
MARANHÃO
BRAZIL
Porto Velho
PERU
PERNAMBUCO
Belém
AMAZONAS
ACRE
Brazil.
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
COLOMBIA
RIO DE
JANEIRO
STA CATARINA
RIO GRANDE
DO SUL Porto Alegre
ARGENTINA
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
URUGUAY
state or national constitutions (Article 30). Brazil is one of four federal states in Latin
America, the others being Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela.
Although all of the states shown in Table 15.1 can be considered federal, there is a great
deal of variation in the precise form that federalism takes in these countries. When it comes
to distinguishing between different forms of federalism,
political scientists frequently focus on whether a federal
Congruent federalism exists when the territorial
system is (a) congruent or incongruent and (b) symmetunits of a federal state share a similar demographic
ric or asymmetric (Lijphart 1999).
makeup with one another and the country as a
whole. Incongruent federalism exists when the
Congruent federalism exists when the territorial
demographic makeup of territorial units differs
units of a federal state share a similar demographic (ethnic,
among the units and the country as a whole.
cultural, linguistic, religious, and so on) makeup. In a
Federalism
Notes
Devolution 6= Federalism
Devolution occurs when a unitary state grants powers to subnational
governments but retains the right to unilaterally recall or reshape those powers.
Regional governments in a unitary state do not have a constitutional right to
any of their powers.
Federalism
Notes
15: Institutional Veto Players
India.
India’s States and Union Territories
Map 15.3
AFGHANISTAN
CHINA
JAMMU &
KASHMIR
Srinagar
HIMCHAL
PRADESH
ARUNACHAL
PRADESH
UTTARKHAND
PUNJAB
PAKISTAN
HARYANA
NEPAL
UTTAR
PRADESH
I N D IA
Bhopal
MADHYA PRADESH
Nagpur
Raipur
MAHARASHTRA
Mumbai
(Bombay)
WEST
BENGAL
ORISSA
ANDHRA
PRADESH
Panaji
GOA
NAGALAND
MANIPUR
TRIPURA
Bhubaneshwar
MYANMAR
KARNATAKA
Bangalore
LAKSHADWEEP
(INDIA)
KERALA
Trivandrum
MALDIVES
Chennai
TAMIL
NADU
ANDAMAN ISLANDS
(INDIA)
Pondicherry
Madurai
SRI
LANKA
NICOBAR ISLANDS
(INDIA)
INDIAN
Article 3 gives the national
legislature the power to change
state boundaries and to create
new states from existing ones.
MEGHALAYA
MIZORAM
Bay of
Bengal
Hyderabad
Arabian
Sea
BANGLADESH
JHARKHAND
CHHA
TTISG
Gandhinagar
BHUTAN
ASSAM
Patna
BIHAR
ARH
GUJARAT
DADRA &
NAGAR HAVELI
SIKKIM
New
Delhi
DELHI
Lucknow
Jaipur
RAJASTJAN
681
OCEAN
Two articles in the Indian constitution are of particular relevance here. The first is Article 3,
which states that the national legislature has the power to change the boundaries of individual states and to create new states by separating territories from existing ones. The second is
Article 356, which allows for the imposition of emergency presidential rule in a state that cannot be governed “in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.” In effect, this article,
commonly known as “President’s Rule,” allows India’s president to take over a state’s executive and rule directly through his appointed state governor. The state’s legislature may be dismissed or simply put in suspended animation during this period of emergency rule. President’s
Article 356 allows the president to
take over a state’s executive and
rule directly through an appointed
governor.
Federalism
Notes
Federal states can be congruent or incongruent.
Congruent federalism exists when the territorial units of a federal state
share a similar demographic makeup with one another and the country as
a whole.
Incongruent federalism exists when the demographic makeup of territorial
units differs among the units and the country as a whole.
Federalism
Notes
Federal states can be symmetric or asymmetric.
Symmetric federalism exists when the territorial units of a federal state
possess equal powers relative to the central government.
Asymmetric federalism exists when some territorial units enjoy more
extensive powers than others relative to the central government.
Decentralization
Notes
Whether a state is federal or unitary is ultimately a constitutional issue.
Whether a state is decentralized or not is about where policy is actually made.
Decentralization refers to the extent to which actual policymaking power lies
with the central or regional governments.
Most political scientists see decentralization as a revenue issue: the
greater the share of all tax revenues going to the central government, the
less decentralized the state.
15: Institutional Veto Players
90
80
70
Notes
Revenue Centralization: Central Government’s Share
of Tax Revenue
Figure 15.1
100
685
Botswana
Guatemala
Indonesia
Netherlands
Thailand
Italy
Nicaragua
Poland
AVERAGE
Estonia
Lithuania
Norway
Denmark
India
60
50
Dominican Republic
Albania
Kenya
United Kingdom
Portugal
Croatia
Hungary
France
Latvia
Czech Republic
Spain
Bolivia
Belarus
Finland
Sweden
Malaysia
Belgium
Austria
Australia
Germany
United States
Switzerland
Japan (1990)
Russia
Canada
South Africa
Mexico
AVERAGE
Brazil
Argentina
China
40
Unitary
Federal
Source: Data are from World Bank (2000, 216–217).
Note: With the exception of Japan, all data points are for 1997; Japan’s data point is for 1990. Tax revenue that is
legally mandated to be transferred to regional governments through a revenue-sharing scheme is treated as belonging to the regional governments even if it is first collected by the central government. The names of some unitary
countries have been omitted simply for visual clarity.
political scientists tend to see federalism as a constitutional issue, they tend to see decentralization as a budgetary one.
In Figure 15.1, we illustrate the share of tax revenue collected by the central government
out of the total tax revenue collected by all levels of government for fifty-three countries in
1997. Of these fifty-three countries, thirteen are federal, and forty are unitary. In some countries, particularly federal ones, a proportion of the tax revenue collected by the central government is automatically transferred to regional governments through a legally mandated
“revenue-sharing” scheme.6 For example, roughly 28 percent of all the revenue collected by
6. Although mandated revenue-sharing schemes legally require central governments to transfer a certain percentage of their
tax revenue to regional governments, central governments do not always fully comply with them. In a study of Latin
America’s four federal states—Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil—Diaz-Cayeros (2006) finds that central
governments come much closer to transferring the mandated amount of tax revenue to regional governments when they
are democratic rather than autocratic. To the extent that central governments do not abide by revenue-sharing schemes, the
15: Institutional Veto Players
data in Figure 15.1 overstate the degree of decentralization in some, mainly federal, states.
687
Notes
Figure 15.2
Two Dimensions of Federalism
Decentralized
China, Denmark,
Finland, India,
Japan, Sweden
Argentina, Brazil,
Canada, Germany,
Russia, Switzerland,
United States
Unitary
Federal
Botswana, Dominican
Republic, Guatemala,
Indonesia, Kenya,
United Kingdom
Belgium, Malaysia
South Africa,
Venezuela
Centralized
origins of federalism in various countries around the
Coming-together federalism is the result of a
world (Stepan 1999, 21–22). Coming-together fedbargaining process in which previously sovereign polities
eralism results from a bottom-up bargaining process
voluntarily agree to give up part of their sovereignty in
order to pool together their resources and improve their
in which previously sovereign polities come together
collective security or achieve other, economic goals.
and voluntarily agree to give up part of their soverHolding-together federalism is the result of a process
eignty in order to pool together their resources so
in which the central government of a polity chooses to
as to improve their collective security and achieve
decentralize its power to subnational governments in
other, typically economic, goals, such as a common
order to diffuse secessionist pressures.
currency and freer trade (Riker 1964). Australia,
Switzerland, and the United States are examples of coming-together federal states. Although
there is some variation, coming-together federations are typically characterized by a
symmetric form of federalism.
In contrast, holding-together federalism is the result of a top-down process in which the
central government of a polity chooses to decentralize its power to subnational governments.
This process typically occurs in multiethnic states in which the central government fears that
the continued existence of the state is somehow threatened by one or more territorially based
Why Federalism?
Notes
Coming-together federalism is the result of a bargaining process in which
previously sovereign polities voluntarily agree to give up part of their
sovereignty in order to pool together their resources and improve their
collective security or achieve other, economic goals.
Holding-together federalism is the result of a process in which the central
government of a polity chooses to decentralize its power to subnational
governments in order to diffuse secessionist pressures.
Federalism
Notes
Potential advantages of federalism.
Closer match between policy and citizen preferences.
Greater government accountability by bring the government closer to the
people.
Competition among states creates an incentive for good government.
Policy experimentation.
System of checks and balances.
Federalism
Notes
Potential disadvantages of federalism.
Unnecessary duplication and contradictory policies.
Increases collective action problems in policy formulation.
Competition leads to downward harmonization.
Competition amplifies pre-existing inequalities.
Facilitates blame shifting and credit claiming, thereby reducing
government accountability.
Bicameralism
Notes
A unicameral legislature is one in which legislative deliberation occurs in a
single assembly.
A bicameral legislature is one in which legislative deliberation occurs in two
distinct assemblies.
About 40% of the world’s countries have bicameral legislatures.
Bicameralism
Notes
Bicameral systems can be congruent or incongruent.
Congruent bicameralism occurs when two legislative chambers have a
similar political composition.
Incongruent bicameralism occurs when the two legislative chambers differ
in their political composition.
The level of congruence depends on how the membership of the two chambers
is selected and whom that membership is supposed to represent.
Bicameralism
Notes
The lower house in bicameral systems is almost always directly elected.
There are four methods of selecting members of the upper house.
1
Heredity
2
Appointment.
3
Indirect elections.
4
Direct elections.
Bicameralism
Notes
Members of the lower chamber in almost all countries are supposed to
represent all citizens equally.
The most common role for the upper chamber is to represent the citizens of
subnational geographic units.
This is always the case in federal states, but is also the case in some
unitary states.
Bicameralism
Notes
The fact that citizens are often distributed in an unequal manner across the
different subnational geographic units frequently leads to malapportionment.
Malapportionment occurs when the distribution of political representation
between constituencies is not based on the size of each constituency’s
population.
In a malapportioned system, the votes of some citizens weigh more than the
votes of others.
Bicameralism
698
Principles of Comparative Politics
Table 15.4
Notes
Malapportionment in Upper Chambers, 1996
Seats held by the percentages of the most favorably
represented citizens (percent)
1020 3050
United States
39.7
Switzerland
38.453.2 64.780.6
55.0
67.7
83.8
Venezuela
31.647.2 60.077.5
Australia
28.747.8 58.774.0
Canada
33.446.3 55.671.3
Germany
24.041.7 54.372.6
India
15.426.9 37.456.8
Austria
11.922.5 32.852.9
Belgium
10.820.9 31.050.9
Source: Data are from Lijphart (1999, 208).
the percentage of seats in the upper chamber going to the most favorably represented citizens in nine countries in 1996 (Lijphart 1999, 208). To see where these numbers come from,
imagine that all of the subnational units in a country are lined up from left to right based
on the size of their populations, with smaller units to the left and larger units to the right.
Starting with the smallest unit and working our way to the right, we identify those units
that together comprise 10 percent, 20 percent, 30 percent, and 50 percent of the country’s
overall population. We then determine the percentage of upper chamber seats that are
allocated to these regions. These are the percentages shown in Table 15.4. As an example,
consider the case of the United States. Table 15.4 indicates that the smallest states that
together comprise 10 percent of the national population control 39.7 percent of the seats
in the U.S. Senate. In other words, they receive almost four times the amount of representation in the Senate as their population would imply they should. The smallest states, which
together comprise 20 percent of the overall U.S. population, control 55 percent of the Senate seats—an overall majority. The other percentages in Table 15.4 can be interpreted in a
similar way. As you can see, there is a great deal of variation in the level of malapportionment seen in upper chambers around the world. Countries like the United States and
Switzerland exhibit high levels of malapportionment, whereas countries like Austria and
Belgium exhibit low levels.
In sum, the degree of congruence in a bicameral system depends on whether the two
legislative chambers employ similar methods for selecting their members and on whether the
Bicameralism
Bicameral systems can be symmetric or asymmetric.
Symmetric bicameralism occurs when the two legislative chambers have
equal or near equal constitutional power.
Asymmetric bicameralism occurs when the two legislative chambers have
unequal constitutional power.
Notes
700
Principles of Comparative Politics
Notes
Two Dimensions of Bicameralism
Figure 15.3
Symmetric
Weak bicameralism
Strong bicameralism
Italy, Japan
Australia, Germany,
Switzerland,
United States
Congruent
Incongruent
Insignificant bicameralism
Weak bicameralism
Austria, Bahamas, Jamaica
Canada, France, India,
United Kingdom
Asymmetric
Source: Based on information in Lijphart (1999, 212).
lower left quadrant—Austria, the Bahamas, and Jamaica—exhibit what might be thought of
as an insignificant form of bicameralism. In an insignificant bicameral system, the upper
chamber is unlikely to be an important political actor because its constitutional powers are
extremely weak and because its political composition tends to mirror that of the lower
chamber.
Countries in the upper left and lower right quadrants exhibit a weak form of bicameralism. In weak bicameral systems, the upper chamber is likely to be a weak political actor.
Although such countries as those in the upper left quadrant—Italy and Japan—have a powerful upper chamber (symmetry), the upper chamber is not expected to significantly affect
the policymaking process given its political makeup, which is like that in the lower chamber
(congruence). Similarly, although such countries as those in the lower right quadrant—
Canada, France, India, and the United Kingdom—have an upper chamber that is likely to
conflict with the lower chamber as a result of its differing political composition (incongruence), the upper chamber is not expected to play a significant role in the policymaking
process because its constitutional powers are weak (asymmetry).
Why Bicameralism?
Notes
Bicameralism can find its origins in the concept of mixed government outlined
in ancient Greece.
Mixed government calls for different institutions to represent the interests
of the different social classes.
By creating a system of checks and balances, mixed government was
supposed to prevent one social class from dominating all of the others.
Why Bicameralism?
Notes
The rise of republicanism in the 18th century saw an emphasis on the
representation of the people as a whole rather than as a set of competing social
classes.
Bicameralism increasingly became seen as a way for federal states to represent
their constituent territorial units.
The lower chamber would represent the popular dimension of the people’s
will.
The upper chamber would represent the territorial dimension of the
people’s will.
Why Bicameralism?
Notes
Some unitary states have retained an upper legislative chamber.
In most cases the power of the upper chamber has been significantly
weakened.
Members of the upper chamber have characteristics of value – wisdom, age,
knowledge – that members of the lower chamber may not have.
This incongruence is achieved by appointing people to the upper chamber.
Constitutionalism
Notes
Constitutionalism refers to the commitment of governments to accept the
legitimacy of, and be governed by, a set of authoritative rules and principles
that are laid out in a constitution.
A system of constitutional justice comprises the set of institutions and
procedures that are established to protect constitutional rules and principles.
Constitutionalism
Notes
Constitutionalism refers to the commitment of governments to accept the
legitimacy of, and be governed by, a set of authoritative rules and principles
that are laid out in a constitution.
A system of constitutional justice comprises the set of institutions and
procedures that are established to protect constitutional rules and principles.
A constitution provides the formal source of state authority.
In addition to establishing the structure, procedure, powers, and duties of
governmental institutions, more recent constitutions also contain a list of
guaranteed rights.
Constitutionalism
Notes
Constitutions can be codified or uncodified.
A codified constitution is one that is written in a single document.
An uncodified constitution is one that has several resources, which may
be written or unwritten.
Only three countries – Israel, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom – have an
uncodified constitution.
Constitutionalism
Notes
Constitutions can be entrenched or unentrenched.
An entrenched constitution can be modified only through a special
procedure of constitutional amendment.
An unentrenched constitution has no special amendment procedure and
can be modified at any point in time with the support of a legislative
majority.
Constitutionalism
Notes
Historically, we can identify two ideal types of constitutions.
1
A legislative supremacy constitution has no constitutional review, has no
bill of rights, and is not entrenched.
2
A higher law constitution has constitutional review, has a bill of rights,
and is entrenched.
Constitutionalism
Notes
Constitutional review is the authority of an institution to invalidate legislation,
administrative decisions, judicial rulings, and other acts of government that
violate constitutional rules, such as rights.
Constitutional review is exercised by judges sitting on special tribunals –
constitutional courts – that are not part of the regular judicial system.
When constitutional review is conducted by ordinary judges from the regular
judicial system, it is commonly referred to as judicial review.
Constitutionalism
15: Institutional Veto Players
Table 15.5
709
Notes
Legislative Supremacy Constitution versus Higher Law
Constitution
Characteristic
Legislative supremacy
Higher law
Entrenched
NoYes
Constitutional review
No
Yes
Bill of rights
No
Yes
an extensive list of political and social rights.19 For example, all 106 constitutions that have
been adopted since 1985 and for which we have reliable data contain a catalogue of rights.
TheAnd
newallconstitutionalism
describes a situation in which almost all countries
but five of these constitutions—those of Iraq (1990), Laos, North Korea, Saudi
nowArabia,
have aandhigher
law constitution.
Vietnam—have
established provisions for constitutional review (Stone Sweet
2008, 233–34). As we noted earlier, this convergence
The new constitutionalism describes a situation in
around the idea that higher law constitutions are somewhich almost all countries now have an entrenched
how better than legislative supremacy constitutions has
constitution, a bill of rights, and a procedure of
been called the new constitutionalism (Shapiro and
constitutional review to protect rights.
Stone 1994). But why did this shift to the new constitutionalism happen?
The shift toward this new constitutionalism began in Europe after 1945 with constitutional courts being established in Austria (1945), Italy (1948), and West Germany (1949).20
The adoption of higher law constitutions in these countries was partly a response to the
experience with fascism in the interwar period (Stone Sweet 2000, 37). The experience of
fascist governments in Italy and Germany made it abundantly clear that states could, indeed,
do wrong and that individuals would sometimes need protection from the state. In effect,
Europe’s experience with fascism undermined much of Europe’s faith in a powerful and
unconstrained state and highlighted the need to protect individual rights. The adoption of
higher law constitutions in Germany and Italy can also be traced to the presence of U.S.
troops on their soil after World War II and the pressure that the United States put on these
countries to incorporate a bill of rights and constitutional review into their constitutions.
19. The rights that are included in these constitutions are fairly extensive (Stone Sweet 2000, 42–43). In addition to many of
the rights that we commonly think of, such as equal rights for men and women, equality before the law, the right to religion,
and the right of asylum, some constitutions contain additional rights, such as the right to adequate health care (France,
Italy), the right to resist political oppression (France, Germany), the right to unemployment compensation (France, Italy,
Spain), and the right to adequate housing (Italy, Spain). Higher law constitutions also tend to establish duties on the part of
the citizens and the state. For example, some constitutions require citizens to work (Italy, Spain) and financially support and
educate their children (Italy, Spain). States are sometimes required to provide public health care (France, Italy, Spain),
pursue full employment (Spain), protect consumers (Spain), and protect the environment (Italy, Spain).
20. Higher law constitutions with constitutional review were adopted by many countries in the interwar period:
Czechoslovakia (1920), Liechtenstein (1925), Greece (1927), Spain (1931), Ireland (1937), and Egypt (1941). With the
exception of Ireland, however, constitutional review was largely ineffective and little utilized. Only the Irish constitutional
court survived World War II. Many other countries in addition to Austria, Italy, and West Germany adopted higher law
constitutions shortly after World War II: Brazil (1946), Burma (1947), Japan (1947), India (1949), and Thailand (1949).
Constitutionalism
Despite the convergence on higher law constitutions, countries differ in their
system of constitutional justice.
Type of constitutional review.
Timing of constitutional review.
Jurisdiction of constitutional review.
Notes
Constitutionalism
Notes
Type of constitutional review.
Abstract constitutional review involves the constitutional review of
legislation in the absence of a concrete legal case.
Concrete constitutional review involves the constitutional review of
legislation with respect to a specific legal case.
Constitutionalism
Notes
Timing of constitutional review.
A priori constitutional review occurs before a law is formally enacted.
A posteriori constitutional review occurs only after a law is formally
enacted.
Constitutionalism
Notes
Jurisdiction of constitutional review.
Centralized constitutional review refers to a situation in which only one
court can conduct constitutional review.
Decentralized constitutional review refers to a situation in which more
than one court can interpret the constitution.
Constitutionalism
716
Principles of Comparative Politics
Table 15.6
Notes
Different Systems of Constitutional Justice
ConcreteAbstract
Jurisdiction/timing
A priori
A posteriori
A priori
Centralized (European)
Not possible
Yes
Yes
A posteriori
Yes
Decentralized (American)
Not possible
Yes
Not observed
Not observed
Source: Navia and Ríos-Figueroa (2005, 199).
chaotic situation with legal holes around the country.21 This helps to explain why the combination of abstract review and a decentralized jurisdiction is not observed at the national
level in the real world.
Although it is possible to distinguish between four different systems of constitutional
justice, as we do in Table 15.6, most political scientists focus on the distinction between
centralized and decentralized systems. They refer to decentralized systems as the American
model of constitutional justice and to centralized systems as the European model of constitutional justice.22
The American Model
In the United States, “any judge of any court, in any case, at any time, at the behest of any
litigating party, has the power to declare a law unconstitutional” (Shapiro and Stone Sweet
1994, 400). As this quotation makes clear, constitutional review in the United States is
decentralized and carried out by ordinary judges in the regular judicial system. Constitutional
review in the United States is, as a result, judicial review. The American separation-ofpowers system, in which the executive, legislature, and judiciary are separate but coequal
branches of government, attempts to mark a clear distinction between what we can
think of as the “judicial function”—resolving legal cases—and the “political function”—
legislating. American courts are supposed to avoid legislating because that is the function
of the people’s elected representatives in the legislature. Still, it is recognized that a constitutional issue that needs resolving might arise in the course of a legal case. It is for this
718
21. Somewhat similar concerns exist with any decentralized jurisdiction system. Indeed, the desire to have uniform legal
decisions across
the country was
one reason why many countries have adopted centralized jurisdiction systems. Combining
Principles
of Comparative
Politics
a decentralized jurisdiction system with concrete review (as opposed to abstract review) is somewhat less problematic
because any local court decisions apply only to the specific case at hand.
22. The European model is sometimes referred to as the Kelsenian model after the Austrian legal theorist, Hans Kelsen, who
helped establish the Austrian Constitutional
1920.
American Court
and inEuropean
Models of Constitutional
Table 15.7
Notes
Justice
Characteristic
American model
European model
Jurisdiction: Who has
the power to engage in
constitutional review?
Decentralized; ordinary courts
can engage in constitutional
review
Centralized; only a single
constitutional court can
engage in constitutional
review; other courts are
barred from doing so,
although they may refer to
the constitutional court.
Timing: When can constitutional review occur?
A posteriori
A priori or a posteriori or
both; some courts have a
priori review over treaties or
government acts; others have
both, and some have either
but not both.
Type: Can constitutional
review occur in the
absence of a real case or
controversy?
Concrete
Abstract and concrete; most
constitutional courts can
exercise review in the absence
of a real case, and many can
also exercise concrete review.
Standing: Who can initiate
disputes?
Litigants engaged in a case or
controversy and who have a
personal stake in the outcome
can initiate a dispute.
The range can be broad, from
governmental actors
(including executives and
members of the legislature) to
individual citizens.
Source: Adapted from Navia and Ríos-Figueroa (2005, 192).
VETO PLAYERS
As we have noted in this chapter, political scientists sometimes distinguish between democracies by whether they are federal or unitary, bicameral or unicameral, and whether they
accept constitutionalism or not. In effect, these political scientists see the world in terms of
different institutional dichotomies. Recently, though, comparative scholars have begun to
move away from this position and to recognize that these institutions are conceptually the
same in that they all act as checks and balances on the political system. Put differently, they
all affect the ease with which the political status quo in a country can be changed. This new
approach to understanding political institutions is called veto player theory (Tsebelis 1995,
1999, 2002).
Veto player theory argues that important characteristics of any country’s institutional
structure are determined by its configuration of veto players. A veto player is an individual
(such as a president) or collective actor (such as a legislative chamber) whose agreement is
Constitutionalism
15: Institutional Veto Players
Table 15.8
The Geographic Distribution of Different Models of
Constitutional Justice, 2010
Region American model
European
model Mixed
Other
None
Europe 5
33 3 1
2
Africa
28 1 7
2
13
Middle East 2 5 0 3
0
Asia and Southeast Asia
0
19
15 2
10
North America 2 0 0 0
0
Central America and South America
13 8 8 1
0
Total
54
89
14 224
Source: Data are from Dr. Arne Mavčič and are available at http://www.concourts.net.
Note: “Mixed” means some combination of the American and European models; “Other” means that the system
of constitutional justice is unique or unclassifiable; “None” means that there are no mechanisms for constitutional
review. Systems based on France are coded as European.
necessary for a change of the political status quo.23 In
Veto player theory offers a way to think about political
any given country, there are two types of veto player.
institutions in a consistent way across countries. In effect,
First, there is the institutional veto player. Instituveto player theory conceptualizes the institutional
structure of a given country in terms of its configuration
tional veto players are those generated by a country’s
of veto players. A veto player is an individual or
constitution. For example, the U.S. Constitution
collective actor whose agreement is necessary for a
identifies actors like the president, the Congress, and
change in the political status quo. There are two types of
the Senate as institutional veto players because it
veto player. An institutional veto player is generated
gives these actors the right to block legislative changes
by a country’s constitution. A partisan veto player is
generated by the way the political game is played.
to the status quo. Second, there is the partisan veto
player. Partisan veto players are those generated by
the political game. In other words, partisan veto players are not specified in a constitution
719
Notes
Veto Player Theory
Notes
Veto player theory offers a way to think about political institutions in a
consistent way across countries.
Veto player theory conceptualizes the institutional structure of a given
country in terms of its configuration of veto players.
A veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary
for a change in the political status quo.
An institutional veto player is generated by a country’s constitution.
A partisan veto player is generated by the way the political game is played.
Veto Player Theory
Notes
Federalism, bicameralism, and constitutionalism can be conceptualized as
different types of institutional veto players.
All three institutions place hurdles on the ability of political actors to
change the status quo.
Veto Player Theory
Notes
Veto player theory indicates that countries with many veto players who have
conflicting preferences will be characterized by:
1
Greater policy stability.
2
Smaller policy shifts.
3
Less variation in the size of policy shifts.
4
Weaker agenda-setting powers.
Veto Player Theory
Notes
Reminder
An indifference curve is the set of points such that an individual is
indifferent between any two points in the set.
The winset of the status quo is the set of alternatives that can defeat the
status quo point.
The winset of the status quo in veto player theory is the set of alternatives that
all veto players prefer to the status quo.
15: Institutional Veto Players
Figure 15.4
An Application of Veto Player Theory
721
Notes
SQ
Issue 1: Economy
B
cAS
C
A
Issue 2: Education
Note: A, B, and C = three veto players; SQ = the status quo policy; cAS = the policy alternative that C would propose
if he were the agenda setter; the three circles = the indifference curves of A, B, and C with respect to the status
quo; the shaded area = the winset, assuming decisions are made by unanimity rule.
dimension as being about the appropriate amount of money to be spent on education. The
status quo policy in the two-dimensional policy space is given by the point SQ. In Figure
15.4, we illustrate the indifference curves for each veto player with respect to the status
quo—these are the circles that surround the ideal points of the three veto players and go
through the status quo point. These indifference curves, as you will remember, indicate all
of the policy outcomes that are equally distant from each veto player’s ideal point as the
status quo. As a result, each veto player is indifferent between any point on his indifference
curve and the status quo. More important, each veto player will prefer any policy outcome
inside his indifference curve to the status quo because this policy outcome will necessarily be
closer to his ideal point.
A central concept in veto player theory is the winset. Recall that a winset is the set of
policy alternatives that would defeat the status quo in a pair-wise contest under whatever
voting rules are being employed. Given the very definition of a veto player, unanimity is
Veto Player Theory
Notes
The size of the winset has a significant impact on policy outcomes.
Policy stability
When the winset is small, policy stability is high because there are few
policy alternatives that can defeat the status quo.
When the winset is large, policy stability is low because there are many
policy alternatives that can defeat the status quo point.
Veto Player Theory
Notes
The size of the winset has a significant impact on policy outcomes.
Size of Policy Shifts
When the winset is small, policy shifts must necessarily be small.
When the winset is large, the possibility arises for more radical shifts in
policy.
Veto Player Theory
Notes
The size of the winset has a significant impact on policy outcomes.
Variance in the Size of Policy Shifts
When the winset is small, policy shifts are always small.
When the winset is large, policy shifts may be large or small.
Veto Player Theory
Notes
The size of the winset has a significant impact on policy outcomes.
Agenda-Setting Power
When the winset is small, the agenda setter cannot move policy far from
where other veto players would want to move it if they were the agenda
setter.
When the winset is large, the agenda setter has the possibility to move
policy far from where the other veto players would move it if they were
the agenda setter.
Veto Player Theory
Notes
Veto player theory shows that an increase in the number of veto players either
decreases the size of the winset or leaves it the same.
Notes
Figure 15.5
The Number of Veto Players and the Size of the Winset
a. Two veto players, A and B
SQ
A
Number of veto players
B
Veto player theory shows
that an increase in the
number of veto players
either decreases the size
of the winset or leaves it
the same.
b. Three veto players, A, B, and C
SQ
A
B
C
c. Two veto players, A and C
SQ
A
C
Note: A, B, C = veto players; SQ = the status quo policy; the shaded area = the winset, assuming decisions are made
by unanimity rule.
15: Institutional Veto Players
725
Notes
Figure 15.6
The Ideological Distance between Veto Players and the
Size of the Winset
a. Similar ideological positions
SQ
Ideological distance
B
A
Veto player theory shows
that increasing the
ideological distance
between veto players
always shrinks the size of
the winset.
b. Dissimilar ideological positions
SQ
A
B
Note: A, B = veto players; SQ = the status quo policy; the shaded area = the winset, assuming decisions are made
by unanimity rule.
Consider the United States. Many on the left of the political spectrum have been disappointed with the legislative achievements of President Barack Obama since he came to
power in January 2009. Obama had run on a platform of “hope” and “change,” and many
believed that he would push the status quo in a distinctly progressive direction. Obama had
proposed radical changes in many areas. For example, he had supported the introduction of
Veto Player Theory
Notes
The size of the winset in any particular situation is determined jointly by the
number of veto players and the ideological distance between them.
In general, the size of the winset shrinks with increases in the number of veto
players and the ideological distance between them.
Veto Player Theory
Notes
Federalism, bicameralism, and constitutionalism can be reconceptualized in
terms of veto player theory.
Countries with these types of institutions will be characterized by:
Policy stability.
Small policy shifts.
Little variation in the size of policy shifts.
Weak agenda setting powers.
Veto Player Theory
Notes
Some more implications.
Policy stability leads to government instability in parliamentary
democracies.
Policy stability leads to regime instability in presidential democracies.
Policy stability encourages judicial and bureaucratic activism.