Thirteen Days (2000)
page last updated 25 February 2003
Most of the errors here are policy errors or (somewhat related) errors of historical fact. This movie distorts the historical
details of this very important crisis in superpower relations, so historical aspects are a focus here.

Wrong: Kenny O'Donnell, special assistant to the president, is a key figure in the White House handling of the
crisis. He is present not only in Executive Committee meetings but in private meetings with the Kennedys, serves
as a close personal advisor to JFK, and conducts some special tasks for the President in the course of the crisis.
O'Donnell was present at some ExComm meetings, but he did not have the central role portrayed in the movie.
Robert Kennedy's own account of the Crisis, Thirteen Days, barely mentions O'Donnell. Robert Kennedy
(Attorney General) and Robert Lovett were the close personal advisors used by JFK during the crisis.

Wrong: During the first Executive Committee meeting on 16 October 1962, General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agressively pushes for a preemptive airstrike against missile sites in Cuba.
According to transcripts of the meeting from the John F. Kennedy presidential library, Taylor did not take such an
aggressive position (although he did support airstrikes).

Wrong: Also during the first ExCom meeting on 16 October, Kenny O'Donnell raises the issue that U.S. action
against Cuba may prompt Soviet action against Berlin.
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, was the one to raise this issue; O'Donnell was not present.

Wrong: On Sunday 21 October General Taylor(?) urges President Kennedy to launch airstrikes, asserting that
they can destroy "better than 90% of the missiles"
General Taylor's actual statement was "The best we can offer you is to destroy 90% of the known missiles."
(emphasis added) This is in the context of a discussion where it was stated that probably only 90% of the missiles
had been located.

Wrong: On Monday 22 October President Kennedy meets with congressional leaders before addressing the
nation. The meeting ends with congressional leaders telling him that Congress won't support him.
Most of the congressional leaders did support Kennedy at this meeting, although there was a minority faction that
criticized his handling of the situation.

Wrong: Starting on 23 October Kenny O'Donnell, on personal instructions from President Kennedy, begins
directly contacting each reconnaissance pilot before his flight. He advises each pilot that in the event of being
fired upon by forces in Cuba to conceal this from their military superiors.
It is both implausible and insulting to suggest that this could occur. Military pilots are personally responsible for
their aircraft and cannot falsify the nature of damage incurred on a mission. The number of ground crew members
involved in repairing such damage makes such a cover-up exceedingly difficult. Several pilots are on record as
having followed procedure and reported being fired upon.

Wrong: On Tuesday 23 October the U.S. conducts an H-bomb test on Johnston Island, which is condemned by
the U.S.S.R. The Kennedys discuss that the AEC should not have conducted the test due to its provocative nature.
The U.S. did not conduct any tests of thermonuclear weapons from 19 October to 26 October. The closest test to
the date here was an 8.3 megaton test by the U.S.S.R. in Novaya Zemlya. The U.S. conducted the following tests
at Johnston Island during the period of this movie: 1.6 mt on 18 Oct., 6 kt on 20 Oct., 300 kt on 26 Oct., 800 kt on
27 Oct., and 8.3 mt on 30 Oct. The U.S.S.R. conducted 6 tests in Kazakstan and 4 tests in Novaya Zemlya (the
largest being the one above).

Wrong: On Saturday 27 October U.S. leaders discuss the fact that they have just confirmed the Soviets have
nuclear-armed FROG missiles in Cuba. General insists that they can be successfully destroyed and pose no threat
to an invasion.
Soviet nuclear-armed FROGs, a battlefield nuclear weapon, were indeed in Cuba during the Crisis. However, U.S.
leaders apparently did not discuss their presence until 29 October, and they did not know for sure that they were
nuclear armed until 1992. During the Tripartite Conference over the Crisis of October, 1962, a conference
involving leaders from both superpowers, the U.S. team was stunned by this revelation from Soviet participants.