Class Reproduction Among Men and Women in France: Reproduction Theory on Its Home
Ground
Author(s): Robert V. Robinson and Maurice A. Garnier
Reviewed work(s):
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91, No. 2 (Sep., 1985), pp. 250-280
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Class Reproduction among Men and Women
in France: Reproduction Theory on Its
Home Groundl
RobertV. Robinsonand Maurice A. Garnier
Indiana University
Throughan analysisofa largesurveyofemployedmenand women
theoryhas
in France, this articleshows that Frenchreproduction
overstatedthe role of education in reproducingclass advantage
ofcontrol
fromgenerationto generation.Amongmen,reproduction
over labor power(i.e., managerial/supervisory
positions)is primarily directinsteadof indirectthrougheducation.At the same time,
ownershipofbusinesses(i.e.,
educationplaysno rolein reproducing
capitalistand pettybourgeoispositions),and thereis littletendency
forcapitalistor pettybourgeoisfathersto converttheireconomic
capitalintotheeducationalcapitalfortheirsonsso thatthesonscan
securemanagerialpositions.Education servesless as a reproducer
of class advantage than as a vehicle of mobilityinto managerial
theoryhas tendedto ignoregenpositions.Althoughreproduction
der differences
in class reproduction,
theseare foundto be substantial. In the reproductionof ownership,womenare less likelythan
of
men to inherita businessfromtheirfather.In the reproduction
controlover labor power,the considerationsthatare importantto
positionsare
men's chances of acquiring managerial/supervisory
generallymuchless importantto women'schances.Thus reproducclass privilegefor
tionstrategiesthatare successfulin perpetuating
men do not workas well forwomen.
Few theorieshave assumedsuchprominencein Frenchsociologyoverthe
theory(Lemert1981,pp. 137last decade and a halfas has reproduction
38). In the late 1960s, French sociologistsbecame increasinglyaware
that, despitemodesteducationalreformsand risinglevels of education
was notyeta reality(Girard
overall,equalityof educationalopportunity
1
This is a revised versionof a paper presentedat the annual meetingsof the American
Sociological Association, San Antonio, August 27-31, 1984. We thank Nancy J.
Davis, Larry J. Griffin,Paul DiMaggio, and three anonymous reviewers for their
helpful comments and Herbert Smith for his advice on the statisticalanalysis. Requests for reprintsshould be sent to Robert V. Robinson, Department of Sociology,
Indiana University,Bloomington,Indiana 47405.
C 1985 by The Universityof Chicago. All rightsreserved.
0002-9602/86/9
102-0002$01.50
250
AJS Volume 91 Number2
Class Reproduction
and Bastide 1973). PierreBourdieu began to look at educationin a new
light.He argued that the persistently
stronglink betweenfamilybackgroundand educationalattainmentwas no accidentbecause, faced by
widespreaddemandsforequalityof opportunity,
eliteshad adoptednew
fromgenerationto generation.
strategiesto ensuretheirown continuity
The educationsystemwas the keyelementin thesestrategies.Through
thechoiceofcurriculum,pedagogicalmethods,therelationships
between
teacherand students,and methodsof selection-all of which gave the
childrenof the economicallyprivilegedand well educatedan advantage
over childrenof the less privilegedand less educated-the education
systemdid not break down class and culturalinequalitiesbut reinforced
them(Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieuand Boltanski 1978).
The questionwhethereducationtransmitsinequalityfromgeneration
to generationor acts as a vehicleof mobilityhas always been centralto
researchon mobilityand status attainment.Glass's (1954) pioneering
studyof occupational mobilityin Britain was designedto assess how
much the Education Act of 1944 had increasedmobility.The role of
educationin the issue of reproductionversusmobilityhas been a more
explicitconcernofstatusattainmentresearchin theUnitedStates(Bielby
1981).Duncan and Hodge's (1963) modelofthestatus-attainment
process
was designedto assess theextentto whichfamilybackgroundwas transmitteddirectlyand indirectly
throughtheindividual'sown education(see
also Blau and Duncan 1967; Jenckset al. 1972, 1979; Feathermanand
Hauser 1978). Criticsof status-attainment
research,such as Bowles and
Gintis(1977; Bowles 1977),have also seen educationas centralin reproducinginequality.
Generally,theoryabout the reproductivefunctionof education assumesthatparentswithprestigiousjobs are able to use their(socio)economicresourcesto get good educationsfortheirchildren,whichin turn
enable thechildrento acquire prestigious
jobs. Bowles and Gintis(1977),
in addition, see the education systemas reproducinginequalityin a
broadersense by inculcatingacceptanceof inequality,familiarizing
studentswith hierarchicalrelationsof productionthroughthe power relationsbetweenstudents,teachers,and principals,and legitimizing
income
differences
thatare based on educationas resulting
frommeritand talent.
in that
Bourdieu'semphasison culturalcapital is somewhatdifferent
he statesthatparentsnot only,in a sense, purchaseeducationalcredentialsfortheirchildrenbutalso providea culturalenvironment
thatfosters
thedevelopmentofthekindsofspeechpatterns,tastes,and interpersonal
skillsthatthe educationalsystemrewardswithits credentials.Furthermore, while status-attainment
researchemphasizesthe technicalskills
and expertisethat education provides, and while Bowles and Gintis
251
AmericanJournalof Sociology
(1977) see the education systemas teachingacceptance of inequality,
Bourdieu sees educationalcredentialsas havinglittlemorethan a symbolic content-that is, as only certifying
that a person comes froma
certainclass background(Bourdieuand Boltanski1981,p. 144; see also
Collins 1975fora similarargument).Finally,althoughstatus-attainment
researchand even Marxist analyses couched in termsof class (e.g.,
Bowles and Gintis1977) focuson occupationsor on occupationalstatus,
many of Bourdieu's argumentsconcernthe reproductionof classes as
definedby relationsof ownershipand authorityin the workplace.
In thisarticle,we show how someofBourdieu'sideas on thereproduction of class privilegecan be synthesizedwith some of our ideas in a
multivariateanalysisoftheprocessesofclass reproduction.
We also offer
hypotheseson whythereare sizable genderdifferences
in the reproductionof class advantage, a topicthathas been neglectedin earliertheory
and research(but see DiMaggio 1982; DiMaggio and Mohr 1983; Oakes
1982). We test our hypothesesthroughan analysis done on the home
groundof Frenchreproduction
theory-on a large-scalesocial surveyof
Frenchwomenand men.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
It can be argued that two fundamentalclass relationscharacterizecontemporary
capitalistsocieties:relationsto themeansof production(ownership)and relationsofauthority
or controloverlaborpower.Wrightand
Perrone(1977) identifyfourprimaryclass locationsthat are determined
by theserelations:capitalists(or employers),who own the meansof production and purchase the labor power of others;managers(including
supervisorsand foremen),who do not own the means of productionbut
exercisecontrolover labor poweron behalfof the owneror owners;the
pettybourgeoisie,who own themeansofproductionbut do notpurchase
labor power (i.e., self-employed
people withoutemployees);and nonsupervisory
workers,who neitherown the means of productionnorcontrollabor power.2
In a studyof men in fivesocieties(the United States, Great Britain,
NorthernIreland, Argentina,and Chile), we foundthattheseclass relationsare associatedwithdifferent
methodsofintergenerational
transmission (Robinson 1984a, 1984b). Ownership,whichis based on possession
ofphysicalcapital,is reproduceddirectlyfromone generationto thenext.
2 Disagreements exist over the boundary between the capitalist and pettybourgeois
classes (see, e.g., Aldrich and Weiss 1981). We show that making additional distinctions among capitalists based on size of enterprisedoes not add to the explanatory
power of this variable.
252
Class Reproduction
Capitalistsand pettybourgeoisiecan simplyhand over the familybusiness to theiroffspring
or providethemwithinvestmentcapital to start
new businesses,and theirchildrendo notneed to getgood educationsin
orderto inherit.
Control over labor power-the relation between managerial/
supervisorypositionsand nonsupervisory
workersin the private and
public sectors-is based on possessionof education,technicaland interpersonalskills,knowledge,expertise,and experience,insteadofon physical capital. One need not assume a meritocratic
processof hiringand
promotionin bureaucracies (e.g., Weber [1922] 1978, pp. 220-23;
Dahrendorf1959) in orderto expectthateducationwill be importantin
acquiring controlpositions. Requiringmore education among successivelyhigherlevelsofsupervisorsand managerslegitimizes
inequalitiesof
power(Bowles and Gintis1977,p. 82); ensuresthatthepersonsin control
have thevalues and workhabitsthattheownersand managementdeem
appropriate(Collins 1975, p. 454; Wrightand Perrone1977, p. 42); and
increases the social distance between workersand their supervisors,
therebydecreasingthe likelihoodof concertedaction(Bowles and Gintis
1977, p. 84).
The nonphysicalbasis of controland its educational requirements
make this class relationsomewhatmore difficult
to reproducedirectly
thanthatof ownership.Parentsin controlpositionsare morelikelythan
thosewho own businessesto take theindirectrouteofensuringthattheir
childrenreceivea good education.This, in turn,givesthechildrenbetter
access to positionsof control.At the same time,however,we foundthat
even thereproduction
ofcontrolrelationsis overwhelmingly
directrather
than indirectthrougheducation,which suggeststhat class background
has an importantlastingeffecton acquiringmanagerial/supervisory
positions. While looking for a explanationfor this directreproductionof
control,we foundsome ideas in Bourdieu'sworkthatwe thoughtmight
help explainthe lastingeffectof familybackgroundon controlrelations.
The presentanalysissynthesizessome of theseideas withour own in a
multivariatemodel of class reproduction.
Bourdieu'sReproductionTheory
In his writingsof the mid-1960sand early 1970s,Bourdieuarguedthat
the functionof the educationsystemis to certifyculturaladvantagesthatis, culturalcapital-already possessedbythechildrenofadvantaged
classes. "Culturalcapital" is "linguisticand culturalcompetence,"which
manifestsitselfin such thingsas the purchaseand borrowingof books;
attendanceat museums,theaterperformances,
and concerts;stylesof
speech and interpersonalskills; and so forth (Bourdieu 1977).
253
AmericanJournalof Sociology
Certificationoccurs throughthe adoption of teachingmethodsand a
curriculumthat can be appreciatedonly by those fromwell-educated
familiesin which the developmentof linguisticability;appreciationof
art, music,literature,and so forth;and appropriatestylesof interaction
have been encouraged.Childrenfromless advantagedbackgroundsare
bothless apt to succeed in such a systemand morelikelyto selectthemselves out early,in anticipationof failure(Bourdieu 1977, p. 495). The
level of educationattainedby individuals-their"educationalcapital"is thus nothingmorethan certifiedculturalcapital (Bourdieu 1977, pp.
492-93; Bourdieuand Boltanski 1981, pp. 144-45).
Accordingto Bourdieu, because culturaland educationalcapital are
strongly
linkedto class position,advantagedclassescan ensurethattheir
childreninherittheirpositionsthroughthe acquisitionof educational
certificates,
that is, throughthe conversionof theirown culturaland
educationalcapital intotheirchildren'seducationalcapital. Educational
capital becomesthe personalpropertyof degreeholders.In the negotiationsbetween"purchasers"and "sellersof labor power,"the greaterthe
educationalcapital of the sellers,the morebargainingpowertheyhave
(Bourdieuand Boltanski 1981, p. 144).3
The reproductivefunctionof the school, accordingto Bourdieu, resultedfromconsciousactionsby dominantclasses to ensuretheirreproduction. In the early years of industrialcapitalism,the "reproduction
strategy"of businessownerswas the directtransferof propertyrights.
FollowingWorld War II, popular demand forequalityof educational
opportunity,
as well as the increasingseparationof ownershipand managementof firmsand the establishment
of "rationalized"proceduresof
recruitment
and promotion,necessitatedmore subtle (i.e., less direct)
reproduction
strategies(Bourdieuand Boltanski1978, p. 202, 205).
Business ownersadopted a new strategyof reproduction,
the conversion of theireconomic capital into educationalcapital. By using their
economicresourcesto ensurethattheirchildrenreceiveda good education, owners could maintainthe positionsof some of theirheirs. The
educationalqualificationsthat owners' childrenobtain enable themto
acquire managerialpositionsor legitimatetheirbeing given such positionsin theirparents'or otherbusinesses(Bourdieuand Passeron1979,p.
79). Of course, this strategywill be most successfulfor owners who
themselvespossessconsiderableculturalcapital(e.g., are well educated),
3 Althoughhuman capital theory(e.g., Becker 1964, Mincer 1974), like reproduction
theory,assumes that educational credentials impart importantadvantages to those
who hold them,it does not regardeducation as primarilya mechanismforreprodvcing
class inequality,looks on education as a means of impartingtechnicalskills instead of
stressingits symbolicmeanings, and is concerned with earnings instead of with class
attainment.
254
Class Reproduction
because the systemmainlycertifies
culturalcapitalthathas alreadybeen
acquired in the home (Bourdieu 1977, pp. 493, 502). Owners'increased
use of the educationalsystemto guaranteetheirchildren'sfutureforces
classes thathave traditionally
used the schoolsto ensuretheirreproduction(e.g., managersand supervisors;see our argumentsabove regarding
control)to increaseinvestmentsin theirchildren'sschoolingin orderto
maintainthe scarcityof personswith highereducationalqualifications
(Bourdieuand Boltanski1978,p. 220). Again,thisstrategy
is presumably
most successfulfor parents who possess considerableeducationaland
culturalcapital themselves.
Even reproductiontheoristsdo not assume perfectreproduction
from
one generationto thenext.The ideologiesconcerning
equalityofopportunityand the importanceof individualmeritrequirethatsome students
fromhumbleoriginssucceed in school to demonstrate
the importanceof
individual talent for academic success. Thus there is allowance for
some-although not much-individual mobility.As a mobilitystrategy,
the acquisitionof educationalcapital is likelyto be more successfulat
obtainingpositionsof controlthan of ownership.There are few if any
educationalrequirementsfor owning a business,but thereare usually
educationalrequirements
forpositionsof control.
Anotherfactorlikelyto be importantin acquiringbothownershipand
controlis experiencein thelabor force.In acquiringcontrol,experienceis
probablya roughindicatorof seniorityas well as of trainingand skills
inculcatedon the job and thus should be related to one's chances of
obtaininga positionofcontroloverlabor power.In acquiringownership,
the meaningof labor forceexperienceis less clear. In some skilledcrafts
and trades,the individualmay acquire experienceand save some capital
over the course of a career in order to starthis or her own business.
Moreover,because experienceis veryhighlycorrelatedwithage (so much
so as to be nearlyinseparableamongmen),ifa business(orcapitalto start
a new business) is to be inheritedon the death of one's parents,the
it increasewithage (Kelley 1978).
chances of inheriting
GenderDifferencesin Class Reproduction
Perhapsthe mostseriousomissionin reproduction
theoryis thefailureto
considergenderdifferences
in the reproduction
of classes. There is good
reasonto expectsuch differences.
First,as Bourdieuand Boltanskihave
noted,ownershipofbusinesseshas probablybeen passed mostfrequently
fromfathersto sons(1978, p. 205). Thus we expectownershiprelationsto
be considerablyless likelyto be reproducedfromfathersto daughters
than fromfathersto sons.
Second, genderdifferences
may characterizethe reproduction
of con255
AmericanJournalof Sociology
trolrelations.Althoughwomen may grow up in culturalenvironments
and obtaineducationssimilarto men's(see, e.g., Garnierand Hout 1982
forFrance), studiesin the United States (e.g., Wolfand Fligstein1979)
have foundthatwomenare placed lowerin the authority
hierarchythan
menwiththesame amountof education.Kanter'sstudyof a U.S. corporationshowshow thisgenderdifference
in rewardsto educationalcapital
a processof"homosocialreproducmayarise(1977, p. 48). She identified
tion," wherebythe "men who manage reproducethemselvesin kind."
Because of the need fortrustin the face of considerableuncertainty
in
makingmanagerialdecisions,(male) managerstendto hireand promote
on the basis of social and gendersimilarity
to themselves.Uncertainty
is
greatestat the highestlevels of management,so social similarity
and the
trustthatthisimpliesare mostimportantat theselevels. Those who, by
virtueof theirculturaland class background,gender,race, and values,
do not "fitin" are situated in the lowest levels of managementor in
nonsupervisorypositions. Even women who have class and cultural
backgroundssimilarto those who are hiringand promotingmay face
exclusionfromsupervisoryand managerialpositions.
These considerations
lead us to expectgenderdifferences
in class reproductionand theroleplayedin it by educationalcapital,as well as differencesin theoutcomesoftheseprocesses.We expectthatwomenand men,
on the average, begin theirlives in familieswithsimilarclass positions
and culturaland educationalcapital. But througha breakdownin the
reproduction
processesthatworkformen,womenattainless advantaged
class positionsthan men.4
THE FRENCH SETTING
France providesa settingwell suitedto our study.An analysisof class
reproductionin France at approximatelythe time that reproduction
theorywas developed(1970)5affordsa testofsomeoftheseargumentson
theirhomeground,wheretheyshouldbe mostconsistentwiththeactual
situation.AlthoughFrance has been studiedfrequently
by reproduction
theorists,this researchhas been piecemealand based on bivariaterelationships.For example,we wereunable to findany studyin whichBourdieu and his colleaguescontrolledsimultaneously
forparents'education
and class (or occupation).Bourdieugenerallyuses father'sclass or occupation as an indicatorof father'seducationalor culturalcapital. This is
4 Our discussion of genderreproductionis limitedto employedwomen, and we assume
that theirclass positions are determinedby theirown positions in the workplace.
5 Nearly all Bourdieu's articles and books cited in this paper are translationsof work
published fromthe mid-1960s to mid-1970s.
256
Class Reproduction
consistentwithhis assumptionthatfather'sclass and educationare very
highlyassociated,but, as we shall show, thesevariablesare linkedonly
weaklyin France and have independenteffectson educationand class
placement.The most seriouslimitationof Bourdieu'sempiricalworkis
thatit has been confinedto samplesof students.Because studentshave
notas yetassumedtheclass positionstheywilloccupyin theirworklives,
one cannotassess the effectsof theirclass and educationalbackground
and own educationalcapitalon theirclass placement.Nor can one determine the extentto which theirclass and educationalbackgroundwork
indirectlythroughformaleducationinstead of directly.To date, then,
Bourdieu's ideas have not been testedusing multivariateanalysesthat
allow assessmentof thedirectand indirecteffectsimpliedby his theory.
To the extentthat reproductiontheoryis generalizableto otheradvanced capitalist,and especiallyto WesternEuropean, societies,the
Frenchcase is also interesting.
The Frencheducationalsystem,likevirtually all European school systems,was a dual-trackone until the late
1950s;itcouldbe arguedthatitstillis. For thecohortsofwomenand men
in our survey,theeducationsystemdifferentiated
betweena primaryand
a secondaryeducation,the latterbeing highlyselective(approximately
25% ofa birthcohortwereallowedto go intothesecondaryschoolsin the
late fifties).Childrenbegan school at the age of six and continueduntil
theywere 11. At age 11, theyeitherenteredthe secondarytrack(ifthey
passed the entranceexamination)or stayedin primaryschool untilthey
were 14, at whichtimetheytook the certificat
d'etudesprimaires.Students in the primarytrack could then enter a vocational school and
attend
completetrainingin threeyearsor could beginan apprenticeship,
courses,and pass an examination(certificatd'aptitudeprofessionnelle)
thatcertified
themas journeymen.Studentsin thesecondarytrackchose
froma numberof curricula,all leading to the baccalaureat,the degree
thatenabled its recipientsto enterthe university.
DATA AND MEASURES
Data
Our data are froma large-scalesurveyof employedmen and womenin
France aged 16 and over, conductedby the Frenchcensus bureau (InstitutNational de la Statistiqueet des Etudes Economiques)in 1970. The
randomsample was stratified
by age and occupationand yielded37,835
cases. The responseratewas 87%. Afterrestricting
thesampleto persons
of nonfarmoriginaged 25-64 who were not currently
enrolledin school
(nearly3,000 personsin the originalsample werestudents),we obtained
samples of 14,434 men and 6,780 women. The restriction
to nonfarm
originis necessary,because we do notwishto confoundthetransmission
257
AmericanJournalof Sociology
of ownershipof businesseswith that of farms,forwhichBourdieu advances a different
argument(see Bourdieuand Boltanski1978,pp. 215is imposedto ensurethatall personsin thesample
20). The age restriction
age.
have completedtheireducationand are not yetof retirement
Measures
on
A reasonablemeasureof culturalcapital would requireinformation
in
and
linguistic
culturalinterests;
involvement art,music,and literature;
and interactionstyle(see DiMaggio 1982), none of whichis available in
thedata we are analyzing.Culturalcapital is, however,less centralthan
educationalcapital to Bourdieu's discussionof reproductionstrategies.
Educational capitalis "embodiedculturalcapitalthathas receivedschool
sanctioning"(Bourdieuand Boltanski1981, p. 145). Much of Bourdieu's
discussionof reproductionstrategiesand the negotiationsbetweenpurchasers and sellersof labor power revolvesaround educationalrather
than culturalcapital, because formaleducationalcredentialsare crucial
in the acquisitionof controlpositionsand (forchildrenof owners)in the
legitimitation
of obtainingsuch positions(Bourdieuand Boltanski1981).
is measuredbytheir
The educationalcapitaloffathersand respondents
formaleducationalcredentialsas follows:(0) no degreeat all, (1) lower
(normallyreceivedaftereightyearsof schooling),(2)
primarycertificate
vocationaldegree(e.g., plumbing,automobilerepair),(3) higherprimary
certificate,(4) secondarydegree (the baccalaureat)or highertechnical
degree.6This measureis used in preference
certificate,
and (5) university
theFrench
to thatofyearsofschoolingbecause it mostaccuratelyreflects
educationsystemand theimportanceofformalcredentials(as opposedto
yearsof schooling)to entryintomostfields.We also ran all analysesof
thefivecategoriesabove
education,classifying
(father'sand respondent's)
6 The original investigatorshad coded as blanks both the answer "no degree" and
nonresponsesto the question on father'seducation. Because treatingthese blanks as
missingdata would eliminate all respondentsfrompoorly educated families,we conducted several analyses to determinehow to treat this variable. Finding that several
variables forfathersshowed a great deal of consistencyin nonresponse,we decided to
declare only those who had not responded to these other questions as missing on
father'seducation and to treat the remainingblanks as "no degree." This procedure
yields a distributionof father'seducation that accords well with distributionsamong
men of approximatelythe fathers'ages (Garnier and Raffalovich 1984) but undoubtedly introducessome error(to the extentthat nonresponsesto father'seducation and
other fathers'variables do not overlap perfectly).Nonetheless, nonresponseon the
fathers'variables was not systematicallyrelatedto othervariables in our analysis. As a
check on our coding, we also ran analyses excluding cases originallycoded blank on
father'seducation. These essentiallysupportthe same substantiveconclusions(details
available on request).
258
Class Reproduction
as a seriesof dummyvariables. We foundlittleimprovement
in the fit
using the dummyvariables and few departuresfromlinearity,so we
presentthe resultsusingthe ordinallevel measuresin the tables below.
In our analyses, we identifyfour class locations: capitalists,managerial/supervisory,
pettybourgeoisie,and nonsupervisory
workers.Relationsofownershipare operationalizedusinginformation
on whetherthe
respondent/father
(a) was theproprietor
ofa businessor self-employed
or
(b) worked for others. Purchase of labor power distinguishesbetween
owners who had employees(capitalists)and those who did not (petty
bourgeoisie).Controloverlaborpowerdistinguishes
betweennonowners
who had managerial/supervisory
positionsand thosewho did not.7 In his
discussion of reproductionstrategies,Bourdieu's use of the concept
"class" is rathervague (Baudelot and Establet 1981, p. 206), but his
references
to the class strugglebetween"ownersof themeansof production"or "purchasersof labor power"and "sellersof labor power"(Bourdieu and Boltanski1981, pp. 145-48) and his analysesof bureaucratization, the separationof ownershipand controlof enterprises,and the
growthof managers(e.g., Bourdieu and Boltanski1978, pp. 201-5) are
consistent
withour operationalization
ofclass. Althoughouroperationalizationmaymisssome ofthesubtletyofBourdieu'sconceptualization,
we
believe that it capturesthe main structuralfeatureswith which he is
concerned.Bourdieu is vague as to whetherhis argumentson thereproductionof managerialpositionsapply to all personswho controllabor
power or only to managers,so we also make a distinctionwithinthe
managerial/supervisory
class between managersand othersupervisory
personnel.8
Labor force experienceis the numberof years since the respondent
enteredthe labor forceafterleaving school. This variable is probably
reasonablyaccurateformen but may overestimatewomen'sexperience,
because it does not take into account the possibilityof the intermittent
workforce
participationthatis morecharacteristic
ofwomenthanmen.9
7 The distinctionbetween managerial/supervisory
and nonsupervisoryworkers was
made on the basis of three variables: (1) a question asked of manual workers as to
whethertheywere foremen;(2) a question asked of nonmanual workersas to whether
or not theirjob involved administrativeor general managerial responsibilities;and (3)
an occupation classification that frequentlyallowed determinationof managerial/
supervisoryposition(e.g., officemanager, clerical supervisor).Persons whose answers
to any of these threequestions indicated thattheyhad supervisoryresponsibilitieswere
classifiedin the managerial/supervisory
position.
8 Among persons classified as managers/supervisors,
the followingwere classifiedas
managers: executive in a commercial firm,managing directorof a commercial firm,
and senior civil servant.
9 Unfortunately,
there is no informationon part-timevs. full-timestatus of respondents forthe year of the survey(about 2% of men and 13% of women were employed
259
AmericanJournalof Sociology
In alternateanalysesto thosereportedbelow,we also includedan interactiontermofeducationand labor forceexperience(Mincer1974). Because
in almosteverycase, it is notincluded
thisinteraction
was nonsignificant
in our finalmodels.
StatisticalAnalysis
The effectof father'sclass and educationon son's and daughter'seducation is estimatedby ordinaryleast squares (OLS) regression.Father's
class is coded as fourdummyvariables(capitalist,manager,othersupervisory,and pettybourgeoisie),withnonsupervisory
workers(who do not
own, purchaselabor power,or controllabor power)as theomittedcategory.We use a logisticregressiontechnique,available in theGLIM package, to estimatethe effectsof father'sclass and educationand respondent's education and experienceon the probabilityof the respondent's
being in a particularclass location. Logisticregressionis necessarybecause the dependentvariable (respondent'sclass) is nominallevel and
does not allow the applicationof OLS regression.Logit estimatesare
somewhatmoredifficult
to interpret
thanOLS estimates.They represent
thechangein thenaturallog oftheodds of beingin a particularcategory
of the dependentvariable that is associated with a unit change in an
independentvariable. The logit analyseswere conductedon a random
subsample, because the originalsamples of women and men and the
ofthemodelsconstituted
too largea data matrixfortheGLIM
complexity
programat our installation(even as modifiedforlargedata sets)to handle. We selectedan equal numberofwomenand men(so significance
tests
would notbe affectedbythelargernumberofmenin theoriginalsample)
via an SPSS random samplingprocedure.The subsamples consistof
3,430 men and 3,408 women.
The extentto whichfather'sclass or educationacts indirectly
through
respondent'seducationcan be determinedby comparingcoefficients
for
father'sclass and educationin a reducedformmodel thatincludesonly
these variables as independentwiththe corresponding
in a
coefficients
modelthatalso includesrespondent'seducation.The degreeto whichthe
coefficient
fora particularfather'sclass (or father'seducation)is reduced
when educationis includedin the model representsthe extentto which
father'sclass affectsrespondent'sclass indirectlythrougheducation.In
additionto thesetwo models,we estimatea modelthatincludesrespondent'sexperience.
part-timein 1972; Contier and Labourie-Racape 1980, p. 64, table 3.2). A question on
full-time/part-time
status was asked forthe previousyear (1969). Analyses of men and
women who had worked full-timeduring 1969 yielded results very similar to those
reportedin the text and tables.
260
Class Reproduction
In orderto testforthe possibilitythatthe effectsof independentvariables varydependingon theclass originsof respondents
(i.e., Bourdieu's
assumptionthat classes have different
reproductionstrategies),we also
conductanalyseswithinfather'sclasses. In thesewithin-origins
analyses,
variationwithin
we also includefather'sSES to see ifthereis significant
classes thataffectsrespondent'seducationand class.10
RESULTS
The employedmenand womenin oursamplecomefromsimilarclass and
educationalbackgrounds(see table 1). As Garnierand Hout (1982),using
a different
data set, foundearlier,thereis also littledifference
between
employedmen and women in educationalattainment,althoughwomen
are slightlymorelikelyto have no degree.Women'slabor forceexperienceis one yearless thanmen's(24 vs. 25 years;notshownin table 1). As
noted above, this probablysomewhatoverstateswomen's labor force
experiencebecause theirlabor forceparticipationis more intermittent
than men's.
The moststrikingdifference
betweenemployedwomenand men is in
class position.Womenare morelikelyto be nonsupervisory
workersthan
men(83% vs. 66%, P < .001), less likelyto be managers(1% vs. 4%, P <
.001), about halfas likelyto be capitalists(3% vs. 8%, P < .001) or other
supervisory
personnel(8% vs. 16%, P < .001), and aboutequallylikelyto
be pettybourgeoisie(5% vs. 6%).
The distributions
of father's,son's, and daughter'sclasses suggestthat
the reproductionof father'sclass may be considerablyless successful
among daughtersthan among sons. Table 2 shows that threetimesas
10 Because French sociologists couch their arguments in terms of class instead of
socioeconomic status, there is no equivalent to Duncan's (1961) socioeconomic index
(SEI) forFrance. As a crude approximation,we convertedoccupations in the French
occupational classificationto scores on the Duncan SEI. The French occupational
classificationmakes frequentdistinctionsbased on ownership,number of employees,
size of enterprise,and authority(and thus captures all our class distinctions)but
relativelyfew occupational distinctions.Inspection of the distributionof occupational
titleswithinclasses showed that the distinctionsmade withinthe capitalist class were
based on size of enterpriseor numberof employees(e. g., industrialists,ownersof large
businesses, owners of small businesses, artisans with fewer than three employees,
etc.). Similarly,almost all the distinctionswithinthe managerial and othersupervisory
classes were those of authority(e.g., directorof a commercial firm,officemanager,
clerical supervisor,foreman,etc.). Only among pettybourgeoisieand nonsupervisory
workerswas theremuch occupational differentiation.
For this reason, the interpretation of SES effectswithin class originsdepends on considerationof the class origin.
Because of these difficultiesof interpretationand because SES has littlelasting effect
on class placement, our discussions of findingson this variable are confinedto footnotes.
261
AmericanJournalof Sociology
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE
DISTRIBUTIONS
EMPLOYED
OF FATHER'S
PERSONS
AND RESPONDENT'S
OF NONFARM
ORIGIN,
Variable
Father'sclass (N = 13,358 men, 6,455 women):
Capitalists.........................................
Managers..........................................
Othersupervisory
...................................
Pettybourgeoisie............
.......................
....................
Nonsupervisory
workers.........
Total............................................
Father'seducation(N = 12,940 men, 6,260 women):
No degree . ........................................
Primaryschool leavingcertificate......
...............
Vocationaldegree...................................
.....................................
Higherprimary
Baccalaureat or highertechnical.......
...............
Universitydegree............
.......................
Total............................................
Respondent'seducation(N = 13,981 men, 6,780 women):
No degree..........................................
Primaryschool leaving certificate......
...............
Vocationaldegree............
.......................
.....................................
Higherprimary
Baccalaureat or highertechnical.......
...............
Universitydegree.............
......................
Total............................................
Respondent'sclass (N = 14,405 men, 6,450 women):
Capitalists.........................................
Managers..........................................
Othersupervisory
...................................
Pettybourgeoisie............
.......................
workers.........
Nonsupervisory
....................
Total............................................100o
CLASS
AND EDUCATION:
AGES 25-64
Men
Women
10
4
3
15
67
99
9
3
4
15
68
99
48
34
6
2
5
6
101
50
33
5
2
5
6
101
23
28
23
7
6
13
100
28
30
19
4
4
15
100
8
4
16
6
66
3
1
8
5
83
100
manysonsas daughtersofcapitalistsinheritedtheirfather'sclass position
(27% vs. 9%). Similarly,13% ofthesonsofmanagersand 25% ofthesons
ofothersupervisorsinheritedtheirfathers'class positionscomparedwith
ofdaughters.The expectedmovementof
only2% and 13%, respectively,
of capitalistsand pettybourgeoisieintocontrolpositionsis also
offspring
greaterformen; 22% of the sons of capitalistsversus 12% of the daughters became managers or supervisors,and 18% of the sons of petty
bourgeoisieversus9% ofthedaughtersacquiredsuch positions.Roughly
thesame percentagesofsonsand daughtersofpettybourgeoisieinherited
ofthesons
theirfathers'classes (13% and 10%), but about three-quarters
of nonsupervisory
workersinheritedtheirfathers'classes comparedwith
262
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cho11
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0.2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
00110
p4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>J
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40-4
C-
l
AmericanJournalof Sociology
86% of the daughters.Thus, women are less successfulthan men in
inheriting
capitalistand managerialpositionsand moresuccessfulin inworking-classpositions.We now turnto a disheritingnonsupervisory
that
determinetheseverydifferent
outcomesfor
cussionof the processes
womenand men.
Family Backgroundand Education
The OLS regressionestimatesin table3 showthat,witha fewexceptions,
rathersimilar processes govern the acquisition of educational capital
among women and men.11As expected,having a managerfather(as
workerfather)gives a modesteducational
opposed to a nonsupervisory
advantage to both sons and daughters(enough to advance themtwothirdsor moreof the distancebetweeneducationalcategories).There is
personnelin the
littledifference
betweenmanagersand othersupervisory
educationaladvantagetheygivetheirchildren.Having a capitalistfather
is also of some small advantage in gettinga good education(enoughto
move a son about a thirdof the way betweeneducationcategoriesand a
daughterhalfway).On theotherhand, havinga pettybourgeoisfatheris
oflittleadvantagein gettingan education.Overall,theeffectsoffather's
class on educationare significant
but decidedlymodestcomparedwith
what reproductiontheorywould lead us to expect.
factorin obtainingeducationalcapitalis havThe mostoverwhelming
ing a highly educated father. Each successivelyhigher educational
qualificationof a fatheradvances respondentsone-halfof the distance
of reproduction
betweeneducationalcategories.Bourdieu'sformulation
theoryassumesthata strongassociationexistsbetweenfather'seducation
and class and thatthisassociationis what allows dominantclassesto use
the educationsystemto reproducethemselves.Actually,the association
betweenfather'sclass and father'seducationis notlarge(multiplecorrelation is 0.33). Moreover, the independenteffectsof father'sclass and
educationon respondent'seducationsuggestthattheremay be (modest)
educationalrewardsto class, netofanyadvantagesfrombeingraisedin a
well-educatedfamily,that are possiblyowing to the greaterabilityof
certainclasses to affordmoreeducationfortheirchildren.Bourdieuand
Passeronclearlyexpectownersto use such a strategybut do notmention
this formanagersor supervisors(1979, p. 79). At the same time,these
independenteffectsmean that comingfroman educationallyprivileged
familyis advantageousto childrenof all class origins.The analysesof
II
arguments
interest,
above,theyareofno substantive
Because,giventhetheoretical
testsare one-tailed
forequationsare not givenin thetables.Significance
intercepts
is predicted.
becausedirection
264
TABLE 3
OLS REGRESSION OF RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION ON FATHER'S CLASS, SES, AND
EDUCATION: EMPLOYED PERSONS OF NONFARM ORIGIN, AGES 25-64
Father'sClass, SES, and Education
All respondents
(N = 12,093 men, 5,937 women):
Capitalist.32...... .......,.,.,.,..
Manager............................
Othersupervisory
.7,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
Pettybourgeois......................
R. ......................
Father'sclass = capitalist
(N = 1,267 men, 570 women):
Father'seducation...................
R
.
.46*
(.07)
.70*
(. 11)
.77*
(.10)
.11*
(.04)
(.05)
(.01)
(.01)
25
.24
(. 00)
(.00)
(.04)
.02*
.15
.24*
(.06)
a
R2..............................
Father'sclass = othersupervisory
(N = 403 men, 229 women):
Father'seducation ...................
Father'sSES .........,.,,,.,,....
R ......................
Father'sclass = pettybourgeois
(N = 1,905 men, 954 women):
.
Father'seducation.
.
.32*
(.05)
18
Father'sSES........................ .06
.52*
(.03)
01*
..........................
(.05)
09
o06
.25*
(.05)
,02*
.30*
.(.07)
.02*
(.01)
(.01)
.48*
(.03)
.35*
(.04)
.01*
(.00)
(.00)
(.02)
(.02)
(.00)
(.00)
. ,13
,
Father'sSES ...............,,.,., .01*
.
R. ............
Father'sclass = nonsupervisory
worker
(N = 7,999 men, 3,972 women):
Father'seducation....................38*
.
,25
.14
.14
.42*
Father'sSES ........................
......
32*
( 04)
,90*
(.07)
.76*
(.07)
09*
.40*
Father'sclass = manager
(N = 519 men, 212 women):
Father'seducation ....................28*
R
Women
,51*
Father'seducation...................
Father'sSES .,,,,,,,,,..
Men
.02*
.
23
.02*
.29
NOTE -Column entriesare unstandardizedregressioncoefficients.
Standarderrorsare in parentheses. All R2s significant
at P < .001.
a There is no variationin father'sSES withinthisclass origin
* P < .05, one-tailedtest.
AmericanJournalof Sociology
table 3 show that father'seducation helps childrenof all classesincludingnonsupervisory
workers-to acquire educationalcapital.12
A keyassumptionof Bourdieu'sargumentis thatownershave increasinglyused theeducationsystemto ensuretheplacementoftheirchildren
in managerialpositions.One would thereforeexpect increasingdifferences over time betweenowners(capitalistsand pettybourgeoisie)and
nonsupervisory
workers.Bourdieualso expectsa wideningeducationgap
betweenmanagers(or othersupervisorypersonnel)and nonsupervisory
workersbecause theincreaseduse oftheeducationsystemby ownershas
forcedmanagers to increase investmentsin theirchildren'seducation
(Bourdieuand Boltanski 1978, p. 220).
A cohortanalysistestingBourdieu'sassumptionis givenin table 4 (see
Garnierand Raffalovich1984formoredetailedcohortanalyses).Among
men,thereis no tendencyforthe gap betweenclasses havingownership
or controland nonsupervisory
workersto widen.If anything,thereverse
appears to be true-the gaps betweenownersor controllersand nonsupervisoryworkersare wider in earlierthan in more recentcohorts.
Amongwomen,thethreeyoungestcohortshave a virtuallyidenticalgap
between capitalists and nonsupervisoryworkers,whereas the oldest
cohorthas a slightlysmaller gap. There is some increase in the gap
workersin themostrecent
betweenpettybourgeoisieand nonsupervisory
cohortbut no consistentpatternof increaseor decreasein thatbetween
workers.If anything,
theR2s
managerial/supervisory
and nonsupervisory
oftheequationsformensuggesta decreasingimpactoffather'sclass and
educationon respondent'seducation,whereasthoseforwomensuggest
no increase. The cohortanalysis thus casts doubt on Bourdieu's claim
thatownershave increasingly
convertedtheireconomiccapitalintoeducational capital fortheirchildrenor that managershave concomitantly
in education.
increasedtheirinvestments
FamilyBackground,Education, and Class Placement
of ownershipare givenin table 5.
Logisticestimatesof the reproduction
Having a fatherwho owns(i.e., a capitalistor pettybourgeois)increasesa
son's chances of becomingan owner himself.Having a capitalist(as
opposed to a nonsupervisory
worker)fatherincreasesa son's chancesof
beingan ownerby nearly500% (e1 79 - 1 = 4.99; see, e.g., Stolzenberg
12 Father's SES is also generallya significantdeterminantof education within class
origins. Apparently, size of enterprise(within capitalist origins), authorityposition
(within other supervisoryorigins), and socioeconomic status (withinpettybourgeois
and nonsupervisoryworkerorigins)significantlyaffecteducation.
266
TABLE
OLS REGRESSION
OF RESPONDENT'S
EDUCATION
4
EDUCATION
OF NONFARM
ORIGIN,
Father's Class and Education
ON FATHER'S
OF EMPLOYED
FOR AGE COHORTS
CLASS
AND
PERSONS
AGES 25-64
Men
Women
Ages 25-34 (N = 3,523 men, 1,793 women):
Capitalist
Manager.
..................,,,,,,
,,,,,,,
..,
Other supervisory
Petty bourgeois
Father's
.....................
.0,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,..
education,.....................
R ..............................,..
Ages 35-44
Capitalist
Manager
.19
(N = 3,720 men,
............................
.
.58*
(.13)
,64*
.91*
(.11)
(.18)
,53*
.97*
(.13)
(.19)
o6
.38*
(.07)
(.11)
43*
,47*
(.02)
(.03)
.24
1,640 women):
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
Other supervisory.....................
Petty bourgeois
,32*
(.08)
,30*
55*
(.08)
(.13)
,91*
(.12)
(.23)
.22
,78*
.36*
(.14)
(.20)
.17
,13*
.......................
(.07)
Father's
education
.,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,
.
..
R2,,,,,,,.,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
(N = 2,726 men, 1,367 women):
(.11)
52*
.52*
(.02)
25
(.03)
,20
Ages 45-54
Capitalist
.
......,,,,,,,,,,,,
Manager. .,
.,,,,,,,,,
Other supervisory
Petty bourgeois
Father's
...............
education
R.
,
...................
Capitalist
(N = 2,124 men, 1,137 women):
. .......
..........
.......
Other supervisory
Petty bourgeois
Father's
.....
......
education,..............
.
.....................
..
.....
1. 13*
.81*
(.14)
(.21)
.79*
1.03*
(.15)
(.18)
.15*
,,,,
.14
(.07)
.10)
(.02)
.28
(.03)
.25
50*
........ ....................
Manager
,55*
(.13)
.53*
.....,
Ages 55-64
R.
.....................
41*
(.09)
............
.....
...
,,,
.43*
.42*
(. 09)
1,25*
(. 10)
(.16)
(.20)
.59*
1 19*
.81*
(.17)
(.18)
,28*
.16*
(.07)
(.08)
.54*
,44*
(02)
32
NOTE -Standard
errors are in parentheses All R2s significant at P <
* Regression coefficient significant at P < .05.
(.02)
.29
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269
AmericanJournalof Sociology
1979, pp. 473-76), and the correspondingfigurefor pettybourgeois
fathersis 256%.
As expected,thereis virtuallyno indirecteffectof father'sownership
through education (compare the coefficientsfor capitalist or petty
bourgeoisfathersin models 1 and 2). Capitalist and pettybourgeois
fathersapparentlygive the familybusinessesto theirsons or provide
themwithinvestmentcapital to starttheirown businesses.13
Among men, educational capital exerts a small but statistically
significanteffecton ownership,net of father'sclass and education(a
changeof one categoryincreasestheodds of owningby about 10%). The
within-origins
analyses(see table 6) show, as expected,that forsons of
capitalists,educationis irrelevantto acquiringownership.Amongsonsof
pettybourgeoisie,however,educationis somewhatadvantageous(barely
at .05), as it also is amongsonsofothersupervisory
significant
personnel.
For men of all originsexceptothersupervisory,
labor forceexperience
is importantin acquiringownershipofa business(each yearincreasesthe
odds ofowningby about 2%). As notedabove, theexperienceeffectmay
occurbecause (forthesons ofowners)inheritanceofbusinessesor capital
tendsto occur later in life(oftenon the father'sdeath; see Kelley 1978)
and because (forsons of nonowners)startinga businessrequirescapital
thatmay take some timeto save fromwages.
In assessingthe reproduction
of controlover labor power,we have to
decide how to treatthedependentvariable. To classifyrespondentssimplyas managerial/supervisory
versusall otherclasses is to confoundcontrol with ownership,because managers/supervisors
both controllabor
powerand do not own. A morereasonableprocedureis to consideronly
nonownerrespondents.We also have to decide whetherany distinction
shouldbe made amongmanagerial/supervisory
personnel.Bourdieu'sargumentsmay applyto all such personnelor onlyto managers.Therefore
we estimatedtwo logit equations-one classifyingnonownersas managerial/supervisory
versusnonsupervisory
workersand one selectingonly
managerial/supervisory
personneland classifyingthemas managerversus othersupervisory.From the second set of equations,we foundthat
our independentvariables could not significantly
improvepredictionof
manager versus other supervisoryover an independencemodel. This
means that any differencebetweenmanagersand othersupervisorsis
unrelatedto thevariablesin our modeland thatno information
is lostin
13 Althoughone mightexpect the sons of owners oflarge businessesto be morelikelyto
become owners than the sons of those who own small businesses, among owners' sons
father'sSES (capturingsize of enterprise)has no effecton ownership. Only among the
sons of workersdoes father'sSES (capturingoccupational variation)affectownership,
and its effectis almost entirelydirect(the coefficientdrops from0. 152 to 0. 148 when
education is included).
270
TABLE 6
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF CLASS REPRODUCTION FOR MEN AND WOMEN BY
CLASS ORIGIN: EMPLOYED PERSONS OF NONFARM ORIGIN, AGES 25-64
DependentVariable
IndependentVariable
Men
Women
A. ReproducingOwnershipof the Means of Production
Father'sclass = capitalist(N = 375 men, 319 women):
Owner vs. nonowner
Father'seducation....... .
Father'sSES ...........
Respondent'seducation
Respondent'sexperience..
Improvementin squared deviancea .7
df .4
P .N.S.
Father'sclass = manager(N = 134 men, 111 women):
Owner vs. nonowner
Father'seducation.......
Father'sSES ...........
Respondent'seducation
Respondent'sexperience..
Improvementin squared deviancea .6
df .4
P .N.S.
Father'sclass = othersupervisory(N = 113 men, 124 women):
Owner vs. nonowner
Father'seducation.....0..
Father'sSES.
00
(.08)
.00
(.01)
.00
(.07)
.02*
.04*
(.01)
7
4
N.S.
.18
(.19)
.21
(.81)
.
Respondent'seducation
-.20
(.23)
b
.05
.14
(.19)
.06*
(.25)
(.02)
-.01
(.04)
7
(.18)
.14
(.30)
(.02)
.35*
(.21)
Respondent'sexperience.. -.03
(.03)
Improvementin squared deviancea ......
7
..................
4
df ..................................................
P ....................................................
N.S.
Father'sclass = pettybourgeois(N = 532 men, 535 women):
Owner vs. nonowner
Father'seducation.......
-.08
Father'sSES
.12
(.11)
(.01)
-.02
Respondent'seducation .
-.01
(. 1 1)
.01
(.01)
1
4
N.S.
-.01
(.04)
.29
(.34)
.06
(.04)
3
4
N.S.
.04
(.09)
(.11)
(.01)
.14*
(.00)
01
(.07)
.00
.08
(.09)
TABLE 6 (Continued)
IndependentVariable
DependentVariable
Men
Women
A. ReproducingOwnershipof the Means of Production(Continued)
Respondent'sexperience..
.03*
(.01)
Improvementin squared deviancea ........................
df .........................
12
4
<.02
P ...............................
(.01)
Respondent'sexperience.
p .
..................
(.01)
.10
(.06)
(.07)
.03*
29
4
<.001
....................................................
-.03
(.09)
.01
.10
(.01)
Improvementin squared deviancea ......
df .................................................
6
4
N.S.
worker(N = 2,276 men, 2,319 women):
Father'sclass = nonsupervisory
-.04
Father'seducation.
Owner vs. nonowner
(.08)
.
01*
Father'sSES
Respondent'seducation
.03*
(.01)
.02*
(.01)
12
4
<.02
B. ReproducingControlOver Labor Power
Father'sclass = capitalist(N = 235 men, 271 women):
Father'seducation..
Managerial/supervisory
(vs. nonsupervisory)
.
Father'sSES
Respondent'seducation
Respondent'sexperience..
(.10)
01
.02
(.13)
.02
(.01)
(.01)
.27 *
(. 10)
.06
(.12)
05
.03*
(.01)
16
Improvementin squared deviancea ...............
df ................................................
4
p ....................................................
Father'sclass = manager(N = 120 men, 104 women):
Father'seducation.......
Managerial/supervisory
(vs. nonsupervisory)
Father'sSES ........... .
<.01
-.04
(.13)
31
(.81)
.31*
Respondent'seducation
(.14)
o7*
Respondent'sexperience..
Improvementin squared deviancea ...........
df ................................................
p ....................................................
272
.............
.04*
(.02)
9
4
N.S.
.01
(.15)
b
.21
(.17)
.01
(.02)
(.02)
<.001
N.S.
20
4
1
4
TABLE
6
(Continued)
IndependentVariable
DependentVariable
Men
Women
B. ReproducingControlOver Labor Power (Continued)
Father'sclass = othersupervisory(N = 97 men, 119 women):
Managerial/supervisory
Father'seducation.....0..
(vs. nonsupervisory)
Father'sSES . .........
Respondent'seducation
Respondent'sexperience..
Improvementin squared deviancea ..........
..4
df
. ............
......
P ...
Father'sclass = pettybourgeois(N = 390 men, 455 women):
Managerial/supervisory
Father'seducation.......
(vs. nonsupervisory)
..
Father'sSES . .....
7
(.14)
.04*
(.02)
.14
.13
(.17)
01
(.02)
.01
(.15)
(.18)
.04*
(.02)
15
<.01
N.S.
.33*
(. 10)
00
(.01)
Respondent's education
. 16*
Respondent'sexperience
Improvementin squared deviancea .186
df ..............
P .<.001
.......
..
(.01)
(.01)
.46*
..
(.01)
-.08
(.11)
.00
(.00)
Respondent'sexperience
.14
(.12)
.01
(.08)
.02*
26
Improvementin squared deviancea.
...
4
df .......
P .<.001
Father'sclass = nonsupervisory
worker(N = 2,077 men, 2,183 women):
.03
Managerial/supervisory
Father'seducation.. ...
(.06)
(vs. nonsupervisory)
.
01*
Father'sSES
Respondent'seducation
.04*
(.02)
4
4
3
4
N.S.
-.08
(.08)
.02*
(.01)
.21*
(.05)
(.06)
(.01)
(.01)
.04*
4
02*
38
4
<.001
NOTE.-Standard errorsare givenin parentheses.
are withthebaselinemodel(constant[grandmean]only).P < 05 indicatesa significant
improvement
in fit.
b
There is no variationin father'sSES withinthisclass origin.
* P < .05, one-tailedtest.
aComparisons
273
AmericanJournalof Sociology
classifyingcontrol as managerial/supervisory
versus nonsupervisory
workers.14
Among men, the reproductionof controlover labor power is more
complicatedthanthatofownership.Having a fatherwho is a manageror
supervisoris a significantadvantage in acquiringcontrol(see table 5),
increasingtheodds by about 90% in each case. Contraryto reproduction
theory(but consistentwithour findingsforfiveothercapitalistsocieties;
see Robinson 1984a), the indirecteffectof father'scontrolthroughson's
formanagerand other
educationis rathersmall (comparethecoefficients
in
1
supervisoryfathers models and 2).
The analyses of men of all class originsshow a significant
effectof
on
control
of
which
is
exerted
indifather'seducation
(see table 5), part
rectlythroughson's education.That father'seducationexertsan effecton
control,net of father'sclass, is consistentwith the independenteffects
(and low association)of thesevariables that we foundearlier.Analyses
within class origins, however, show that father'seducation had a
significanttotal effecton son's controlonly among the sons of petty
bourgeoisie and nonsupervisoryworkers. Among the sons of petty
bourgeoisietheeffectoffather'seducationis mainlydirect(thecoefficient
drops from0.362 to 0.313 when educationis included),suggestingthat
sons of well-educatedpettybourgeoisie(probablydoctors,lawyers,etc.)
benefitdirectlyfrombeingraisedin a well-educatedfamilyor fromtheir
father'sconnections.Amongsons of nonsupervisory
workers,however,
the effectis much more indirect(0.157 to 0.028), suggestingthat the
educationaladvantages that well-educatedworkersare able to provide
theirsons help the sons in obtainingmanagerial/supervisory
positions.15
There is evidenceof anotherreproduction
strategy
thatenablessons to
inacquire controlpositions. Having a capitalist fathersignificantly
creasesa son's likelihoodof acquiringa managerial/supervisory
position
byabout as muchas havinga fatherwho controlslaborpower(increasing
the odds of controllingby about 100%). As was trueof father'scontrol,
however,only a small part of this advantage worksindirectlythrough
son's education, which suggests that business connectionsof owner
14 The absence of much difference
between managerial and othersupervisoryworkers
is consistentwith the verysimilar effectsof these classes as independentvariables (see
tables 3, 4, and 5).
15 Father's SES affectscontrol among men of other supervisoryand nonsupervisory
origins. Among men with other supervisoryorigins, most of the SES effect(which
captures authoritydistinctions)is direct (0.456 to 0.437 with education included),
corroboratingour findingthat education does not play much part in reproducing
controlor authority.Among those with nonsupervisoryoriginsthe effectof father's
SES is more indirect (the coefficientdrops from 0.017 to 0.011 with education included).
274
Class Reproduction
fathersmaybe importantin placingtheirsons in controlpositions.There
is littlesupportfor Bourdieu's claim that owners are convertingtheir
economiccapital intoeducationalcapital fortheirsons or thatthisstrategy is being used to legitimatethe sons' acquiringcontrolover labor
power.
Pettybourgeoisfathersgive theirsons somewhatless of an advantage
in acquiringcontrolpositionsthancapitalistfathers(0.43 vs. 0.77). This
maybe truepartlybecause theirown businessesdo nothireemployees,so
thattheirsons do nothave theoption(whichmaybe available to sons of
capitalists)of assumingmanagerial/supervisory
positionsin them.
Labor forceexperienceis an importantfactorin men'sobtainingmanagerial/supervisory
positions(increasingtheodds by about 4% per year).
No doubtthisreflects
or trainingacquired
a tendencyto rewardseniority
on thejob.
Son's educationexertsa strongeffecton son's control,net of father's
class and education(the odds of controllingincreaseby 48% fora unit
changein education).Education apparentlyservesas a vehicleformobility independentof father'sclass and education. This mobilityeffectis
moreclearlyseen in analyseswithinfather'sclasses(see table6). For men
ofall but supervisory
origins,educationconferssignificant
advantagesin
acquiringcontrolover labor power, only a small part of whichderives
fromclass origins(see table 3). Ironically,it is among the sons of nonsupervisory
workersthateducationis ofthegreatestadvantagein obtaining controlover labor power.
GenderDifferencesin Class Reproduction
As expected,processesof class reproductionare weaker among women
than among men. Having a capitalist or petty bourgeois father
significantly
increasesa daughter'schancesofbecomingan ownerherself
by 172%, for both. Althoughpettybourgeoisfathersare only slightly
more advantageous to sons than to daughtersin acquiringownership
(1.27 for men vs. 0.99 for women), capitalistfathersare considerably
more advantageousto sons (1.79 vs. 1.00), probablyreflecting
the tendency of fathersto pass businessesto theirsons ratherthan to their
daughters(see table 5). As for men, however,therewas virtuallyno
tendencyfor ownershipto be passed on indirectlythrougheducation.
Interestingly,
as formen, respondent'seducationhas a modesteffectin
obtainingownership-increasingthe odds of owningby about 13% per
change of educationalcategory-but this effectdoes not appear in the
within-origins
analyses(see table 6). Also as formen, experiencein the
workforcesignificantly
improvesa woman's chancesof owninga business (0.026 forwomen,0.025 formen).
275
AmericanJournalof Sociology
Genderdifferences
also characterizethe reproductionof control.The
effectsof all variables but manager and pettybourgeoisoriginsare
slightlyweaker forwomen than formen, and the cumulativeeffectof
this,as shownin table 2, is thatwomenare less likelythanmento end up
as managersor supervisors.Nonetheless,as formen, verylittleof the
effectoffather'scontrol(i.e., managerand othersupervisory)
and father's
ownershipis exertedindirectlythrougheducation,contraryto what reproductiontheorywould predict.
Education has less than halfas large an effecton control(netof class
and educationalbackground)among women as among men, increasing
the odds of being a manageror supervisorby 17% foreach educational
category(compared with 48% for men). Moreover,the within-origins
analysesshow thateducationis a significant
of controlonly
determinant
amongwomenof nonsupervisory
working-class
origins.This is thesame
class originwheretheeducationeffectformenwas also greatest,buteven
heretheeffectis onlyhalfas strongas it is amongmen. Apparently,the
strongmobilityeffectof educationthat we foundamong men is much
weakeramong womenand is confinedto thoseof nonsupervisory
working-classorigins.Finally,althoughworkforceexperienceis a significant
factorin women'sgainingaccess to controlpositions,itis notrewardedto
the extentthatit is amongmen (0.017 vs. 0.039 formen).
For women,then,thechancesofobtaininga managerialor supervisory
positionare somewhatless affectedby theconsiderations
(and strategies)
thatwe have foundto be importantformen. Kanter's(1977) conception
of "homosocialreproduction"may well apply to the situationof French
womenin our study;it appears that genderis a considerationin hiring
and promoting
intopositionsofcontroloverlabor power.Male managers
and supervisorsmay hireand promoteindividualspartlyon the basis of
genderwiththeresultthatwomenwith"appropriate"class backgrounds,
education,and experienceare less likelyto be rewardedwithpromotions
and responsibility than men with similar backgrounds and
16
qualifications.
16 Althoughthe cohortanalyses (table 4) suggestedthat the educational advantages of
having a fatherwho owns a business or controlslabor power are actually greaterfor
youngerwomen than foryoungermen, additional cohortanalyses (not shown in table
5 but available on request) showed thatthese initialadvantages have not helped much
in the short careers of the women in this cohort. The differencesbetween men and
women (shown in table 5) also held up within the youngestcohort. Apparently,the
lasting effectof youngerwomen's initial advantage in education is negligiblebecause
education has a much weaker effecton controlover labor power among women than
among men.
276
Class Reproduction
DISCUSSION
Our analysisof class reproduction
amongmenand womenin France has
shown thatthe role of educationalcapital in reproducingclass is much
overstatedby reproductiontheory.Education plays onlya small role in
reproducing
ownershipofthemeansofproductionand controloverlabor
power. Ownersare not increasingly
converting
theireconomiccapitalto
educationalcapital so thattheirchildrencan acquirepositionsofcontrol.
Nor is thereanyevidenceof a concomitantincreasein theinvestments
of
managersor supervisorsin theirchildren'seducation.Ownersand managers are apparentlyquite capable of placing some of theirchildrenin
ownershipand controlpositionswithoutusingtheeducationsystem(see
also Birnbaum1980). Education,ifanything,servesmoreas a vehicleof
mobilitythan as a reproducerof class inequality.
ofclass
One possibleexplanationof theapparentlydirectreproduction
is that people may be hiredand promotedinto managerial/supervisory
rankson thebasis ofcluesto theirclass background-stylesofspeechand
dress, interpersonalbehavior, and so forth,so that class and cultural
backgroundare directlyrewarded(Kanter 1977). Business contactsof
managerand capitalistfathersmayalso helpexplainthepatternofdirect
reproduction.17
Anotherpossibilityis that managerial/supervisory
parentsraisetheirchildrento be moreself-assertive,
independent,and spontaneous, whereas working-classparentsraise theirchildrento be more
disciplinedand conformableto externalauthority.Kohn has extensively
in theUnitedStates(e.g., Kohn 1969;
documentedsuch class differences
Kohn and Schooler1982),and the findinghas been replicatedin at least
one studyof France (Perron1971). Studies on U.S. data by Kohn and
Schooler(1982) and Edwards (1984) suggestthattheseclass-linkedtraits
lead to differential
chancesforpromotionto positionsof control.Socializationto different
traitsmaythusbe partlyresponsiblefortheapparently
directeffectof father'scontrolon son's and daughter'scontrol.
Althoughreproduction
theoryhas generallyignoredgenderdifferences,
our analysissuggeststhatstrategiesofreproduction
workbetterin ensuring sons' successionsto positionsof powerthandaughters'.As withany
in stratification
genderdifference
processesor outcomes,the sourcesof
thesedifferences
are difficult
to specify.It maybe thatfathersin capitalist
and managerialpositionsput moreeffort
intoassuringthefuturesoftheir
17 Bourdieu and Boltanski mention that "social capital" or networksof friendsand
relativesmay play a role in reproducingclass relationsbut clearlyplace moreemphasis
on the rolesof economic and educational capital (1978, p. 208). For discussionsof some
means wherebyparents' social standing may be transmitteddirectly,see Griffinand
Alexander (1978) and Bowles (1977).
277
AmericanJournalof Sociology
sons than thoseof theirdaughters.Our findingthathaving a capitalist
fatheris moreadvantageousto sons thanto daughtersin acquiringownershipsuggeststhis. At the same time, the factthat daughtersreceive
about the same educationas sons indicatesthatsome effortis beingput
intodaughters'careers,althougheven herethefathermaybe hopingthat
his daughterwill meet a well-educatedman at school (see Silver 1973).
Therefore,it is possiblethatparentshave different
reproduction
strategies fordaughtersthan forsons (see DiMaggio and Mohr 1983).
in the acquisitionof controlover labor power
The genderdifferences
result
from
as Kanter's(1977) studyshows.
may
outrightdiscrimination,
Alternatively,
womenmaybe socializedto behaviorsthatmakethemless
likelyto be hiredor promoted(e.g., theymay be less aggressiveor less
independent).Unfortunately,
thepresentanalysisallows us to document
in class reproductionbut not to decide among their
genderdifferences
possiblesources.
These problemswithreproduction
theorypointto the possibleimporof
tance of differential
class and gendersocializationin thereproduction
class and genderinequality.Differentialsocializationis, of course, an
integralpart of Bourdieu's conceptionof class reproduction,but it appears that the role played by formaleducationin thisprocesshas been
muchoverstated.Future studiesalong theselines may requiredifferent
methodologiesfromthat employedhere-for example, observationof
of hiringand promotiondecisions
child-rearing
practices,ethnographies
withincorporations,and so forth-to show whichbehavioraltraitsare
passed fromparentsto childrenand how these traitsare differentially
rewardedor punishedin the workplace.If our researchservesto stimulate such furtherattemptsto identifythe processeswherebyclass and
culturaladvantagesare perpetuated,it will have servedits purpose.
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