Deutsche Bank
Research
European Elections Outlook:
Profiles of Eurosceptic Populist Parties
May 2014
Position
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Research
European Elections Outlook
Profiles of Eurosceptic Populist Parties
Eurosceptic parties on the rise
Party
Poll
AT
FPÖ
20%
FR
Front National
22%
DE
AfD
6%
GR
Syriza
26%
IT
Forza Italia
20%
IT
Five Stars
24%
NL
PVV
15%
UK
UKIP
25%
— Overall characteristics
— Criticism of EU centralism, red tape
and the allegedly rising tide of
regulation
— Self-conception as parliamentary
opposition to the national
“establishment”
— Europe has become a topic only in
the course of the financial and debt
crisis
— Differentiation is necessary
— Left-wing and Right-wing
— Opposition degree: Moderate vs.
radical
Source: pollwatch2014.eu
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European Elections Outlook
Profiles of Eurosceptic Populist Parties
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Profiles of Populist-Eurosceptic Parties
Most eurosceptic parties have only few objectives in common
o
Sovereignty back to nation states – strengthen intergovernmental elements
o
Criticism of allegedly bureaucratic, inaccessible EU policies
o
Involve financial institutions in bearing the costs of the crisis
o
Migration/immigration issues
Therefore, most populist groups
o
are imprecise in their manifestos
o
are inconsistent in their allegations and proposals as most of the party manifestos
are skewed towards national interests
o
show a low consensus orientation due to focus on national sovereignty
o
show a lack of professional experience: 7 out of 28 eurosceptic parties not yet in the
EP, other parties only with small splinter faction without the institutional support of a
parliamentary group
 Irrespective of the election result the future influence of eurosceptics remains open.
1
The subsequent summaries of the parties‘ positioning ahead of the European Elections were compiled from election manifestos and press reports on the
parties‘ long term agendas. Forza Italia is not listed in the summary as the party has not yet published an election manifesto for the upcoming European
elections.
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European Elections Outlook
Profiles of Eurosceptic Populist Parties
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Influence of eurosceptics in EP – don’t panic!
Consensus among established
“party families” in the Parliament
Consensus voting in percent from 2009 to 2013
— Only formation of a political group
ensures higher financial support,
representation in committees and right to
propose resolutions for approval
Budget
— Extreme-right parties intend to form a
political group against “EU centralism”
— FN, FPÖ, PVV, Lega Nord, Vlaams
Belang, Swedish Democrats and
Finns Party could ally (more than) 25
MEPs from 7 countries – the
minimum requirement for a political
group
Institutional issues
Social issues and
employment
Environment
0
20
40
GUE-NGL
Grüne/EFA
S&D
EVP
ECR
EFD
60
80
100
ALDE
Source: VoteWatch Europe/ Notre Europe
Deutsche Bank
Research
European Elections Outlook
Profiles of Eurosceptic Populist Parties
— Regarding current polls, a right-wing
populist parliamentary group cannot be
excluded. However, keeping the group
together could become challenging given
national particularist interests
3
European Elections 2014: Populist Election Manifestos
Party
Euro
EU
Role of the Country in
Europe/Migration issues
FPÖ
(AT)
•Return to the Shilling, preferably in a
hard currency union with Germany
and other core countries
•Exit EFSF/ESM
•Exit from EU justified if further
European integration process
disregards principle of subsidiarity
•Return to EFTA/EEA
•New major contractual agreement
that will be voted on in a referendum
(comprehensive proposal for new
set of European institutions)
•Federal Europe of nation states
•No membership for Turkey
•Core Europe of the Net
Contributors
•Rejection of multiculturalism
•strict limits on immigration from
countries outside the EU
Vlaams
Belang
(BE)
•Despite all advantages of the Euro
(transaction cost, exchange rate risk),
the cost of keeping the Euro is higher
than dissolving the euro area.
•Either a new limited currency union
or national currencies as the only
sustainable solution.
•Intergovernmental cooperation in
order to prevent any dominance of
bigger over smaller countries
•Exit from EU: Norway and
Switzerland show that smaller
countries can also do it alone
•Flanders could become a similar
political actor in the EU such as
Austria, Denmark, Finland or
Sweden.
•Repatriation of immigrants who
“reject, deny or combat Flemish
culture.“
AfD
(DE)
•Dissolution and/or reorganization of
the euro area with two options: (1)
Right for single countries to exit the
EMU. (2) Right for core countries to
form a new exchange rate system
similar to ERM II. If none of these
options can be achieved, Germany
should leave the EMU.
•Back to No-Bailout-Principle
•Dissolve ESM, end OMT
•ECB voting rights according to
capital key.
•No TTIP that burdens Europe
•No fiscal socialization of any
liabilities arising from bank
resolutions
• 25% equity ratio for banks
•Competence review: Consolidation
before further enlargement
Decentralization of policies wherever
possible
•Reduction of he Common
Agricultural Policy Budget down to
zero by 2024
•Sovereign insolvency mechanism
• Strict adherence to subsidiarity
principle
•Increase of information
transparency on euro bailout
policies as a basis for the formation
of democratic will.
•Stricter asylum policies,
requirement that asylum seekers
remain in the countries where they
applied for asylum first.
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European Elections Outlook
Profiles of Eurosceptic Populist Parties
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European Elections 2014: Populist Election Manifestos
Party
Euro
EU
Role of the Country in
Europe/Migration issues
Fins
(FI)
•Diminish common responsibility on
economic issues in the Euro area
•Respect the No Bailout Clause
•No mutual guarantees for bank
resolution
•Aims to foster discussion of various
options on the future of the Euro
•Against central governance that
interferes too much with day-to-day
life
•Competence review, redraft of
European treaties
•Reduce power of the Commission
•Decentralized Europe of nations
•Limit humanitarian immigration to
refugee quotas that correspond
with economic situation
•Limit family unifications, deport
immigrants guilty of serious or
recurrent crimes
•Welcome work-based immigration
Front
National
(FR)
•Calls for an ordinary plan to
deconstruct EMU in order to achieve
competitive devaluations
•No austerity to safeguard the euro
•Controls to limit financial speculation
•Renegotiation of European Treaties
in order to give sovereignty back to
the nations
•Abolish current institutional pattern,
disempower the Commission which
is not democratically legitimized
•Zero contributions to the European
budget
•Decentralized Europe of nations
•Mainly caimpaigns against Muslim
immigration
•Deportation of illegal, criminal,and
unemployed immigrants
•Plebiscites on immigration policy
similar to Switzerland
UKIP
(UK)
N/A
• Amicable EU-Exit
• Free trade deal with the EU as UK
is the biggest customer of the EU
• No political union
• Escape from EU-regulation on
business, employment, financial
services, farming, energy and trade
that allegedly harm the UK
• re-introduce border controls
• re-establish national immigration
laws to ensure that domestic
employees do not lose their jobs to
foreigners and that the National
Healthcare System is not
overstrained
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Profiles of Eurosceptic Populist Parties
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European Elections 2014: Populist Election Manifestos
Party
Euro
EU
Role of the Country in
Europe/Migration issues
PVV
(NL)
• EMU exit: Back to the Dutch Guilder
• Exit from ESM
•Exit from EU, bilateral trade
agreements similar to Switzerland
•Reduce net contributions to zero
•Plebiscites on every EU plan that
constrains national sovereignty
•All former veto rights back to the
Netherlands
•Limit free movement of workers
•No new EU members
•Stop any immigration from Muslim
countries, limit immigration from
Eastern European countries
• Contact points for reporting
immigrants who commit crimes
and/or squeeze out the local labour
force.
• Withdraw from the Schengen
agreement
SYRIZA
(GR)
•No euro Exit, but (1) relieve current
victims of the crisis, (2) ensure
stabilization and recovery, (3)
reforms legitimized by plebiscites
• Withdraw from the MoU regarding
the Greek rescue packages.
Renegotiation of interest payments
for support loans and suspension of
loan repayments until the economy
has revived and growth and
employment return.
•Demand the European Union to
change the role of the European
Central Bank so that it finances
states and programs of public
investment.
•Intergovernmental cooperation in
economic affairs.
•Shift the burden of economic
adjustment from the society to
banks and creditor countries.
•Social inclusion of immigrants and
equal rights protection between
genders
•Restoration of a strong welfare
state
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European Elections Outlook
Profiles of Eurosceptic Populist Parties
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European Elections 2014: Populist Election Manifestos
Party
Euro
EU
Role of the Country in
Europe/Migration issues
Lega Nord
(IT)
• Immediate EMU exit: Italy needs a
new currency that reflects the current
economic situation of the country
• Membership in the EMU harms the
Italian economy
• No single European rule of austerity
could ever benefit Italy better than
the ability of Italy to reacquire
competitiveness in export markets
due to competitive devaluations
according to the productivity of
companies
• End the democratic deficit of the
EU as a „medieval empire“
• Renationalize EU competences
regarding (1) defence, (2) external
policy, (3) monetary policies, (4)
fiscal policies
• Possibility of national opt-outs
• No further enlargement
• Migration: Give competences
relating to migration back to nation
states
• Direct cooperation of those
countries that are most affected by
illegal immigration – without
interference from Brussels
• Rejection of the merely economic
understanding of European
integration: Support national and
regional identities and a Europe of
diverse cultures
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European Elections Outlook
Profiles of Eurosceptic Populist Parties
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Contact: European Policy Research
Barbara Böttcher
See also:
Head of European Policy Research
Phone: +49 69 910-31787
[email protected]
Nicolaus Heinen
Phone: +49 69 910-31713
[email protected]
Stefan Vetter
Phone: +49 69 910-21261
[email protected]
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Research
European Elections Outlook
Profiles of Eurosceptic Populist Parties
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Profiles of Eurosceptic Populist Parties
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